76-640: For the Iraq Inquiry, see Chilcot Inquiry . Chilcot is a surname. Notable people with the surname include: John Chilcot (born 1939), chairman of the Iraq Inquiry , referred to as the Chilcot Inquiry Thomas Chilcot (1707?–1766), English organist and composer See also [ edit ] Chilcott (surname) [REDACTED] Surname list This page lists people with
152-469: A Protocol in agreement with the Iraq Inquiry on the treatment of sensitive written and electronic information. Evidence which will not be made available to the public includes anything likely to: The inquiry heard evidence from a variety of witnesses, such as politicians, including several cabinet ministers at the time of the invasion; senior civil servants, including lawyers and intelligence chiefs; diplomats, mostly composed of British ambassadors to Iraq and
228-403: A bigger hospital were bought in and a 200 bedded hospital was eventually built and staff moved over and supplemented. The hospital took over 3500 casualties of which more than 350 were major trauma cases, and around 70 paediatric trauma cases. Injuries included blunt trauma, gun shot wounds, shrapnel injuries and severe burns. The British television film The Mark of Cain depicted service of
304-634: A consideration of what political or legal consequences are appropriate for those responsible". After the inquiry's report was issued, Tony Blair acknowledged that the report made "real and material criticisms of preparation, planning, process and of the relationship with the United States" but cited sections of the report that he said "should lay to rest allegations of bad faith, lies or deceit". He stated: "whether people agree or disagree with my decision to take military action against Saddam Hussein , I took it in good faith and in what I believed to be
380-533: A hospital ward. In effect the hospital was based on the front line of the British area of responsibility and was the furthest forward medical unit in recent history. Casualties would often miss out the regimental aid posts and dressing stations and go straight to the hospital. Staff at the hospital worked 12 hour shifts without days off until more staff began to arrive around a month later. The 25 bedded unit kept working despite some nearby mortar fire while elements of
456-434: A judge's ruling and blocked the disclosure of extracts of a conversation between Bush and Blair moments before the invasion. In his submission to the inquiry, Philippe Sands observed that: an independent Dutch Inquiry has recently concluded – unanimously and without ambiguity – that the war was not justified under international law. The Dutch inquiry Committee was presided by W.J.M. Davids, a distinguished former President of
532-577: A judgment of the findings one way or the other. Our focus, again, is on the challenges we have in Iraq and Syria right now, and that's where our focus is". After the report was issued, Jeremy Corbyn , the leader of the opposition and leader of the Labour Party - who had voted against military action - gave a speech in Westminster stating: "I now apologise sincerely on behalf of my party for
608-603: A modern mechanised and armoured force function. During the post invasion phase, and following a number of British casualties blamed on inadequate equipment, a great deal of new equipment was purchased to help deal with the threats posed by insurgents. These included 166 armoured Pinzgauer Vector PPVs , 108 Mastiff PPVs , 145 enhanced FV430 Mk3 Bulldogs , Lockheed Martin Desert Hawk UAVs and 8 Britten-Norman Defender ISTAR aircraft. A total of 179 British Armed Forces personnel died serving on Operation Telic between
684-468: A new composite divisional headquarters on 28 December 2003. Major General Andrew Stewart took over from General Lamb as commander of British forces. After the end of major operations, the main components of the British forces changed greatly. 3 Commando Brigade was withdrawn in early May and 16 Air Assault Brigade left later in the same month apart from a couple of infantry battalions. 7 Armoured Brigade remained until relieved by 19 Mechanised Brigade at
760-595: A second resolution was necessary – and March 2003 – when he said that Resolution 1441 was sufficient – and the report describes pressure being applied by the Prime Minister's Office to get Goldsmith to revise his opinion. By ultimately going to war without a Security Council resolution , the UK was "undermining the Security Council's authority". The report found that Blair had attempted to persuade Bush of
836-525: A sentence from a private memo from Blair to Bush which read "I will be with you whatever". Contrary to Tony Blair 's claims, Chilcot found that the Special Relationship did not require unquestioning agreement between the UK and the US, and the report identified several previous occasions where one country had gone to war without the other without long-term damage to diplomatic relations, including
