The 11th Army Group was the main British Army force in Southeast Asia during the Second World War . Although a nominally British formation, it also included large numbers of troops and formations from the British Indian Army and from British African colonies, and also Nationalist Chinese and United States units.
69-607: 11th Army Group was activated in November 1943 to act as the land forces HQ for the newly formed South East Asia Command (SEAC), Admiral Lord Mountbatten , Supreme Commander of SEAC. The commander of 11th Army Group was General George Giffard , who had formerly been Commander-in-Chief West Africa Command and Commander of Eastern Army (part of GHQ India ). The headquarters was first situated in New Delhi , eventually moving to Kandy , Ceylon . Its responsibilities were limited to
138-874: A daunting task. Part of Stratemeyer's command, the Tenth Air Force, had been integrated with the RAF Third Tactical Air Force in India in December 1943 and was tasked with a number of roles in support of a variety of allied forces. Another component, the US Fourteenth Air Force in China, was under the jurisdiction of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as China theater commander. Although the India-China Division of
207-547: A defence of Dutch interests, and withdrew from Indonesia. As 1946 drew on, under its second and final commander, Lieutenant-General Montagu Stopford (June to November 1946), SEAC discharged its final tasks and was disbanded. It was no longer felt that a joint command was needed in the area. . China Burma India Theater of World War II Second Sino-Japanese War Taishō period Shōwa period Asia-Pacific Mediterranean and Middle East Other campaigns Coups China Burma India Theater ( CBI )
276-746: A new obsession for him. "On April 14, 1942, William Donovan , as Coordinator of Information (forerunner of the Office of Strategic Services ), activated Detachment 101 for action behind enemy lines in Burma . The first unit of its kind, the Detachment was charged with gathering intelligence, harassing the Japanese through guerrilla actions , identifying targets for the Army Air Force to bomb, and rescuing downed Allied airmen. Because Detachment 101
345-700: A plan designating the Pacific Ocean Areas as the focus of the main effort against Japan. Their reasoning was that advances in the Central Pacific were the most rapid route towards sustained, direct attacks on the Japanese Home Islands – e.g. subjecting Tokyo and other major cities to attacks by strategic bombers . A secondary line of advance – by US and Australian forces – "along the New Guinea- N.E.I. -Philippine axis",
414-426: A poor relationship in general. Slim later commented wryly: "Stilwell ... bitterly resisted... To watch Stilwell ... shift his opposition [to Gifford] from one of ... his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence." At a meeting organized by Mountbatten, to solve the problem, Stilwell surprised the others present by agreeing that, while he would direct NCAC and CEA in
483-403: A systematic firebombing of Japanese cities. Chinese Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek realized it was all fantasy. On the other hand, there were vast sums of American dollars available if he collaborated. He did so and managed to feed his starving soldiers, but they were so poorly equipped and led that offensive operations against the Japanese in China were impossible. However, Chiang did release
552-708: The 1st Air Commando Group . Within Eastern Air Command, Air Marshal Sir John Baldwin commanded the Third Tactical Air Force, originally formed to provide close air support to the Fourteenth Army. Baldwin was later succeeded by Air Marshal Sir Alec Coryton . U.S. Brigadier-General Howard C. Davidson and later Air Commodore F. J. W. Mellersh commanded the Strategic Air Force. In the new command, various units of
621-501: The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) , popularly known as "Merrill's Marauders", and the 5332d Brigade, Provisional or 'Mars Task Force', which assumed the Marauders' mission. Japanese policy towards China had long been a source of international controversy. Western powers had exploited China through the open door policy , advocated by United States diplomat William Woodville Rockhill , while Japan intervened more directly, creating
690-545: The British Fourteenth Army , under the command of General William Slim , could be co-ordinated. However, in practice, Gen. Stilwell never agreed to this arrangement. Stilwell was able to do this because of his multiple positions within complex command structures, including especially his simultaneous positions of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia, and Chief of Staff to Chinese leader Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek . As SEAC's deputy leader, Stilwell
759-476: The Burma Road . Moving north, the Japanese took Tounggoo and captured Lashio in northern Burma on 29 April. The British, primarily concerned with India, looked to Burma as the main theater of action against Japan and wanted Chinese troops to fight there. The United States conjured up visions of millions of Chinese soldiers who would hold the Japanese then throw them back, while providing close-in airbases for
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#1732786658832828-617: The Central Pacific (i.e. the "Pacific Ocean Areas" in contemporaneous Allied terminology) and the South-West Pacific , resulted from compromises reached at the Casablanca Conference . UK participants were focused on Nazi Germany, and saw the war against Japan being limited "to the defense of a fixed line in front of those positions that must be held". However, because such an approach was unacceptable to
