Forward air control is the provision of guidance to close air support (CAS) aircraft intended to ensure that their attack hits the intended target and does not injure friendly troops. This task is carried out by a forward air controller (FAC).
115-518: A primary forward air control function is ensuring the safety of friendly troops during close air support . Enemy targets in the front line ("Forward Edge of the Battle Area" in US terminology) are often close to friendly forces and therefore friendly forces are at risk of friendly fire through proximity during air attack. The danger is twofold: the bombing pilot cannot identify the target clearly, and
230-538: A turf war over doctrine raged between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army for the entire war. Additionally, the U.S. Marine Corps maintained its own FAC operation during the war. Also, U.S. Navy carrier aviation would not completely coordinate its operations with the Air Force/Army system until the final month of the war. With no common doctrine agreed upon during the war, forward air control systems were shut down postwar in 1956. Forward air controllers played
345-471: A 2010 American reality television series "Turf War" ( The Office ) , a 2012 episode of the American comedy television series The Office "Turf War", an episode of the 2012 American television series The Mob Doctor "Turf War", an episode of the 2012 American television series NYC 22 "Turf War", a 2010 episode of the American television series Swords " My Turf War ", a 2007 episode of
460-483: A Forward Air Support Link at each brigade to forward air support requests. When trained tentacle teams arrived in 1942, they cut response time on support requests to thirty minutes. It was also in the North Africa desert that the cab rank strategy was developed. It used a series of three aircraft, each in turn directed by the pertinent ground control by radio. One aircraft would be attacking, another in flight to
575-551: A computerized fire control system. On 1 November 1968, President Lyndon Johnson declared a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam . With that act, the focus of the contending forces became the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As the U.S. more than quadrupled the number of airstrikes aimed at interdiction , North Vietnamese anti-aircraft guns and gunners transferred south to the Trail to match this new onslaught. Both sides realized that
690-440: A concern – pilots did not know recognition signals and regularly bombed friendly units, until an A-36 was shot down in self-defense by Allied tanks. The expectation of losses to friendly fire from the ground during the planned invasion of France prompted the black and white invasion stripes painted on all Allied aircraft from 1944. In 1944, USAAF commander Lt. Gen. Henry ("Hap") Arnold acquired 2 groups of A-24 dive bombers,
805-542: A considerable portion of the tactical air strikes. By the cessation of hostilities, airborne forward air controllers alone were credited with flying 40,354 forward air control sorties, and directing air strikes that killed an estimated 184,808 communist troops. At times, tactical air was credited with inflicting about half of all communist casualties. Despite having agreed on a common forward air control doctrine as embodied in Field Manual 31 - 35 Air-Ground Operations ,
920-443: A critical importance in places where the infantry had got pinned down. At this time, British doctrine came to recognize two forms of air support; trench strafing (the modern-day doctrine of CAS), and ground strafing (the modern-day doctrine of air interdiction ) – attacking tactical ground targets away from the land battle. As well as strafing with machine-guns, planes engaged in such operations were commonly modified with bomb racks;
1035-706: A declining supply of aircraft and fuel, crippled their ability to provide effective CAS on the western front after 1943. The Royal Air Force (RAF) entered the war woefully unprepared to provide CAS. In 1940 during the Battle of France , the Royal Air Force and Army headquarters in France were located at separate positions, resulting in unreliable communications. After the RAF was withdrawn in May, Army officers had to telephone
1150-495: A dual FAC/strike mission under call sign "Nimrod". The U.S. Air Force began Operation Shed Light as a test of night time battlefield illumination. In response to increasing pressure from air strikes, the communists turned entirely to night operations in Vietnam by 1968. C-123 Provider cargo aircraft were used as flareships to light up the Trail and direct air strikes, under the call sign "Candlestick", until late 1969. Withdrawn in
1265-768: A further and lower convergence point than aerial combat did. Of the Allied powers that fought in the Second World War, the Soviet Union used specifically designed ground attack aircraft more than the UK and US. Such aircraft included the Ilyushin Il-2 , the single most produced military aircraft at any point in world history. The Soviet military also frequently deployed the Polikarpov Po-2 biplane as
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#17327945697201380-452: A greater psychological effect on friendly and hostile forces alike. Moreover, unlike massive, indiscriminate artillery strikes, small aerial bombs would not render ground untrafficable, slowing attacking friendly forces. Although the prevailing view in official circles was largely indifferent to CAS during the interwar period, its importance was expounded upon by military theorists, such as J. F. C. Fuller and Basil Liddell Hart . Hart, who
1495-582: A ground attack aircraft. turf war [REDACTED] Look up turf war in Wiktionary, the free dictionary. A turf war is a fight over territory or resources, or may refer to: Music [ edit ] Turf Wars , a 2007 album by the Canadian band Daggermouth "Turf War", a song on the 2001 album Filmtracks 2000 by American composer Bill Television [ edit ] Turf War ,
1610-484: A high tempo of exploitation even when they outran their artillery assets. He also used a modified antiaircraft radar to track friendly attack aircraft to redirect them as necessary, and experimented with assigning fighter pilots to tours as forward air controllers to familiarize them with the ground perspective. In July 1944, Quesada provided VHF aircraft radios to tank crews in Normandy. When the armored units broke out of
1725-471: A key factor in the rapid advance and success of his Third Army. The American Navy and Marine Corps used CAS in conjunction with or as a substitute for the lack of available artillery or naval gunfire in the Pacific theater . Navy and Marine F6F Hellcats and F4U Corsairs used a variety of ordnance such as conventional bombs, rockets and napalm to dislodge or attack Japanese troops using cave complexes in
