Artemisium or Artemision ( Greek : Ἀρτεμίσιον) is a cape in northern Euboea , Greece. The hollow cast bronze statue of Zeus or Poseidon , known as the Artemision Bronze , was found off this cape in a sunken ship, as was the Jockey of Artemision , a bronze statue of a racehorse and its jockey.
141-397: The Battle of Artemisium , a series of naval engagements over three days during the second Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC, simultaneously with the more famous land battle at Thermopylae , took place here. Part of the action of the film 300: Rise of an Empire was loosely based on this battle. In 1928, an Ancient Greek shipwreck at the site was found containing artefacts including
282-402: A confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other. Initially the 'congress' agreed to defend
423-451: A confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. This was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other. The 'congress' met again in the spring of 480 BC. A Thessalian delegation suggested that
564-697: A constricted area, where Persian numbers would count for little. The battle at Artemisium had seen attempts to negate the Persian advantage in numbers, but ultimately the Allies may have realised that they needed an even more constricted channel in order to defeat the Persians. Therefore, by rowing into the Straits of Salamis to attack the Greeks, the Persians were playing into the Allies' hands. It seems probable that
705-509: A council of war with the Persian fleet; Herodotus says this occurred at Phalerum . Artemisia , queen of Halicarnassus and commander of its naval squadron in Xerxes's fleet, tried to convince him to wait for the Allies to surrender believing that battle in the straits of Salamis was an unnecessary risk. Nevertheless, Xerxes and his chief advisor Mardonius pressed for an attack. It is difficult to explain exactly what eventually brought about
846-495: A demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed by throwing them in a pit; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well. This meant that Sparta was also effectively at war with Persia. Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos , before receiving
987-473: A demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of the Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down a well. This meant that Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia. Darius thus put together an amphibious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos , before receiving
1128-503: A full-scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any other contemporary state. By early 480 BC,
1269-437: A full-scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. Xerxes decided that the Hellespont would be bridged to allow his army to cross to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state. By early 480 BC,
1410-644: A hand picked force under Mardonius to complete the conquest the following year. However, under pressure from the Athenians, the Peloponnesian Allies eventually agreed to try to force Mardonius to battle, and marched on Attica. Mardonius withdrew to Boeotia to lure the Greeks into open terrain and the two sides eventually met near the city of Plataea. There, at the Battle of Plataea in August 479 BC,
1551-541: A heavy individual equipment comparable to Greek hoplites, and were able to vanquish five Greek ships: In that sea‑fight of all Xerxes' fighters the Egyptians bore themselves best; besides other great feats of arms that they achieved, they took five Greek ships and their crews withal. Of the Greeks on that day the Athenians bore themselves best; and of the Athenians Clinias son of Alcibiades ; he brought to
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#17327973981991692-461: A huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly restarted the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be
1833-405: A huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then died whilst preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I. Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly restarted the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be
1974-472: A large fleet since 483 BC, ostensibly for their ongoing conflict with Aegina. However, it is probable that this build up, initiated by Themistocles, was also made with a future conflict with the Persians in mind. The Athenians initially requested command of the Allied fleet, but let Eurybiades of Sparta command it to preserve unity. Strategically, the Allied mission was simple. The fleet needed to protect
2115-494: A manoeuver known as diekplous . It is not entirely clear what this was, but it probably involved sailing into gaps between enemy ships and then ramming them in the side. This maneuver would have required skilled sailing, and therefore the Persians would have been more likely to employ it. The Allies, however, developed tactics specifically to counter this. Herodotus suggests that the Allied ships were heavier and, by implication, less maneuverable. Their weight would further reduce
2256-406: A more orderly fashion. Aeschylus claims that as the Persians approached (possibly implying that they were not already in the Straits at dawn), they heard the Greeks singing their battle hymn ( paean ) before they saw the Allied fleet: ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων ἴτε ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ᾽, ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ παῖδας, γυναῖκας, θεῶν τέ πατρῴων ἕδη, θήκας τε προγόνων: νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών. O sons of
2397-493: A mountain path. Much of the Greek army retreated, before the Spartans and Thespians who had continued to block the pass were surrounded and killed. The simultaneous Battle of Artemisium was up to that point a stalemate; however, when news of Thermopylae reached them, the Allied fleet also retreated, since holding the straits of Artemisium was now a moot point. The Allied fleet now rowed from Artemisium to Salamis to assist with
2538-404: A possibility. Xerxes had also positioned around 400 troops on the island known as Psyttaleia , in the middle of the exit from the straits, in order to kill or capture any Greeks who ended up there (as a result of shipwreck or grounding). Regardless of what time they entered the straits, the Persians did not move to attack the Allies until daylight. Since they were not planning to flee after all,
2679-403: A reinforcement of 53 ships from Athens. Again waiting until late afternoon, the Allies took the opportunity to attack a patrol of Cilician ships, destroying them, before retreating as night fell. These ships were possibly survivors of the wrecked detachment sent around Euboea, or were perhaps anchored in an isolated harbour. On the third day of the battle the Persian fleet was ready to attack
2820-450: A ship, captained by Abronichus, which had been appointed to liaise between the army and the fleet. However, there was still no sign of the Persian fleet, and the first day the Persians spent at Thermopylae passed without them launching an attack. The next day, the Persian fleet finally drew near to Artemisium, heading for the Gap of Skiathos (between the coast of Magnesia and Skiathos ), when
