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89-713: The Brandt Mle CM60A1 was developed as a result of French counter-insurgency experiences during the Algerian War . France had initially favoured the deployment of swift, lightly armoured cars against the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), including the M8 Greyhound and Panhard EBR . However, these vehicles had been designed for conventional combat on European battlefields and proved poorly suited to Algerian conditions; their heavy anti-tank armament also risked collateral damage and

178-578: A 1959 design study requested by the Direction des Etudes et Fabrications d'Armement (DEFA) for an amphibious APC based on the same chassis as the Panhard AML. However, the design proposal was not adopted by the French Army. In 1967, design work on a single prototype began anyway, with the objective of export sales. While the amphibious APC programme was underway, the concept was simply known as

267-716: A 2-tonne recovery crane to the base vehicle, while the VPC rebuild incorporates new mapboards and increased interior lighting. Another M3 modernisation programme is being marketed by a subsidiary of the Saudi Military Industries Corporation . As part of the Saudi rebuild, the Model 4HD petrol engine is replaced by a new four-cylinder, liquid-cooled diesel turbocharged engine developing 102 hp (75 kW). Other upgrades include power steering, vacuum brakes, and

356-463: A counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out of three. Relying on economic theory , this is what Zambernardi labels the "impossible trilemma" of counterinsurgency. Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents. According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals,

445-403: A degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However, in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel fighters working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they are home-grown militias or imported fighters who have no unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier. According to Liddell Hart, there are few effective counter-measures to this strategy. So long as

534-541: A prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars . Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time. However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon 's army had no means of effectively combating

623-445: A reason for the insurgents to continue until victory. Trường Chinh , second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam , wrote in his Primer for Revolt : The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and

712-870: A significant number of these vehicles fell into the hands of the competing militias, notably the Lebanese Arab Army (LAA), the Army of Free Lebanon (AFL), the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Al-Mourabitoun , Kataeb Regulatory Forces (KRF), and the Tigers Militia . A few M3 VTTs were again captured by the Lebanese Forces (LF) militia from the Lebanese Army during the Elimination War in 1990, and remained in service with

801-520: A state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans , Italians , and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning

890-606: A successful counterinsurgency: In "The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Dr. David Kilcullen , the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information: This

979-468: A tonne of cargo. The M3 is powered by a four-cylinder, air-cooled Panhard 4HD petrol engine inherited from the AML. This engine has a diminutive 2-litre displacement and a compression ratio of 7:1, enabling it to run on low octane fuel. It had a reliable reputation and was rated for a mileage of 26,000 kilometres before needing major overhaul. However, the engine was also regarded as somewhat underpowered for

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1068-430: Is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces ". The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary . Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history . However, modern thinking on counterinsurgency

1157-530: Is a sociological phenomenon that constrains the habits of a military (in this case, the Nigerian military) to the long-established, yet increasingly ineffective, ideology of the offensive in irregular warfare. As Omeni writes, Whereas the Nigerian military's performance against militias in the Niger Delta already suggested the military had a poor grasp of the threat of insurgent warfare; it was further along

1246-544: Is an amphibious armoured personnel carrier . Developed as a private venture for the export market, the M3 was built with the same mechanical and chassis components as the Panhard AML range of light armoured cars. The two vehicle types share a 95% interchangeability of automotive parts. The M3 is an extremely versatile design which can be configured for a wide variety of auxiliary battlefield roles. The most popular variants of

1335-401: Is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly,

1424-429: Is drawn through intakes in the hull roof, with the exhaust pipes running on either side of the roofline. All the interior space to the rear of the engine and transmission is the troop compartment. Aside from the driver, the M3 can carry eleven passengers. Two are seated in the centre of the hull, three on either side of the hull facing outwards, and another three facing the rear. There are three hatches on either side of

1513-451: Is not normally fitted with an NBC overpressure system, although this was offered as an option by Panhard. The hull of the M3 is of all-welded steel construction varying in thickness from 8mm to 12mm. The hull has a horizontal roofline and a pointed, tapering front with a well-sloped glacis plate, similar to that of the AML. Both hull sides are vertical to a point before sloping inwards to accommodate additional crew hatches. The bottom of