1840-575: A major part in the largest bombing campaign in history during the Vietnam War . While World War II had featured indiscriminate mass air raids on major cities worldwide, bombing during the Vietnam War was aimed at smaller targets in a country the size of New Mexico. Unless bombs were dropped in a free fire zone, or on a pre-briefed target, the bombing in Vietnam was directed by FACs. Also unlike World War II, serious efforts were made to avoid hitting
1955-552: A radio transmitter in his airplane to send changes via morse code to an artillery battery on the ground. Colonel Billy Mitchell also equipped his Spad XVI command airplane with a radio, and the Germans experimented with radios in their Junkers J.I all-metal-structure, armored-fuselage sesquiplanes . The Marines in the so-called Banana wars of the 1920s and 1930s used Curtiss Falcons and Vought Corsairs that were equipped with radios powered by airstream-driven generators, with
2070-472: A range of up to 50 miles. Another method of communication was for the pilot to drop messages in a weighted container, and to swoop in and pick up messages hung out by ground troops on a "clothesline" between poles. The objective was aerial reconnaissance and air attack. Using these various methods, the Marine pilots combined the functions of both FAC and strike aircraft, as they carried out their own air attacks on
2185-407: A role previously dominated by FACs on the ground, and the use of B-52s for CAS . U.S. Marine Corps Aviation was much more prepared for the application of CAS in the Vietnam War, due to CAS being its central mission. In fact, as late as 1998, Marines were still claiming in their training manuals that "Close air support (CAS) is a Marine Corps innovation." One of the main debates taking place within
2300-551: A skill equivalency to that of a JFO. The Australian Army operatives developed this capability within the ANA in late 2015 to 2016 to include NVG, ISR, Afghan Air Force/Army/Police and other units, which culminated in the enduring Joint exercise Tolo Aftab which was first held in January 2016 ( https://www.armynewspaper.defence.gov.au/army-news/may-5th-2016/flipbook/6/ ). This was enhanced and developed by ADF personnel from RAAF and ARA until
2415-540: Is a well known example of a dive bomber built for precision bombing but which was successfully used for CAS. It was fitted with wind-blown sirens on its landing gear to enhance its psychological effect. Some variants of the Stuka were equipped with a pair of 37 mm (1.5 in) Bordkanone BK 3,7 cannons mounted in under-wing gun pods, each loaded with two six-round magazines of armour-piercing tungsten carbide -cored ammunition, for anti-tank operations. Other than
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#17327945697202530-494: Is allocated a FAC or JTAC . Such assignment (designated as a "B-Billet") is given to Marine aviators often as they are most knowledgeable about close air support and air superiority doctrines. The Afghan National Army (ANA) relied on coalition partners to raise and sustain its FAC and Joint Fires Officer (JFO) capability. The ANA capability, known as the Afghan Tactical Air Coordinator maintained
2645-497: Is not aware of the locations of friendly forces. Camouflage, a constantly changing situation and the fog of war all increase the risk. Present day doctrine holds that Forward Air Controllers (FACs) are not needed for air interdiction , although there has been such use of FACs in the past. An additional concern of forward air controllers is the avoidance of harm to noncombatants in the strike area. As close air support began during World War I , there were pioneer attempts to direct
2760-622: Is the determining factor. CAS may need to be conducted during shaping operations with special forces if the mission requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of those forces. A closely related subset of air interdiction , battlefield air interdiction , denotes interdiction against units with near-term effects on friendly units, but which does not require integration with friendly troop movements. CAS requires excellent coordination with ground forces, typically handled by specialists such as artillery observers , joint terminal attack controllers , and forward air controllers . World War I
2875-691: The AN/MPQ-14 , a system that enabled radar-guided bomb release at night or in poor weather. Though the Marine Corps continued its tradition of intimate air–ground cooperation in the Korean War , the newly created United States Air Force (USAF) again moved away from CAS, now to strategic bombers and jet interceptors . Though eventually the Air Force supplied sufficient pilots and forward air controllers to provide battlefield support, coordination
2990-616: The Force Intervention Brigade operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo , an FAC called 27 missions. For NATO forces the qualifications and experience required to be a FAC are set out in a NATO Standard (STANAG). FACs may form part of a Fire Support Team or Tactical Air Control Party , they may be ground based, airborne FACs in fixed-wing aircraft (FAC-A) or in helicopters (ABFAC). Since 2003
3105-724: The Korean War and the Vietnam War . French colonial operations in the Rif War from 1920–1926 used air power similarly to the Marines in Nicaragua against the Sandinistas but in a different environment, the desert. The French Mobile Groups of combined arms not only used aircraft for scouting and air attack; the airplanes carried trained artillery officers as observers. These aerial observers called in artillery fire via radio. The German military noted close air support operations in
3220-779: The Korean War broke out. The United Kingdom and Commonwealth continued to build on their experience in the Second World War in various campaigns around the world in the second half of the twentieth century, including the Malayan Emergency , the Suez Crisis , the Indonesian Confrontation and operations in Aden and Oman . With the re-formation of the Army Air Corps in 1957 this new corps's functions included airborne forward air control. Although
3335-764: The North African Campaign in 1941 the British Army and the Royal Air Force established Forward Air Support Links (FASL), a mobile air support system using ground vehicles. Light reconnaissance aircraft would observe enemy activity and report it by radio to the FASL which was attached at brigade level. The FASL was in communication (a two-way radio link known as a "tentacle") with the Air Support Control (ASC) Headquarters attached to
