Grand strategy or high strategy is a state's strategy of how means (military and nonmilitary) can be used to advance and achieve national interests in the long-term. Issues of grand strategy typically include the choice of military doctrine , force structure and alliances , as well as economic relations, diplomatic behavior , and methods to extract or mobilize resources.
200-511: In contrast to strategy , grand strategy encompasses more than military means (such as diplomatic and economic means); does not equate success with purely military victory but also the pursuit of peacetime goals and prosperity; and considers goals and interests in the long-term rather than short-term. In contrast to foreign policy , grand strategy emphasizes the military implications of policy; considers costs benefits of policies, as well as limits on capabilities; establishes priorities; and sets out
400-433: A Prussian general and military theorist who stressed the "moral" (in modern terms meaning psychological ) and political aspects of waging war. His most notable work, Vom Kriege ( About War ), though unfinished at his death, is considered a seminal treatise on military strategy and science . Clausewitz stressed the multiplex interaction of diverse factors in war, noting how unexpected developments unfolding under
600-474: A "dissolution of rationality" amongst decision-makers. The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have seen many instances of state armies attempting to suppress insurgencies and terrorism , and engaging in other forms of asymmetrical warfare . Clausewitz did not focus solely on wars between countries with well-defined armies. The era of the French Revolution and Napoleon
800-646: A "strategy of exhaustion" (see attrition warfare ) to hold off his opponents and conserve his Prussian forces. Assailed from all sides by France, Austria, Russia and Sweden, Frederick exploited his central position, which enabled him to move his army along interior lines and concentrate against one opponent at a time. Unable to achieve victory, he was able to stave off defeat until a diplomatic solution emerged. Frederick's "victory" led to great significance being placed on " geometric strategy " which emphasized lines of manoeuvre, awareness of terrain and possession of critical strong-points. The French Revolutionary Wars and
1000-400: A battle site. Initially, the lack of force concentration helped with foraging for food and sought to confuse the enemy as to his real location and intentions. The "indirect" approach into battle also allowed Napoleon to disrupt the linear formations used by the allied armies. As the battle progressed, the enemy committed their reserves to stabilize the situation, Napoleon would suddenly release
1200-580: A besieged city, spreading disease and death, such as the Black Plague. If a particular town or city displeased the Mongolian Khan, everyone in the city would be killed to set an example for all other cities. This was early psychological warfare . To refer to the nine strategic principles outlined above, the Mongol strategy was directed toward an objective (that schwerpunkt (main focus) being
1400-495: A case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, the United States must refrain from using military might in campaigns that do not directly deal with U.S. interests. "If a sense of moral indignation, instead of a calculating assessment of the national interest, governs U.S. foreign policy, the United States will become involved in even more murky conflicts in which few if any tangible American interests are at stake." Posen has argued that
1600-422: A caveat: The cost of maintaining global public goods catches up to the superpower providing them. "Other countries free-ride off of the hegemon, allowing them to grow faster. Technologies diffuse from the hegemonic power to the rest of the world, facilitating catch-up. Chinese analysts have posited that these phenomena, occurring right now, are allowing China to outgrow the United States." Barry Posen , director of
1800-488: A classic example of the conception and execution of military strategy. In addition to exploiting railroads and highways for manoeuvre, Moltke also exploited the telegraph for control of large armies. He recognised the need to delegate control to subordinate commanders and to issue directives rather than specific orders. Moltke is most remembered as a strategist for his belief in the need for flexibility and that no plan, however well prepared, can be guaranteed to survive beyond
2000-548: A conflict did occur, presumably both combatants would be annihilated . Heavily influenced by the war in Vietnam and by antipathy to American strategist Henry Kissinger , the American biologist, musician, and game-theorist Anatol Rapoport argued in 1968 that a Clausewitzian view of war was not only obsolete in the age of nuclear weapons, but also highly dangerous as it promoted a "zero-sum paradigm" to international relations and
2200-496: A dynamic, inherently unstable interaction of the forces of violent emotion, chance, and rational calculation. Another example of this confusion is the idea that Clausewitz was a proponent of total war as used in the Third Reich's propaganda in the 1940s. In fact, Clausewitz never used the term "total war": rather, he discussed "absolute war," a concept which evolved into the much more abstract notion of "ideal war" discussed at
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#17327878981952400-538: A famous chapter on "The People in Arms". One prominent critic of Clausewitz is the Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld . In his 1991 book The Transformation of War , Creveld argued that Clausewitz's famous "Trinity" of people, army, and government was an obsolete socio-political construct based on the state, which was rapidly passing from the scene as the key player in war, and that he (Creveld) had constructed
2600-452: A general statement—e.g., "We're going to do this by a naval invasion of the North of country X", "We're going to blockade the ports of country Y", to a more specific "C Platoon will attack while D platoon provides fire cover". In its purest form, strategy dealt solely with military issues. In earlier societies, a king or political leader was often the same person as the military leader. If not,
2800-554: A great extent the American Civil War , saw Napoleonic tactics of "offense at all costs" pitted against the defensive power of the trench , machine gun and barbed wire . As a reaction to its World War I experience, France attempted to use its Maginot Line to apply the principles of mass and economy of force, in that troops could be concentrated in the north for an offensive there while the Line acted as force multiplier in
3000-438: A great power war, but provides no clear guidelines for humanitarian interventions. The authors envision that a strategy of selective engagement would involve a strong nuclear deterrent with a force structure capable of fighting two regional wars, each through some combination of ground, air and sea forces complemented with forces from a regional ally. They question, however, whether such a policy could garner sustained support from
3200-545: A historian and analyst than as a theorist. See for example Wellington's extended essay discussing Clausewitz's study of the Campaign of 1815—Wellington's only serious written discussion of the battle, which was widely discussed in 19th-century Britain. Clausewitz's broader thinking came to the fore following Britain's military embarrassments in the Boer War (1899–1902). One example of a heavy Clausewitzian influence in that era
3400-462: A liberal democracy experienced with a moralistic approach to international relations, whether the United States could successfully differentiate necessary versus unnecessary engagement and whether a strategy that focuses on Europe, Asia and the Middle East actually represents a shift from current engagement. In the piece, Barry Posen classified himself as a "selective engagement" advocate, with
3600-613: A major counterinsurgency war in Vietnam.) With the end of the Cold War, an early strategic debate eventually coalesced into a strategy of primacy, culminating in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The aftershocks of this war, along with an economic downturn, rising national debt, and deepening political gridlock, have led to a renewed strategic debate, centered on two major schools of thought: primacy and restraint. A return to offshore balancing has also been proposed by prominent political scientists Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer . The end of
3800-495: A means to an end, but it is not an end in itself. There are numerous examples in history where victory on the battlefield has not translated into goals such as long term peace, security or tranquillity. Many military strategists have attempted to encapsulate a successful strategy in a set of principles. Sun Tzu defined 13 principles in his The Art of War while Napoleon listed 115 maxims. American Civil War General Nathan Bedford Forrest had only one: to "[get] there first with
4000-625: A military theorist interested in the examination of war, utilising the campaigns of Frederick the Great and Napoleon as frames of reference for his work. He wrote a careful, systematic, philosophical examination of war in all its aspects. The result was his principal book, On War , a major work on the philosophy of war. It was unfinished when Clausewitz died and contains material written at different stages in his intellectual evolution, producing some significant contradictions between different sections. The sequence and precise character of that evolution
4200-401: A new "non-trinitarian" model for modern warfare. Creveld's work has had great influence. Daniel Moran replied, 'The most egregious misrepresentation of Clausewitz's famous metaphor must be that of Martin van Creveld, who has declared Clausewitz to be an apostle of Trinitarian War, by which he means, incomprehensibly, a war of 'state against state and army against army,' from which the influence of
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#17327878981954400-517: A policy of containment as part of their grand strategy during the Cold War . The conversation around grand strategy in the United States has evolved significantly since the country's founding, with the nation shifting from a strategy of continental expansion, isolation from European conflicts, and opposition to European empires in the Western hemisphere in its first century, to a major debate about
4600-549: A political act, and thus maintained that the purpose of all strategy was to achieve the political goal that the state was seeking to accomplish. As such, Clausewitz famously argued that war was the "continuation of politics by other means", and as such, suggested that the amount of force used by a warring state would and should be proportional to whatever political aim that the state sought to achieve via war. Clausewitz further dismissed "geometry" as an insignificant factor in strategy, believing instead that ideally all wars should follow
4800-433: A position Clausewitz doesn't occupy. It is also a pointless attack on a concept that is quite useful in its own right. In any case, their failure to read the actual wording of the theory they so vociferously attack, and to grasp its deep relevance to the phenomena they describe, is hard to credit." Some have gone further and suggested that Clausewitz's best-known aphorism, that war is a continuation of policy with other means,
