68-548: Antitrust Act can refer to: The Sherman Antitrust Act , first United States federal government action to limit monopolies Sherman Antitrust Act (federal preemption) The Clayton Antitrust Act , enacted to remedy deficiencies in antitrust law created under the Sherman Antitrust Act Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act Tunney Act , officially known as
136-495: A motion to dismiss , plaintiffs, under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , must plead facts consistent with FRCP 8(a) sufficient to show that a conspiracy is plausible (and not merely conceivable or possible). This protects defendants from bearing the costs of antitrust "fishing expeditions"; however it deprives plaintiffs of perhaps their only tool to acquire evidence (discovery). Second, courts have employed more sophisticated and principled definitions of markets. Market definition
204-553: A competitive marketplace to protect consumers from abuses. In Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan 506 U.S. 447 (1993) the Supreme Court said: The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself. According to its authors, it
272-576: A friend who supported Cleveland: There was a time when I hoped to meet you in heaven, it is gone. Hoar argued in the Senate in favor of women's suffrage as early as 1886. He was one of only seven senators, and one of only two Republican senators (along with Henry W. Blair of New Hampshire ), to vote against the Edmunds–Tucker Act of 1887, which abolished women's suffrage in Utah after it had been
340-455: A more sophisticated market definition that does not permit as manipulative a definition. Section 2 of the Act forbids monopoly. In Section 2 cases, the court has, again on its own initiative, drawn a distinction between coercive and innocent monopoly. The act is not meant to punish businesses that come to dominate their market passively or on their own merit, only those that intentionally dominate
408-440: A state requires conduct analyzed under the rule of reason, a court must carefully distinguish rule of reason analysis for preemption purposes from the analysis for liability purposes. To analyze whether preemption occurs, the court must determine whether the inevitable effects of a statutory restraint unreasonably restrain trade. If they do, preemption is warranted unless the statute passes the appropriate state action tests. But, when
476-496: A statute is attacked on its face or for its effects. A statute can be condemned on its face only when it mandates, authorizes or places irresistible pressure on private parties to engage in conduct constituting a per se violation of Section 1. If the statute does not mandate conduct violating a per se rule, the conduct is analyzed under the rule of reason, which requires an examination of the conduct's actual effects on competition. If unreasonable anticompetitive effects are created,
544-528: A sufficient reason for invalidating the ... statute. For if an adverse effect on competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state statute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation would be effectively destroyed. This indicates that not every anticompetitive effect warrants preemption. In neither Exxon nor New Motor Vehicle did the created effect constitute an antitrust violation. The Rice guideline therefore indicates that only when
612-543: A territorial right since 1870 (among other stipulations which were mainly aimed at eliminating Mormon polygamy and curbing the institutional power of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints there). Hoar was a consistent opponent of American imperialism. He did not share his Senate colleagues' enthusiasm for American intervention in Cuba in the late 1890s. In December 1897, he met with Native Hawaiian leaders opposed to
680-534: Is clarified by examining the three cases cited in Rice to support the statement. In New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co. , automobile manufacturers and retail franchisees contended that the Sherman Act preempted a statute requiring manufacturers to secure the permission of a state board before opening a new dealership if and only if a competing dealer protested. They argued that a conflict existed because
748-401: Is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Sherman Antitrust Act The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (26 Stat. 209 , 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 – 7 ) is a United States antitrust law which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce and consequently prohibits unfair monopolies . It
SECTION 10
#1732791508906816-436: Is divided into three sections. Section 1 delineates and prohibits specific means of anticompetitive conduct, while Section 2 deals with end results that are anti-competitive in nature. Thus, these sections supplement each other in an effort to prevent businesses from violating the spirit of the Act, while technically remaining within the letter of the law. Section 3 simply extends the provisions of Section 1 to U.S. territories and
884-461: Is necessary, in rule of reason cases, for the plaintiff to prove a conspiracy is harmful. It is also necessary for the plaintiff to establish the market relationship between conspirators to prove their conduct is within the per se rule. In early cases, it was easier for plaintiffs to show market relationship, or dominance, by tailoring market definition, even if it ignored fundamental principles of economics. In U.S. v. Grinnell , 384 U.S. 563 (1966),
952-709: The Clayton Act created exceptions for certain union activities, but the Supreme Court ruled in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering that the actions allowed by the Act were already legal. Congress included provisions in the Norris–La Guardia Act in 1932 to more explicitly exempt organized labor from antitrust enforcement, and the Supreme Court upheld these exemptions in United States v. Hutcheson 312 U.S. 219 . To determine whether
