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137-630: In their work, Anderson and McVey theorized that neither the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) nor President Sukarno took part in organizing the operation; instead, they became the victims. On the basis of the material available, they proposed that the coup was indeed an "internal army affair" as was claimed by the September 30 Movement to remove members of the Indonesian Army General Staff who allegedly worked with

274-521: A Maphilindo confederation (an idea introduced by Philippine president Diosdado Macapagal . The PKI rejected Maphilindo; party militants entered Malaysian Borneo, fighting the British , Malaysian, Australian , and New Zealand forces there. Although some groups reached the Malay Peninsula , planning to join the struggle there, most were captured on arrival. Most PKI combat units were active in

411-421: A 1961 graduate and research fellow at the university's Center for International Studies, to gather information on the coup. Using Cornell's collection of national and provincial Indonesian newspapers and by listening to radio broadcasts from the country, Anderson and McVey began writing their findings and analysis. A "very tentative" 162-page summary and analysis of the events was completed on January 10, 1966, and

548-412: A complete briefing of the coup and the events leading up to it. In a private meeting with Kahin, Anderson, McVey, and Bunnell, the delegation promised that it would promptly deliver documents requested for the past eight years after returning to Jakarta. On November 27, 1976, a delegation of Moerdani's men arrived with over 200 pounds of trial records of alleged conspirators of the coup but did not provide

685-525: A coup. The PKI demanded a ban on the Murba Party, which was imposed by Sukarno in early 1965. In the context of Konfrontasi with Malaysia, the PKI called for arming the people. Large sectors of the army were opposed to this, and Sukarno remained officially noncommittal. In July, about 2,000 PKI members began military training near Halim Air Force Base ; the concept of arming the people had won support among

822-571: A diplomatic approach by persuading the PRRI soldiers to surrender and return to loyalty to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. This event is called Operation Callback. On May 29, 1961, Ahmad Husein officially surrendered along with around 24,500 of his followers. Furthermore, the government granted amnesty to civilian and military elements who had been involved in the PRRI. The amnesty

959-409: A hundred PKI members. Between 100,000 and two million Indonesians were killed in the mass killings that followed. The victims included non-Communists who were slain because of mistaken identity or guilt by association. Although a lack of information makes it impossible to pinpoint an exact casualty figure, many scholars today suggest that the figure is at least 500,000. According to a CIA study of

1096-694: A joint front, the People's Democratic Front , in February 1948. Although the front did not last, the Socialist Party later merged with the PKI; by this time, the Pesindo militias were under PKI control. On 11 August 1948, Musso returned to Jakarta after twelve years in the Soviet Union . The PKI politburo was reconstructed, and included D. N. Aidit , M. H. Lukman , and Njoto . After signing

1233-519: A junior partner in the Sukarno policy was institutionalized; the PKI welcomed Nasakom, seeing it as a multi-class united front. Although the PKI supported Sukarno, it retained its political autonomy; in March 1960, the party denounced the president's undemocratic handling of the budget. On 8 July of that year, Harian Rakyat carried an article critical of the government. The PKI leadership was arrested by

1370-405: A non-Communist power in the interest of promoting a local revolution with dubious prospects". The final suggested motivation was that the PKI, in its Communist beliefs, was "driven by an overweening ambition and a congenital need to express itself in violence", which the authors asserted as "mythological" rather than "analytical". Anderson and McVey further disputed these proposals by reasoning that

1507-481: A number of supporters in the Indonesian Air Force , the officers decided to utilize Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force Base as the location to which Sukarno would be evacuated. Additionally, they enlisted the help of Communist radical youths in order to secure military installations across the city. Anderson and McVey theorized that the night of Thursday, September 30, was chosen for the operation because it

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1644-672: A number of sympathizers throughout several military branches inside and outside the capital city, including Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri of the presidential guard. Fueled by rumors that members of the General Staff had been working with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency , a group of officers from the Diponegoro Division plotted to conduct a series of raids to kidnap members of the General Staff to either be held as hostages or killed. They believed that President Sukarno , whom Untung would warn of an impending coup by

1781-748: A preemptive move must be guaranteed that the information was accurate. If Sukarno did not die immediately following the coup, an alliance between the President and the military would prove disastrous for the party. Secondly, it was suggested that the Communist government of the People's Republic of China had pressured the PKI to undertake the operation after coming in conflict with the PKI's peaceful methods of gaining popular support. Anderson and McVey argued that "the Chinese have not been risk-takers, not have they been inclined to sacrifice promising relations with

1918-696: A quick victory in preventing the destruction of the Caltex oil fields and refinery in Pekanbaru by the PRRI forces. That attack also laid bare that the PRRI was receiving military aid from the United States, given the large amount of US-made equipment abandoned by the PRRI forces which had taken flight. The United States Government, especially the CIA (see CIA activities in Indonesia ) had covertly supported

2055-604: A result of these divisions, the revolution was postponed in June 1926. However, a limited revolt in Batavia (as Jakarta was then known) began out on 12 November; similar revolts took place in Padang, Bantam and Surabaya . The Batavia revolt was crushed in a day or two, and the others were quashed in a few weeks. As a result of the failed revolution, 13,000 people were arrested, 4,500 imprisoned, 1,308 interned , and 823 exiled to

2192-506: A result, communist thoughts and ISDV agents were successfully planted in the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. After the involuntary departure of several Dutch cadres, combined with the infiltration operations, the membership shifted from majority-Dutch to majority-Indonesian. At its 23 May 1920 congress in Semarang , the ISDV changed its name to Perserikatan Komunis di Hindia (PKH;

2329-565: A revolution to overthrow the Dutch colonial government. At a conference in Prambanan , Central Java , communist-controlled trade unions decided that the revolution would start with a strike by railroad workers which would then trigger a general strike; after that, the PKI would replace the colonial government. The planned revolution would begin in Padang , but a government-security clampdown at

