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78-590: AS-204 was a Saturn IB launch vehicle that is associated with two missions: Apollo 1 , scheduled to be the first crewed Apollo flight, but the crew was killed on the launch pad Apollo 5 , the first test of the Apollo Lunar Module, which used the AS-204 rocket that was originally intended for Apollo 1 [REDACTED] Topics referred to by the same term This disambiguation page lists articles associated with

156-519: A NASA internal document citing problems with prime Apollo contractor North American Aviation , which became known as the Phillips Report . This disclosure embarrassed NASA Administrator James E. Webb , who was unaware of the document's existence, and attracted controversy to the Apollo program. Despite congressional displeasure at NASA's lack of openness, both congressional committees ruled that

234-442: A fire in the cockpit." After 6.8 seconds of silence, a second, badly garbled transmission was heard by various listeners (who believed this transmission was made by Chaffee ) as: The transmission lasted 5.0 seconds and ended with a cry of pain. Some blockhouse witnesses said that they saw White on the television monitors, reaching for the inner hatch release handle as flames in the cabin spread from left to right. The heat of

312-476: A great deal of risk, especially in initial operations, regardless of planning. You just can't forecast all the things that could happen, or when they could happen. "I suppose that someday we are going to have a failure. In every other business there are failures, and they are bound to happen sooner or later", he added. Grissom was asked about the fear of potential catastrophe in a December 1966 interview: You sort of have to put that out of your mind. There's always

390-631: A mechanically operated one for the Gemini and Apollo programs. Before the fire, the Apollo astronauts had recommended changing the design to an outward-opening hatch, and this was already slated for inclusion in the Block II command module design. According to Donald K. Slayton 's testimony before the House investigation of the accident, this was based on ease of exit for spacewalks and at the end of flight, rather than for emergency exit. The board noted that

468-509: A possibility that you can have a catastrophic failure, of course; this can happen on any flight; it can happen on the last one as well as the first one. So, you just plan as best you can to take care of all these eventualities, and you get a well-trained crew and you go fly. The launch simulation on January 27, 1967, on pad 34, was a "plugs-out" test to determine whether the spacecraft would operate nominally on (simulated) internal power while detached from all cables and umbilicals. Passing this test

546-503: A total of six hours and fifteen minutes, two and a half hours longer than it had been during the plugs-out test. The review board cited "many types and classes of combustible material" close to ignition sources. The NASA crew systems department had installed 34 square feet (3.2 m ) of Velcro throughout the spacecraft, almost like carpeting. This Velcro was found to be flammable in a high-pressure 100% oxygen environment. Astronaut Buzz Aldrin states in his book Men From Earth that

624-568: Is that both bodies were at the lower edge of the hatch. They were not in the seats. They were almost completely clear of the seat areas." As a result of the in-flight failure of the Gemini 8 mission on March 17, 1966, NASA Deputy Administrator Robert Seamans wrote and implemented Management Instruction 8621.1 on April 14, 1966, defining Mission Failure Investigation Policy And Procedures . This modified NASA's existing accident procedures, based on military aircraft accident investigation, by giving

702-513: The spacecraft performed. The CSM for this flight, number 012 built by North American Aviation (NAA), was a Block I version designed before the lunar orbit rendezvous landing strategy was chosen; therefore it lacked the capability of docking with the lunar module. This was incorporated into the Block II CSM design, along with lessons learned in Block I. Block II would be test-flown with

780-632: The Apollo lunar program ended, three Apollo CSM/Saturn IBs ferried crews to the Skylab space station. In 1975, one last Apollo/Saturn IB launched the Apollo portion of the joint US- USSR Apollo–Soyuz Test Project (ASTP). A backup Apollo CSM/Saturn IB was assembled and made ready for a Skylab rescue mission, but never flown. The remaining Saturn IBs in NASA's inventory were scrapped after the ASTP mission, as no use could be found for them and all heavy lift needs of

858-577: The Apollo program were made from LC-34 and LC-37 , Cape Kennedy Air Force Station . The Saturn IB was used between 1973 and 1975 for three crewed Skylab flights, and one Apollo-Soyuz Test Project flight. This final production run did not have alternating black and white S-IB stage tanks, or vertical stripes on the S-IVB aft tank skirt, which were present on the earlier vehicles. Since LC-34 and 37 were inactive by then, these launches utilized Kennedy Space Center's LC-39B . Mobile Launcher Platform No. 1

