Free will is the capacity or ability to choose between different possible courses of action .
149-402: Free will is closely linked to the concepts of moral responsibility , praise , culpability , and other judgements which apply only to actions that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of advice , persuasion , deliberation , and prohibition . Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame. Whether free will exists, what it is and
298-482: A false dilemma . Different compatibilists offer very different definitions of what "free will" means and consequently find different types of constraints to be relevant to the issue. Classical compatibilists considered free will nothing more than freedom of action, considering one free of will simply if, had one counterfactually wanted to do otherwise, one could have done otherwise without physical impediment. Many contemporary compatibilists instead identify free will as
447-579: A physical system under repeated conditions, and it implies that there is a causal relationship involving the elements of the system. Factual and well-confirmed statements like "Mercury is liquid at standard temperature and pressure" are considered too specific to qualify as scientific laws. A central problem in the philosophy of science , going back to David Hume , is that of distinguishing causal relationships (such as those implied by laws) from principles that arise due to constant conjunction . Laws differ from scientific theories in that they do not posit
596-597: A belief in determinism if this freedom weighs upon us or if we need an excuse". A similar view is that individual moral culpability lies in individual character. That is, a person with the character of a murderer has no choice other than to murder, but can still be punished because it is right to punish those of bad character. How one's character was determined is irrelevant from this perspective. Robert Cummins, for example, argues that people should not be judged for their individual actions, but rather for how those actions "reflect on their character". If character (however defined)
745-516: A choice or volition – a willing, trying, or endeavoring on behalf of the agent (such as the cognitive component of lifting one's arm). Such intentional actions are interpreted as free actions. It has been suggested, however, that such acting cannot be said to exercise control over anything in particular. According to non-causal accounts, the causation by the agent cannot be analysed in terms of causation by mental states or events, including desire, belief, intention of something in particular, but rather
894-443: A closely related variant, 'When (if ever) does moral responsibility transfer from its human creator(s) to the system?'. The questions arguably adjoin with but are distinct from machine ethics , which is concerned with the moral behavior of artificial systems. Whether an artificial system's behavior qualifies it to be morally responsible has been a key focus of debate. Batya Friedman and Peter Kahn Jr. posited that intentionality
1043-417: A conscious being). While determinism usually refers to a naturalistically explainable causality of events, predeterminism seems by definition to suggest a person or a "someone" who is controlling or planning the causality of events before they occur and who then perhaps resides beyond the natural, causal universe. Predestination asserts that a supremely powerful being has indeed fixed all events and outcomes in
1192-543: A deterministic universe is known as the problem of free will or sometimes referred to as the dilemma of determinism . This dilemma leads to a moral dilemma as well: the question of how to assign responsibility for actions if they are caused entirely by past events. Compatibilists maintain that mental reality is not of itself causally effective. Classical compatibilists have addressed the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will holds as long as humans are not externally constrained or coerced. Modern compatibilists make
1341-494: A different problem for free will. Hard determinism is the claim that determinism is true, and that it is incompatible with free will , so free will does not exist. Although hard determinism generally refers to nomological determinism (see causal determinism below), it can include all forms of determinism that necessitate the future in its entirety. Relevant forms of determinism include: Other forms of determinism are more relevant to compatibilism, such as biological determinism ,
1490-471: A distinct condition, separate from the control condition: For instance, Alfred Mele thinks that the epistemic condition is a component of the control condition. Nonetheless, there seems to be a philosophical consensus of sorts that it is both distinct and explanatorily relevant. One major concept associated with the condition is "awareness". According to those philosophers who affirm this condition, one needs to be "aware" of four things to be morally responsible:
1639-399: A distinction between freedom of will and freedom of action , that is, separating freedom of choice from the freedom to enact it. Given that humans all experience a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists think it is necessary to accommodate this intuition. Compatibilists often associate freedom of will with the ability to make rational decisions. A different approach to the dilemma
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#17327824539461788-502: A given set of circumstances. Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, which requires that the world is not closed under physics. This includes interactionist dualism , which claims that some non-physical mind , will, or soul overrides physical causality . Physical determinism implies there
1937-420: A law or theory from facts. Calling a law a fact is ambiguous , an overstatement , or an equivocation . The nature of scientific laws has been much discussed in philosophy , but in essence scientific laws are simply empirical conclusions reached by scientific method; they are intended to be neither laden with ontological commitments nor statements of logical absolutes . A scientific law always applies to
2086-450: A libertarian position. In daily life, we feel as though choosing otherwise is a viable option. Although this feeling does not firmly establish the existence of free will, some incompatibilists claim the phenomenological feeling of alternate possibilities is a prerequisite for free will. Jean-Paul Sartre suggested that people sometimes avoid incrimination and responsibility by hiding behind determinism: "we are always ready to take refuge in
2235-554: A major focus of philosophical debate. The view that posits free will as incompatible with determinism is called incompatibilism and encompasses both metaphysical libertarianism (the claim that determinism is false and thus free will is at least possible) and hard determinism (the claim that determinism is true and thus free will is not possible). Another incompatibilist position is hard incompatibilism , which holds not only determinism but also indeterminism to be incompatible with free will and thus free will to be impossible whatever
2384-476: A mechanism or explanation of phenomena: they are merely distillations of the results of repeated observation. As such, the applicability of a law is limited to circumstances resembling those already observed, and the law may be found to be false when extrapolated. Ohm's law only applies to linear networks; Newton's law of universal gravitation only applies in weak gravitational fields; the early laws of aerodynamics , such as Bernoulli's principle , do not apply in
2533-546: A moral person, coining the idea of a 'Moral Turing Test'. They subsequently disavowed the Moral Turing Test in recognition of controversies surrounding the Turing Test . Andreas Matthias described a 'responsibility gap' where to hold humans responsible for a machine would be an injustice, but to hold the machine responsible would challenge 'traditional' ways of ascription. He proposed in 2004 three cases where
2682-411: A new causal chain. But this is impossible. Man cannot create himself or his mental states ex nihilo . This argument entails that free will itself is absurd, but not that it is incompatible with determinism. Strawson calls his own view "pessimism" but it can be classified as hard incompatibilism . Causal determinism is the concept that events within a given paradigm are bound by causality in such
