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160-701: Bisaltia, along with Crestonia, was ruled by a Thracian prince at the time of the invasion of Xerxes I of Persia , but by the onset of the Peloponnesian War it was annexed by Macedon . In Roman times, Bisaltia crossed a branch of the via Egnatia, in which the Roman sources (Itineraria) mention four horses change stations : Trinlo (=Tragilos), Graero , Arason (=Arolos) and Euporia . In various sites of Bisaltia have been found so far several interesting inscriptions of imperial times. Important towns of Bisaltia were Argilos, Berge and Brea . Bisaltia

320-704: A Greek supply convoy, which resulted in the Greek supply lines being halted. The Greeks were attacked by the Persian cavalry for the next two days. He launched another cavalry raid on the Greek lines, which succeeded in blocking the Gargaphian spring, which had been the only source of water for the Greek army, as they could not draw from the Asopos due to the threat posed by Persian archers. The Greeks had now been encamped at their second position for 12 days. Coupled with

480-532: A Persian general known as Artabazus escorted Xerxes to the Hellespont with 60,000 men; as he neared Pallene on the return journey to Thessaly: "he thought it right that he should enslave the people of Potidaea , whom he found in revolt". Despite attempts to capture Potidaea by treachery, the Persians were forced to keep up the siege for three months. Then, attempting to use an unusually low tide to attack

640-509: A few hundred others. On the third day of the battle, the remaining Allies sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians and slaughter as many as they could. Ultimately, however, the Allied rearguard was annihilated, and the pass of Thermopylae opened to the Persians. Simultaneous with the battle at Thermopylae, an Allied naval force of 271 triremes defended the Straits of Artemisium against

800-516: A full-scale invasion, it required long-term planning, stock-piling and conscription. It was decided that Xerxes' Pontoon Bridges were to be set up to allow his army to cross the Hellespont to Europe, and that a canal should be dug across the isthmus of Mount Athos (rounding which headland, a Persian fleet had been destroyed in 492 BC). These were both feats of exceptional ambition, which would have been beyond any contemporary state. However,

960-521: A hit-and-run attack on some Cilician ships, capturing and destroying them. On the third day, however, the Persian fleet attacked the Allies lines in full force. In a day of savage fighting, the Allies held on to their position, but suffered severe losses (half the Athenian fleet was damaged ); nevertheless, the Allies inflicted equal losses on the Persian fleet. That evening, the Allies received news of

1120-583: A huge army and marched out of the Peloponnesus. The Persians retreated to Boeotia and built a fortified camp near Plataea. The Greeks, however, refused to be drawn into the prime terrain for cavalry around the Persian camp, resulting in a stalemate that lasted 11 days. While attempting a retreat after their supply lines were disrupted, the Greek battle line fragmented. Thinking that the Greeks were in full retreat, Mardonius ordered his forces to pursue them, but

1280-464: A huge new army with which he meant to completely subjugate Greece; however, in 486 BC, his Egyptian subjects revolted, indefinitely postponing any Greek expedition. Darius then died while preparing to march on Egypt, and the throne of Persia passed to his son Xerxes I . Xerxes crushed the Egyptian revolt, and very quickly restarted the preparations for the invasion of Greece. Since this was to be

1440-468: A journey of about 600 km (360 mi). It paused at Doriskos where it was joined by the fleet. Xerxes reorganized the troops into tactical units replacing the national formations used earlier for the march. The Allied 'congress' met again in the spring of 480 BC. A Thessalian delegation suggested that the allies could muster in the narrow Vale of Tempe , on the borders of Thessaly , and thereby block Xerxes's advance. A force of 10,000 Allies led by

1600-629: A minor portion of his army. Xerxes left Mardonius with the charge of his troops. Mardonius decided to spend the winter in Thessaly . Mardonius tried to win over the Athenians and their fleet through the mediation of Alexander I of Macedon . Upon their refusal, the Persians marched south again. Athens was again evacuated and left to the enemy, leading to the second phase of the Destruction of Athens . Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to

1760-567: A night at Tanagra and then marched to Skolos . Mardonius built a fortified encampment around 1.9 square kilometres (0.73 sq mi) in area on the north bank of the Asopos river in Boeotia, thus covering the ground from Erythres past Hysiae and up to the lands of Plataea. The Athenians under the command of Aristides joined the Allied army at Eleusis in Attica. The army traveled on

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1920-455: A potential total of 120,000 from the same-sized camp. Indeed, most estimates for the total Persian force are generally in this range. The historian Hans Delbrück , basing his calculations on the distance the Persians marched in a day when Athens was attacked, concluded that 75,000 was the upper limit for the size of the Persian army, including the supply personnel and other non-combatants. In his battle account of Plataea, Delbrück estimated that

2080-630: A similarly long line. They note that the Spartan phalanxes were eight ranks deep in only one instance in recorded history. They argue that the Greeks had formed a defensive line during the final battle, and would send small groups out to provoke the Persians into breaking their formations, and only then would they start pushing like Classical hoplite phalanxes. They argue that the Greeks would not have formed tight phalanxes, and instead would have kept some distance between each soldier to allow individual soldiers to attack. Konijnendijk and Bardunias note that

2240-519: A vassal as early as the late 6th century BC, but remained having autonomy and not fully subordinate yet. In 491 BC, Darius sent emissaries to all the Greek city-states, asking for a gift of " earth and water " in token of their submission to him. Having had a demonstration of his power the previous year, the majority of Greek cities duly obliged. In Athens, however, the ambassadors were put on trial and then executed; in Sparta, they were simply thrown down

2400-547: A well. This meant that Sparta was also now effectively at war with Persia. (Later, in order to appease Xerxes, who was about to launch the Second Persian invasion of Greece after succeeding his father, Darius, two Spartans were voluntarily sent to Susa for execution, in atonement for the death of the Persian heralds sent earlier by Darius.) Darius thus put together an ambitious task force under Datis and Artaphernes in 490 BC, which attacked Naxos , before receiving

2560-399: Is because both of them were waiting for their opponent to attack first. The armies thus stayed camped in their locations for eight days. On the eighth day after the arrival of the Persian and Greek armies at Plataea, heeding the advice of a Theban named Timagenes, Mardonius set up a lookout on the passes of Mount Cithaeron. At night on the same day, Mardonius dispatched his cavalry to attack

2720-678: Is contained within the Serres regional unit and part of the Thessaloniki regional unit in Greece . 40°57′30″N 23°23′10″E  /  40.9583°N 23.3861°E  / 40.9583; 23.3861 Second Persian invasion of Greece Land forces : 80,000 –100,000 soldiers or less (modern estimates) Sea forces : 600 –1,200 ships (modern estimates) Total : 200,000 300,000–500,000 (modern estimates) The second Persian invasion of Greece (480–479 BC) occurred during

2880-656: The Acropolis were eventually defeated, and Xerxes then ordered Athens to be torched. The Acropolis was razed and the Older Parthenon as well as the Old Temple of Athena were destroyed. The Persians had now captured most of Greece, but Xerxes had perhaps not expected such defiance from the Greeks; his priority was now to complete the war as quickly as possible; the huge invasion force could not be supplied indefinitely, and probably Xerxes did not wish to be at

3040-522: The Balkan allies, at Eion on the Strymon river , and at Therme , modern-day Thessaloniki . There, food had been sent from Asia for several years in preparation for the campaign. Animals had been bought and fattened, while the local populations had, for several months, been ordered to grind the grains into flour. The Persian army took roughly three months to travel unopposed from the Hellespont to Therme,