2466-636: A series of militant strikes in August 1951 which were followed by clamp-downs in Medan and Jakarta, and the party leadership briefly went underground . Also under Aidit, the PKI began to consider the possibility of cooperation with the Indonesian National Party (PNI) to overthrow the Masyumi -led cabinet of Mohammad Natsir . The PKI favoured Sukarno's plans for Guided Democracy before

2603-399: A vastly superior military force and might have thrown the President into alliance with the army". According to Anderson and McVey, they were presented with three possible motivations if this theory were true. The first was that the PKI had received information of Sukarno 's failing health and feared that the military would purge the party after his death. However, the authors believed that such

2740-403: A violent uprising, which provided a pretext to clamp down on the PKI. It was claimed by army sources that the PKI had announced the proclamation of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia on 18 September, with Musso as president and Amir Sjarifuddin as prime minister. At the same time, however, the PKI had denounced the uprising and appealed for calm. The uprising was suppressed by republican troops, and

2877-450: A well. The generals' killers announced the following morning that a new Revolutionary Council had seized power, calling themselves the " 30 September Movement " ("G30S"). With much of the army's top leadership dead or missing, General Suharto took control of the army and put down the abortive coup by 2 October. The army quickly blamed the coup attempt on the PKI, and began an Indonesia-wide anti-Communist propaganda campaign. Evidence linking

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3014-413: Is a time of the week when, "in universal Javanese belief, magical forces are abroad, and spiritual strength and support most readily obtained". They further discovered evidence that at least two "prominent leaders" other than Sukarno were evacuated to Halim Perdanakusuma: Air Force Commander Omar Dani and PKI Chairman Dipa Nusantara Aidit . Anderson and McVey suggested that Aidit's presence would "prove to

3151-651: Is unfair to the new student generation, to emergent scholars, and to the students participating in the Modern Indonesia Project who have had nothing to do with the Paper. In order to clear any misconception of the findings and to allow readers to assess the paper independently, it was finally published in its entirety by the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project in 1971. In observing the unstable political climate of Indonesia since

3288-496: The Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia (APRI or nicknamed "tentara pusat/the central army") conducted a joint operation consisting of Army , Navy , and Air force . The operation that was carried out was Operation Tegas  [ id ] , Operation 17 Agustus , Operation Saptamarga  [ id ] , Operation Sadar  [ id ] , Operation merdeka  [ id ] In

3425-585: The Boven-Digoel camp in the Digul region of Western New Guinea ; several people died in captivity. Many non-communist political activists were also targeted by colonial authorities under the pretext of suppressing the communist rebellion, and the party was outlawed by the Dutch East Indies government in 1927. The PKI went underground, and Dutch (and, later, Japanese) surveillance ensured that it

3562-750: The Central All-Indonesian Workers Organization (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), People's Youth (Pemuda Rakjat), the Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia), the Peasants Front of Indonesia (Barisan Tani Indonesia), the Institute of People's Culture ( Lembaga Kebudajaan Rakjat ) and the Association of Indonesian Scholars (Himpunan Sardjana Indonesia). At its peak,

3699-559: The Indonesian Army . Compared to neighboring West Java and East Java , the region of Central Java , where the Diponegoro Division was headquartered, experienced a more traditional culture. Because the region "has been for centuries the seat of political power in Java", residents believed that its position "has been usurped by Djakarta ". This inequality resulted in a hostility between officers who held traditional Javanese values and

3836-683: The October Revolution in Russia as an inspiration for a similar uprising in Indonesia. The organization gained momentum among Dutch settlers in the archipelago. Red Guards were formed, numbering 3,000 within three months. In late 1917, soldiers and sailors at the Surabaya naval base revolted and established soviets . Colonial authorities suppressed the Surabaya soviets and the ISDV, whose Dutch leaders (including Sneevliet) were deported to

3973-540: The Renville Agreement in 1948, many of the republican armed units returned from zones of conflict; this gave the Indonesian republicans some confidence that they would be able to counter the PKI militarily. Guerrilla units and militias under PKI influence were ordered to disband. In Madiun , a group of PKI military which refused to disarm were countered in September of that year; the confrontations sparked

4110-649: The Vietnam War I was abruptly pulled back into the orbit of Indonesia [...] To my surprise, the radio official informed me that shortly before he'd left the station [...] a report had come in that there had been a military coup in Indonesia [...] I had not been closely following events in Indonesia, but, even if I had, I would have been utterly surprised at this turn of events in a country that I thought I knew reasonably well. When Kahin returned to Cornell, graduate students and Indonesia specialists Benedict Anderson and Frederick Bunnell had begun working with Ruth McVey ,

4247-542: The West New Guinea dispute as Indonesia was able to escalate tensions in the dispute by threatening overt conflict. Another important aspect was the influence of this event on the large exodus of Minangkabau people from Sumatra to other regions in Indonesia, along with the large psychological effects that stem from the attached stigma of being a rebel, despite the Minangkabau's determined resistance against

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4384-467: The "Cornell Paper" has been subject to further analysis and revision. At approximately 7:15 a.m. local time on October 1, 1965, an announcement was made over the airwaves of Radio Republik Indonesia in the capital city of Jakarta that the self-proclaimed September 30 Movement overnight prevented a coup d'état attempt by the Council of Generals, an alleged "subversive movement" sponsored by

4521-461: The 'Cornell Paper'." As late as 1969, at Boston, at the meeting of the Association of Asian Studies and the newly formed Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, panels on the September 30 affair were held in which none of the participants cited the "Cornell Paper", although we can again fairly assume that they were all cognizant of its existence. The failure to bring this situation into the open

4658-434: The (admittedly always fragile) logic of probabilities indicate that the coup of October 1, 1965, was neither the work of the PKI [ Communist Party of Indonesia ] nor of Sukarno himself. Though both were deeply involved, it was after the coup plans were well under way. They were more the victims than the initiators of events. The PKI was entangled before it knew what was happening; Sukarno mistakenly attempted to take advantage of

4795-541: The 1955 election, and actively supported him. The party finished fourth in the election, with 16 percent of the vote and nearly two million members. It won 39 seats (out of 257), and 80 out of 514 in the Constituent Assembly . Almost 30 percent of the votes in East Java were cast for the PKI. Opposition to continued Dutch control of Irian Jaya was often raised by the party during the decade, and

