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121-587: During the Second Afghan Civil War , it emerged as one of the major actors in Kabul and some other parts of the country. Political Islamism was the ideology of most of its key leaders, but the party gradually tilted towards its Hazara ethnic support base and became the key vehicle of the community's political demands and aspirations. Its ideological background and ethnic support base has continuously shaped its character and political agenda. Through

242-522: A balance between ethnicity and religion. The result was an Islamic ideology used to express and further the rights of a historically disadvantaged community; a strong desire for unity of the Hazaras was its main driving force. In fact, ideologically, Nasr's trademark combination of ethnic nationalism and radical Islamism increasingly became the ideology of Wahdat, an ethnic discourse dominated by, and expressed through, an Islamic language. Abdul Ali Mazari ,

363-575: A battleground for the most devastating and atrocious conflicts. Wahdat became an important part of the conflict for nearly three years. This provoked intense internal debates within the party. The questions of external alignments further inflamed the internal tensions. Muhammad Akbari rose as leader of a pro-Massoud camp within the party, challenging the wisdom of Abdul Ali Mazari's refusal to join Burhanuddin Rabbani's and Massoud's government and his participation in an alliance with Hekmatyar ,

484-480: A center of political leadership and power for the new party beyond and away from the local factional and personal rivalries of local commanders. What contrasted the negotiation process for the formation of Wahdat with similar previous efforts was that it was essentially a process initiated from within the Hazarajat region. The process was informed and shaped by the realities of war, factionalism, and loss of control of

605-629: A coalition of separate parties in Tehran. The fragmentation of the Hazara mujahedin had given the Iranians effective leverage to control small organizations, often tied to various religious authorities and government agencies in Iran. The Iranians feared that a single party based inside Afghanistan could mean they would lose control over the movement. Furthermore, the increasingly evident ethnic discourse within

726-455: A former member of Nasr and first secretary general of Wahdat, was the main agent of the explicit transformation of the party into a platform for the rights and political demands of the Hazaras. When he arrived in Kabul in 1992, he further opened the door of the party to Hazaras of all social and ideological backgrounds. A group of former leftists and government bureaucrats joined the inner circle of

847-526: A half million refugees to Pakistan ": Jamiat-e Islami , Junbish-i Milli , Hezb-i Wahdat , Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin and Ittehad-e Islami . As of November 1995, the Taliban also engaged in bombing and shelling Kabul, causing many civilians to be killed or injured. As of 28 April, an interim government under interim President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi , with interim minister of defense Ahmad Shah Massoud , claimed to be governing Afghanistan, as agreed in

968-688: A large number of rockets, Hekmatyar's forces would not have been able to target and destroy half of Kabul." The Taliban ('the students') have been described as a movement of religious students ( talib ) from the Pashtun areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan who had been educated in traditional Islamic schools in Pakistan . The movement was founded in September 1994, promising to "rid Afghanistan of warlords and criminals". Several analysts state that at least since October 1994, Pakistan and especially

1089-527: A more confrontational approach within the government on the issues of development and reconstruction plans in Hazara areas. It is alleged that his powers as the Minister of Planning were being transferred to the more powerful and assertive finance ministry, under the leadership of the western educated technocrat Ashraf Ghani . Mohaqiq left the cabinet in controversy in 2004. Khalili and Mohaqeq have since engaged in personal rivalry and competition for power within

1210-563: A religious party, Hezb-e Wahdat can be credited with an openness and inclusiveness exceptional in a conservative society like Afghanistan. In an exceptional move among the Afghan mujahedin, the party included ten women members in its central council and had devoted an entire committee for women's affairs that was headed by a university-educated Hazara woman. The main point, however, is that the movement gradually tilted towards its ethnic support base. Subsequent political developments in Kabul exposed

1331-516: A resistance front in the Balkhab district of Saripul . Wahdat It never managed to recover after the fall of Mazar e sharif and Bamyan into the hands of the Taliban, because of the high losses in its rank and file and at the leadership levels. Thus Hezb-e Wahdat participated in the post-Taliban political process with little of its past political and military weight. Wahdat still claimed to represent