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#1732787061282912-424: A similar situation in future, the British government is equipped to respond in the most effective manner in the best interests of the country. The open sessions of the inquiry commenced on 24 November 2009 and concluded on 2 February 2011. In 2012, the government vetoed the release to the inquiry of documents detailing minutes of Cabinet meetings in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Concurrently,
988-554: Is different from Wikidata All set index articles Chilcot Inquiry The Iraq Inquiry (also referred to as the Chilcot Inquiry after its chairman, Sir John Chilcot ) was a British public inquiry into the nation's role in the Iraq War . The inquiry was announced in 2009 by Prime Minister Gordon Brown and published in 2016 with a public statement by Chilcot. On 6 July 2016, Sir John Chilcot announced
1064-524: Is to be criticised a fair opportunity to comment on a draft prior to finalisation and publication. Chilcot wrote a letter to David Cameron in October 2015, announcing that the text could be complete by April 2016, and furthermore proposed a release date of June or July 2016. The committee of inquiry, the members of which were chosen by Gordon Brown , comprised: The committee also took secretarial support during proceedings from Margaret Aldred. When
1140-639: The Financial Times , Philip Stephens , said that Blair's "sin was one of certitude rather than deceit", and writing for Bloomberg View , Eli Lake said that the report proved Blair "didn't lie his way into Iraq". Speaking in Parliament, Corbyn said that MPs who voted for the war were "misled by a small number of leading figures in the Government" who "were none too scrupulous about how they made their case for war", and Caroline Lucas , MP for
1216-615: The Independent on Sunday , in which he questioned the appointment to the inquiry panel of two British historians on the basis of their previous support for Israel . In a diplomatic cable from the US embassy in London, released as part of Cablegate , Jon Day, director general for security policy at the British Ministry of Defence is cited having promised the US to have "put measures in place to protect your interests" regarding
1292-514: The 2010 general election —generated political controversy. Conservative Party leader David Cameron dismissed the inquiry as "an establishment stitch-up ", and the Liberal Democrats threatened a boycott. In a parliamentary debate over the establishment of the inquiry, MPs from all the major parties criticised the government's selection of its members. MPs drew attention to the absence of anyone with first-hand military expertise,
1368-459: The Butler report the following year, the one thing Sir John could not have afforded to produce was another report that was dismissed as a whitewash.' Political commentators were split as to what extent the report showed that Tony Blair had lied or deliberately misled Parliament and the public. NBC News said that the report "stops short of saying Blair lied", the chief political commentator for
1444-477: The Conservative Party for its role in the lead-up to the war. Cameron said that he did not see "a huge amount of point" in "replaying all the arguments of the day" and said that focus should instead be on learning "the lessons of what happened and what needs to be put in place to make sure that mistakes cannot be made in future". The same day, US State Department spokesperson John Kirby stated in
1520-515: The Foreign Office successfully appealed against a judge's ruling and blocked the disclosure of extracts of a conversation between George W. Bush and Tony Blair days before the invasion. The government stated that revealing this conversation would present a "significant danger" to British–American relations . The million-word report of the inquiry was due to be released to the public by 2014, but difficult negotiations were continuing with
1596-506: The Green Party , said that contradictions between public statements and private memos to Bush proved that Blair was "lying" about whether war could have been averted. Philippe Sands said the report pulled its punches but marshalled the factual evidence in such a way that an inference of lying, deceit or manipulation was possible. The timing and nature of the inquiry—and particularly the fact that it would not issue its report until after
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#17327870612821672-625: The Vietnam War and Falklands War . The report found that British planning for a post- Ba'athist Iraq was "wholly inadequate" and that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) left UK forces in Iraq without adequate equipment or a plan. It also found that there was no ministerial oversight of post-conflict strategy. Initial planning for the war assumed an invasion from the north, but Turkey refused permission for UK troops to cross its border. Plans were therefore completely rewritten two months before