897-644: The Ceylon Army Command . The Indian XXXIII Corps , training in Southern India for amphibious operations, also came under Eleventh Army Group for some purposes. It seemed logical that 11th Army Group should incorporate all Allied land forces, across the whole front in Burma, under a single command structure, including Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), which was made up mostly of Republic of China Army divisions under General Joseph Stilwell ,
966-600: The Chinese Expeditionary Force of two Chinese armies for action in Burma under Stilwell . Due to conflicts between Chiang, the British, Stilwell, and American General Claire Chennault , as well as general ill-preparedness against the more proficient Japanese army, the Burma defense collapsed. Stilwell escaped to India, but the recovery of Burma and construction of the Ledo Road to supply China became
1035-820: The European Theater of Operations , the CBI was never a " theater of operations " and did not have an overall operational command structure. Initially U.S. land units were split. Those in China were technically commanded by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek , as Stillwell was Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander in China. When the GALAHAD force (later to become the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional)) arrived in Bombay in October 1943, it came under
1104-593: The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., and had no command relationship with any authority in India. However, XX Bomber Command remained totally dependent on Eastern Air Command for supplies, bases, ground staff, and infrastructure support. The B-29 force included the 1st Photo Squadron , and the 58th Bombardment Wing at Chakulia , Kharagpur , with the 40th ( Chakulia Airport ), 444th , 462nd , and 468th Bombardment Groups . While in India, XX BC
1173-699: The Second World War . The initial supreme commander of the theatre was General Sir Archibald Wavell while head of the short-lived American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM) which was dissolved after the fall of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies . On 30 March 1942 the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued instructions naming General Douglas MacArthur as commander-in-chief of the South West Pacific Area , which
1242-412: The 11th Army Group at the same level as the Fourteenth Army, the attacks could then be co-ordinated at Army Group level. As Stilwell was also Deputy Supreme Commander of SEAC and, technically, already Giffard's superior, this would have meant Stilwell relinquishing day-to-day field control of NCAC and CEA forces. However, Stilwell rejected this suggestion; he and Giffard had very different personalities and
1311-703: The AAF's Air Transport Command received its tonnage allocations from Stratemeyer as Stilwell's deputy, ICD reported directly to Headquarters ATC in Washington, D.C. In the spring of 1944, the arrival of Boeing B-29 Superfortresses in the theater, presaged a major offensive against Japan. XX Bomber Command of the Twentieth Air Force was tasked with the strategic bombing of Japan under Operation Matterhorn . It engaged in very-long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombardment operations against Japan, Formosa , China, Indochina and Burma . It reported directly to
1380-625: The British, except that one Japanese unit in Borneo refused to surrender until November 1945. Thailand, although it had officially been an ally of Japan, quickly resumed both its independence and its ties with the western powers. Because of shortages of personnel, some use was made of Japanese Surrendered Personnel (JSP) in these areas. The Allies found that their war-time allies in the Viet Minh in Indochina, and Indonesian nationalist forces in
1449-581: The British-led South East Asia Command (SEAC) and Admiral Lord Mountbatten . However, Stilwell often broke the chain of command and communicated directly with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff on operational matters. When joint allied command was agreed upon, it was decided that the senior position should be held by a British officer because the British had the greatest number of forces in India and Burma (in much
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#17327866588321518-488: The China. RAF aircraft destined for SEAC had the word "SNAKE" applied after the serial during ferrying to prevent them being appropriated by other commands along the route. In February 1945 Air Marshal Keith Park was appointed Allied Air Commander of South-East Asia Command [SEAC] where he served until the end of the war. Once most of Burma was re-captured by Fourteenth Army, the command turned its attention towards its next major operational objective: Malaya. However,
1587-484: The East Indies, were well armed, well-organised and determined. It was intended that British forces would temporarily enforce military government over a small section of Indochina, because of local resistance, logistics and French sensibilities. However, in the end the commander of British forces declared de facto military government, to make it possible for French forces to return. Aided by armed militias formed by