2961-451: A strong position to force a Greek surrender; this seemed the only hope of concluding the campaign in that season. In contrast, by avoiding destruction, or as Themistocles hoped, by crippling the Persian fleet, the Greeks could effectively thwart the invasion. However, it was strategically not necessary for the Persians to actually fight this battle at Salamis. According to Herodotus, Queen Artemisia of Caria pointed this out to Xerxes in
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#17327973981993102-438: A summer gale (a 'Hellesponter' – probably a north-easterly storm ) broke, driving the Persian fleet onto the mountainous coast. The storm lasted two days, wrecking approximately one third of the Persian ships. Meanwhile, at Thermopylae, the Persians had continued to wait for the Greeks to disperse, also choosing not to attack during the storm. The day after the storm finished, the Allied fleet returned to Artemisium to protect
3243-482: A tactic for this situation, where they turned their "bows on to the barbarians, [and] they drew their sterns together in the middle" . This is usually taken to mean that they formed into a circle, with their rams pointing outwards; Thucydides reports that in the Peloponnesian War , Peloponnesian fleets twice adopted a circular formation, with their sterns together. However, Herodotus does not actually use
3384-483: A wedge of Greek ships pushed through the Persians' lines, splitting the fleet in two. According to Plutarch, Ariabignes was killed by Ameinias and Socles ( Greek : Σωκλής ) of Pallene. When Ariabignes attempted to board on their ship, they hit him with their spears, and thrust him into the sea. Plutarch also mentions that it was Artemisia who recognized Ariabignes' body floating among the shipwrecks and brought it back to Xerxes. Herodotus recounts that Artemisia ,
3525-505: Is difficult to establish with any certainty. Herodotus presents the battle as though it occurred directly after the capture of Athens, but nowhere explicitly states as much. If Thermopylae/Artemisium occurred in September, then this may be the case, but it is probably more likely that the Persians spent two or three weeks capturing Athens, refitting the fleet, and resupplying. Clearly though, at some point after capturing Athens, Xerxes held
3666-415: Is not clear when, why or how this decision was made, but it is clear that they did take the battle to the Allies. Herodotus reports that there were 378 triremes in the Allied fleet, and then breaks the numbers down by city state (as indicated in the table). However, his numbers for the individual contingents only add up to 371. He does not explicitly say that all 378 fought at Salamis ("All of these came to
3807-496: Is that these ships had been a decoy sent to reconnoitre the northern exit from the straits, in case the arrival of the encircling Egyptian detachment was imminent (if indeed this also occurred). Another possibility (not exclusive of the former) is that the departure of the Corinthians triggered the final approach of the Persians, suggesting as it did that the Allied fleet was disintegrating. At any rate, if they indeed ever left,
3948-427: Is uncertain; possibly the Allied ships were bulkier in construction, or that the ships were waterlogged since they had not been dried out in the winter (though there is no real evidence for either suggestion). Another suggestion is that the heaviness was caused by the weight of fully armored hoplite marines (20 fully armored hoplites would have weighed 2 tons). This 'heaviness', whatever its cause, would further reduce
4089-454: Is unlikely that the Allies would have rested one of their flanks against Persian occupied territory. It seems relatively certain that the Persian fleet was sent out to block the exit from the Straits the evening before the battle. Herodotus clearly believed that the Persian fleet actually entered the Straits at nightfall, planning to catch the Allies as they fled. However, modern historians have greatly debated this point, with some pointing out
4230-640: The Artemision Bronze , a statue either of Zeus or Poseidon , and the Jockey of Artemision , a bronze statue of a racehorse and its rider. In September 1952, the American School of Classical Studies at Athens made a return visit to the shipwreck, directed by George E. Mylonas , S. A. Dontas and Christos Karouzos . The excavation employed five divers and a sailing boat, the Alkyone , which
4371-490: The Battle of Artemisium the Greeks suffered heavy losses and retreated after the loss at Thermopylae. This allowed the Persians to conquer Phocis , Boeotia , Attica and Euboea . The allies prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth while the fleet was withdrawn to nearby Salamis Island. Although heavily outnumbered, the Greeks were persuaded by Athenian general Themistocles to bring the Persian fleet to battle again, in
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4512-544: The Iliad , and generally claim that the Persians could have launched no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean. However, very few appear to accept that there were this many ships at Salamis: most favour a number in the range 600–800. This is also the range given by adding the approximate number of Persian ships after Artemisium (~550) to the reinforcements (120) quantified by Herodotus. The overall Persian strategy for
4653-482: The Achaemenid fleet: The number 1,207 appears very early in the historical record (472 BC), and the Greeks appear to have genuinely believed they faced that many ships. Because of the consistency in the ancient sources, some modern historians are inclined to accept 1,207 as the size of the initial Persian fleet; others reject this number, with 1,207 being seen as more of a reference to the combined Greek fleet in
4794-469: The Allied cause: Men of Ionia, that what you are doing is not proper, campaigning against your fathers and wishing to enslave Greece. It would be best if you came on our side. But if this is not possible, at least during the battle stand aside and also beg the Carians to do the same with you. But if you can not do either the one or the other, if you are chained by higher force and you can not defect during
4935-467: The Allied command was in-fighting, that the Peloponnesians were planning to evacuate that very night, and that to gain victory all the Persians needed to do was to block the straits. In performing this subterfuge, Themistocles seems to have been trying to bring about exactly the opposite; to lure the Persian fleet into the Straits. This was exactly the kind of news that Xerxes wanted to hear; that
5076-428: The Allied crews, it was their first taste of battle, and the experience gained was invaluable at the forthcoming Battle of Salamis . Moreover, fighting the Persians at Artemisium allowed the Greek admirals to see how the Persian fleet performed, and gave them insights into how it might be beaten. In addition, the events before and during Artemisium were crucial in cutting down the size of the Persian fleet (even if this
5217-452: The Allied fleet. The Persians did not want to attack the Allies yet, because they thought the Allies would simply flee, and so they sought to trap them. The Allies resolved to go and meet this detachment, to prevent being trapped, though they planned to leave by nightfall to prevent the Persians becoming aware of their plans. The Allies most likely realised that this situation presented them with an opportunity to destroy an isolated part of
