Misplaced Pages

#303696

133-675: The operation began in the early hours of 3 August 1943, with the objective of following up the successful Soviet defensive effort in the Battle of Kursk . The offensive was directed against the German Army Group South 's northern flank. By 23 August, the troops of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts had recaptured Kharkov. It was the last time that Kharkov changed hands during the Soviet-German War . The operation led to

266-549: A German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its strategic depths . Though the Red Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives after the German attack at Kursk were their first successful summer offensives of the war. The battle has been called the "last gasp of Nazi aggression". As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclusion,

399-488: A brief period between October 13 and October 20, 1919, when it was controlled by Anton Denikin 's White Army . Oryol was once again moved between different oblasts in the 1920s and 1930s: first as Oryol Governorate until 1928, then Central Black Earth Region between 1928 and 1934, finally in Kursk Oblast ), finally becoming the administrative center of its own Oryol Oblast on September 27, 1937. The Oryol Prison

532-423: A city, an ostrog and a posad surrounded by gaps. The city housed a cathedral, a voivode 's (warlord or military leader's) house, government buildings and courts for the boyar children; the prison consisted of gunners' yards, a blacksmith, and two parish churches near the prison towers. In the posad was a sloboda . In 1636, Oryol was rebuilt by the voivode B. Koltovsky; it expanded with annexation of land beyond

665-688: A deep German salient to the east, which prevented the Red Army from making use of this vital traffic and supply centre. Following boastful reports made by Soviet radio that Soviet troops had entered the city, when in fact it was still held by XI Army Corps , Joseph Stalin personally ordered its immediate capture. The German supply situation in Kharkov was now untenable; artillerymen, after firing their last rounds, were abandoning their guns to fight as infantry. The army's supply depot had five trainloads of spare tank tracks left over from Operation Citadel but very little else. The high consumption of ammunition in

798-774: A discussion in which the OKW Operations Staff suggested abandoning the offensive, Hitler further postponed the operation until 3 July then, on 1 July, Hitler announced 5 July as the launch date of the offensive. A three-month quiet period had descended upon the Eastern Front as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Germans attempted to build up their forces. The Germans used this period for specialised training of their assault troops. All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waffen-SS had built

931-622: A fluid manner. On 6 February 1943, Manstein met with Hitler at his headquarters in Görlitz (now Gierłoż, Poland ) to discuss the proposals he had previously sent. He received an approval from Hitler for a counteroffensive against the Soviet forces advancing in the Donbas region. On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces were reorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South and placed under Manstein's command. Directly to

1064-420: A full-scale duplicate Soviet strong point that was used to practice the techniques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to get back up to strength. The German forces to be used in the offensive included 12 panzer divisions and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tank strengths greater than their neighbouring panzer divisions. However,

1197-472: A further 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt. Furthermore, mobile obstacle detachments were tasked with laying more mines directly in the path of advancing enemy armoured formations. These units, consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with mines at division level and one company of combat engineers normally equipped with 500–700 mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves at every level of command. In

1330-478: A heavy artillery concentration, and break through the five successive German defensive lines between Kursk and Kharkov. The former two armies had borne the brunt of the German attack in Operation Citadel. Supported by two additional mobile corps, the 1st Tank Army and the 5th Guards Tank Army , both mostly re-equipped after the end of Operation Citadel, would act as the front's mobile groups and develop

1463-411: A letter dated 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germans would attack the salient with a strong armoured force: We can expect the enemy to put [the] greatest reliance in this year's offensive operations on his tank divisions and air force, since his infantry appears to be far less prepared for offensive operations than last year ... In view of this threat, we should strengthen the anti-tank defences of

SECTION 10

#1732788031304

1596-543: A new fortress be built on the spot in 1566 for the purpose of defending the southern borders of the country. The fortress was built starting in the summer of 1566 and ending in the spring of 1567. The location chosen was less than ideal strategically, as the fortress was located on a seasonally flooded low ground easily targeted from the neighboring high ground. False Dmitry I and his army passed through Oryol in 1605; Ivan Bolotnikov in 1606; False Dmitry II camped in Oryol for

1729-556: A possible German attack in the Kursk sector. Stalin and some senior officers were eager to strike first once the rasputitsa ended, but a number of key officers, including Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov , recommended a strategic defensive before going on the offensive. In a letter to the Stavka and Stalin, on 8 April, Zhukov wrote: In the first phase the enemy, collecting their best forces—including 13–15 tank divisions and with

1862-416: A regular movement was opened. Length of the contact network 76.51 km (47.54 mi). There are 4 routes for 2019. Since 1868, there has been a railway connection between Oryol and Moscow. Here converge 5 railway lines: on Yelets , Moscow, Kursk , Bryansk , Mikhailovsky mine. The main terminals: Oryol Station, Station Luzhki-Oryol. On November 3, 1898, Oryol inaugurated an electric tram. The draft

1995-513: A sector held by SS Division Das Reich, to cut the Poltava -Kharkov rail link. Fierce fighting ensued, in which Korotich was captured by the 5th Guards Mechanised Corps and subsequently recaptured by the Das Reich infantry then to remain under German control, but the 5th Guards Tank Army ( Pavel Rotmistrov ) cut the rail link finally on 22 August 1943. The loss of this line of communication was

2128-513: A series of counterstrokes into the flanks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkov and Kursk. The II SS Panzer Corps had arrived from France in January 1943, refitted and up to near full strength. Armoured units from the 1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had pulled out of the Caucasus and further strengthened Manstein's forces. The operation