2831-425: A non-physical entity on physical reality. Indeterministic physical models (particularly those involving quantum indeterminacy ) introduce random occurrences at an atomic or subatomic level. These events might affect brain activity, and could seemingly allow incompatibilist free will if the apparent indeterminacy of some mental processes (for instance, subjective perceptions of control in conscious volition ) map to
2980-426: A particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions be present". The production of a summary description of our environment in the form of such laws is a fundamental aim of science . Several general properties of scientific laws, particularly when referring to laws in physics , have been identified. Scientific laws are: The term "scientific law" is traditionally associated with the natural sciences , though
3129-430: A point; hence the rate of change of density in a region of space must be the amount of flux leaving or collecting in some region (see the main article for details). In the table below, the fluxes flows for various physical quantities in transport, and their associated continuity equations, are collected for comparison. u = velocity field of fluid (m s ) Ψ = wavefunction of quantum system More general equations are
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#17327824539463278-405: A power, or ability, to prefer or choose". The contemporary philosopher Galen Strawson agrees with Locke that the truth or falsity of determinism is irrelevant to the problem. He argues that the notion of free will leads to an infinite regress and is therefore senseless. According to Strawson, if one is responsible for what one does in a given situation, then one must be responsible for the way one
3427-529: A psychological capacity, such as to direct one's behavior in a way responsive to reason, and there are still further different conceptions of free will, each with their own concerns, sharing only the common feature of not finding the possibility of determinism a threat to the possibility of free will. The problem of free will has been identified in ancient Greek philosophical literature. The notion of compatibilist free will has been attributed to both Aristotle (4th century BCE) and Epictetus (1st century CE): "it
3576-452: A robot, then people must not have free will. This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it remains possible and plausible that we are different from such objects in important ways. Another argument for incompatibilism is that of the "causal chain". Incompatibilism is key to the idealist theory of free will. Most incompatibilists reject
3725-403: A series of improving and more precise generalizations. Scientific laws are typically conclusions based on repeated scientific experiments and observations over many years and which have become accepted universally within the scientific community . A scientific law is " inferred from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena , and expressible by the statement that
3874-634: A specific immoral act that a specific person committed, people tend to say that that person is morally responsible for their actions, even if they were determined (that is, people also give compatibilist answers). The neuroscience of free will investigates various experiments that might shed light on free will. One of the attributes defined for psychopathy is "failure to accept responsibility for own actions". When people attribute moral responsibility, they usually attribute it to individual moral agents. However, Joel Feinberg, among others, has argued that corporations and other groups of people can have what
4023-454: A substantial departure from technologies and theory as extant in 2014. An artificial system based on those technologies will carry zero responsibility for its behaviour. Moral responsibility is apportioned to the humans that created and programmed the system. Colin Allen et al. proposed that an artificial system may be morally responsible if its behaviours are functionally indistinguishable from
4172-515: A viable criminal jurisprudence is compatible with the denial of deserved blame and punishment. His view rules out retributivist justifications for punishment, but it allows for incapacitation of dangerous criminals on the analogy with quarantine of carriers of dangerous diseases. Isolation of carriers of the Ebola virus can be justified on the ground of the right to defend against threat, a justification that does not reference desert. Pereboom contends that
4321-406: A way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states. Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe. Causal determinists believe that there is nothing uncaused or self-caused . The most common form of causal determinism is nomological determinism (or scientific determinism), the notion that
4470-418: Is a combination of extensive evidence of something not occurring, combined with an underlying theory , very successful in making predictions, whose assumptions lead logically to the conclusion that something is impossible. While an impossibility assertion in natural science can never be absolutely proved, it could be refuted by the observation of a single counterexample . Such a counterexample would require that
4619-482: Is a compatibilist and she has just sat down on the sofa, then she is committed to the claim that she could have remained standing, if she had so desired. But it follows from the consequence argument that, if Jane had remained standing, she would have either generated a contradiction, violated the laws of nature or changed the past. Hence, compatibilists are committed to the existence of "incredible abilities", according to Ginet and van Inwagen. One response to this argument
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4768-467: Is a consequence of the shift symmetry of time (no moment of time is different from any other), while conservation of momentum is a consequence of the symmetry (homogeneity) of space (no place in space is special, or different from any other). The indistinguishability of all particles of each fundamental type (say, electrons, or photons) results in the Dirac and Bose quantum statistics which in turn result in
4917-417: Is a criticism against the libertarian conception of moral responsibility. It suggests that any given action, and even a person's character, is the result of various forces outside a person's control. It may not be appropriate, then, to hold that person solely morally responsible. Thomas Nagel suggests that four different types of luck (including genetic influences and other external factors) end up influencing
5066-557: Is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, and that computer systems as conceivable in 1992 in material and structure could not have intentionality. Arthur Kuflik asserted in 1999 that humans must bear the ultimate moral responsibility for a computer's decisions, as it is humans who design the computers and write their programs. He further proposed that humans can never relinquish oversight of computers. Frances Grodzinsky et al. considered artificial systems that could be modelled as finite state machines . They posited in 2008 that if
5215-427: Is a predetermined course of events. It may be conceived as a predetermined future, whether in general or of an individual. It is a concept based on the belief that there is a fixed natural order to the cosmos. Although often used interchangeably, the words "fate" and "destiny" have distinct connotations. Fate generally implies there is a set course that cannot be deviated from, and over which one has no control. Fate
5364-537: Is a principal concern of ethics . Philosophers refer to people who have moral responsibility for an action as " moral agents ". Agents have the capability to reflect upon their situation, to form intentions about how they will act, and then to carry out that action. The notion of free will has become an important issue in the debate on whether individuals are ever morally responsible for their actions and, if so, in what sense. Incompatibilists regard determinism as at odds with free will, whereas compatibilists think
5513-453: Is a set course that cannot be deviated from, but does not of itself make any claim with respect to the setting of that course (i.e., it does not necessarily conflict with incompatibilist free will). Free will if existent could be the mechanism by which that destined outcome is chosen (determined to represent destiny). Discussion regarding destiny does not necessitate the existence of supernatural powers. Logical determinism or determinateness