5000-419: A powerful rival from upending the global balance of power, fighting terrorists, and limiting nuclear proliferation. John Ikenberry of Princeton University and Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth , both of Dartmouth College , push back on Posen's selective engagement thesis, arguing that American engagement is not as bad as Posen makes it out to be. Advocates of selective engagement, they argue, overstate
5200-492: A practical plan rather than a set of ambitions and wishes. A country's political leadership typically directs grand strategy with input from the most senior military officials. Development of a nation's grand strategy may extend across many years or even multiple generations. Much scholarship on grand strategy focuses on the United States, which has since the end of World War II had a grand strategy oriented around primacy, "deep engagement", and/or liberal hegemony, which entail that
5400-520: A precursor to trench warfare were the Lines of Torres Vedras during the Peninsular War . French Armies lived off the land and when they were confronted by a line of fortifications which they could not out flank, they were unable to continue the advance and were forced to retreat once they had consumed all the provisions of the region in front of the lines. The Peninsular campaign was notable for
5600-479: A resurgence in the late 1960s and 1970s. Bernard Brodie defined strategy as "guide to accomplishing something and doing it efficiently... a theory for action". According to historian Hal Brands , "all states... do grand strategy, but many of them do not do it particularly well." One of the earlier writings on grand strategy comes from Thucydides 's History of the Peloponnesian War , an account of
5800-412: A scenario, the United States would have more leeway in using resources to combat the most pressing threats to its security. A strategy of restraint, therefore, would help preserve the country's prosperity and security more so than a hegemonic strategy. To be sure, Posen makes clear that he is not advocating isolationism. Rather, the United States should focus on three pressing security challenges: preventing
6000-583: A seminar on Clausewitz for the Party leadership in Yan'an . Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely a regurgitation of Lenin but reflects Mao's own study. The idea that war involves inherent "friction" that distorts, to a greater or lesser degree, all prior arrangements, has become common currency in fields such as business strategy and sport. The phrase fog of war derives from Clausewitz's stress on how confused warfare can seem while one
6200-432: A socio-political phenomenon. He also stressed the complex nature of war, which encompasses both the socio-political and the operational and stresses the primacy of state policy. (One should be careful not to limit his observations on war to war between states, however, as he certainly discusses other kinds of protagonists). The word " strategy " had only recently come into usage in modern Europe, and Clausewitz's definition
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6400-452: A strategy would entail military forces at similar levels to those during the Cold War, with emphasis on military modernization and research and development. They note, however, that "the quest for primacy is likely to prove futile for five reasons": the diffusion of economic and technological capabilities, interstate balancing against the United States, the danger that hegemonic leadership will fatally undermine valuable multilateral institutions,
6600-528: A strong influence on German military thought specifically. Later Prussian and German generals, such as Helmuth Graf von Moltke , were clearly influenced by Clausewitz: Moltke's widely quoted statement that "No operational plan extends with high certainty beyond the first encounter with the main enemy force" is a classic reflection of Clausewitz's insistence on the roles of chance, friction, "fog," uncertainty, and interactivity in war. Clausewitz's influence spread to British thinking as well, though at first more as
6800-541: A town. There was still room for triumphs for the strategy of manoeuvre such as Sherman's March to the Sea in 1864, but these depended upon an enemy's unwillingness to entrench. Towards the end of the war, especially in defense of static targets as in the battles of Cold Harbor and Vicksburg , trench networks foreshadowed World War I. Many of the lessons of the American Civil War were forgotten, when in wars like
7000-517: A unipolar distribution of military power, accelerating global economic growth and reducing security tensions. These public goods benefit the hegemon as much, if not more, than they do other actors." Drezner maintains the empirical evidence supporting the third argument is the strongest, though with some qualifiers. "Although the precise causal mechanism remain disputed, hegemonic eras are nevertheless strongly correlated with lower trade barriers and greater levels of globalization." However, Drezner highlights
7200-548: A victory for the Greeks against Persia, which exemplified that military strategy was extremely beneficial to defeating a numerous enemy. Early strategies included the strategy of annihilation, exhaustion, attrition warfare , scorched earth action, blockade , guerrilla campaign, deception and feint . Ingenuity and adeptness were limited only by imagination, accord, and technology. Strategists continually exploited ever-advancing technology. The word "strategy" itself derives from
7400-508: A whole new field of study into military strategy. In particular, his opponents were keen to develop a body of knowledge in this area to allow them to counteract a masterful individual with a highly competent group of officers, a General Staff. The two most significant students of his work were Carl von Clausewitz , a Prussian with a background in philosophy , and Antoine-Henri Jomini , who had been one of Napoleon's staff officers. One notable exception to Napoleon's strategy of annihilation and
7600-406: A wide range of global threats ." Ikenberry, Brooks, and Wohlforth are not convinced that the current U.S. grand strategy generates subsequent counterbalancing. Unlike the prior hegemons, the United States is geographically isolated and faces no contiguous great power rivals interested in balancing it. This means the United States is far less threatening to great powers that are situated oceans away,
7800-501: Is Spenser Wilkinson , journalist, the first Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, and perhaps the most prominent military analyst in Britain from c. 1885 until well into the interwar period. Another is naval historian Julian Corbett (1854–1922), whose work reflected a deep if idiosyncratic adherence to Clausewitz's concepts and frequently an emphasis on Clausewitz's ideas about 'limited objectives' and
8000-439: Is a hegemon and uses this power advantage to create a liberal international system and at times use force to enforce or spread liberal values (such as individual rights, free trade, and the rule of law). The United States strives to retain overwhelming military power, under a theory that potential competitors will not even try to compete on the global stage. It also retains an extensive network of permanent alliance commitments around
8200-563: Is a source of much debate as to the exact meaning behind some seemingly contradictory observations in discussions pertinent to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war, for example (though many of these apparent contradictions are simply the result of his dialectical method). Clausewitz constantly sought to revise the text, particularly between 1827 and his departure on his last field assignments, to include more material on "people's war" and forms of war other than high-intensity warfare between states, but relatively little of this material
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8400-404: Is considered to be a gross exaggeration and inaccurate assessment of the situations in the fourth century under Constantine by many modern historians. B.H. Warmington, for instance, argues that the statement by Zosimus is "[an] oversimplification," reminding us that "the charge of exposure of the frontier regions is at best anachronistic and probably reflects Zosimus' prejudices against Constantine;
8600-501: Is especially important, as these wars demonstrated that such energies could be of decisive importance and for a time led to a democratisation of the armed forces much as universal suffrage democratised politics. While Clausewitz was intensely aware of the value of intelligence at all levels, he was also very skeptical of the accuracy of much military intelligence: "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.... In short, most intelligence
8800-598: Is evident in his first extended study, written when he was 25, of the Thirty Years' War . He rejects the Enlightenment 's view of the war as a chaotic muddle and instead explains its drawn-out operations by the economy and technology of the age, the social characteristics of the troops, and the commanders' politics and psychology. In On War , Clausewitz sees all wars as the sum of decisions, actions, and reactions in an uncertain and dangerous context, and also as
9000-408: Is false." This circumstance is generally described as part of the fog of war . Such skeptical comments apply only to intelligence at the tactical and operational levels; at the strategic and political levels he constantly stressed the requirement for the best possible understanding of what today would be called strategic and political intelligence. His conclusions were influenced by his experiences in
9200-418: Is free to roam; and its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to pure reason." Christopher Bassford says the best shorthand for Clausewitz's trinity should be something like "violent emotion/chance/rational calculation." However, it is frequently presented as "people/army/government," a misunderstanding based on a later paragraph in the same section. This misrepresentation
9400-411: Is immersed within it. The term center of gravity , used in a military context derives from Clausewitz's usage, which he took from Newtonian mechanics . In U.S. military doctrine, "center of gravity" refers to the basis of an opponent's power at the operational, strategic, or political level, though this is only one aspect of Clausewitz's use of the term. The deterrence strategy of the United States in
9600-412: Is in fact merely his dialectical antithesis: "War is merely the continuation of policy with other means." The synthesis of his dialectical examination of the nature of war is his famous "trinity," saying that war is "a fascinating trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; the play of chance and probability, within which the creative spirit
9800-492: Is inconsistent with Clausewitzian thought. He claims that Clausewitz was morally indifferent to war (though this probably reflects a lack of familiarity with personal letters from Clausewitz, which demonstrate an acute awareness of war's tragic aspects) and that his advice regarding politics' dominance over the conduct of war has nothing to do with pacifist ideas. Other notable writers who have studied Clausewitz's texts and translated them into English are historians Peter Paret of
