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44-734: The Barcelona Charter , in full the European Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Traditional Ships in Operation is an informal but widely accepted standard for maintenance and restoration projects on historic watercraft that are still in operation as active sailing vessels . More than a thousand historic watercraft of all sizes are still in operation in Europe . Only a small number of them are registered monuments or real museum ships , while nearly all of them have

88-417: A coordination problem : it emerges from situations in which all parties realize mutual gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions. Examples : Private standards are developed by private entities such as companies, non-governmental organizations or private sector multi-stakeholder initiatives, also referred to as multistakeholder governance . Not all technical standards are created equal. In

132-477: A certain historic or cultural value in the context of maritime or regional history . The wide majority of historic watercraft are owned and operated by private owners, associations, foundations etc. European Maritime Heritage , the European umbrella organization for traditional vessels in operation, decided to develop a code of best practice for the conservation and restoration of such vessels to safeguard

176-418: A coordination game is choosing the sides of the road upon which to drive, a social standard which can save lives if it is widely adhered to. In a simplified example, assume that two drivers meet on a narrow dirt road. Both have to swerve in order to avoid a head-on collision. If both execute the same swerving maneuver they will manage to pass each other, but if they choose differing maneuvers they will collide. In

220-494: A driver could take U.S. Route 101 or Interstate 280 from San Francisco to San Jose . While 101 is shorter, 280 is considered more scenic, so drivers might have different preferences between the two independent of the traffic flow. But each additional car on either route will slightly increase the drive time on that route, so additional traffic creates negative network externalities, and even scenery-minded drivers might opt to take 101 if 280 becomes too crowded. A congestion game

264-416: A game is an anti-coordination game if B > A and C > D for row-player 1 (with lowercase analogues b > d and c > a for column-player 2). {Down, Left} and {Up, Right} are the two pure Nash equilibria. Chicken also requires that A > C, so a change from {Up, Left} to {Up, Right} improves player 2's payoff but reduces player 1's payoff, introducing conflict. This counters

308-434: A government (i.e., through legislation ), business contract, etc. The standardization process may be by edict or may involve the formal consensus of technical experts. The primary types of technical standards are: Technical standards are defined as: Technical standards may exist as: When a geographically defined community must solve a community-wide coordination problem , it can adopt an existing standard or produce

352-515: A large user base, doing some well established thing that between them is mutually incompatible. Establishing national/regional/international standards is one way of preventing or overcoming this problem. To further support this, the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Committee published the "Six Principles" guiding members in the development of international standards. The existence of a published standard does not imply that it

396-412: A new one. The main geographic levels are: National/Regional/International standards is one way of overcoming technical barriers in inter-local or inter-regional commerce caused by differences among technical regulations and standards developed independently and separately by each local, local standards organisation , or local company. Technical barriers arise when different groups come together, each with

440-621: A number of papers in relation to the proliferation of private food safety standards in the agri-food industry, mostly driven by standard harmonization under the multistakeholder governance of the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI). With concerns around private standards and technical barriers to trade (TBT), and unable to adhere to the TBT Committee's Six Principles for the development of international standards because private standards are non-consensus,

484-402: A payoff based on their individual performance as well as a bonus that was weighted by the number of errors accumulated by their worst performing team member. Players also had the option to purchase more time, the cost of doing so was subtracted from their payoff. While groups initially failed to coordinate, researchers observed about 80% of the groups in the experiment coordinated successfully when

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528-404: A riskier option when the difference between taking the risk or the safe option is smaller. The laboratory results suggest that coordination failure is a common phenomenon in the setting of order-statistic games and stag-hunt games. Coordination games are closely linked to the economic concept of externalities , and in particular positive network externalities , the benefit reaped from being in

572-562: A single international standard ; ISO 9001 (quality), ISO 14001 (environment), ISO 45001 (occupational health and safety), ISO 27001 (information security) and ISO 22301 (business continuity). Another example of a sector working with a single international standard is ISO 13485 (medical devices), which is adopted by the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF). In 2020, Fairtrade International , and in 2021, Programme for

616-409: A voluntary standard tends to be stable in situations in which all parties can realize mutual gains, but only by making mutually consistent decisions. In contrast, an obligation standard (enforced by law as " de jure standard") is a solution to the prisoner's problem . Coordination games also have mixed strategy Nash equilibria . In the generic coordination game above, a mixed Nash equilibrium

660-664: Is a crowding game in networks. The minority game is a game where the only objective for all players is to be part of smaller of two groups. A well-known example of the minority game is the El Farol Bar problem proposed by W. Brian Arthur . A hybrid form of coordination and anti-coordination is the discoordination game , where one player's incentive is to coordinate while the other player tries to avoid this. Discoordination games have no pure Nash equilibria. In Figure 1, choosing payoffs so that A > B, C < D, while a < b, c > d, creates

704-404: Is always useful or correct. For example, if an item complies with a certain standard, there is not necessarily assurance that it is fit for any particular use. The people who use the item or service (engineers, trade unions, etc.) or specify it (building codes, government, industry, etc.) have the responsibility to consider the available standards, specify the correct one, enforce compliance, and use