5662-419: Is already present in a deterministic world. Deliberative indeterminism asserts that the indeterminism is confined to an earlier stage in the decision process. This is intended to provide an indeterminate set of possibilities to choose from, while not risking the introduction of luck (random decision making). The selection process is deterministic, although it may be based on earlier preferences established by
5811-440: Is appealed to as supplying the "elbow room" that libertarians believe necessary. A first common objection to event-causal accounts is that the indeterminism could be destructive and could therefore diminish control by the agent rather than provide it (related to the problem of origination). A second common objection to these models is that it is questionable whether such indeterminism could add any value to deliberation over that which
5960-410: Is assumed power to intervene in the physical world. Agent (substance)-causal accounts have been suggested by both George Berkeley and Thomas Reid . It is required that what the agent causes is not causally determined by prior events. It is also required that the agent's causing of that event is not causally determined by prior events. A number of problems have been identified with this view. Firstly, it
6109-443: Is called ‘collective moral responsibility’ for a state of affairs. For example, when South Africa had an apartheid regime, the country's government might have been said to have had collective moral responsibility for the violation of the rights of non-European South Africans. The emergence of automation, robotics and related technologies prompted the question, 'Can an artificial system be morally responsible?' The question has
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6258-417: Is considered a matter of spontaneity and creativity. The exercise of intent in such intentional actions is not that which determines their freedom – intentional actions are rather self-generating. The "actish feel" of some intentional actions do not "constitute that event's activeness, or the agent's exercise of active control", rather they "might be brought about by direct stimulation of someone's brain, in
6407-546: Is damaging to entertain the illusion that a person can make a single decision that is somehow, suddenly, independent of their physiology and history. He describes what scientists have learned from brain damaged patients, and offers the case of a school teacher who exhibited escalating pedophilic tendencies on two occasions – each time as results of growing tumors. Eagleman also warns that less attractive people and minorities tend to get longer sentencing – all of which he sees as symptoms that more science
6556-431: Is difficult to establish the reason for any given choice by the agent, which suggests they may be random or determined by luck (without an underlying basis for the free will decision). Secondly, it has been questioned whether physical events can be caused by an external substance or mind – a common problem associated with interactionalist dualism . Hard incompatibilism is the idea that free will cannot exist, whether
6705-428: Is evident that observation may disturb the outcome of the observation itself, rendering limited our ability to identify causality. Niels Bohr , one of the main architects of quantum theory, suggested, however, that no connection could be made between indeterminism of nature and freedom of will. Agent/substance-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will rely upon substance dualism in their description of mind. The agent
6854-403: Is frequently taken to mean that human actions cannot interfere with (or have no bearing on) the outcomes of a pre-determined course of events, and that one's destiny was established externally (for example, exclusively by a creator deity). The concept of predeterminism is often argued by invoking causal determinism , implying that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to
7003-459: Is functioning as a hindrance or obstacle to her realizing one of her purposes – a hindrance or obstacle in the form of resistance within her will which must be overcome by effort." According to Robert Kane such "ultimate responsibility" is a required condition for free will. An important factor in such a theory is that the agent cannot be reduced to physical neuronal events, but rather mental processes are said to provide an equally valid account of
7152-418: Is generally understood that they implicitly reflect, though they do not explicitly assert, causal relationships fundamental to reality, and are discovered rather than invented. Scientific laws summarize the results of experiments or observations, usually within a certain range of application. In general, the accuracy of a law does not change when a new theory of the relevant phenomenon is worked out, but rather
7301-418: Is in certain mental respects. But it is impossible for one to be responsible for the way one is in any respect. This is because to be responsible in some situation S , one must have been responsible for the way one was at S . To be responsible for the way one was at S , one must have been responsible for the way one was at S , and so on. At some point in the chain, there must have been an act of origination of
7450-421: Is intended to get Arjuna to perform his duty (i.e., fight in the battle), but he is also claiming that being a successful moral agent requires being mindful of the wider circumstances in which one finds oneself. Paramahansa Yogananda also said, "Freedom means the power to act by soul guidance, not by the compulsions of desires and habits. Obeying the ego leads to bondage; obeying the soul brings liberation." In
7599-417: Is needed in the legal system. Derk Pereboom defends a skeptical position about free will he calls hard incompatibilism . In his view, we cannot have free will if our actions are causally determined by factors beyond our control, or if our actions are indeterministic events – if they happen by chance. Pereboom conceives of free will as the control in action required for moral responsibility in
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#17327824539467748-505: Is one of the main goals of science. The fact that laws have never been observed to be violated does not preclude testing them at increased accuracy or in new kinds of conditions to confirm whether they continue to hold, or whether they break, and what can be discovered in the process. It is always possible for laws to be invalidated or proven to have limitations, by repeatable experimental evidence, should any be observed. Well-established laws have indeed been invalidated in some special cases, but
7897-409: Is only one possible future and is therefore not compatible with libertarian free will. As consequent of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarian explanations that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior – theory unknown to many of the early writers on free will. Incompatibilist theories can be categorised based on
8046-500: Is only vanity that causes us to regard ourselves as the agent in charge of these actions. However, Krishna adds this caveat: "... [But] the Man who knows the relation between the forces of Nature and actions, witnesses how some forces of Nature work upon other forces of Nature, and becomes [not] their slave..." When we are ignorant of the relationship between forces of Nature, we become passive victims of nomological facts. Krishna's admonition
8195-419: Is perhaps more relevant. Despite this, hard determinism has grown less popular in present times, given scientific suggestions that determinism is false – yet the intention of their position is sustained by hard incompatibilism. One kind of incompatibilism, metaphysical libertarianism holds onto a concept of free will that requires that the agent be able to take more than one possible course of action under
8344-400: Is related to determinism , but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be fated externally (see for instance theological determinism ). Destiny likewise is related to determinism, but makes no specific claim of physical determinism. Even with physical indeterminism an event could still be destined to occur. Destiny implies there
8493-491: Is that if a person has free will, then they are the ultimate cause of their actions. If determinism is true, then all of a person's choices are caused by events and facts outside their control. So, if everything someone does is caused by events and facts outside their control, then they cannot be the ultimate cause of their actions. Therefore, they cannot have free will. This argument has also been challenged by various compatibilist philosophers. A third argument for incompatibilism