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1452-450: A result of their loss of control over their military commanders. The path to unity had been a painstakingly long and complex process, which experienced repeated setbacks and obstacles, because each party sought to maximize their role in the process. This turned out to be a major contentious issue throughout several rounds of negotiations in the run up to formation of the party. Smaller parties pressed for equal representation of all groups while

1573-402: A role in the party. Ideas for reform and restructuring the party were presented to Karim Khalili and Muhammad Mohaqiq, who were seen as the key leaders. While the need to change and broaden the party leadership has frequently been acknowledged by both Mohaqiq and Khalili, most reformists (including clerics) have been frustrated by lack of practical will and determination of the senior leaders. With

1694-423: A single political leadership. It was created in response to a strong urge for unity among the Hazara leaders as well as commoners. In its organizational hierarchy, the party included the following key structures: The search for change and unity was instigated and led in particular by the senior leaders of the two main organizations, Pasdaran and Nasr, which were the most exposed to the threat of deligitimisation as

1815-542: A week after Hekmatyar attempted to shoot down the plane of President Mujaddidi. Furthermore, as part of the peace talks Hekmatyar was demanding the departure of Dostum's forces, which would have tilted the scales in his favour. This led to fighting between Dostum and Hekmatyar. On 30 May 1992, during fighting between the forces of Dostum's Junbish-i Milli and Hekmatyar's Hizb-i Islami in the southeast of Kabul, both sides used artillery and rockets, killing and injuring an unknown number of civilians. In June 1992, as scheduled in

1936-916: The Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami ('Islamic Revolution Movement'), became the Vice President of Afghanistan in the Mujahideen government. However, when the Mujahideen leaders opened their weapons at each other and the civil war in Afghanistan started, he resigned from his post and forbade the troops loyal to him from taking part in the war. He remained in Pakistan and tried his best to stop the war between Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. In 1996,

2057-557: The Harakat-i-Islami , and Hezb-i Wahdat 's Akbari faction. Such alliances did not stop the advance and victories of the Taliban. On 27 September 1996, the Taliban, took control of Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan . Jamiat-e Islami (‘Islamic Society’) was a political party of ethnic Tajiks , and included one of the strongest mujahideen militias in Afghanistan since 1979. Its military wing

2178-779: The Mohammad Najibullah regime in 1992, Sayyaf's organization's human rights record became noticeably worse, underlined by their involvement in the infamous massacres and rampages in the Hazara Kabul neighbourhood of Afshar in 1992–1993 during the Battle of Kabul . Sayyaf's faction was responsible for, "repeated human butchery", when his faction of Mujahideen turned on civilians and the Shia Hezb-i Wahdat group in west Kabul starting May 1992. Amnesty International reported that Sayyaf's forces rampaged through

2299-696: The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Junbish-i Milli and Jamiat-e Islami in June shelled areas south of Kabul, Ittehad-e Islami and Hezb-i Wahdat were fighting each other in west Kabul. At the end of June 1992, Burhanuddin Rabbani took over the interim Presidency from Mujaddidi, as provided in the Peshawar Accords – a paralyzed 'interim government' though, right from its proclamation in April 1992. In

2420-537: The Peshawar Accords . But soon, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin again infiltrated Kabul trying to take power. This forced other parties to advance on the capital as well. Already before 28 April, the Mujahideen forces that had fought against Russian troops with help from the US had taken command of Kabul and Afghanistan. Hekmatyar had asked other groups such as Harakat-Inqilab-i-Islami and

2541-477: The Republic of Afghanistan in April 1992. The Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin , led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and supported by Pakistan ’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), refused to form a coalition government and tried to seize Kabul with the help of Khalqists . On 25 April 1992 fighting broke out between three, and later five or six, mujahideen armies. Alliances between the combatants were transitory throughout

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2662-648: The Russian Federation halted its support to it. On 16 April 1992 Afghan President Mohammad Najibullah stepped down and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was dissolved. Several mujahideen parties started negotiations to form a national coalition government. But one group, the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar , presumably supported and directed by Pakistan 's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), did not join