4932-533: The Affair ha[d] yet appeared". In his 1978 book, National University of Malaysia scholar Harold Crouch found that "the testimony of PKI leaders at the [Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa] (Special Military Court) trials as well as the opinions expressed by PKI émigré groups in Europe and elsewhere made the 'Cornell' thesis very difficult to defend in its original form". In reviewing these testimonies, Crouch asserted that

5069-651: The Air Force and the Navy. On 8 September, PKI demonstrators began a two-day siege of the U.S. consulate in Surabaya . Aidit addressed a PKI rally on 14 September, urging members to be alert for things to come. On 30 September, Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani (both PKI-associated organizations) held a mass rally in Jakarta to protest the inflation crisis. During the night of 30 September and 1 October 1965, six of Indonesia's top army generals were killed and their bodies thrown down

5206-737: The American Government for arms to combat the rebel commands. The Americans, however, had declined the Indonesian request, forcing the Indonesians to approach the Soviet Union for assistance. The Soviet Union thus became a major supplier of arms to the Indonesian Government, allowing Indonesia to rapidly modernize its armed forces into one of the strongest in Southeast Asia. This had follow on effects in

5343-661: The Army General Staff, would be persuaded to support the Diponegoro coup group while the Army was "too decimated in its top leadership to do anything but acquiesce". The officers understood that "the one occasion in the year when Diponegoro troops could legitimately be in Djakarta was the annual parade and demonstration put on by paratroop, cavalry, armor and other units for Armed Forces Day October 5". After securing

5480-519: The Army remained loyal to the President. He eventually agreed to give Major General Suharto "sole responsibility for restoring security and order". By October 5, the Army had ended all resistance movements in Central Java. [...] We the People can fully comprehend what Lt. Col. Untung has asserted in carrying out his patriotic movement. But however the case may be, this is an internal Army affair. On

5617-573: The Army's account during his visit to California in 1967. The foreword to the publication stated that it was written in response to "a campaign waged by certain circles in Western countries against the New Order government". The work itself argued that the coup attempt was not an internal military affair after taking into account the testimonies of PKI members made during a series of military trials. When Kahin visited Indonesia in June 1967, he met with

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5754-430: The Army's success in blaming the PKI was "both because of actual PKI involvement, however confused, and because all groups now in power wish to believe it, since for years they lived in growing fear of a possible PKI takeover". To conclude their observations of the events of and following the coup, Anderson and McVey asserted, "It is not the place here to go into the details of the anti-Communist campaign which developed in

5891-592: The Banteng Council in Bukittinggi were detained, including Minister of Agriculture Eny Karim . The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia formed a cabinet for the revolutionary government, with Sjafruddin Prawiranegara being named as both its prime minister and finance minister. The composition was as follows: Despite the various stakeholders who had appeared to all be on

6028-585: The Communist Union of the Indies). Semaun became party chairman, and Darsono the vice-chairman. Its highest committee members were predominantly Dutch. During this time, communist sympathizers were still considered part of Sarekat Islam itself. In the period leading up to the Sarekat Islam's sixth congress in 1921, members affiliated with the central branch in Batavia decided to attempt to purge

6165-542: The Communists had organized the coup attempt by Untung and his group. Anderson and McVey noted that the Harian Rakjat "prided itself on well written and cogently argued editorials", but the editorial in question "is no gem of style or clarity". They believed that the "foolish hesitant editorial" provided the Army an opportunity to place the blame of the coup on the PKI. Since the coup, Anderson and McVey noted that

6302-428: The Dutch colonial system and the fact that many pre-Independence nationalistic leaders had hailed from Sumatra. In addition to the violence committed against the local community during and after the conflict period, the humiliation and trauma of the defeat had also rocked the self-esteem and dignity of the Minangkabau people. This was especially stark In an interview with Harun Zaid, where he said "What had an impact on me

6439-502: The Dutch, President Sukarno was concerned that the party's growing influence would eventually threaten his position. Because the PKI's growth troubled the right-wing sectors of Indonesian society and some foreign powers (especially the vigorously anti-communist United States ), its relationship with the other forces also fighting for independence was generally difficult. The PKI and the Socialist Party (Partai Sosialis) formed

6576-479: The ISDV was formed. At this point, the association had about 100 members; only three were Indonesians, and it rapidly took a radically anti-capitalist direction. When Sneevliet moved the ISDV's headquarters from Surabaya to Semarang , the ISDV began attracting many Indonesians from like-minded movements which had been growing throughout the Dutch Indies since 1900. The ISDV became increasingly incompatible with

6713-608: The Netherlands. Around the same time, the ISDV and communist sympathizers began infiltrating other political groups in the East Indies in a tactic known as the "block within" strategy. The most apparent effect was the infiltration committed on a nationalist-religious organization Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) which advocated a pan-islam stance and freedom from colonial rule. Many members including Semaun and Darsono were successfully influenced by radical leftist ideas. As

6850-454: The PKI an opportunity to profile itself as a national party. By the mid 1950s, the PKI had a reputation of being one of the least corrupt parties in Indonesia. Officials in the US were becoming concerned that it might be difficult to defeat the PKI in elections, as they were well organized and spoke to the needs of the people. Said Richard Nixon , vice president at the time: "a democratic government

6987-401: The PKI in 1965, it was a legal party operating openly in the country. Accused of responsibility for the 1965 army-led coup attempt , the party was banned by General Suharto in March 1966. The Indies Social Democratic Association ( Dutch : Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging , ISDV) was founded in 1914 by Dutch socialist Henk Sneevliet and another Indies socialist. The 85-member ISDV

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7124-418: The PKI minister Njoto was in attendance. A resolution denouncing G30S was passed, and Njoto was arrested immediately after the meeting. A mass demonstration was held in Jakarta two days later demanding a ban on the PKI, and the party's main office was burned down. On 13 October, Ansor Youth Movement (the youth wing of Nahdlatul Ulama ) held anti-PKI rallies across Java . Five days later, Ansor killed about