3200-571: The Greco-Persian Wars , as King Xerxes I of Persia sought to conquer all of Greece. The invasion was a direct, if delayed, response to the defeat of the first Persian invasion of Greece (492–490 BC) at the Battle of Marathon , which ended Darius I 's attempts to subjugate Greece. After Darius's death, his son Xerxes spent several years planning for the second invasion, mustering an enormous army and navy. The Athenians and Spartans led

3360-452: The Oenoe road via Panactum , the plains of Skourta and the eastern Pastra mountain , across the passes of Mount Cithaeron and arrived near Plataea . The archaeologist Andreas Konecny estimates that the crossing of Cithaeron would have taken place sometime between late July and mid August. Under the guidance of their commanding general, Pausanias , the Greeks took up positions opposite

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3520-580: The Serpent Column , also supports some of Herodotus's specific claims. The Greek city-states of Athens and Eretria had supported the unsuccessful Ionian Revolt against the Persian Empire of Darius I in 499–494 BC. The Persian Empire was still relatively young and prone to revolts among its subject peoples. Moreover, Darius was a usurper and had spent considerable time extinguishing revolts against his rule. The Ionian revolt threatened

3680-482: The Siege of Sestos ), and therefore evidently felt that Herodotus's history was accurate enough not to need re-writing or correcting. Plutarch criticised Herodotus in his essay "On The Malignity of Herodotus", describing Herodotus as " Philobarbaros " (barbarian-lover), for not being pro-Greek enough, which suggests that Herodotus might actually have done a reasonable job of being even-handed. A negative view of Herodotus

3840-513: The 1st century BC in his Bibliotheca Historica , also provides an account of the Greco-Persian wars, partially derived from the earlier Greek historian Ephorus . This account is fairly consistent with Herodotus's. The Greco-Persian wars are also described in less detail by a number of other ancient historians including Plutarch, Ctesias , and are alluded by other authors, such as the playwright Aeschylus . Archaeological evidence, such as

4000-540: The Allies assembled the largest ever hoplite army and marched north from the Isthmus to confront Mardonius. At the ensuing Battle of Plataea , the Greek infantry again proved its superiority, inflicting a severe defeat on the Persians and killing Mardonius in the process. On the same day, across the Aegean Sea an Allied navy destroyed the remnants of the Persian navy at the Battle of Mycale . With this double defeat,

4160-637: The Allies received the news that Xerxes was clearing paths around Mount Olympus , and thus intending to march towards Thermopylae, it was both the period of truce that accompanied the Olympic games , and the Spartan festival of Carneia , during both of which warfare was considered sacrilegious. Nevertheless, the Spartans considered the threat so grave that they despatched their king Leonidas I with his personal bodyguard (the Hippeis ) of 300 men (in this case,

4320-514: The Argives had been severely weakened in 494 BC, when a Spartan-force led by Cleomenes I had annihilated the Argive army in Battle of Sepeia and then massacred the fugitives. The allies had no 'standing army', nor was there any requirement to form one; since they were fighting on home territory, they could muster armies as and when required. Different-sized allied forces thus appeared throughout

4480-452: The Asopos river and the Gargaphian spring. During the day chosen for the retreat, the Greeks underwent constant attacks by the Persian cavalry. Meanwhile, the Persians were considering a retreat to Thebes where they had "already stored a great deal of food, as well as fodder for the pack animals." However, the retreat went awry. The Allied contingents in the centre began their movement late at night, and perhaps because they were not aware of

4640-463: The Athenian fleet probably refused to join the Allied navy in the spring. The navy, now under the command of the Spartan king Leotychides , thus skulked off Delos , while the remnants of the Persian fleet skulked off Samos , both sides unwilling to risk battle. Similarly, Mardonius remained in Thessaly, knowing an attack on the isthmus was pointless, while the Allies refused to send an army outside

4800-468: The Athenian refugees in Salamis. Athens sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance and threatened to accept the Persian terms if it was not provided. These events occurred sometime in the month of June. According to Herodotus , the Spartans were at that time celebrating the festival of Hyacinthus , and delayed making a decision for ten days until they were persuaded of the danger to all of Greece if

4960-482: The Athenians surrendered. When Mardonius learned of the Spartan force marching to join the allied Greek army, he completed the destruction of Athens, tearing down whatever was left standing. He then retreated towards Boeotia, hoping to lure the Greek army into territory that would be advantageous for the Persian cavalry. Mardonius withdrew from Attica through the Decelea defile , passed by Sphendale , encamped for

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5120-525: The Athenians to reinforce his troops, but the latter had been engaged by the phalanx of the Thebans and Mardonius' Greeks, and were unable to assist Pausanias. Konijnendijk argues that the Spartans' flank had been attacked by the Persians, and notes that Pausanias had asked the Athenians to deploy their archers, who were tactically needed against the Persian archers and missileers, if they could not deploy all of their army. Meanwhile, Mardonius had learned of

5280-605: The Athenians, marking the beginning of a new phase in the Greco-Persian Wars, the Greek counter-attack . In Sestos, the medizing general Artayctes was crucified and his son was stoned to death by Xanthippus , an Athenian general. According to Plutarch , Alexander the Great , during his invasion of Persia , had recognized that the victory at Plataea had paved the way for his conquest. The cuirass armor of Masistius,

5440-545: The Bactrians were the Indians and Sacae , opposite the 3,300 soldiers of Hermione, Eretria, Styra, Chalcis, Anaktoria, Leucadia, Palea, and Aegina. Konecny estimates that these Indians and Sace would have totaled around 6,000 to 9,000. The Medes, Bactrians, Indians and Sacae formed the center of the Persian line, numbering around 24,000 to 36,000. Thus the total Persian infantry would have numbered around 44,000 to 66,000; and

5600-608: The Battle of Plataea, Herodotus tells us that rumour of the Allied victory reached the Allied navy, at that time off the coast of Mount Mycale in Ionia . Their morale boosted, the Allied marines fought and won a decisive victory at the Battle of Mycale that same day, destroying the remnants of the Persian fleet. As soon as the Peloponnesians had marched north of the isthmus, the Athenian fleet under Xanthippus had joined up with

5760-510: The Boeotian cities that had not surrendered, before taking possession of the now-evacuated city of Athens. The Allied army, meanwhile, prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth . The ensuing naval Battle of Salamis in 480   BC ended in a decisive victory for the Allies, marking a turning point in the conflict. Following the defeat of his navy at Salamis, Xerxes retreated to Sardis with

5920-429: The Greek allies would take the offensive against the Persians, marking a new phase of the Greco-Persian Wars . The Achaemenid Emperor Xerxes I , on his accession quickly initiated his preparations for an invasion of Greece, including the task of building two pontoon bridges across the Hellespont . A congress of city states met, probably at Corinth , in 481   BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states

6080-417: The Greek army at Plataea had a total of 78,000 soldiers and that these supplies would have lasted for two days, if each soldier were to receive one choinix of rations per day, equivalent to 800 grams (1.8 lb). Konecny estimates that each column would have had to travel 75 kilometres (47 mi) one way, and argues that there would have been three supply columns in transit at all times in order to supply

6240-438: The Greek army. He argues that at least 500 people would have accompanied each column, and that thus a minimum of 2,000 auxiliaries had arrived at the Greek camp since four columns had already supplied them, and that at least 1,500 auxiliaries would always have to be travelling on the supply lines. The historian Nicholas Sekunda argues that the animals in the supply column would have been pack animals and not oxen, and says that