2261-481: A serious blow to the ability of the Army Detachment Kempf to defend its positions around the city. This meant critical delays of supplies and reinforcements, and the unit's position was becoming increasingly untenable. The way to Poltava now remained open, but Soviet General Nikolai Vatutin hesitated to push through while the Germans flanking the gap held firm. Instead, he turned his left flank armies,

2394-417: A trap where their armoured power would be destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a major Soviet counteroffensive. They decided to meet the enemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wear out the German groupings before launching their own offensive. Preparation of defences and fortifications began by the end of April, and continued until the German attack in early July. The two-month delay between

2527-678: Is part of the Central Federal District , as well as the Central Economic Region . While there are no historical records, archaeological evidence shows that a fortress settlement existed between the Oka River and Orlik Rivers as early as the 12th century, when the land was a part of the Principality of Chernigov . The name of the fortress is unknown; it may not have been called Oryol at the time. In

2660-418: Is the administrative center of the oblast and, within the framework of administrative divisions , it also serves as the administrative center of Orlovsky District , even though it is not a part of it. As an administrative division, it is incorporated separately as the city of oblast significance of Oryol —an administrative unit with the status equal to that of the districts . As a municipal division ,

2793-443: The 168th , 106th , 198th , 320th Infantry Divisions , and the 6th Panzer Division which acted as was the corps reserve. This constituted a deep salient east into Soviet lines and was subject to outflanking attempts on the corps left flank; Soviet armoured units had already appeared 20 miles behind the corps front line. XI Army Corps now made a series of phased withdrawals toward Kharkov to prevent encirclement. Only reaching

SECTION 20

#1732788031304

2926-473: The Dzerzhinsky Square and met men from the 89th Rifle Division . The Soviet troops hoisted a red banner over the city once again. By 1100, Kharkov and its outskirts had been taken completely. The final battle for the city was over. By re-establishing a continuous front on Army Group South 's left flank, the 4th Panzer Army and the 8th Army had, for the moment, blunted the Soviet thrust, but to

3059-487: The II SS Panzer Corps , XXIV Corps and XLVIII Panzer Corps southward to blunt the Soviet offensive. As intended, these Soviet operations drew off German forces from the main thrust of the Soviet offensive, dissipating the German reserve in anticipation for their main drive. The Soviet plan called for the 5th and 6th Guards Armies , and the 53rd Army , to attack on a 30-kilometer wide sector, supported by

3192-623: The Panther tank , but also the Ferdinand tank destroyer and greater numbers of the Tiger heavy tank. He postponed the operation in order to await their arrival. Receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler further delayed the offensive to allow for more equipment to reach the front. With pessimism for Citadel increasing with each delay, in June, Alfred Jodl ,

3325-682: The Red Army moved to a general offensive in the south, in Operation Little Saturn . By January 1943, a 160-to-300-kilometre-wide (99 to 186 mi) gap had opened between German Army Group B and Army Group Don , and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut off all German forces south of the Don River , including Army Group A operating in the Caucasus . Army Group Center came under significant pressure as well. Kursk

3458-721: The 13th century, the fortress became a part of the Zvenigorod district of the Karachev Principality. In the early 15th century, the territory was conquered by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania . The city was soon abandoned by its population after being sacked either by Lithuanians or the Golden Horde . The territory became a part of the Tsardom of Russia in the 16th century. Ivan IV Vasilyevich decreed that

3591-424: The 35 major Luftwaffe raids on Soviet airfields in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airfields. According to historian Antony Beevor , in contrast, Soviet aviation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground. The Soviet deception efforts were so successful that German estimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks. The result

3724-640: The 40th Army by a day. Seven panzer and motorized divisions making up the III Panzer Corps , along with four infantry divisions were assembled to counterattack into the flank of the advancing Soviet forces but were checked. After nine days the SS Division Das Reich and the SS Division Totenkopf arrived and initiated a counterattack against the two Soviet Armies near Bogodukhov , 30 km northwest of Kharkov. In

3857-420: The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf", of Army Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 combat soldiers) and 100,000–108,000 men (66,000 combat soldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, that held the western side of the salient contained an estimated 110,000. In total, the German forces had a total strength of 777,000–779,000 men, and the three attacking armies contained 438,271 combat soldiers. Army Group South

3990-550: The 51st and 52nd – together equipped with 200 Panthers, for which the offensive had been delayed, were attached to the Großdeutschland Division in the XLVIII Panzer Corps of Army Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalions arriving on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little time to perform reconnaissance or to orient themselves to the terrain they found themselves in. This was a breach of

4123-470: The 5th Guards Tank Army and the 5th Guards Army , against the western front of Army Group Kempf where the 2nd and 3rd SS Panzer Divisions fought to keep the front angled south-westward away from Kharkov. On the weaker east front of Army Group Kempf, the Soviet 57th Army cleared the right bank of the Donets between Chuguyev and Zmiyev . These threats had led to a request by General Werner Kempf to abandon

Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation - Misplaced Pages Continue

4256-607: The Allied threat in the Mediterranean, rather than using them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front. As a result, Hitler cancelled the offensive at Kursk after only a week, in part to divert forces to Italy. Germany's heavy losses of men and tanks ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army held a strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Battle of Kursk was the first time in the Second World War that