748-625: Is given by probabilities p = (d-b)/(a+d-b-c) to play Up and 1-p to play Down for player 1, and q = (D-C)/(A+D-B-C) to play Left and 1-q to play Right for player 2. Since d > b and d-b < a+d-b-c, p is always between zero and one, so existence is assured (similarly for q). In the generic coordination game in Fig. 6, a mixed Nash equilibrium is given by the probabilities: p = (d-b)/(a+d-b-c), to play Option A and 1-p to play Option B for player 1, and q = (D-C)/(A+D-B-C), to play A and 1-q to play B for player 2. If we look at Fig 1. and apply

792-432: Is not true for all coordination games, as the assurance game in Fig. 3 shows. An assurance game describes the situation where neither player can offer a sufficient amount if they contribute alone, thus player 1 should defect from playing if player 2 defects. However, if Player 2 opts to contribute then player 1 should contribute also. An assurance game is commonly referred to as a “ stag hunt ” (Fig.5), which represents

836-400: Is originally due to Jean-Jacques Rousseau . This is different in another type of coordination game commonly called battle of the sexes (or conflicting interest coordination), as seen in Fig. 4. In this game both players prefer engaging in the same activity over going alone, but their preferences differ over which activity they should engage in. Assume that a couple argues over what to do on

880-612: Is recognized by several European marine safety authorities as well as national owner organizations of historic watercraft. Despite the fact that the Barcelona Charter was written mainly as a European Charter, the principles of the Charter can be applied globally and were, for example, published by the National Research Institute for Restoration and Conservation of Japan. Technical standard It

924-646: Is usually a formal document that establishes uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes, and practices. In contrast, a custom, convention, company product, corporate standard, and so forth that becomes generally accepted and dominant is often called a de facto standard. A technical standard may be developed privately or unilaterally, for example by a corporation, regulatory body, military, etc. Standards can also be developed by groups such as trade unions and trade associations. Standards organizations often have more diverse input and usually develop voluntary standards: these might become mandatory if adopted by

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968-475: The Stag hunt , in which {Stag,Stag} has higher payoffs, but {Hare,Hare} is safer). Coordination games have been studied in laboratory experiments. One such experiment by Bortolotti, Devetag, and Andreas Ortmann was a weak-link experiment in which groups of individuals were asked to count and sort coins in an effort to measure the difference between individual and group incentives. Players in this experiment received

1012-583: The WTO does not rule out the possibility that the actions of private standard-setting bodies may be subject to WTO law. BSI Group compared private food safety standards with "plugs and sockets", explaining the food sector is full of "confusion and complexity". Also, "the multiplicity of standards and assurance schemes has created a fragmented and inefficient supply chain structure imposing unnecessary costs on businesses that have no choice but to pass on to consumers". BSI provide examples of other sectors working with

1056-423: The payoff matrix in Fig. 2, successful passing is represented by a payoff of 8, and a collision by a payoff of 0. In this case there are two pure Nash equilibria: either both swerve to the left, or both swerve to the right. In this example, it doesn't matter which side both players pick, as long as they both pick the same. Both solutions are Pareto efficient . This game is called a pure coordination game . This

1100-454: The Charter was written in English , but unofficial translations are available for a number of European languages ( Catalan, Dutch, French, German and Portuguese ). A detailed commentary on all paragraphs of the Charter was developed by the maritime historian Ingo Heidbrink . Although the Barcelona Charter is not a binding legal instrument, it is widely accepted as a code of best practice and

1144-468: The Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) issued position statements defending their use of private standards in response to reports from The Institute for Multi-Stakeholder Initiative Integrity (MSI Integrity) and Greenpeace. Private standards typically require a financial contribution in terms of an annual fee from the organizations who adopt the standard. Corporations are encouraged to join

1188-406: The activity itself. Unlike the other forms of coordination games described previously, knowing your opponent’s strategy won’t help you decide on your course of action. Due to this there is a possibility that an equilibrium will not be reached. In social sciences , a voluntary standard (when characterized also as de facto standard ) is a typical solution to a coordination problem. The choice of

1232-504: The basis of the Charter of Venice and include for example the requirement for proper documentation of all work carried out as well as proper historical background research as a basis for all work to be done. The aim of all paragraphs is to safeguard the particular historic value of a vessel for future generations although the vessel is still in operation and therefore certain safety-regulations of today have to be matched. The original text of

1276-443: The board of governance of the standard owner which enables reciprocity. Meaning corporations have permission to exert influence over the requirements in the standard, and in return the same corporations promote the standards in their supply chains which generates revenue and profit for the standard owner. Financial incentives with private standards can result in a perverse incentive , where some private standards are created solely with

1320-461: The development of a technical standard, private standards adopt a non-consensus process in comparison to voluntary consensus standards. This is explained in the paper International standards and private standards . The International Trade Centre published a literature review series with technical papers on the impacts of private standards and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) published