1020-652: The Democratic Party , which he viewed as the party of the saloon keeper, ballot box stuffer , and Klansman . Hoar was referred to by his middle name "Frisbie" among friends. Hoar was born in Concord, Massachusetts , on August 29, 1826. He studied for several months at a boarding school in Waltham, Massachusetts , run by Samuel and Sarah Bradford Ripley . He graduated from Harvard University in 1846 and earned his law degree at Harvard Law School in 1849. He
1088-641: The Freedmen's Bureau , and took a leading part in reconstruction legislation . He took part in the investigation of the Crédit Mobilier scandal and the impeachment of William W. Belknap , President Grant 's secretary of war. In 1880 Hoar was chairman of the 1880 Republican National Convention . When James Garfield , who eventually won the party's nomination and the presidential election, rose to object that votes were being cast for him without his consent, Hoar disallowed his objection. He later said: "I
1156-674: The Smithsonian Institution in 1880, an overseer of Harvard University from 1896, and a trustee of the Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology . Through his efforts, the lost manuscript of William Bradford 's Of Plymouth Plantation (1620–1647), an important founding document of the United States, was returned to Massachusetts , after being discovered in Fulham Palace , London, in 1855. Hoar
1224-919: The Treaty of Paris . Hoar pushed for and served on the Lodge Committee , investigating allegations, later confirmed, of United States war crimes in the Philippine–American War. He also denounced the U.S. intervention in Panama . Hoar voted against the Chinese Exclusion Act. In 1865, Hoar was one of the founders of the Worcester County Free Institute of Industrial Science, now the Worcester Polytechnic Institute . Hoar
1292-427: The U.S. Senate until his death during his fifth term. For one term during his House service, from 1873 to 1875, his brother Ebenezer Rockood Hoar served alongside him. He was a Republican, but generally avoided heavy partisanship, and did not hesitate to criticize other members of the party whose actions or policies he believed were in error. Between 1856 and 1857 Hoar was active as a Kansas Free-Stater , supported
1360-479: The United States Senate from 1877 until his death in 1904. He belonged to an extended family that became politically prominent in 18th- and 19th-century New England . An abolitionist and Radical Republican , Hoar recognized the immorality of slavery and was raised in a household which actively opposed racial bigotry and often defied laws they deemed unjust. Hoar strongly opposed and assailed
1428-483: The Act preempts a state law , courts will engage in a two-step analysis, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Rice v. Norman Williams Co. The antitrust laws allow coincident state regulation of competition. The Supreme Court enunciated the test for determining when a state statute is in irreconcilable conflict with Section 1 of the Sherman Act in Rice v. Norman Williams Co. Different standards apply depending on whether
SECTION 20
#17327915089061496-413: The Act to bring suits for treble damages (i.e. three times as much money in damages as the violation cost them). Over time, the federal courts have developed a body of law under the Sherman Act making certain types of anticompetitive conduct per se illegal, and subjecting other types of conduct to case-by-case analysis regarding whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade. The law attempts to prevent
1564-627: The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act See also [ edit ] United States antitrust law Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title Antitrust Act . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Antitrust_Act&oldid=456484307 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description
1632-570: The Clayton Act. The amendment proscribed certain anti-competitive practices in which manufacturers engaged in price discrimination against equally-situated distributors. The federal government began filing cases under the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. Some cases were successful and others were not; many took several years to decide, including appeals. Notable cases filed under the act include: Congress claimed power to pass
1700-502: The District of Columbia. Section 1: Section 2: The Clayton Antitrust Act , passed in 1914, proscribes certain additional activities that had been discovered to fall outside the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Clayton Antitrust Act added certain practices to the list of impermissible activities: The Clayton Antitrust Act specifically states that unions are exempt from this ruling. The Robinson–Patman Act of 1936 amended
1768-658: The McKinley administration. He denounced the Philippine–American War and called for independence for the Philippines in a three-hour speech in the Senate, saying: You have sacrificed nearly ten thousand American lives—the flower of our youth. You have devastated provinces. You have slain uncounted thousands of the people you desire to benefit. You have established reconcentration camps. Your generals are coming home from their harvest bringing sheaves with them, in
1836-517: The Revolution or of the Civil War as models, has looked in some cases to Spain for your example. I believe—nay, I know—that in general our officers and soldiers are humane. But in some cases they have carried on your warfare with a mixture of American ingenuity and Castilian cruelty. Your practical statesmanship has succeeded in converting a people who three years ago were ready to kiss the hem of
1904-577: The Robinson-Patman and Sherman Acts" should be preempted. In both New Motor Vehicle and Exxon , the Court upheld the statutes and rejected the arguments presented as Merely another way of stating that the ... statute will have an anticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a conflict between the statute and the central policy of the Sherman Act – 'our charter of economic liberty'. ... Nevertheless, this sort of conflict cannot itself constitute