4389-1074: The Belgorod–Kharkov sector during this operation are estimated to be 71,611 killed and 183,955 wounded; 1,864 tanks, 423 artillery guns, and 153 aircraft were lost. German personnel losses were at least 10,000 killed and missing and 20,000 wounded. German tank losses are estimated to be several times lower than Soviet tank losses. Battle of Kursk Günther von Kluge Hermann Hoth Werner Kempf Walter Model Otto Deßloch Robert Ritter von Greim Heinz Guderian Alfred Jodl Vasily Sokolovsky Konstantin Rokossovsky Aleksandr Vasilevsky Nikolai Vatutin Ivan Konev Pavel Rotmistrov Sergei Rudenko Kirill Moskalenko Markian Popov Alexander Novikov The Battle of Kursk

4522-562: The Central Front had been reconstructed from the Don Front , which had been part of the northern pincer of Operation Uranus and had been responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed three main defensive belts in their sectors, with each subdivided into several zones of fortification. The Soviets employed the labour of over 300,000 civilians. Fortifying each belt

4655-515: The Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused, believing that his forces were too weak to launch such an attack. Further Axis advances were blocked by Soviet forces that had been shifted down from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod. By mid-April, amid poor weather and with the German forces exhausted and in need of refitting, the offensives of Operational Order No. 5 were postponed. On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6, which called for

4788-480: The Central and Voronezh fronts, and assemble as soon as possible. Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank defence. Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns further strengthened the anti-tank defences. Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level of command, mostly as anti-tank strong points with the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and

4921-576: The Chief of Staff at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propaganda office to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive. Due to concerns of an Allied landing in the south of France or in Italy and delays in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again, this time to 20 June. Zeitzler was profoundly concerned with the delays, but he still supported the offensive. On 17–18 June, following

5054-477: The Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings. Hitler called his senior officers and advisors to Munich for a meeting on 4 May. Hitler spoke for about 45 minutes on the reasons to postpone the attack, essentially reiterating Model's arguments. A number of options were put forth for comment: going on the offensive immediately with the forces at hand; delaying the offensive further to await

5187-477: The Eastern Front. In 1943, an offensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk and Western Fronts against Army Group Centre was abandoned shortly after it began in early March, when the southern flank of the Central Front was threatened by Army Group South. Soviet intelligence received information about German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an intended German offensive in

5320-680: The Ferdinand tank destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondary armament. The soldiers were also promised financial rewards for each tank destroyed, with the People's Commissariat of Defence providing a bounty of 1,000 roubles for each destroyed tank. The Soviets employed maskirovka (military deception) to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and to conceal the movement of men and materiel. These included camouflaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airfields and depots, generating false radio-traffic, and spreading rumours among

5453-487: The German Army on the Eastern Front. Operations Polkovodets Rumyantsev, along with the concurrent Operation Kutuzov marked the first time in the war that the Germans were not able to defeat a major Soviet offensive during the summer and regain their lost ground and the strategic initiative. Losses for the operation are difficult to establish due to large numbers of transfers and missing in action. Soviet casualties in

Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation - Misplaced Pages Continue

5586-459: The German area of control, centred on the city of Kursk. The heavy losses sustained by Germany since the opening of Operation Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantry and artillery. Units were in total 470,000 men understrength. For the Wehrmacht to undertake an offensive in 1943, the burden of the offensive, in both attacking the Soviet defences and holding ground on the flanks of

5719-462: The German armaments industry . The Soviet government had foreknowledge of the German plans from the Lucy spy ring . Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German armoured spearhead . The Germans delayed the offensive while they tried to build up their forces and waited for new weapons, giving

5852-539: The German decision to attack the Kursk salient and its implementation allowed the Red Army ample time to thoroughly prepare. The Voronezh Front , commanded by Nikolai Vatutin , was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front, commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky , defended the northern face. Waiting in reserve was the Steppe Front , commanded by Ivan Konev . In February 1943,

5985-594: The German defensive lines, moving into the rear areas and capturing Belgorod while advancing some 60 km. Delivering powerful blows from the north and east, the attackers overwhelmed the German defenders. German reserves were shifted from the Orel sector and north from the Donbas regions in an attempt to stem the tide and slow down the Soviet attacks. Success was limited to the Panzergrenadier Division Großdeutschland delaying

6118-475: The II SS Panzer Corps under Paul Hausser . The XLVIII Panzer Corps , commanded by Otto von Knobelsdorff , would advance on the left while Army Detachment Kempf would advance on the right. The 2nd Army , under the command of Walter Weiss , would contain the western portion of the salient. On 27 April, Model met with Hitler to review and express his concern regarding intelligence which showed

6251-462: The Kursk offensive operation, codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"), to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The directive was drafted by Kurt Zeitzler , the OKH Chief of Staff. For the offensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defences or to launch an offensive of their own. Some military historians have described the operation using

6384-728: The Kursk sector through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland . The Soviets verified the intelligence via their spy in Britain, John Cairncross , at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park , who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow. Cairncross also provided Soviet intelligence with identifications of the Luftwaffe airfields in the region. Soviet politician Anastas Mikoyan wrote that on 27 March 1943, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin notified him of

6517-753: The Luftwaffe had seen earlier. The introduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 fighters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2 "Shturmovik" and the Pe-2 , had become available as well. The VVS also fielded large numbers of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant

6650-522: The Oka. Oryol remained a fortress city with a corresponding garrison; Pushkarskaya Sloboda was still located in the prison, boyar children and nobles settled on the left bank of the Orlik, and a Cossack sloboda developed near the Oka. Oryol lost its military character after the 1689 fire, when the partially-burned city fortress was not rebuilt. In central Oryol, streets fan out from the fortress; two main axes are

