Misplaced Pages

#141858

108-406: The leader or representative of a rūnanga is sometimes referred to as Te Upoku o Te Rūnanga (literally "The head of the rūnanga"). The Rūnanga System (1861–1863) constituted a system of Māori self-government devised by Governor George Grey , to be comparable to the provinces . The plan was for them to be led by European commissioners. The system was never fully implemented and was cancelled due to

216-411: A certain ideal of perfection, either moral or non-moral, is the goal of rationality. According to the intuitionist perspective, something is rational "if and only if [it] conforms to self-evident truths, intuited by reason". These different perspectives diverge a lot concerning the behavior they prescribe. One problem for all of them is that they ignore the role of the evidence or information possessed by

324-400: A fundamental moral freedom but also as a necessary condition of political freedom and by extension the freedom and autonomy of any political structure . John Locke further developed this idea, arguing that genuine freedom requires cognitive self-discipline and self-government. He believed that man's capacity for self-governance is the source of all freedom. He believed that freedom is not

432-626: A means. Proceduralists hold that this is the only way a desire can be irrational. Substantivists, on the other hand, allow that noninstrumental desires may also be irrational. In this regard, a substantivist could claim that it would be irrational for Jack to lack his noninstrumental desire to be healthy. Similar debates focus on the rationality of emotions . Theoretical and practical rationality are often discussed separately and there are many differences between them. In some cases, they even conflict with each other. However, there are also various ways in which they overlap and depend on each other. It

540-466: A negative evaluation of the agent in terms of responsibility but remains silent on normative issues. On a competence-based account, which defines rationality in terms of the competence of responding to reasons, such behavior can be understood as a failure to execute one's competence. But sometimes we are lucky and we succeed in the normative dimension despite failing to perform competently, i.e. rationally, due to being irresponsible. The opposite can also be

648-404: A person believes in the axioms of Euclidean geometry and is nonetheless convinced that it is possible to square the circle . Positive coherence refers to the support that different mental states provide for each other. For example, there is positive coherence between the belief that there are eight planets in the solar system and the belief that there are less than ten planets in the solar system:

756-768: A possession but an action, that is, it is not something that you have but something you do. Locke proposes that rationality is the key to true agency and autonomy, and that political governance is enabled by the governing of one's own judgement . His political philosophy was a prominent influence on Immanuel Kant , and was later taken up in part by the Founding Fathers of the United States . The nature of self-governance, that freedom relies upon self-regulation, has further been explored by contemporary academics Gilles Deleuze , Michel Foucault , Judith Butler , William E. Connolly , and others. Self-governance

864-411: A proposition. Various theories of rationality assume some form of ideal rationality, for example, by demanding that rational agents obey all the laws and implications of logic . This can include the requirement that if the agent believes a proposition , they should also believe in everything that logically follows from this proposition. However, many theorists reject this form of logical omniscience as

972-493: A requirement for rationality. They argue that, since the human mind is limited, rationality has to be defined accordingly to account for how actual finite humans possess some form of resource-limited rationality. According to the position of bounded rationality , theories of rationality should take into account cognitive limitations, such as incomplete knowledge, imperfect memory, and limited capacities of computation and representation. An important research question in this field

1080-400: A substantive account of rationality in contrast to structural accounts. One important argument in favor of the normativity of rationality is based on considerations of praise- and blameworthiness. It states that we usually hold each other responsible for being rational and criticize each other when we fail to do so. This practice indicates that irrationality is some form of fault on the side of

1188-450: A way to adapt to the limitations of the human mind, especially in complex cases where these limitations make brute calculations impossible or very time- and resource-intensive. Most discussions and research in the academic literature focus on individual rationality. This concerns the rationality of individual persons, for example, whether their beliefs and actions are rational. But the question of rationality can also be applied to groups as

SECTION 10

#1732801861142

1296-406: A weaker criterion of coherence to avoid cases of necessary irrationality: rationality requires not to obey all norms of coherence but to obey as many norms as possible. So in rational dilemmas, agents can still be rational if they violate the minimal number of rational requirements. Another criticism rests on the claim that coherence-based accounts are either redundant or false. On this view, either

1404-400: A whole on the social level. This form of social or collective rationality concerns both theoretical and practical issues like group beliefs and group decisions. And just like in the individual case, it is possible to study these phenomena as well as the processes and structures that are responsible for them. On the social level, there are various forms of cooperation to reach a shared goal. In

1512-536: Is Hume's law , which states that one cannot deduce what ought to be based on what is. So just because a certain heuristic or cognitive bias is present in a specific case, it should not be inferred that it should be present. One approach to these problems is to hold that descriptive and normative theories talk about different types of rationality. This way, there is no contradiction between the two and both can be correct in their own field. Similar problems are discussed in so-called naturalized epistemology . Rationality