1364-445: The following scenario. Two hunters can choose to either hunt a stag together (which provides the most economically efficient outcome) or they can individually hunt a Rabbit. Hunting Stags is challenging and requires cooperation. If the two hunters do not cooperate the chances of success is minimal. Thus, the scenario where both hunters choose to coordinate will provide the most beneficial output for society. A common problem associated with

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1408-427: The game was repeated. When academics talk about coordination failure, most cases are that subjects achieve risk dominance rather than payoff dominance. Even when payoffs are better when players coordinate on one equilibrium, many times people will choose the less risky option where they are guaranteed some payoff and end up at an equilibrium that has sub-optimal payoff. Players are more likely to fail to coordinate on

1452-530: The historic value of these vessels and to define minimum methodological standards for any work to be carried out on these vessels. A working group mainly consisting of Arne Gotved , John Robinson and the professional maritime historian Ingo Heidbrink drafted the text of the Charter which was finally adopted by European Maritime Heritage in 2003. The Barcelona Charter describes in a few paragraphs how conservation and restoration of traditional ships in operation should be done. The basic principles are developed on

1496-509: The intent of generating money. BRCGS, as scheme owner of private standards, was acquired in 2016 by LGC Ltd who were owned by private equity company Kohlberg Kravis Roberts . This acquisition triggered substantial increases in BRCGS annual fees. In 2019, LGC Ltd was sold to private equity companies Cinven and Astorg. Coordination problem A coordination game is a type of simultaneous game found in game theory . It describes

1540-411: The item correctly. Validation of suitability is necessary. Standards often get reviewed, revised and updated on a regular basis. It is critical that the most current version of a published standard be used or referenced. The originator or standard writing body often has the current versions listed on its web site. In social sciences , including economics , a standard is useful if it is a solution to

1584-528: The need for solution to coordination problems. Often we are confronted with circumstances where we must solve coordination problems without the ability to communicate with our partner. Many authors have suggested that particular equilibria are focal for one reason or another. For instance, some equilibria may give higher payoffs , be naturally more salient , may be more fair , or may be safer . Sometimes these refinements conflict, which makes certain coordination games especially complicated and interesting (e.g.

1628-459: The players expect (Down, Right), player 1 thinks their payoff would fall from 2 to 1 if they deviated to Up, and player 2 thinks their payoff would fall from 4 to 3 if they chose Left. A player's optimal move depends on what they expect the other player to do, and they both do better if they coordinate than if they played an off-equilibrium combination of actions. This setup can be extended to more than two strategies or two players. A typical case for

1672-401: The pure Nash equilibria, the mixed equilibrium is not an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). The mixed Nash equilibrium is also Pareto dominated by the two pure Nash equilibria (since the players will fail to coordinate with non-zero probability), a quandary that led Robert Aumann to propose the refinement of a correlated equilibrium . Games like the driving example above have illustrated

1716-460: The same network as other agents. Conversely, game theorists have modeled behavior under negative externalities where choosing the same action creates a cost rather than a benefit. The generic term for this class of game is anti-coordination game . The best-known example of a 2-player anti-coordination game is the game of Chicken (also known as Hawk-Dove game ). Using the payoff matrix in Figure 1,

1760-417: The same probability equations we obtain the following results: p = (4-3) / (4+4-3-3) = ½ and, q = (2-1) / (2+2-1-1) = ½ The reaction correspondences for 2×2 coordination games are shown in Fig. 7. The pure Nash equilibria are the points in the bottom left and top right corners of the strategy space, while the mixed Nash equilibrium lies in the middle, at the intersection of the dashed lines. Unlike

1804-562: The situation where a player will earn a higher payoff when they select the same course of action as another player. The game is not one of pure conflict, which results in multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria in which players choose matching strategies. Figure 1 shows a 2-player example. Both (Up, Left) and (Down, Right) are Nash equilibria. If the players expect (Up, Left) to be played, then player 1 thinks their payoff would fall from 2 to 1 if they deviated to Down, and player 2 thinks their payoff would fall from 4 to 3 if they chose Right. If

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1848-415: The stag hunt is the amount of trust required to achieve this output. Fig. 5 shows a situation in which both players (hunters) can benefit if they cooperate (hunting a stag). As you can see, cooperation might fail, because each hunter has an alternative which is safer because it does not require cooperation to succeed (hunting a hare). This example of the potential conflict between safety and social cooperation

1892-421: The standard coordination game setup, where all unilateral changes in a strategy lead to either mutual gain or mutual loss. The concept of anti-coordination games has been extended to multi-player situation. A crowding game is defined as a game where each player's payoff is non-increasing over the number of other players choosing the same strategy (i.e., a game with negative network externalities). For instance,

1936-430: The weekend. Both know that they will increase their utility by spending the weekend together, however the man prefers to watch a football game and the woman prefers to go shopping. Since the couple want to spend time together, they will derive no utility by doing an activity separately. If they go shopping, or to football game one person will derive some utility by being with the other person, but won’t derive utility from

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