6400-473: The Greek lines. During a reconnaissance patrol, the Persians had noticed a gap in the Greek lines on the western flank. At the foot of a cliff, the Megarians were deployed in terrain accessible to the Persian cavalry, about 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) from the westernmost point of the line. The Megarian line was about 400 metres (1,300 ft) wide at the front, of this frontage, about 250 metres (820 ft)

6560-456: The Greek phalanx. Konecny argues that the distance between both fronts might have been 50 metres (160 ft) to 70 metres (230 ft). Another estimate for the distance between the Greek and Persian lines is 100 metres (330 ft) to 150 metres (490 ft). By now, the Persians had formed their shield wall and their archers continued to fire while covered behind it. The Persian Immortals would have ten soldiers in each column, with those on

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6720-414: The Greek resistance. About a tenth of the Greek city-states joined the 'Allied' effort; most remained neutral or submitted to Xerxes. The invasion began in spring 480 BC, when the Persian army crossed the Hellespont and marched through Thrace and Macedon to Thessaly . The Persian advance was blocked at the pass of Thermopylae by a small Allied force under King Leonidas I of Sparta; simultaneously,

6880-457: The Greek retreat and rushed to Pausanias' position with the Persian left wing he was personally commanding. They had marched around 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) from their camp behind the Asopos river to the Argiopios. The Greeks had put up their shields at their front line and were fighting the Persian cavalry. The Persians were not advancing in a formation but managed to form their lines opposite

7040-453: The Greeks moved forward, still remaining on higher ground, to a new position near the Asopos river which was more defensible and better watered. In response, Mardonius brought his men westward up to the Asopos and arrayed them for battle in a line 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) long. However, neither the Persians nor the Greeks would attack; Herodotus claims this is because both sides had received bad omens from their seers. Konecny argues that this

7200-504: The Greeks would have formed an open phalanx and not a closed one. He argues that the Spartans then formed a defensive line, thus pulling the Persians in towards them. He argues that the continuing use of ballistic weapons and small clashes along the lines would have reduced numbers on both sides, however, the Greeks did not break ranks and retreat. Meanwhile, the Spartans had outnumbered the Persians guarding Mardonius. Konijnendijk argues that these Persians would have inflicted many casualties on

7360-419: The Greeks' numbers, and postulates that the Greeks may have been the ones who outnumbered the Persians, since the latter feared the size of the former's army. Konijendjik argues that the Persian strategy was to pursue a lengthened war and thus force a Greek retreat, since the latter had limited access to supplies and water. He argues that the Greek strategy was to pull the Persians into a pitched battle , because

7520-431: The Greeks' spears by grabbing hold of them, but failed. At this point, the hoplites might have closed the distances between each other and huddled together tightly. They started pushing against the Persians who were risking asphyxiation because they were not accustomed to such fighting. The Persians may have stepped back a little and sent small groups to attack portions of the Greek line, in order to make them withdraw from

7680-405: The Greeks, particularly the Spartans, Tegeans and Athenians halted and gave battle, routing the lightly armed Persian infantry and killing Mardonius. A large portion of the Persian army was trapped in its camp and killed. The destruction of this army, and the remnants of the Persian navy allegedly on the same day at the Battle of Mycale , decisively ended the invasion. After Plataea and Mycale,

7840-499: The Greeks. He argues that the Persians could have outflanked the Greeks easily, but they did not because they actually did not outnumber the Greeks by a lot. He also argues that Mardonius normally would not have proposed a duel of champions between the Persian Immortals and Greek hoplites because it would have reduced his numerical advantage. Konijnendijk argues that Mardonius had proposed the duel because he wanted to reduce

8000-568: The Peloponessus. Mardonius moved to break the stalemate, by offering peace, self-government and territorial expansion to the Athenians (with the aim of thereby removing their fleet from the Allied forces), using Alexander I of Macedon as an intermediary. The Athenians made sure that a Spartan delegation was on hand to hear the offer, but rejected it. Athens was thus evacuated again, and the Persians marched south and re-took possession of it. Mardonius brought even more thorough destruction to

8160-545: The Peloponnesus would not be outflanked. According to Herodotus, after this loss Xerxes attempted to build a causeway across the straits to attack Salamis (although Strabo and Ctesias place this attempt before the battle). In any case, this project was soon abandoned. With the Persians' naval superiority removed, Xerxes feared that the Greeks might sail to the Hellespont and destroy the pontoon bridges. According to Herodotus, Mardonius volunteered to remain in Greece and complete

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8320-465: The Persian army, including the allied Greeks, had totaled 40,000. Konecny estimates that Persians would have had around 55 to 70 thousand infantry, and their camps would have had anywhere from 120 to 150 thousand people including the camp followers . The details of the arrangement of the Persian line were given by Herodotus. The Persians were on the left wing, facing the 11,500 Lacedaemonian and Tegean hoplites. Konecny estimates that these Persians on

8480-517: The Persian cavalry around 5,000 to 7,000. Against the 11,600 Athenians, Plataeans and Megarians, were deployed the Boeotians, Locrians, Malians, Thessalians, and the Phocians. Konecny estimates that these troops would have numbered around 11,000 to 13,000. Andreas Konecny estimates that the Greek supply train destroyed by the Persian cavalry would have had 120 tons of supplies. He estimates that

8640-469: The Persian cavalry arrived at the Greek position, they found it decamped and conveyed this information to Mardonius through a messenger. According to Herodotus, the Spartans sent 45,000 men – 5,000 Spartiates (full citizen soldiers), 5,000 other Lacodaemonian hoplites ( perioeci ) and 35,000 helots (seven per Spartiate). Pausanias, the regent for his cousin Pleistarchus , was chosen to command

8800-689: The Persian cavalry commander, was displayed at the shrine of Athena Polias in the Erechtheion , located in the Acropolis complex in Athens, and was still to be found at the same location in the 2nd century   AD. The geographer Pausanias had also seen a sword, said to be Mardonius' acinaces , in the Acropolis. The manger of Mardonius' horse was gifted to the Temple of Athena Alea in Tegea, and

8960-454: The Persian cavalry over the Greek infantry, and how the former had initiated the battle at Plataea. He argues that these cavaliers could fire arrows and javelins at the Greeks without coming within the range of the latter's spears; and that the Persian infantry inflicted much damage on the Spartans, who did not have long-range weapons to counter and defend themselves. He also observes how the Persians used their archers for area denial by putting

9120-477: The Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished. The Spartan hoplites who died were buried in two different graves, while the helots were buried in a third one. Those buried at the first grave were either priests ( irees ) or "young men in their twenties" ( irenes ). Pausanias did not permit the desecration of Mardonius' corpse. The allied Greek army rested for ten days and then proceeded to siege Thebes and rebuke its politicians who had been proponents of

9280-421: The Persian fleet to battle. Partly as a result of subterfuge on the part of Themistocles, the navies finally engaged in the cramped Straits of Salamis. There, the large Persian numbers were an active hindrance, as ships struggled to manoeuvre and became disorganised. Seizing the opportunity, the Greek fleet attacked, and scored a decisive victory, sinking or capturing at least 200 Persian ships, and thus ensuring

9440-404: The Persian fleet was blocked by an Allied fleet at the straits of Artemisium . At the famous Battle of Thermopylae , the Allied army held back the Persian army for three days, before they were outflanked by a mountain path and the Allied rearguard was trapped and annihilated. The Allied fleet had also withstood two days of Persian attacks at the Battle of Artemisium , but when news reached them of