2783-418: The Second Afghan Civil War , took place between 28 April 1992—the date a new interim Afghan government was supposed to replace the Republic of Afghanistan of President Mohammad Najibullah —and the Taliban 's occupation of Kabul establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on 27 September 1996. The war immediately followed the 1989–1992 civil war with the mujahideen victory and dissolution of

2904-724: The Australian National University, Amin Saikal , confirmed the Pakistani support in 1992 for Hekmatyar: "Pakistan was keen to gear up for a breakthrough in Central Asia ...Islamabad could not possibly expect the new Islamic government leaders ... to subordinate their own nationalist objectives in order to help Pakistan realize its regional ambitions. ... Had it not been for the ISI's logistic support and supply of

3025-400: The Hazara leftists. On the other hand, the leftists did not seek any official positions within the party ranks. They were mostly concerned with ensuring their personal security and avoiding persecution by the mujahedin. The idea of building an Islamic government and promoting religious fraternity rapidly ran into difficulties. Hezb-e Wahdat's stance as the representative of the Hazara mujahedin

3146-403: The Hazarajat, far away from leaderships in Kabul. The situation of Hezb-e Wahdat in early 2009 and its political fragmentation can best be explained by the leadership style of its leaders. In the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, Khalili was widely recognised as leader of the party. In April 2002 he flew to Kabul from Bamyan, in a move that shifted the party headquarters to Kabul. He

3267-644: The Hazaras and the Hazarajat region fell under its control as the Taliban regime was overthrown. In the Interim Administration (2001–2002), Wahdat had a modest weight; Muhammad Mohaqiq represented the party as one of the deputy chairmen and Minister of Planning. Members of Harakat and Akbari's Wahdat mostly represented the Shiites in the Interim Administration as well as the Transitional Administration in 2002-2003. Moreover, in

3388-502: The Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin group. In January 1994, Dostum 's Junbish-i Milli forces and Mazari's Hezb-i Wahdat joined sides with Hekmatyar 's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin . Fighting this year also broke out in the northern town of Mazar-i-Sharif . In November 1994, the new Deobandi jihadist militia known as Taliban conquered Kandahar city and by January 1995 they controlled 12 Afghan provinces. In 1995,

3509-827: The Hezb-i Wahdat and the Ittehad-e Islami engaged in violent street battles against each other. With the support of Saudi Arabia, Sayyaf's forces repeatedly attacked western suburbs of Kabul resulting in heavy civilian casualties. Likewise, Mazari's forces were also accused of attacking civilian targets in the west. Mazari acknowledged taking Pashtun civilians as prisoners, but defended the action by saying that Sayyaf's forces took Hazaras first. Mazari's group started cooperating with Hekmatyar's group from January 1993. The Junbish-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan ('National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan') militia of former communist and ethnic Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum

3630-642: The Islamic State of Afghanistan and held some posts in the government. Soon, however, conflict broke out between the Hazara Hezb-i Wahdat of Mazari, the Wahabbi Pashtun Ittehad-e Islami of warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf supported by Saudi Arabia. The Islamic State's defense minister Ahmad Shah Massoud tried to mediate between the factions with some success, but the ceasefire remained only temporary. As of June 1992,

3751-527: The Kabul government within the entire Hazarajat region Henceforth Bamyan was the center of important political developments. It injected a new stimulus into the ongoing unification process among the mujahedin organizations in the region. The town hosted the final meeting that resulted in the declaration of the Misaq-e Wahdat or the unity treaty in July 1989 less than a year after its liberation. It became

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3872-653: The Khalis faction to join him while entering Kabul , but they declined his offer and instead backed the Peshawar Accords. Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin entered the city from the south and west but were quickly expelled. The forces of Jamiat-e Islami and Shura-e Nazar entered the city, with agreement from Nabi Azimi and the Commander of the Kabul Garrison, General Abdul Wahid Baba Jan that they would enter