1602-400: Is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency: Galula contends that: A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of

1691-514: Is propelled at a modest speed of 4 km/h through water by all four wheels. Although never adopted by the French Army, the M3 series was procured in vast quantities by foreign armies and security forces, especially in Africa and the Middle East. By the time production ceased in 1986, it was the most common wheeled APC produced by any Western nation in the world. The Panhard M3 was the result of

1780-406: Is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value. In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by powerful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Creveld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by the metaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether

1869-588: The Belgian Gendarmerie . The CM60A1 was the topic of some controversy in the Irish Army following a series of accidents and misfires. At some point prior to 1980, incidents involving the mortar type had become so common that its use was prohibited. The mortars were removed from Irish AML-60s shortly afterwards and replaced with a single heavy machine gun. As of 1980, over 1,600 CM60A1 mortars had been produced. A much larger, long-ranged variant of

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1958-724: The Nigerian Civil War between 1967 and 1970, with one being captured by Biafran forces. AML-60s also saw service with the Royal Cambodian Army and the Khmer National Army during the Cambodian Civil War between 1967 and 1975. AML-60s have been deployed as part of three United Nations peacekeeping missions since 1964: UNOSOM , UNIFIL , and UNFICYP . Two different models of high explosive ammunition were typically fired from

2047-907: The People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) during the South African Border War . Throughout the Portuguese Colonial Wars , the AML-60 equipped Portuguese reconnaissance platoons, mainly deployed for convoy escort. In 1975 Zaire donated some of its AML-60s to the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), where they saw action as part of the Angolan Civil War , often manned by French or Portuguese mercenaries. Nigerian AML-60s were exposed to considerable combat during

2136-673: The US Department of State as the Policy Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Salam al-Zaubai . In his book, When Bad States Win: Rethinking Counterinsurgency Strategy , he found little evidence to support the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency. “There is little robust generalizable evidence that population-centric approaches are effective,” he argued. Panhard M3 The Panhard M3 VTT ( French : Véhicule de Transport de Troupes )

2225-526: The University of Michigan . Berman, Shapiro, and Felter have outlined the modern information-centric model. In this framework, the critical determinant of counterinsurgent success is information about insurgents provided to counterinsurgents, such as insurgent locations, plans, and targets. Information can be acquired from civilian sources (human intelligence, HUMINT ), or through signals intelligence ( SIGINT ). Dr. Jeffrey Treistman previously served with

2314-579: The Véhicule Transport de Troupes , or VTT. The first VTT prototype was completed in August 1969 and incorporated a very simple boxlike hull with vertical sides, a flat roofline, and a single 7.5mm AA-52 machine gun in a Creusot-Loire CAFL-38S turret. External access to the hull was through two large entry doors on each side and twin doors at the rear of the troop compartment. The AML chassis and drive train underwent some detail modifications but

2403-474: The 1980s. In 1983 the firm began work on a modernised derivative of the M3 known as the Panhard Buffalo. The Buffalo had an increased wheelbase and could be fitted with either a diesel or petrol engine. Its hull was fitted with external stowage boxes that gave it somewhat bulkier appearance than its predecessor; these boxes were also designed to detach during a land mine explosion, and thereby preserve

2492-483: The AML series and were persuaded to purchase large numbers of M3s to complement their preexisting fleet. The first production M3s were manufactured for the Royal Saudi Army , which ordered 150. Another 60 were ordered by Iraq shortly afterwards. By 1972, more export orders had been placed by the national armies of Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Lebanon, and Zaire. The United Arab Emirates Army went on to become

2581-587: The CM60A1 and CS 60, with a barrel extension incorporated onto the existing armament, was known as the Brandt LR Gun-mortar . CM60A1s have seen extensive combat, primarily with the AML-60 and Eland-60 light armoured cars. French forces deployed AML-60s armed with CM60A1 mortars during Operation Tacaud in Chad . South African Eland-60s were used for counter-insurgency and frequently engaged militants of