9600-400: The Persian infantry proved no match for the heavily armoured Greek hoplites, and the Spartans broke through to Mardonius's bodyguard and killed him. The Persian force thus dissolved in rout; 40,000 troops managed to escape via the road to Thessaly, but the rest fled to the Persian camp where they were trapped and slaughtered by the Allies, thus finalising their victory. On the afternoon of

9760-522: The Persian invasions. Based on his estimates for the daily victual provisions, Sekunda estimates that the daily spending on rations by the Greeks would have been 10,000 drachmas. He argues that the allied Greeks could have arranged such sums. Sekunda observes that the battle of Plataea was the first instance of a Greek army receiving supplies on the battlefield, instead of living off the land, getting supplies from allied polities on their route or buying from markets set up by camp followers. Konecny argues that

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9920-481: The Persian lines but remained on high ground. They deployed their lines from Erythrai to Hysiai, and from their positions on the Cithaeron could observe the Persian lines 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) across the Asopos river. The Greek units were camped in order of their positions in the phalanx, so that the formation could be set up easily at the start of battle. Mardonius initiated hit-and-run cavalry attacks against

10080-428: The Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route. Modern scholars thus generally attribute the numbers given in the ancient sources to the result of miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors, or disinformation by the Persians in the run up to the war. The topic has been hotly debated but the modern consensus revolves around

10240-460: The Persian navy into the narrow Straits of Salamis, where the huge number of Persian ships became disorganised, and were soundly beaten by the Allied fleet. The Allied victory at Salamis prevented a quick conclusion to the invasion, and fearing becoming trapped in Europe, Xerxes retreated to Asia leaving his general Mardonius to finish the conquest with the elite of the army. The following spring,

10400-474: The Persian shield wall was the Greeks' target during the early clashes, and that the Persian Immortals had kept fighting even after the shield wall broke, but stopped after their commander Mardonius was killed. He also notes that the Spartans were the only experienced and skilled soldiers in the Greek camp, and that all the other Greek soldiers were amateurs. Konijnendijk notes the dominance of

10560-625: The Persian triremes by nationality: Herodotus also records that this was the number at the Battle of Salamis, despite the losses earlier in storms off Sepia and Euboea, and at the battle of Artemisium. He claims that the losses were replenished with reinforcements, though he only records 120 triremes from the Greeks of Thrace and an unspecified number of ships from the Greek islands. Aeschylus , who fought at Salamis, also claims that he faced 1,207 warships there, of which 1,000 were triremes and 207 fast ships. Diodorus and Lysias independently claim there were 1,200 at Doriskos. The number of 1,207 (for

10720-474: The Persians arrived at Thermopylae in mid-August, they initially waited for three days for the Allies to disperse. When Xerxes was eventually persuaded that the Allies intended to contest the pass, he sent his troops to attack. However, the Greek position was ideally suited to hoplite warfare, the Persian contingents being forced to attack the phalanx head on. The Allies thus withstood two full days of battle and everything Xerxes could throw at them. However, at

10880-415: The Persians could only have taken pack animals with them after the attack, since oxen could not have traversed the unpaved route. Sekunda estimates that the food provisions would be at least one choinix per day for both the Greek and Persian soldiers. Sekunda also estimates that the supply column disrupted by the Persians would have had either 58,000 choinikes of barley or 47,000 choinikes of wheat, half

11040-411: The Persians lost the battle because they did not deploy their cavalry fully in the final battle, and also because their morale had shattered after Mardonius' death. He further argues that the Greeks did not win because of presumed technological superiority, but because of their consistent refusal to break and their sustained strong morale. Konijnendijk and historian Paul M. Bardunias observe that Plataea

11200-467: The Persians' iron cuirass armor would have been of better quality than the Greek bronze cuirass armor. Konijnendijk states that only some soldiers of both armies would have worn armor, and that their numbers would not have been greater than 10%. He thus postulates that the Greeks did not have better armor than the Persians. He argues that it was not the Greeks but the Persian soldiers who were "uniformly trained and equipped for close combat". He claims that

11360-544: The Persians, and because they wanted to solidify their dominance in the Peloponnese. The allied forces were commanded by the Athenians for the remainder of the war. The remnants of the Persian army, under the command of Artabazos, tried to retreat to Asia Minor . Travelling through the lands of Thessaly, Macedonia and Thrace by the shortest road, Artabazos eventually made it back to the Hellespont, though losing many soldiers to Thracian attacks, weariness and hunger. After

11520-464: The Persians, as did many cities to the north of the pass of Thermopylae when it seemed help was not forthcoming. A second strategy was therefore suggested to the Allies by Themistocles . The route to southern Greece (Boeotia, Attica and the Peloponnesus) would require the army of Xerxes to travel through the very narrow pass of Thermopylae . This could easily be blocked by the Allies, despite

11680-426: The Persians. Attaginus , the foremost medizing politician, escaped; his sons were pardoned by Pausanias. However, all the other remaining medisers were executed without being tried. The Spartans did not send any troops for the allied effort after the battle; the historian Marcello Lupi contends that the Spartans did so because they did not have any naval experience, because their soldiers could have been corrupted by

11840-422: The Persians. Directly before Artemisium, the Persian fleet had been caught in a gale off the coast of Magnesia , losing many ships, but could still probably muster over 800 ships at the start of the battle. On the first day (also the first of the Battle of Thermopylae), the Persians detached 200 seaworthy ships, which were sent to sail around the eastern coast of Euboea . These ships were to round Euboea and block

12000-437: The Spartan polemarch Euenetus and Themistocles was thus dispatched to the pass. However, once there, they were warned by Alexander I of Macedon that the vale could be bypassed by at least two other passes and that the army of Xerxes was overwhelming; the Allies therefore retreated. Shortly afterwards, they received the news that Xerxes had crossed the Hellespont. The abandonment of Tempe meant that all of Thessaly submitted to

12160-453: The Spartan troops. The historian Ian Macgregor-Morris argues that the 5,000 Spartiates sent to Plataea would have been 3/5th of Sparta's troops, while the historian Hans van Wees argues that these 5,000 would have been all the Spartan citizens fit to serve. The Spartan troops at Plataea might have been the largest army the Spartans had sent beyond the Isthmus of Corinth . Euryanax was chosen by Pausanias as his deputy commander. The Greek army

12320-418: The Spartans had thus mobilized almost all of their fighting age helots to assist with the logistical problems posed by such a large Greek army. He argues that only 10,000 helots would have been deployed for combat, with the remaining 25,000 helots working the supply lines. He further claims that if all the 35,000 helots had been on the battlefield, the Greeks wouldn't have been able to form their phalanxes before

12480-416: The Spartans may have arranged their units according to their syssitia (meal groups). They argue that the Spartan line would have had a depth of four ranks, with some columns on the line having greater depth, arrayed in a "rough formation". They posit that the Persians lost because of overspecialization . They postulate that Plataea was a battle of shield walls, where the Greeks won because their shield wall

12640-403: The Spartans till Arimnestos, a soldier, hurled a stone at Mardonius and killed him. Mardonius' death hit the morale of his guards, and once they broke their lines and retreated, the rest of the Persian army did so too. However, the Athenians still had to fight the Thebans who were blocking them, eventually the Thebans retreated and the Persian cavalry did not let the Greeks pursue and outflank

12800-467: The Spartans to also charge the Persian lines. Konecny argues that the Persian arrow volleys would have been dispiriting for the Greeks, since their arrows would have managed to hit undefended gaps and body parts. The Spartans and Tegeans had started to push into the Persian lines. The Greeks started thrusting their spears at the Persian shield wall, and some of them tried to break the Persians' shields. The Persians put aside their bows and tried to break