1620-651: Is a good reason for them and irrational otherwise. It is not clear in all cases what belongs to the domain of rational assessment. For example, there are disagreements about whether desires and emotions can be evaluated as rational and irrational rather than arational. The term "irrational" is sometimes used in a wide sense to include cases of arationality. The meaning of the terms "rational" and "irrational" in academic discourse often differs from how they are used in everyday language. Examples of behaviors considered irrational in ordinary discourse are giving into temptations , going out late even though one has to get up early in

1728-494: Is about how cognitive agents use heuristics rather than brute calculations to solve problems and make decisions. According to the satisficing heuristic, for example, agents usually stop their search for the best option once an option is found that meets their desired achievement level. In this regard, people often do not continue to search for the best possible option, even though this is what theories of ideal rationality commonly demand. Using heuristics can be highly rational as

1836-429: Is accepted that deductive reasoning in the form of modus ponens leads to rational beliefs. This claim can be investigated using methods like rational intuition or careful deliberation toward a reflective equilibrium . These forms of investigation can arrive at conclusions about what forms of thought are rational and irrational without depending on empirical evidence . An important question in this field concerns

1944-409: Is also the rational choice. This thought experiment indicates that rationality and normativity coincide since what is rational and what one ought to do depends on the agent's mind after all. Some theorists have responded to these thought experiments by distinguishing between normativity and responsibility . On this view, critique of irrational behavior, like the doctor prescribing drug B, involves

2052-425: Is based on the controversial claim that we can decide what to believe. It can take the form of epistemic decision theory , which states that people try to fulfill epistemic aims when deciding what to believe. A similar idea is defended by Jesús Mosterín . He argues that the proper object of rationality is not belief but acceptance . He understands acceptance as a voluntary and context-dependent decision to affirm

2160-462: Is between ideal rationality, which demands that rational agents obey all the laws and implications of logic, and bounded rationality , which takes into account that this is not always possible since the computational power of the human mind is too limited. Most academic discussions focus on the rationality of individuals. This contrasts with social or collective rationality, which pertains to collectives and their group beliefs and decisions. Rationality

2268-475: Is between negative and positive coherence. Negative coherence is an uncontroversial aspect of most such theories: it requires the absence of contradictions and inconsistencies . This means that the agent's mental states do not clash with each other. In some cases, inconsistencies are rather obvious, as when a person believes that it will rain tomorrow and that it will not rain tomorrow. In complex cases, inconsistencies may be difficult to detect, for example, when

SECTION 20

#1732801861142

2376-535: Is claimed that humans are rational animals , this usually refers to the ability to think and act in reasonable ways. It does not imply that all humans are rational all the time: this ability is exercised in some cases but not in others. On the other hand, the term can also refer to the process of reasoning that results from exercising this ability. Often many additional activities of the higher cognitive faculties are included as well, such as acquiring concepts, judging , deliberating , planning, and deciding as well as

2484-445: Is closely linked to the idea of self-governance because it emphasizes the importance of individuals and groups being able to take control of their own lives and to make decisions about their own future. It is also closely linked to the idea of autonomy, which refers to the ability of individuals and groups to make decisions for themselves, without external influence or control. The means of self-governance usually comprises some or all of

2592-642: Is discussed in a great variety of fields, often in very different terms. While some theorists try to provide a unifying conception expressing the features shared by all forms of rationality, the more common approach is to articulate the different aspects of the individual forms of rationality. The most common distinction is between theoretical and practical rationality. Other classifications include categories for ideal and bounded rationality as well as for individual and social rationality. The most influential distinction contrasts theoretical or epistemic rationality with practical rationality. Its theoretical side concerns

2700-416: Is either arational , if it is outside the domain of rational evaluation, or irrational , if it belongs to this domain but does not fulfill its standards. There are many discussions about the essential features shared by all forms of rationality. According to reason-responsiveness accounts, to be rational is to be responsive to reasons. For example, dark clouds are a reason for taking an umbrella , which

2808-544: Is important for solving all kinds of problems in order to efficiently reach one's goal. It is relevant to and discussed in many disciplines. In ethics , one question is whether one can be rational without being moral at the same time. Psychology is interested in how psychological processes implement rationality. This also includes the study of failures to do so, as in the case of cognitive biases . Cognitive and behavioral sciences usually assume that people are rational enough to predict how they think and act. Logic studies