2670-677: The CM60A1: the M35/47 shell, which was developed for the Brandt Mle 1935 and had a range of 1,600 metres, and the M61 shell, which has a range of 2,000 metres. Specialized smoke, coloured marker, and practice variants of the M61 projectiles were also used. Other projectiles included canister and M63 illumination rounds. The CM60A1 could fire any type of ammunition used by the Brandt Mle 1935 and

2759-680: The Ferret but carrying a mortar, which was regarded as more effective than a large gun system at breaking up ambushes and suppressing dispersed FLN positions. The result, the Panhard AML-60 , entered service in 1961. AML-60s were fitted with an HE-60-7 turret developed by the Compagnie Normande de Mécanique de Précision (CNMP), which mated the CM60A1 mortar to twin co-axial machine guns or a single co-axial 20 mm autocannon. This turret could store about 43 mortar projectiles. The CM60A1

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2848-840: The LF Military Police corps until the end of the Civil War in October that year. Ireland purchased a number of vehicles in the early 1970s in the context of the internal security problems arising from the paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland. The vehicles were not well suited to the role, having a very distinct sound signature whilst the twin FN MAGs in the Creusot-Loire TL.21.80 turret were not capable of accurate fire. A small number were deployed with

2937-520: The M2 (not to be confused with the US M2 mortar ). Throughout the 1960s, CM60A1s were exported with the AML-60 to Algeria , Burundi , Cambodia , Côte d'Ivoire , Iraq , Ireland, Morocco , Nigeria , Portugal, Rwanda , Saudi Arabia , Senegal , and Spain. Some governments favoured the purchase of the lightly armed AML-60 model as opposed to the heavier AML-90 due to its comparatively attractive cost. By

3026-565: The M3 design and unsuitable for propelling the APC at higher speeds off-road. A number of defence contractors offer extensive overhauls of the M3 chassis and hull to extend the vehicle's service life and improve its utility on modern battlefields. One particularly ambitious rebuild was proposed by Saymar, an Israeli firm, for the M3 VTT as well as the VLA and VPC variants. This entailed the replacement of

3115-593: The Nigerian Army has struggled in COIN due to capabilities shortcomings, holds some merit. However, a full-spectrum analysis of the Nigeria case suggests that this popular dominant narrative scarcely scratches the surface of the true COIN challenge. This population-centered challenge, moreover, is one that militaries across the world continue to contend with. And in attempting to solve the COIN puzzle, state forces over

3204-668: The Turkish forces off. In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War . The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such

3293-548: The US M2 mortar . South Africa manufactured its own range of high explosive, canister, and illumination rounds for the K1, as well as a unique smoke projectile. At some point, France developed an armour-piercing shell for the CM60A1, but it is unclear whether this entered production. CM60A1 mortars have been exported widely with AML-60, Eland-60, and Ratel-60 armoured fighting vehicles. Counter-insurgency Counterinsurgency ( COIN , or NATO spelling counter-insurgency )

3382-431: The base personnel carrier included an armoured ambulance, a mobile command post, and an internal security vehicle. It could also be fitted with a wide variety of turrets and armament, ranging from a single general-purpose machine gun to medium calibre autocannon. The M3's relatively light weight and the location of its air and exhaust outlets on the hull roof made it possible to design it as an amphibious vehicle. The M3

3471-408: The child started the fight or how well armed the child is, an adult in a fight with a child will feel that he is acting unjustly if he harms the child and foolish if the child harms him; he will, therefore, wonder if the fight is necessary. Van Creveld argues that "by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents – let alone

3560-495: The city, killing between 10-25,000 people, including many women and children. Asked by reporters what had happened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage and deaths, promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks, and razed Hama's well-known great mosque, replacing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brotherhood scattered, the population was so cowed that it would be years before opposition groups dared to disobey

3649-428: The civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support – will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available – not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice". Every act of insurgency becomes, from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the conflict, while also being

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3738-540: The decades have tried a range of tactics. Starting in the early 2000s, micro-level data has transformed the analysis of effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Leading this work is the "information-centric" group of theorists and researchers, led by the work of the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) group at Princeton University , and the Conflict and Peace, Research and Development (CPRD) group at