3450-949: The North American A-36 Apache , a P-51 Mustang modified with dive brakes, the Americans and British used no dedicated CAS aircraft in the Second World War, preferring fighters or fighter-bombers that could be pressed into CAS service. While some aircraft, such as the Hawker Typhoon and the P-47 Thunderbolt , performed admirably in that role, there were a number of compromises that prevented most fighters from making effective CAS platforms. Fighters were usually optimized for high-altitude operations without bombs or other external ordnance – flying at low level with bombs quickly expended fuel. Cannons had to be mounted differently for strafing – strafing required
3565-631: The Second Battle of the Aisne , the British debuted the first ground-attack aircraft, a modified F.E 2b fighter carrying 20 lb (9.1 kg) bombs and mounted machine-guns . After exhausting their ammunition, the planes returned to base for refueling and rearming before returning to the battle-zone. Other modified planes used in this role were the Airco DH.5 and Sopwith Camel – the latter
Forward air control - Misplaced Pages Continue
3680-499: The Spanish Civil War and decided to develop its forward air control capability. By 1939, they had forward air control teams called Ground Attack Teams attached to every headquarters from regiment level upwards. These Teams directed air strikes flown by Luftwaffe close air support units. Extensive coordinated training by air and ground troops had raised this system to state of the art by the beginning of World War II. When
3795-414: The Spanish Civil War lead to the creation of five ground-attack groups in 1938, four of which would be equipped with Stukas . The Luftwaffe matched its material acquisitions with advances in the air-ground coordination. General Wolfram von Richthofen organized a limited number of air liaison detachments that were attached to ground units of the main effort. These detachments existed to pass requests from
3910-1139: The United States Armed Forces have used the term joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) for some of their ground based FACs. NATO is making efforts to increase the safety and reduce the risk of fratricide in air to ground operations. Co-operation between different NATO agencies such as the NATO Standardization Agency and the JAPCC resulted in the development of common standards for Forward Air Controllers and these are now set out in STANAG 3797 (Minimum Qualifications for Forward Air Controllers). NATO FACs are trained to request, plan, brief and execute CAS operations both for Low Level and Medium/High Level operations and their training NATO FACs includes electronic warfare , suppression of enemy air defences , enemy air defence, air command and control, attack methods and tactics, weaponeering and Joint Air Attack Team Tactics . FACs in
4025-579: The United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) was founded on 20 June 1941, it included provisions for Air Ground Control Parties to serve with the United States Army at the division, corps, and Army headquarters. The Air Ground Control Parties functions were to regulate bombing and artillery in close conjunction with the ground troops, as well as assess bomb damage. They were thus the first of similar units to try to fulfill
4140-769: The War Office in London to arrange for air support. The stunning effectiveness of German air-ground coordination spurred change. On the basis of tests in Northern Ireland in August 1940, Group Captain A. H. Wann RAF and Colonel J.D. Woodall (British Army) issued the Wann-Woodall Report, recommending the creation of a distinct tactical air force liaison officer (known colloquially as "tentacles") to accompany Army divisions and brigades. Their report spurred
4255-460: The invasion of Normandy , 33 divisions had received no joint air-ground training. The USAAF saw the greatest innovations in 1944 under General Elwood Quesada , commander of IX Tactical Air Command, supporting the First U.S. Army. He developed the "armored column cover", where on-call fighter-bombers maintained a high level of availability for important tank advances, allowing armor units to maintain
4370-518: The invasion of Normandy . CAS continued to advance during the conflicts of the Cold War , especially the Korean War and the Vietnam War ; major milestones included the introduction of attack helicopters , gunships , and dedicated CAS attack jets . The use of aircraft in the close air support of ground forces dates back to World War I , the first conflict to make significant military use of aerial forces. Air warfare, and indeed aviation itself,
4485-494: The 1973 Yom Kippur War , provided aircraft with an effective ranged anti-tank weapon. These considerations motivated armies to promote the helicopter from a support role to a combat arm. Though the U.S. Army controlled rotary-wing assets, coordination continued to pose a problem. During wargames, field commanders tended to hold back attack helicopters out of fear of air defenses, committing them too late to effectively support ground units. The earlier debate over control over CAS assets
4600-596: The Allied system used to subsequently gain victory in the air over Germany in 1944 and devastate its cities and industries. The use of forward air control to guide close air support (CAS) aircraft, so as to ensure that their attack hits the intended target and not friendly troops, was first used by the British Desert Air Force in North Africa, but not by the USAAF until operations in Salerno. During
4715-595: The American television series Scrubs Other [ edit ] "Turf War" (Banksy) , a 2003 exhibition by street artist Banksy The Legend of Korra: Turf Wars , a three-part graphic novel series Turf War (horse) , tied winner of the 2007 Delta Jackpot Stakes Turf War, a mode of play in the 2000 video game Smuggler's Run Turf War, a gameplay mode in Nintendo's video game series Splatoon See also [ edit ] Gang war (disambiguation) Turf (disambiguation) Topics referred to by
Forward air control - Misplaced Pages Continue
4830-613: The British achieved air superiority over the German aircraft sent to aid the Ottoman Turks , squadrons of S.E 5a's and D.H. 4s were sent on wide-ranging attacks against German and Turkish positions near the Jordan river . Combined with a ground assault led by General Edmund Allenby , three Turkish armies soon collapsed into a full rout. In the words of the attacking squadron's official report: No 1 Squadron made six heavy raids during