1972-507: The Sherman Act through its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce . Therefore, federal courts only have jurisdiction to apply the Act to conduct that restrains or substantially affects either interstate commerce. (Congress also has ultimate authority over economic rules within the District of Columbia and US territories under the 17th enumerated power and the Territorial Clause , respectively.) This requires that
2040-442: The Sherman Act was adopted, there were only a few federal statutes imposing penalties for obstructing or misusing interstate transportation. With an expanding commerce, many others have since been enacted safeguarding transportation in interstate commerce as the need was seen, including statutes declaring conspiracies to interfere or actual interference with interstate commerce by violence or threats of violence to be felonies. The law
2108-448: The Sherman Act, 21 Cong.Rec. 2456. It was in this sense of preventing restraints on commercial competition that Congress exercised "all the power it possessed." Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, supra, 286 U. S. 435. At Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v. United States , 85 F.2d 1, affirmed , 175 U. S. 175 U.S. 211; At Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States , 221 U. S. 1 , 221 U. S. 54 -58. The Sherman Act
Antitrust Act - Misplaced Pages Continue
2176-462: The Sherman Act, the statute "appears firmly anchored to the assumption that the Sherman Act will deter any attempts by the appellants to preserve their ... price level [in one state] by conspiring to raise the prices at which liquor is sold elsewhere in the country". Thus, Seagram indicates that when conduct required by a state statute combines with other conduct that, taken together, constitutes an illegal restraint of trade, liability may be imposed for
2244-458: The States, and the States have no authority to legislate in respect of commerce between the several States or with foreign nations. See also the statement on the floor of the House by Mr. Culberson, in charge of the bill, There is no attempt to exercise any doubtful authority on this subject, but the bill is confined strictly and alone to subjects over which, confessedly, there is no question about
2312-658: The annexation of their nation . He then presented the Kūʻē Petitions to Congress and helped to defeat President William McKinley 's attempt to annex the Republic of Hawaii by treaty, though the islands were eventually annexed by means of joint resolution , called the Newlands Resolution . After the Spanish–American War , Hoar became one of the Senate's most outspoken opponents of the imperialism of
2380-458: The artificial raising of prices by restriction of trade or supply. "Innocent monopoly", or monopoly achieved solely by merit, is legal, but acts by a monopolist to artificially preserve that status, or nefarious dealings to create a monopoly, are not. The purpose of the Sherman Act is not to protect competitors from harm from legitimately successful businesses, nor to prevent businesses from gaining honest profits from consumers, but rather to preserve
2448-467: The backing of gold , and free coinage of silver. In addition to viewing silver as an "inferior metal," Hoar favored protectionist tariffs , a common position within the Republican Party. He served as a member, and at times chairman, of the important Senate Judiciary Committee . In 1874, a dying Charles Sumner lay on his deathbed, and among his last visitors were Rep. Hoar. Sumner told
2516-411: The bill which was adopted without change, declared: No attempt is made to invade the legislative authority of the several States or even to occupy doubtful grounds. No system of laws can be devised by Congress alone which would effectually protect the people of the United States against the evils and oppression of trusts and monopolies. Congress has no authority to deal, generally, with the subject within
2584-439: The courts in the first instance to say how far they could carry it or its particular definitions as applicable to each particular case as the occasion might arise." Similarly Senator Hoar, a member of that committee who with Senator Edmunds was in charge of the bill, stated George Hoar George Frisbie Hoar (August 29, 1826 – September 30, 1904) was an American attorney and politician who represented Massachusetts in
2652-400: The effect unreasonably restrains trade, and is therefore a violation, can preemption occur. The third case cited to support the "anticompetitive effect" guideline is Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter , in which the Court rejected a facial Sherman Act preemption challenge to a statute requiring that persons selling liquor to wholesalers affirm that the price charged was no higher than
2720-472: The garment of the American and to welcome him as a liberator, who thronged after your men when they landed on those islands with benediction and gratitude, into sullen and irreconcilable enemies, possessed of a hatred which centuries can not eradicate. By this time, one of his strongest opponents on the pro-imperialist side was his fellow Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge , who was a leading advocate for
2788-432: The judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them". Another important, yet, in the context of Rice , ambiguous guideline regarding preemption by Section 1 is the Court's statement that a "state statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect". The meaning of this statement
Antitrust Act - Misplaced Pages Continue
2856-612: The legalization of racial discrimination" He was a member of the Congressional Electoral Commission that settled the highly disputed 1876 U.S. presidential election . He authored the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 . During the 1884 United States presidential election , Hoar expressed sharp anger at Mugwumps , Republicans who supported Bourbon Democrat Grover Cleveland over GOP nominee James G. Blaine ; he asserted to