2916-415: Is impossible to be rational, no matter which norm is privileged. Some defenders of coherence theories of rationality have argued that, when formulated correctly, the norms of rationality cannot enter into conflict with each other. That means that rational dilemmas are impossible. This is sometimes tied to additional non-trivial assumptions, such that ethical dilemmas also do not exist. A different response

3024-432: Is in tune with the agent's beliefs and realizes their desires. Externalists, on the other hand, see reasons as external factors about what is good or right. They state that whether an action is rational also depends on its actual consequences. The difference between the two positions is that internalists affirm and externalists reject the claim that rationality supervenes on the mind. This claim means that it only depends on

3132-404: Is necessary for true freedom. Plato believed that individuals or groups cannot achieve freedom unless they govern their own pleasures and desires, and instead will be in a state of enslavement. He states that self-mastery is the ability to be one's own master, it means being able to control one's own impulses and desires, rather than being controlled by them. Accordingly, this principle is not only

3240-414: Is no clear consensus on whether they belong to this domain or not. For example, concerning the rationality of desires, two important theories are proceduralism and substantivism. According to proceduralism, there is an important distinction between instrumental and noninstrumental desires . A desire is instrumental if its fulfillment serves as a means to the fulfillment of another desire. For example, Jack

3348-415: Is not just a philosophical concept but also a practical one. It can be seen in various forms such as self-regulation, self-control, self-management and self-leadership. It is an important concept in the fields of management, leadership, and governance, and is seen as a key to achieving personal and organizational goals. Self-governance can also be seen in the context of community and society, where it refers to

Rūnanga - Misplaced Pages Continue

3456-494: Is often argued that to be rational, the believer has to respond to the impressions or reasons presented by these sources. For example, the visual impression of the sunlight on a tree makes it rational to believe that the sun is shining. In this regard, it may also be relevant whether the formed belief is involuntary and implicit The second factor pertains to the norms and procedures of rationality that govern how agents should form beliefs based on this evidence. These norms include

3564-436: Is practically rational to take medicine if one has the desire to cure a sickness. But it is theoretically irrational to adopt the belief that one is healthy just because one desires this. This is a form of wishful thinking . In some cases, the demands of practical and theoretical rationality conflict with each other. For example, the practical reason of loyalty to one's child may demand the belief that they are innocent while

3672-436: Is rational depends on the agent's experience. Since different people make different experiences, there are differences in what is rational for them. Rationality is normative in the sense that it sets up certain rules or standards of correctness: to be rational is to comply with certain requirements. For example, rationality requires that the agent does not have contradictory beliefs. Many discussions on this issue concern

3780-457: Is rational to bring an umbrella if the agent has strong evidence that it is going to rain. But without this evidence, it would be rational to leave the umbrella at home, even if, unbeknownst to the agent, it is going to rain. These versions avoid the previous objection since rationality no longer requires the agent to respond to external factors of which they could not have been aware. A problem faced by all forms of reason-responsiveness theories

3888-512: Is related to something else. But there are disagreements as to what it has to be related to and in what way. For reason-based accounts, the relation to a reason that justifies or explains the rational state is central. For coherence-based accounts, the relation of coherence between mental states matters. There is a lively discussion in the contemporary literature on whether reason-based accounts or coherence-based accounts are superior. Some theorists also try to understand rationality in relation to

3996-406: Is sick and wants to take medicine to get healthy again. In this case, the desire to take the medicine is instrumental since it only serves as a means to Jack's noninstrumental desire to get healthy. Both proceduralism and substantivism usually agree that a person can be irrational if they lack an instrumental desire despite having the corresponding noninstrumental desire and being aware that it acts as

4104-414: Is sometimes claimed that theoretical rationality aims at truth while practical rationality aims at goodness . According to John Searle , the difference can be expressed in terms of " direction of fit ". On this view, theoretical rationality is about how the mind corresponds to the world by representing it. Practical rationality, on the other hand, is about how the world corresponds to the ideal set up by

4212-457: Is that "reason is the slave of the passions". This is often understood as the claim that rationality concerns only how to reach a goal but not whether the goal should be pursued at all. So people with perverse or weird goals may still be perfectly rational. This position is opposed by Kant, who argues that rationality requires having the right goals and motives . According to William Frankena there are four conceptions of rationality based on

4320-424: Is that rationality is relative to the person's perspective or mental states. Whether a belief or an action is rational usually depends on which mental states the person has. So carrying an umbrella for the walk to the supermarket is rational for a person believing that it will rain but irrational for another person who lacks this belief. According to Robert Audi , this can be explained in terms of experience : what