3827-488: The drive train and chassis of the Panhard AML, albeit with a few detail modifications such as a longer wheelbase and wider track. Nearly all of its mechanical components are interchangeable with those found on the AML. The vehicle is fully amphibious and can enter water with minimal preparation. It is propelled and steered in water by its wheels, but was designed for crossing lakes and small rivers rather than deploying at sea. The M3 lacks specialised night vision equipment and

3916-456: The dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Counter-insurgency focuses on bridging these gaps. Insurgents take advantage of social issues known as gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate. In The Insurgent Archipelago , John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of the insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of

4005-402: The elderly Model 4HD petrol engine with a more fuel-efficient Toyota 2LT diesel engine. Other upgrades included a modified electrical system with a new voltage regulator and starter, the installation of an air conditioning unit, the replacement of the M3's drum brakes with new disc brakes, powered steering, and a new intercom and telecommunications system. The VLA rebuild includes the addition of

4094-444: The enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics … and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory. Van Creveld thus identifies "time" as the key factor in counterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons from

4183-596: The export market. In the late 1970s, the CM60A1 was successfully mounted on a variant of the Panhard M3 designated M3 VTT 60B . It was also offered for export with the Berliet VXB-170 . South Africa later mounted K1 mortars on its fleet of Ratel infantry fighting vehicles, which were designated Ratel-60 . A gun-mortar almost identical to the CM60A1 was produced by FN Herstal for the FN 4RM/62F AB armoured cars of

4272-494: The fault of its governors." Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love". Liddell Hart attributed the failure of counterinsurgencies to various causes. First, as pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach , a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force. He showed as

4361-629: The few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of which he lists two clear cases: the British efforts during The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama massacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood , he asserts that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and outlines two distinct methods. The first method relies on superb intelligence, provided by those who know

4450-642: The golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st century. He defines this distinction as "Maoist" and "post-Maoist" insurgency. The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt systematically in his writings with counterinsurgency. In his Reflexiones Militares , published between 1726 and 1730, he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient insurgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if they could not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recognized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances: "A state rarely rises up without

4539-406: The government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward." Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, wherein he argued that a successful counterinsurgency effort must be proactive in seizing the initiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines five basic principles for

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4628-441: The grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control: In a Selected Area 1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel

4717-415: The hull structure is welded to a shallow vee to partly deflect the explosive force of a land mine. The driver is seated at the front of the vehicle and provided with a single hatch cover in the glacis plate opening to the right. The hatch cover is fitted with three integral periscopes for driving when it is closed. The engine and transmission are housed in a compartment directly to the driver's rear. Air

4806-453: The hull which lift upwards for observation or engaging targets in the surrounding terrain with personal weapons. There are also two auxiliary hatches in the roofline, one directly to the driver's rear and another at the very rear of the troop compartment. The infantry section debarks from two entry doors on either side of the hull or from two entry doors at the rear of the hull. If needed, the troop compartment can be reconfigured to carry up to

4895-443: The information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for

4984-453: The institution of COIN within militaries and their tendency to reject the innovation and adaptation often necessary to defeat insurgency. These three features, furthermore, influence and can undermine the operational tactics and concepts adopted against insurgents. The COIN challenge, therefore, is not just operational; it also is cultural and institutional before ever it reflects on the battlefield. According to Omeni, institutional isomorphism

5073-425: The insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. David Galula gained his practical experience in counterinsurgency as a French Army officer in the Algerian War . His theory of counterinsurgency

5162-456: The insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at

5251-471: The insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest). The overall goal, according to this model, "is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return

5340-401: The integrity of the hull. The internal layout of the new vehicle was identical to the M3 and parts compatibility was retained with the M3 and AML. The Panhard Buffalo did not enjoy the same export success as the M3 and serial production was only carried out on an as-needed basis. A very small number was purchased by Colombia and several Francophone African states. The Panhard M3 was built on

5429-451: The line, as the military struggled against Boko Haram's threat, that the extent of this weakness was exposed. At best, the utility of force, for the Nigerian military, had become but a temporary solution against the threat of insurgent warfare. At worst, the existing model has been perpetuated at such high cost, that urgent revisionist thinking around the idea of counterinsurgency within the military institution may now be required. Additionally,