3993-479: The Northern Autonomous Zone. He printed his own Afghan currency, ran a small airline named Balkh Air , and formed relations with countries including Uzbekistan. While the rest of the country was in chaos, his region remained prosperous and functional, and it won him the support from people of all ethnic groups. Many people fled to his territory to escape the violence and fundamentalism imposed by

4114-641: The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence were heavily supporting the Taliban. Amin Saikal stated: "Hekmatyar's failure to achieve what was expected of him [later] prompted the ISI leaders to come up with a new surrogate force [the Taliban]." Also a publication of the George Washington University stated: when Hekmatyar in 1994 had failed to "deliver for Pakistan", Pakistan turned towards a new force:

4235-502: The Taliban grew stronger, as analysts say with decisive support from Pakistan . This induced some other warring factions to form new alliances, starting with the Burhanuddin Rabbani 'interim government' and Hekmatyar with his Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin in early March. In July, a new government was formed by five factions: Rabbani's Jamiat-e Islami , the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin , Abdul Rasul Sayyaf ’s Ittehad-e Islami ,

4356-436: The Taliban later on. In 1994, Dostum allied himself with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar against the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, but in 1995 sided with the government again. According to the U.S. Special Envoy to Afghanistan in 1989–1992, Peter Tomsen , Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was hired in 1990 by the Pakistani intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) planned to conquer and rule Afghanistan which

4477-489: The Taliban took control of Afghanistan. Most of the Taliban leaders were the students of Molvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Mohammadi, however, maintained a good relationship with the Taliban. The Shia Hazara Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan ('Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan') of Abdul Ali Mazari was strongly supported by Shia Iran , according to Human Rights Watch , with Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and National Security officials providing direct orders. After

4598-509: The Taliban when they took control of Bamyan in September 1998. In its history, the party suffered three major defeats. The first defeat was marked by its downfall in Kabul and the death of Mazari at the hands of the Taliban in March 1995. Secondly, in August 1998 the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif was overrun by the Taliban; the city was the second important centre of the northern alliance after

4719-457: The Taliban, Pakistan's Interior Minister Naseerullah Babar (1993–96) would state in 1999, "we created the Taliban", and Pervez Musharraf , Pakistani President in 2001-2008 and Chief of Army Staff since 1998, wrote in 2006: "we sided" with the Taliban to "spell the defeat" of anti-Taliban forces. According to journalist and author Ahmed Rashid , between 1994 and 1999, an estimated 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis trained and fought in Afghanistan on

4840-1024: The Taliban. Ahmad Shah Massoud, involved in the political and military turmoil of Afghanistan since 1973 and therefore not an impartial observer, in early September 1996 described the Taliban as the centre of a wider movement in Afghanistan of armed Islamic radicalism: a coalition of wealthy sheikhs (like Osama bin Laden ) and preachers from the Persian Gulf advocating the Saudi's puritanical outlook on Islam which Massoud considered abhorrent to Afghans but also bringing and distributing money and supplies; Pakistani and Arab intelligence agencies; impoverished young students from Pakistani religious schools chartered as volunteer fighters notably for this group called Taliban; and exiled Central Asian Islamic radicals trying to establish bases in Afghanistan for their revolutionary movements. Although Pakistan initially denied supporting

4961-480: The USSR forces with strong ideological fervor. However, none of the organizations were able to determine the outcome of the political control of Hazarajat in their favor. Towards the second half of the 1980s a complete stalemate was emerging in the region, with each organization confined to specific pockets of territory. As a result, there was an overwhelming desire for change felt both by the villagers and senior leaders of

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5082-531: The aftermath of jihad in the country. The military class that had flourished during the civil war posed one of the main obstacles to unification. Nahzat-e Islami is a good example of military commanders refusing to unite in spite of the agreement of their leaders. Its senior leaders participated in the unification process and hosted one of the meetings in their stronghold in the Jaghori district of Ghazni province . However, Wasiq, Nehzat's main military commander in