1748-410: The surname Chilcot . If an internal link intending to refer to a specific person led you to this page, you may wish to change that link by adding the person's given name (s) to the link. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Chilcot&oldid=998059445 " Category : Surnames Hidden categories: Articles with short description Short description
1824-417: The 1996 action film The Rock – and expressed doubts about its reliability. Nonetheless, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw asked MI6 to use the source to provide "silver bullet intelligence". The inquiry was not about the legality of military action and could not rule on this as it was not an internationally recognised court. However, the report did criticise the process by which the government investigated
1900-478: The British inventory deployed. It also saw a 33 ship fleet, which was the largest taskforce deployed by the UK since the Falklands War. Some 120 Challenger 2 main battle tanks , 150 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles , 32 L131 self-propelled 155 mm howitzers and 36 L118 105 mm towed howitzers were deployed with the land forces, with reconnaissance vehicles and everything else that makes
1976-615: The Christmas 2002 period, the term became jokingly known amongst personnel as a backronym for T ell E veryone L eave I s C ancelled. The force was commanded by a three-star tri-service headquarters. The commander of the operation was Air Marshal Brian Burridge , with Major General Peter Wall acting as his chief of staff. The headquarters was situated at CENTCOM headquarters in Qatar . The three services each had two-star commanders leading operations. The Royal Navy commander
2052-492: The Dutch Supreme Court, and four of its seven members were lawyers. The Dutch Committee was well-placed to address the substantive legal issues. I note, however, that the composition of this Inquiry includes no members with any legal background. In 2011, the Independent published an article with 15 charges that have yet to be answered by the inquiry. Speaking at a public meeting in 2013, David Owen said that
2128-493: The Iraqi Interior Ministry from 2003 to 2005. The final witness in the public hearings, heard on 2 February 2011, was Jack Straw , Foreign Secretary from 2001 to 2006. The Inquiry's final report was published on 6 July 2016. Comprising 2.6 million words in 12 volumes, plus an executive summary , a physical copy was priced at £ 767. Bereaved families received a free copy. It was also published online. It
2204-513: The Iraqi government directly to Blair, without first confirming its accuracy. The investigators found that references to this intelligence in government reports were over-certain and did not adequately stress uncertainties and nuance. The informant was later found to have been lying. The Chilcot report states that "personal intervention [by Dearlove] and its urgency gave added weight to a report that had not been properly evaluated and would have coloured
2280-562: The United Kingdom and the United States had undermined the authority of the United Nations Security Council , that the process of identifying the legal basis was "far from satisfactory", and that a war was unnecessary. The report was made available under an Open Government Licence . It was initially established by Prime Minister Gordon Brown that the Iraq Inquiry would be held in camera , excluding
2356-487: The United States over the publication of documents. The Lord-in-waiting Lord Wallace of Saltaire said on behalf of the government that it would be "inappropriate" to publish the report in the months leading up to the next general election in 2015. In August, it transpired that the Report would in any event be further delayed, possibly into 2016, due to the legal requirement of " Maxwellisation ", allowing any person who
Chilcot - Misplaced Pages Continue
2432-553: The United States; Admiral Lord Boyce , former Chief of the Defence Staff ; Sir John Scarlett , Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service ; Major-General Tim Cross , the most senior British officer on the ground in the aftermath of the invasion; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Brian Burridge , overall commander of British forces in the invasion. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair was publicly questioned by
2508-489: The United States; and high-ranking military officers including former Chiefs of the General Staff and Chiefs of the Defence Staff as well as senior operational commanders. The inquiry heard mostly from civil servants, intelligence and security officials, diplomats and military officers from the first public hearings up until it recessed for Christmas. Key witnesses included Sir Christopher Meyer , former ambassador to
2584-492: The ability to launch WMD within 45 minutes, and instead laid the blame for the weaknesses in its evidence on the Joint Intelligence Committee . More specifically, the report blamed Secret Intelligence Service (better known as MI6) head Richard Dearlove who presented so-called "hot" intelligence about alleged weapons of mass destruction provided by an Iraqi with "phenomenal access" to high levels in