4945-497: The British system. At the start of the War, the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) had, as its principal mission, the doctrine of strategic bombing. This incorporated the unerring belief that unescorted bombers could win the war without the advent of ground troops. This doctrine proved to be fundamentally flawed. However, during the entire course of the war the USAAF top brass clung to this doctrine, and hence operated independently of
5060-536: The CAS role. Though the Army gained more control over its own CAS due to the development of the helicopter gunship and attack helicopter, the Air Force continued to provide fixed-wing CAS for Army units. Over the course of the war, the adaptation of The Tactical Air Control System proved crucial to the improvement of Air Force CAS. Jets replaced propeller-driven aircraft with minimal issues. The assumption of responsibility for
5175-690: The Desert Air Force, was steadily refined and perfected, during the campaigns in Italy, Normandy and Germany. By the time the Italian Campaign had reached Rome , the Allies had established air superiority . They were then able to pre-schedule strikes by fighter-bomber squadrons; however, by the time the aircraft arrived in the strike area, oftentimes the targets, which were usually trucks, had fled. The initial solution to fleeing targets
5290-560: The Germans were first exposed to dive-bombing , which permitted greater accuracy while making attack aircraft more difficult to track by antiaircraft gunners. As a result, Ernst Udet , chief of the Luftwaffe's development, initiated procurement of close support dive bombers on the model of the U.S. Navy's Curtiss Helldiver , resulting in the Henschel Hs 123 , which was later replaced by the famous Junkers Ju 87 Stuka . Experience in
5405-780: The Indian Army, flying a HAL Krishak , played a crucial part in a close air support defense against steep odds. The Pakistani loss of armor in December 1971 was one of the most severe since the great armored clashes of World War II . Major Singh won the Maha Vir Chakra for his performance under heavy ground fire. During the Portuguese Overseas War , the Portuguese Air Force used mainly Dornier Do 27 and OGMA/Auster D.5 light aircraft in
5520-717: The Luftwaffe refused to provide Erwin Rommel with an air liaison officer for the Afrika Korps , because it "would be against the best use of the air force as a whole." German CAS was also extensively used on the Eastern Front during the period 1941–1943. Their decline was caused by the growing strength of the Red Air Force and the redeployment of assets to defend against American and British strategic bombardment. Luftwaffe's loss of air superiority, combined with
5635-458: The Marine Corps during the war was whether to adopt the helicopter gunship as a part of CAS doctrine and what its adoption would mean for fixed-wing CAS in the Marine Corps. The issue would eventually be put to rest, however, as the helicopter gunship proved crucial in the combat environment of Vietnam. Though helicopters were initially armed merely as defensive measures to support the landing and extraction of troops, their value in this role led to
5750-457: The Normandy beachhead, tank commanders were able to communicate directly with overhead fighter-bombers. However, despite the innovation, Quesada focused his aircraft on CAS only for major offensives. Typically, both British and American attack aircraft were tasked primarily to interdiction, even though later analysis showed them to be twice as dangerous as CAS. XIX TAC , under the command of General Otto P. Weyland used similar tactics to support
5865-405: The Pacific for the rest of the war. By November 1943, the U.S. Marines were using forward air control during the Battle of Bougainville . The United States would end World War II still without an air control doctrine. When the U.S. Air Force split from the U.S. Army in 1947, neither took on the responsibility for forward air control; the U.S. military thus had no functional forward air control when
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#17327945697205980-494: The RAF to create an RAF Army Cooperation Command and to develop tentacle equipment and procedures placing an Air Liaison Officer with each brigade. Although the RAF was working on its CAS doctrine in London, officers in North Africa improvised their own coordination techniques. In October 1941, Sir Arthur Tedder and Arthur Coningham , senior RAF commanders in North Africa, created joint RAF-Army Air Support Control staffs at each corps and armored division headquarters, and placed
6095-459: The Sandinistas in Nicaragua in 1927. The commonality of pilots and ground troops belonging to the same service led to a close air support role similar to that sought by use of FACs, without the actual use of a FAC. On 27 October 1927, a Marine patrol used cloth panels to direct an air strike—arguably the first forward air control mission. This distinctive U.S. Marine doctrine of interaction between Marine infantry and aviation would persist, recurring in
6210-467: The U.S. military also had FACs; the U.S. Army had at least two aviation companies of FACs, the U.S. Marine Corps had an organic FAC squadron within its forces, and the U.S. Navy established its own FAC squadron in the Mekong Delta . U.S. involvement had begun with a South Vietnamese FAC training program; later in the war, Laotians and Hmong were also trained as FACs. There was a great deal of technical innovation in forward air control operations during
6325-452: The USAF began using laser guided ordnance. By May 1971, U.S. Air Force intelligence concluded that air strikes had wiped out all the North Vietnamese trucks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This was a demonstrably untrue conclusion, as trucks still traversed the Trail until the communist takeover in 1975. After war's end, the U.S. Air Force ended the forward air control mission, just as they had following World War II and Korea. Major Atma Singh, of
6440-517: The United Kingdom are trained at the Joint Forward Air Controller Training and Standards Unit (JFACTSU) where controllers are drawn from all three services: Naval Service ( Royal Marines and Royal Marines Reserve ), the Army , and the RAF ( RAF Regiment ). UK FACs operate as TACPs or form part of Royal Artillery Fire Support Teams which direct artillery as well as close air support. The Army Air Corps provides Airborne Forward Air Controllers. When deployed on operations each USMC infantry company