12960-460: The Theban cavalry would have had at most 1,000 soldiers. Gaebel argues that the Thebans managed to inflict disproportionate casualties on the Greek center because the latter had not formed their phalanx and were running astray. Gaebel notes that the Megarians had already been attacked successfully by Persian cavalry earlier and should not have risked advancing in open plains where the opponent's cavalry

13120-421: The banks of the Asopos river within their arrows' range and thus cutting off the Greeks' source of fresh water. Konijnendijk argues that the Greeks would have lost at Plataea if their army had been all hoplites, and that the light infantry missileers, who were two-thirds of the Greek army, could counter the Persians' long-range weapons more effectively. He argues that these missileers would have sought cover behind

13280-421: The battlefield. He further argues that these attendants served as skeuphoros (baggage carriers), and were either slaves or the relatives of the hoplites too young to serve in the military. The historian John Francis Lazenby, by comparing the size of the Persian camp with later Roman military camps, calculates the number of troops at 70,000, including 10,000 cavalry. The historian Peter Connolly arrives at

13440-706: The campaign was delayed one year because of another revolt in Egypt and Babylonia . In 481 BC, after roughly four years of preparation, Xerxes began to muster the troops for the invasion of Europe. Herodotus gives the names of 46 nations from which troops were drafted. The Persian army was gathered in Asia Minor in the summer and autumn of 481 BC. The armies from the Eastern satrapies was gathered in Kritala, Cappadocia and were led by Xerxes to Sardis where they passed

13600-677: The campaign. These numbers are discussed fully in the article for each battle. Having crossed into Europe in April 480 BC, the Persian army began its march to Greece. Five major food depots had been set up along the path: at White Headland on the Thracian side of the Hellespont, at Tyrodiza in Perinthian territory, at Doriskos at the Evros river estuary where the Asian army was linked up with

13760-640: The chief advisor of Xerxes in naval matters. In effect, the Sidon fleet held a position of primacy among the naval forces of the Achaemenid Empire at that time, providing the best ships in the fleet, even before the fleet of Artemisia of Halicarnassus or the Egyptians. The Phoenicians furnished a fleet of 300 ships, "together with the Syrians of Palestine". Herodotus gives a detailed breakdown of

13920-571: The city of Plataea in Boeotia , and was fought between an alliance of the Greek city-states (including Sparta , Athens , Corinth and Megara ), and the Achaemenid Empire of Xerxes I (allied with Greek states including Boeotia , Thessalia , and Macedon ). The previous year, the Persian invasion force, led by the Persian king Xerxes I in person, had scored victories at the battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium and conquered

14080-417: The city. According to Herodotus, Mardonius "burnt Athens and utterly overthrew or demolished whatever wall or house or temple was left standing". Mardonius now repeated his offer of peace to the Athenian refugees on Salamis. Athens, along with Megara and Plataea, sent emissaries to Sparta demanding assistance, and threatening to accept the Persian terms if not. The Spartans, who were at that time celebrating

14240-511: The command of the Spartan regent Pausanias , stayed on high ground above Plataea to protect themselves against such tactics. Mardonius ordered a hit-and-run cavalry attack on the Greek lines, but the attack was unsuccessful and the cavalry commander killed. The outcome prompted the Allies to move to a position nearer the Persian camp, still on high ground. As a result, the Allied lines of communication were exposed. The Persian cavalry began to intercept food deliveries and finally managed to destroy

14400-467: The commencement of a festival dedicated to Zeus Eleutherios , the Eleutheria, in order to honor the Greeks who had died during the battle. The historian Roel Konijnendijk argues that technological advantages, if these existed, were not among the reasons for the Greek victory over the Persians at Plataea. He argues that there were multiple other reasons for the outcome of the battle. He claims that

14560-441: The confrontation. Thebes was a major absentee and was suspected of being willing to aid the Persians once the invasion force arrived. Not all Thebans agreed with this policy, and 400 "loyalist" hoplites joined the Allied force at Thermopylae (at least according to one possible interpretation). The most notable city actively siding with the Persians ("Medised") was Argos , in the otherwise Spartan-dominated Peloponnese. However,

14720-469: The conquest with a hand-picked group of troops, while advising Xerxes to retreat to Asia with the bulk of the army. All of the Persian forces abandoned Attica, with Mardonius over-wintering in Boeotia and Thessaly. Some Athenians were thus able to return to their burnt-out city for the winter. They would have to evacuate again in front of a second advance by Mardonius in June 479 BC. According to Herodotus

14880-456: The contingent that was pushing forward. Artabazos , who had earlier commanded the Persians at the Sieges of Olynthus and Potidea , had disagreed with Mardonius about attacking the Greeks, and had not fully engaged the forces under his command. As the rout commenced, he led these men away from the battlefield to Phocis , hoping to escape eventually to the Hellespont. Konijnendijk argues that

15040-443: The contradictions in the ancient sources. A later influential historian, J. B. Bury, calls Herodotus's numbers "wholly fabulous" and judges that the Persian land forces may have been 180,000. A major limiting factor for the size of the Persian army, first suggested by Sir Frederick Maurice (a British transport officer) is the supply of water. Maurice suggested in the region of 200,000 men and 70,000 animals could have been supported by

15200-469: The daily provisions for the 110,000 people in the Greek camp, including the non-combatants. Sekunda argues that the Greeks would have had a "common treasury", noting Plutarch's statement that during the Spartan command of the allied Greeks, the latter would pay some type of contribution. The historian Peter Brunt argues that such a treasury would not have existed. Sekunda argues that the Spartans might have had enough time to make financial provisions during

15360-402: The daily water requirement at 250,000 liters (66,000 U.S. gal) for the 110,000 people in the Greek camp based on a daily requirement of 2.27 liters (0.60 U.S. gal) per person. However, these figures do not account for the water requirements of the animals in the Greek camp. During the retreat of the Greeks on the 13th day after their arrival, all of their center wing left

15520-418: The decision was taken, under the guidance of the politician Themistocles, to build a massive fleet of triremes that would be necessary for the Greeks to fight the Persians. The Athenians did not have the man-power to fight on land and sea; therefore combatting the Persians would require an alliance of several Greek city states. In 481 BC Xerxes sent ambassadors around Greece asking for earth and water, but making

15680-407: The depth of the Greek ranks at Plataea, but had written about the greater depth of the Persian ranks. They thus argue that the Greek forces at Plataea were not arrayed in grids, and did not fight in the manner of Classical hoplite phalanxes. They note that the Spartans at Plataea did not execute the movements attributed to them by later authors like Xenophon . Konijnendijk and Bardunias argue that

15840-520: The disaster at Thermopylae, they withdrew to Salamis . After Thermopylae, all of Euboea , Phocis , Boeotia and Attica fell to the Persian army, which captured and burnt Athens . However, a larger Allied army fortified the narrow Isthmus of Corinth , protecting the Peloponnesus from Persian conquest. Both sides thus sought a naval victory that might decisively alter the course of the war. The Athenian general Themistocles succeeded in luring

16000-572: The elite young soldiers in the Hippeis were replaced by veterans who already had sons). Leonidas was supported by contingents from the Peloponnesian cities allied to Sparta, and other forces that were picked up en route to Thermopylae. The Allies proceeded to occupy the pass, rebuilt the wall the Phocians had built at the narrowest point of the pass and waited for Xerxes's arrival. When