10000-596: Is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically. For an opposing view see the sixteen essays presented in Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe. In military academies, schools, and universities worldwide, Clausewitz's Vom Kriege is often (usually in translation) mandatory reading. Some theorists of management look to Clausewitz - just as some look to Sun Tzu - to bolster ideas on
10200-478: Is not responsible for, and cannot afford the costs of, maintaining world order." They also believe that "the pursuit of economic well-being is best left to the private sector," and that the United States should not attempt to spread its values because doing so increases resentment towards the U.S. and in turn, decreases its security. In short, neo-isolationism advises the United States to preserve its freedom of action and strategic independence. In more practical terms,
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#173278789819510400-497: Is on support for international institutions as a means to achieving hegemony. Military strategy Military strategy is a set of ideas implemented by military organizations to pursue desired strategic goals . Derived from the Greek word strategos , the term strategy, when first used during the 18th century, was seen in its narrow sense as the "art of the general ", or "the art of arrangement" of troops. and deals with
10600-413: Is quite narrow: "the use of engagements for the object of war" (which many today would call "the operational level" of war). Clausewitz conceived of war as a political, social, and military phenomenon which might—depending on circumstances—involve the entire population of a political entity at war. In any case, Clausewitz saw military force as an instrument that states and other political actors use to pursue
10800-505: Is the antithesis in a dialectical argument whose thesis is the point—made earlier in the analysis—that "war is nothing but a duel [or wrestling match, the extended metaphor in which that discussion was embedded] on a larger scale." His synthesis, which resolves the deficiencies of these two bold statements, says that war is neither "nothing but" an act of brute force nor "merely" a rational act of politics or policy. This synthesis lies in his "fascinating trinity" [ wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit ]:
11000-403: Is the art of organizing forces on or near the battlefield to secure objectives as part of the broader military strategy. Military strategy is the planning and execution of the contest between groups of armed adversaries. It is a subdiscipline of warfare and of foreign policy , and a principal tool to secure national interests . Its perspective is larger than military tactics , which involve
11200-739: The Austro-Prussian War or the Franco-Prussian War , manoeuvre won the day. In the period preceding World War I, two of the most influential strategists were the Prussian generals, Helmuth von Moltke and Alfred von Schlieffen . Under Moltke the Prussian army achieved victory in the Austro-Prussian War (1866) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), the latter campaign being widely regarded as
11400-532: The Greek "στρατηγία" ( strategia ), "office of general, command, generalship", in turn from "στρατηγός" ( strategos ), "leader or commander of an army, general", a compound of "στρατός" ( stratos ), "army, host" + "ἀγός" ( agos ), "leader, chief", in turn from "ἄγω" ( ago ), "to lead". No evidence exists of it being used in a modern sense in Ancient Greek, but we find it in Byzantine documents from
11600-949: The Imperial Russian Army from 1812 to 1813 during the Russian campaign , taking part in the Battle of Borodino (1812). Like many Prussian officers serving in Russia, he joined the Russian–German Legion in 1813. In the service of the Russian Empire , Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen (1812), which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom that ultimately defeated Napoleon and his allies. In 1815
11800-636: The Institute for Advanced Study and Sir Michael Howard . Howard and Paret edited the most widely used edition of On War (Princeton University Press, 1976/1984) and have produced comparative studies of Clausewitz and other theorists, such as Tolstoy. Bernard Brodie 's A Guide to the Reading of "On War," in the 1976 Princeton translation, expressed his interpretations of the Prussian's theories and provided students with an influential synopsis of this vital work. The 1873 translation by Colonel James John Graham
12000-604: The Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815. He entered the Kriegsakademie (also cited as "The German War School", the "Military Academy in Berlin", and the "Prussian Military Academy," later the "War College") in Berlin in 1801 (aged 21), probably studied the writings of the philosophers Immanuel Kant and/or Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Schleiermacher and won the regard of General Gerhard von Scharnhorst ,
12200-824: The Napoleonic Wars that followed revolutionized military strategy. The impact of this period was still to be felt in the American Civil War and the early phases of World War I . With the advent of cheap small arms and the rise of the drafted citizen soldier, armies grew rapidly in size to become massed formations. This necessitated dividing the army first into divisions and later into corps . Along with divisions came divisional artillery ; light-weight, mobile cannon with great range and firepower. The rigid formations of pikemen and musketeers firing massed volleys gave way to light infantry fighting in skirmish lines. Napoleon I of France took advantage of these developments to pursue an effective "battle of annihilation". Napoleon invariably sought to achieve decision in battle, with
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#173278789819512400-556: The National War College of the United States: One of the main sources of confusion about Clausewitz's approach lies in his dialectical method of presentation. For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is the continuation of policy with other means," (" Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln ") while accurate as far as it goes, was not intended as a statement of fact. It
12600-408: The flanking formation to attack the enemy. His opponents, being suddenly confronted with a new threat and with little reserves, had no choice but to weaken the area closest to the flanking formation and draw up a battle line at a right angle in an attempt to stop this new threat. Once this had occurred, Napoleon would mass his reserves at the hinge of that right angle and launch a heavy attack to break
12800-468: The " fog of war " (i.e., in the face of incomplete, dubious, and often erroneous information and great fear , doubt, and excitement) call for rapid decisions by alert commanders. He saw history as a vital check on erudite abstractions that did not accord with experience. In contrast to the early work of Antoine-Henri Jomini , he argued that war could not be quantified or reduced to mapwork, geometry, and graphs. Clausewitz had many aphorisms , of which one of
13000-401: The "light-switch model," in which only two positions exist: on and off. "Many, seemingly most, proponents of U.S. preeminence do not recognize the existence of options between current policy of promiscuous global interventionism and isolationism." Adherence to the light switch model, Carpenter argues, reflects intellectual rigidity or an effort to stifle discussion about a range of alternatives to
13200-462: The 1950s was closely inspired by President Dwight Eisenhower 's reading of Clausewitz as a young officer in the 1920s. Eisenhower was greatly impressed by Clausewitz's example of a theoretical, idealized "absolute war" in Vom Kriege as a way of demonstrating how absurd it would be to attempt such a strategy in practice. For Eisenhower, the age of nuclear weapons had made what was for Clausewitz in
13400-400: The 20th century, some thinkers argued that all manners of actions (political, economic, military, cultural) counted as grand strategy in an era of total warfare. However, most definitions saw a division of labor between the actions of political leaders and those of the executing military. According to Helmuth von Moltke, the initial task of strategy was to serve politics and the subsequent task
13600-802: The 6th century onwards, and most notably in the work attributed to Emperor Leo VI the Wise of Byzantium . As a counterpoint to European developments in the strategic art, the Mongol emperor Genghis Khan provides a useful example. Genghis' successes, and those of his successors, were based on manoeuvre and terror. The main focus of Genghis' strategic assault was the psychology of the opposing population. By steady and meticulous implementation of this strategy, Genghis and his descendants were able to conquer most of Eurasia . The building blocks of Genghis' army and his strategy were his tribal levies of mounted archers , scorched earth -style methods, and, equally essential,
13800-456: The British, because it cost far less to aid Spanish insurgents than it did to equip and pay regular British army units to engage the same number of French troops. As the British army could be correspondingly smaller it was able to supply its troops by sea and land without having to live off the land as was the norm at the time. Further, because they did not have to forage they did not antagonise
14000-504: The Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the focal point of U.S. strategy: containing the Soviet Union. A major debate emerged about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. In a 1997 article, Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross identified four major grand strategic alternatives in the debate: Stemming from a defensive realist understanding of international politics, what the authors call "neo-isolationism" advocates
14200-572: The Communist Soviet and Chinese traditions, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war. Because Lenin was an admirer of Clausewitz and called him "one of the great military writers," his influence on the Red Army was immense. The Russian historian A.N. Mertsalov commented that "It
14400-470: The First World War had been embraced by many European general staffs and emulated by the British. More recent scholars typically see that war as so confused in terms of political rationale that it in fact contradicts much of On War. That view assumes, however, a set of values as to what constitutes "rational" political objectives—in this case, values not shaped by the fervid Social Darwinism that
14600-482: The Germans would go on to the offensive in the east. Influenced by Hannibal's success at the Battle of Cannae , Schlieffen planned for a single great battle of encirclement, thereby annihilating his enemy. Another German strategist of the period was Hans Delbrück who expanded on Clausewitz's concept of "limited warfare" to produce a theory on the "strategy of exhaustion". His theory defied popular military thinking of
14800-587: The Great , King of Prussia , held a minor post in the Prussian internal-revenue service. Clausewitz entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve as a lance corporal , eventually attaining the rank of major general. Clausewitz served in the Rhine campaigns (1793–1794) including the siege of Mainz , when the Prussian Army invaded France during the French Revolution , and fought in