7261-615: The PKI office in Jakarta experienced a grenade attack in July 1957. The party made advances in municipal elections that month, and in September the Islamist Masyumi Party demanded that the PKI be banned. On 3 December, trade unions largely under PKI control began seizing Dutch-owned companies. These seizures paved the way for the nationalization of foreign-owned businesses. The struggle against foreign capitalism gave

7398-413: The PKI to the generals' assassinations is inconclusive, leading to speculation that their involvement was very limited or that Suharto organised the events (in whole or in part) and scapegoated the communists. In the ensuing violent anti-communist purge , an estimated 500,000 communists (real and suspected) were killed and the PKI effectively eliminated. General Suharto outmaneuvered Sukarno politically and

7535-434: The PKI undoubtedly took part in the events of 1965, but "the circumstances and extent of its involvement are still unclear". Communist Party of Indonesia Former parties Former parties Former parties The Communist Party of Indonesia ( Indonesian : Partai Komunis Indonesia , PKI ) was a communist party in the Dutch East Indies and later Indonesia . It was the largest non-ruling communist party in

7672-480: The PKI was not banned and continued to function; its reconstruction began in 1949. During the 1950s, the party began publishing again; its main publications were Harian Rakyat and Bintang Merah , as well as quarterly journal PKI dan Perwakilan . In January 1951, during the meeting of the Central Committee, D. N. Aidit was chosen General Secretary. Under Aidit, the PKI grew rapidly—from 3,000–5,000 in 1950 to 165,000 in 1954 and 1.5 million in 1959. The PKI led

7809-459: The PKI, which had built a positive image under the leadership of Dipa Nusantara Aidit , would not have gambled its position for the possibility of failure. The second alternative to Anderson's and McVey's interpretation was that, instead of masterminding the operation, "[the PKI] played a role at one remove—by persuading the President, directly or indirectly, to attempt the removal en masse of his and their military enemies". The primary planning of

7946-429: The PKI. A tribunal held in the Hague in 2016 concluded the massacres were crimes against humanity , and the U.S. backed the Indonesian military "knowing well that they were embarked upon a programme of mass killings". Declassified U.S. diplomatic cables released in 2017 corroborate this. According to UCLA historian Geoffrey B. Robinson, the Indonesian army's campaign of mass killings would not have occurred without

8083-478: The PRRI and bombing key infrastructure in Sumatra. 1,031 dead full government source: Total: 3,702 killed, 5,228 wounded, 1,242 missing 6,115 dead 24,500 surrender full government source: 5,592 civilians killed 3,834 civilians wounded 2,472 civilians missing (include casualties in PRRI and Permesta rebellion) The central government saw PRRI as a separatist movement that had to be crushed by force of arms. The central government through

8220-443: The PRRI on 17 February 1958. Prior to the establishment of the PRRI, there were several "rebellions" led by the various regional Army commanders in Sumatra. These events were the result of growing dissatisfaction with the Central Government and Indonesia's faltering economic development. The Central Government was seen by some in the outer islands (i.e. outside of Java) as disconnected from the Indonesian people. Some Army commands in

8357-424: The President that the PKI was inextricably compromised in the affair, and therefore that if he wished to preserve his 'leftward course', [...] he had no alternative but to come out" against the Council of Generals. Anderson and McVey emphasized that in the announcement made on the morning of October 1, "Untung repeatedly stressed that the September 30th Movement was purely and simply an internal Army affair". As such,

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8494-449: The Republic of Indonesia The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia ( Indonesian : Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia , abbr. PRRI ) was a revolutionary government set up in Sumatra to oppose the central government of Indonesia in 1958. Although frequently referred to as the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, the Permesta rebels were a separate movement in Sulawesi , that had pledged allegiance with

8631-402: The SDAP leadership in the Netherlands , who distanced themselves from the association and began to equate them with Volksraad (People's Council). A reformist faction of the ISDV broke away and formed the Indies Social Democratic Party in 1917. The ISDV began Soeara Merdeka ( The Voice of Freedom ), its first Indonesian-language publication, that year. Later on, the ISDV saw the events of

8768-467: The Soviet Union and began to organize the labor unions into a single organization. In September, the Union of Indonesian Labour Organizations (Persatuan Vakbonded Hindia) was formed. At the Fifth Comintern Congress in 1924, it was emphasized that "the top priority of communist parties is to gain control of trades unions"; there could be no successful revolution without this. The PKH began to concentrate on unions, decided to improve discipline, and demanded

8905-455: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency . By the end of the following week, the movement had been crushed by forces of Major General Suharto , who was charged with the sole responsibility of restoring order. Several alternatives to their theory were also presented and disputed, including the official government account that the PKI had masterminded the coup attempt. Although the paper was intended to be kept confidential, information on its existence

9042-434: The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency . Led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri of the Tjakrabirawa, the Presidential Guard, the movement arrested members of the Council of Generals and assumed control of media and communication outlets. It also claimed to have President Sukarno under its protection. Untung then declared the creation of the Indonesian Revolution Council, composed of civilian and military personnel to support

9179-419: The actions of the central army are running out of control. APRI soldiers committed acts of violence. Thousands of people suspected of being PRRI sympathizers were arbitrarily arrested. Actions of mass killings occurred in a number of places. Under the Jam Gadang , APRI killed around 187 people by shooting. Only 17 of that number were PRRI soldiers, while the rest were civilians. The corpses were then lined up in

9316-410: The army, but was later released in accordance with Sukarno's orders. When an independent Malaysia was conceived, it was rejected by the PKI and the Malayan Communist Party . With growing popular support and a membership of about three million by 1965, the PKI was the strongest communist party outside China and the republics of the Soviet Union . The party had a firm base in mass organizations such as

9453-413: The beginning of 1926 which ended the right to assembly and led to the arrest of PKI members forced the party to go deeper underground. Dissention among PKI leaders about the timing and course of the revolution resulted in poor planning. Tan Malaka , the Comintern's agent for Southeast Asia and Australia , did not agree with the plot (partly because he believed that the PKI had insufficient mass support). As