6555-430: The United Nations Commander, Gen. Mark Clark , to permanently attach an attack squadron to each of the four army corps in Korea. Though the request was denied, Clark allocated many more Navy and Air Force aircraft to CAS. Despite the rocky start, the USAF would also work to improve its coordination efforts. It eventually required pilots to serve 80 days as forward air controllers (FACs), which gave them an understanding of
6670-534: The United States, as part of the United Nations Command (UNC) in the Korean War, entered the war on 26 June 1950 with no forward air controllers, it rapidly improvised close air support procedures for UNC forces. By 20 July, jury-rigged systems were not only controlling air strikes against the communist foe, but also occasionally directing aerial interceptions of opposing aircraft. Both the U.S. high command and North Korean General Nam Il agreed that only tactical air power saved United Nation forces from defeat during
6785-440: The activity of the Panzers . Joseph Stalin paid the Il-2 a great tribute in his own inimitable manner: when a particular production factory fell behind on its deliveries, Stalin sent the following cable to the factory manager: "They are as essential to the Red Army as air and bread". From Navy experiments with the KGW-1 Loon , the Navy designation for the German V-1 flying bomb, Marine Captain Marian Cranford Dalby developed
6900-410: The air request net by the Air Force improved communication equipment and procedures, which had long been a problem. Additionally, a major step in satisfying the Army's demands for more control over their CAS was the successful implementation of close air support control agencies at the corps level under Air Force control. Other notable adaptations were the usage of airborne Forward Air Controllers (FACs),
7015-400: The air war in Southeast Asia. By early 1966, a rising level of communist anti-aircraft fire against propeller-driven FAC aircraft necessitated the use of jet aircraft for FACs in high-risk areas in North Vietnam. The Fast FAC mission would supplement the FAC mission in Southeast Asia until war's end. In July 1966, night FAC operations began against the Ho Chi Minh Trail; A-26 Invaders began
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#17327945697207130-487: The air. And in 1943, the USAAF changed their radios to a frequency incompatible with ground radios. The situation improved during the Italian Campaign , where American and British forces, working in close cooperation, exchanged CAS techniques and ideas. There, the AAF's XII Air Support Command and the Fifth U.S. Army shared headquarters, meeting every evening to plan strikes and devising a network of liaisons and radios for communications. However, friendly fire continued to be
7245-462: The army rather than the air force. Fighters and ground attack aircraft like the A-10 Thunderbolt II provide close air support using rockets, missiles, bombs, and strafing runs. During the Second World War, a mixture of dive bombers and fighters were used for CAS missions. Dive bombing permitted greater accuracy than level bombing runs, while the rapid altitude change made it more difficult for anti aircraft gunners to track. The Junkers Ju 87 Stuka
7360-468: The army version of the Navy's SBD-2, in response to the success of the Stuka and German CAS. Later, the USAAF developed a modification of the North American P-51 Mustang with dive brakes – the North American A-36 Apache . However, there was no training to match the purchases. Though Gen. Lesley McNair, commander of Army Ground Forces, pushed to change USAAF priorities, the latter failed to provide aircraft for even major training exercises. Six months before
7475-411: The battle area, while a third was being refuelled and rearmed at its base. If the first attack failed to destroy the tactical target, the aircraft in flight would be directed to continue the attack. The first aircraft would land for its own refuelling and rearming once the third had taken off. The CAS tactics developed and refined by the British during the campaign in North Africa served as the basis for
7590-420: The civilian populace, which also called for FAC intervention. In 1961, when forward air control was revived , it promptly ran into the recurring problems of unreliable radios, a shortage of supplies, lack of suitable aircraft, differing concepts of close air support, and unfavorable terrain. The first manning requirement for FACs, levied in 1962, amounted to 32 slots in Vietnam. Even as the slots slowly filled,
7705-501: The conflict. Aviators, who wanted institutional independence from the Army, pushed for a view of air-power centered around interdiction, which would relieve them of the necessity of integrating with ground forces and allow them to operate as an independent military arm. They saw close air support as both the most difficult and most inefficient use of aerial assets. Close air support was the most difficult mission, requiring identifying and distinguishing between friendly and hostile units. At
7820-441: The corps or armoured division which could summon support through a Rear Air Support Link with the airfields. They also introduced the system of ground direction of air strikes by what was originally termed a "Mobile Fighter Controller" traveling with the forward troops. The controller rode in the "leading tank or armoured car" and directed a "cab rank" of aircraft above the battlefield. This system of close co-operation first used by
7935-432: The course of the Vietnam War. The United States came up with a number of ways to make its forward air control system more effective. As early as 1962, Douglas C-47 flareship FACs began the forward air control mission in South Vietnam, mostly on night missions. In September 1965, another C-47 went into action as the first Airborne Command and Control Center. As additional ABCCC aircraft were added, they would constantly govern
8050-422: The creation of the air liaison officer (ALO) position. The ALO is an aeronautically rated officer that has spent a tour away from the cockpit, serving as the primary adviser to the ground commander on the capabilities and limitations of airpower . The Korean War revealed important flaws in the application of CAS. Firstly, the USAF preferred interdiction over fire support while the Army regarded support missions as
8165-419: The creators of the combined-arms tactical doctrine commonly known as " blitzkrieg ", believed the best way to provide cover for the crossing would be a continuous stream of ground attack aircraft on French defenders. Though few guns were hit, the attacks kept the French under cover and prevented them from manning their guns. Aided by the sirens attached to Stukas , the psychological impact was disproportional to
