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33-740: Cheeki Rafiki was a Bénéteau First 40.7, which had been built 2006 in Bénéteau's shipyard in Saint-Hilaire-de-Riez , France. She had been delivered to the customer in December 2006, who planned to enter her in charter regattas around Great Britain. In 2011, Stormforce Coaching took over the management of the yacht, but not her ownership. Subsequently, they entered the yacht twice into the Atlantic Rally for Cruisers (ARC), in 2011 and 2013. After each of these crossings, she stayed in

66-570: A "light grounding": It is assumed that the structural damages in the hull of Cheeki Rafiki had not been sufficiently repaired after the previous groundings, such that the stability of the glued hull was compromised. It couldn't withstand the force of the increasing waves. The pictures show that the layers of the hull had separated. Some bolts could also have failed due to corrosion . The extensive report gives many recommendations for improvements. However, it does not ask for increased stability requirements for keel-to-hull constructions. Shortly after

99-494: A suspended sentence whilst his bankrupt firm Stormforce was fined £ 50,000. Saint-Hilaire-de-Riez Saint-Hilaire-de-Riez ( French pronunciation: [sɛ̃.t‿ilɛʁ də ʁje] ) is a commune in the Vendée department , administrative region of Pays de la Loire , western France . Saint-Hilaire-de-Riez station has rail connections to Saint-Gilles-Croix-de-Vie and Nantes. This Vendée geographical article

132-781: A tropical cyclone). A set of red warning flags (daylight) and red warning lights (night time) is displayed at shore establishments which coincide with the various levels of warning. In Canada, maritime winds forecast to be in the range of 6 to 7 are designated as "strong"; 8 to 9 "gale force"; 10 to 11 "storm force"; 12 "hurricane force". Appropriate wind warnings are issued by Environment Canada's Meteorological Service of Canada: strong wind warning, gale (force wind) warning, storm (force wind) warning and hurricane-force wind warning. These designations were standardised nationally in 2008, whereas "light wind" can refer to 0 to 12 or 0 to 15 knots and "moderate wind" 12 to 19 or 16 to 19 knots, depending on regional custom, definition or practice. Prior to 2008,

165-481: Is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Beaufort scale The Beaufort scale ( / ˈ b oʊ f ər t / BOH -fərt ) is an empirical measure that relates wind speed to observed conditions at sea or on land. Its full name is the Beaufort wind force scale . The scale that carries Beaufort's name had a long and complex evolution from the previous work of others (including Daniel Defoe

198-545: Is also widely used in the Netherlands, Germany, Greece, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malta, and Macau, although with some differences between them. Taiwan uses the Beaufort scale with the extension to 17 noted above. China also switched to this extended version without prior notice on the morning of 15 May 2006, and the extended scale was immediately put to use for Typhoon Chanchu . Hong Kong and Macau retain force 12 as

231-424: Is still sometimes used in weather forecasts for shipping and the severe weather warnings given to the public. Wind speed on the Beaufort scale is based on the empirical relationship : where v is the equivalent wind speed at 10 metres above the sea surface and B is Beaufort scale number. For example, B = 9.5 is related to 24.5 m/s which is equal to the lower limit of "10 Beaufort". Using this formula

264-528: The Caribbean Sea for a few months. The disaster happened during the journey home in early 2014. Central to the later investigation was the construction of the hull and especially the link between the hull and the so-called "matrix", an inner layer that was embedded in the lower part of the hull to give it the necessary stability and stiffness. The keel was secured to the hull by ten bolts; nine of them 24mm in diameter and one 14mm. They were laminated into

297-431: The Beaufort scale number, followed by a description, wind speed, wave height, sea conditions, land conditions, photo of the sea, and the associated warning flag. The Beaufort scale is neither an exact nor an objective scale; it was based on visual and subjective observation of a ship and of the sea. The corresponding integral wind speeds were determined later, but conversions have not been made official. The Beaufort scale

330-425: The accident. Furthermore, the crew could also not be blamed for the accident, because they were competent and the skipper was in the possession of all required certificates for such a voyage. At the time of the accident, the wind blew with force 7 , which is rough but still completely within the limits for which such boats are constructed. The accident investigation report points out though, that it's unclear whether