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936-604: The CSM and LM together on a Saturn   V (AS-503) to an elliptical medium Earth orbit (MEO), to be crewed by Frank Borman , Michael Collins and William Anders . McDivitt, Scott and Schweickart had started their training for AS-258 in CM-101 at the NAA plant in Downey, California, when the Apollo   1 accident occurred. Once all outstanding CSM-012 hardware problems had been fixed,

1014-481: The Deputy Administrator the option of performing independent investigations of major failures, beyond those for which the various Program Office officials were normally responsible. It declared, "It is NASA policy to investigate and document the causes of all major mission failures which occur in the conduct of its space and aeronautical activities and to take appropriate corrective actions as a result of

1092-410: The Gemini, made that impractical. This became moot when slippage in readiness of the AS-204 spacecraft caused the last-quarter 1966 target date to be missed, and the mission was rescheduled for February 21, 1967. In October 1966, NASA announced the flight would carry a small television camera to broadcast live from the command module. The camera would also be used to allow flight controllers to monitor

1170-575: The LM when the latter was ready. Director of Flight Crew Operations Deke Slayton selected the first Apollo crew in January 1966, with Grissom as Command Pilot, White as Senior Pilot, and rookie Donn F. Eisele as Pilot. But Eisele dislocated his shoulder twice aboard the KC-135 weightlessness training aircraft , and had to undergo surgery on January 27. Slayton replaced him with Chaffee, and NASA announced

1248-452: The Moon if we can't talk between two or three buildings?" The simulated countdown was put on hold again at 5:40 pm while attempts were made to troubleshoot the communications problem. All countdown functions up to the simulated internal power transfer had been successfully completed by 6:20 pm, and at 6:30 the count remained on hold at T minus 10 minutes. The crew members were using

1326-576: The Saturn I's payload limit of 20,000 pounds (9,100 kg) to 162 km would allow testing of only the command module with a smaller propulsion module attached, as the command and service module would have a dry weight of at least 26,300 pounds (11,900 kg), in addition to service propulsion and reaction control fuel. In July 1962, NASA announced selection of the C-5 for the lunar landing mission, and decided to develop another launch vehicle by upgrading

1404-506: The Saturn I, replacing its S-IV second stage with the S-IVB , which would also be modified for use as the Saturn V third stage. The S-I first stage would also be upgraded to the S-IB by improving the thrust of its engines and removing some weight. The new Saturn IB, with a payload capability of at least 35,000 pounds (16,000 kg), would replace the Saturn I for Earth orbit testing, allowing

1482-516: The Saturn IB and Saturn V provided a common interface to the Apollo spacecraft. The only major difference was that the S-IVB on the Saturn V burned only part of its propellant to achieve Earth orbit, so it could be restarted for trans-lunar injection . The S-IVB on the Saturn IB needed all of its propellant to achieve Earth orbit. The Saturn IB launched two uncrewed CSM suborbital flights to a height of 162 km, one uncrewed LM orbital flight, and

1560-730: The US space program could be serviced by the cheaper and more versatile Titan III family and also the Space Shuttle . In 1959, NASA's Silverstein Committee issued recommendations to develop the Saturn class launch vehicles, growing from the C-1 . When the Apollo program was started in 1961 with the goal of landing men on the Moon, NASA chose the Saturn I for Earth orbital test missions. However,

1638-516: The astronauts to breathe while reducing the fire risk. The Apollo   1 crew had successfully tested this procedure with their spacecraft in the Operations and Checkout Building altitude (vacuum) chamber on October 18 and 19, 1966, and the backup crew of Schirra, Eisele and Cunningham had repeated it on December 30. The investigation board noted that, during these tests, the command module had been fully pressurized with pure oxygen four times, for

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1716-587: The astronauts was detected by the spacecraft's inertial measurement unit and the astronauts' biomedical sensors, and also indicated by increases in oxygen spacesuit flow, and sounds from Grissom's stuck-open microphone. The stuck microphone was part of a problem with the communications loop connecting the crew, the Operations and Checkout Building , and the Complex 34 blockhouse control room. The poor communications led Grissom to remark: "How are we going to get to