9590-412: The border regions of Borneo . In January 1964, the PKI began confiscating British property owned by British companies in Indonesia. During the mid-1960s, the United States Department of State estimated party membership at about two million (3.8 percent of Indonesia's working-age population). Sukarno's balancing act with the PKI, the military, nationalist factions, and Islamic groups was threatened by

9727-427: The case that Sukarno wanted to remove his opposition, "surely more generals would have been taken care of, particularly Suharto and [ Umar Wirahadikusumah ]". We thought it important to circulate this interpretation even in its present incomplete state because the sponsorship we assign to the coup is not one that has usually been considered; and we feared that if we waited until a definitive history could be undertaken

9864-430: The civilian movement to prevent its coup attempt from being thwarted by the Army, Anderson and McVey then believed Sukarno must have been a key figure. This was the final alternative, in which the President acted spontaneously after being spurred by Untung and his men to act against the Army General Staff without his knowing that rumors of an impending coup were false. Again, Anderson and McVey disputed this theory because in

10001-504: The communists as the only active extremist organization. In 1922, whilst Semaun was attending Far Eastern Labour Conference in Moscow , Tan Malaka tried to turn a strike by government pawnshop workers into a national strike by all Indonesian labor unions. The plot failed and Malaka was arrested, given a choice between internal or external exile; he chose the latter and left for the Soviet Union . In May, Semaun returned after seven months in

10138-453: The contents of "a study of recent Indonesian events by a group of scholars at Cornell University". Several days later, the Post published a letter from Kahin criticizing Kraft for going "considerably beyond a discussion of the events of early October to speculate on more recent developments". He explained that the paper was a "tentative attempt [...] to reconstruct the confusing events surrounding

10275-664: The coup attempt was a Communist plot". In 1967, Guy Pauker, an analyst of Indonesian affairs for the RAND Corporation informed the Army of the existence of the "Cornell Paper" and its proposed theories. According to University of Melbourne scholar Katharine E. McGregor, the U.S. government-sponsored RAND Corporation "clearly acted to help the New Order regime defend its version of the coup and hence its legitimacy". In conjunction with Lieutenant Colonel Ismail Saleh and Pauker, Nugroho worked to publish an English version of

10412-535: The coup" and "neither discussed nor hazarded judgment on any subsequent events". According to Kahin, the paper was frequently "misquoted, doctored , and misrepresented". Scholars and journalists who requested copies of the study from Cornell were turned down, but several received a four-page document titled Hypothesis on the Origin of the Coup Analysis and mistook it for the actual paper. Alternative versions of

10549-538: The courtyard of the Clock Tower. From mid-April 1958 to 1960, all junior and senior high schools were closed. Andalas University , which had only been running for two years, was forced to close because almost all of its lecturers and students joined PRRI. Towards the end of 1960, the entire area of West Sumatra was under the control of the APRI army. Abdul Haris Nasution noted that PRRI military operations claimed

10686-457: The dissident Army Councils for almost twelve months, promptly began preparations to militarily defeat the PRRI. The rebels had virtually no chance of success given the overwhelming superiority of the government forces. In addition, the military experience possessed by General Nasution, who was leading the government military forces, far exceeded that of Lieutenant Colonel Husein. The government military campaign that commenced on 12 March 1958 scored

10823-480: The early stages of the military operation, government administration activities were paralyzed, officials and employees fled in order to save themselves. To revive the government, the central government divided Central Sumatra into three provinces, one of which was West Sumatra. On May 17, 1958, Kaharuddin Datuk Rangkayo Basa was appointed as the first Governors of West Sumatra . On the other hand,

10960-485: The end of the CIA's program of covert support to the PRRI, with the US shifting its support back towards Sukarno and the Central Government as the anticipated victor from the conflict. Although the conflict dragged on over the next three years, the government forces were successful in pushing the PRRI into the jungle and mountains, and retook several strongholds, including Kototinggi where the PRRI leadership

11097-466: The establishment of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia. The party name was changed again that year, to Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia). In a May 1925 plenary session , the Comintern executive committee ordered the Indonesian communists to form an anti-imperialist coalition with non-communist, nationalist organizations; extremist elements led by Alimin and Musso called for

11234-408: The establishment of the PRRI. The lack of alienation from the political order of that time also meant that there was no real support or traction on the ground at all for such an open rebellion. Giving no slack to the PRRI, the Central Government in Jakarta also moved decisively against the PRRI, arresting several of the named cabinet ministers, discharging from service military commanders who supported

11371-415: The events despite the limited amount of access to information. In his view, Anderson's and McVey's work "contains a number of important insights and a considerable amount of significant data which other writers have not taken into account". In the opening paragraph of the synopsis of the study's results, Anderson and McVey outlined their tentative conclusions: The weight of the evidence so far assembled and

11508-498: The events in Indonesia, "In terms of the numbers killed the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century". The United States played a significant role in the killings , supplying economic, technical and military aid to the Indonesian military when the killings began and providing "kill lists" (via the U.S. embassy in Jakarta) with the names of thousands of suspected high-ranking members of

11645-481: The events of 1965 , Kahin wrote in the preface to the publication, "It will probably be some time yet before a reasonably comprehensive and sound analysis can be written." Under the direction of Nugroho Notosusanto of the Armed Forces History Centre, Indonesia published in 1966 its first account of the coup, "which was largely a consolidated version of Army propaganda setting out 'proof' that

11782-461: The events of October 1, 1965, was that of "a coup which would bring the Communists to power". It was used by the Indonesian military to blame the PKI (and, in some cases, foreign minister Subandrio ) for attempting to create a puppet government that would eventually give way to PKI control. However, Anderson and McVey expressed their doubts that the PKI would consider using violence as a course of action as it "would have involved pitting itself against