6783-409: The Red Army and VVS formations would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort. For the operation, the Germans used four armies along with a large portion of their total tank strength on the Eastern Front. On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army Group Centre based in the northern side of the salient contained 335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south,

SECTION 50

#1732788031304

6916-456: The Red Army constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk. He argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended completely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive, or radically revising the plan for Citadel. Though in mid-April, Manstein had considered

7049-536: The Red Army time to construct a series of deep defensive belts and establish a large reserve force for counter-offensives, with one German officer describing Kursk as "another Verdun ". The battle was the final strategic offensive that the Germans were able to launch on the Eastern Front. Because the Allied invasion of Sicily began during the battle, Adolf Hitler was forced to divert troops training in France to meet

7182-478: The Soviet advance around Bogodukhov stopped, the Germans now began to attempt to close the gap between Akhtyrka and Krasnokutsk . The counterattack started on 18 August, and on 20 August "Totenkopf" and "Großdeutschland" met behind the Soviet units. Parts of two Soviet armies and two tank corps were trapped, but the trapped units heavily outnumbered the German units. Many Soviet units were able to break out, while suffering heavy casualties. After this setback

7315-489: The Soviet frontline troops and the civilian population in the German-held areas. Movement of forces and supplies to and from the salient took place at night only. Ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with the landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and fires were forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motor transport in and around them forbidden. According to a Soviet General Staff report, 29 of

7448-425: The Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943, by cutting off and enveloping the forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk salient. Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with his allies , who he thought were considering withdrawing from the war. It was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labour in

7581-525: The Soviet troops focused on Kharkov and captured it after heavy fighting on 23 August. The battle is usually referred to as the Fourth Battle of Kharkov by the Germans and the Belgorod–Kharkov strategic offensive operation by the Soviets. The Soviet operation was executed in two primary axes, one in the Belgorod–Kharkov axis and another in the Belgorod–Bogodukhov axis . On the first day,

7714-591: The Soviets also launched powerful counterattacks the same day, one of which led to a large armoured clash, the Battle of Prokhorovka . On 3 August, the Soviets began the second phase of the Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, Полководец Румянцев ) against the German forces on the southern side of the salient. The Germans hoped to weaken

7847-538: The Soviets assembled a large number of lend-lease tanks. These included U.S.-manufactured M3 Lee medium tanks and British-built Churchill , Matilda II and Valentine infantry tanks. However, the T-34 made up the bulk of the Soviet armour. Without including the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front, the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend

7980-600: The Soviets concentrated 80% of their entire air fleet for use at the Battle of Kursk. According to some historians, the Soviets employed 40% of their manpower and 75% of their armoured forces to the battle. By 1943 the Luftwaffe's strength on the Eastern Front had started to weaken after Stalingrad, and the siphoning of resources to North Africa . The Luftwaffe forces in the east were further depleted with fighter units being shifted back to Germany to defend against

8113-579: The Steppe Front had an additional 573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the Soviet force was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combat soldiers. Soviet armour strength included 4,869 tanks and 259 SPGs. Overall a third of the Soviet tanks at Kursk were light tanks , but in some units this proportion was considerably higher. Of the 3,600 tanks in the Central and Voronezh Fronts in July 1943, 1,061 were light as T-60 and T-70 tanks. With very thin armour and small guns, they were unable to effectively engage

SECTION 60

#1732788031304

8246-482: The Tiger's 88mm gun at long range, and there were very few SU-122s and SU-152s at Kursk. Oryol Oryol ( Russian : Орёл , IPA: [ɐˈrʲɵl] , lit.   ' eagle ' ), also transliterated as Orel or Oriol , is a city and the administrative center of Oryol Oblast , Russia, situated on the Oka River , approximately 368 kilometers (229 mi) south-southwest of Moscow. It

8379-511: The Upper and Lower Korchak Roads. Opposite the fortress was probably a second marketplace in the Zaotsk section, where the dragoon settlements had a relatively-regular layout along the river. Away from the river, the grid becomes a fan. The city – its fortress, three marketplaces, two monasteries and a number of parish churches – was developed from the river. Its structure

8512-549: The advance, would have to be carried primarily by the panzer divisions. On 10 March, Manstein presented a plan whereby the German forces would pinch off the Kursk salient with a rapid offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided. On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which authorised several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient. As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade Günther von Kluge , commander of Army Group Centre, to immediately attack

8645-566: The aim of the defeating the 4th Panzer Army , Army Group Kempf , and the northern wing of Army Group South . It was also hoped that the German 1st Panzer Army and the newly reformed 6th Army would be trapped by an advance of the Red Army forces to the Azov Sea . The Soviet forces included the Voronezh Front and the Steppe Front, which deployed about 1,144,000 men with 2,418 tanks and 13,633 guns and rocket launchers for

8778-505: The armoured formations and the limitations of German industry to replace losses. General Heinz Guderian argued strongly against the operation, stating "the attack was pointless". The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was not aborted. Three days later, OKW , Hitler's conduit for controlling the military, postponed the launch date for Citadel to 12 June. Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his concerns over an operation that would likely degrade

8911-426: The arrival of new and better tanks; radically revising the operation, or cancelling it altogether. Manstein advocated an early attack, but requested two additional infantry divisions, to which Hitler responded that none were available. Kluge spoke out strongly against postponement and discounted Model's intelligence. Albert Speer , the minister of Armaments and War Production, spoke about the difficulties of rebuilding