8280-417: The day, dropped three tons of bombs and fired nearly 24,000 machine gun rounds. The close air support doctrine was further developed in the interwar period . Most theorists advocated the adaptation of fighters or light bombers into the role. During this period, airpower advocates crystallized their views on the role of air-power in warfare. Aviators and ground officers developed largely opposing views on
8395-851: The decision was made to create a unified RAF Iraq Command to use air power as a more cost-effective way of controlling large areas than the use of conventional land forces. It was effectively used to suppress the Great Iraqi Revolution of 1920 and various other tribal revolts. During the Spanish Civil War German volunteer aviators of the Condor Legion on the Nationalist side, despite little official support from their government, developed close air support tactics that proved highly influential for subsequent Luftwaffe doctrine. U.S. Marine Corps Aviation
8510-526: The destructive power of close air support (although as often as not, the Stukas were used as tactical bombers instead of close air support, leaving much of the actual work to the older Hs 123 units for the first years of the war). In addition, the reliance on air support over artillery reduced the demand for logistical support through the Ardennes. Though there were difficulties in coordinating air support with
8625-401: The difficulties from the ground perspective and helped cooperation when they returned to the cockpit. The USAF also provided airborne FACs in critical locations. The Army also learned to assist, by suppressing anti-aircraft fire prior to air strikes. The U.S. Army wanted a dedicated USAF presence on the battlefield to reduce fratricide , or the harm of friendly forces. This preference led to
8740-780: The enlisted members of the Tactical Air Control Party . Since their 1977 introduction into modern military practice for close air support purposes, General Crosbie E. Saint provided the AH-64 Apache the doctrinal cover for use in AirLand Battle operations such as in the NATO European theatre. Various aircraft can fill close air support roles. Military helicopters are often used for close air support and are so closely integrated with ground operations that in most countries they are operated by
8855-425: The face of mounting opposition, the flareships would still serve elsewhere in theater until 30 June 1971. In a similar role, Lockheed AC-130 gunships, call sign "Blindbat", not only lit the Trail and directed air strikes, but used its own copious firepower on enemy trucks. The gunships carried both electronic sensors tied into Operation Igloo White and night observation devices for spotting enemy trucks, as well as
8970-684: The fall of the elected Government. Close air support In military tactics , close air support ( CAS ) is defined as aerial warfare actions—often air-to-ground actions such as strafes or airstrikes —by military aircraft against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces. A form of fire support , CAS requires detailed integration of each air mission with fire and movement of all forces involved. CAS may be conducted using aerial bombs , glide bombs , missiles , rockets , autocannons , machine guns , and even directed-energy weapons such as lasers . The requirement for detailed integration because of proximity, fires or movement
9085-455: The fighters to map grid coordinates, or they might resort to a description of prominent terrain features as guidance. However, one drawback for the Rovers was the constant rotation of pilots, who were there for fortnightly stints, leading to a lack of institutional memory. US commanders, impressed by the British tactics at the Salerno landings, adapted their own doctrine to include many features of
9200-685: The first purpose-built ground attack aircraft , the Junkers J.I . During the 1918 German spring offensive , the Germans employed 30 squadrons, or Schlasta , of ground attack fighters and were able to achieve some initial tactical success. The British later deployed the Sopwith Salamander as a specialized ground attack aircraft, although it was too late to see much action. During the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of 1918, CAS aircraft functioned as an important factor in ultimate victory. After
9315-708: The forward air control role, in the several theatres of operation: Angola , Portuguese Guinea and Mozambique . During the Rhodesian Bush War the Rhodesian Air Force mounted Airborne FACs in Aermacchi AL60 B Trojans and Lynx aircraft. South Africa deployed both Airborne FACs (in AM.3CM Bosboks ) and ground-based FACs during the Border War including the Battle of Cassinga . During
9430-755: The front lines. The requesting unit would direct the air strikes. The U.S. Army would not copy the British system until the Allied invasion of Italy , but adapted it for use there and in France after the Invasion of Normandy of 6 June 1944. In the Pacific Theater, 4 Squadron of the Royal Australian Air Force began forward air control at the Battle of Buna-Gona , New Guinea in November 1942. The RAAF continued forward air control in
9545-510: The functions of the FAC without being airborne. However, these units were often plagued by turf wars and cumbersome communications between the respective armies and air forces involved. As a result, it could take hours for an air strike requested by ground troops to actually show up. However, forward air control during World War II came into existence as a result of exigency, and was used in several theaters of World War II. Its reincarnation in action
9660-489: The ground to the air, and receive reconnaissance reports, but they were not trained to guide aircraft onto targets. These preparations did not prove fruitful in the invasion of Poland , where the Luftwaffe focused on interdiction and dedicated few assets to close air support. But the value of CAS was demonstrated at the crossing of the Meuse River during the Invasion of France in 1940. General Heinz Guderian , one of
9775-671: The immediate postwar period. The newly formed Royal Air force (RAF) contributed to the defeat of the Afghan military during the Third Anglo-Afghan War by harassing Afghani troops and breaking up their formations. Z Force, an RAF air squadron, was also used to support ground operations during the Somaliland campaign , in which the Darawiish king Diiriye Guure 's insurgency was defeated. Following from these successes,
9890-632: The importance of CAS, views that would frame institutional battles for CAS in the 20th century. The inter-war period saw the use of CAS in a number of conflicts, including the Polish–Soviet War , the Spanish Civil War , the Iraqi revolt of 1920 and the Gran Chaco War . The British used air power to great effect in various colonial hotspots in the Middle East and North Africa during
