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91-658: On 12 December 1985, North Korea became a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On 10 April 1992, its NPT safeguards agreement entered into force. In May 1992, North Korea submitted its initial report to the IAEA under that agreement, and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections began. Shortly thereafter inconsistencies emerged between the North Korea initial declaration and

182-506: A "nuclear deterrent for self-defence". On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test . US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons. In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently, KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers’ facilities around

273-487: A 20-year interest-free period after the completion of each LWR plant. It was reported that US President Bill Clinton 's officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed as North Korea's leader Kim Il Sung had recently died . North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of

364-483: A German nuclear program. These efforts began immediately after the discovery of nuclear fission and its military potential. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima . Earnest international efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation began soon after World War II , when the Truman Administration proposed

455-413: A cost of $ 4 billion, primarily supplied by South Korea. In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. North Korea was required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, allowing the IAEA to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, before key nuclear components of

546-482: A military defeat assisted this process. In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons. In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend the classical safeguards system, and

637-569: A model protocol was agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle. Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol . This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as

728-408: A nuclear fuel. India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe total) comprise: The two under construction and two of the planned ones are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic products. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. In 2001 a final agreement

819-526: A nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that several stages of the nuclear fuel cycle allow diversion of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over Iran's nuclear activities is a case in point. Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation risks. A fundamental goal for American and global security

910-401: A party to the NPT, although North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, then withdrew in 2003 and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006. One critique of the NPT is that the treaty is discriminatory in the sense that only those countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 are recognized as nuclear weapon states while all other states are treated as non-nuclear-weapon states who can only join

1001-506: A resumption of IAEA inspections and to re-open negotiations with South Korea over nuclear questions (North Korea had broken off talks with South Korea in late 1992). North Korea approached the IAEA in January 1994, offering a single inspection, less comprehensive than those conducted by the IAEA in 1992. After several weeks of tough negotiations, the IAEA announced on 16 February 1994 that North Korea had accepted "the inspection activities" that

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1092-558: A safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium and plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by

1183-574: A second series of nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan followed with a series of tests of its own. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test . Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores (the Combined Development Trust ), and at times even outright sabotage —such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility in Norway thought to be used for

1274-594: A set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The group began with seven members—the United States,

1365-774: A supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol. Key elements of the model Additional Protocol: As of 3 July 2015, 146 countries have signed the Additional Protocols and 126 have brought them into force. The IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional Protocol in Taiwan. Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action , Iran has agreed to implement its protocol provisionally. Among

1456-497: Is a potential nuclear arms stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays . In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 1996 (not entered into force as of June 2020) and to codify commitments made by

1547-509: Is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since 1948 . There is a persistent low-level bilateral military conflict due to the alleged backing of insurgency by Pakistan in India, and the infiltration of Pakistani state-backed militants into the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir , along with the disputed status of Kashmir . Both engaged in a conventional arms race in

1638-430: Is not accurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of heavy water) supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any by-products would be "employed for peaceful purposes only." Archived 27 September 2007 at

1729-427: Is not classified as a "special nuclear material" but rather as a by-product. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to nuclear disarm . This radioactive, super-heavy, hydrogen isotope is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there

1820-438: Is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, as viewed by Indian strategists, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army . Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India . Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in

1911-587: Is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous". For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic “ good governance ” characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management: These characteristics include low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own personal gain as occurred with

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2002-566: The A.Q. Khan smuggling network in Pakistan), high degrees of political stability (defined by the World Bank as "likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism"), high governmental effectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate measure of "the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and]

2093-679: The Baruch Plan of 1946, named after Bernard Baruch , America's first representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). The Baruch Plan , which drew heavily from the Acheson–Lilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the verifiable dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arsenal in the world) after all governments had cooperated successfully to accomplish two things: (1)

2184-727: The Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 (XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, D.C. , London and Moscow . The NPT entered into force in March 1970. Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over

2275-497: The European Commission . Its goal is to "[..] provide competitive, commercially-based services as an alternative to a state’s development of costly, proliferation-sensitive facilities, and address other issues associated with the safe and secure management of used fuel and radioactive waste ." According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power , tritium