2660-480: The absence of members with acknowledged or proven inquisitorial skills, and the absence of any elected representatives. Several MPs drew attention to the fact that Chilcot would be unable to receive evidence under oath. Gilbert's appointment to the enquiry was criticised on the basis that he had once compared Bush and Blair to Roosevelt and Churchill. The criticism by the Liberal Democrats continued with
2736-472: The best interests of the country. ... I will take full responsibility for any mistakes without exception or excuse. I will at the same time say why, nonetheless, I believe that it was better to remove Saddam Hussein and why I do not believe this is the cause of the terrorism we see today whether in the Middle East or elsewhere in the world". Following the publication of the report, John Prescott , who
2812-600: The daily White House press briefing that the US would not respond to the report and that reporters should direct their questions to British officials instead, explaining that their focus was now on Syria rather than a decision made 13 years prior: "... we're not going to make a judgment one way or the other about this report, and I'll let British officials speak to the degree to which they intend to derive lessons learned from it. That's really, again, for them to talk to. We're not going to go through it, we're not going to examine it, we're not going to try to do an analysis of it or make
2888-535: The deployment of Royal Navy and Royal Marines was announced. 20 January saw the land forces deployment announced and 6 February the Royal Air Force . They were ready in time for hostilities to start on 19 March. When compared with the deployment of forces prior to the Gulf War things proceeded a great deal faster, with the slowest deploying elements taking 10 weeks to get from base to combat readiness in
2964-486: The disastrous decision to go to war in Iraq in March 2003" which he called an "act of military aggression launched on a false pretext" something that has "long been regarded as illegal by the overwhelming weight of international opinion". Corbyn specifically apologised to "the people of Iraq"; to the families of British soldiers who died in Iraq or returned injured; and to "the millions of British citizens who feel our democracy
3040-504: The enquiry on 29 January 2010, and again on 21 January 2011. On both of these occasions protests took place outside the conference centre. Because of widespread public interest in Blair's evidence, public access to the hearings had to be allocated by lottery. Special dispensations to attend were allocated to those whose close family were casualties of the war, some of whom shouted angry accusations at Blair during his second appearance. From
3116-785: The handover of responsibility taking place on 30 May. In May 2006 7th Armoured Brigade, the Desert Rats were relieved by 20th Armoured Brigade under the command of Brigadier James Everard . October 2006 saw 19 Light Brigade take over from 20th Armoured Brigade. 1 Mechanised Brigade provided HQ and troops for Op TELIC 10, deploying to Iraq in June 2007. During that tour, both the PJCC and Basra Palace were handed back to Iraqi control. They handed over to 4th Mechanised Brigade on 1 December 2007. The conflict saw over 100 fixed-wing aircraft and over 100 rotary-wing aircraft of virtually every type in
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3192-667: The inquiry "is being prevented from revealing extracts that they believe relevant from exchanges between President Bush and Prime Minister Blair". He blamed Blair and Cameron for this state of affairs, who he believed have entered into a private deal to prevent the publication of important documents out of mutual self-interest. It emerged that the Cabinet Office was resisting the release of "more than 130 records of conversations" between Bush and Blair, as well as "25 notes from Mr Blair to President Bush" and "some 200 cabinet-level discussions". The report has been criticised for ignoring
3268-546: The inquiry began hearing witnesses, a series of documents including military reports were leaked to a newspaper which appeared to show poor post-war planning and lack of provisions. The inquiry was pursued by a committee of Privy Counsellors with broad terms of reference to consider Britain's involvement in Iraq between 2001 and 2009. It covered the run-up to the conflict , the subsequent military action and its aftermath to establish how decisions were made, to determine what happened and to identify lessons to ensure that, in
3344-528: The inquiry was announced on 15 June 2009 by Prime Minister Gordon Brown , it was initially announced that proceedings would take place in private, a decision which was subsequently reversed after receiving criticism in the media and the House of Commons . The inquiry commenced in July 2009, with public hearings commencing on 24 November 2009 with Peter Ricketts , chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee at