1794-495: The board, and was replaced by Robert W. Van Dolah of the U.S. Bureau of Mines . The next day North American's chief engineer for Apollo, George Jeffs, resigned as well. Seamans ordered all Apollo   1 hardware and software impounded, to be released only under control of the board. After thorough stereo photographic documentation of the CM-012 interior, the board ordered its disassembly using procedures tested by disassembling

1872-426: The cabin, beginning the second phase. The third phase began when most of the oxygen was consumed and was replaced with atmospheric air, essentially quenching the fire, but causing high concentrations of carbon monoxide and heavy smoke to fill the cabin, and large amounts of soot to be deposited on surfaces as they cooled. It took five minutes for the pad workers to open all three hatch layers, and they could not drop

1950-443: The cabin, which both astronauts and technicians found convenient for holding tools and equipment in place. Although Shea gave the spacecraft a passing grade, after the meeting they gave him a crew portrait they had posed with heads bowed and hands clasped in prayer, with the inscription: It isn't that we don't trust you, Joe, but this time we've decided to go over your head. Shea gave his staff orders to tell North American to remove

2028-405: The command and service module to be flown with a partial fuel load. It would also allow launching the 32,000-pound (15,000 kg) lunar excursion module separately for uncrewed and crewed Earth orbital testing, before the Saturn V was ready to be flown. It would also give early development to the third stage. On May 12, 1966, NASA announced the vehicle would be called the "uprated Saturn I", at

2106-495: The command module (CM). The name Apollo 1, chosen by the crew, was made official by NASA in their honor after the fire. Immediately after the fire, NASA convened an Accident Review Board to determine the cause of the fire, and both chambers of the United States Congress conducted their own committee inquiries to oversee NASA's investigation. The ignition source of the fire was determined to be electrical, and

2184-452: The cover until the excess pressure was vented. Emergency procedure called for Grissom to open the cabin vent valve first, allowing White to remove the cover, but Grissom was prevented from doing this because the valve was located to the left, behind the initial wall of flames. Also, while the system could easily vent the normal pressure, its flow capacity was utterly incapable of handling the rapid increase to 29 psi (200 kPa) caused by

2262-461: The crew selection on March 21, 1966. James McDivitt , David Scott and Russell Schweickart were named as the backup crew. On September 29, Walter Schirra , Eisele, and Walter Cunningham were named as the prime crew for a second Block I CSM flight, AS-205. NASA planned to follow this with an uncrewed test flight of the LM (AS-206), then the third crewed mission would be a dual flight designated AS-278 (or AS-207/208), in which AS-207 would launch

2340-401: The crew were not believed to be major factors, and it was concluded that most of them had occurred postmortem. Asphyxiation occurred after the fire melted the astronauts' suits and oxygen tubes, exposing them to the lethal atmosphere of the cabin. The review board identified several major factors which combined to cause the fire and the astronauts' deaths: The review board determined that

2418-486: The electrical power momentarily failed at 23:30:55 GMT, and found evidence of several electric arcs in the interior equipment. They were unable to conclusively identify a single ignition source. They determined that the fire most likely started near the floor in the lower left section of the cabin, close to the Environmental Control Unit. It spread from the left wall of the cabin to the right, with

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2496-524: The end of the S-IVB burn. AS-206, 207, and 208 inserted the Command and Service Module in a 150-by-222-kilometer (81-by-120-nautical-mile) elliptical orbit which was co-planar with the Skylab one. The SPS engine of the Command and Service Module was used at orbit apogee to achieve a Hohmann transfer to the Skylab orbit at 431 kilometers (233 nautical miles). The first five Saturn IB launches for

2574-500: The environmental control unit in the command module was found to have a design flaw, and was sent back to the manufacturer for design changes and rework. The returned ECU then leaked water/glycol coolant, and had to be returned a second time. Also during this time, a propellant tank in another service module had ruptured during testing at NAA, prompting the removal from the KSC test chamber of the service module so it could be tested for signs of