1656-725: The Japanese during the occupation, Indonesian nationalists in Java declared the Dutch East Indies a republic, and independent from the Netherlands . The British intended that the Dutch colonial administration should return, and assisted a small military contingent, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA). However they initially avoided significant conflict with the nationalists. It
1725-400: The Japanese military during the war had encouraged the hoarding but discouraged the growing of rice. Migrations to urban areas, where rations were rumored to be more available, worsened the situation. In Kuala Lumpur, Pahang, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Singapore, over 20 per cent of children were undersized or malnourished for their age. The British tried to bring in as much food as they could, but
1794-560: The Pacific Ocean Areas, in which the supreme commander was US Admiral Chester Nimitz . Some saw SEAC as an organization for recapturing colonial possessions. The British also sometimes appeared to be more interested in liberating their own Asian possessions than the Americans did. This led Washington to try to distance itself from SEAC politically. On 2 December 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff officially approved in principle
1863-765: The Philippines , Malaya , Singapore , Hong Kong , Guam , Wake Island , and Thailand . Japan cut off Allied supplies to China that had been coming through Burma . China could be supplied only by flying over the Himalaya mountains (" The Hump ") from India, or capturing territory in Burma and building a new road—the Ledo Road . In 1941 and 1942, Japan was overextended. Its naval base could not defend its conquests, and its industrial base could not strengthen its navy. To cut off China from Allied aid, it went into Burma and captured Rangoon on 8 March 1942, cutting off
1932-491: The Royal Air Force and the U.S. Tenth Air Force worked side-by-side. In the autumn of 1943 SEAAC had 48 RAF and 17 USAAF squadrons; by the following May, the figures had risen to 64 and 28, respectively. At Eastern Air Command, Gen. Stratemeyer had a status comparable to that of Stilwell. Coordinating the efforts of the various allied air components while maintaining relations with diverse command structures proved
2001-720: The Supreme Commander a Commander in Chief for each of the land sea and air forces. This was implemented for the naval and air forces (including the establishment of Air Command, South East Asia ) but the British 11th Army Group , under SEAC itself, controlled only British land forces. US and Chinese forces serving in the South East Asian theatre, organised as the Northern Combat Area Command or NCAC commanded by Stilwell, answered directly to
2070-571: The Supreme Commander because Stilwell refused to serve under the 11th Army Group commander George Giffard . The Eleventh Army Group had the Fourteenth Army on the Burma front, and the British garrison in Ceylon under its direct command. Stilwell also served as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek , who was officially the Supreme Allied Commander in China. Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse
2139-757: The United States, it was agreed that there would be offensive actions in Burma, operations in support of China, and other activity beyond holding a defensive line in South East Asia, as a result of US demands that the Japanese be kept off-balance, throughout any areas in which they might encounter Allied forces. Nevertheless, for the Western Allies, the South East Asia theatre, China , and the North Pacific (including Alaska), were destined to become secondary theatres, relative to efforts in
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2208-637: The advance of the Chinese Ledo forces into north Burma in late 1943 meant that he was often out of touch with both his own headquarters and with the overall situation. Not until late 1944, after Stilwell was recalled to Washington, was the chain of command clarified. His overall role, and the CBI command, was then split among three people: Lt Gen. Raymond Wheeler became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia; Major-General Albert Wedemeyer became Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, and commander of US Forces, China Theater (USFCT). Lt Gen. Daniel Sultan
2277-589: The defense of China to be vital to the defense of the United States. Over the summer, as Japan moved south into French Indo-China , the U.S., Britain and the Netherlands instituted an oil embargo on Japan, cutting off 90% of its supplies. The embargo threatened the operations of the Kwantung Army , which had over a million soldiers deployed in China. Japan responded with a tightly co-ordinated offensive on 7/8 December, simultaneously attacking Pearl Harbor ,
2346-474: The field, "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing ". In effect, Stilwell would both temporarily become Slim's deputy and, de facto , temporarily vacate his role as Deputy Commander of SEAC. That is, Slim would continue to report to Giffard in regard to Fourteenth Army, but would report directly to Mountbatten in regard to NCAC/CEA. Mountbatten accepted this temporary command structure. In practice, Slim found that he
2415-457: The formation of ACSEA in November 1943, and the middle of August 1944, American and British forces operating in Burma destroyed or damaged more than 700 Japanese aircraft with a further 100 aircraft probably destroyed. This achievement considerably reduced dangers to Air Transport Command cargo planes flying in support of the Hump airlift operation. By May 1944, EAC resupply missions in support of