5358-412: The Allied lines in full force. Seeing the Persian fleet assemble, the Allies attempted to block the Straits of Artemisium as best they could, and waited for the Persians to attack. The Persians formed their ships into a semicircle and tried to enclose the Allied fleet, upon which the Allies rowed forward and joined battle. The battle raged all day long, with the Allies hard put to defend their line. When
5499-400: The Allied ships may also have made them more stable in the winds off the coast of Salamis, and made them less susceptible to ramming (or rather, less liable to sustain damage when rammed). The Persians preferred a battle in the open sea, where they could better utilize their own superior seamanship and numbers. For the Greeks, the only realistic hope of a victory was to draw the Persians into
5640-455: The Allies (who had waited patiently off the coast of Salamis for at least a week while Athens was captured) may have been in response to Persian offensive maneuvers. Possibly, a Persian army had been sent to march against the Isthmus in order to test the nerve of the fleet. Either way, when Xerxes received this news, he ordered his fleet to go out on patrol off the coast of Salamis, blocking
5781-490: The Allies decided to withdraw to Salamis . The Persians overran and gained control over Phocis , then Boeotia , and finally entered Attica where they captured the now-evacuated Athens. However, seeking a decisive victory over the Allied fleet, the Persians were later defeated at the Battle of Salamis in late 480 BC. Fearing being trapped in Europe, Xerxes withdrew with much of his army to Asia, leaving Mardonius to complete
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5922-461: The Allies may have planned to ambush the detachment as it passed by Artemisium, on its journey from Aphetae. Either way, they decided to make a demonstration towards the Persian lines during what remained of the day, to convince the Persians that they were planning to stay at Artemisium. Herodotus also suggests that this was an opportunity for them to assess Persian seamanship and tactics. The Allies probably waited until late afternoon so that there
6063-455: The Allies spent the evening heatedly debating their course of action. The Peloponnesians were in favour of evacuating, and at this point, Themistocles attempted his ruse with Xerxes. It was only when Aristides , the exiled Athenian general arrived that night, followed by some deserters from the Persians, with news of the deployment of the Persian fleet, that the Peloponnesians accepted that they could not escape, and so would fight. However,
6204-533: The Allies to seek a decisive victory against the Persian fleet. Luring the Persian navy into the Straits of Salamis in September, the Allied fleet was able to destroy much of the Persian fleet, which essentially ended the threat to the Peloponnese. Fearing that the Greeks might attack the bridges across the Hellespont and trap his army in Europe, Xerxes retreated with much of the army back to Asia. He left
6345-411: The Allies would have been able to spend the night preparing for battle, and after a speech by Themistocles, the marines boarded and the ships made ready to sail. According to Herodotus, this was dawn, and as the Allies "were putting out to sea the barbarians immediately attacked them" . If the Persians only entered the straits at dawn, then the Allies would have had the time to take up their station in
6486-444: The Allies. Nightfall then ended the battle, with the Allies having fared better than they possibly expected to. During the night, another storm broke (this time probably a thunder-storm, possibly with a south easterly wind), preventing the Allies from setting off southwards to counter the Persian detachment sent around the outside of Euboea. However, the storm also hit the Persian detachment of ships, driving them off course and onto
6627-477: The Athenians might be willing to submit to him, and that he would be able to destroy the rest of the Allied fleet. Xerxes evidently took the bait, and the Persian fleet was sent out that evening to effect this block. Xerxes ordered a throne to be set up on the slopes of Mount Aigaleo (overlooking the straits), in order to watch the battle from a clear vantage point, and so as to record the names of commanders who performed particularly well. According to Herodotus,
6768-454: The Corinthians soon returned to the battle. Approaching the Allied fleet in the crowded Straits, the Persians appear to have become disorganised and cramped in the narrow waters. Moreover, it would have become apparent that, far from disintegrating, the Greek fleet was lined up, ready to attack them. However, rather than attacking immediately, the Allies initially appeared to back their ships away as if in fear. According to Plutarch , this
6909-443: The Greek army won a decisive victory, destroying much of the Persian army, and ending the invasion of Greece. Meanwhile, at the near-simultaneous naval Battle of Mycale the Greeks destroyed much of the remaining Persian fleet, thereby reducing the threat of further invasions. Considered by itself, Artemisium was a relatively insignificant battle. The Allies did not defeat the Persian navy, nor prevent it from advancing further along
7050-488: The Greek fleet numbered only 220. The fleet was effectively under the command of Themistocles, but nominally led by the Spartan nobleman Eurybiades , as had been agreed at the congress in 481 BC. Although Themistocles had tried to claim leadership of the fleet, the other city states with navies objected, and so Sparta (which had no naval tradition) was given command of the fleet as a compromise. According to Herodotus,
7191-472: The Greeks to fight the Persians. However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combating the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta. Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and
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#17327973981997332-471: The Greeks to fight the Persians. However, the Athenians did not have the manpower to fight on land and sea; and therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of Greek city states. In 481 BC, Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but made the very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta. Support thus began to coalesce around these two leading states. A congress of city states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and
7473-463: The Greeks, but these were caught in another storm and shipwrecked. The main action of the battle took place after two days of smaller engagements. The two sides fought all day, with roughly equal losses; however, the smaller Allied fleet could not afford the losses. After the engagement, the Allies received news of the defeat of the Allied army at Thermopylae. Since their strategy required both Thermopylae and Artemisium to be held, and given their losses,
7614-486: The Greeks, go, Liberate your country, liberate Your children, your women, the seats of your fathers' gods, And the tombs of your forebears: now is the struggle for all things. Herodotus recounts that, according to the Athenians, as the battle began the Corinthians hoisted their sails and began sailing away from the battle, northwards up the straits. However, he also says that all the other Greeks denied this story. If this did in fact occur, one possible interpretation