3420-529: The inquiry's resumption in January 2010, it heard predominantly from politicians and former government officials, including Alastair Campbell , Tony Blair 's director of communications and on 2 February 2010, then- Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short , when she repeatedly criticised Blair, Attorney General Peter Goldsmith and others in the UK Government for what she maintained
3496-480: The inquiry. This has been interpreted as an indication that the inquiry is restricted "to minimize embarrassment for the United States." In 2012, Attorney General Dominic Grieve was criticised when he vetoed the release of documents to the inquiry detailing minutes of Cabinet meetings in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Concurrently, the Foreign Office successfully appealed against
3572-460: The intelligence agencies, and making exaggerated claims about threats to Britain's national security". The report found that in the run-up to the war , peaceful diplomatic options to avoid instability and WMD proliferation had not been exhausted, and that the war was therefore "not a last resort". Intervention might have become necessary later, but at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam Hussein did not pose an immediate threat and
3648-691: The invasion and its aftermath were reservists, from the Territorial Army , Royal Naval Reserve and from the Royal Auxiliary Air Force Regiment. Notice that additional British forces were deploying to the region (large numbers of RAF personnel were already deployed in Kuwait, Turkey and elsewhere in the region on Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch ) was given in three separate Commons statements by Geoff Hoon Secretary of State for Defence . On 7 January,
3724-516: The legal basis for the war, finding it "far from satisfactory". Lord Goldsmith , the Attorney General , should have provided a detailed written report to Cabinet, but was instead asked to provide oral evidence without extensive questioning, and he did not explain what the basis would be for deciding whether Iraq had violated United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 . Goldsmith's advice changed between January 2003 – when he said that
3800-595: The majority of the UN Security Council supported the continuation of UN weapons inspections and monitoring. The report does not question Blair's personal belief that there was a case for war, only the way he presented the evidence that he had. The report cleared the Prime Minister's Office of influencing the Iraq Dossier (the "Dodgy Dossier"), which contained the claim that Iraq possessed
3876-473: The need to seek support from the UN, European allies and Arab states, but that he "overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq". The report accused Blair personally of being too conciliatory towards the US, saying: "Despite concerns about the state of US planning, he did not make an agreement on a satisfactory post-conflict plan a condition of UK participation in military action", and drew attention to
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#17327870612823952-435: The perception of ministers and senior officials". The day after the report was published, Blair conceded that he should have challenged such intelligence reports before relying on them to justify military action in Iraq. Some MI6 staff had also expressed concerns about the quality of its source – in particular, noting that an inaccurate detail about storing chemical weapons in glass containers appeared to have been taken from
4028-406: The public and press. However, the decision was later deferred to Sir John Chilcot , the inquiry chairman, who said that it was "essential to hold as much of the proceedings of the inquiry as possible in public". In July 2009, when the inquiry commenced, it was announced that the committee would be able to request any British document and call any British citizen to give evidence. In the week before
4104-503: The report's publication, more than seven years after the inquiry was announced. Usually referred to as the Chilcot report by the news media, the document stated that at the time of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Saddam Hussein did not pose an urgent threat to British interests, that intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction was presented with unwarranted certainty, that peaceful alternatives to war had not been exhausted, that
4180-413: The risks of the war, the report found that this was not taken into account in planning. "The risks of internal strife in Iraq, active Iranian pursuit of its interests, regional instability and Al Qaeda activity in Iraq were each explicitly identified before the invasion". A "can-do" attitude among military officials also led them to downplay dangers and setbacks during briefings. The report also described