9044-433: The attack. Against this the German army could field 200,000 men and 237 tanks and assault guns. When the Soviet Southern Front and the Southwestern Front launched a diversionary attack across the Dnieper and Mius Rivers in an apparent attempt to cut off the German forces extended in the southern portion of the German Army Group South on 17 July, its commander General Erich von Manstein responded by moving

9177-493: The attacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein. Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring rasputitsa , resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March. The counteroffensive left a Soviet salient extending 250 kilometres (160 mi) from north to south and 160 kilometres (99 mi) from east to west into

9310-411: The battlefield from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point had been reached in the land battle, to render close air support . The changing strengths between the two opponents prompted the Luftwaffe to make operational changes for the battle. Previous offensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwaffe raids against opposing airfields to achieve aerial superiority. By this point in

9443-414: The breakthrough by encircling Kharkov from the north and west. Mikhail Katukov 's 1st Tank Army was to form the westward-facing outer encirclement line, while Pavel Rotmistrov 's 5th Guards Tank Army would form the inner line, facing the city. A secondary attack to the west of the main breakthrough was to be conducted by the 27th and 40th Armies with the support of four separate tank corps. Meanwhile, to

9576-470: The city of Belgorod (see Belgorod–Bogodukhov offensive operation ). Following its withdrawal from Belgorod on the night of 5/6 August 1943, the XI Army Corps under the command of General Erhard Raus now held defensive positions south of the city between the Donets and Lopan Rivers north of Kharkov. The XI Army Corps consisted of a Kampfgruppe (battlegroup) from the 167th Infantry Division ,

9709-505: The city of oblast significance of Oryol is incorporated as Oryol Urban Okrug . Administratively, the city is divided into four districts: In February 2012, the city duma abolished the direct election of mayor. In December 2013, a referendum was held and 71% of the people supported the return of direct mayoral election. City-managers: According to the Federal State Statistics Service , in January 2020

9842-479: The city on 12 August 1943. Manstein did not object, but Adolf Hitler countered with an order that the city had to be held "under all circumstances". After a prediction that the order to hold Kharkov would produce "another Stalingrad", on 14 August 1943 Kempf was relieved by Manstein who appointed General Otto Wöhler in Kempf's place. A few days later, Army Group Kempf was renamed the 8th Army . Kharkov now constituted

9975-437: The city. Regardless of Hitler's demands, Wöhler and Manstein agreed that the city could not be held for long. On 21 August 1943, Manstein gave his consent to abandon Kharkov. On 22 August 1943 the German troops began their retreat from the city, under pressure from the Red Army. The 57th & 69th Armies pushed in from three sides with the coming of daylight. The Soviets sensed that the Germans were evacuating Kharkov, due to

10108-404: The corridor, and planes strafed and bombed the German columns. After dark, the 89th Guards and 107th Rifle Divisions broke into the interior of the city, driving the last German rearguard detachments before them. Enormous fires were set by the Germans as part of the scorched earth policy. By 0200 on 23 August 1943, elements of the 183rd Rifle Division pushed into the city centre, reached

10241-434: The course of the operation. Fuel was the most significant limiting factor. To help build up supplies for the support of Citadel, the Luftwaffe greatly curtailed its operations during the last week of June. Despite this conservation of resources, the Luftwaffe did not have the resources to sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began. For Citadel, the Luftwaffe confined its operations to

10374-638: The day of the liberation from the German invaders was celebrated as the city's day. On September 19, 1943, in the Oryol, was the first parade of partisan units stationed in the Oryol region during the war. Oryol has the same time zone as Moscow (Moscow time), or UTC+03:00. Oryol stands on the banks of the Oka River and its tributary Orlik river in the Central Russian Upland of the East European Plain , approximately 368 km (229 mi) south-southwest of Moscow. Oryol

10507-588: The direct support of the forces on the ground. In this mission the Luftwaffe continued to make use of the Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka" dive-bombers. A new development to this aircraft was the "Bordkanone" 3,7 cm cannon, one of which could be slung under each wing of the Stuka in a gun pod . Half of the Stuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equipped with these Kanonenvogel (literally "cannon-bird") tankbuster aircraft. The air groups were also strengthened by

10640-528: The early 18th century. In the mid-18th century Oryol became one of the major centers of grain production, with the Oka River being the major trade route until the 1860s when it was replaced by a railroad. Oryol was granted town status in 1702. In 1708, Oryol was included as a part of Kiev Governorate ; in 1719, Oryol Province was created within Kiev Governorate. The Province was transferred to

10773-492: The east and southeast, the 69th and 7th Guards Armies , followed later by the Southwestern Front's 57th Army , were to join the attack. On 3 August the offensive was begun with a heavy artillery barrage directed against the German defensive positions. Though the German defenders fought tenaciously, the two tank armies committed to the battle could not be held back. By 5 August the Soviets had broken through

10906-466: The entire territory of the city. Each bus, tram and trolley is equipped with route indicators that inform about the route through the city, designated stops. There are also taxis and rental cars. In past years, in the summer on the Oka River waterbus operated as a form of transport excursion and walking orientation. In the Oryol converge important highways of federal and regional values: The main intercity terminal: Oryol Bus Station On 29 October 1968,

11039-435: The escalating Allied bombing campaign . By the end of June, only 38.7 percent of the Luftwaffe's total aircraft remained in the east. In 1943 the Luftwaffe could still achieve local aerial superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of German aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were slated for Citadel. The goal of the Luftwaffe remained unchanged. The priority was to gain aerial supremacy , then to isolate