2484-472: The handling of operations against Japanese forces. GHQ India remained responsible for the rear areas and the training of the Army in India , although there was often overlap between the headquarters' responsibilities and (in the first year of Eleventh Army Group's existence) conflicts between their planners. The main subordinate formations of 11th Army Group were Fourteenth Army (under General William Slim ) and
2553-516: The land command problems in South East Asia had been relieved when General Stilwell was recalled to Washington on 19 October, at the behest of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek . His replacement as commander of NCAC and the administrative HQ U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater (USFIBT) was Lieutenant General Sultan . (Stilwell's replacements for his other responsibilities were Lieutenant General Wedemeyer as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek and General Wheeler as Deputy Supreme Commander, SEAC.) As part of
2622-420: The most senior officer among US forces in China, Burma and India . Stilwell controlled significant forces: while NCAC units were to advance from Ledo (India), towards Myitkyina (Burma), to cover the construction of the Ledo Road , Stilwell also commanded the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEA), which would advance into Burma from the north-east, out of Yunnan . If both of Stilwell's commands were placed under
2691-456: The naval commander under Mountbatten. It was not until late 1944 that the land forces chain of command was clarified, after Stilwell was recalled to Washington. His overall role, and the CBI command were then split among three people: Lt Gen. Raymond Wheeler became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia; Maj. Gen. Albert Wedemeyer became Chief of Staff to Chiang, and commander of US Forces, China Theater (USFCT). Lt Gen. Daniel Sultan
2760-569: The outset, Western Allied forces available for the wider war against Japan were limited – by an overall Allied commitment towards defeating Nazi Germany , before the Empire of Japan . This was especially the case for the UK, and major advances were not anticipated in Asia until mid-late 1944 at least – that is, not until the defeat of Germany had become inevitable. A strategic focus by the Western Allies on
2829-509: The puppet-state of Manchukuo . By 1937, Japan was engaged in a full-scale war of conquest in China . The infamous Rape of Nanking galvanized Western opinion and led to direct financial aid for the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and increasing economic sanctions against Japan. In 1941, the U.S. made a series of decisions to support China in its war with Japan: Lend Lease supplies were provided after President Franklin D. Roosevelt announced
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2898-447: The reorganisation, NCAC was placed directly under ALFSEA, although they were also subject to directives from Chiang. Indian XV Corps , commanded by Lieutenant General Christison , was removed from command of Fourteenth Army and subordinated directly to ALFSEA. The Corps was responsible for operations in Burma's coastal Arakan Province , and had its own separate lines of communication and supply. Fourteenth Army, still under Slim's command,
2967-509: The return of forces from the pre-war colonial powers. The formation deployed to the East Indies was the Indian XV Corps under command of Lieutenant General Sir Philip Christison , which included 5th Indian Infantry Division , 23rd Indian Infantry Division and 5th Parachute Brigade . Military government was soon established in Burma, Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo . Sarawak and Sumatra did not prove to be major headaches for
3036-1134: The same time, Western governments expected SEAC to re-establish colonial regimes in territories lost to Japan in 1941–45 where nationalist, anti-colonial forces had gained strength. After Japan's surrender, Lt. General Itagaki Seishiro , who commanded the Japanese Seventh Area Army in Southeast Asia, were sent to Tokyo to stand trial for war crime. His soldiers who guarded the Jurong and Changi prisons in Singapore became captives of their former Allied prisoners. The British soon put these captives to work filling bomb craters, cleaning toilets, and cutting grass. They marched to their work sites each morning and back to their prisons at night. There were bouts of violence targeting former Japanese soldiers, but there were also offers of help to those Japanese civilians that were still waiting to be repatriated. Food shortages were everywhere. Requisitions by
3105-600: The same way as the US did in the Pacific War ). Admiral Lord Mountbatten was appointed as the Supreme Allied Commander of South-East Asia forces in October 1943. Chiang however later objected to deferring to Mountbatten on matters related to operations in China. General Stilwell, who also had operational command of the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), a US-Chinese formation, was to report in theory to Gen. George Giffard – commander of Eleventh Army Group – so that NCAC and
3174-446: The system of rationing soon broke down. Prices soared, and a black market for British military ration flourished. Rising inflation was made worse after the British demonetized the Japanese occupation currency. A wave of strikes swept Singapore, led by Communist leaning labour unions and hundreds of thousands their members. British Commonwealth troops were landed in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia) and French Indochina to facilitate