2366-471: The People's Republic of China , an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers. Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. Kashmir

2457-647: The Six-party talks about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on 19 September 2005. The accord made no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However, the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework. Ultimately the Six-party talks were discontinued in 2009. On May 31, 2006, KEDO decided to terminate

2548-503: The U.N. General Assembly . Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. Under the "Atoms for Peace" program thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country. Efforts to conclude an international agreement to limit

2639-519: The UK , and the United States . Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses

2730-660: The Wayback Machine . Similarly, the United States sold India heavy water for use in the reactor "only... in connection with research into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" Archived 27 September 2007 at the Wayback Machine . India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha . The Indian government controversially justified this, however, by claiming that Smiling Buddha

2821-491: The fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution are controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium . Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within

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2912-431: The southern part of the country . At the moment, India has a small fast breeder reactor and is planning a much larger one ( Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor ). This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as

3003-595: The 1980s by the Soviet Union , before its collapse. Soon after the Agreed Framework was signed, U.S. Congress control changed to the Republican Party , who did not support the agreement. Some Republican Senators were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as appeasement . KEDO's first director, Stephen Bosworth , later commented "The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature". Arranging project financing

3094-410: The 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States. But it

3185-635: The Agency had requested. In response, the Clinton Administration agreed to suspend the Team Spirit military exercise with South Korea (a long-standing North Korean demand) and begin a new round of talks with North Korea—subject to North Korea allowing full implementation of the IAEA inspection and beginning high level talks with South Korea. The main provisions of the agreement were: There were also some confidential minutes supporting

3276-469: The Agency's findings, centering on a mismatch between declared plutonium product and nuclear waste solutions and the results of the Agency's analysis. The latter suggested that undeclared plutonium existed in North Korea. In order to find answers to the inconsistencies detected and to determine the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration provided, the IAEA requested access to additional information and to two sites which seemed to be related to

3367-578: The DPRK. Soon after the agreement was signed, U.S. Congress control changed to the Republican Party , who did not support the agreement. Some Republican Senators were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as appeasement . Initially, U.S. Department of Defense emergency funds not under Congress' control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement, together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts. Consequently, some of

3458-565: The IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council . The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter a diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on

3549-733: The LWR construction project. Nuclear proliferation Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons , fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as " Nuclear Weapon States " by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons , commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT . Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase

3640-592: The LWR project did not commence until 2000. U.S. officials in 1998 testified to Congress that there were no fundamental violations of any aspect of the Framework Agreement by North Koreans. Joel S. Wit, State Department Coordinator for implementation of the Agreed Framework (1995–2000) during the Clinton administration, stated that "we did know about the DPRK cheating on the highly-enriched uranium front starting in 1998." The U.S. diplomat who negotiated

3731-565: The NPT and which have significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium , address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside

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3822-452: The NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq,

3913-406: The NPT, and a 100 MW indigenous unit in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads. It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used Canadian CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this

4004-623: The North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a uranium enrichment program. The parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program. The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded by denying that North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea

4095-728: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, North Korea "suspended the effectuation" of that withdrawal in June 1993. In November 1993, North Korea proposed to the United States that the two governments negotiate a "package solution" to all of the issues dividing them. The Clinton Administration accepted this in principle but conditioned such "comprehensive" talks on North Korea acting first to allow

4186-412: The U.S. Terms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot Yongbyon nuclear reactor , abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and the canning and sealing, under IAEA monitoring, of spent fuel that could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a nuclear weapon . In exchange two light water reactors would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at

4277-437: The U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement. International funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea. In May 1998, North Korea warned it would restart nuclear research if the U.S. could not install the LWR. Formal ground breaking on the site was on 21 August 1997, but significant spending on

4368-530: The United States and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the United States kept up its end of the bargain. Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002. Construction of both reactors was well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002. Senators accused President Clinton of understating

4459-471: The United States of a "hostile policy" including deliberately delaying fuel supplies and progress on the KEDO project that "effectively nullified" the agreement, listing North Korea as part of the "Axis of evil" and a target of the U.S. pre-emptive nuclear strikes. Although the agreement had largely broken down, North Korea did not restart work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under