15000-651: The Great Recession and the United States' ballooning debt have rendered unsustainable." Posen proposes the United States abandon its hegemonic strategy and replace it with one of restraint. This translates into jettisoning the quest of shaping a world that is satisfactory to U.S. values and instead advances vital national security interests: The U.S. military would go to war only when it must. Large troop contingents in unprecedentedly peaceful regions such as Europe would be significantly downsized, incentivizing NATO members to provide more for their own security. Under such
15200-458: The Greek forces were outnumbered stood as a good military strategy. The Greek allied forces ultimately lost the battle, but the training, use of armor, and location allowed them to defeat many Persian troops before losing. In the end, the Greek alliance lost the battle but not the war as a result of that strategy which continued on to the battle of Plataea. The Battle of Plataea in 479 BC resulted in
15400-542: The Napoleonic concept of victory through a decisive battle of annihilation and destruction of the opposing force, at any cost. However, he also recognized that his ideal of how war should be fought was not always practical in reality and that limited warfare could influence policy by wearing down the opposition through a " strategy of attrition ". In contrast to Clausewitz, Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779-1869) dealt mainly with operational strategy, planning and intelligence ,
15600-587: The Prussian Duchy of Magdeburg as the fourth and youngest son of a family that made claims to a noble status which Carl accepted. Clausewitz's family claimed descent from the Barons of Clausewitz in Upper Silesia , though scholars question the connection. His grandfather, the son of a Lutheran pastor, had been a professor of theology. Clausewitz's father, once a lieutenant in the army of Frederick
15800-558: The Prussian Army, which was often in an intelligence fog due partly to the superior abilities of Napoleon's system but even more simply to the nature of war. Clausewitz acknowledges that friction creates enormous difficulties for the realization of any plan, and the fog of war hinders commanders from knowing what is happening. It is precisely in the context of this challenge that he develops the concept of military genius ( German : der kriegerische Genius ), evidenced above all in
16000-817: The Prussian-Saxon army commanded by Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand , Duke of Brunswick —he was captured, one of the 25,000 prisoners taken that day as the Prussian army disintegrated. He was 26. Clausewitz was held prisoner with his prince in France from 1807 to 1808. Returning to Prussia, he assisted in the reform of the Prussian army and state. Johann Gottlieb Fichte wrote On Machiavelli, as an Author, and Passages from His Writings in June 1807. (" Über Machiavell, als Schriftsteller, und Stellen aus seinen Schriften " ). Carl Clausewitz wrote an interesting and anonymous Letter to Fichte (1809) about his book on Machiavelli. The letter
16200-486: The Roman empire by weakening its frontier defenses and allowing it to be susceptible to outside armies coming in. Also, people who lived near the Roman frontiers would begin to look to the barbarians for protection after the Roman armies departed. This argument is considered to have originated in the writings of Eunapius As stated by the 5th century AD historian Zosimus: Constantine abolished this frontier security by removing
16400-604: The Russian-German Legion became integrated into the Prussian Army and Clausewitz re-entered Prussian service as a colonel. He was soon appointed chief-of-staff of Johann von Thielmann 's III Corps. In that capacity he served at the Battle of Ligny and the Battle of Wavre during the Waterloo campaign in 1815. An army led personally by Napoleon defeated the Prussians at Ligny (south of Mont-Saint-Jean and
16600-651: The Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology , believes the activist U.S. foreign policy that continues to define U.S. strategy in the twenty-first century is an "undisciplined, expensive, and bloody strategy" that has done more harm than good to U.S. national security. "It makes enemies almost as fast as it slays them, discourages allies from paying for their own defense, and convinces powerful states to band together and oppose Washington's plans, further raising
16800-506: The U.S. should work to contain China and other competitors rather than engage them. In regards to humanitarian crises and regional conflicts, primacy holds that the U.S. should only intervene when they directly impact national security, more along the lines of selective engagement than collective security. It does, however, advocate for the active prevention of nuclear proliferation at a level similar to collective security. Implementation of such
17000-596: The United States and "would complicate the spread of liberal institutions and the construction of liberal states." Support for liberal hegemonic strategies among major thinkers in both political parties helps explain the broad elite support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 2011 intervention in Libya, even though U.S. military involvement in those conflicts had been initiated by presidents of different parties. The chief difference on foreign policy between Republican and Democratic proponents of liberal hegemony, according to Posen,
17200-505: The United States assure the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States, while the proliferation of such weapons to countries like Britain, France, China and Russia prevents the emergence of any competing hegemon on the Eurasian landmass. The United States' security and the absence of threats means that "national defense will seldom justify intervention abroad." Even further, its proponents argue that "the United States
17400-537: The United States maintains military predominance; maintains an extensive network of allies (exemplified by NATO, bilateral alliances and foreign US military bases); and integrates other states into US-designed international institutions (such as the IMF, WTO/GATT and World Bank). Critics of this grand strategy, which includes proponents for offshore balancing , selective engagement, restraint, and isolationism , argue for pulling back. Daniel Assamah and Shaoyu Yuan , challenge
17600-474: The United States pursue ultimate hegemony and dominate the international system economically, politically and militarily, rejecting any return to bipolarity or multipolarity and preventing the emergence of any peer competitor. Therefore, its proponents argue that U.S. foreign policy should focus on maintaining U.S. power and preventing any other power from becoming a serious challenger to the United States. With this in mind, some supporters of this strategy argue that
17800-420: The United States remove itself from active participation in international politics in order to maintain its national security. It holds that because there are no threats to the American homeland, the United States does not need to intervene abroad. Stressing a particular understanding of nuclear weapons, the authors describe how proponents believe the destructive power of nuclear weapons and retaliatory potential of
18000-405: The United States was able and willing at all times to use nuclear weapons. In this way, through the massive retaliation doctrine and the closely related foreign-policy concept of brinkmanship , Eisenhower hoped to hold out a credible vision of Clausewitzian nuclear "absolute war" in order to deter the Soviet Union and/or China from ever risking a war or even conditions that might lead to a war with
18200-463: The United States wields its security leverage, the authors argue, it shapes the overall structure of the global economy. "Washington wins when U.S. allies favor [the] status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances." Ted Carpenter, senior fellow at the Cato Institute , believes that the proponents of primacy suffer from
18400-408: The United States. ...Philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As
18600-488: The United States. The authors imagine that such a grand strategy would involve stronger support for international institutions, agreements, and the frequent use of force for humanitarian purposes. Were international institutions to ultimately entail the deployment of a multinational force, the authors suppose the United States' contribution would emphasize command, control, communications and intelligence, defense suppression, and precision-guided munitions-what they considered at
18800-510: The Western by focusing more on asymmetric warfare and deception. Chanakya 's Arthashastra has been an important strategic and political compendium in Indian and Asian history as well. Strategy differs from operations and tactics , in that strategy refers to the employment of a nation's entire military capabilities through high-level and long-term planning, development, and procurement to guarantee security or victory. Operations and tactics
19000-569: The acquisition of an empire in the 1890s (culminating in the conquest of the Philippines and Cuba during the Spanish–American War), followed by rapid shifts between offshore balancing, liberal internationalism, and isolationism around the world wars. The Cold War saw increasing use of deep, onshore engagement strategies (including the creation of a number of permanent alliances, significant involvement in other states' internal politics, and
19200-450: The addition of other means. We deliberately use the phrase 'with the addition of other means' because we also want to make it clear that war in itself does not suspend political intercourse or change it into something entirely different. In essentials that intercourse continues, irrespective of the means it employs. The main lines along which military events progress, and to which they are restricted, are political lines that continue throughout
19400-592: The amount of counteracting force on each side. After 1970, some theorists claimed that nuclear proliferation made Clausewitzian concepts obsolete after the 20th-century period in which they dominated the world. John E. Sheppard Jr., argues that by developing nuclear weapons, state-based conventional armies simultaneously both perfected their original purpose, to destroy a mirror image of themselves, and made themselves obsolete. No two powers have used nuclear weapons against each other, instead using diplomacy , conventional means , or proxy wars to settle disputes. If such
19600-636: The armies of Genghis, nearly all other armies were cumbersome and relatively static. It was not until well into the 20th century that any army was able to match the speed of deployment of Genghis' armies. When confronted with a fortified city, the Mongol imperatives of maneuver and speed required that it be quickly subdued. Here the terror engendered by the bloody reputation of the Mongolians helped to intimidate and subdue. So too did primitive biological warfare . A trebuchet or other type of ballista weapon would be used to launch dead animals and corpses into
19800-409: The attainment of the political object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy. Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate
20000-535: The authors claim. Moreover, any competitor would have a hard time matching U.S. military might. "Not only is the United States so far ahead militarily in both quantitative and qualitative terms, but its security guarantees also give it the leverage to prevent allies from giving military technology to potential U.S. rivals. Because the United States dominates the high-end defense industry, it can trade access to its defense market for allies' agreement not to transfer key military technologies to its competitors." Finally, when
20200-407: The authors discuss how the implementation of a so-called "neo-isolationist" grand strategy would involve less focus on the issue of nuclear proliferation, withdrawal from NATO, and major cuts to the United States military presence abroad. The authors see a military force structure that prioritizes a secure nuclear second-strike capability, intelligence, naval and special operations forces while limiting
20400-408: The caveat that the United States should not only act to reduce the likelihood of great power war, but also oppose the rise of a Eurasian hegemon capable of threatening the United States. Robert J. Art argues that selective engagement is the best strategy for the twenty-first century because it is, by definition, selective. "It steers the middle course between an isolationist, unilateralist course, on
20600-449: The classical Western tradition; writers who use "Karl" are often seeking to emphasize their German (rather than European) identity. "Carl Philipp Gottfried" appears on Clausewitz's tombstone. Nonetheless, sources such as military historian Peter Paret and Encyclopædia Britannica continue to use Gottlieb instead of Gottfried. Clausewitz was born on 1 July 1780 in Burg bei Magdeburg in
20800-427: The concept of the grand strategy which encompasses the management of the resources of an entire nation in the conduct of warfare. In the environment of the grand strategy, the military component is largely reduced to operational strategy —the planning and control of large military units such as corps and divisions . As the size and number of the armies grew and the technology to communicate and control improved,
21000-455: The conduct of a campaign, and " generalship " rather than "statesmanship". He proposed that victory could be achieved by occupying the enemy's territory rather than destroying a opposing army. As such, geometric considerations were prominent in Jomini's theory of strategy. Jomini's two basic principles of strategy were to concentrate against fractions of the enemy force at a time and to strike at
21200-642: The corruption of the soldiers who lived in the cities was a literary commonplace." An example of modern grand strategy is the decision of the Allies in World War II to concentrate on the defeat of Germany first . The decision, a joint agreement made after the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941) had drawn the US into the war, was a sensible one in that Germany was the most powerful member of the Axis, and directly threatened
21400-468: The costs of carrying out its foreign policy." The United States was able to afford such adventurism during the 1990s, Posen argues, because American power projection was completely unchallenged. Over the last decade, however, American power has been relatively declining while the Pentagon continues to "depend on continuous infusions of cash simply to retain its current force structure—levels of spending that
21600-399: The costs of current U.S. grand strategy and understate the benefits. "The benefits of deep engagement...are legion. U.S. security commitments reduce competition in key regions and act as a check against potential rivals. They help maintain an open world economy and give Washington leverage in economic negotiations. And they make it easier for the United States to secure cooperation for combating
21800-428: The definition of strategy to refer to the distribution and application of military means to achieve policy objectives. For these thinkers, grand strategy was not only different from the operational strategy of winning a particular battle, but it also encompassed both peacetime and wartime policies. For them, grand strategy should operate for decades (or longer) and should not cease at war's end or begin at war's start. In
22000-512: The development of another method of warfare which went largely unnoticed at the time, but would become far more common in the 20th century. That was the aid and encouragement the British gave to the Spanish to harass the French behind their lines which led them to squander most of the assets of their Iberian army in protecting the army's line of communications. This was a very cost effective move for
22200-401: The difference between "military strategy" and "grand strategy" shrank. Fundamental to grand strategy is the diplomacy through which a nation might forge alliances or pressure another nation into compliance, thereby achieving victory without resorting to combat. Another element of grand strategy is the management of the post-war peace. As Clausewitz stated, a successful military strategy may be
22400-469: The disposition and manoeuvre of units on a particular sea or battlefield, but less broad than grand strategy otherwise called national strategy, which is the overarching strategy of the largest of organizations such as the nation state , confederation , or international alliance and involves using diplomatic, informational, military and economic resources. Military strategy involves using military resources such as people, equipment, and information against
22600-401: The distance of communication between the political and the military leader was small. But as the need of a professional army grew, the bounds between the politicians and the military came to be recognized. In many cases, it was decided that there was a need for a separation. As French statesman Georges Clemenceau said, "War is too important a business to be left to soldiers." This gave rise to
22800-546: The distinction between maneuver and battle, strategy and tactics, expanded with the capacity of technology and transit. Tactics that were once the province of a company of cavalry would be applied to a panzer army . It is often said that the art of strategies defines the goals to achieve in a military campaign, while tactics defines the methods to achieve these goals. Strategic goals could be "We want to conquer area X", or "We want to stop country Y's expansion in world trade in commodity Z"; while tactical decisions range from
23000-409: The distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. ... Furthermore, while the horizons of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond
23200-554: The early-19th century only a theoretical vision an all too real possibility in the mid-20th century. From Eisenhower's viewpoint, the best deterrent to war was to show the world just how appalling and horrific a nuclear "absolute war" would be if it should ever occur, hence a series of much-publicized nuclear tests in the Pacific, giving first priority in the defense budget to nuclear weapons and to their delivery-systems over conventional weapons, and making repeated statements in public that
23400-443: The effect of the trade-off precisely because it is a moderate, strategic policy. The authors write "the most important distinguishing feature of cooperative security is the proposition that peace is effectively indivisible." Unlike the other three alternatives, cooperative security draws upon liberalism as well as realism in its approach to international relations. Stressing the importance of world peace and international cooperation,
23600-686: The ends of policy". Hence, both gave the pre-eminence to political aims over military goals. Sun Tzu (544–496 BC) is often considered as the father of Eastern military strategy and greatly influenced Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese historical and modern war tactics. The Art of War by Sun Tzu grew in popularity and saw practical use in Western society as well. It continues to influence many competitive endeavors in Asia, Europe, and America including culture, politics, and business, as well as modern warfare. The Eastern military strategy differs from
23800-458: The ends of policy. Tactics means the dispositions for, and control of, military forces and techniques in actual fighting. Put more shortly: strategy is the art of the conduct of war, tactics the art of fighting." Military strategy in the 19th century was still viewed as one of a trivium of "arts" or "sciences" that govern the conduct of warfare; the others being tactics , the execution of plans and maneuvering of forces in battle, and logistics ,
24000-425: The ends of their policy, in a dialectic between opposing wills, each with the aim of imposing his policies and will upon his enemy. Clausewitz's emphasis on the inherent superiority of the defense suggests that habitual aggressors are likely to end up as failures. The inherent superiority of the defense obviously does not mean that the defender will always win, however: there are other asymmetries to be considered. He
24200-613: The enemy) and "tactics" (the science of organizing armies). Byzantine Emperor Leo VI distinguished between the two terms in his work Taktika . Prior to the French Revolution , most thinkers wrote on military science rather than grand strategy. The term grand strategy first emerged in France in the 19th century. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte, Comte de Guibert , wrote an influential work, General Essay on Tactics , that distinguished between "tactics" and "grand tactics" (which scholars today would refer to as grand strategy). Emperor Leo's Taktika
24400-636: The enthusiastic acceptance by the Prussian military establishment—especially Moltke the Elder , a former student of Clausewitz —of what they believed to be Clausewitz's ideas, and the subsequent widespread adoption of the Prussian military system worldwide, had a deleterious effect on military theory and practice , due to their egregious misinterpretation of his ideas: As so often happens, Clausewitz's disciples carried his teaching to an extreme which their master had not intended.... [Clausewitz's] theory of war
24600-570: The execution of operations. 'Military genius' is not simply a matter of intellect, but a combination of qualities of intellect, experience, personality, and temperament (and there are many possible such combinations) that create a very highly developed mental aptitude for the waging of war. Key ideas discussed in On War include: Clausewitz used a dialectical method to construct his argument, leading to frequent misinterpretation of his ideas. British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart contends that
24800-568: The existence of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union . Conversely, while Japan's conquests garnered considerable public attention, they were mostly in colonial areas deemed less essential by planners and policy-makers. The specifics of Allied military strategy in the Pacific War were therefore shaped by the lesser resources made available to the theatre commanders. The US and the UK used
25000-461: The fact that Jomini produced a system of war, Clausewitz a philosophy. The one has been outdated by new weapons, the other still influences the strategy behind those weapons." Jomini did not attempt to define war but Clausewitz did, providing (and dialectically comparing) a number of definitions. The first is his dialectical thesis: "War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." The second, often treated as Clausewitz's 'bottom line,'