363-430: The area in question, sent out a HC-130 Long Range Surveillance Aircraft. They were looking for a disabled yacht and persons in the water, since two PLB devices had sent emergency signals. The aircraft crew identified only debris at the expected position. On May 17, more than 24 hours after the last contact with the ship, the container vessel Maersk Kure identified Cheeki Rafiki ' s hull, upside-down. The keel

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396-456: The century before). In the 18th century, naval officers made regular weather observations, but there was no standard scale and so they could be very subjective — one man's "stiff breeze" might be another's "soft breeze"—: Beaufort succeeded in standardising a scale. The scale was devised in 1805 by Francis Beaufort (later Rear Admiral ), a hydrographer and a Royal Navy officer, while serving on HMS  Woolwich , and refined until he

429-617: The coastline, and the Irish Sea or part thereof: "Gale Warnings" are issued if winds of Beaufort force 8 are expected; "Strong Gale Warnings" are issued if winds of Beaufort force 9 or frequent gusts of at least 52 knots are expected.; "Storm Force Warnings" are issued if Beaufort force 10 or frequent gusts of at least 61 knots are expected; "Violent Storm Force Warnings" are issued if Beaufort force 11 or frequent gusts of at least 69 knots are expected; "Hurricane Force Warnings" are issued if winds of greater than 64 knots are expected. This scale

462-434: The crew alive was in vain. The maximum time somebody can survive in water of 16 °C (61 °F) is about 15.5 hours. The accident resulted in heated discussion amongst yachtsmen over the safety of sailboats and particularly over the construction and dimensioning of the connection between keel and hull, which had obviously failed in this case, but is of utmost importance for a sailing vessel. There were speculations whether

495-717: The growth of steam power, the descriptions were changed to how the sea, not the sails, behaved and extended to land observations. Anemometer rotations to scale numbers were standardised only in 1923. George Simpson , CBE (later Sir George Simpson), director of the UK Meteorological Office, was responsible for this and for the addition of the land-based descriptors. The measures were slightly altered some decades later to improve its utility for meteorologists . Nowadays, meteorologists typically express wind speed in kilometres or miles per hour or, for maritime and aviation purposes, knots , but Beaufort scale terminology

528-540: The highest winds in hurricanes would be 23 in the scale. F1 tornadoes on the Fujita scale and T2 TORRO scale also begin roughly at the end of level 12 of the Beaufort scale, but are independent scales, although the TORRO scale wind values are based on the 3/2 power law relating wind velocity to Beaufort force. Wave heights in the scale are for conditions in the open ocean, not along the shore. The leftmost column gives

561-512: The hull. Many were broken and it had been like that for months. The yacht was therefore unsound, broken, and unsafe before the men left from Antigua." Innes pleaded not guilty . The jury at Winchester Crown Court acquitted Innes of manslaughter, but they did find him and the company guilty of unsafe operation of the vessel and of failing to fulfill the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Act . On May 11, 2018 Innes received

594-513: The keel actually separated, even though technically, computationally and based on the weather at the place of incident there was no obvious reason for this. The wreck of the Cheeki Rafiki was not available for investigation, as it has not been found yet. So the MAIB had to find their conclusions from the few pictures of the rescue crews, the history of the boat and reports from sister ships. It

627-586: The keel, and put through the outer hull, the matrix, and a steel washer , and then secured with nuts. The building process and the construction fulfilled the CE-seaworthiness Classification of category A (ocean), in the version valid at the time of building. Additionally, the construction process had been surveyed by Bureau Veritas . Cheeki Rafiki had participated in the Antigua Sailing Week event in spring 2014 and

660-438: The manufacturer to remove the keel completely was considered best practice, its cost-effectiveness was questioned though. The report concludes that the most probable cause for the accident was a failure of the glued link between the "matrix" (inner skeleton) and the outer hull. Similar damages could be observed in sister ships which were involved in groundings, too. Different repair yards said that they could only hardly determine

693-474: The maximum. In the United States of America, winds of force 6 or 7 result in the issuance of a small craft advisory , with force 8 or 9 winds bringing about a gale warning , force 10 or 11 a storm warning ("a tropical storm warning " being issued instead of the latter two if the winds relate to a tropical cyclone ), and force 12 a hurricane-force wind warning (or hurricane warning if related to