7755-471: The Isthmus of Corinth , demolishing the single road that led through it, and building a wall across it. As at Thermopylae, to make this an effective strategy required the Allied navy to stage a simultaneous blockade, barring the passage of the Persian navy across the Saronic Gulf , so that troops could not be landed directly on the Peloponnese. However, instead of a mere blockade, Themistocles persuaded
7896-530: The Isthmus of Corinth, demolishing the single road that led through it, and building a wall across it. This strategy was flawed, however, unless the Allied fleet was able to prevent the Persian fleet from transporting troops across the Saronic Gulf. In a council-of-war called once the evacuation of Athens was complete, the Corinthian naval commander Adeimantus argued that the fleet should assemble off
8037-521: The Peloponnesian city of Troezen . The Allied fleet sailed north to Cape Artemisium once it became known that the Persian army was advancing along the coast past Mount Olympus , probably around late July or the beginning of August. The Allies took up station at Artemisium, most likely beaching their ships at the headland, from which they could quickly launch them as needed. The Allies sent three ships to Skiathos as scouts to provide warning of
8178-408: The Peloponnesians may have been party to Themistocles's stratagem, so serenely did they accept that they would now have to fight at Salamis. The Allied navy was thus able to prepare properly for battle the forthcoming day, whilst the Persians spent the night fruitlessly at sea, searching for the alleged Greek evacuation. The next morning, the Persians rowed into the straits to attack the Greek fleet; it
8319-428: The Persian fleet assembled at Doriskos in the spring of 480 BC. The number of 1,207 (for the outset only) is also given by Ephorus , while his teacher Isocrates claims there were 1,300 at Doriskos and 1,200 at Salamis. Ctesias gives another number, 1,000 ships, while Plato , speaking in general terms refers to 1,000 ships and more. Herodotus gives a precise list of the ships of the various nations that composed
8460-677: The Persian fleet initially numbered 1,207 triremes. However, by his reckoning they lost approximately a third of these ships in a storm off the coast of Magnesia , 200 more in a storm off the coast of Euboea, and at least 50 ships to Allied action at the Battle of Artemisium. Herodotus claims that these losses were replaced in full, but only mentions 120 ships from the Greeks of Thrace and nearby islands as reinforcements. Aeschylus , who fought at Salamis, also claims that he faced 1,207 warships there, of which 207 were "fast ships". Diodorus and Lysias independently claim there were 1,200 ships in
8601-454: The Persian fleet still probably outnumbered the Allies by nearly 3:1. As a result, the Allies contemplated withdrawing completely. The Euboeans, not wanting to be abandoned to the Persians, bribed Themistocles to try to ensure that the Allied fleet remained. Since the joint operation at Thermopylae and Artemisium was his strategy in the first place, it is likely this is exactly what Themistocles wanted, and this bribe allowed him in turn to bribe
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#17327973981998742-422: The Persian fleet. Herodotus is not clear on where the Allies planned to meet this detachment, only that they resolved to do so. One possibility is that they planned to sail down the Straits of Euboea, and hope that the other Allied ships, patrolling the coast of Attica, followed the Persians as they entered the Straits of Euboea from the south; then the Persians might themselves be caught in a trap. Alternatively,
8883-412: The Persian movements and come to the mistaken conclusion that the Persians were sailing east around Skiathos, aiming to sail around the eastern side of Euboea. The signals sent by fire beacons must have been very simplistic, and potentially interpreted wrongly; alternatively, the signallers may have genuinely believed that the Persian fleet was sailing to the east of Skiathos. If the Persians sailed around
9024-582: The Persian navy at the Battle of Mycale . The Persians made no further attempts to conquer the Greek mainland. The battles of Salamis and Plataea thus mark a turning point in the course of the Greco-Persian Wars as a whole; from then onward, the Greek poleis would take the offensive. The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499-494 BC, led by
9165-432: The Persian navy at the Straits of Artemisium . An Allied naval force of 271 triremes was thus dispatched to await the arrival of the Persians. Approaching Artemisium towards the end of summer, the Persian navy was caught in a gale off the coast of Magnesia and lost around a third of their 1200 ships. After arriving at Artemisium, the Persians sent a detachment of 200 ships around the coast of Euboea in an attempt to trap
9306-455: The Persians pivoted their fleet off the tip of Cape Vavari, so that from an initial east–west alignment (blocking the exit), they came round to a north–south alignment (see diagram). The Persian fleet seems to have been formed into three ranks of ships (according to Aeschylus); with the powerful Phoenician fleet on the right flank next to Mount Aigaleo, the Ionian contingent on the left flank and
9447-507: The Persians to the Greeks, one before Artemisium and one before Salamis, so the total complement at Salamis would have been 373 (or 380). According to the Athenian playwright Aeschylus , who actually fought at Salamis, the Greek fleet numbered 310 triremes (the difference being the number of Athenian ships). Ctesias claims that the Athenian fleet numbered only 110 triremes, which ties in with Aeschylus's numbers. According to Hyperides ,
9588-446: The Persians would not have attempted this unless they had been confident of the collapse of the Allied navy, and thus Themistocles's subterfuge appears to have played a key role in tipping the balance in the favor of the Greeks. Salamis was, for the Persians, an unnecessary battle and a strategic mistake. The battle of Salamis is not well described by ancient sources, and it is unlikely that anyone (other than perhaps Xerxes) involved in
9729-514: The Queen of Halicarnassus, and commander of the Carian contingent, found herself pursued by the ship of Ameinias of Pallene. In her desire to escape, she attacked and rammed another Persian vessel, thereby convincing the Athenian captain that the ship was an ally; Ameinias accordingly abandoned the chase. However, Xerxes, looking on, thought that she had successfully attacked an Allied ship, and seeing
9870-411: The Spartan and Corinthian admirals, Eurybiades and Adeimantus to remain at Artemisium. Later on that day, a deserter from the Persian fleet, a Greek called Scyllias, swam into the Allied camp. He brought bad news for the Allies – whilst most of the Persian fleet was undergoing repairs, the Persians had detached 200 seaworthy ships to sail around the outer coast of Euboea, to block the escape route of
10011-438: The Straits. The remaining Persian ships limped back to the harbour of Phalerum and the shelter of the Persian army. The Athenian general Aristides then took a detachment of men across to Psyttaleia to slaughter the garrison that Xerxes had left there. The exact Persian casualties are not mentioned by Herodotus. However, he writes that the next year, the Persian fleet numbered 300 triremes. The number of losses then depends on