16160-523: The end of the second day, they were betrayed by a local resident named Ephialtes who revealed to Xerxes a mountain path that led behind the Allied lines. Xerxes then sent his elite guards, the Immortals on a night march to outflank the Allies. When he was made aware of this maneuver (while the Immortals were still en route ), Leonidas dismissed the bulk of the Allied army, remaining to guard the rear with 300 Spartans, 700 Thespians, 400 Thebians and perhaps

16320-415: The fate of Leonidas and the Allies at Thermopylae. Since the Allied fleet was badly damaged, and since it no longer needed to defend the flank of Thermopylae, they retreated from Artemisium to the island of Salamis . Victory at Thermopylae meant that all Boeotia fell to Xerxes; the two cities that had resisted him, Thespiae and Plataea , were captured and razed. Attica was also left open to invasion, and

16480-458: The festival of Hyacinthus , delayed making a decision for 10 days. However, when the Athenian emissaries then delivered an ultimatum to the Spartans, they were amazed to hear that a task force was in fact already marching to meet the Persians. When Mardonius heard that the Allied army was on the march, he retreated into Boeotia, near Plataea, trying to draw the Allies into open terrain where he could use his cavalry. The Allied army however, under

16640-699: The field while their right wing initially did not budge. The Spartans and Tegeans had by now reached the Temple of Demeter. The rearguard under Amompharetus began to withdraw from the ridge to join them. Konecny argues that the Spartans had already had Amompharetus' lochos in their formation when the first units of the Persian cavalry had started attacking. Konecny estimates that Pausanias' line with 11,500 soldiers would have been 1.3 kilometres (0.81 mi) to 1.45 kilometres (0.90 mi) long, assuming there were 8 soldiers per column who each took up 0.8 metres (2.6 ft) to 1 metre (3.3 ft) of space. Pausanias asked

16800-460: The figure of 200,000 or 300,000–500,000. Nevertheless, whatever the real numbers were, it is clear that Xerxes was eager to ensure a successful expedition by mustering overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea, and also that much of the army died of starvation and disease, never returning to Asia. Herodotus tells us that the army and navy, while moving through Thrace, was halted at Doriskos for an inspection by Xerxes, and he recounts

16960-403: The final reckoning, both sides were prepared to stake everything on a naval battle, in the hope of decisively altering the course of the war. Thus, it was that the Allied fleet remained off the coast of Salamis into September, despite the imminent arrival of the Persians. Even after Athens fell to the advancing Persian army, the Allied fleet still remained off the coast of Salamis, trying to lure

17120-584: The first Persian charge. Konecny estimates that during Mardonius' march to Skolos he had traveled around 70 kilometres (43 mi) from Athens in two days, while most of his army would have taken around a week. Konecny estimates that the allied Greek army would have required 300,000 liters (79,000 U.S. gal) of water daily. The mountain slopes they had deployed on did not have access to freshwater, and carrying such quantities daily would have been logistically difficult and would have made them highly vulnerable to attacks by Persian cavalry. Sekunda estimates

17280-431: The first ones ready for contact when the Persian cavalry arrived. The Persian cavalry had begun to mobilize for attacking by this time. However, because Amompharetus and his unit were still in their line of sight, they did not rush, perhaps thinking that all of their opponent's army was just ahead of Amompharetus' unit. This allowed Pausanias to execute his retreat safely, and gave Amompharetus enough time to withdraw. When

17440-476: The first time, a chronicler set himself to trace the origins of a conflict not to a past so remote so as to be utterly fabulous, nor to the whims and wishes of some god, nor to a people's claim to manifest destiny, but rather explanations he could verify personally". Some subsequent ancient historians, despite following in his footsteps, criticised Herodotus, starting with Thucydides . Nevertheless, Thucydides chose to begin his history where Herodotus left off (at

17600-498: The former were logistically constrained with regards to managing their large army for long, and because they might have believed the terrain was advantageous for them. Konijnendijk argues that both the Greeks and Persians had depleted their supplies before the final battle. Mardonius may have decided on attacking first because the Greek victory at the Battle of Salamis and the Battle of Mycale would have threatened his line of communications and routes for retreating. He argues that

17760-406: The fringe of his empire for so long. Thermopylae had shown that a frontal assault against a well defended Greek position had little chance of success; with the Allies now dug in across the isthmus, there was therefore little chance of the Persians conquering the rest of Greece by land. However, if the isthmus's defensive line could be outflanked, the Allies could be defeated. Such an outflanking of

17920-508: The front of the line being sparabara wearing scaled iron corslets , armed with spears, bows and shields. The nine soldiers to the rear would have bows and spears, or axes. According to Herodotus, Pausanias refused to advance because he was waiting for good omens. At this point, as Greek soldiers began to fall under the barrage of arrows, the Tegeans started to run at the Persian lines. Pausanias finally received favourable omens and ordered

18080-439: The helots were indeed deployed along with the other Spartans during the final battle, and were not auxiliaries. They argue that the Spartan formation could not have been eight ranks deep with one hoplite in front and seven light infantry to the rear. They argue that such a line would have been 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) long, which would not be possible on Plataea's terrain, and the Persian Immortals would not have been able to create

18240-439: The hoplite shields at Plataea. He argues that Pausanias knew the hoplites were weaker in such a scenario and that archers were needed. Konijnendijk notes that the Greeks had sent hoplites and archers for the first few skirmishes, and that the archers had managed to turn these into a pitched battle by injuring the Persian commander's horse. He argues that the Persians had advantages in mobility, range, flexibility and lethality over

18400-458: The integrity of his empire, and Darius thus vowed to punish those involved (especially those not already part of the empire). Darius also saw the opportunity to expand his empire into the fractious world of Ancient Greece. A preliminary expedition under Mardonius, in 492 BC, to secure the land approaches to Greece ended with the re-conquest of Thrace and forced Macedon to become a fully subordinate kingdom part of Persia. It had previously been

18560-405: The internal workings of the congress or the discussions during its meetings. Only 70 of the approximately 700 Greek cities sent representatives. Nevertheless, this was remarkable for the disjointed Greek world, especially since many of the city-states in attendance were still technically at war with each other. The majority of other city-states remained more-or-less neutral, awaiting the outcome of

18720-659: The invasion was ended, and Persian power in the Aegean severely dented. The Greeks would now move to the offensive , eventually expelling the Persians from Europe, the Aegean Islands and Ionia before the war finally came to an end in 449 BC with the Peace of Callias . The main source for the Great Greco-Persian Wars is the Greek historian Herodotus . Herodotus, who has been called the 'Father of History',

18880-414: The isthmus required the use of the Persian navy, and thus the neutralisation of the Allied navy. In summary, if Xerxes could destroy the Allied navy, he would be in a strong position to force a Greek surrender; this seemed the only hope of concluding the campaign in that season. Conversely by avoiding destruction, or as Themistocles hoped, by destroying the Persian fleet, the Greeks could avoid conquest. In

19040-451: The lack of food, the restriction of the water supply made the Greek position untenable, so they decided to retreat to a position in front of Plataea, from where they could guard the passes and have access to fresh water. To prevent the Persian cavalry from attacking during the retreat, it was to be performed that night. The position the Greeks chose for their retreat was named the "island", at a distance of 1.8 kilometres (1.1 mi) from both