25200-434: The feasibility of preventive war and the dangers of imperial overstretch. Daniel Drezner , professor of international politics at Tufts University , outlines three arguments offered by primacy enthusiasts contending that military preeminence generates positive economic externalities . "One argument, which I label 'geoeconomic favoritism,' hypothesizes that the military hegemon will attract private capital because it provides
25400-469: The first encounter with the enemy. Field Marshal Schlieffen succeeded Moltke and directed German planning in the lead up to World War I. He advocated the "strategy of annihilation" but was faced by a war on two fronts against numerically superior opposition. The strategy he formulated was the Schlieffen Plan , defending in the east while concentrating for a decisive victory in the west, after which
25600-506: The forward-deployment of forces to Europe and Asia. Posen and Ross identify such prominent scholars and political figures as Earl Ravenal , Patrick Buchanan and Doug Bandow . With similar roots in the realist tradition of international relations, selective engagement advocates that the United States should intervene in regions of the world only if they directly affect its security and prosperity. The focus, therefore, lies on those powers with significant industrial and military potential and
25800-414: The four schools of U.S. grand strategy that he identified in the 1990s have been replaced by just two: liberal hegemony, which came from a fusion of primacy and cooperative security, and restraint, which came from a fusion of neo-isolationism and selective engagement. Other scholars have proposed a third policy, offshore balancing. Proponents of liberal hegemony favor a world order in which the United States
26000-480: The full power of the pursuit of the enemy could not be achieved because the second army needed attention. Napoleon used the central position strategy during the Battle of Waterloo . Napoleon masked Wellington and massed against the Prussian army , and then after the Battle of Ligny was won, Napoleon attempted to do the same to the Allied/British army located just to the south of Waterloo. His subordinate
26200-513: The future first chief-of-staff of the newly reformed Prussian Army (appointed 1809). Clausewitz, Hermann von Boyen (1771–1848) and Karl von Grolman (1777–1843) were among Scharnhorst's primary allies in his efforts to reform the Prussian army between 1807 and 1814. Clausewitz served during the Jena Campaign as aide-de-camp to Prince August . At the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt on 14 October 1806—when Napoleon invaded Prussia and defeated
26400-632: The geopolitical policy objectives into militarily achievable goals and campaigns. Field Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke , Chief of the Imperial General Staff and co-chairman of the Anglo-US Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee for most of the Second World War, described the art of military strategy as: "to derive from the [policy] aim a series of military objectives to be achieved: to assess these objectives as to
26600-493: The greater part of the soldiery from the frontiers to cities that needed no auxiliary forces. He thus deprived of help the people who were harassed by the barbarians and burdened tranquil cities with the pest of the military, so that several straightway were deserted. Moreover, he softened the soldiers who treated themselves to shows and luxuries. Indeed, to speak plainly, he personally planted the first seeds of our present devastated state of affairs – Zosimus This charge by Zosimus
26800-415: The greatest security and safety to investors. A second argument posits that the benefits from military primacy flow from geopolitical favoritism: that sovereign states, in return for living under the security umbrella of the military superpower, voluntarily transfer resources to help subsidize the cost of the economy. The third argument postulates that states are most likely to enjoy global public goods under
27000-408: The highest circles, socialising with Berlin's political, literary, and intellectual élite. Marie was well-educated and politically well-connected—she played an important role in her husband's career progress and intellectual evolution. She also edited, published, and introduced his collected works. Opposed to Prussia's enforced alliance with Napoleon , Clausewitz left the Prussian army and served in
27200-429: The inherent strengths of the defensive form of war. Corbett's practical strategic views were often in prominent public conflict with Wilkinson's—see, for example, Wilkinson's article "Strategy at Sea", The Morning Post , 12 February 1912. Following the First World War, however, the influential British military commentator B. H. Liddell Hart in the 1920s erroneously attributed to him the doctrine of "total war" that during
27400-466: The introduction to his magnum opus on the philosophy of war in 1832. (He had started working on the text in 1816 but had not completed it.) She wrote the preface for On War and had published most of his collected works by 1835. She died in January 1836. Clausewitz was a professional combat soldier and a staff officer who was involved in numerous military campaigns, but he is famous primarily as
27600-402: The larger portion overwhelmed and defeated the second army quickly. He would then march on the second army leaving a portion to pursue the first army and repeat the operations ( defeat in detail ). This was designed to achieve the highest concentration of men into the primary battle while limiting the enemy's ability to reinforce the critical battle. The central position did have a weakness in that
27800-483: The legions could not win a battle through military combat skill or superior numbers, they could simply outlast the invaders, who, as historian E.A. Thompson wrote, "Did not think in terms of millions of bushels of wheat." The emperor Constantine moved the legions from the frontiers to one consolidated roving army as a way to save money and to protect wealthier citizens within the cities. However, this grand strategy, according to some ancient sources, had costly effects on
28000-426: The lines. The rupture in the enemy lines allowed Napoleon's cavalry to flank both lines and roll them up leaving his opponent no choice but to surrender or flee. The second strategy used by Napoleon I of France when confronted with two or more enemy armies was the use of the central position. This allowed Napoleon to drive a wedge to separate the enemy armies. He would then use part of his force to mask one army while
28200-494: The locals and so did not have to garrison their lines of communications to the same extent as the French did. So the strategy of aiding their Spanish civilian allies in their guerrilla or 'small war' benefited the British in many ways, not all of which were immediately obvious. Clausewitz 's On War has become a respected reference for strategy, dealing with political, as well as military, leadership , his most famous assertion being: Clausewitz saw war first and foremost as
28400-513: The maintenance of an army. The view had prevailed since the Roman times, and the borderline between strategy and tactics at this time was blurred, and sometimes categorization of a decision is a matter of almost personal opinion. Carnot , during the French Revolutionary Wars thought it simply involved concentration of troops . Strategy and tactics are closely related and exist on the same continuum; modern thinking places
28600-447: The maneuver to battle to dictate how and where the battle would progress. The Battle of Austerlitz was a perfect example of this maneuver. Napoleon withdrew from a strong position to draw his opponent forward and tempt him into a flank attack, weakening his center. This allowed the French army to split the allied army and gain victory. Napoleon used two primary strategies for the approach to battle. His "Manoeuvre De Derrière" ( move onto
28800-454: The manoeuvring was constrained to narrow, vulnerable corridors. Steam power and ironclads changed transport and combat at sea. Newly invented telegraph enabled more rapid communication between armies and their headquarters capitals. Combat was still usually waged by opposing divisions with skirmish lines on rural battlefields, violent naval engagements by cannon-armed sailing or steam-powered vessels, and assault on military forces defending
29000-425: The military objectives in real war that support political objectives generally fall into two broad types: limited aims or the effective "disarming" of the enemy "to render [him] politically helpless or militarily impotent. Thus, the complete defeat of the enemy may not be necessary, desirable, or even possible. In modern times the reconstruction of Clausewitzian theory has been a matter of much dispute. One analysis
29200-442: The military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievement of each is likely to necessitate: to measure available and potential resources against the requirements and to chart from this process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action." Field-Marshal Montgomery summed it up thus "Strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means, such as armed forces and supplies, to fulfil
29400-504: The morale and mental state of the opposing population) achieved through the offensive; this offensive was itself characterized by concentration of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity. In 1520 Niccolò Machiavelli 's Dell'arte della guerra (Art of War) dealt with the relationship between civil and military matters and the formation of grand strategy. In the Thirty Years' War (1618-1648), Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden demonstrated advanced operational strategy that led to his victories on
29600-420: The most decisive objective. Clausewitz and Jomini remain required reading for today's military professional officer. The evolution of military strategy continued in the American Civil War (1861–1865). The practice of strategy was advanced by generals such as Robert E. Lee , Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman , all of whom had been influenced by the feats of Napoleon ( Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson
29800-430: The most famous is, "War is the continuation of policy with other means." Or “Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln” with the word 'bloße' indicating 'merely' and 'politik' indicating 'diplomacy'. Clausewitz's Christian names are sometimes given in non-German sources as "Karl", "Carl Philipp Gottlieb", or "Carl Maria". He spelled his own given name with a "C" in order to identify with
30000-493: The most men". The concepts given as essential in the United States Army Field Manual of Military Operations ( FM 3–0 ) are: According to Greene and Armstrong, some planners assert adhering to the fundamental principles guarantees victory, while others claim war is unpredictable and the strategist must be flexible. Others argue predictability could be increased if the protagonists were to view
30200-423: The need for a grand strategy. Some contemporaries of Clausewitz and Jomini disputed the links between politics and war, arguing that politics ceases to be important once war has begun. Narrow definitions, similar to those of Clausewitz, were commonplace during the 19th century. Towards the end of the 19th century and into the early 20th century (in particular with B. H. Liddell Hart's writings), some writers expanded