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726-540: The report was published operating company Stormforce and its director Douglas Innes were charged, with Innes facing four counts of manslaughter by gross negligence . He was accused of insufficient maintenance to cut costs. The yacht was, according to the Crown Prosecution Service , not seaworthy for an ocean passage, as several bolts of the keel were corroded or broken even before the voyage: "A number of keel bolts had broken, causing it to detach from

759-633: The sails of a frigate , then the main ship of the Royal Navy , from "just sufficient to give steerage" to "that which no canvas sails could withstand". The scale was made a standard for ship's log entries on Royal Navy vessels in the late 1830s and, in 1853, the Beaufort scale was accepted as generally applicable at the First International Meteorological Conference in Brussels . In 1916, to accommodate

792-412: The severity of such damages. Also, a skipper cannot easily determine whether a "light" grounding had caused any damage. The report states that "Almost all [yacht owners and professional yacht skippers asked] agreed that groundings can occur when racing, and that if, in their opinion, it was a ‘light’ grounding, no inspection for damage was necessary", while at the same time, there are several definitions for

825-566: The ship was even allowed to set to sea under applicable laws. This because, as a professionally skippered boat, there are extensive rules concerning equipment, crewing and yearly safety inspections. The latter was overdue, but the operator was intending to postpone the inspection until the boat was back in England, so that he could avoid the costs of having to fly an inspector to the Caribbean . The investigation report then tries to evaluate why

858-512: The shipyard had fallen below the margins for required hull stability to cut costs as a measure to win customers in the highly competitive market for affordable yachts. The report of the British Marine Accident Investigation Branch showed that the construction did satisfy the relevant construction specifications available at the time of construction. It even almost passed the revised ones at the time of

891-598: Was Hydrographer of the Navy in the 1830s, when it was adopted officially. It was first used during the 1831-1836 "Darwin voyage" of HMS Beagle under Captain Robert FitzRoy , who was later to set up the first Meteorological Office in Britain giving regular weather forecasts. The initial scale of 13 classes (zero to 12) did not reference wind speed numbers, but related qualitative wind conditions to effects on

924-658: Was extended in 1946 when forces 13 to 17 were added. However, forces 13 to 17 were intended to apply only to special cases, such as tropical cyclones . Nowadays, the extended scale is used in Taiwan, mainland China and Vietnam, which are often affected by typhoons . Internationally, the World Meteorological Organization Manual on Marine Meteorological Services (2012 edition) defined the Beaufort Scale only up to force 12 and there

957-414: Was known that she had had a few groundings prior to the accident – experts investigated by the MAIB said that this was not uncommon for ships participating in races. The connection between hull, matrix and keel had been repaired several times already. Even experts are not normally capable of telling how such a repair would be properly done and how to tell that it was acceptably fixed. The recommendation from

990-494: Was missing, but the rudder was still in place. Due to bad weather conditions, the wreck could not be investigated further. Only about one week later could a ship of the United States Navy send a diver to the still-floating wreck. This confirmed the life raft was still secured to its storage location; the crew had not had the time to bring it out. Consequently, the search was terminated, because any hope of finding

1023-793: Was no recommendation on the use of the extended scale. The scale is used in the Shipping Forecasts broadcast on BBC Radio 4 in the United Kingdom, and in the Sea Area Forecast from Met Éireann , the Irish Meteorological Service. Met Éireann issues a "Small Craft Warning" if winds of Beaufort force 6 (mean wind speed exceeding 22 knots) are expected up to 10 nautical miles offshore. Other warnings are issued by Met Éireann for Irish coastal waters, which are regarded as extending 30 miles out from

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1056-427: Was not much wind, but it was constantly increasing after May 10. On May 16, the wind blew with Force 7 and a considerable sea had built up. The skipper reported to shore that the ship was taking on significant amounts of water for no apparent reason. A later phone call was incomprehensible, such that the director called MRCC Falmouth for help. A search-and-rescue operation was started. RCC Boston , responsible for

1089-404: Was supposed to return to Southampton , England afterwards, to be available as charter yacht the following season. She left Antigua on May, 4 with a crew of four men on board. The voyage was expected to take about 30 days. During the voyage, the skipper exchanged emails with the director of Stormforce over satellite phone , especially about route suggestions and weather reports. Initially, there

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