2652-498: The event of a launch abort. The boost hatch cover was partially, but not fully, latched in place because the flexible boost protective cover was slightly distorted by some cabling run under it to provide the simulated internal power (the spacecraft's fuel cell reactants were not loaded for this test). After the hatches were sealed, the air in the cabin was replaced with pure oxygen at 16.7  psi (115  kPa ), 2 psi (14 kPa) higher than atmospheric pressure. Movement by

2730-641: The findings and recommendations." Immediately after the   fire NASA Administrator James E. Webb asked President Lyndon B. Johnson to allow NASA to handle the investigation according to its established procedure, promising to be truthful in assessing blame, and to keep the appropriate leaders of Congress informed. Deputy Director Seamans then ordered the establishment of the Apollo 204 Review Board chaired by Langley Research Center director Floyd L. Thompson , which included astronaut Frank Borman , spacecraft designer Maxime Faget , and six others. On February 1, Cornell University professor Frank A. Long left

2808-424: The fire fed by pure oxygen caused the pressure to rise to 29 psi (200 kPa), which ruptured the command module's inner wall at 6:31:19 (23:31:19 GMT, initial phase of the fire). Flames and gases then rushed outside the command module through open access panels to two levels of the pad service structure. The intense heat, dense smoke, and ineffective gas masks designed for toxic fumes rather than smoke, hampered

2886-495: The fire spread rapidly due to combustible nylon material and the high-pressure pure oxygen cabin atmosphere. Rescue was prevented by the plug door hatch, which could not be opened against the internal pressure of the cabin. Because the rocket was unfueled, the test had not been considered hazardous, and emergency preparedness for it was poor. During the Congressional investigation, Senator Walter Mondale publicly revealed

2964-451: The fire. Three minutes after the count was resumed the hatch installation was started. The hatch consisted of three parts: a removable inner hatch which stayed inside the cabin; a hinged outer hatch which was part of the spacecraft's heat shield; and an outer hatch cover which was part of the boost protective cover enveloping the entire command module to protect it from aerodynamic heating during launch and from launch escape rocket exhaust in

3042-477: The first crewed Block II CSM, which would then rendezvous and dock with the LM launched uncrewed on AS-208. In March, NASA was studying the possibility of flying the first Apollo mission as a joint space rendezvous with the final Project Gemini mission, Gemini 12 in November 1966. But by May, delays in making Apollo ready for flight just by itself, and the extra time needed to incorporate compatibility with

3120-409: The first crewed CSM orbital mission (first planned as Apollo 1 , later flown as Apollo 7 ). It also launched one orbital mission, AS-203 , without a payload so the S-IVB would have residual liquid hydrogen fuel. This mission supported the design of the restartable version of the S-IVB used in the Saturn V, by observing the behavior of the liquid hydrogen in weightlessness . In 1973, the year after

3198-454: The flammable material had been removed per the crew's August 19 complaints and Joseph Shea's order, but was replaced before the August 26 delivery to Cape Kennedy. The inner hatch cover used a plug door design, sealed by higher pressure inside the cabin than outside. The normal pressure level used for launch (2 psi (14 kPa) above ambient) created sufficient force to prevent removing

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3276-438: The flammables from the cabin, but did not supervise the issue personally. North American shipped spacecraft CM-012 to Kennedy Space Center on August 26, 1966, under a conditional Certificate of Flight Worthiness: 113 significant incomplete planned engineering changes had to be completed at KSC. That was not all; an additional 623 engineering change orders were made and completed after delivery. Grissom became so frustrated with

3354-455: The floor being affected only briefly. The board noted that a silver-plated copper wire, running through an environmental control unit near the center couch, had become stripped of its Teflon insulation and abraded by repeated opening and closing of a small access door. This weak point in the wiring also ran near a junction in an ethylene glycol /water cooling line that had been prone to leaks. Electrolysis of ethylene glycol solution with

3432-430: The ground crew's attempts to rescue the men. There were fears the command module had exploded, or soon would, and that the fire might ignite the solid fuel rocket in the launch escape tower above the command module, which would have likely killed nearby ground personnel, and possibly have destroyed the pad. As the pressure was released by the cabin rupture, the rush of gases within the module caused flames to spread across