4550-450: The United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification. On 9 August 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons . Khamenei's official statement

4641-475: The agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late. KEDO's first director, Stephen Bosworth , later commented "The Agreed Framework was a political orphan within two weeks after its signature". Some analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the Korean War . But because of congressional opposition,

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4732-597: The agreement, which have not been made public. These are reported to include that full-scope IAEA safeguards would be applied when the major non-nuclear components of the first LWR unit were completed but before the delivery of key nuclear components. The commitments in the agreement were voluntary and non-binding, not approved by the United States Senate as with a treaty , though noted by the United Nations Security Council . It

4823-512: The agreement. These plants could potentially have produced enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed Framework was successful in freezing North Korean plutonium production in Yongbyon plutonium complex for eight years from 1994 to December 2002; however, it failed to stop North Korea from developing a secret highly enriched uranium program, begun in the "mid- or late-1990s." Discussions took place through

4914-406: The capability to make a nuclear explosive device. The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty,

5005-464: The correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons-grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial electricity-generating reactors) and a nuclear reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium . The weakness of

5096-506: The cost of the project. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rust Deming told Congress "to be frank, we have in past years not always met the fuel year deadline". In January 2002, U.S. President George W. Bush labeled North Korea in his first State of the Union Address as part of an Axis of Evil . In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly visited North Korea to confront

5187-461: The destruction of nuclear weapons invoked basic moral and religious intuitions. In one part of his address to the UN, Baruch said, "Behind the black portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized upon with faith, can work out our salvation. If we fail, then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear. Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace or World Destruction.... We must answer

5278-426: The establishment of an "international atomic development authority," which would actually own and control all military-applicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material . Baruch's plea for

5369-541: The export of sensitive technology from countries such as the UK and the United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group . The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production. Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control

5460-409: The extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation. Dual-use technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of

5551-553: The former USSR, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Canada and Japan—but now includes 46 countries including all five nuclear weapons states . The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation is an international project involving 25 partner countries, 28 observer and candidate partner countries, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Generation IV International Forum, and

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5642-447: The framework, Robert Gallucci has warned that it could collapse if United States did not fulfill obligations that it agreed to. There was increasing disagreement between North Korea and the United States on the scope and implementation of the agreement. The United States did little to meet its commitment to normalize political and economic relations. When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between

5733-477: The international non-proliferation regime. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plants or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities. In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving

5824-410: The leading countries that have not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA safeguards, and Brazil, which opposes making the protocol a requirement for international cooperation on enrichment and reprocessing, but has not ruled out signing. The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation comes from countries that have not joined

5915-512: The non-NPT states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records. The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea , safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures. While traditional safeguards easily verified

6006-452: The nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. Due to economic and technological isolation of India after the nuclear tests in 1974, India has largely diverted focus on developing and perfecting the fast breeder technology by intensive materials and fuel cycle research at the dedicated center established for research into fast reactor technology, Indira Gandhi Center for Atomic Research (IGCAR) at Kalpakkam , in

6097-401: The nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation. The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on; All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus

6188-493: The nuclear power plant project assets at the construction site at Kumho in North Korea and at manufacturers' facilities around the world ($ 1.5 billion invested to date) were preserved and maintained. The project was reported to be about 30% complete. One reactor containment building was about 50% complete and another about 15% finished. No key equipment for the reactors had been moved to the site. In 2005, there were reports indicating that KEDO had agreed in principle to terminate

6279-450: The possibility of nuclear warfare (up to and including the so-called countervalue targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons), de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states . Four countries besides the five recognized Nuclear Weapon States have acquired, or are presumed to have acquired, nuclear weapons: India , Pakistan , North Korea , and Israel . None of these four are

6370-500: The previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the U.S. Congress would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December. On 10 January 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as

6461-534: The quality of policy formulation and implementation"), and a strong degree of regulatory competence. At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons , more commonly known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China , France , Russian Federation ,

6552-552: The reach of industrialized nations. Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates

6643-411: The reactor would be delivered. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities. The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementing the energy-related parts of the agreement. North Korea would repay KEDO over

6734-469: The scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the United Nations Security Council , just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely. IAEA safeguards can help ensure that uranium supplied as nuclear fuel and other nuclear supplies do not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact,

6825-470: The spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early 1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France) had acquired nuclear weapons (see List of states with nuclear weapons for more information). Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at

6916-494: The storage of nuclear waste. The DPRK refused access to the sites, and on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its decision to withdraw from the NPT. On 1 April 1993, the IAEA concluded that North Korea was in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and referred this to the UN Security Council. Following UN Security Council resolution 825 , which called upon the DPRK to reconsider its decision to withdraw from

7007-471: The treaty if they forswear nuclear weapons. Research into the development of nuclear weapons was initially undertaken during World War II by the United States (in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada), Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. After surrendering to end

7098-531: The use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and

7189-616: The war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon , becoming the second country to detonate a nuclear bomb. The United Kingdom first tested a nuclear weapon in October 1952. France first tested a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974, which prompted Pakistan to develop its own nuclear program and, when India conducted

7280-622: The world ($ 1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained. Each side blamed the other for ending the Agreed Framework. The United States pointed out that a North Korean uranium enrichment facility would violate the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which states "The South and the North shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities." North Korea accused

7371-650: The world's longing for peace and security." With this remark, Baruch helped launch the field of nuclear ethics , to which many policy experts and scholars have contributed. Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained official American policy until 1953, when President Eisenhower made his " Atoms for Peace " proposal before

7462-491: The worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely. The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation. The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guidelines, essentially

7553-491: Was "clear evidence indicating the North has begun constructing a centrifuge facility" and this plant could produce annually enough HEU for two or more nuclear weapons per year when it is finished. However, some experts assessed that the equipment North Korea imported was insufficient evidence of a production-scale enrichment program. KEDO members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to

7644-658: Was 2003. Since then, other members joined: KEDO discussions took place at the level of a U.S. Assistant Secretary of State , South Korea's deputy foreign minister , and the head of the Asian bureau of Japan's Foreign Ministry. The KEDO Secretariat was located in New York. KEDO was shut down in 2006. Formal ground breaking on the site for two light water reactors (LWR) was on August 19, 1997, at Kumho , 30 km north of Sinpo . The Kumho site had been previously selected for two similar sized reactors that had been promised in

7735-399: Was a "peaceful nuclear explosion." The country has at least three other research reactors including the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium as a nuclear fuel, by breeding fissile U-233. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization ( KEDO )

7826-654: Was an organization founded on March 15, 1995, by the United States , South Korea , and Japan to implement the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework that froze North Korea 's indigenous nuclear power plant development centered at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center , that was suspected of being a step in a nuclear weapons program. KEDO's principal activity was to construct two light water reactor nuclear power plants in North Korea to replace North Korea's Magnox type reactors. The original target year for completion

7917-452: Was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time. Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility. The HEU intelligence that James Kelly's accusation is based on is still controversial: According to the CIA fact sheet to Congress on 19 November 2002, there

8008-497: Was made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. As of February 2006 Iran formally announced that uranium enrichment within their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapon research and construction. India , Pakistan and Israel have been "threshold" countries in terms of

8099-457: Was not easy, and formal invitations to bid were not issued until 1998, by which time the delays were infuriating North Korea. Significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000, with "First Concrete" pouring at the construction site on August 7, 2002. Construction of both reactors was well behind the original schedule. In the wake of the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in 2003, KEDO largely lost its function. KEDO ensured that

8190-454: Was signed in the wake of North Korea's 90-day advance notification of its intended withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (which North Korea "suspended" after 89 days), a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active Yongbyon nuclear reactor . The U.S. regarded the Agreed Framework primarily as a non-proliferation agreement, whereas North Korea placed greater value on measures normalizing relations with

8281-460: Was signed with Russia for the country's first large nuclear power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under a Russian-financed US$ 3 billion contract. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power supplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000. Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadian-designed 40 MW "research" reactor which started up in 1960, well before

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