11919-453: The events were caused by panic and political uncertainty. Part of the anti-Communist force responsible for the massacres consisted of members of the criminal underworld who were given permission to engage in acts of violence. Among the worst-affected areas was the island of Bali , where the PKI had grown rapidly before the crackdown. Approximately 80,000 people - 5% of the island's population - are estimated to have been killed. As in Java, it

12056-483: The expense of other provinces as well as the capital city". Additionally, they lacked an understanding of the internal politics of the Indonesian National Police and other military branches that took part in the crisis. Kahin "found [himself] in disagreement with some of the views presented in this paper"; however, he called the work a " tour de force " for providing an "impressive analysis" of

12193-555: The expiration of a five-day ultimatum to the government. The ultimatum demanded for three things. First, for the Djuanda Cabinet to return its mandate. Second, for Mohammad Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta ( Hamengkubuwono IX ) to form a cabinet until a future election. Third, for President Sukarno to return to his constitutional position. Following the declaration, a number of government officials sent to negotiate with

12330-415: The fact that Lieutenant Colonel Husein had little choice but to pursue a strategy of withdrawal and guerrilla warfare which would make it difficult for the United States to publicly recognise the PRRI, the United States had to reconsider its previous policy assessment that the break-up of Indonesia and emergence of a Communist government was likely. The Pope incident on 18 May 1958 signalled the beginning of

12467-449: The findings of the study to match official accounts released by Suharto and his officers during visits to the country in 1967 and 1968. However, he questioned their accuracy and credibility. In October 1975, ten years after the incident and after Suharto had become President, the Indonesian government sent a delegation of "military men and government intellectuals", led by intelligence officers Ali Murtopo and Benny Moerdani , to present

12604-510: The heads of victims on poles and paraded them through villages. The killings have been on such a scale that the disposal of the corpses has created a serious sanitation problem in East Java and Northern Sumatra where the humid air bears the reek of decaying flesh. Travelers from those areas tell of small rivers and streams that have been literally clogged with bodies. Although the motive for the killings seemed political, some scholars argue that

12741-478: The intelligence officer responsible for coordinating the interrogation of political prisoners and formulating an official government account of the October 1, 1965, incident. Kahin requested "much more pertinent documentation" on the event in order to create a "fuller and more scholarly" report and analysis of the coup. He made a similar request to judge advocate general Kabul Arifin, and both men promised to provide

12878-576: The lists back to us when you’re done'. Time magazine presented the following account on 17 December 1965: Communists, red sympathizers and their families are being massacred by the thousands. Backlands army units are reported to have executed thousands of communists after interrogation in remote jails. Armed with wide-bladed knives called parangs, Moslem bands crept at night into the homes of communists, killing entire families and burying their bodies in shallow graves. The murder campaign became so brazen in parts of rural East Java, that Moslem bands placed

13015-452: The lives of 7,146 people on both sides. Most of those who died, namely 6,115 were "from the PRRI side". Saafroedin Bahar  [ id ] Saafroedin Bahar noted that the number of victims resulting from the short PRRI conflict was far greater than the victims of the war with the Netherlands during the independence revolution. Apart from military operations, the central government took

13152-494: The majority did so in the middle of 1961. The last vestiges of the PRRI held out for a few more months before the final surrender by Mohammad Natsir , who was the last of them, on 28 September 1961. One of the most significant outcomes of the conflict was the establishment of Foreign Relations of the Soviet Union to the Indonesian Government . As the crisis had unfolded, the Indonesian Government had approached

13289-496: The military had previously contributed to several internal and national crises, including a 1958 rebellion movement . The study also develops a unique political perspective that analyzes the "frequently antagonistic interaction" between the metropolitan elite of the capital city and more isolated provincial capitals. Anderson acknowledged that he and McVey placed a considerable amount of attention on events in Central Java "at

13426-486: The movement and to "safeguard the Indonesian Republic from the wicked deeds of the Council of Generals and its agents". George McTurnan Kahin , a leading expert on Southeast Asia and director of Cornell University 's Modern Indonesia Project, recounted how he learned of the announcement: I accepted [an interview with a Boston radio station in September 1965], and it was then that from my absorption with

13563-545: The movement did not find it necessary to "impose any form of press control, nor indeed any particular mobilization of the press". In the announcement, Untung asserted that all "political parties, mass organizations, newspapers, and periodicals may continue functioning" until it became necessary for them to "declare their loyalty to the Indonesian Revolution Council". Seeking to seize the political initiative, Sukarno refused to make any decision until he

13700-483: The necessary materials for a more complete documentation. However, the documents were never provided by the government, and, despite a final request made by Kahin in 1971, the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project released Anderson's and McVey's report without the accompanying government account. Kahin believed that the promises made by the officials who conversed with him were "overruled by a higher authority". The Indonesian government also attempted to persuade Anderson to revise

13837-432: The operation would then be conducted by Sukarno, motivated to remove Army General Staff members who opposed his idea of a " Nasakom " ( Indonesian : Nasionalis, Agama, dan Komunis ; English: Nationalist, Religious, and Communist ) state. Anderson and McVey disputed this theory through analyzing the threat to Sukarno's leadership prior to the coup attempt, believing that "its major assumption—the failure of Sukarno to affect

13974-431: The organization of its communist members. Agus Salim , the organization's secretary, introduced a motion banning Sarekat Islam members from dual membership in other parties. The motion passed despite opposition from Tan Malaka and Semaun, forcing the communists to change tactics. The Dutch colonial authorities introduced more restrictions on political activity and Sarekat Islam decided to focus on religious matters, leaving

14111-401: The other hand, we the People who are conscious of the policy and duties of the revolution are convinced of the correctness of the action taken by the September 30th Movement to preserve the revolution and the People. [...]  — Harian Rakjat editorial, October 2, 1965 On October 2, the PKI newspaper Harian Rakjat published an editorial that would eventually be used as evidence that

14248-623: The outer islands began covert smuggling operations of copra and contraband items to improve their financial position. These operations were soon followed with requests for greater economic and political autonomy from the Central Government in Jakarta. After their demands were not met they began to rebel against the government, conducting a series of bloodless coups within their regional command areas, and setting up alternative local government systems. The rebel army commands included: Governor Roeslan, who yielded powers to Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein, said that: "The Banteng Council in particular and