11172-424: The exception of a small area in the immediate environs of Kursk. The combined depth of the three main defensive zones was about 40 kilometres (25 mi). The six defensive belts on either side of Kursk were 130–150 kilometres (81–93 mi) deep. If the Germans managed to break through these defences they would still be confronted by additional defensive belts to the east, manned by the Steppe Front. These brought

11305-573: The final defenses north of the city on 12 August 1943, following breakthroughs by the 57th and 69th Armies in several sectors of the front-line, the disintegration of the 168th Infantry Division and after an intervention by the corps reserve. When its attempts to force a breakthrough in the Bogodukhov-Olshany-Zolochev met with frustration along the Merla River , the Steppe Front directed its assaults towards Korotich ,

11438-534: The first time in the war, the Red Army had the full strategic initiative, and they used it well. Worse still, the large manpower losses of the Wehrmacht in July and August 1943 severely restricted Army Groups South and Centre 's reactions to future Soviet thrusts during the winter of 1943 and in 1944, which was most evident in Operation Bagration during which the Red Army almost completely destroyed

11571-514: The following armoured battles of firepower and maneuver, the SS divisions destroyed a great many Soviet tanks. To assist the Soviet 6th Guards Army and the 1st Tank Army, the 5th Guards Tank Army joined the battles. All three Soviet armies suffered heavily, and the tank armies lost more than 800 of their initial 1,112 tanks. These Soviet reinforcements stopped the German counterattack, but their further offensive plans were blunted. With

11704-473: The force was markedly deficient in infantry divisions, which were essential to hold ground and to secure the flanks. By the time the Germans initiated the offensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and assault guns (70 percent of the German armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mortars . The Battle of Kursk would engulf more than 70% of Germany's military force on

11837-480: The frontal armour of German medium and heavy tanks or AFVs. The most capable Soviet tank at Kursk was the T-34. However, the original version was armed only with a 76.2mm gun, which struggled against uparmoured Panzer IVs, and the frontal armour of Tigers and Panthers was essentially impenetrable. Only the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns had the power to destroy the Tiger at short range, but they were not equal to

11970-520: The general offensive which would finally finish off his main force. Stalin consulted with his frontline commanders and senior officers of the General Staff from 12 to 15 April 1943. In the end he and the Stavka agreed that the Germans would probably target Kursk. Stalin believed the decision to defend would give the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans would be drawn into

12103-608: The heaviest German ammunition expenditure on the Eastern Front up to that point, with 236,915 tons consumed in July and 254,648 in August. The previous peak had been 160,645 tons in September 1942. The Red Army used two Fronts for the defence of Kursk, and created a third front behind the battle area which was held as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts fielded 12 armies, with 711,575 men (510,983 combat soldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) respectively. In reserve,

12236-451: The highest concentration in the first main defensive belt. The minefields at Kursk achieved densities of 2,500 anti-personnel and 2,200 anti-tank mines per kilometre, six times the density used in the defence of Moscow . For example, the 6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, was spread out over nearly 64 kilometres (40 mi) of front and was protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines in its first defensive belt with

12369-479: The last month and a half had cut into supplies put aside for the last two weeks of August and the first two weeks of September; until the turn of the month the army would have to get along with fifty percent of its daily average requirements in artillery and tank ammunition. XI Army Corps now had a combat strength of only 4,000 infantrymen, one man for every ten yards of front. Two days after taking command of 8th Army , Wöhler also asked Manstein for permission to abandon

12502-452: The lessening of artillery fire and diminishing resistance in the front lines. Later in the day, thunderous explosions were heard as ammunition dumps were blown up. Large German columns were then observed leaving the city and the Soviet troops pushed into the largely destroyed city. Moving out of Kharkov to the south, the German forces fought to hold open a corridor through which the 8th Army could withdraw. Soviet artillery and mortars shelled

12635-494: The methods of the Panzerwaffe , considered essential for the successful use of armour. Though led by experienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crews were new recruits and had little time to become familiar with their new tanks, let alone train together to function as a unit. The two battalions came direct from the training ground and lacked combat experience. In addition, the requirement to maintain radio silence until

12768-589: The newly created Belgorod Governorate in 1727. On March 11 (February 28 old style ), 1778 Oryol Vice-Royalty was created from parts of Voronezh and Belgorod Governorates. In 1779, the city was almost entirely rebuilt based on a new plan; and the Oryol River was renamed Orlik (lit: "little eagle"). After the October Revolution of 1917, the city was in Bolshevik's hands, except for

12901-469: The north and southeast fresh blows had already been dealt or were in the making. The Red Army, on the other hand, employed the rippling effect that marked their offensives: if thwarted in one place, they would quickly shift to others. Most importantly, the failure of the German offensive in the Battle of Kursk meant the Germans permanently lost the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front , although Hitler refused to acknowledge it. The defeat meant that, for

13034-474: The north, Army Group B was dissolved, with its forces and areas of responsibility divided between Army Group South and Army Group Centre. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive breach in the German lines. On 18 February, Hitler arrived at Army Group South headquarters at Zaporizhia just hours before the Soviets liberated Kharkov , and had to be hastily evacuated on the 19th. Once given freedom of action, Manstein intended to utilise his forces to make