8642-598: Is that it equivocates on the notions of abilities and necessities, or that the free will evoked to make any given choice is really an illusion and the choice had been made all along, oblivious to its "decider". David Lewis suggests that compatibilists are only committed to the ability to do something otherwise if different circumstances had actually obtained in the past. Using T , F for "true" and "false" and ? for undecided, there are exactly nine positions regarding determinism/free will that consist of any two of these three possibilities: Incompatibilism may occupy any of
8791-480: Is that of incompatibilists , namely, that if the world is deterministic, then our feeling that we are free to choose an action is simply an illusion . Metaphysical libertarianism is the form of incompatibilism which posits that determinism is false and free will is possible (at least some people have free will). This view is associated with non-materialist constructions, including both traditional dualism , as well as models supporting more minimal criteria; such as
8940-441: Is the dominant causal factor in determining one's choices, and one's choices are morally wrong, then one should be held accountable for those choices, regardless of genes and other such factors. In law, there is a known exception to the assumption that moral culpability lies in either individual character or freely willed acts. The insanity defense – or its corollary, diminished responsibility (a sort of appeal to
9089-425: Is the mathematical consequence of the 3-dimensionality of space . One strategy in the search for the most fundamental laws of nature is to search for the most general mathematical symmetry group that can be applied to the fundamental interactions. Conservation laws are fundamental laws that follow from the homogeneity of space, time and phase , in other words symmetry . Conservation laws can be expressed using
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#17327824539469238-414: Is the notion that all propositions, whether about the past, present, or future, are either true or false. This creates a unique problem for free will given that propositions about the future already have a truth value in the present (that is it is already determined as either true or false), and is referred to as the problem of future contingents . Omniscience is the capacity to know everything that there
9387-616: Is the origin of this position of Spinoza. "If a man is Not on the road to destruction, then he has not taken the path that ONLY SEEMS right to him." P.F. Strawson is a major example of a contemporary compatibilist. His paper "Freedom and Resentment," which adduces reactive attitudes, has been widely cited as an important response to incompatibilist accounts of free will. Other compatibilists, who have been inspired by Strawson's paper, are as follows: Gary Watson, Susan Wolf, R. Jay Wallace, Paul Russell, and David Shoemaker . Daniel Dennett asks why anyone would care about whether someone had
9536-412: Is therefore argued that it is doubtful that one can praise or blame someone for performing an action generated randomly by his nervous system (without there being any non-physical agency responsible for the observed probabilistic outcome). Hard determinists (not to be confused with fatalists ) often use liberty in practical moral considerations, rather than a notion of a free will. Indeed, faced with
9685-471: Is to know (included in which are all future events), and is a property often attributed to a creator deity. Omniscience implies the existence of destiny. Some authors have claimed that free will cannot coexist with omniscience. One argument asserts that an omniscient creator not only implies destiny but a form of high level predeterminism such as hard theological determinism or predestination – that they have independently fixed all events and outcomes in
9834-510: The Pauli exclusion principle for fermions and in Bose–Einstein condensation for bosons . Special relativity uses rapidity to express motion according to the symmetries of hyperbolic rotation , a transformation mixing space and time. Symmetry between inertial and gravitational mass results in general relativity . The inverse square law of interactions mediated by massless bosons
9983-459: The convection–diffusion equation and Boltzmann transport equation , which have their roots in the continuity equation. Classical mechanics, including Newton's laws , Lagrange's equations , Hamilton's equations , etc., can be derived from the following principle: where S {\displaystyle {\mathcal {S}}} is the action ; the integral of the Lagrangian of
10132-412: The fallacy of the single cause ) – can be used to argue that the guilty deed was not the product of a guilty mind. In such cases, the legal systems of most Western societies assume that the person is in some way not at fault, because his actions were a consequence of abnormal brain function (implying brain function is a deterministic causal agent of mind and motive). The argument from luck
10281-440: The frontal lobe reduces the ability to weigh uncertain risks and make prudent decisions, and therefore leads to an increased likelihood that someone will commit a violent crime. This is true not only of patients with damage to the frontal lobe due to accident or stroke, but also of adolescents, who show reduced frontal lobe activity compared to adults, and even of children who are chronically neglected or mistreated. In each case,
10430-950: The law of conservation of energy can be written as Δ E = 0 {\displaystyle \Delta E=0} , where E {\displaystyle E} is the total amount of energy in the universe. Similarly, the first law of thermodynamics can be written as d U = δ Q − δ W {\displaystyle \mathrm {d} U=\delta Q-\delta W\,} , and Newton's second law can be written as F = d p d t . {\displaystyle \textstyle F={\frac {dp}{dt}}.} While these scientific laws explain what our senses perceive, they are still empirical (acquired by observation or scientific experiment) and so are not like mathematical theorems which can be proved purely by mathematics. Like theories and hypotheses, laws make predictions; specifically, they predict that new observations will conform to
10579-453: The social sciences also contain laws. For example, Zipf's law is a law in the social sciences which is based on mathematical statistics . In these cases, laws may describe general trends or expected behaviors rather than being absolutes. In natural science, impossibility assertions come to be widely accepted as overwhelmingly probable rather than considered proved to the point of being unchallengeable. The basis for this strong acceptance
10728-406: The uncertainty principle . The relevance of such prospective indeterminate activity to free will is, however, contested, even when chaos theory is introduced to magnify the effects of such microscopic events. Below these positions are examined in more detail. Determinism can be divided into causal, logical and theological determinism. Corresponding to each of these different meanings, there arises
10877-474: The (more famous) mass–energy equivalence E = mc is a special case. General relativity is governed by the Einstein field equations , which describe the curvature of space-time due to mass–energy equivalent to the gravitational field. Solving the equation for the geometry of space warped due to the mass distribution gives the metric tensor . Using the geodesic equation, the motion of masses falling along
11026-533: The 2nd, zero resultant acceleration): where p = momentum of body, F ij = force on body i by body j , F ji = force on body j by body i . For a dynamical system the two equations (effectively) combine into one: in which F E = resultant external force (due to any agent not part of system). Body i does not exert a force on itself. From the above, any equation of motion in classical mechanics can be derived. Equations describing fluid flow in various situations can be derived, using
11175-495: The Galilean transformations for low velocities much less than the speed of light c . The magnitudes of 4-vectors are invariants – not "conserved", but the same for all inertial frames (i.e. every observer in an inertial frame will agree on the same value), in particular if A is the four-momentum , the magnitude can derive the famous invariant equation for mass–energy and momentum conservation (see invariant mass ): in which