4428-499: Is that there are usually many reasons relevant and some of them may conflict with each other. So while salmonella contamination is a reason against eating the fish, its good taste and the desire not to offend the host are reasons in favor of eating it. This problem is usually approached by weighing all the different reasons. This way, one does not respond directly to each reason individually but instead to their weighted sum . Cases of conflict are thus solved since one side usually outweighs

Rūnanga - Misplaced Pages Continue

4536-550: Is the ability of a person or group to exercise all necessary functions of regulation without intervention from an external authority . It may refer to personal conduct or to any form of institution , such as family units , social groups , affinity groups , legal bodies , industry bodies , religions , and political entities of various degrees. Self-governance is closely related to various philosophical and socio-political concepts such as autonomy , independence , self-control , self-discipline , and sovereignty . In

4644-421: Is the case. But one can assess what is the case independently of knowing what should be done. So in this regard, one can study theoretical rationality as a distinct discipline independent of practical rationality but not the other way round. However, this independence is rejected by some forms of doxastic voluntarism. They hold that theoretical rationality can be understood as one type of practical rationality. This

4752-455: Is the quality of being guided by reasons or being reasonable. For example, a person who acts rationally has good reasons for what they do. This usually implies that they reflected on the possible consequences of their action and the goal it is supposed to realize. In the case of beliefs , it is rational to believe something if the agent has good evidence for it and it is coherent with the agent's other beliefs. While actions and beliefs are

4860-418: Is therefore a fundamental tenet of many democracies , republics and nationalist governments. Mohandas Gandhi 's term " swaraj " is a branch of this self-rule ideology. Henry David Thoreau was a major proponent of self-rule in lieu of immoral governments. This principle has been explored in philosophy for centuries, with figures in ancient Greek philosophy such as Plato positing that self-mastery

4968-467: Is to bite the bullet and allow that rational dilemmas exist. This has the consequence that, in such cases, rationality is not possible for the agent and theories of rationality cannot offer guidance to them. These problems are avoided by reason-responsiveness accounts of rationality since they "allow for rationality despite conflicting reasons but [coherence-based accounts] do not allow for rationality despite conflicting requirements". Some theorists suggest

5076-445: Is usually accepted, but many theorists have raised doubts that rationality can be identified with normativity. On this view, rationality may sometimes recommend suboptimal actions, for example, because the agent lacks important information or has false information. In this regard, discussions between internalism and externalism overlap with discussions of the normativity of rationality. An important implication of internalist conceptions

5184-452: Is usually understood as conservative in the sense that rational agents do not start from zero but already possess many beliefs and intentions. Reasoning takes place on the background of these pre-existing mental states and tries to improve them. This way, the original beliefs and intentions are privileged: one keeps them unless a reason to doubt them is encountered. Some forms of epistemic foundationalism reject this approach. According to them,

5292-501: Is why it is rational for an agent to do so in response. An important rival to this approach are coherence-based accounts, which define rationality as internal coherence among the agent's mental states. Many rules of coherence have been suggested in this regard, for example, that one should not hold contradictory beliefs or that one should intend to do something if one believes that one should do it. Goal-based accounts characterize rationality in relation to goals, such as acquiring truth in

5400-623: The New Zealand Wars . Rūnanga as a broad definition can be seen as the way groups make or attempt to make decisions. Māori groups and councils debate and discuss issues in a vast array of different ways which, while informed by the past, have changed greatly over the last century. This article related to the Māori people of New Zealand is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Self-government Self-governance , self-government , self-sovereignty , or self-rule

5508-657: The mind should work. Descriptive theories, on the other hand, investigate how the mind actually works. This includes issues like under which circumstances the ideal rules are followed as well as studying the underlying psychological processes responsible for rational thought. Descriptive theories are often investigated in empirical psychology while philosophy tends to focus more on normative issues. This division also reflects how different these two types are investigated. Descriptive and normative theorists usually employ different methodologies in their research. Descriptive issues are studied by empirical research . This can take

SECTION 50

#1732801861142

5616-491: The rules of inference discussed in regular logic as well as other norms of coherence between mental states. In the case of rules of inference, the premises of a valid argument offer support to the conclusion and make therefore the belief in the conclusion rational. The support offered by the premises can either be deductive or non-deductive . In both cases, believing in the premises of an argument makes it rational to also believe in its conclusion. The difference between

5724-443: The ability of individuals to take responsibility for their own actions and the actions of their community. Additionally, self-governance is also closely related to the concept of self-determination. Self-determination refers to the idea that individuals and groups have the right to govern themselves, to make decisions about their own lives and to determine their own future and political status without outside interference. This concept