10005-517: The late 1950s and early 1960s, the US Army began to identify a dedicated CAS need for itself. The Howze Board, which studied the question, published a landmark report describing the need for a helicopter-based CAS requirement. However, the Army did not follow the Howze Board recommendation initially. Nevertheless, it did eventually adopt the use of helicopter gunships and attack helicopters in
10120-623: The latter part of the Second World War. The Soviet Union 's Red Air Force quickly recognized the value of ground-support aircraft. As early as the Battles of Khalkhyn Gol in 1939, Soviet aircraft had the task of disrupting enemy ground operations. This use increased markedly after the June 1941 Axis invasion of the Soviet Union . Purpose-built aircraft such as the Ilyushin Il-2 Sturmovik proved highly effective in blunting
10235-573: The main concern for air forces. Then, the Army advocated a degree of decentralization for good reactivity, in contrast with the USAF-favored centralization of CAS. The third point dealt with the lack of training and joint culture, which are necessary for an adequate air-ground integration. Finally, USAF aircraft were not designed for CAS: "the advent of jet fighters , too fast to adjust their targets, and strategic bombers , too big to be used on theatre, rendered CAS much harder to implement". During
10350-519: The mobile warfare stage of the war. When the front lines bogged down into static trench warfare in Summer 1951, forward air control diminished in importance. To cope with the communist switch to night operations, both radar and Shoran bombing techniques were developed. However, close air support continued, and sometimes used to direct interdiction missions against the communist lines of communications . By this time, Allied air forces were contributing
10465-475: The modification of early helicopters as dedicated gunship platforms. Though not as fast as fixed-wing aircraft and consequently more vulnerable to anti-aircraft weaponry, helicopters could use terrain for cover, and more importantly, had much greater battlefield persistence owing to their low speeds. The latter made them a natural complement to ground forces in the CAS role. In addition, newly developed anti-tank guided missiles , demonstrated to great effectiveness in
10580-550: The need for aerial support of ground operations. Though the Luftwaffe , like its counterparts, tended to focus on strategic bombing, it was unique in its willingness to commit forces to CAS. Unlike the Allies, the Germans were not able to develop powerful strategic bombing capabilities, which implied industrial developments they were forbidden to take according to the Treaty of Versailles . In joint exercises with Sweden in 1934,
10695-438: The plane would fly in very low to the ground and release the bombs just above the trenches. The Germans were also quick to adopt this new form of warfare and were able to deploy aircraft in a similar capacity at Cambrai. While the British used single-seater planes, the Germans preferred the use of heavier two-seaters with an additional machine gunner in the aft cockpit . The Germans adopted the powerful Hannover CL.II and built
10810-528: The rapid advance, the Germans demonstrated consistently superior CAS tactics to those of the British and French defenders. Later, on the Eastern front , the Germans would devise visual ground signals to mark friendly units and to indicate direction and distance to enemy emplacements. Despite these accomplishments, German CAS was not perfect and suffered from the same misunderstanding and interservice rivalry that plagued other nations' air arms, and friendly fire
10925-483: The rapid armored advance of General Patton 's Third Army in its drive across France. Armed reconnaissance was a major feature of XIX TAC close air support, as the rapid advance left Patton's Southern flank open. Such was the close nature of cooperation between the Third Army and XIX TAC that Patton actually counted on XIX TAC to guard his flanks. This close air support from XIX TAC was credited by Patton as having been
11040-560: The requirement proved inadequate. The 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron was then assigned in-country in mid-1963 to augment the FAC force. By January 1965, there were still only 144 USAF FACs in Southeast Asia. While the U.S. Air Force would continue to add more FACs, projecting a need for 831 FACs, and stationing four more Tactical Air Support Squadrons in Southeast Asia by April 1965, the manning levels of assigned FACs would run about 70% of need until December 1969. Other branches of
11155-500: The rest of the Army. Thus it was initially unprepared to provide CAS, and in fact, had to be dragged "kicking and screaming" into the CAS function with the ground troops. USAAF doctrinal priorities for tactical aviation were, in order, air superiority, isolation of the battlefield via supply interdiction, and thirdly, close air support. Hence, during the North African Campaign , CAS was poorly executed, if at all. So few aerial assets were assigned to U.S. troops that they fired on anything in
11270-413: The same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title Turf war . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Turf_war&oldid=1116821222 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description
11385-428: The same time, targets engaged in combat are dispersed and concealed, reducing the effectiveness of air attacks. They also argued that the CAS mission merely duplicated the abilities of artillery, whereas interdiction provided a unique capability. Ground officers contended there was rarely sufficient artillery available, and the flexibility of aircraft would be ideal for massing firepower at critical points, while producing
11500-546: The supply of military necessities being moved south to insurgents would be crucial to a communist victory. At about this time, the Raven FACs began supporting Vang Pao 's Central Intelligence Agency -supported guerrilla army on the Plain of Jars in northern Laos with air strikes serving as aerial artillery blasting the way clear for offensive sweeps by the partisans. In early 1970, in an attempt to improve bombing accuracy,
11615-597: The target. If it can identify the target, it can't hit it. But if it does hit the target, it doesn't do a great deal of damage anyway." It is unsurprising, then, that MacArthur excluded USAF aircraft from the airspace over the Inchon Landing in September 1950, instead relying on Marine Aircraft Group 33 for CAS. In December 1951, Lt. Gen. James Van Fleet , commander of the Eighth U.S. Army , formally requested