11324-480: The Lagrangian, is required (in other words it is not as simple as "differentiating a function and setting it to zero, then solving the equations to find the points of maxima and minima etc", rather this idea is applied to the entire "shape" of the function, see calculus of variations for more details on this procedure). Notice L is not the total energy E of the system due to the difference, rather than
11473-581: The Lorentz transformation). Similarly, the Newtonian gravitation law is a low-mass approximation of general relativity, and Coulomb's law is an approximation to quantum electrodynamics at large distances (compared to the range of weak interactions). In such cases it is common to use the simpler, approximate versions of the laws, instead of the more accurate general laws. Laws are constantly being tested experimentally to increasing degrees of precision, which
11622-582: The Western tradition, Baruch Spinoza echoes the Bhagavad Gita ' s point about agents and natural forces, writing "men think themselves free because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant [of those causes]." Krishna is hostile to the influence of passions on our rational faculties, speaking up instead for
11771-641: The ability to consciously veto an action or competing desire. Yet even with physical indeterminism , arguments have been made against libertarianism in that it is difficult to assign Origination (responsibility for "free" indeterministic choices). Free will here is predominantly treated with respect to physical determinism in the strict sense of nomological determinism , although other forms of determinism are also relevant to free will. For example, logical and theological determinism challenge metaphysical libertarianism with ideas of destiny and fate , and biological , cultural and psychological determinism feed
11920-664: The above classical equations of motion and often conservation of mass, energy and momentum. Some elementary examples follow. Some of the more famous laws of nature are found in Isaac Newton 's theories of (now) classical mechanics , presented in his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica , and in Albert Einstein 's theory of relativity . The two postulates of special relativity are not "laws" in themselves, but assumptions of their nature in terms of relative motion . They can be stated as "the laws of physics are
12069-532: The absence of any relevant desire or intention on the part of that person". Another question raised by such non-causal theory, is how an agent acts upon reason, if the said intentional actions are spontaneous. Some non-causal explanations involve invoking panpsychism , the theory that a quality of mind is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both animate and inanimate entities. Event-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will typically rely upon physicalist models of mind (like those of
12218-597: The action (which one is doing), its moral significance, consequences, and alternatives. Mauro suggests that a sense of personal responsibility does not operate or evolve universally among humankind. He argues that it was absent in the successful civilization of the Iroquois . In recent years, research in experimental philosophy has explored whether people's untutored intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility are compatibilist or incompatibilist. Some experimental work has included cross-cultural studies. However,
12367-549: The analogy holds for incapacitation of dangerous criminals. He also argues that the less serious the threat, the more moderate the justifiable method of incapacitation; for certain crimes only monitoring may be needed. In addition, just as we should do what we can, within reasonable bounds, to cure the carriers of the Ebola virus we quarantine, so we should aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate the criminals we incapacitate. Pereboom also proposes that given hard incompatibilism, punishment justified as general deterrence may be legitimate when
12516-436: The assumptions underlying the theory that implied the impossibility be re-examined. Some examples of widely accepted impossibilities in physics are perpetual motion machines , which violate the law of conservation of energy , exceeding the speed of light , which violates the implications of special relativity , the uncertainty principle of quantum mechanics , which asserts the impossibility of simultaneously knowing both
12665-597: The behaviour of a set of dominoes to neural activity in the brain where; "If the brain is nothing but a complex physical object whose states are as much governed by physical laws as any other physical object, then what goes on in our heads is as fixed and determined by prior events as what goes on when one domino topples another in a long row of them." Physical determinism is currently disputed by prominent interpretations of quantum mechanics , and while not necessarily representative of intrinsic indeterminism in nature, fundamental limits of precision in measurement are inherent in
12814-444: The case may be regarding determinism. In contrast, compatibilists hold that free will is compatible with determinism. Some compatibilists even hold that determinism is necessary for free will, arguing that choice involves preference for one course of action over another, requiring a sense of how choices will turn out. Compatibilists thus consider the debate between libertarians and hard determinists over free will vs. determinism
12963-399: The case of compressible flow such as occurs in transonic and supersonic flight; Hooke's law only applies to strain below the elastic limit ; Boyle's law applies with perfect accuracy only to the ideal gas, etc. These laws remain useful, but only under the specified conditions where they apply. Many laws take mathematical forms, and thus can be stated as an equation; for example,
13112-421: The compatibilist), yet they presuppose physical indeterminism, in which certain indeterministic events are said to be caused by the agent. A number of event-causal accounts of free will have been created, referenced here as deliberative indeterminism , centred accounts , and efforts of will theory . The first two accounts do not require free will to be a fundamental constituent of the universe. Ordinary randomness
13261-512: The concept of personal responsibility (or some popularization thereof) may include (for example) parents, managers, politicians, technocrats , large-group awareness trainings (LGATs), and religious groups. Some see individual responsibility as an important component of neoliberalism . Depending on how a philosopher conceives of free will , they will have different views on moral responsibility. Metaphysical libertarians think actions are not always causally determined, allowing for
13410-466: The context of its capacity to determine future events. Despite this, predeterminism is often considered as independent of causal determinism. The term predeterminism is also frequently used in the context of biology and heredity, in which case it represents a form of biological determinism . The term predeterminism suggests not just a determining of all events, but the prior and deliberately conscious determining of all events (therefore done, presumably, by
13559-439: The control (or freedom) condition (which answers the question 'did the individual doing the action in question have free will?') and the epistemic condition, the former of which is explored in the above discussion. The epistemic condition, in contrast to the control condition, focuses on the question 'was the individual aware of, for instance, the moral implications of what she did?' Not all philosophers think this condition to be
13708-438: The debate about whether people naturally have compatibilist or incompatibilist intuitions has not come out overwhelmingly in favor of one view or the other, finding evidence for both views. For instance, when people are presented with abstract cases that ask if a person could be morally responsible for an immoral act when they could not have done otherwise, people tend to say no, or give incompatibilist answers. When presented with
13857-412: The definition of generalized momentum, there is the symmetry: The Hamiltonian as a function of generalized coordinates and momenta has the general form: Newton's laws of motion They are low-limit solutions to relativity . Alternative formulations of Newtonian mechanics are Lagrangian and Hamiltonian mechanics. The laws can be summarized by two equations (since the 1st is a special case of