2924-504: The legislative power of Congress. And see the statement of Senator Edmunds, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee which reported out the bill in the form in which it passed, that in drafting that bill the committee thought that "we would frame a bill that should be clearly within our constitutional power, that we would make its definition out of terms that were well known to the law already, and would leave it to
2992-428: The lowest price at which sales were made anywhere in the United States during the previous month. Since the attack was a facial one, and the state law required no per se violations, no preemption could occur. The Court also rejected the possibility of preemption due to Sherman Act violations stemming from misuse of the statute. The Court stated that rather than imposing "irresistible economic pressure" on sellers to violate
3060-428: The market through misconduct, which generally consists of conspiratorial conduct of the kind forbidden by Section 1 of the Sherman Act, or Section 3 of the Clayton Act. While the Act was aimed at regulating businesses, its prohibition of contracts restricting commerce was applied to the activities of labor unions until the 1930s. This is because unions were characterized as cartels as well (cartels of laborers). In 1914
3128-401: The market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special form of public injury. For that reason the phrase "restraint of trade," which, as will presently appear, had a well understood meaning in common law, was made the means of defining the activities prohibited. The addition of the words "or commerce among the several States"
3196-606: The plaintiff must show that the conduct occurred during the flow of interstate commerce or had an appreciable effect on some activity that occurs during interstate commerce. A Section 1 violation has three elements: A Section 2 monopolization violation has two elements: Section 2 also bans attempted monopolization, which has the following elements: Violations of the Sherman Act fall (loosely ) into two categories: A modern trend has increased difficulty for antitrust plaintiffs as courts have come to hold plaintiffs to increasing burdens of pleading. Under older Section 1 precedent, it
3264-527: The representative to ensure passage of what became known as the Civil Rights Act of 1875 : You must take care of the civil rights bill – my bill, the civil rights bill – don't let it fail! Indeed, Hoar successfully fought in ensuring the bill's passage, although it became law in a weakened form. Hoar was long noted as a fighter against political corruption . He campaigned for the rights of African Americans and Native Americans , which included
3332-405: The required conduct violates Section 1 and the statute is in irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman Act. Then statutory arrangement is analyzed to determine whether it qualifies as "state action" and is thereby saved from preemption. Rice sets out guidelines to aid in preemption analysis. Preemption should not occur "simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with
3400-403: The restraint without requiring preemption of the state statute. Rice v. Norman Williams Co. supports this misuse limitation on preemption. Rice states that while particular conduct or arrangements by private parties would be subject to per se or rule of reason analysis to determine liability, "[t]here is no basis ... for condemning the statute itself by force of the Sherman Act." Thus, when
3468-560: The reusing of tribal lands for individual settlement of Native Americans. He was a strong advocate of the Dawes Act and allotment schemes which allocated communal tribal lands to individuals. He explained these views by comparing federal Indian relations to that of "a father to his son, or by a guardian to an insane ward..." - out of context. He opposed the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, describing it as "nothing less than
SECTION 50
#17327915089063536-466: The shape of other thousands of sick and wounded and insane to drag out miserable lives, wrecked in body and mind. You make the American flag in the eyes of a numerous people the emblem of sacrilege in Christian churches, and of the burning of human dwellings, and of the horror of the water torture. Your practical statesmanship which disdains to take George Washington and Abraham Lincoln or the soldiers of
3604-498: The statute might cause him to violate the antitrust laws". This language suggests that preemption occurs only if economic analysis determines that the statutory requirements create "an unacceptable and unnecessary risk of anticompetitive effect", and does not occur simply because it is possible to use the statute in an anticompetitive manner. It should not mean that preemption is impossible whenever both procompetitive and anticompetitive results are conceivable. The per se rule "reflects
3672-685: The statute permitted "auto dealers to invoke state power for the purpose of restraining intrabrand competition". In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland , oil companies challenged a state statute requiring uniform statewide gasoline prices in situations where the Robinson-Patman Act would permit charging different prices. They reasoned that the Robinson-Patman Act is a qualification of our "more basic national policy favoring free competition" and that any state statute altering "the competitive balance that Congress struck between
3740-458: The statutory conduct combines with other practices in a larger conspiracy to restrain trade, or when the statute is used to violate the antitrust laws in a market in which such a use is not compelled by the state statute, the private party might be subjected to antitrust liability without preemption of the statute. The Act was not intended to regulate existing state statutes regulating commerce within state borders. The House committee, in reporting