3510-399: The hatch. Because of the large strands of melted nylon fusing the astronauts to the cabin interior, removing the bodies took nearly 90 minutes. The bodies were only able to be removed after 7.5 hours from the time the incident took place, due to the gasses and toxins present which prevented medical personnel from entering initially. Deke Slayton was possibly the first NASA official to examine

3588-463: The identical CM-014 and conducted a thorough investigation of every part. The board also reviewed the astronauts' autopsy results and interviewed witnesses. Seamans sent Webb weekly status reports of the investigation's progress, and the board issued its final report on April 5, 1967. According to the Board, Grissom suffered severe third-degree burns on more than one-third of his body and his spacesuit

3666-501: The inability of the training simulator engineers to keep up with the spacecraft changes that he took a lemon from a tree by his house and hung it on the simulator. The command and service modules were mated in the KSC altitude chamber in September, and combined system testing was performed. Altitude testing was performed first uncrewed, then with both the prime and backup crews, from October 10 through December 30. During this testing,

3744-438: The inner hatch to the cabin floor as intended, so they pushed it out of the way to one side. Although the cabin lights remained on, they were unable to see the astronauts through the dense smoke. As the smoke cleared they found the bodies, but were not able to remove them. The fire had partly melted Grissom's and White's nylon space suits and the hoses connecting them to the life support system. Grissom had removed his restraints and

3822-683: The instrument unit at the Space Systems Center in Huntsville, Alabama . Located at the top of the S-IVB stage, it consisted of a Launch Vehicle Digital Computer (LVDC), an inertial platform, accelerometers, a tracking, telemetry and command system and associated environmental controls. It controlled the entire rocket from just before liftoff until battery depletion. Like other rocket guidance systems, it maintained its state vector (position and velocity estimates) by integrating accelerometer measurements, sent firing and steering commands to

3900-540: The intense heat of the fire. North American had originally suggested the hatch open outward and use explosive bolts to blow the hatch in case of emergency, as had been done in Project Mercury . NASA did not agree, arguing the hatch could accidentally open, as it had on Grissom's Liberty Bell 7 flight, so the Manned Spacecraft Center designers rejected the explosive design in favor of

3978-431: The issues raised in the report had no bearing on the accident. Crewed Apollo flights were suspended for twenty months while the command module's hazards were addressed. However, the development and uncrewed testing of the lunar module (LM) and Saturn V rocket continued. The Saturn IB launch vehicle for Apollo   1, AS-204, was used for the first LM test flight, Apollo 5 . The first successful crewed Apollo mission

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4056-413: The main engines and auxiliary thrusters, and fired the appropriate ordnance and solid rocket motors during staging and payload separation events. As with other rockets, a completely independent and redundant range safety system could be invoked by ground radio command to terminate thrust and to destroy the vehicle should it malfunction and threaten people or property on the ground. In the Saturn IB and V,

4134-480: The nickname "Cluster's Last Stand". The four outboard engines were mounted on gimbals , allowing them to be steered to control the rocket. Eight fins surrounding the base thrust structure provided aerodynamic stability and control. Data from: General characteristics Engine The S-IVB was built by the Douglas Aircraft Company at Huntington Beach, California . The S-IVB-200 model

4212-542: The payload capability to 46,000 pounds (21,000 kg). The S-IB stage was built by the Chrysler corporation at the Michoud Assembly Facility , New Orleans . It was powered by eight Rocketdyne H-1 rocket engines burning RP-1 fuel with liquid oxygen (LOX). Eight Redstone tanks (four holding fuel and four holding LOX) were clustered around a Jupiter rocket LOX tank, which earned the rocket

4290-524: The range safety system was permanently disabled by ground command after safely reaching orbit. This was done to ensure that the S-IVB stage would not inadvertently rupture and create a cloud of debris in orbit that could endanger the crew of the Apollo CSM. Acceleration of the Saturn IB increased from 1.24 G at liftoff to a maximum of 4.35 G at the end of the S-IB stage burn, and increased again from 0 G to 2.85 G from stage separation to

4368-504: The reassembled spacecraft completed a successful altitude chamber test with Schirra's backup crew on December 30. According to the final report of the accident investigation board, "At the post-test debriefing the backup flight crew expressed their satisfaction with the condition and performance of the spacecraft." This would appear to contradict the account given in the 1994 book Lost Moon: The Perilous Voyage of Apollo   13 by Jeffrey Kluger and astronaut James Lovell , that "When