19200-645: The left wing would have numbered around 20,000 to 30,000. To the right of the Persians were the Medes , facing the 6,200 soldiers of Corinth, Potidaea, Orchomenus and Sicyon. Konecny estimates that these Medes would have numbered around 12,000 to 18,000. Next to the Medes, the Bactrians were deployed in front of the 3,400 soldiers of Epidaurus, Troezen, Lepreum, Tiryns, Mycenae, and Phlius. Konecny estimates that these Bactrians would have totaled around 6,000 to 9,000. After

19360-496: The line of retreat for the Allied fleet. Meanwhile, the Allies and the remaining Persians engaged in the late afternoon, the Allies having the better of the engagement and capturing 30 vessels. That evening, another storm occurred, wrecking the majority of the Persian detachment which had been sent around Euboea. On the second day of the battle, news reached the Allies that their lines of retreat were no longer threatened; they therefore resolved to maintain their position. They staged

19520-614: The loot pillaged from the Persians was sold to fund the construction of multiple buildings, like the Athenian Treasury at Delphi . It is possible that originals, misattributions or replicas of the Persian spoils from Plataea were stored at the Acropolis complex, particularly in the Parthenon . A bronze column in the shape of intertwined snakes, the Serpent column , was created from melted-down Persian armor, acquired during

19680-573: The names of six major commanders and 29 myriarchs (leaders of a baivabaram , the basic unit of the Persian infantry, which numbered about 10,000-strong ); this would give a land force of roughly 300,000 men. Other proponents of larger numbers suggest figures from 250,000 to 700,000. The size of the Persian fleet is also disputed, though perhaps less so. According to Herodotus the Persian fleet numbered 1,207 triremes and 3,000 transport and supply ships, including 50-oared galleys ( Penteconters ) (πεντηκοντήρ). Tetramnestos , King of Sidon , served as

19840-456: The new terrain, ended up advancing 1.8 kilometres (1.1 mi) past the island to arrive at the Temple of Hera . The Tegeans and Spartans on the right wing were chosen to advance to the Cithaeron passes and accompany the stuck supply convoys to the new Greek position. However, these units had not even begun to retreat by daybreak. This was because a Spartan commander, Amompharetus , refused to retreat because he thought it would be cowardly. While

20000-522: The number must have been lower by the Battle of Salamis. Other recent works on the Persian Wars reject this number—1,207 being seen as more of a reference to the combined Greek fleet in the Iliad —and generally claim that the Persians could have launched no more than around 600 warships into the Aegean. The Athenians had been preparing for war with the Persians since the mid-480s BC, and in 482 BC

20160-509: The numbers of troops found to be present: Herodotus doubles this number to account for support personnel and thus he reports that the whole army numbered 5,283,220 men. Other ancient sources give similarly large numbers. The poet Simonides , who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million; Ctesias gave 800,000 as the total number of the army that assembled in Doriskos. An early and very influential modern historian, George Grote , set

20320-461: The only spring of water available to the Allies. The Allied position now undermined, Pausanias ordered a night-time retreat towards their original positions. This went awry, leaving the Athenians, and Spartans and Tegeans isolated on separate hills, with the other contingents scattered further away, near Plataea itself. Seeing that he might never have a better opportunity to attack, Mardonius ordered his whole army forward. However, as at Thermopylae,

20480-456: The outset only) is also given by Ephorus , while his teacher Isocrates claims there were 1,300 at Doriskos and 1,200 at Salamis. Ctesias gives another number, 1,000 ships, while Plato , speaking in general terms refers to 1,000 ships and more. These numbers are (by ancient standards) consistent, and this could be interpreted that a number around 1,200 is correct. Among modern scholars some have accepted this number, although suggesting that

20640-433: The overwhelming number of Persians. Furthermore, to prevent the Persians from bypassing Thermopylae by sea, the allied navy could block the straits of Artemisium . This dual strategy was adopted by congress. However, the Peloponnesian cities made fall-back plans to defend the Isthmus of Corinth should it come to it, while the women and children of Athens were evacuated en masse to the Peloponnesian city of Troezen . When

20800-464: The plunder of the Persian camp, and was erected at Delphi . It commemorated all the Greek city-states that had participated in the battle, listing them on the column. Most of it still survives in the Hippodrome of Constantinople in present-day Istanbul , where it was carried by Constantine the Great during the founding of his city on the Greek colony of Byzantium . The poet Simonides of Ceos

20960-416: The regions of Thessaly , Phocis , Boeotia, Athens, Euboea and Attica . However, at the ensuing Battle of Salamis , the allied Greek navy had won an unlikely but decisive victory, preventing the conquest of the Peloponnesus region. Xerxes then retreated with much of his army, leaving his general Mardonius to finish off the Greeks the following year. In the summer of 479   BC, the Greeks assembled

21120-461: The remaining population of Athens was thus evacuated, with the aid of the Allied fleet, to Salamis. The Peloponnesian Allies began to prepare a defensive line across the Isthmus of Corinth, building a wall, and demolishing the road from Megara , thereby abandoning Athens to the Persians. Athens fell a first time in September 480 BC. The small number of Athenians who had barricaded themselves on

21280-418: The rest of the Allied fleet. The fleet, now able to match the Persians, had first sailed to Samos, where the Persian fleet was based. The Persians, whose ships were in a poor state of repair, had decided not to risk fighting and instead drew their ships up on the beach under Mycale. An army of 60,000 men had been left there by Xerxes, and the fleet joined with them, building a palisade around the camp to protect

21440-424: The rest of the Spartans retreated, his lochos was left behind. Meanwhile the Athenians and Plataeans had also been unable to retreat, because their path had been blocked by the scattered centre. The Athenians sent a messenger to Pausanias asking for his new directive. Pausanias asked the Athenians to retreat to the Cithaeron passes and not to the "island", and join up with the Spartans if possible. This message

21600-421: The rest of the retreating Persian army. Konijnendijk argues that it is puzzling that these cavaliers did not participate in the fight fully at this point, and notes that perhaps they were following standard Persian cavalry tactics. However, the Greeks managed to catch up with the retreating Persians and took their camp after some struggle. The historian Robert Gaebel argues that the Persian cavalry who had covered

21760-423: The retreat of the Persian army were actually Boiotian cavalry, particularly the Theban cavalry led by Asopodoros, the son of Timandros. Gaebel observes that Herodotus had written about these cavalry units attacking the Greek center and inflicting 600 casualties on them, while the Thebans had suffered 300 casualties during this attack. Gaebel estimates that the Greek center would have had 3,500 to 4,000 soldiers, while

21920-488: The rivers in that region of Greece. He further suggested that Herodotus may have confused the Persian terms for chiliarchy (1,000) and myriarchy (10,000), leading to an exaggeration by a factor of ten. Other early modern scholars estimated that the land forces participating in the invasion at 100,000 soldiers or less, based on the logistical systems available to the Ancients. Munro and Macan note Herodotus giving

22080-424: The second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would try again, over time it became apparent that the Persian desire to conquer Greece was much diminished. Battle of Plataea The Battle of Plataea was the final land battle during the second Persian invasion of Greece . It took place in 479   BC near

22240-436: The ships. However, Leotychides decided to attack the camp with the Allied fleet's marines. Seeing the small size of the Allied force, the Persians emerged from the camp, but the hoplites again proved superior and destroyed much of the Persian force. The ships were abandoned to the Allies, who burnt them, crippling Xerxes' sea power, and marking the ascendancy of the Allied fleet. With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale,