4256-478: The role of the UK media. The UK media, "played on the 'hearts and minds' of the British public, constructing a moral case for the Iraq invasion that would convince the general population." Operation Telic Operation Telic ( Op TELIC ) was the codename under which all of the United Kingdom 's military operations in Iraq were conducted between the start of the invasion of Iraq on 19 March 2003 and
4332-821: The same time as 3rd Division took over from 1st Division. 102 Logistics Brigade was relieved by 101 Logistic Brigade in late May. Most of the RAF aircraft left the area with a few retained for patrols over Iraq and support of ground forces. British naval forces also returned to more usual levels, with two surface combatants, a tanker and a repair ship present in early July. A further rotation of ground troops occurred in November 2003, with 19 Mechanised Brigade relieved by 20th Armoured Brigade ; 20th Armoured Brigade in its turn being relieved by 1 Mechanised Brigade . In April 2004, 20th Armoured Brigade turned over its responsibilities to 1 Mechanised Brigade and Lieutenant General John McColl
4408-534: The situation in the city of Basra , where British forces were forced to make a deal with insurgents to end attacks on British troops, as "humiliating". According to the report, British military action did not achieve its goals, and Baghdad and south-east Iraq destabilised rapidly in the wake of the invasion . At the time, the UK was also involved in the War in Afghanistan and military commanders felt that there
4484-517: The start of public hearings, with party leader Nick Clegg accusing the government of "suffocating" the inquiry, referring to the power given to government departments to veto sections of the final report. Meanwhile, a group of anti-war protestors staged a demonstration outside the conference centre. Concerns were also raised about the expertise of the panel, particularly with regard to issues of legality by senior judges. On 22 November 2009, former British Ambassador Oliver Miles published an article in
4560-799: The start of the campaign in March 2003 and the end of operations in July 2009; 136 in hostile incidents and the remaining 43 under non-hostile circumstances. Full non-fatal casualty records are currently only available for the period after 1 January 2006. From that date, 3,598 British personnel were wounded, injured or fell ill (315 wounded in action); 1,971 of whom required aeromedical evacuation. However, these totals are likely to rise significantly as and when full records for 2003 to 2006 become available. By 11 March 2007, more than 2,100 soldiers had returned from Iraq suffering from some form of mental illness, including PTSD . In theatre both military and civilian casualties were treated by British Field Hospitals (FH), 22 FH in Kuwait and 34 FH in Iraq. 34 Field Hospital
4636-453: The theatre. The deployment used 64 British and foreign flagged merchant vessels. Telic means a purposeful or defined action (from Greek τέλος, telos ). Unlike the United States who called their equivalent military deployment Operation Iraqi Freedom , the Ministry of Defence uses a computer to generate its names so that they carry no overtly political connotations. The meaning was initially unknown but as initial planning took place over
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#17327870612824712-452: The time of the invasion of Iraq, as the first witness. Opening the proceedings, Sir John Chilcot announced that the inquiry was not seeking to apportion blame but that it would "get to the heart of what happened" and would not "shy away" from making criticism where it was justified. The commission resumed its hearings in January 2011 with the former prime minister, Tony Blair as its prime witness. On 29 October 2009, HM Government published
4788-466: The war began with insufficient time to assess the dangers or prepare the brigades. Soldiers were not issued with key equipment, and there were shortfalls in the provision of helicopters, armoured vehicles and in reconnaissance and intelligence assets. In addition, the MoD was slow to respond to the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Although military officials presented several concerns about
4864-584: The withdrawal of the last remaining British forces on 22 May 2011. The bulk of the mission ended on 30 April 2009 but around 150 troops, mainly from the Royal Navy , remained in Iraq until 22 May 2011 as part of the Iraqi Training and Advisory Mission. 46,000 troops were deployed at the onset of the invasion and the total cost of war stood at £9.24 billion in 2010. Operation telic was the largest deployment of British forces since World War II . It
4940-654: Was Rear Admiral David Snelson who had his headquarters ashore in Bahrain. The afloat Royal Navy commander was Commodore Jamie Miller, who had the aircraft carrier HMS Ark Royal as his flagship. The 1st (United Kingdom) Armoured Division was commanded by Major General Robin Brims . Three army brigades were assigned to the division. 16 Air Assault Brigade was commanded by Brigadier 'Jacko' Page, 7th Armoured Brigade by Brigadier Graham Binns and 102nd Logistic Brigade by Brigadier Shaun Cowlam. 3 Commando Brigade