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5518-531: The main body of armed insurgents. 2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent come back in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. 3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas. 4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization. 5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace

5607-651: The manufacture of the HE-60-7 turrets and armament under licence. By 1965, South Africa had purchased 450 CM60A1s for the future production of its modified Eland-60 armoured cars, along with a licence for both the mortar and its associated ammunition, which was granted by the French government's Direction technique des armements terrestres (DTAT). CM60A1s manufactured in South Africa under licence were designated K1 . The South African Army also referred to this weapon as

5696-445: The margins of the theoretical debate – even though Africa today is faced with a number of deadly insurgencies. In Counter-insurgency in Nigeria , Omeni, a Nigerian academic, discusses the interactions between certain features away from the battlefield, which account for battlefield performance against insurgent warfare. Specifically, Omeni argues that the trio of historical experience, organisational culture (OC) and doctrine, help explain

5785-405: The mid to late 1970s, the CM60A1 had been largely superseded by the similar Cloche Spéciale (CS) 60, which was distinguished by its ribbed barrel. The CS 60 utilized more ergonomic ammunition, which allowed for up to 56 mortar projectiles to be stored in the HE-60-7 turret, as opposed to the CM60A1's 43. Nevertheless, both mortar types continued to be marketed in a wide range of commercial turrets for

5874-418: The military's decisive civil war victory, the pivot in Nigeria's strategic culture towards a regional role, and the institutional delegitimization brought about by decades of coups and political meddling, meant that much time went by without substantive revisionism to the military's thinking around its internal function. Change moreover, where it occurred, was institutionally isomorphic and not as far removed from

5963-541: The military's own origins as the intervening decades may have suggested. Further, the infantry-centric nature of the Nigerian Army 's battalions, traceable back to the Nigerian Civil War back in the 1960s, is reflected in the kinetic nature of the Army's contemporary COIN approach. This approach has failed to defeat Boko Haram in the way many expected. Certainly, therefore, the popular argument today, which holds that

6052-428: The natural and artificial environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such superior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must be trained to a point of high professionalism and discipline such that they will exercise discrimination and restraint. Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterinsurgents do not alienate members of the populace besides those already fighting them, while delaying

6141-401: The objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them while sacrificing

6230-442: The overall design remained basically unchanged despite the addition of the new hull. The same Panhard four-cylinder engine type developing 97hp was retained from the AML; however, due to the much heavier hull this left it somewhat underpowered for its weight class. The engine was also relocated from the rear of the chassis to the centre, directly behind the driver's position, to accommodate the rear troop compartment. The wheelbase of

6319-472: The overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective, and legitimate institutions." Military historian Martin van Creveld , noting that almost all attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure, advises: The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do

6408-555: The people as the fish swims in the sea. –Aphorism based on the writing of Mao Zedong Counterinsurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda , Psy-ops , and assassinations . Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military , paramilitary , political , economic , psychological , and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency . To understand counterinsurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend

6497-401: The prototype was also increased from 2.5 to 2.7m and the track from 1.6 to 2m. One major criticism of the early VTT was that there was no provision for the embarked troops to fire their personal weapons from inside the vehicle, necessitating a minor redesign of the hull. The new hull had sloped rather than perfectly vertical sides angled for ballistic ricochet; the upper part of each hull side

6586-582: The rebels, and in the end, their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was finally able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had almost no choice but to abandon the situation. Counterinsurgency efforts may be successful, especially when the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippine–American War , the Shining Path in Peru, and the Malayan Emergency have been

6675-600: The regime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war . Van Creveld condenses al-Assad's strategy into five rules while noting that they could easily have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli : In "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", Dr. Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic now working in the United States, clarifies the tradeoffs involved in counterinsurgency operations. He argues that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice,

6764-802: The replacement of the Panhard electromagnetic clutch with a more conventional hydraulic pressure plate clutch. At least 60 M3 VTTs were delivered to the Lebanese Army in 1970-73 and saw considerable action during the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), with some being loaned to the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in 1976. Following the collapse of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in January that year,