4446-400: The same time the "lunar excursion module" was renamed the lunar module . However, the "uprated Saturn I" terminology was reverted to Saturn IB on December 2, 1967. By the time it was developed, the Saturn IB payload capability had increased to 41,000 pounds (19,000 kg). By 1973, when it was used to launch three Skylab missions, the first-stage engine had been upgraded further, raising

4524-542: The same title formed as a letter–number combination. If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=AS-204&oldid=1022356555 " Category : Letter–number combination disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Apollo 1 Apollo 1 , initially designated AS-204 ,

4602-660: The silver anode of the wire was discovered at the Manned Spacecraft Center on May 29, 1967, to be a hazard capable of causing a violent exothermic reaction , igniting the ethylene glycol mixture in the Command Module's pure oxygen atmosphere. Experiments at the Illinois Institute of Technology confirmed the hazard existed for silver-plated wires, but not for copper-only or nickel-plated copper. In July, ASPO directed both North American and Grumman to ensure no silver or silver-coated electrical contacts existed in

4680-423: The southeastern United States with Florida (the launch point) prominent. The Moon is seen in the distance, symbolic of the eventual program goal. A yellow border carries the mission and astronaut names with another border set with stars and stripes, trimmed in gold. The insignia was designed by the crew, with the artwork done by North American Aviation employee Allen Stevens. The Apollo command and service module

4758-430: The spacecraft was removed from the altitude chamber on January 3, 1967, and mated to its Saturn IB launch vehicle on pad 34 on January 6. Grissom said in a February 1963 interview that NASA could not eliminate risk despite precautions: An awful lot of people have devoted more effort than I can describe to [make] Project Mercury and its successors, as safe as humanly possible ... But we also recognize that there remains

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4836-486: The spacecraft's instrument panel in flight. Television cameras were carried aboard all crewed Apollo missions. Grissom's crew received approval in June 1966 to design a mission patch with the name Apollo   1 (though the approval was subsequently withdrawn pending a final decision on the mission designation, which was not resolved until after the fire). The design's center depicts a command and service module flying over

4914-410: The spacecraft's interior. His testimony contradicted the official report concerning the position of Grissom's body. Slayton said of Grissom and White's bodies, "it is very difficult for me to determine the exact relationships of these two bodies. They were sort of jumbled together, and I couldn't really tell which head even belonged to which body at that point. I guess the only thing that was real obvious

4992-414: The spacecraft's oxygen and communication systems. Grissom immediately noticed a strange odor in the air circulating through his suit which he compared to "sour buttermilk", and the simulated countdown was put on hold at 1:20 pm, while air samples were taken. No cause of the odour could be found, and the countdown was resumed at 2:42 pm. The accident investigation found this odour not to be related to

5070-529: The tank problem. These tests were negative. In December the second Block I flight AS-205 was canceled as unnecessary; Schirra, Eisele and Cunningham were reassigned as the backup crew for Apollo   1. McDivitt's crew was now promoted to prime crew of the Block II/LM mission, re-designated AS-258 because the AS-205 launch vehicle would be used in place of AS-207. A third crewed mission was planned to launch

5148-407: The test planners had failed to identify the test as hazardous; emergency equipment (such as gas masks) were inadequate to handle this type of fire; that fire, rescue, and medical teams were not in attendance; and that the spacecraft work and access areas contained many hindrances to emergency response such as steps, sliding doors, and sharp turns. Saturn IB By sharing the S-IVB upper stage,

5226-591: The time to run through their checklist again, when a momentary increase in AC Bus   2 voltage occurred. Nine seconds later (at 6:31:04.7), one of the astronauts (some listeners and laboratory analysis indicate Grissom) exclaimed "Hey!", "Fire!", or "Flame!"; this was followed by two seconds of scuffling sounds through Grissom's open microphone. This was immediately followed at 6:31:06.2 (23:31:06.2 GMT) by someone (believed by most listeners, and supported by laboratory analysis, to be Chaffee) saying, "[I've, or We've] got