10152-527: The allies could muster in the narrow Vale of Tempe , on the borders of Thessaly, and thereby block Xerxes's advance. A force of 10,000 hoplites was dispatched to the Vale of Tempe , through which they believed the Persian army would have to pass. However, once there, they were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed through the Sarantoporo Pass , and that the army of Xerxes
10293-538: The ancient sources are unusually consistent on this point. Other authors reject this number, with 1,207 being seen as more of a reference to the combined Greek fleet in the Iliad , and generally claim that the Persians could have launched no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean. Herodotus claims there were 280 ships in the Greek fleet at the Battle of Artemisium, made up of the following contingents (numbers in parentheses refer to Penteconters , other ships are all Triremes): The Athenians had been building up
10434-406: The approach of the Persian fleet but two weeks passed without sight. Finally, ten Sidonian triremes arrived off Skiathos, and the main Allied fleet was informed by a fire-beacon lit on the island. However, the Allied patrol ships themselves were caught unaware and two were captured, whilst one ran aground. According to Herodotus, in the ensuing confusion, unsure whether or not the beacon heralded
10575-432: The arrival of the whole Persian fleet, as a precaution the whole Allied fleet launched into the straits of Artemisium. Once it became clear that the Persian fleet was not going to arrive that day, they decided to sail to Chalcis , halfway down on the western coast of Euboea, leaving men on the heights of Euboea to warn of the actual arrival of the Persian ships. Historians suggest that the Allies may have misinterpreted
10716-464: The battle had a clear idea what was happening across the width of the straits. What follows is more of a discussion than a definitive account. In the Allied fleet, the Athenians were on the left, and on the right were probably the Spartans (although Diodorus says it was the Megareans and Aeginetians); the other contingents were in the center. The Allied fleet probably formed into two ranks, since
10857-432: The battle, assuming that neither side simply attacked without forethought. Clearly though, at some point just before the battle, new information began to reach Xerxes of rifts in the allied command; the Peloponnesians wished to evacuate from Salamis while they still could. This alleged rift amongst the Allies may have simply been a ruse, in order to lure the Persians to battle. Alternatively, this change in attitude amongst
10998-417: The campaigning season (and not waited 4 days at Thermopylae for the Greeks to disperse). Time was now of the essence for the Persians – the huge invasion force could not be reasonably supported indefinitely, nor probably did Xerxes wish to be at the fringe of his empire for so long. Thermopylae had shown that a frontal assault against a well defended Greek position was useless; with the Allies now dug in across
11139-500: The coast of Greece. Conversely, neither did the Persians destroy the Greek fleet, nor irreparably weaken it. The battle was thus an indecisive one, which pleased neither side. Nevertheless, in the wider context of the Greco-Persian wars, it was a very significant battle for the Allies. The Allies had demonstrated to themselves that they could stand up to the Persian navy, even having the better of some encounters. For many of
11280-413: The coast of the Isthmus in order to achieve such a blockade. However, Themistocles argued in favour of an offensive strategy, aimed at decisively destroying the Persians' naval superiority. He drew on the lessons of Artemisium, pointing out that "battle in close conditions works to our advantage" . He eventually won through, and the Allied navy remained off the coast of Salamis. The timeline for Salamis
11421-436: The conquest of Greece. The following year, however, saw an Allied army decisively defeat the Persians at the Battle of Plataea , thereby ending the Persian invasion. The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499–494 BC. The Persian Empire was still relatively young, and prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples. Moreover, Darius
11562-417: The cost of making the ships even heavier). Indeed, Herodotus refers to the Greeks capturing ships, rather than sinking them. When the Persians saw the Allied fleet rowing towards them, they decided to seize the opportunity to attack, even though it was late in the day, as they thought they would win an easy victory. They quickly advanced on the much smaller Allied fleet. However, the Allies had come up with
11703-410: The cramped waters, the great Persian numbers were an active hindrance, as ships struggled to maneuver and became disorganized. Seizing the opportunity, the Greek fleet formed in line and achieved a victory. Xerxes retreated to Asia with much of his army, leaving Mardonius to complete the conquest of Greece. The following year the remainder of the Persian army was defeated at the Battle of Plataea and
11844-408: The difficulties of maneuvering in this confined space by night, and others accepting Herodotus's version. There are thus two possibilities; that during the night the Persians simply blocked the exit to the Straits, and then entered the straits in daylight; or that they entered the straits and positioned themselves for battle during the night. Regardless of when they attempted it, it seems likely that
11985-415: The east coast of Euboea. The Greek position at Artemisium may have been chosen in order to watch for such attempts. If narrowness of the channel had been the only determinant, the Allies could have found a better position near the city of Histiaea . The Persians were at a significant tactical advantage, outnumbering the Allies and having "better sailing" ships. The "better sailing" that Herodotus mentions
12126-588: The final evacuation of Athens. En route Themistocles left inscriptions addressed to the Ionian Greek crews of the Persian fleet on all springs of water that they might stop at, asking them to defect to the Allied cause. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack the Boeotian cities that had not surrendered, Plataea and Thespiae , before marching on the now evacuated city of Athens. The Allies (mostly Peloponnesian) prepared to defend
12267-464: The first line of Persian ships was pushed back by the Greeks, they became fouled in the advancing second and third lines of their own ships. On the Greek left, the Persian admiral Ariabignes (a brother of Xerxes) was killed early in the battle; left disorganised and leaderless, the Phoenician squadrons appear to have been pushed back against the coast, many vessels running aground. In the centre,
12408-454: The flank of the army at Thermopylae, whilst not being cut off themselves. For the Persians, the strategic situation was equally simple, although with more options. They needed to force their way through either one of Thermopylae or Artemisium (since holding both was necessary for the Allied effort), or to outflank either position. Outflanking the Straits of Artemisium was theoretically much easier than outflanking Thermopylae, by sailing around