5203-416: The allegations, Massoud was funding and arming as many as 20,000 troops to allow Akbari to take over Wahdat's leadership in Kabul and establish its control in Hazarajat as well. The split opened a deep and long standing political division among the Hazaras of Afghanistan. While Mazari and his successor Khalili commanded the support of most of the Hazaras, Akbari mostly operated in opposition to them. Following

5324-432: The anti-Soviet jihad and the civil war, Hezb-e Wahdat accumulated significant political capital among Afghanistan's Hazaras. By 2009, however, Hezb-e Wahdat was so fragmented and divided that the political weight it carried in the country bore little resemblance to what it had once been. It had fragmented into at least four competing organizations, each claiming ownership of the name and legacy of Hezb-e Wahdat. Following

5445-514: The central council opposed the inclusion of the educated Kabulis in the party, viewing them as godless communists. While none of the former leftists were given any position of authority within the party leadership, their strengthening relationship with, and perceived influence on, Abdul Ali Mazari angered the more conservative sections of the party. Most notable in this regard was Muhammad Akbari, who consistently opposed Wahdat's alliance with non-jihadi groups such as General Dostum ’s Junbish Milli and

5566-471: The city through Bagram, Panjshir , Salang and Kabul Airport. Many government forces, including generals, joined Jamiat-e Islami, including the forces of General Baba Jan, who was at the time in charge of the garrison of Kabul. On 27 April, all other major parties such as Junbish-i Milli, Hezb-i Wahdat, Ittehad-e Islami and Harakat had entered the city as well. After suffering heavy casualties, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin forces deserted their positions and fled to

5687-620: The civil war in Afghanistan raged between at least four parties: the Burhanuddin Rabbani 'interim government' with Ahmad Shah Massoud and his Jamiat-e Islami forces; the Taliban ; Abdul Rashid Dostum with his Junbish-e Melli-ye Islami forces; and the Hezb-i Wahdat . The Taliban captured Ghazni (south of Kabul) and Maidan Wardak Province (west of Kabul) and in February approached Kabul. The Taliban then continued shelling Kabul and attacking Massoud's forces in Kabul. In 1996,

5808-468: The clergy. Behishthi's Shura was different from other organizations. He represented the conservative and non-revolutionary component of the ulema. He was a follower of the Khoei school of thought, a moderate, non-political and conservative line of thinking opposed to Khomeini ’s revolutionary Islamism and dominant among Afghan Shiites until the early 1980s. By the time Hezb-e Wahdat was in the making, Beheshti

5929-457: The collapse of the Kabul government was believed to be imminent and a dramatic reconfiguration of political alignments was in the making. This was happening at a time when the Kabul government and the ruling Hezb-e Demokratik-e Khalq (People's Democratic Party, PDPA) were experiencing intensive factional and ethnic rivalries. Declining faith in the future of the government facilitated the emergence of new political alignments largely between members of

6050-525: The collapse of the pro-Soviet Kabul government in the Hazarajat in 1979, the region fell under the control of Shura-ye Inqilab , a hastily assembled region-wide organization Soon it was challenged and overthrown by several new radical Islamist groups that engaged in endless power and ideological struggles, however, these were nonviolent and the various groups were still targeting the USSR forces in unity. The wars and conflicts were launched and fought against

6171-656: The complexity of the process. Harakat Islami , led by Shaikh Asif Mohsini , was the main Shiite party that refused to join Wahdat. The party was dominated by non-Hazara Shiites. Initially, the party was represented in a series of negotiations, but Mohsini later declined to sign, having presented a number of conditions to be met. His conditions were interpreted as an unwillingness to join a party in which historical Hazara grievances and political aspirations predominated. Nonetheless, sections of his party joined Hezb-e Wahdat either because

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6292-735: The council voted for Mazari, testifying to the lasting cohesiveness of Nasr as a political block within Wahdat. By contrast, while most former members of Pasdaran supported Akbari, some of them cast their votes for Mazari. For instance, Ali Jan Zahidi, Ghulam Hussain Shafaq, Hayatullah Balaghi and Abdul Ahmed Fayaz, previously important local leaders of Pasdaran, threw their support behind Mazari. Similarly, most former members of Harakat and Nahzat followed Pasdaran, while most of Sazman-e Daawat and Mostazafin supported Mazari. Other organisations such as Shuray-e Ittefaq and Jabh-e Motahid were bitterly divided. Moreover, distrust and suspicions continued to undermine