30400-429: The one hand, and world policeman, highly interventionist role, on the other." Therefore, Art, concludes, it avoids both overly restrictive and overly expansive definitions of U.S. interests, finding instead a compromise between doing too much and too little militarily. Additionally, selective engagement is the best strategy for achieving both realist goals—preventing WMD terrorism, maintaining great power peace, and securing
30600-405: The operational level between them. All deal with distance, time and force but strategy is large scale, can endure through years, and is societal while tactics are small scale and involve the disposition of fewer elements enduring hours to weeks. Originally strategy was understood to govern the prelude to a battle while tactics controlled its execution. However, in the world wars of the 20th century,
30800-425: The opponent's resources to gain supremacy or reduce the opponent's will to fight, developed through the precepts of military science . NATO 's definition of strategy is "presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations." Strategy may be divided into 'grand strategy', geopolitical in scope and 'military strategy' that converts
31000-455: The people is entirely excluded." Christopher Bassford went further, noting that one need only read the paragraph in which Clausewitz defined his Trinity to see "that the words 'people,' 'army,' and 'government' appear nowhere at all in the list of the Trinity's components.... Creveld's and Keegan's assault on Clausewitz's Trinity is not only a classic 'blow into the air,' i.e., an assault on
31200-488: The perceived impenetrability of these perimeter defenses, the Emperors kept no central reserve army. The Roman system of roads allowed for soldiers to move from one frontier to another (for the purpose of reinforcements during a siege) with relative ease. These roads also allowed for a logistical advantage for Rome over her enemies, as supplies could be moved just as easily across the Roman road system as soldiers. This way, if
31400-430: The planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy. The father of Western modern strategic studies , Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), defined military strategy as "the employment of battles to gain the end of war." B. H. Liddell Hart 's definition put less emphasis on battles, defining strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill
31600-445: The political." Henry A. Kissinger , however, described Lenin's approach as being that politics is a continuation of war by other means, thus turning Clausewitz's argument "on its head." Rapoport argued that: As for Lenin's approval of Clausewitz, it probably stems from his obsession with the struggle for power. The whole Marxist conception of history is that of successive struggles for power, primarily between social classes. This
31800-483: The preface to The Influence of Sea Power upon History how the Romans used their sea power to effectively block the sea lines of communication of Hannibal with Carthage ; and so via a maritime strategy achieved Hannibal's removal from Italy, despite never beating him there with their legions. One of these strategies was shown in the battle between Greek city states and Persia. The Battle of Thermopylae in which
32000-411: The prevailing notion that only great powers are capable of having grand strategies. They found that smaller states like Rwanda can, and do, deploy national resources in response to external challenges and opportunities, which is a hallmark of grand strategy. This approach is influenced by the country's historical memory and involves a complex interplay of military, economic, and diplomatic tools tailored to
32200-506: The prevention of war amongst those states. Most proponents of this strategy believe Europe, Asia and the Middle East matter most to the United States. Europe and Asia contain the great powers, which have the greatest military and economic impact on international politics, and the Middle East is a primary source of oil for much of the developed world. In addition to these more particular concerns, selective engagement also focuses on preventing nuclear proliferation and any conflict that could lead to
32400-556: The rear ) was intended to place the French Army across the enemy's lines of communications . This forced the opponent to either march to battle with Napoleon or attempt to find an escape route around the army. By placing his army into the rear, his opponent's supplies and communications would be cut. This had a negative effect on enemy morale. Once joined, the battle would be one in which his opponent could not afford defeat. This also allowed Napoleon to select multiple battle angles into
32600-418: The remarks by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky : In describing the essence of war, Marxism-Leninism takes as its point of departure the premise that war is not an aim in itself, but rather a tool of politics. In his remarks on Clausewitz's On War, Lenin stressed that "Politics is the reason, and war is only the tool, not the other way around. Consequently, it remains only to subordinate the military point of view to
32800-427: The security of a state (as emphasized by Barry Posen ). British military historian B. H. Liddell Hart played an influential role in popularizing the concept of grand strategy in the mid-20th century. Subsequent definitions tend to build on his. He defines grand strategy as follows: [T]he role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards
33000-580: The situation from the other sides in a conflict. Field Marshal Count Helmuth von Moltke expressed strategy as a system of " ad hoc expedients" by which a general must take action while under pressure. These underlying principles of strategy have survived relatively unchanged as the technology of warfare has developed. Strategy (and tactics) must constantly evolve in response to technological advances. A successful strategy from one era tends to remain in favor long after new developments in military weaponry and matériel have rendered it obsolete. World War I, and to
33200-686: The soil of the Holy Roman Empire . It was not until the 18th century that military strategy was subjected to serious study in Europe. The word was first used in German as " Strategie " in a translation of Leo VI's Tactica in 1777 by Johann von Bourscheid. From then onwards, the use of the word spread throughout the West. In the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), Frederick the Great improvised
33400-501: The sole aim of utterly destroying his opponent, usually achieving success through superior maneuver. As ruler and general he dealt with the grand strategy as well as the operational strategy, making use of political and economic measures. While not the originator of the methods he used, Napoleon effectively combined the relatively superior maneuver and battle stages into one event. Before this, General Officers had considered this approach to battle as separate events. However, Napoleon used
33600-531: The south, and maneuver and security, by preventing the Germans from going directly from Alsace to Paris. The principles of military strategy emerged at least as far back as 500 BC in the works of Sun Tzu and Chanakya . The campaigns of Alexander the Great , Chandragupta Maurya , Hannibal , Qin Shi Huang , Julius Caesar , Zhuge Liang , Khalid ibn al-Walid and, in particular, Cyrus the Great demonstrate strategic planning and movement. Mahan describes in
33800-475: The specific context of Rwanda. There is no universally accepted definition of grand strategy. One common definition is that grand strategy is a state's strategy of how means (military and nonmilitary) can be used to advance and achieve national interests in the long-term. Grand strategy expands on the traditional idea of strategy in three ways: Thinkers differ as to whether grand strategy should serve to promote peace (as emphasized by B. H. Liddell Hart) or advance
34000-528: The status quo. Selective engagement is a strategy that sits in between primacy and isolationism and, given growing multipolarity and American fiscal precariousness, should be taken seriously. "Selectivity is not merely an option when it comes to embarking on military interventions. It is imperative for a major power that wishes to preserve its strategic insolvency. Otherwise, overextension and national exhaustion become increasing dangers." Carpenter thinks that off-loading U.S. security responsibility must be assessed on
34200-444: The supply of oil; and liberal goals—preserving free trade, spreading democracy, observing human rights, and minimizing the impact of climate change . The realist goals represent vital interests and the liberal goals represent desirable interests. Desirable interests are not unimportant, Art maintains, but they are of lesser importance when a trade-off between them and vital interests must be made. Selective engagement, however, mitigates
34400-419: The time to be the United States' comparative advantage in aerospace power. Collective action problems , the problems of the effective formation of international institutions, the vacillating feelings of democratic populations, and the limitations of arms control are all offered by the authors as noted criticisms of collective security. Primacy is a grand strategy with four parts: As a result, it advocates that
34600-400: The time, which was strongly in favour of victory in battle, yet World War I would soon demonstrate the flaws of a mindless "strategy of annihilation". Carl von Clausewitz Carl Philipp Gottfried (or Gottlieb ) von Clausewitz ( / ˈ k l aʊ z ə v ɪ t s / KLOW -zə-vits , German: [ˈkaʁl fɔn ˈklaʊzəvɪts] ; 1 July 1780 – 16 November 1831) was
34800-407: The use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise. By such means the former dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities, to which the only limitations are those imposed by
35000-771: The vast horse-herds of Mongolia. Each archer had at least one extra horse—there was an average of five horses per man—thus the entire army could move with astounding rapidity. Moreover, since horse milk and horse blood were the staples of the Mongolian diet, Genghis' horse-herds functioned not just as his means of movement but as his logistical sustainment. All other necessities would be foraged and plundered. Khan's marauders also brought with them mobile shelters, concubines, butchers, and cooks. Through maneuver and continuous assault, Chinese, Persian , Arab and Eastern European armies could be stressed until they collapsed, and were then annihilated in pursuit and encirclement. Compared to
35200-411: The very beginning of Vom Kriege —the purely logical result of the forces underlying a "pure," Platonic "ideal" of war. In what he called a "logical fantasy," war cannot be waged in a limited way: the rules of competition will force participants to use all means at their disposal to achieve victory. But in the real world, he said, such rigid logic is unrealistic and dangerous. As a practical matter,
35400-457: The view supposes the growth in democratic governance and the use of international institutions will hopefully overcome the security dilemma and deter interstate conflict. Posen and Ross propose that collective action is the most effective means of preventing potential state and non-state aggressors from threatening other states. Cooperative security considers nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and humanitarian crises to be major interests of