14385-544: The paper's thesis were also published by Cornell graduate Daniel Lev in the February 1966 issue of the Asian Survey and by Lucien Rey in the British journal New Left Review the following month. In his 1969 book The Communist Collapse in Indonesia , author Arnold Brackman identified Lucien Rey as "a cover name for someone who, on the basis of the article's content, must have had access to at least one version of

14522-518: The party experienced another period of repression. On 30 September, Madiun was taken over by republican troops of the Siliwangi Division . Thousands of party members were killed, and 36,000 were imprisoned. Amongst the executed were several leaders, including Musso (who was killed on 31 October, allegedly while trying to escape from prison). Although Aidit and Lukman went into exile in China ,

14659-551: The party politburo issued a September 1966 statement of self-criticism , criticizing the party's previous cooperation with the Sukarno regime. After Aidit and Njoto were killed, Sudisman (the fourth-ranking PKI leader before October 1963) took over the party's leadership. He attempted to rebuild the party on a base of interlocking groups of three members but made little progress before he was captured in December 1966 and sentenced to death in 1967. Revolutionary Government of

14796-486: The party supported Sukarno's efforts to quell the rebellion (including the introduction of martial law). The rebellion was eventually defeated. In August 1959, there was an attempt on behalf of the military to prevent the PKI's party congress. The congress was held as scheduled, however, and was addressed by Sukarno. In 1960, Sukarno introduced " Nasakom ": an abbreviation of nasionalisme (nationalism), agama (religion) and komunisme (communism). The PKI's role as

14933-582: The party worked on a variety of fronts, such as Gerindo and trade unions. It began working amongst Indonesian students in the Netherlands within the nationalist organization Perhimpunan Indonesia , which the party would soon control. The PKI re-emerged on the political scene after the 1945 surrender of Japan and actively participated in the Indonesian National Awakening ; many armed units were under PKI control or influence. Although PKI militias played an important role in fighting

15070-467: The party's rise. The growing influence of the PKI concerned the United States and other anti-communist Western powers. The political and economic situation had become more volatile; annual inflation reached over 600 percent, and living conditions for Indonesians worsened. In December 1964, Chairul Saleh of the Murba Party (formed by former PKI leader Tan Malaka ) claimed that the PKI was preparing

15207-620: The people of Central Sumatra in general have no wish to build a State within a State, because relations between the Regional and the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia will certainly return to normal when there is a Cabinet that can eliminate all the feelings of confusion, tension and dissatisfaction that threaten the security of the Indonesian State and People." The PRRI was proclaimed to have been established on 15 February 1958 by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Hussein following

15344-406: The political leadership of the military in the past few years—is doubtful". They further questioned as to why, instead of removing the generals as quickly as possible, the President chose to conduct the kidnappings "so crudely [...] from a political viewpoint". From Anderson's and McVey's perspective, "Sukarno placed himself compromisingly at Halim and spent all day there, floundering". In ruling out

15481-451: The possibilities that Sukarno and/or the PKI organized the events of October 1, 1965, Anderson and McVey considered two additional alternatives. The first was an independent move by Untung and his movement to seize control and remove members of the Army General Staff for their "Western orientation", " Menteng mentality", and "obstruction of Sukarno's endeavors" without the desire for popular support. If Untung and his men did not want to involve

15618-477: The pro-PKI Central All-Indonesian Workers Organization was banned in April. Some of the events were fictionalized in the 1982 film, The Year of Living Dangerously . After initial sporadic resistance, the PKI was paralyzed after the 1965–1966 killings. The party's leadership was crippled at all levels, leaving many of its former supporters and sympathizers disillusioned, leaderless and disorganized. The remnants of

15755-513: The rebel PRRI Government in 1958, despite some dissent in the agency from Desmond Fitzgerald . With the Americans posturing to become directly involved in the crisis, General Nasution conducted surprise amphibious assaults on rebel cities in Sumatra during March 1958. With the military balance swiftly swinging in favour of the Central Government in Jakarta during the period March–May 1958, and

15892-433: The requested documents. In response to Kahin's persistent requests and Anderson's resistance, the government subsequently placed the two on its blacklist and denied them entry into the country. Although Kahin's travel ban was lifted in 1991, Anderson was not able to enter Indonesia until 1999 following Suharto's resignation from office. As of 1971, five years after the alleged coup attempt, "no full-length scholarly study of

16029-420: The revolutionary movement in high esteem and officers of the Army General Staff who were more "intellectual" and educated in the ways of the Dutch. Anderson and McVey observed that the more traditional officers believed "soldiering itself is less a matter of techniques and skills, than the development of moral and spiritual faculties through a kind of modernized asceticism ". Officers of the Diponegoro Division had

16166-617: The same side of resisting Central Government control to some extent, the declaration of the rebel government and the open split from the Central Government in Jakarta had immediately highlighted that not all parties were willing to take things to such an extreme. One of these unwilling parties was the Garuda Council led by Lieutenant Colonel Barlian. Even within Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Hussein's Banteng Council, there were key leaders and segments who opposed

16303-524: The situation created by the deaths of six of his top Generals. The actual originators of the coup are to be found not in Djakarta, but in Central Java, among middle-level Army officers in Semarang , at the Headquarters of the Seventh (Diponegoro) Territorial Division. The Diponegoro Division, according to Anderson and McVey, comprised a greater percentage of ethnic Javanese people than other units in

16440-624: The statement was issued with the signature of the President's security chief. Couriers were also sent to Major Generals Pranoto Reksosamudra and Umar Wirahadikusumah summoning them to Halim Perdanakusuma for discussions on a new Army leadership. One courier found his way to Major General Suharto , who had assumed command of the Army and whom Sukarno wanted to avoid because of his "independent-mindedness and powerful personality". He refused to allow either Umar or Pranoto leave for Halim Perdanakusuma, and, Anderson and McVey believed, Sukarno then realized "Suharto would probably suspect him of having engineered