5304-403: The trio climbed out of the ship,   ... Schirra made it clear that he was not pleased with what he had seen," and that he later warned Grissom and Shea that "there's nothing wrong with this ship that I can point to, but it just makes me uncomfortable. Something about it just doesn't ring right," and that Grissom should get out at the first sign of trouble. After the successful altitude tests,

5382-582: The vicinity of possible glycol spills in the Apollo spacecraft. The plugs-out test had been run to simulate the launch procedure, with the cabin pressurized with pure oxygen at the nominal launch level of 16.7 psi (115 kPa), 2 psi (14 kPa) above standard sea level atmospheric pressure. This is more than five times the 3 psi (21 kPa) partial pressure of oxygen in the atmosphere, and provides an environment in which materials not normally considered flammable will be highly flammable and burst into flame. The high-pressure oxygen atmosphere

5460-437: Was almost completely destroyed. White suffered third-degree burns on almost half of his body and a quarter of his spacesuit had melted away. Chaffee suffered third-degree burns on almost a quarter of his body and a small portion of his spacesuit was damaged. The autopsy report determined that the primary cause of death for all three astronauts was cardiac arrest caused by high concentrations of carbon monoxide . Burns suffered by

5538-495: Was essential to making the February 21 launch date. The test was considered non-hazardous because neither the launch vehicle nor the spacecraft was loaded with fuel or cryogenics and all pyrotechnic systems (explosive bolts) were disabled. At 1:00 pm EST (18:00 GMT ) on January 27, first Grissom, then Chaffee, and White entered the command module fully pressure-suited, and were strapped into their seats and hooked up to

5616-526: Was flown by Apollo   1's backup crew on Apollo 7 in October 1968. AS-204 was to be the first crewed test flight of the Apollo command and service module (CSM) to Earth orbit, launched on a Saturn IB rocket. AS-204 was to test launch operations, ground tracking and control facilities and the performance of the Apollo-Saturn launch assembly and would have lasted up to two weeks, depending on how

5694-401: Was lying on the floor of the spacecraft. White's restraints were burned through, and he was found lying sideways just below the hatch. It was determined that he had tried to open the hatch per the emergency procedure, but was not able to do so against the internal pressure. Chaffee was found strapped into his right-hand seat, as procedure called for him to maintain communication until White opened

5772-482: Was modified, adding an elevated platform known as the "milkstool" to accommodate the height differential between the Saturn IB and the much larger Saturn V. This enabled alignment of the Launch Umbilical Tower's access arms to accommodate crew access, fueling, and ground electrical connections for the Apollo spacecraft and S-IVB upper stage. The tower's second stage access arms were modified to service

5850-443: Was much bigger and far more complex than any previous crewed spacecraft. In October 1963, Joseph F. Shea was named Apollo Spacecraft Program Office (ASPO) manager, responsible for managing the design and construction of both the CSM and the LM. In a spacecraft review meeting held with Shea on August 19, 1966 (a week before delivery), the crew expressed concern about the amount of flammable material (mainly nylon netting and Velcro ) in

5928-576: Was planned to be the first crewed mission of the Apollo program , the American undertaking to land the first man on the Moon. It was planned to launch on February 21, 1967, as the first low Earth orbital test of the Apollo command and service module . The mission never flew; a cabin fire during a launch rehearsal test at Cape Kennedy Air Force Station Launch Complex 34 on January 27 killed all three crew members—Command Pilot Gus Grissom , Senior Pilot Ed White , and Pilot Roger B. Chaffee —and destroyed

6006-488: Was similar to that which had been used successfully in the Mercury and Gemini programs. The pressure before launch was deliberately greater than ambient in order to drive out the nitrogen-containing air and replace it with pure oxygen, and also to seal the plug door hatch cover. During the launch, the pressure would have been gradually reduced to the in-flight level of 5 psi (34 kPa), providing sufficient oxygen for

6084-503: Was similar to the S-IVB-500 third stage used on the Saturn V , with the exception of the interstage adapter, smaller auxiliary propulsion control modules, and lack of on-orbit engine restart capability. It was powered by a single Rocketdyne J-2 engine. The fuel and oxidizer tanks shared a common bulkhead, which saved about ten tons of weight and reduced vehicle length over ten feet. General characteristics Engine IBM built

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