14006-413: The determination of outcome as their physical processes (see non-reductive physicalism ). Although at the time quantum mechanics (and physical indeterminism ) was only in the initial stages of acceptance, in his book Miracles: A preliminary study C.S. Lewis stated the logical possibility that if the physical world were proved indeterministic this would provide an entry point to describe an action of
14155-735: The development of compatibilist models. Separate classes of compatibilism and incompatibilism may even be formed to represent these. Below are the classic arguments bearing upon the dilemma and its underpinnings. Incompatibilism is the position that free will and determinism are logically incompatible, and that the major question regarding whether or not people have free will is thus whether or not their actions are determined. "Hard determinists", such as d'Holbach , are those incompatibilists who accept determinism and reject free will. In contrast, " metaphysical libertarians ", such as Thomas Reid , Peter van Inwagen , and Robert Kane , are those incompatibilists who accept free will and deny determinism, holding
14304-404: The dynamics of the system for all times. The term "path" simply refers to a curve traced out by the system in terms of the generalized coordinates in the configuration space , i.e. the curve q ( t ), parameterized by time (see also parametric equation for this concept). The action is a functional rather than a function , since it depends on the Lagrangian, and the Lagrangian depends on
14453-423: The early Greek stoics (for example, Chrysippus ), and some modern philosophers lament the lack of progress over all these centuries. On one hand, humans have a strong sense of freedom, which leads them to believe that they have free will. On the other hand, an intuitive feeling of free will could be mistaken. It is difficult to reconcile the intuitive evidence that conscious decisions are causally effective with
14602-450: The emerging field of neuroethics , argue, on the basis of such cases, that our current notion of moral responsibility is founded on libertarian (and dualist ) intuitions. They argue that cognitive neuroscience research (e.g. neuroscience of free will ) is undermining these intuitions by showing that the brain is responsible for our actions, not only in cases of florid psychosis , but also in less obvious situations. For example, damage to
14751-525: The free will required for moral responsibility in the desert-involving sense is not in the offing. However, he also contends that by contrast with the backward-looking, desert-involving sense of moral responsibility, forward-looking senses are compatible with causal determination. For instance, causally determined agents who act badly might justifiably be blamed with the aim of forming faulty character, reconciling impaired relationships, and protecting others from harm they are apt to cause. Pereboom proposes that
14900-400: The general continuity equation (for a conserved quantity) can be written in differential form as: where ρ is some quantity per unit volume, J is the flux of that quantity (change in quantity per unit time per unit area). Intuitively, the divergence (denoted ∇⋅) of a vector field is a measure of flux diverging radially outwards from a point, so the negative is the amount piling up at
15049-537: The ghosts and gods and that it cannot survive in a naturalistic environment devoid of miracles". We cannot punish another for wrong acts committed, contends Waller, because the causal forces which precede and have brought about the acts may ultimately be reduced to luck, namely, factors over which the individual has no control. One may not be blamed even for one's character traits, he maintains, since they too are heavily influenced by evolutionary, environmental, and genetic factors (inter alia). Although his view would fall in
15198-416: The given law. Laws can be falsified if they are found in contradiction with new data. Some laws are only approximations of other more general laws, and are good approximations with a restricted domain of applicability. For example, Newtonian dynamics (which is based on Galilean transformations) is the low-speed limit of special relativity (since the Galilean transformation is the low-speed approximation to
15347-570: The goal of the legal system is to punish people for misdeeds, require the libertarian intuition. Many forms of ethically realistic and consequentialist approaches to justice, which are aimed at promoting future welfare rather than retribution, can survive even a hard determinist interpretation of free will. Accordingly, the legal system and notions of justice can thus be maintained even in the face of emerging neuroscientific evidence undermining libertarian intuitions of free will. Neuroscientist David Eagleman maintains similar ideas. Eagleman says that
15496-478: The guilty party can, they argue, be said to have less responsibility for his actions. Greene and Cohen predict that, as such examples become more common and well known, jurors' interpretations of free will and moral responsibility will move away from the intuitive libertarian notion that currently underpins them. They also argue that the legal system does not require this libertarian interpretation. Rather, they suggest that only retributive notions of justice , in which
15645-510: The idea that all behaviors, beliefs, and desires are fixed by our genetic endowment and our biochemical makeup, the latter of which is affected by both genes and environment, cultural determinism and psychological determinism . Combinations and syntheses of determinist theses, such as bio-environmental determinism, are even more common. Suggestions have been made that hard determinism need not maintain strict determinism, where something near to, like that informally known as adequate determinism ,
15794-410: The idea that freedom of action consists simply in "voluntary" behavior. They insist, rather, that free will means that someone must be the "ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. They must be causa sui , in the traditional phrase. Being responsible for one's choices is the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then,
15943-489: The implications of whether it exists or not constitute some of the longest running debates of philosophy. Some conceive of free will as the ability to act beyond the limits of external influences or wishes. Some conceive free will to be the capacity to make choices undetermined by past events. Determinism suggests that only one course of events is possible, which is inconsistent with a libertarian model of free will. Ancient Greek philosophy identified this issue, which remains
16092-448: The incompatibility of omnipotence with a good creator deity (i.e. if a deity knew what they were going to choose, then they are responsible for letting them choose it). Predeterminism is the idea that all events are determined in advance. Predeterminism is the philosophy that all events of history , past, present and future, have been decided or are known (by God , fate , or some other force), including human actions. Predeterminism
16241-407: The indeterminacy of certain physical events – and the outcomes of these events could therefore be considered caused by the agent. Models of volition have been constructed in which it is seen as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of physical indeterminism. An example of this approach is that of Robert Kane , where he hypothesizes that "in each case, the indeterminism
16390-401: The legal justice system ought to become more forward looking. He says it is wrong to ask questions of narrow culpability, rather than focusing on what is important: what needs to change in a criminal's behavior and brain. Eagleman is not saying that no one is responsible for their crimes, but rather that the "sentencing phase" should correspond with modern neuroscientific evidence. To Eagleman, it
16539-436: The machine had a fixed state transition table, then it could not be morally responsible. If the machine could modify its table, then the machine's designer still retained some moral responsibility. Patrick Hew argued that for an artificial system to be morally responsible, its rules for behaviour and the mechanisms for supplying those rules must not be supplied entirely by external humans. He further argued that such systems are
16688-497: The machine's behaviour ought to be attributed to the machine and not its designers or operators. First, he argued that modern machines are inherently unpredictable (to some degree), but perform tasks that need to be performed yet cannot be handled by simpler means. Second, that there are increasing 'layers of obscurity' between manufacturers and system, as hand coded programs are replaced with more sophisticated means. Third, in systems that have rules of operation that can be changed during