6413-543: The death of Mazari at the hands of the Taliban in March 1995, Karim Khalili was elected as the new party leader. He reorganised the party, re-established control over the Hazarajat region and joined Massoud and Junbesh against the newly emerged Taliban threat in a new alliance called the Supreme Council for Defence of the Motherland, which was later known as the ‘ northern alliance ’. In contrast, Akbari joined

6534-445: The difficulties of establishing an Islamic government in the country. With the fall of the communist regime in Kabul and the failure to form an Islamic government, the warring factions turned to their ethnic and regional support bases. While Islamism remained the officially proclaimed ideology of most groups, ethnic demands and power struggles surfaced as major sources of political mobilization. Wahdat's leaders were endeavoring to strike

6655-410: The disintegration of its military structures and the necessity to transform into a full political party, Hezb-e Wahdat faced an extremely difficult challenge that required radical changes. The transition from a military to political organisation has been similarly difficult for other Afghan organisations created during the years of war. But Hizb-e Wahdat faced a unique predicament of its own, deriving from

6776-484: The district, refused to dismantle his military structure and continued to operate under the name of Nahzat. This resulted in a military confrontation with the formerly Nasr commanders who were fighting on behalf of Hezb-e Wahdat. The conflict resulted in the total defeat of Nahzat and other smaller organisations in this district in 1993. As a result, Wahdat in Jaghori and most other parts of Ghazni established itself through

6897-428: The doors of the party to more educated Hazara cadres was a precondition for meeting reformist expectations, but the return to the country of many young Hazaras educated in Iran and Pakistan was out of all proportion with the threat that had been represented by the limited number of leftists and government officials welcomed into Wahdat in 1992. After 2001, the party nominally maintained its old structure in which seven of

7018-400: The eleven commissions within the Jaghori of the party were chaired by ulema. Only technical and insignificant positions such as health and archaeological committees were headed by non-clerical figures. Furthermore, the non-clerical figures were mostly acting on behalf of their senior clerical leaders. But an opening of the party to the growing secular intelligentsia meant that their monopoly over

7139-468: The emergence of a much larger educated class among the Hazaras. Wahdat's political cadres were mostly clerics educated in religious schools in Afghanistan or in Iran and Iraq. In their rise to political leadership they fiercely competed with university-educated challengers and remained sceptical and fearful of modern educated politicians. They suddenly found themselves forced to engage with western notions of democracy, human rights, etcetera. As in 1992, opening

7260-443: The end of Hezb-e Wahdat's political life as a cohesive political organisation. The fall of these two cities proved to be much more than military defeats. Nearly all of the territories under its control were captured by the Taliban. Its political and military cadres fled into neighbouring countries. Khalili went to Iran. From amongst the senior leaders, only Muhaqiq after a brief period in Iran returned quickly to Afghanistan and organised

7381-629: The establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan on 28 April 1992 with Sibghatullah Mojaddedi as acting President, but this never attained real authority over Afghanistan. Fighting and rivalry over Kabul had started on 25 April 1992, involving six armies: Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin , Jamiat-e Islami , Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami , Ittehad-e Islami , Hezb-i Wahdat and Junbish-i Milli . Mujahideen warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ( Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin ), after talks with mujahideen leader Ahmad Shah Massoud ( Jamiat-e Islami ) on 25 May 1992,

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7502-416: The fall of Kabul and also held a major concentration of Wahdat's troops and civilian Hazaras. Hezb-e Wahdat had played the key role in repelling a Taliban offensive on the city in 1997 and was to bear the brunt of Taliban anger this time. Thousands of Hazaras were massacred or imprisoned. Thirdly, in a few weeks the Taliban captured Bamyan, the new headquarters of the party, in another dramatic move. This marked