5832-571: The absence of new evidence, it is rational to keep the mental states one already has. According to foundationalism, the burden of proof is always in favor of suspending mental states. For example, the agent reflects on their pre-existing belief that the Taj Mahal is in Agra but is unable to access any reason for or against this belief. In this case, conservatists think it is rational to keep this belief while foundationalists reject it as irrational due to

5940-513: The academic literature. The most influential distinction is between theoretical and practical rationality. Theoretical rationality concerns the rationality of beliefs. Rational beliefs are based on evidence that supports them. Practical rationality pertains primarily to actions. This includes certain mental states and events preceding actions, like intentions and decisions . In some cases, the two can conflict, as when practical rationality requires that one adopts an irrational belief. Another distinction

6048-491: The actually correct path goes right. Bernard Williams has criticized externalist conceptions of rationality based on the claim that rationality should help explain what motivates the agent to act. This is easy for internalism but difficult for externalism since external reasons can be independent of the agent's motivation. Externalists have responded to this objection by distinguishing between motivational and normative reasons . Motivational reasons explain why someone acts

6156-514: The agent does not need to respond to reasons in general, but only to reasons they have or possess. The success of such approaches depends a lot on what it means to have a reason and there are various disagreements on this issue. A common approach is to hold that this access is given through the possession of evidence in the form of cognitive mental states , like perceptions and knowledge . A similar version states that "rationality consists in responding correctly to beliefs about reasons". So it

6264-416: The agent should always choose the option with the highest expected value. However, calculating the expected value of each option may take a very long time in complex situations and may not be worth the trouble. This is reflected in the fact that actual reasoners often settle for an option that is good enough without making certain that it is really the best option available. A further difficulty in this regard

6372-489: The agent should change their plans and intentions. Theoretical rationality concerns the rationality of cognitive mental states, in particular, of beliefs. It is common to distinguish between two factors. The first factor is about the fact that good reasons are necessary for a belief to be rational. This is usually understood in terms of evidence provided by the so-called sources of knowledge , i.e. faculties like perception , introspection , and memory . In this regard, it

6480-645: The agent to be irrational, leading to a rational dilemma. For example, if terrorists threaten to blow up a city unless the agent forms an irrational belief, this is a very weighty reason to do all in one's power to violate the norms of rationality. An influential rival to the reason-responsiveness account understands rationality as internal coherence. On this view, a person is rational to the extent that their mental states and actions are coherent with each other. Diverse versions of this approach exist that differ in how they understand coherence and what rules of coherence they propose. A general distinction in this regard

6588-435: The agent. In this regard, it matters for rationality not just whether the agent acts efficiently towards a certain goal but also what information they have and how their actions appear reasonable from this perspective. Richard Brandt responds to this idea by proposing a conception of rationality based on relevant information: "Rationality is a matter of what would survive scrutiny by all relevant information." This implies that

SECTION 60

#1732801861142

6696-488: The arrangement of products in a supermarket can be rational if it is based on a rational plan. The term "rational" has two opposites: irrational and arational . Arational things are outside the domain of rational evaluation, like digestive processes or the weather. Things within the domain of rationality are either rational or irrational depending on whether they fulfill the standards of rationality. For example, beliefs, actions, or general policies are rational if there

6804-474: The case of theoretical rationality. Internalists believe that rationality depends only on the person's mind . Externalists contend that external factors may also be relevant. Debates about the normativity of rationality concern the question of whether one should always be rational. A further discussion is whether rationality requires that all beliefs be reviewed from scratch rather than trusting pre-existing beliefs. Various types of rationality are discussed in

6912-417: The case: bad luck may result in failure despite a responsible, competent performance. This explains how rationality and normativity can come apart despite our practice of criticizing irrationality. The concept of normativity can also be used to distinguish different theories of rationality. Normative theories explore the normative nature of rationality. They are concerned with rules and ideals that govern how

7020-526: The claim that, in order to respond to reasons, people have to be aware of them, i.e. they have some form of epistemic access. But lacking this access is not automatically irrational. In one example by John Broome , the agent eats a fish contaminated with salmonella , which is a strong reason against eating the fish. But since the agent could not have known this fact, eating the fish is rational for them. Because of such problems, many theorists have opted for an internalist version of this account. This means that

7128-508: The context of nation states , self-governance is called national sovereignty which is an important concept in international law . In the context of administrative division , a self-governing territory is called an autonomous region . Self-governance is also associated with political contexts in which a population or demographic becomes independent from colonial rule , absolute government , absolute monarchy , or any government that they perceive does not adequately represent them. It

7236-452: The different sets of rules they require. One problem with such coherence-based accounts of rationality is that the norms can enter into conflict with each other, so-called rational dilemmas . For example, if the agent has a pre-existing intention that turns out to conflict with their beliefs, then the enkratic norm requires them to change it, which is disallowed by the norm of persistence. This suggests that, in cases of rational dilemmas, it