12549-456: The flank of the army at Thermopylae. The following day, (the fifth since the Persians had arrived at Thermopylae) the Persian army began their attacks on the Allied army at Thermopylae. The same day, the Persian fleet finally appeared through the Gap of Sciathos, and began mooring on the coast opposite Artemisium, at Aphetae. According to Herodotus, 15 Persian ships blundered into the Allied lines, and were captured. Although clearly storm damaged,
12690-414: The fleets finally disengaged at nightfall, both sides had suffered roughly equal losses. However, the smaller Allied fleet could scarcely afford such losses; half the Athenian ships (the largest contingent in the fleet) were damaged or lost. According to Herodotus, the Athenians were the best fighters on the Allied side. On the Achaemenid side, the best results had been achieved by the Egyptians, who wore
12831-549: The forthcoming conflict with Persia. The most common naval tactics in the Mediterranean area at the time were ramming (triremes being equipped with a ram at the bows), or boarding by ship-borne marines (which essentially turned a sea battle into a land one). The Persians and Asiatic Greeks had by this time begun to use a manoeuvre known as diekplous . It is not entirely clear what this was, but it probably involved rowing into gaps between enemy ships and then ramming them in
12972-466: The hope that a victory would prevent naval operations against the Peloponnese . Persian king Xerxes was also eager for a decisive battle. As a result of subterfuge on the part of Themistocles (which included a message directly sent to Xerxes letting him know that much of the Greek fleet was stationed at Salamis), the Persian navy rowed into the Straits of Salamis and tried to block both entrances. In
13113-406: The invasion of 480 BC was to overwhelm the Greeks with a massive invasion force, and complete the conquest of Greece in a single campaigning season. In contrast, the Greeks sought to make the best use of their numbers by defending restricted locations and to keep the Persians in the field for as long as possible. Xerxes had obviously not anticipated such resistance, or he would have arrived earlier in
13254-441: The land approaches to Greece, re-conquered Thrace , and forced Macedon to become a fully subordinate client kingdom part of Persia. It had been made a vassal or ally as early as the late 6th century BC, but remained having autonomy. Mardonius' campaign of 492 BC changed this. In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of ' earth and water ' in token of their submission to him. Having had
13395-423: The liaison ship from Thermopylae and told the Allies of the destruction of the Allied rearguard at Thermopylae. Since holding the Straits of Artemisium now no longer held any strategic purpose, and given their losses, the Allies decided to evacuate immediately. The Persians were alerted to the withdrawal of the Greeks by a boat from Histiaea , but did not at first believe it. They sent some ships to see if this
13536-417: The likelihood of the Allied ships employing the diekplous . The source of this heaviness is uncertain; possibly the Allied ships were bulkier in construction. Another suggestion is that the heaviness was caused by the weight of fully armoured hoplite marines. The Allies may have had extra marines on board if their ships were less maneuverable, since boarding would then be the main tactic available to them (at
13677-407: The likelihood of them employing the diekplous . It is therefore probable that the Allies had extra marines on board if their ships were less manoeuvrable, since boarding would then be the main tactic available to them (at the cost of making the ships even heavier). Indeed, Herodotus refers to the Greeks capturing ships at Artemisium, rather than sinking them. It has been suggested that the weight of
13818-421: The narrow Vale of Tempe , on the borders of Thessaly , and thereby block Xerxes's advance. However, once there, they were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed through the pass by the modern village of Sarantaporo , and that the army of Xerxes was overwhelming, so the Greeks retreated. Shortly afterward, they received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont. A second strategy
13959-408: The narrow Isthmus, there was little chance of conquering the rest of Greece by land. However, as equally demonstrated by Thermopylae, if the Greeks could be outflanked, their smaller numbers of troops could be destroyed. Such an outflanking of the Isthmus required the use of the Persian navy, and thus the destruction of the Allied navy. Therefore, if Xerxes could destroy the Allied navy, he would be in
14100-482: The number of ships the Persian had to begin with; something in the range of 200–300 seems likely, based on the above estimates for the size of the Persian fleet. According to Herodotus, the Persians suffered many more casualties than the Greeks because most Persians did not know how to swim. A king sate on the rocky brow Which looks o'er sea-born Salamis And ships, by thousands, lay below, And men in nations;—all were his! He counted them at break of day— And when
14241-499: The operations, when we come at hand, act purposely as cowards remembering that we are of the same blood and that the first cause of animosity with the barbarians came from you. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army burned and sacked the Boeotian cities that had not submitted to them— Plataea and Thespiae —and then marched on the now evacuated city of Athens. Meanwhile, the Allies (for the most part Peloponnesian) prepared to defend
14382-426: The opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece. A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a client kingdom of Persia. In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of ' earth and water ' in token of their submission to him. Having had
14523-493: The other contingents in the centre. Diodorus says that the Egyptian fleet was sent to circumnavigate Salamis, and block the northern exit from the Straits. If Xerxes wanted to trap the Allies completely, this maneuver would have made sense (especially if he was not expecting the Allies to fight). However, Herodotus does not mention this (and possibly alludes to the Egyptian presence in the main battle), leading some modern historians to dismiss it; though again, others accept it as
14664-487: The outer, eastern side of Euboea, they could head straight to Attica, and thereby cut off the Allied fleet's line of retreat. Furthermore, the Persians had enough ships to attempt to both attack the Straits of Artemisium, and sail around Euboea. The withdrawal to Chalcis therefore gave the Allies the opportunity to escape from the Straits of Euboea if the Persians did travel around the outside of Euboea, but also allowed them to return to Artemisium if necessary. In this context,
14805-404: The overwhelming numbers of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent the Persians bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied navies could block the straits of Artemisium. This dual strategy was adopted by the congress. However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth should all else fail, whilst the women and children of Athens were evacuated en masse to
14946-597: The poor performance of his other captains commented that "My men have become women, and my women men". The friendly ship she sank was a Calyndian ship and the king of the Calyndians, Damasithymos ( Greek : Δαμασίθυμος ) was on it. None of the crew of the Calyndian ship survived. The Persian fleet began to retreat towards Phalerum, but according to Herodotus, the Aeginetans ambushed them as they tried to leave