35600-669: The village of Waterloo ) on 16 June 1815, but they withdrew in good order. Napoleon's failure to destroy the Prussian forces led to his defeat a few days later at the Battle of Waterloo (18 June 1815), when the Prussian forces arrived on his right flank late in the afternoon to support the Anglo-Dutch-Belgian forces pressing his front. Napoleon had convinced his troops that the field grey uniforms were those of Marshal Grouchy's grenadiers. Clausewitz's unit fought heavily outnumbered at Wavre (18–19 June 1815), preventing large reinforcements from reaching Napoleon at Waterloo. After
35800-653: The war between the Peloponnesian League (led by Sparta ) and the Delian League (led by Athens ). From the era of Hadrian , Roman emperors employed a military strategy of "preclusive security—the establishment of a linear barrier of perimeter defence around the Empire. The Legions were stationed in great fortresses". These " fortresses " existed along the perimeter of the Empire, often accompanied by actual walls (for example, Hadrian's Wall ). Due to
36000-400: The war into the subsequent peace." A prince or general who knows exactly how to organise his war according to his object and means, who does neither too little nor too much, gives by that the greatest proof of his genius. But the effects of this talent are exhibited not so much by the invention of new modes of action, which might strike the eye immediately, as in the successful final result of
36200-401: The war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments, but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peace – for its security and prosperity. In antiquity, the Greek word "strategy" referred to the skills of a general. By the sixth century, Byzantines distinguished between "strategy" (the means by which a general defends the homeland and defeats
36400-516: The war, Clausewitz served as the director of the Kriegsakademie , where he served until 1830. In that year he returned to active duty with the army. Soon afterward, the outbreak of several revolutions around Europe and a crisis in Poland appeared to presage another major European war. Clausewitz was appointed chief of staff of the only army Prussia was able to mobilise in this emergency, which
36600-571: The whole. It is the exact fulfilment of silent suppositions, it is the noiseless harmony of the whole action which we should admire, and which only makes itself known in the total result. Clausewitz introduced systematic philosophical contemplation into Western military thinking, with powerful implications not only for historical and analytical writing but also for practical policy, military instruction, and operational planning. He relied on his own experiences, contemporary writings about Napoleon, and on deep historical research. His historiographical approach
36800-488: The world, using the alliance system both to advance and retain hegemonic power and to solidify emerging liberal political systems. According to Posen, this strategy sees "threats emanating from three major sources: failed states, rogue states, and illiberal peer competitors." Failed states, in this view, are sources of instability; rogue states can sponsor terrorism, acquire weapons of mass destruction, and behave unpredictably; illiberal peer competitors would compete directly with
37000-476: Was an irony of fate that the view in the USSR was that it was Lenin who shaped the attitude towards Clausewitz, and that Lenin's dictum that war is a continuation of politics is taken from the work of this [allegedly] anti-humanist anti-revolutionary." The American mathematician Anatol Rapoport wrote in 1968 that Clausewitz as interpreted by Lenin formed the basis of all Soviet military thinking since 1917, and quoted
37200-570: Was constantly applied by Lenin in a variety of contexts. Thus the entire history of philosophy appears in Lenin's writings as a vast struggle between "idealism" and "materialism." The fate of the socialist movement was to be decided by a struggle between the revolutionists and the reformers. Clausewitz's acceptance of the struggle for power as the essence of international politics must have impressed Lenin as starkly realistic. Clausewitz directly influenced Mao Zedong, who read On War in 1938 and organised
37400-436: Was expounded in a way too abstract and involved for ordinary soldier-minds, essentially concrete, to follow the course of his argument—which often turned back from the direction in which it was apparently leading. Impressed yet befogged, they grasped at his vivid leading phrases, seeing only their surface meaning, and missing the deeper current of his thought. As described by Christopher Bassford , then-professor of strategy at
37600-735: Was full of revolutions, rebellions, and violence by "non-state actors" - witness the wars in the French Vendée and in Spain. Clausewitz wrote a series of "Lectures on Small War" and studied the rebellion in the Vendée (1793–1796) and the Tyrolean uprising of 1809. In his famous "Bekenntnisdenkschrift" of 1812 he called for a "Spanish war in Germany" and laid out a comprehensive guerrilla strategy to be waged against Napoleon. In On War he included
37800-499: Was heavily—and controversially—edited by the philosopher, musician, and game theorist Anatol Rapoport . The British military historian John Keegan attacked Clausewitz's theory in his book A History of Warfare . Keegan argued that Clausewitz assumed the existence of states, yet 'war antedates the state, diplomacy and strategy by many millennia.' Clausewitz died without completing Vom Kriege, but despite this his ideas have been widely influential in military theory and have had
38000-707: Was included in the book. Soldiers before this time had written treatises on various military subjects, but none had undertaken a great philosophical examination of war on the scale of those written by Clausewitz and Leo Tolstoy , both of whom were inspired by the events of the Napoleonic Era . Clausewitz's work is still studied today, demonstrating its continued relevance. More than sixteen major English-language books that focused specifically on his work were published between 2005 and 2014, whereas his 19th-century rival Jomini has faded from influence. The historian Lynn Montross said that this outcome "may be explained by
38200-456: Was interested in co-operation between the regular army and militia or partisan forces, or citizen soldiers, as one possible—sometimes the only—method of defense. In the circumstances of the Wars of the French Revolution and those with Napoleon, which were energised by a rising spirit of nationalism, he emphasised the need for states to involve their entire populations in the conduct of war. This point
38400-425: Was popularised by U.S. Army Colonel Harry Summers' Vietnam-era interpretation, facilitated by weaknesses in the 1976 Howard/Paret translation. The degree to which Clausewitz managed to revise his manuscript to reflect that synthesis is the subject of much debate. His final reference to war and Politik , however, goes beyond his widely quoted antithesis: "War is simply the continuation of political intercourse with
38600-536: Was published in Fichte's Verstreute kleine Schriften 157–166. For an English translation of the letter see Carl von Clausewitz Historical and Political Writings Edited by: Peter Paret and D. Moran (1992). On 10 December 1810, he married the socially prominent Countess Marie von Brühl , whom he had first met in 1803. She was a member of the noble German Brühl family originating in Thuringia . The couple moved in
38800-870: Was rife in 1914 Europe. One of the most influential British Clausewitzians today is Colin S. Gray ; historian Hew Strachan (like Wilkinson also the Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, since 2001) has been an energetic proponent of the study of Clausewitz, but his own views on Clausewitz's ideas are somewhat ambivalent. With some interesting exceptions (e.g., John McAuley Palmer , Robert M. Johnston , Hoffman Nickerson), Clausewitz had little influence on American military thought before 1945 other than via British writers, though Generals Eisenhower and Patton were avid readers of English translations. He did influence Karl Marx , Friedrich Engels , Vladimir Lenin , Leon Trotsky , Võ Nguyên Giáp , Ferdinand Foch , and Mao Zedong , and thus
39000-499: Was said to have carried a book of Napoleon's maxims with him.) However, the adherence to the Napoleonic principles in the face of technological advances such as the long-range infantry breechloader rifles and minie ball guns generally led to disastrous consequences for both the Union and Confederate forces and populace. The time and space in which war was waged changed as well. Railroads enabled swift movement of large forces but
39200-505: Was sent to the Polish border. Its commander, Gneisenau , died of cholera (August 1831), and Clausewitz took command of the Prussian army's efforts to construct a cordon sanitaire to contain the great cholera outbreak (the first time cholera had appeared in modern heartland Europe, causing a continent-wide panic). Clausewitz himself died of the same disease shortly afterwards, on 16 November 1831. His widow edited, published, and wrote
39400-640: Was shortly thereafter translated into French and German, leading most thinkers to distinguish between tactics and strategy. Carl von Clausewitz proposed in an influential work that politics and war were intrinsically linked. Clausewitz defined strategy as "the use of engagements for the object of the war". Antoine-Henri Jomini argued that because of the intrinsically political nature of war that different types of wars (e.g. offensive wars, defensive wars, wars of expediency, wars with/without allies, wars of intervention, wars of conquest, wars of opinion, national wars, civil wars) had to be waged differently, thus creating
39600-500: Was that of Panagiotis Kondylis , a Greek writer and philosopher, who opposed the interpretations of Raymond Aron in Penser la Guerre, Clausewitz, and other liberal writers. According to Aron, Clausewitz was one of the first writers to condemn the militarism of the Prussian general staff and its war-proneness, based on Clausewitz's argument that "war is a continuation of policy by other means." In Theory of War, Kondylis claims that this
39800-445: Was to prepare the means to wage war. Moltke however warned that plans may not survive an encounter with the enemy. Other thinkers challenged Clausewitz's idea that politics could set the aims of war, as the aims of war would change during the war given the success or failure of military operations.These thinkers argued that strategy was a process that required adaptation to changing circumstances. Scholarship on grand strategy experienced
40000-487: Was unable to mask the defeated Prussian army, who reinforced the Waterloo battle in time to defeat Napoleon and end his domination of Europe. It can be said that the Prussian Army under Blücher used the "maneuver de derrière" against Napoleon who was suddenly placed in a position of reacting to a new enemy threat. Napoleon's practical strategic triumphs, repeatedly leading smaller forces to defeat larger ones, inspired
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