7344-401: The earlier belief implies the latter belief. Other types of support through positive coherence include explanatory and causal connections. Coherence-based accounts are also referred to as rule-based accounts since the different aspects of coherence are often expressed in precise rules. In this regard, to be rational means to follow the rules of rationality in thought and action. According to

7452-428: The enkratic rule, for example, rational agents are required to intend what they believe they ought to do. This requires coherence between beliefs and intentions. The norm of persistence states that agents should retain their intentions over time. This way, earlier mental states cohere with later ones. It is also possible to distinguish different types of rationality, such as theoretical or practical rationality, based on

7560-459: The evidence linking them to the crime may demand a belief in their guilt on the theoretical level. But the two domains also overlap in certain ways. For example, the norm of rationality known as enkrasia links beliefs and intentions. It states that "[r]ationality requires of you that you intend to F if you believe your reasons require you to F". Failing to fulfill this requirement results in cases of irrationality known as akrasia or weakness of

7668-438: The fact that a food is healthy is a reason to eat it. So this reason makes it rational for the agent to eat the food. An important aspect of this interpretation is that it is not sufficient to merely act accidentally in accordance with reasons. Instead, responding to reasons implies that one acts intentionally because of these reasons. Some theorists understand reasons as external facts. This view has been criticized based on

7776-403: The field of actions but not of behavior in general. The difference between the two is that actions are intentional behavior, i.e. they are performed for a purpose and guided by it. In this regard, intentional behavior like driving a car is either rational or irrational while non-intentional behavior like sneezing is outside the domain of rationality. For various other practical phenomena, there

7884-523: The following: Rationality Rationality is the quality of being guided by or based on reason . In this regard, a person acts rationally if they have a good reason for what they do, or a belief is rational if it is based on strong evidence . This quality can apply to an ability, as in a rational animal , to a psychological process , like reasoning , to mental states , such as beliefs and intentions , or to persons who possess these other forms of rationality. A thing that lacks rationality

7992-400: The form of formal and informal fallacies is another cause of theoretical irrationality. All forms of practical rationality are concerned with how we act. It pertains both to actions directly as well as to mental states and events preceding actions, like intentions and decisions . There are various aspects of practical rationality, such as how to pick a goal to follow and how to choose

8100-406: The form of studies that present their participants with a cognitive problem. It is then observed how the participants solve the problem, possibly together with explanations of why they arrived at a specific solution. Normative issues, on the other hand, are usually investigated in similar ways to how the formal sciences conduct their inquiry. In the field of theoretical rationality, for example, it

8208-441: The formation of desires and intentions. These processes usually affect some kind of change in the thinker's mental states. In this regard, one can also talk of the rationality of mental states, like beliefs and intentions. A person who possesses these forms of rationality to a sufficiently high degree may themselves be called rational . In some cases, also non-mental results of rational processes may qualify as rational. For example,

8316-402: The goals it tries to achieve. They correspond to egoism , utilitarianism , perfectionism , and intuitionism . According to the egoist perspective, rationality implies looking out for one's own happiness . This contrasts with the utilitarian point of view, which states that rationality entails trying to contribute to everyone's well-being or to the greatest general good. For perfectionism,

8424-452: The goals it tries to realize. Other disputes in this field concern whether rationality depends only on the agent's mind or also on external factors, whether rationality requires a review of all one's beliefs from scratch, and whether we should always be rational. A common idea of many theories of rationality is that it can be defined in terms of reasons. On this view, to be rational means to respond correctly to reasons. For example,

8532-426: The lack of reasons. In this regard, conservatism is much closer to the ordinary conception of rationality. One problem for foundationalism is that very few beliefs, if any, would remain if this approach was carried out meticulously. Another is that enormous mental resources would be required to constantly keep track of all the justificatory relations connecting non-fundamental beliefs to fundamental ones. Rationality

8640-472: The laws of probability theory when assessing the likelihood of future events. This article focuses mainly on irrationality in the academic sense. The terms "rationality", " reason ", and "reasoning" are frequently used as synonyms. But in technical contexts, their meanings are often distinguished. Reason is usually understood as the faculty responsible for the process of reasoning. This process aims at improving mental states. Reasoning tries to ensure that

8748-422: The laws of correct arguments . These laws are highly relevant to the rationality of beliefs. A very influential conception of practical rationality is given in decision theory , which states that a decision is rational if the chosen option has the highest expected utility . Other relevant fields include game theory , Bayesianism , economics , and artificial intelligence . In its most common sense, rationality