15087-407: The preparations were complete, and the army Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges . The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician Themistocles , to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for
15228-413: The preparations were complete, and the army which Xerxes had mustered at Sardis marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges . The Athenians had also been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC the decision was taken, under the guidance of the Athenian politician Themistocles , to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for
15369-485: The rocky coast of 'the Hollows' of Euboea. This part of the Persian fleet was thus also shipwrecked, losing most of the ships. The following day (which was also the second day of the battle of Thermopylae) the Persian fleet, now recovering from the two storms, declined to attack the Allies, and instead attempted to make their fleet seaworthy again. News of the shipwreck off Euboea reached the Allies that day, as well as
15510-470: The run-up to Salamis. Artemisia suggested that fighting at sea was an unnecessary risk, recommending instead: If you do not hurry to fight at sea, but keep your ships here and stay near land, or even advance into the Peloponnese, then, my lord, you will easily accomplish what you had in mind on coming here. The Hellenes are not able to hold out against you for a long time, but you will scatter them, and they will each flee to their own cities. The Persian fleet
15651-411: The satrap of Miletus, Aristagoras. The Persian Empire was still relatively young, and prone to revolts amongst its subject peoples. Moreover, Darius was a usurper, and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule. The Ionian revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and Darius thus vowed to punish those involved (especially those not already part of the empire). Darius also saw
15792-457: The side. This manoeuvre would have required skilled crews, and therefore the Persians would have been more likely to employ it; the Allies however, developed tactics specifically to counter this. There has been much debate as to the nature of the Allied fleet compared to the Persian fleet. Much of this centres on the suggestion, from Herodotus, that the Allied ships were heavier, and by implication less manoeuvrable. The source of this heaviness
15933-494: The southern exit. Then, at dusk, he ordered them to withdraw, possibly in order to tempt the Allies into a hasty evacuation. That evening Themistocles attempted what appears to have been a spectacularly successful use of disinformation. He sent a servant, Sicinnus , to Xerxes, with a message proclaiming that Themistocles was "on the king's side and prefers that your affairs prevail, not the Hellenes" . Themistocles claimed that
16074-432: The straits of Artemisium. This dual strategy was adopted by the congress. However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth should it come to it, whilst the women and children of Athens had been evacuated en masse to the Peloponnesian city of Troezen . Famously, the much smaller Greek army held the pass of Thermopylae against the Persians for three days before being outflanked by
16215-428: The straits would have been too narrow for a single line of ships. Herodotus has the Allied fleet in a line running north–south, probably with the northern flank off the coast of modern-day Saint George's Islet ( Ayios Georgis ), and the southern flank off the coast of Cape Vavari (part of Salamis). Diodorus suggests the Allied fleet was aligned east–west, spanning the straits between Salamis and Mount Aigaleo; however, it
16356-419: The submission of the other Cycladic Islands . The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed. Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon , where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon , the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia. Darius therefore began raising
16497-419: The submission of the other Cycladic Islands . The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed. Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon , where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon , the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia. Darius therefore began raising
16638-591: The sun set where were they? Xerxes, sitting on Mount Aigaleo on his throne, witnessed the carnage. Some ship-wrecked Phoenician captains tried to blame the Ionians for cowardice before the end of the battle. Xerxes, in a foul mood, and having just witnessed an Ionian ship capture an Aeginetan ship, had the Phoenicians beheaded for slandering "more noble men". According to Diodorus, Xerxes "put to death those Phoenicians who were chiefly responsible for beginning
16779-465: The time-line, following Lazenby and Holland. Herodotus gives a detailed description of the Persian fleet that assembled at Doriskos in spring 480 BC (see table). However, after the fleet was struck the storm off the coast of Magnesia, approximately one third of the fleet was lost. Thus, by Herodotus's reckoning, the Persian fleet would have had approximately 800 triremes at Artemisium. Some modern scholars have accepted these numbers, especially since
16920-444: The use of diekplous . Having assumed this formation upon the giving of a prearranged signal, the Allied ships moved suddenly outwards from this position at a second signal, rowing into the Persian ships and catching them off guard. Their superior seamanship negated, the Persians came off worst from the encounter with 30 of their ships captured or sunk. During the battle a Persian ship, captained by Antidorus of Lemnos , defected to
17061-440: The war providing triremes...The total number of ships...was three hundred and seventy-eight"), and he also says that the Aeginetans "had other manned ships, but they guarded their own land with these and fought at Salamis with the thirty most seaworthy". Thus it has been supposed that the difference between the numbers is accounted for by a garrison of 12 ships left at Aegina . According to Herodotus, two more ships defected from
17202-529: The war two hundred men and a ship of his own, all at his private charges. Returning to Artemisium, the Allies saw that they would probably not be able to hold the line for another day, such were their losses. They thus debated whether they should withdraw from Artemisium, whilst they awaited news from Thermopylae. Themistocles ordered the men to slaughter and barbecue the flocks of the Euboeans, so that they would not fall into Persian hands. Abronichus arrived on
17343-408: The watchers left on Euboea could inform the Allies if the Persian fleet did indeed sail east of Euboea. The Allied fleet thus continued to wait at Chalcis. Nevertheless, the Allies, undoubtedly anxious about facing a Persian fleet that so greatly outnumbered them, may have somewhat overreacted. Around ten days later, the Persian army arrived at Thermopylae, and the Allies at Chalcis were informed by