5016-598: Was also under the operational command of the division and was commanded by Brigadier Jim Dutton . The Royal Air Force commander was Air Vice-Marshal Glenn Torpy . Major General Wall took over command of 1st Armoured Division on 1 May 2003. He was replaced as Chief of Staff by Major General Barney White-Spunner . Rear Admiral Snelson was succeeded by Major General Tony Milton , Commandant General Royal Marines as maritime forces commander on 16 April 2003. On 11 July 2003, 1st Armoured Division handed control over south-east Iraq to 3rd Mechanised Division , Major General Wall
5092-403: Was appointed deputy commander of occupation ground forces. By July 2004 the British area saw its fifth commander when Major General Bill Rollo took over. At the end of 2004 General Rollo was succeeded by Major General Jonathan Riley and in November of that year 4 Armoured Brigade rotated to replace 1 Mechanised Brigade. In May 2005, 4 Armoured Brigade was replaced by 12 Mechanised Brigade with
5168-505: Was broadly critical of the actions of the British government and military in making the case for the war, in tactics and in planning for the aftermath of the Iraq War . Richard Norton-Taylor of The Guardian wrote that the report "could hardly be more damning" of Tony Blair and "was an unprecedented, devastating indictment of how a prime minister was allowed to make decisions by discarding all pretence at cabinet government, subverting
5244-422: Was deceiving her and other MPs in an attempt to obtain consent for the invasion of Iraq. Gordon Brown had to retract his claim that spending on defence rose every year during the Iraq war, as this was found not to have been the case. Following a recess to avoid influencing the general election , the inquiry resumed public hearings on 29 June 2010. The first witness was Douglas Brand , chief police adviser to
5320-697: Was longer than the King James Version of the Bible , the Complete Works of William Shakespeare , and Tolstoy's War and Peace put together. The report was made available under the Open Government Licence v3.0, although this excluded material supplied by third parties. [REDACTED] The report – described by BBC News as "damning", by The Guardian as a "crushing verdict", and by The Telegraph as "scathing" –
5396-600: Was made up of regular troops from their base in Strensall just outside York and members for volunteer reserve units from all over the country. A small 25 bedded hospital was sent across the Kuwait Iraq border in the early days of the war. On arrival at Shaibah the hospital was set up and ready to take casualties within six and a half hours. Everything that you would expect in a modern hospital was present with an Emergency Department, X-ray, Labs, Surgical Theatres x 2, ITU and
5472-503: Was more potential for success there, which meant that equipment, manpower and the attention of commanders were diverted from Iraq in the later stages of the war, exacerbating difficulties. In a statement to the House of Commons the afternoon after the inquiry's report was released, the then Prime Minister David Cameron refused to say whether the Iraq War was "a mistake" or "wrong" and rejected calls for an apology to be issued on behalf of
5548-609: Was only approached in size by the 1991 Operation Granby deployment for the Gulf War and the 1956 Operation Musketeer Suez Crisis deployment. It was considerably larger than the 1982 Operation Corporate in the Falklands War , which saw around 30,000 personnel deployed and the Korean War , which saw fewer than 20,000 personnel deployed. Some 9,500 of the British servicemen and women who deployed on Operation Telic for
5624-404: Was succeeded by Major General Graeme Lamb as commander of British ground forces in Iraq. Unlike the invasion period, by then there was a substantial presence from many nations other than America, Britain, Australia and Poland. In addition to British troops, 3rd Division now commanded Italian , Dutch , Danish , Czech , Lithuanian , Norwegian , and New Zealand forces. 3rd Division handed over
5700-473: Was the Deputy Prime Minister at the time of the Iraq War, said that the war was illegal. The Financial Times reported, 'Every previous inquiry into Britain's decision to invade Iraq has swiftly been condemned by the public as a "whitewash". Such a description hardly applies to the monumental inquest that has been published by Sir John Chilcot. ... After Lord Hutton's report in 2003 and
5776-507: Was traduced and undermined by the way in which the decision to go to war was taken on". In a statement by Alex Salmond released after the inquiry's report was issued, the Scottish National Party said: "After such carnage, people will ask inevitable questions of was conflict inevitable and worthwhile? The answer from Chilcot is undoubtedly no. And who is responsible? The answer is undoubtedly Tony Blair. There must now be
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