13167-470: The number of residents came to 308 838. It is the 66th place among 1117 cities of Russia for 2019. Largest ethnic groups in 2010: The formation of the Oryol as an important transportation hub is due to the favorable geographical position of the city on the borders of the Central and Central Black Earth economic regions . The city has trolley, tram and bus systems. These kinds of public transport cover

13300-416: The objective of pinching off the Kursk salient with attacks on the base of the salient from north and south simultaneously. After the German offensive stalled on the northern side of the salient, on 12 July, the Soviets commenced their Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of Operation Kutuzov ( Russian : Кутузов ) against the rear of the German forces on the same side. On the southern side,

13433-506: The occupied area behind Army Group Centre destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222 railway wagons and 44 bridges, and in the Kursk sector there were 1,092 partisan attacks on railways. These attacks delayed the build-up of German supplies and equipment, and required the diversion of German troops to suppress the partisans, delaying their training for the offensive. Central Partisan Headquarters coordinated many of these attacks. In June Soviet Air Forces (VVS) flew over 800 sorties at night to resupply

13566-416: The panzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. He considered the offensive, as planned, to be a misuse of the panzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he had laid out as the essential elements for a successful panzer attack - surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. In his opinion, the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they would be needed for

13699-468: The partisan groups operating behind Army Group Centre. The VVS also provided communication and sometimes even daylight air-support for major partisan operations. Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry manning the defences to help them overcome the tank phobia that had been evident since the start of the German invasion. Soldiers were packed into trenches and tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear were gone. This training exercise

13832-490: The pending defence of western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked, Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front? Hitler replied, "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach." Guderian concluded, "In that case your reaction to

13965-409: The problem is the correct one. Leave it alone." Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory phase, were hopeful that the offensive would revitalise German strategic fortunes in the east. As the challenges offered by Citadel increased, he focused more and more on the expected new weapons that he believed were the key to victory: principally

14098-629: The recent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129 , with its 30 mm MK 103 cannon , and the F-subtype ground attack ("jabo") version of the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 . In the months preceding the battle, Luftflotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The VVS formations encountered displayed better training, and were flying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness and skill than

14231-676: The remainder amply spread out elsewhere. Each anti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles, and five to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as by infantry with automatic firearms . Independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during counterattacks. Soviet preparations also included increased activity of Soviet partisans , who attacked German communications and supply lines. The attacks were mostly behind Army Group North and Army Group Centre. In June 1943, partisans operating in

14364-547: The retreat of the German forces in Ukraine behind the Dnieper River and set the stage for the Battle of Kiev in autumn 1943. Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev had been planned by Stavka to be the major Soviet summer offensive in 1943. However, due to heavy losses sustained during the Battle of Kursk in July, time was needed for the Soviet formations to recover and regroup. The operation commenced on 3 August, with

14497-418: The salient, driving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the rail line from Soviet attack. Army Group South would commit the 4th Panzer Army, under Hermann Hoth , and Army Detachment Kempf , under Werner Kempf , to pierce the southern face of the salient. This force would drive north to meet the 9th Army east of Kursk. Manstein's main attack was to be delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by

14630-401: The salient. This amounted to 26 percent of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortars and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent of its tanks. One source states that in the Battle of Stalingrad the Soviets used fourteen field armies and one tank army, while at Kursk they used twenty-two full-strength field armies and five tank armies. According to one source,

14763-641: The skies over Oryol. Oryol was liberated on August 5, 1943 during the Oryol strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov" on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge . The city was almost completely destroyed. By Order No .2 of I. V. Stalin of August 5, 1943, on this day in Moscow, an artillery salute was given to the troops that liberated Oryol. Since then, the city has had the nickname, "City of the First Salute", and

14896-468: The start of the attack meant that the Panther units had little training in battalion-level radio procedures. Furthermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing problems with their transmissions, and proved mechanically unreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost 16 Panthers due to mechanical breakdown, leaving only 184 available for the launching of the offensive. July and August 1943 saw

15029-408: The success of Citadel, but problems with supply shortfalls hampered their preparations. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the Luftwaffe's ability to build up essential stockpiles of petrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlike Red Army units there were no reserves of aircraft that could be used to replace damaged aircraft over

15162-443: The support of a large number of aircraft—will strike Kursk with their Kromskom-Orel grouping from the north-east and their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the south-east... I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to an offensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to

15295-403: The term blitzkrieg (lightning war); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle. Operation Citadel called for a double envelopment , directed at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders of five armies and seal off the salient. Army Group Centre would provide General Walter Model 's 9th Army to form the northern pincer. It would cut through the northern face of

15428-471: The total depth of the defences to nearly 300 kilometres (190 mi). The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug 4,200 kilometres (2,600 mi) and 5,000 kilometres (3,100 mi) of trenches respectively, laid out in criss-cross pattern for ease of movement. The Soviets built more than 686 bridges and about 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) of roads in the salient. Red Army combat engineers laid 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines , with

15561-608: The units of the Voronezh Front quickly penetrated the German front-line defences on the boundary of the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf, between Tomarovka and Belgorod and gained 100 kilometres in a sector along the Akhtyrka – Bogodukhov – Olshany – Zolochev line along the banks of the Merla river . They were finally halted on 12 August by armoured units of the III Panzer Corps . On 5 August 1943 XI Corps evacuated

15694-467: The war . It was one of the costliest battles of the Second World War, the single deadliest armoured battle in history, and the opening day of the battle, 5 July, was the single costliest day in the history of aerial warfare . The battle was also marked by fierce house-to-house fighting and hand-to-hand combat . The battle began with the launch of the German offensive Operation Citadel ( German : Unternehmen Zitadelle ), on 5 July, which had