3808-503: The trial judge, Charles Wyzanski , composed the market only of alarm companies with services in every state, tailoring out any local competitors; the defendant stood alone in this market, but had the court added up the entire national market, it would have had a much smaller share of the national market for alarm services that the court purportedly used. The appellate courts affirmed this finding; however, today, an appellate court would likely find this definition to be flawed. Modern courts use
3876-401: The use of means which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition." At Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader 310 U.S. 469 , 310 U. S. 492 -93 and n. 15: The legislative history of the Sherman Act, as well as the decisions of this Court interpreting it, show that it was not aimed at policing interstate transportation or movement of goods and property. The legislative history and
3944-436: The voluminous literature which was generated in the course of the enactment and during fifty years of litigation of the Sherman Act give no hint that such was its purpose. They do not suggest that, in general, state laws or law enforcement machinery were inadequate to prevent local obstructions or interferences with interstate transportation, or presented any problem requiring the interposition of federal authority. In 1890, when
4012-746: Was active in the American Historical Association and the American Antiquarian Society , serving terms as president of both organizations. He was elected a member of the American Antiquarian Society in 1853, and served as vice-president from 1878 to 1884, and then served as president from 1884 to 1887. In 1887 he was among the founders of the American Irish Historical Society . He was a regent of
4080-805: Was admitted to the bar and settled in Worcester, Massachusetts , where he practiced law. Initially a member of the Free Soil Party , of which he became the leader, he joined the Republican Party shortly after its founding. Hoar was elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1852 and to the Massachusetts Senate in 1857. He represented Massachusetts as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives for four terms from 1869 to 1877 and then served in
4148-488: Was buried in Sleepy Hollow Cemetery, Concord . After his death, a statue of him was erected in front of Worcester's city hall, paid for by public donations. In 1853, Hoar married Mary Louisa Spurr (1831–1859). In 1862, he married Ruth Ann Miller (1830–1903). With his first wife, he was the father of a son, U.S. Representative Rockwood Hoar , and a daughter, Mary (1854–1929). With his second wife he
SECTION 60
#17327915089064216-938: Was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1901. His autobiography , Autobiography of Seventy Years , was published in 1903. It appeared first in serial form in Scribner's magazine . In 1904, he was one of several high-profile investors who backed the Intercontinental Correspondence University , but the institution folded by 1915. He attended the Unitarian Church of All Souls in Washington, D.C. Hoar enjoyed good health until June 1904. He died in Worcester on September 30 of that year and
4284-444: Was enacted in the era of "trusts" and of "combinations" of businesses and of capital organized and directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of public concern. The goal was to prevent restraints of free competition in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices, or otherwise control
4352-603: Was not an additional kind of restraint to be prohibited by the Sherman Act, but was the means used to relate the prohibited restraint of trade to interstate commerce for constitutional purposes, Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427, 286 U. S. 434, so that Congress, through its commerce power, might suppress and penalize restraints on the competitive system which involved or affected interstate commerce. Because many forms of restraint upon commercial competition extended across state lines so as to make regulation by state action difficult or impossible, Congress enacted
4420-415: Was not intended to impact market gains obtained by honest means, by benefiting the consumers more than the competitors. Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts , another author of the Sherman Act, said the following: ... [a person] who merely by superior skill and intelligence...got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist...(but was if) it involved something like
4488-449: Was not settled how much evidence was required to show a conspiracy. For example, a conspiracy could be inferred based on parallel conduct, etc. That is, plaintiffs were only required to show that a conspiracy was conceivable. Since the 1970s, however, courts have held plaintiffs to higher standards, giving antitrust defendants an opportunity to resolve cases in their favor before significant discovery under FRCP 12(b)(6). That is, to overcome
4556-493: Was passed by Congress and is named for Senator John Sherman , its principal author. The Sherman Act broadly prohibits 1) anticompetitive agreements and 2) unilateral conduct that monopolizes or attempts to monopolize the relevant market. The Act authorizes the Department of Justice to bring suits to enjoin (i.e. prohibit) conduct violating the Act, and additionally authorizes private parties injured by conduct violating
4624-457: Was terribly afraid that he would say something that would make his nomination impossible." An economic nationalist , Hoar believed in capitalism as progress for civilization in accordance to the plans by God. He supported measures which aimed at protecting American industries from foreign competition. In Congress, Hoar established a reputation as a conservative on economic issues. He opposed monetary inflation, post-war greenbacks without
#905094