6853-541: The second method exemplified by the Hama massacre . In 1982, the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point of being overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood . Al-Assad sent a Syrian Army division under his brother Rifaat to the city of Hama , known to be the center of the resistance. Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaat used his heavy artillery to demolish

6942-467: The single largest operator of the M3, ordering 198 in 1978. The Iraqi Army was a close second, with 156 in service. The last production vehicles were completed for Iraq and Algeria and delivered by 1985. At this time, 1,180 M3s had been produced. The vehicle type was in service in 26 nations worldwide. The M3 design had remained identical in over two decades of serial production, and Panhard recognized that its basic technology had become quite dated by

7031-634: The sites of failed insurgencies. Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans often had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs ' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike, and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish

7120-408: The softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units. 7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by

7209-613: The struggle in Northern Ireland had cost the United Kingdom three thousand fatal casualties. Of the three thousand, about seventeen hundred were civilians...of the remaining, a thousand were British soldiers. No more than three hundred were terrorists, a ratio of three to one. If the prerequisites for the first method – excellent intelligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashing out – are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsurgents who still want to win must use

7298-462: The third objective. Zambernardi's theory posits that to protect populations, which is necessary to defeat insurgencies and to physically destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent's military forces must be sacrificed, risking the loss of domestic political support. Another writer who explores a trio of features relevant to understanding counterinsurgency is Akali Omeni. Within the contemporary context, COIN warfare by African militaries tends to be at

7387-461: The time when the counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own actions and demoralized. General Patrick Walters, the British commander of troops in Northern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective was not to kill as many terrorists as possible but to ensure that as few people on both sides were killed. In the vast majority of counterinsurgencies, the "forces of order" kill far more people than they lose. In contrast and using very rough figures,

7476-587: The turret sights. Due to the lack of a modern fire control system in the HE-60-7 turrets, range to target had to be estimated by the vehicle crew. This required a series of precise but time-consuming calculations to be made by the crew commander for ascertaining firing angles. Brandt's Mle CM60A1 design proved to be an immediate export success, as South Africa placed an order for 350 AML-60s in 1961, over half of which were to be assembled locally with French technical assistance. A South African military delegation visited France between November 22 and 28 that year to discuss

7565-405: The vehicle, but was unique in its opening breech locked by a falling block much like direct fire artillery. The firing pin was automatically withdrawn when the breech was unlocked, reducing the likelihood of misfires. Different variants of the CM60A1 were produced with electrical or mechanical firing mechanisms. A hydraulic buffer provided a recoil of 135 mm. Ranging was visual and conducted through

7654-646: Was also provided with three roof hatches. The hatch covers could be lifted for observation and to fire personal weapons at external targets. The two large doors at the rear of the troop compartment were also provided with firing ports. It was this version of the VTT which was approved for serial production as the Panhard M3 in April 1971. At the time, the two largest foreign clients for Panhard military vehicles were Saudi Arabia and Iraq, both of which had invested heavily in

7743-467: Was developed during decolonization . During insurgency and counterinsurgency, the distinction between civilians and combatants is often blurred. Counterinsurgency may involve attempting to win the hearts and minds of populations supporting the insurgency. Alternatively, it may be waged in an attempt to intimidate or eliminate civilian populations suspected of loyalty to the insurgency through indiscriminate violence. The guerrilla must swim in

7832-535: Was of limited usefulness in fighting off guerrilla raids. The French Army wanted a much lighter, more efficient vehicle that was easier to maintain and initially adopted the Daimler Ferret for this purpose. Nevertheless, Ferrets could only be armed with a single general-purpose machine gun, and were regarded as inadequate for offensive purposes. A number of French defence contractors took up the challenge of creating yet another new vehicle of similar dimensions to

7921-525: Was unique in that it was the first turret-mounted, breech-loading, dual-purpose mortar to be mass-produced. Its turret mount gave it continuous traverse and, unlike muzzle-loading infantry mortars, it could engage targets of opportunity at close range that could not otherwise be suppressed with indirect fire. The CM60A1 had a hydraulic recoil system and could be loaded with standard mortar ammunition for indirect fire support, as well as specialized direct fire ammunition. It could still be muzzle loaded from outside

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