8856-442: The means for reaching this goal. Other issues include the coherence between different intentions as well as between beliefs and intentions. Some theorists define the rationality of actions in terms of beliefs and desires. On this view, an action to bring about a certain goal is rational if the agent has the desire to bring about this goal and the belief that their action will realize it. A stronger version of this view requires that

8964-415: The mind and how it should be changed. Another difference is that arbitrary choices are sometimes needed for practical rationality. For example, there may be two equally good routes available to reach a goal. On the practical level, one has to choose one of them if one wants to reach the goal. It would even be practically irrational to resist this arbitrary choice, as exemplified by Buridan's ass . But on

9072-431: The morning, smoking despite being aware of the health risks, or believing in astrology . In the academic discourse, on the other hand, rationality is usually identified with being guided by reasons or following norms of internal coherence. Some of the earlier examples may qualify as rational in the academic sense depending on the circumstances. Examples of irrationality in this sense include cognitive biases and violating

9180-709: The most paradigmatic forms of rationality, the term is used both in ordinary language and in many academic disciplines to describe a wide variety of things, such as persons , desires , intentions , decisions , policies, and institutions. Because of this variety in different contexts, it has proven difficult to give a unified definition covering all these fields and usages. In this regard, different fields often focus their investigation on one specific conception, type, or aspect of rationality without trying to cover it in its most general sense. These different forms of rationality are sometimes divided into abilities , processes , mental states , and persons. For example, when it

9288-478: The norms of rationality obtain. It differs from rationality nonetheless since other psychological processes besides reasoning may have the same effect. Rationality derives etymologically from the Latin term rationalitas . There are many disputes about the essential characteristics of rationality. It is often understood in relational terms: something, like a belief or an intention, is rational because of how it

9396-466: The other hand, aims at non-epistemic goals, like moral , prudential, political, economic, or aesthetic goals. This is usually understood in the sense that rationality follows these goals but does not set them. So rationality may be understood as a " minister without portfolio " since it serves goals external to itself. This issue has been the source of an important historical discussion between David Hume and Immanuel Kant . The slogan of Hume's position

9504-453: The other. So despite the reasons cited in favor of eating the fish, the balance of reasons stands against it, since avoiding a salmonella infection is a much weightier reason than the other reasons cited. This can be expressed by stating that rational agents pick the option favored by the balance of reasons. However, other objections to the reason-responsiveness account are not so easily solved. They often focus on cases where reasons require

9612-400: The patient's death. The doctor's problem is that they cannot tell which of the drugs B and C results in a complete cure and which one in the patient's death. The objectively best case would be for the patient to get drug B, but it would be highly irresponsible for the doctor to prescribe it given the uncertainty about its effects. So the doctor ought to prescribe the less effective drug A, which

9720-408: The person's mind whether they are rational and not on external factors. So for internalism, two persons with the same mental states would both have the same degree of rationality independent of how different their external situation is. Because of this limitation, rationality can diverge from actuality. So if the agent has a lot of misleading evidence, it may be rational for them to turn left even though

9828-478: The premises make it more likely that the conclusion is true. In this case, it is usually demanded that the non-deductive support is sufficiently strong if the belief in the conclusion is to be rational. An important form of theoretical irrationality is motivationally biased belief, sometimes referred to as wishful thinking . In this case, beliefs are formed based on one's desires or what is pleasing to imagine without proper evidential support. Faulty reasoning in

9936-523: The question of what exactly these standards are. Some theorists characterize the normativity of rationality in the deontological terms of obligations and permissions . Others understand them from an evaluative perspective as good or valuable. A further approach is to talk of rationality based on what is praise- and blameworthy. It is important to distinguish the norms of rationality from other types of norms. For example, some forms of fashion prescribe that men do not wear bell-bottom trousers . Understood in

10044-456: The rationality of beliefs : whether it is rational to hold a given belief and how certain one should be about it. Practical rationality, on the other hand, is about the rationality of actions , intentions , and decisions . This corresponds to the distinction between theoretical reasoning and practical reasoning: theoretical reasoning tries to assess whether the agent should change their beliefs while practical reasoning tries to assess whether

10152-492: The relation between descriptive and normative approaches to rationality. One difficulty in this regard is that there is in many cases a huge gap between what the norms of ideal rationality prescribe and how people actually reason. Examples of normative systems of rationality are classical logic , probability theory , and decision theory . Actual reasoners often diverge from these standards because of cognitive biases , heuristics, or other mental limitations. Traditionally, it