15827-465: The war Red Army equipment reserves were extensive and the Luftwaffe commanders realised that aircraft could be easily replaced, making such raids futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned. In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers flying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted during Citadel. The Luftwaffe command understood that their support would be crucial for

15960-476: The winter of 1607–1608. Polish forces sacked it in 1611 and 1615. While the population fled after the second sacking and moved to Mtsensk , the Orlovsky Uyezd continued to exist administratively. Oryol was rebuilt in 1636. The question of moving the fortress to the more advantageous high ground was debated until the 1670s, but the move was never made. The fortress was deemed unnecessary and taken apart in

16093-511: Was Lenin Square, on which the House of Soviets was built in 1961. In 1966, construction of flood-control embankments in the central city began. Oryol has a humid continental climate ( Köppen climate classification Dfb ). Winters are moderately cold and changeable. The first half is softer, second with often warmings. Summers are warm, in separate years — they can be rainy or hot and dry. Oryol

16226-536: Was a major World War II Eastern Front battle between the forces of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union near Kursk in southwestern Russia during the summer of 1943, resulting in a Soviet victory. The Battle of Kursk is the single largest battle in the history of warfare . It ranks only behind the Battle of Stalingrad several months earlier as the most often-cited turning point in the European theatre of

16359-670: Was a notable place of incarceration for political prisoners and war prisoners of the Second World War . Christian Rakovsky , Maria Spiridonova , Olga Kameneva and 160 other prominent political prisoners were shot on September 11, 1941 on Joseph Stalin 's orders in the Medvedev Forest massacre outside Oryol. During the German-Soviet War, Oryol was occupied by the Wehrmacht on October 7, 1941. The French air squadron Normandie-Niemen fought in

16492-408: Was an interconnected web of minefields, barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches , deep entrenchments for infantry, anti-tank obstacles , dug-in armoured vehicles, and machine-gun bunkers. Behind the three main defensive belts were three more belts prepared as fallback positions; the first was not fully occupied or heavily fortified, and the last two, though sufficiently fortified, were unoccupied with

16625-486: Was approved. Oryol's modern layout was developed in 1939 by Suborov, an architect at the leningrad-based Russian State Research and Design Institute of Urbanism . The first post-war reconstruction plan was made in Lengiprogor under the direction of architect V. A. Gaikovich. Oryol's development required a new general plan, which was drawn up in 1958 by V. A. Gaikovich and A. M. Suborov of Lengiprogor. The city's center

16758-511: Was equipped with more armoured vehicles , infantry and artillery than the 9th Army of Army Group Center. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Army possessed 988 tanks and assault guns. German industry produced 2,816 tanks and self-propelled guns between April and June, of which 156 were Tigers and 484 Panthers. At Kursk, a total of 259 Panther tanks, about 211 Tigers, and 90 Ferdinands were used. The two new Panther battalions –

16891-505: Was founded at the behest of Ivan the Terrible in 1566, in the area between the Oka and Orlik rivers. Little information exists about its early history; the earliest data available refers to 1636, when the city was rebuilt after its destruction during the Time of Troubles . According to historian T. G. Svistunova, the 16th-century Oryol fortress had three lines of fortifications and consisted of

17024-459: Was hastily prepared and did not receive a name. Later known as Third Battle of Kharkov , it commenced on 21 February, as 4th Panzer Army under General Hoth launched a counter-attack. The German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the drive north, retaking Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod on 18 March. A Soviet offensive launched on 25 February by the Central Front against Army Group Centre had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow

17157-506: Was not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions. The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34 medium tank, on which the Red Army attempted to concentrate production. The tank arm also contained large numbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s. In the salient itself

17290-640: Was prepared by the Belgian entrepreneur FF Gilon and firm «Compagnie mutuelle de tramways», which won the right to build not only a tram, but also lighting in the city. Oryol tram is one of the oldest electric tram systems in Russia. It is 1 year older than Moscow and 9 years — St. Petersburg. In 2017, the length of the lines in double-track calculation was 18.3 km (11.4 mi). For 2019, there are 3 routes, which are operated: Tatra T3 (74 units), Tatra T6B5 (13 units), 71-403 (1 unit), 71-405 (1 unit). The city

17423-440: Was referred to by the soldiers as "ironing". In combat, the soldiers would spring up in the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the spearheading armoured vehicles. The separated armoured vehicles – now vulnerable to infantry armed with PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles, demolition charges and molotov cocktails – could then be disabled or destroyed at point-blank range. These types of attacks were mostly effective against

17556-500: Was retaken by the Soviets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February. The Soviet Bryansk , Western , and newly created Central Fronts prepared for an offensive which envisioned the encirclement of Army Group Centre between Bryansk and Smolensk . By February 1943 the southern sector of the German front was in strategic crisis. Since December 1942, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had been strongly requesting "unrestricted operational freedom" to allow him to use his forces in

17689-480: Was visible from the Oka: the central fortress, the fan-shaped center and the grid of the Zaotsk settlements. The city was connected by bridges, making Oryol a military fortress and a trade center. The city's earliest plans, by Mikhail Buzovlev and Petr Botvinev, date to 1728. A 1778 plan fixed its radial layout, and a radial-semicircular system was proposed the following year. In 1848, a new plan including Polesskaya Square

#303696