11730-400: The trench strafing by the ground troops marking their positions by laying out signal panels on the ground, firing flares, or lighting smoke signals. Aircrews had difficulty communicating with the ground troops; they would drop messages or use messenger pigeons . Benno Fiala von Fernbrugg , an Austro-Hungarian pilot, pioneered the use of radio for fire control; at the Battle of Gorlice he used
11845-403: The universal acceptance of the integration of air power into combined arms warfare, with all of the war's major combatants having developed effective air-ground coordination techniques by the conflict's end. New techniques, such as the use of forward air control to guide CAS aircraft and identifying invasion stripes , also emerged at this time, being heavily shaped by the Italian Campaign and
11960-575: Was a result of field expedience rather than planned operations. On the Allied side, British forces in the North Africa campaign began using the Forward Air Support Links, a "tentacle" system that used radio links from front line units to the rear. Air force teams were co-located with the army command. Close air support would be requested by forward units and if approved delivered from "cab ranks" of fighter-bombers held near
12075-472: Was an advocate of what later came to be known as ' Blitzkrieg ' tactics, thought that the speed of armoured tanks would render conventional artillery incapable of providing support fire. Instead he proposed that: actual 'offensive' support must come from an even more mobile artillery moving alongside. For this purpose the close co-operation of low-flying aircraft ... is essential As a continental power intent on offensive operations, Germany could not ignore
12190-503: Was not uncommon. For example, on the eve of the Meuse offensive, Guderian's superior cancelled his CAS plans and called for high-altitude strikes from medium bombers, which would have required halting the offensive until the air strikes were complete. Fortunately for the Germans, his order was issued too late to be implemented, and the Luftwaffe commander followed the schedule he had previously worked out with Guderian. As late as November 1941,
12305-553: Was not until 1916 that an air support doctrine was elaborated and dedicated fighters for the job were put into service. By that point, the startling and demoralizing effect that attack from the air could have on the troops in the trenches had been made clear. At the Battle of the Somme , 18 British armed reconnaissance planes strafed the enemy trenches after conducting surveillance operations. The success of this improvised assault spurred innovation on both sides. In 1917, following
12420-401: Was particularly successful in this role. Aircraft support was first integrated into a battle plan on a large scale at the 1917 Battle of Cambrai , where a significantly larger number of tanks were deployed than previously. By that time, effective anti-aircraft tactics were being used by the enemy infantry and pilot casualties were high, although air support was later judged as having been of
12535-538: Was reiterated between ground commanders and aviators. Nevertheless, the US Army incrementally gained increased control over its CAS role. In the mid-1970s, after Vietnam, the USAF decided to train an enlisted force to handle many of the tasks the ALO was saturated with, to include terminal attack control . Presently, the ALO mainly serves in the liaison role, the intricate details of mission planning and attack guidance left to
12650-477: Was relatively difficult at this early date to co-ordinate these attacks due to the primitive nature of air-to-ground radio communication . Though most air-power proponents sought independence from ground commanders and hence pushed the importance of interdiction and strategic bombing, they nonetheless recognized the need for close air support. From the commencement of hostilities in 1914, aviators engaged in sporadic and spontaneous attacks on ground forces , but it
12765-646: Was still in its infancy – and the direct effect of rifle caliber machine guns and light bombs of World War I aircraft was very limited compared with the power of (for instance) an average fighter bomber of World War II, but CAS aircraft were still able to achieve a powerful psychological impact. The aircraft was a visible and personal enemy – unlike artillery – presenting a personal threat to enemy troops, while providing friendly forces assurance that their superiors were concerned about their situation. The most successful attacks of 1917–1918 had included planning for co-ordination between aerial and ground units, although it
12880-434: Was still lacking. Since pilots operated under centralized control, ground controllers were never able to familiarize themselves with pilots, and requests were not processed quickly. Harold K. Johnson, then commander of the 8th Cavalry Regiment , 1st Cavalry Division (later Army Chief of Staff ) commented regarding CAS: "If you want it, you can't get it. If you can get it, it can't find you. If it can find you, it can't identify
12995-478: Was the British "Rover" system. These were pairings of air controllers and army liaison officers at the front but able to switch communications seamlessly from one brigade to another – hence Rover. Incoming strike aircraft arrived with pre-briefed targets, which they would strike 20 minutes after arriving on station only if the Rovers had not directed them to another more pressing target. Rovers might call on artillery to mark targets with smoke shells, or they might direct
13110-560: Was the first conflict to make extensive use of CAS, albeit using relatively primitive methods in contrast to later warfare, though it was made evident that proper coordination between aerial and ground forces via radio made attacks more effective. Several conflicts during the interwar period —including the Polish–Soviet War , the Spanish Civil War , the Iraqi Revolt , and the Chaco War —made notable use of CAS. World War II marked
13225-581: Was used as an intervention force in support of U.S. Marine Corps ground forces during the Banana Wars , in places such as Haiti , the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua . Marine Aviators experimented with air-ground tactics and in Haiti and Nicaragua they adopted the tactic of dive bombing . The observers and participants of these wars would base their CAS strategies on their experience of
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