17484-428: The word circle, and Lazenby points out the difficulty of forming a circle of 250 ships (the Peloponnesian fleets had 30–40 ships). It is thus possible the Allies formed into more of a crescent formation, with the wings drawn back to prevent the Persian ships sailing around the Allied line. Whatever the case, it seems likely that this maneuver was intended to negate the superior Persian seamanship, and perhaps specifically
17625-467: Was a naval battle fought in 480 BC, between an alliance of Greek city-states under Themistocles , and the Achaemenid Empire under King Xerxes . It resulted in a victory for the outnumbered Greeks. The battle was fought in the straits between the mainland and Salamis , an island in the Saronic Gulf near Athens , and marked the high point of the second Persian invasion of Greece . It
17766-464: Was a delayed response to the defeat of the first Persian invasion of Greece , which had been ended by the Athenian victory at the Battle of Marathon . King Xerxes had amassed a huge army and navy, and set out to conquer all of Greece . The Athenian general Themistocles proposed that the Allied Greeks block the advance of the Persian army at the pass of Thermopylae and simultaneously block
17907-474: Was a series of naval engagements over three days during the second Persian invasion of Greece . The battle took place simultaneously with the land battle at Thermopylae , in August or September 480 BC, off the coast of Euboea and was fought between an alliance of Greek city-states , including Sparta , Athens , Corinth and others, and the Persian Empire of Xerxes I . The Persian invasion
18048-408: Was an usurper, and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule. The Ionian revolt threatened the integrity of his empire, and Darius thus vowed to punish those involved (especially those not already part of the empire). Darius also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece. A preliminary expedition under Mardonius in 492 BC, to secure
18189-404: Was arguably the largest naval battle of the ancient world , and marked a turning point in the invasion. To block the Persian advance, a small force of Greeks blocked the pass of Thermopylae , while an Athenian-dominated allied navy engaged the Persian fleet in the nearby straits of Artemisium . In the resulting Battle of Thermopylae , the rearguard of the Greek force was annihilated, while in
18330-399: Was little chance of being drawn into a full scale engagement; they did not want to suffer casualties before sailing to meet to the Persian detachment. These decisions finally led to the beginning of the battle. The exact chronology of the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium, and their relation to each other is somewhat unclear. The chronology below represents an estimated reconstruction of
18471-456: Was not all due to military action), meaning that the odds faced by the Allies at the Battle of Salamis were not overwhelming. As the poet Pindar put it, Artemisium was "where the sons of the Athenians laid the shining foundation-stone of freedom" . 39°03′N 23°12′E / 39.05°N 23.2°E / 39.05; 23.2 Battle of Salamis The Battle of Salamis ( / ˈ s æ l ə m ɪ s / SAL -ə-miss )
18612-480: Was overwhelming, the Greeks retreated. Shortly afterwards, they received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont. Themistocles therefore suggested a second strategy to the allies. The route to southern Greece ( Boeotia , Attica and the Peloponnesus ) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the very narrow pass of Thermopylae . The pass could easily be blocked by the Greek hoplites, despite
18753-416: Was possible to sink an enemy ship, or at least disable it by shearing off the banks of oars on one side. If the initial ramming was not successful, marines boarded the enemy ship and something similar to a land battle ensued. Both sides had marines on their ships for this eventuality; the Greeks with fully armed hoplites ; the Persians probably with more lightly armed infantry. Across the battlefield, as
18894-400: Was probably due to the superior seamanship of the crews; most of the Athenian ships (and therefore the majority of the fleet) were newly built as according to Themistocles' request to the Athenians to build a fleet of 200 triremes in 483 BC, and had inexperienced crews. Despite the inexperienced crew on the part of the Athenians, these newly constructed triremes would ultimately prove crucial in
19035-459: Was probably due to the superior seamanship of the crews; most of the Athenian ships (and therefore the majority of the fleet) were newly built, and had inexperienced crews. The most common naval tactics in the Mediterranean area at the time were ramming (triremes were equipped with a ram at the bows), or boarding by ship-borne marines (which essentially turned a sea battle into a land one). The Persians and Asiatic Greeks had by this time begun to use
19176-448: Was still large enough to both bottle up the Allied navy in the straits of Salamis, and send ships to land troops in the Peloponnese. However, in the final reckoning, both sides were prepared to stake everything on a naval battle, in the hope of decisively altering the course of the war. The Persians were at a tactical advantage, outnumbering the Allies, and also having "better sailing" ships. The "better sailing" that Herodotus mentions
19317-468: Was the case, and finding that it was, the whole fleet set sail for Artemisium in the morning. The Persians then sailed on to Histiaea and sacked the surrounding region. The Allied fleet sailed to Salamis , off the coast of Attica, to assist with the evacuation of the remaining Athenians. En route, Themistocles left inscriptions addressed to the Ionian Greek crews of the Persian fleet on all springs of water that they might stop at, asking them to defect to
19458-480: Was the ship of the Athenian Ameinias of Pallene ; the Aeginetans would claim it as one of their ships. The whole Greek line then followed suit and made straight for the disordered Persian battle line. The details of the rest of the battle are generally sketchy, and no one involved would have had a view of the entire battlefield. Triremes were generally armed with a large ram at the front, with which it
19599-461: Was therefore adopted by the allies. The route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica and the Peloponnese) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the very narrow pass of Thermopylae . This could easily be blocked by the Greek hoplites, despite the overwhelming numbers of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent the Persians bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the Athenian and allied navies could block
19740-432: Was to gain better position, and also in order to gain time until the early morning wind. Herodotus recounts the legend that as the fleet had backed away, they had seen an apparition of a woman, asking them "Madmen, how far will ye yet back your ships?" However, he more plausibly suggests that whilst the Allies were backing water, a single ship shot forward to ram the nearest Persian vessel. The Athenians would claim that this
19881-429: Was used to dredge the sea floor between dives. The project succeeded in re-locating the shipwreck, but did not recover any notable finds. 39°0′45″N 23°13′37″E / 39.01250°N 23.22694°E / 39.01250; 23.22694 This Central Greece location article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Battle of Artemisium The Battle of Artemisium or Artemision
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