16837-451: The necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the consequence argument . Peter van Inwagen remarks that C.D. Broad had a version of the consequence argument as early as the 1930s. The difficulty of this argument for some compatibilists lies in the fact that it entails the impossibility that one could have chosen other than one has. For example, if Jane
16986-447: The new formulations created to explain the discrepancies generalize upon, rather than overthrow, the originals. That is, the invalidated laws have been found to be only close approximations, to which other terms or factors must be added to cover previously unaccounted-for conditions, e.g. very large or very small scales of time or space, enormous speeds or masses, etc. Thus, rather than unchanging knowledge, physical laws are better viewed as
17135-517: The nine positions except (5), (8) or (3), which last corresponds to soft determinism . Position (1) is hard determinism , and position (2) is libertarianism . The position (1) of hard determinism adds to the table the contention that D implies FW is untrue, and the position (2) of libertarianism adds the contention that FW implies D is untrue. Position (9) may be called hard incompatibilism if one interprets ? as meaning both concepts are of dubious value. Compatibilism itself may occupy any of
17284-413: The nine positions, that is, there is no logical contradiction between determinism and free will, and either or both may be true or false in principle. However, the most common meaning attached to compatibilism is that some form of determinism is true and yet we have some form of free will, position (3). Alex Rosenberg makes an extrapolation of physical determinism as inferred on the macroscopic scale by
17433-749: The operation of the machine. A more extensive review of the arguments may be found in Patrick Hew's 2014 article on artificial moral agents. Physical law Scientific laws or laws of science are statements, based on repeated experiments or observations , that describe or predict a range of natural phenomena . The term law has diverse usage in many cases (approximate, accurate, broad, or narrow) across all fields of natural science ( physics , chemistry , astronomy , geoscience , biology ). Laws are developed from data and can be further developed through mathematics ; in all cases they are directly or indirectly based on empirical evidence . It
17582-404: The origin of the universe. In the case of predeterminism, this chain of events has been pre-established, and human actions cannot interfere with the outcomes of this pre-established chain. Predeterminism can be used to mean such pre-established causal determinism, in which case it is categorised as a specific type of determinism . It can also be used interchangeably with causal determinism – in
17731-451: The outcome of an experiment. Laws differ from hypotheses and postulates , which are proposed during the scientific process before and during validation by experiment and observation. Hypotheses and postulates are not laws, since they have not been verified to the same degree, although they may lead to the formulation of laws. Laws are narrower in scope than scientific theories , which may entail one or several laws. Science distinguishes
17880-659: The past and the present dictate the future entirely and necessarily by rigid natural laws, that every occurrence results inevitably from prior events. Quantum mechanics poses a serious challenge to this view. Fundamental debate continues over whether the physical universe is likely to be deterministic . Although the scientific method cannot be used to rule out indeterminism with respect to violations of causal closure , it can be used to identify indeterminism in natural law. Interpretations of quantum mechanics at present are both deterministic and indeterministic , and are being constrained by ongoing experimentation. Destiny or fate
18029-406: The path q ( t ), so the action depends on the entire "shape" of the path for all times (in the time interval from t 1 to t 2 ). Between two instants of time, there are infinitely many paths, but one for which the action is stationary (to the first order) is the true path. The stationary value for the entire continuum of Lagrangian values corresponding to some path, not just one value of
18178-581: The penalties do not involve undermining an agent's capacity to live a meaningful, flourishing life, since justifying such moderate penalties need not invoke desert. Compatibilists contend that even if determinism were true, it would still be possible for us to have free will. The Hindu text The Bhagavad Gita offers one very early compatibilist account. Facing the prospect of going to battle against kinsmen to whom he has bonds, Arjuna despairs. Krishna attempts to assuage Arjuna's anxieties. He argues that forces of nature come together to produce actions, and it
18327-434: The phrase "free will" made any sense (compare with theological noncognitivism , a similar stance on the existence of God ). He also took the view that the truth of determinism was irrelevant. He believed that the defining feature of voluntary behavior was that individuals have the ability to postpone a decision long enough to reflect or deliberate upon the consequences of a choice: "...the will in truth, signifies nothing but
18476-565: The physical system between two times t 1 and t 2 . The kinetic energy of the system is T (a function of the rate of change of the configuration of the system), and potential energy is V (a function of the configuration and its rate of change). The configuration of a system which has N degrees of freedom is defined by generalized coordinates q = ( q 1 , q 2 , ... q N ). There are generalized momenta conjugate to these coordinates, p = ( p 1 , p 2 , ..., p N ), where: The action and Lagrangian both contain
18625-692: The position and the momentum of a particle, and Bell's theorem : no physical theory of local hidden variables can ever reproduce all of the predictions of quantum mechanics. Some laws reflect mathematical symmetries found in nature (e.g. the Pauli exclusion principle reflects identity of electrons, conservation laws reflect homogeneity of space , time, and Lorentz transformations reflect rotational symmetry of spacetime ). Many fundamental physical laws are mathematical consequences of various symmetries of space, time, or other aspects of nature. Specifically, Noether's theorem connects some conservation laws to certain symmetries. For example, conservation of energy
18774-468: The possibility of free will and thus moral responsibility. All libertarians are also incompatibilists; for they think that if causal determinism were true of human action, people would not have free will. Accordingly, some libertarians subscribe to the principle of alternate possibilities, which posits that moral responsibility requires that people could have acted differently. Phenomenological considerations are sometimes invoked by incompatibilists to defend
18923-416: The possibility that determinism requires a completely different moral system, some proponents say "So much the worse for free will!". Clarence Darrow , the famous defense attorney, pleaded the innocence of his clients, Leopold and Loeb , by invoking such a notion of hard determinism. During his summation, he declared: What has this boy to do with it? He was not his own father; he was not his own mother; he
19072-520: The property of responsibility and speculates that the idea of moral responsibility may be "a purely metaphysical hankering". In this view, the denial of moral responsibility is the moral hankering to be able to assert that one has some fictitious right such as asserting PARENTAL rights instead of parent responsibility. Bruce Waller has argued, in Against Moral Responsibility (MIT Press), that moral responsibility "belongs with
19221-476: The same category as the views of philosophers like Dennett who argue against moral responsibility, Waller's view differs in an important manner: He tries to, as he puts it, "rescue" free will from moral responsibility (See Chapter 3). This move goes against the commonly held assumption that how one feels about free will is ipso facto a claim about moral responsibility. In philosophical discussions of moral responsibility, two necessary conditions are usually cited:
19370-512: The same in all inertial frames " and "the speed of light is constant and has the same value in all inertial frames". The said postulates lead to the Lorentz transformations – the transformation law between two frame of references moving relative to each other. For any 4-vector this replaces the Galilean transformation law from classical mechanics. The Lorentz transformations reduce to
19519-457: The same process. Deliberative indeterminism has been referenced by Daniel Dennett and John Martin Fischer . An obvious objection to such a view is that an agent cannot be assigned ownership over their decisions (or preferences used to make those decisions) to any greater degree than that of a compatibilist model. Centred accounts propose that for any given decision between two possibilities,
19668-417: The scope of the law's application, since the mathematics or statement representing the law does not change. As with other kinds of scientific knowledge, scientific laws do not express absolute certainty, as mathematical laws do. A scientific law may be contradicted, restricted, or extended by future observations. A law can often be formulated as one or several statements or equations , so that it can predict
19817-413: The sense involving deserved blame and praise, punishment and reward. While he acknowledges that libertarian agent causation, the capacity of agents as substances to cause actions without being causally determined by factors beyond their control, is still a possibility, he regards it as unlikely against the backdrop of the most defensible physical theories. Without libertarian agent causation, Pereboom thinks
19966-453: The strength of reason will be considered for each option, yet there is still a probability the weaker candidate will be chosen. An obvious objection to such a view is that decisions are explicitly left up to chance, and origination or responsibility cannot be assigned for any given decision. Efforts of will theory is related to the role of will power in decision making. It suggests that the indeterminacy of agent volition processes could map to
20115-554: The sum: The following general approaches to classical mechanics are summarized below in the order of establishment. They are equivalent formulations. Newton's is commonly used due to simplicity, but Hamilton's and Lagrange's equations are more general, and their range can extend into other branches of physics with suitable modifications. S = ∫ t 1 t 2 L d t {\displaystyle {\mathcal {S}}=\int _{t_{1}}^{t_{2}}L\,\mathrm {d} t\,\!} Using
20264-411: The two can coexist. Moral responsibility does not necessarily equate to legal responsibility . A person is legally responsible for an event when a legal system is liable to penalise that person for that event. Although it may often be the case that when a person is morally responsible for an act, they are also legally responsible for it, the two states do not always coincide. Preferential promoters of
20413-417: The type of indeterminism they require; uncaused events, non-deterministically caused events, and agent/substance-caused events. Non-causal accounts of incompatibilist free will do not require a free action to be caused by either an agent or a physical event. They either rely upon a world that is not causally closed, or physical indeterminism. Non-causal accounts often claim that each intentional action requires
20562-429: The underlying indeterminacy of the physical construct. This relationship, however, requires a causative role over probabilities that is questionable, and it is far from established that brain activity responsible for human action can be affected by such events. Secondarily, these incompatibilist models are dependent upon the relationship between action and conscious volition, as studied in the neuroscience of free will . It
20711-572: The universe in advance, and is a famous doctrine of the Calvinists in Christian theology . Predestination is often considered a form of hard theological determinism . Moral responsibility In philosophy , moral responsibility is the status of morally deserving praise , blame , reward , or punishment for an act or omission in accordance with one's moral obligations . Deciding what (if anything) counts as "morally obligatory"
20860-409: The universe in advance. In such a case, even if an individual could have influence over their lower level physical system, their choices in regard to this cannot be their own, as is the case with libertarian free will. Omniscience features as an incompatible-properties argument for the existence of God , known as the argument from free will , and is closely related to other such arguments, for example
21009-454: The value of heeding the dictates of one's own nature: "Even a wise man acts under the impulse of his nature. Of what use is restraint?" Spinoza similarly identifies the taming of one's passions as a way to extricate oneself from merely being passive in the face of external forces and a way toward following our own natures. Jesus asserted that "There is a path that SEEMS right to a man which leads to Destruction". The contrapositive (equivalent)
21158-399: The view that some form of indeterminism is true. Another view is that of hard incompatibilists, which state that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism . Traditional arguments for incompatibilism are based on an " intuition pump ": if a person is like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or
21307-472: The view that the physical world can be explained entirely by physical law . The conflict between intuitively felt freedom and natural law arises when either causal closure or physical determinism ( nomological determinism ) is asserted. With causal closure, no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain, and with physical determinism, the future is determined entirely by preceding events (cause and effect). The puzzle of reconciling 'free will' with
21456-464: The way that a person's actions are evaluated morally. For instance, a person driving drunk may make it home without incident, and yet this action of drunk driving might seem more morally objectionable if someone happens to jaywalk along his path (getting hit by the car). This argument can be traced back to David Hume . If physical indeterminism is true, then those events that are not determined are scientifically described as probabilistic or random. It
21605-438: The world is deterministic or not. Derk Pereboom has defended hard incompatibilism, identifying a variety of positions where free will is irrelevant to indeterminism/determinism, among them the following: Pereboom calls positions 3 and 4 soft determinism , position 1 a form of hard determinism , position 6 a form of classical libertarianism , and any position that includes having F as compatibilism . John Locke denied that
21754-468: Was formulated by Carl Ginet in the 1960s and has received much attention in the modern literature. The simplified argument runs along these lines: if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over the consequences of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are
21903-549: Was introduced by Christian philosophy (4th century CE). It has traditionally meant (until the Enlightenment proposed its own meanings) lack of necessity in human will, so that "the will is free" meant "the will does not have to be such as it is". This requirement was universally embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists. The underlying questions are whether we have control over our actions, and if so, what sort of control, and to what extent. These questions predate
22052-707: Was not his own grandparents. All of this was handed to him. He did not surround himself with governesses and wealth. He did not make himself. And yet he is to be compelled to pay. Paul the Apostle , in his Epistle to the Romans addresses the question of moral responsibility as follows: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?" In this view, individuals can still be dishonoured for their acts even though those acts were ultimately completely determined by God. Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, researchers in
22201-495: Was the fact that nothing hindered us from doing or choosing something that made us have control over them". According to Susanne Bobzien , the notion of incompatibilist free will is perhaps first identified in the works of Alexander of Aphrodisias (3rd century CE): "what makes us have control over things is the fact that we are causally undetermined in our decision and thus can freely decide between doing/choosing or not doing/choosing them". The term "free will" ( liberum arbitrium )
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