10260-403: The responsible beliefs and desires are rational themselves. A very influential conception of the rationality of decisions comes from decision theory . In decisions, the agent is presented with a set of possible courses of action and has to choose one among them. Decision theory holds that the agent should choose the alternative that has the highest expected value . Practical rationality includes

10368-540: The rules recommend the same option as the balance of reasons or a different option. If they recommend the same option, they are redundant. If they recommend a different option, they are false since, according to its critics, there is no special value in sticking to rules against the balance of reasons. A different approach characterizes rationality in relation to the goals it aims to achieve. In this regard, theoretical rationality aims at epistemic goals, like acquiring truth and avoiding falsehood. Practical rationality, on

10476-424: The sense that rationality only depends on the reasons accessible to the agent or how things appear to them. What one ought to do, on the other hand, is determined by objectively existing reasons. In the ideal case, rationality and normativity may coincide but they come apart either if the agent lacks access to a reason or if he has a mistaken belief about the presence of a reason. These considerations are summed up in

10584-416: The statement that rationality supervenes only on the agent's mind but normativity does not. But there are also thought experiments in favor of the normativity of rationality. One, due to Frank Jackson , involves a doctor who receives a patient with a mild condition and has to prescribe one out of three drugs: drug A resulting in a partial cure, drug B resulting in a complete cure, or drug C resulting in

10692-415: The strongest sense, a norm prescribes what an agent ought to do or what they have most reason to do. The norms of fashion are not norms in this strong sense: that it is unfashionable does not mean that men ought not to wear bell-bottom trousers. Most discussions of the normativity of rationality are interested in the strong sense, i.e. whether agents ought always to be rational. This is sometimes termed

10800-528: The subject repeatedly reflects on all the relevant facts, including formal facts like the laws of logic. An important contemporary discussion in the field of rationality is between internalists and externalists . Both sides agree that rationality demands and depends in some sense on reasons. They disagree on what reasons are relevant or how to conceive those reasons. Internalists understand reasons as mental states, for example, as perceptions, beliefs, or desires. On this view, an action may be rational because it

10908-450: The subject that should not be the case. A strong counterexample to this position is due to John Broome , who considers the case of a fish an agent wants to eat. It contains salmonella, which is a decisive reason why the agent ought not to eat it. But the agent is unaware of this fact, which is why it is rational for them to eat the fish. So this would be a case where normativity and rationality come apart. This example can be generalized in

11016-469: The theoretical cases, a group of jurors may first discuss and then vote to determine whether the defendant is guilty. Or in the practical case, politicians may cooperate to implement new regulations to combat climate change . These forms of cooperation can be judged on their social rationality depending on how they are implemented and on the quality of the results they bear. Some theorists try to reduce social rationality to individual rationality by holding that

11124-463: The theoretical level, one does not have to form a belief about which route was taken upon hearing that someone reached the goal. In this case, the arbitrary choice for one belief rather than the other would be theoretically irrational. Instead, the agent should suspend their belief either way if they lack sufficient reasons. Another difference is that practical rationality is guided by specific goals and desires, in contrast to theoretical rationality. So it

11232-408: The two is given by how the premises support the conclusion. For deductive reasoning, the premises offer the strongest possible support: it is impossible for the conclusion to be false if the premises are true. The premises of non-deductive arguments also offer support for their conclusion. But this support is not absolute: the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Instead,

11340-554: The way they do while normative reasons explain why someone ought to act in a certain way. Ideally, the two overlap, but they can come apart. For example, liking chocolate cake is a motivational reason for eating it while having high blood pressure is a normative reason for not eating it. The problem of rationality is primarily concerned with normative reasons. This is especially true for various contemporary philosophers who hold that rationality can be reduced to normative reasons. The distinction between motivational and normative reasons

11448-431: The whole system of beliefs is to be justified by self-evident beliefs. Examples of such self-evident beliefs may include immediate experiences as well as simple logical and mathematical axioms . An important difference between conservatism and foundationalism concerns their differing conceptions of the burden of proof . According to conservativism, the burden of proof is always in favor of already established belief: in

11556-466: The will . Another form of overlap is that the study of the rules governing practical rationality is a theoretical matter. And practical considerations may determine whether to pursue theoretical rationality on a certain issue as well as how much time and resources to invest in the inquiry. It is often held that practical rationality presupposes theoretical rationality. This is based on the idea that to decide what should be done, one needs to know what

11664-447: Was often assumed that actual human reasoning should follow the rules described in normative theories. On this view, any discrepancy is a form of irrationality that should be avoided. However, this usually ignores the human limitations of the mind. Given these limitations, various discrepancies may be necessary (and in this sense rational ) to get the most useful results. For example, the ideal rational norms of decision theory demand that

#141858