16577-405: The support of the US and other powerful Western governments. Documentary filmmaker Joshua Oppenheimer , director of The Act of Killing and The Look of Silence , said: We know that U.S. embassy officials were compiling lists of thousands of names of public figures in Indonesia and handing these to the army and saying, 'Kill everybody on these lists and check off the names as you go, and give

16714-410: The total membership of the party and its front organizations was claimed to be one-fifth of the Indonesian population. In March 1962, the PKI joined the government; party leaders Aidit and Njoto were appointed advisory ministers. The following month, the PKI held its party congress. In 1963, the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines discussed territorial disputes and the possibility of

16851-424: The tracks of this group, and others involved, might have been successfully wiped from the sands of time. Anderson and McVey reproduced twenty copies of the paper using mimeographs and circulated them to both Cornell and non-Cornell scholars and officials requesting their commentary and criticism. Because of the sensitive nature of the document, they also requested that its contents be kept confidential. This decision

16988-669: The wake of the Army coup of October 1." However, they believed that the coup itself and subsequent events formed "quite separate political phenomena" despite being "intimately related". Anderson and McVey believed this to be the case because of a three-week absence of violence that ended on October 21, when Communist youth elements clashed with the Army Para-Commando Regiment ( Indonesian : Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat , abbreviated as RPKAD) in Boyolali Regency . The first alternative interpretation of

17125-477: The whole thing". After seizing control of the RRI station and securing the capital, Suharto issued an ultimatum to Untung's group at Halim Perdanakusuma. Refusing to follow Untung for a final stand at the Diponegoro Division headquarters in Central Java, Sukarno retreated to Bogor Palace where he was placed in the custody of the Army. Although Sukarno was not allowed to make any personal broadcasts, Suharto announced that

17262-486: The world before its violent disbandment in 1965 . The party had two million members in the 1955 elections, with 16 percent of the national vote and almost 30 percent of the vote in East Java . At the time, it was the largest communist party in the world after the Chinese and Soviet communist parties. During most of the period immediately following the Indonesian Independence until the eradication of

17399-502: Was [probably] not the best kind for Indonesia." A coup attempt was made by pro-US forces in the military and the political right wing in February 1958. The rebels, based in Sumatra and Sulawesi , proclaimed a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) on 15 February. The revolutionary government immediately began arresting thousands of PKI members in areas under their control, and

17536-602: Was a merger of the two Dutch socialist parties (the SDAP and the Socialist Party of the Netherlands), which would become the Communist Party of the Netherlands with Dutch East Indies leadership. The Dutch members of the ISDV introduced communist ideas to educated Indonesians looking for ways to oppose colonial rule. The ISDV began a Dutch-language publication, Het Vrije Woord ( The Free Word , edited by Adolf Baars ), in October 1915. It did not demand independence when

17673-423: Was allowed contact with political friends and advisors. With no reason to doubt Sukarno or their control of Jakarta, Untung and his men allowed the President to communicate via couriers. One such courier delivered a message read over Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) at 1:15 p.m. that Sukarno was not a prisoner of Untung's movement, which "carried far more weight than anything that Untung himself could say" because

17810-512: Was appointed president in 1968, consolidating his influence on the military and government. On 2 October, the Halim base was recaptured by the army. Although Harian Rakyat carried an article in support of the G30S coup, the official PKI line at the time was that the attempted coup was an internal affair within the armed forces. On 6 October, Sukarno's cabinet held its first meeting since 30 September;

17947-481: Was eventually leaked in a March 5, 1966, article by The Washington Post journalist Joseph Kraft . Cornell turned down requests to access the paper, and its contents became subject to misinterpretation and forgery before publication. Requests made to the Indonesian government to supplement the study with additional documents pertaining to the incident were not fulfilled, and the paper was finally published in 1971 without any additional material. Since its publication,

18084-477: Was headquartered. General Nasution, who was leading the government forces, launched Operasi Pemanggilan Kembali (Operation Call Back) at the end of 1960 to take advantage of internal rifts within the PRRI. The main objective of which was to persuade the army officers supporting the PRRI to surrender themselves, because once there was no longer military support, the civilians would also follow suit. Small numbers of PRRI troops began surrendering from April 1961, while

18221-490: Was made after taking into consideration the safety of colleagues and former students conducting work in Indonesia for fear that they "could possibly be held accountable for the views expressed in the paper". Despite the authors' request, at least one copy of the paper was reproduced and circulated further, gaining notoriety as the "Cornell Paper". The existence of the paper became public after The Washington Post ' s Joseph Kraft published an article on March 5, 1966, reporting

18358-491: Was never a disciplined or coherent organisation for the remainder of the pre-war period. During the initial period of illegality, with much of its leadership imprisoned, the PKI kept a somewhat lower profile. Although PKI leader Musso returned from his Moscow exile in 1935 to reorganize the underground (or "illegal") PKI, his stay in Indonesia was brief, and the leadership of that illegal branch (such as Djokosoedjono ) were soon arrested and exiled to Boven-Digoel. Remnants of

18495-482: Was stated in Presidential Decree No. 322 of 1961 dated 22 June 1961. Although the PRRI leadership responded to the government's call, in reality the promise of amnesty was only rhetoric. For several years, PRRI's civilian and military leadership was quarantined. Communities, especially college students and students, experience heavy life pressures. The Central Government in Jakarta, having tolerated

18632-420: Was the military that incited and organized the killings, despite since-discredited claims that the military actually had to restrain local people. On 22 November, Aidit was captured and summarily executed by the army. The military announced that Aceh had been cleared of communists in December, and special military courts were set up to try jailed PKI members. The party was banned by Suharto on 12 March, and

18769-435: Was titled A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia . According to Anderson, the report places emphasis on two aspects of Indonesian politics previously unexplored by scholars of the country. The first aspect is the political involvement of the Indonesian military in transforming itself from a "decentralized, popular guerrilla force into a more professional centralized ruling group". The volatility of

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