3243-527: The term "CBI" was significant in logistical, material and personnel matters; it was and is commonly used within the US for these theaters. U.S. and Chinese fighting forces in the CBI included the Chinese Expeditionary Force , the Flying Tigers , transport and bomber units flying the Hump , including the Tenth Air Force , the 1st Air Commando Group , the engineers who built the Ledo Road ,
3312-711: The theater, with Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Peirse as Commander-in-Chief. Under Peirse's deputy, USAAF Major General George E. Stratemeyer , Eastern Air Command (EAC) was organized in 1943 to control Allied air operations in Burma, with headquarters in Calcutta . Unlike the strained relations and confusion with Allied ground force commands, air force operations in the CBI were relatively smooth. Relations improved even further after new U.S. military aid began arriving, together with capable USAAF officers such as Brigadier General William D. Old of CBI Troop Carrier Command, and Colonels Philip Cochran and John R. Alison of
3381-483: The three original command organizations at Ramgarh.) Headquarters Ramgarh Training Center was responsible for the training of Chinese Army in India, and Headquarters Chinese Army in India was responsible for the activation, organization, administration, and command of Chinese units. After consultation among the Allied governments, Air Command South-East Asia was formed in November 1943 to control all Allied air forces in
3450-617: The two air forces to be integrated under the name Eastern Air Command. The US Fourteenth Air Force , which was based in China and the US Twentieth Air Force – strategic bomber units based in India – were never controlled by SEAC but their operations were coordinated with SEAC. At sea, the command structure was relatively simple, since the Royal Navy was providing almost all naval forces in the area. Admiral Sir James Somerville , Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet , became
3519-625: The use of atomic bombs on the Japanese mainland brought the war to an abrupt end. The borders of SEAC were adjusted in the aftermath of the war, and its emphasis shifted from combat operations to military government. French Indochina was added, along with Borneo – most of which had already been captured by Australian forces, under the South West Pacific Command – and Java . The command became responsible for over 128 million people, with at least 120,000 of them still under Japanese custody. This added immensely to its problems. At
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#17327866588323588-425: Was Giffard's superior, but as operational commander of NCAC, Giffard was Stilwell's superior. As the two men did not get on, this inevitably lead to conflict and confusion. Stilwell, however, bitterly resisted [taking orders from Giffard] ... To watch Stilwell, when hard pressed, shift his opposition from one of the several strong-points he held by virtue of his numerous Allied, American and Chinese offices, to another
3657-442: Was a lesson in mobile offensive-defence. Eventually at a SEAC meeting to sort out the chain of command for NCAC, Stilwell astonished everyone by saying "I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing ". Although far from ideal, this compromise was accepted. Although Stilwell was the control and co-ordinating point for all command activity in the theater, his assumption of personal direction of
3726-606: Was able to work well with Stilwell and "this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well". Once Stilwell's forces reached Kamaing on 20 May 1944, the arrangement ceased and Stilwell again took orders only from Mountbatten. On 12 November 1944, Eleventh Army Group was redesignated Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA). General Sir Oliver Leese succeeded Giffard in command. (Mountbatten's Chief of Staff , Lieutenant General Pownall , had been lobbying for some time for Leese to be appointed, but Leese could not be relieved of command of Eighth Army for several months). Many of
3795-844: Was appointed deputy supreme commander. Stilwell was also, officially, deputy to Chiang Kai Shek , as Allied commander in China, and commanded all US forces across both theatres (which were known in the US as the China Burma India (CBI) Theater ). Meanwhile the British Army commander in India, Auchinleck as Commander-in-Chief, India , provided vital base support. Mountbatten arrived in India on 7 October and SEAC came formally into being in Delhi at midnight on 15/16 November. SEAC headquarters moved in April 1944 to Kandy in Ceylon . From
3864-408: Was appointed the Air Commander in Chief under Mountbatten. Air units taking part in the Burma Campaign were, at first, part of either the RAF Third Tactical Air Force or the USAAF Tenth Air Force . Tenth Air Force came under SEAC only through Stilwell as commanding General CBI Theater. To avoid a potentially cumbersome chain of command and overlapping effort Mountbatten gave orders in December for
3933-566: Was established on 30 June 1942 by General Stilwell, the Commanding General, USAF, CBI, for the training of Chinese troops in India. The Supreme Commander, China Theater, General Chiang Kai-Shek, had approved Ramgarh Cantonment , as the site for a training center to train, equip, and reinforce the Chinese troops that had retreated into India from Burma. The first Chinese troops arrived on 17 July 1942. Headquarters RTC and Hq Camp Ramgarh combined and CG RTC assumed command on 1 February 1943. (These two organizations and Hq Chinese Army in India were