22400-417: The submission of the other Cycladic Islands . The task force then moved on Eretria, which it besieged and destroyed. Finally, it moved to attack Athens, landing at the bay of Marathon , where it was met by a heavily outnumbered Athenian army. At the ensuing Battle of Marathon, the Athenians won a remarkable victory, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Persian army to Asia. Darius therefore began raising

22560-458: The tone by expressing incredulity at the numbers given by Herodotus: "To admit this overwhelming total, or anything near to it, is obviously impossible." Grote's main objection is the supply problem, though he does not analyse the problem in detail. He did not reject Herodotus's account altogether, citing the latter's reporting of the Persians' careful methods of accounting and their stockpiling of supply caches for three years, but drew attention to

22720-565: The town from sea, the Persian army was caught by the returning tide, many drowning and the survivors being attacked by the Potideans in boats. Artabazus was thus forced to lift the siege, and return to Mardonius in Thessaly with the remnants of his men. While besieging Potidea, Artabazus also decided to besiege Olynthus , which was also in revolt. The town was held by the Bottiaean tribe, who had been driven out of Macedon . Having taken

22880-489: The town, he massacred the defenders and handed over the town to the Chalcidian people. Over the winter, there seems to have been some tension between the Allies. In particular, the Athenians, who were not protected by the isthmus, but whose fleet were the key to the security of the Peloponnesus, felt hard done by. They demanded an Allied army march north the following year. When the other Allies failed to commit to this,

23040-458: The union but simply calls them "οἱ Ἕλληνες" (the Greeks) and "the Greeks who had sworn alliance" (Godley translation) or "the Greeks who had banded themselves together" (Rawlinson translation). Hereafter, they will be referred to as the 'Allies'. Sparta and Athens had a leading role in the congress but interests of all the states played a part in determining defensive strategy. Little is known about

23200-448: The very deliberate omission of Athens and Sparta. Support thus began to coalesce around these two states. A congress of states met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. This confederation had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. Herodotus does not formulate an abstract name for

23360-529: The victory at Mycale, the Allied fleet sailed to the Hellespont to break down the pontoon bridges, but found that this had already been done. The Peloponnesians sailed home, but the Athenians remained to attack the Chersonesos , still held by the Persians. There was a Persian garrison in Sestos , the strongest town in the region, and the Athenians laid siege to them there. After a protracted siege Sestos fell to

23520-576: The winter. Early in spring it moved to Abydos where it was joined with the armies of the western satrapies. Then the army that Xerxes had mustered marched towards Europe, crossing the Hellespont on two pontoon bridges . The numbers of troops that Xerxes mustered for the second invasion of Greece have been the subject of endless dispute because the numbers given in ancient sources are very large indeed. Herodotus claimed that there were, in total, 2.5 million military personnel, accompanied by an equivalent number of support personnel. The poet Simonides , who

23680-400: Was a contemporary, talks of four million; Ctesias , based on Persian records, gave 800,000 as the total number of the army (without the support personnel) that was assembled by Xerxes. While it has been suggested that Herodotus or his sources had access to official Persian Empire records of the forces involved in the expedition, modern scholars tend to reject these figures based on knowledge of

23840-463: Was also present. Herodotus recounts several anecdotes about the conduct of specific Spartans during the battle. According to Herodotus, the Battle of Mycale occurred on the same day as Plataea. With the twin victories of Plataea and Mycale, the second Persian invasion of Greece was over. Moreover, the threat of future invasion was abated; although the Greeks remained worried that Xerxes would attempt an invasion again, over time it became apparent that

24000-420: Was also reinforced by contingents of hoplites from the other Allied city-states. The historian Nicholas Sekunda argues that Herodotus had assumed that each Greek hoplite was accompanied by a lightly armed attendant from the ranks of the psiloi , which had led to Herodotus inflating his numbers for the allied Greek army to 110,000. Sekunda argues that these attendants were present in the Greek camp but not on

24160-432: Was attacking. These Athenians were commanded by Olympiodoros . The Athenians formed a single or double line formation, and from their rear their archers fired their volleys. An Athenian archer managed to hit Masistius' horse when the latter was on the frontline opposite the Athenians. Masistius was flung off his horse and landed near the Athenian line, where the soldiers started stabbing him but were unable to kill him as he

24320-593: Was born in 484 BC in Halicarnassus, Asia Minor (then under Persian overlordship). He wrote his 'Enquiries' (Greek— Historia ; English— (The) Histories ) around 440–430 BC, trying to trace the origins of the Greco-Persian Wars, which would still have been relatively recent history (the wars finally ending in 450 BC). Herodotus's approach was entirely novel, and at least in Western society, he does seem to have invented 'history' as we know it. As Holland has it: "For

24480-425: Was capable of movement, sending out skirmishers and moving in on their opponent. The Persian shield wall, on the other hand, was better for shielding archers, missileers and cavalry. They observe that the sparabara (heavy infantry) were the only Persians who could face off against the hoplites in close quarters, and when the former were defeated, the outmatched light infantry had to fight the hoplites. They note that

24640-414: Was exposed. The Persian cavalry under the command of Masistius began attacking in continuous waves. Konecny estimates that hundreds of cavaliers would have been required to attack in each wave. The Megarians requested reinforcements and said they would retreat if these were not sent. 300 Athenians (hoplites or infantry) along with their archers replaced the Megarians at the spot where the Persian cavalry

24800-453: Was formed, generally referred to as the Allies. In August 480   BC, after hearing of Xerxes' approach, a small Allied army led by Spartan King Leonidas I blocked the pass of Thermopylae . Famously, the massively outnumbered Greek army held Thermopylae for three days before being outflanked by the Persians, who used a little-known mountain path. Following Thermopylae, the Persian army proceeded to burn and sack Plataea and Thespiae,

24960-420: Was instrumental in commemorating the victory at Plataea; he wrote an encomium and an elegy about the battle. The historian Marcello Lupi contends that these texts were commissioned by the Spartans, possibly by Pausanias, since they glorify both. In Spartan propaganda, the victory at Plataea was seen as having avenged the Spartan defeat at Thermopylai. After the battle, the Athenian commander Aristides proposed

25120-597: Was passed on to Renaissance Europe, though he remained well read. However, since the 19th century his reputation has been dramatically rehabilitated by archaeological finds that have repeatedly confirmed his version of events. The prevailing modern view is that Herodotus generally did a remarkable job in his Historia , but that some of his specific details (particularly troop numbers and dates) should be viewed with skepticism. Nevertheless, there are still some historians who believe Herodotus made up much of his story. The Greek historian Diodorus Siculus from Sicily, writing in

25280-427: Was received before daybreak but the Athenians began moving only after dawn. Konecny posits that Aristides may have wanted to avoid the chaos of nighttime movements. Pausanias then marched 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) to the north of modern Erythres, and the Greeks of the scattered center started to converge on his position, though the latter would have taken longer to get into formation. Pausanias' two units, however, were

25440-485: Was the first battle since Thermopylai and the last battle ever where the Persian Immortals fought the Spartan hoplites. They argue that multiple features of a typical hoplite battle are missing in Herodotus' narrative of Plataea, however, later authors assumed they were. They argue that the general narrative of Plataea as a phalanx battle is contrary to the evidence. They note that Herodotus had provided any details about

25600-444: Was wearing scale corslet armor underneath his clothes. Masistius was finally killed when an Athenian soldier stabbed him in the eye. The Persians tried with much effort to recover his body but were pushed back by the Greek infantry, which had just arrived to reinforce the Athenians. The Persian cavalry retreated soon after. Masistius' body was paraded on a cart in front of the Greek lines. Their morale boosted by this small victory,

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