4002-415: Was killed, as he pushed for the nationalists to surrender their weapons. As a result, on 10 November 1945, Surabaya was attacked by British forces, leading to the bloody Battle of Surabaya . The city was secured later that month. The battle for Surabaya was the bloodiest single engagement of the Indonesian National Revolution (1945–49). However, the British were reluctant to devote their scarce resources to
4071-449: Was made responsible for the water areas of the South China Sea, Borneo, and Java. In August 1943, the Allies created the combined South East Asian Command, to assume overall command of air, sea and land operations in the theatre. In August 1943, with the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff , Winston Churchill appointed Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten as Supreme Allied Commander South East Asia. US Army General Joseph Stilwell
4140-518: Was never larger than a few hundred Americans, it relied on support from various tribal groups in Burma. In particular, the vigorously anti-Japanese Kachin people were vital to the unit's success." Detachment 101's efforts opened the way for Stilwell's Chinese forces, Wingate's Raiders, Merrill's Marauders , and the counter-attack against the Japanese Imperial life-line. US forces in the CBI were administered by General Joseph "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell . However, unlike other combat theaters, for example
4209-483: Was only possible for British forces to establish military government in parts of Indonesia, and they found that the location of Allied prisoners of war – and civilians interned by Japanese forces – were sometimes used by nationalists in bargaining for political ends. British troops found themselves in increasing conflict with the nationalists. The nationalists attacked JSP garrisons awaiting repatriation, to seize their arms. A British Brigadier, A. W. S. Mallaby ,
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#17327866588324278-430: Was placed under ALFSEA. As the drive to liberate Burma began in earnest however, Chiang Kai-shek and Wedemeyer made increasing demands for NCAC's formations to be moved to the China Theatre to meet the threat of Japanese attacks from the north. Once the Burma Road from Mandalay to Chungking was secured NCAC became passive and in March 1945 Mountbatten agreed to the US and Chinese troops in NCAC being gradually withdrawn to
4347-399: Was promoted, from deputy commander of CBI to commander of US Forces, India-Burma Theater (USFIBT) and commander of the NCAC. The 11th Army Group was redesignated Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA) under a new commander Lieutenant-General Oliver Leese who had relinquished command of the Eighth Army in Italy, and NCAC (which by this time included Chinese, American and British units)
4416-510: Was promoted, from deputy commander of CBI to commander of US Forces, India–Burma Theater (USFIBT) and commander of the NCAC. The 11th Army Group was redesignated Allied Land Forces South East Asia (ALFSEA), and NCAC was decisively placed under this formation. However, by the time the last phase of the Burma Campaign began in earnest, NCAC had become irrelevant, and it was dissolved in early 1945. Ramgarh Training Center, in Bihar Province, India, an American-staffed, American-operated organisation,
4485-414: Was responsible for deploying troops into Malaya, the Dutch East Indies , Thailand and French Indo-China to disarm Japanese forces and repatriate Allied prisoners of war. The headquarters was closed down later in the year. South East Asia Command South East Asia Command ( SEAC ) was the body set up to be in overall charge of Allied operations in the South-East Asian Theatre during
4554-419: Was supported logistically by Tenth Air Force and the India-China Division, Air Transport Command . The B-29 groups moved to West Field, Tinian , in early 1945. After a period of reshuffling, Eastern Air Command's air operations began to show results. In August 1944, Admiral Mountbatten said to a press conference that EAC fighter missions had practically swept the Japanese air force from Burmese skies. Between
4623-426: Was the United States military designation during World War II for the China and Southeast Asian or India–Burma (IBT) theaters . Operational command of Allied forces (including U.S. forces) in the CBI was officially the responsibility of the Supreme Commanders for South East Asia or China. In practice, U.S. forces were usually overseen by General Joseph Stilwell , the Deputy Allied Commander in China;
4692-486: Was the largest component of ALFSEA, making the main attack into Central Burma. After the capture of Rangoon in May 1945, British Twelfth Army was formed in Burma, and became part of ALFSEA. Indian XV Corps reverted to the command of Fourteenth Army, which was preparing amphibious operations to recover Malaya . NCAC had previously ceased active operations. Leese was relieved and replaced as commander of ALFSEA by General Slim. After Japan surrendered in August 1945, ALFSEA
4761-510: Was to be controlled by the separate South West Pacific Area command under Douglas MacArthur (US Army). The initial land forces operational area for SEAC was India , Burma , Ceylon , Malaya , northern islands of Sumatra , and, for offensive operations, Siam (Thailand). On 15 August 1945 (VJ-Day) this was expanded to include the rest parts of Dutch East Indies and southern part of French Indochina . Command arrangements in SEAC were always complicated. Ideally there should have been under
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