7623-441: The fall of Kabul, the Afghan political parties agreed on a peace and power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accords. The Peshawar Accords created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period to be followed by general elections. According to Human Rights Watch: The sovereignty of Afghanistan was vested formally in the Islamic State of Afghanistan, an entity created in April 1992, after

7744-584: The fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah government. ... With the exception of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, all of the parties... were ostensibly unified under this government in April 1992. ... Hekmatyar's Hezbe Islami, for its part, refused to recognize the government for most of the period discussed in this report and launched attacks against government forces but the shells and rockets fell everywhere in Kabul resulting in many civilian casualties. The Hezb-i Wahdat initially took part in

7865-422: The first election of the secretary general of the party was hotly contested. It was also particularly sensitive given the context of the civil war in Kabul, with regards to which both figures were proposing different political directions for the party. Akbari hoped he could alter the role of the party in the war and in the conflict in Kabul in favour of Rabbani's government through his election as secretary general of

7986-581: The first four months. Overall, the Afghan Civil War of 1992–1996 was a period of intense conflict and suffering for the people of Afghanistan. The collapse of the Soviet-backed government, ethnic and religious divisions, and external involvement all contributed to the conflict. The legacy of this period of Afghan history continues to shape the country's politics and society today. The Republic of Afghanistan quickly collapsed in 1992 after

8107-624: The formation of Hizb-e Wahdat. However, while the alliance provided the Hazara mujahedin with a common political voice in negotiations and bargaining with the Sunni organizations based in Peshawar , Pakistan, it failed to tackle the incessant ideological friction within the party. To stabilize the region a more radical move was required. With the announcement of the Soviet withdrawal in January 1988,

8228-473: The government as well as for leadership among the Hazaras. Their rivalry came to the fore when Mohaqiq decided to stand as a candidate for presidential elections in 2005 and Khalili ran as the second vice-president with Hamid Karzai . Subsequently, Mohaqiq joined the main opposition alliance, the Understanding Front, led by Yunus Qanuni . By standing in opposition to the government, he championed

8349-416: The hand of Hazara mujahideen . This further facilitated and encouraged the formation of a regional organization. The operation that resulted in the collapse of the government in the town was coordinated jointly by different mujahidin forces in the region. Sazman-e Nasr (Victory Organization) played a central and coordinating role in the attack. This development marked complete the elimination of any presence of

8470-679: The head of the Isma'ili community, and together they captured the capital city. He and Massoud fought in a coalition against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Massoud and Dostum's forces joined together to defend Kabul against Hekmatyar. Some 4000-5000 of his troops, units of his Sheberghan -based 53rd Division and Balkh -based Guards Division, garrisoning Bala Hissar fort, Maranjan Hill, and Khwaja Rawash Airport , where they stopped Najibullah from entering to flee. Dostum then left Kabul for his northern stronghold Mazar-i-Sharif , where he ruled, in effect, an independent region (or ' proto-state '), often referred as

8591-514: The inmates, including many criminals, who were able to take arms and commit gruesome crimes against the population. With a government structure yet to be established, chaos broke out in Kabul. The immediate objective of the interim government was to defeat the forces acting against the Peshawar Accord. A renewed attempt at peace talks on 25 May 1992 again agreed to give Hekmatyar the position of prime minister, however, this lasted less than

8712-465: The issue of deliberating a new political strategy. Some of the Sunni fundamentalist parties had basically ignored the Shiite claims of any form of effective representation in a future government. In opposition to Hezb-e Wahdat's demand of a quarter share in future power-sharing arrangements, some of the Sunni parties stated that the Shiites did not count as a significant community, deserving to be included in

8833-431: The leader of Hezb-e Islami , who had emerged as the main opposition. The differences between Abdul Ali Mazari and Akbari resulted in the first major split within the party. After the split, both leaders maintained separate political and military organisations under the name of Wahdat, with Abdul Ali Mazari maintaining the main body of the party. The growing rivalries and tensions between the two leaders surfaced strongly in

8954-458: The leader of the party, was elected as chief of its political affairs committee. The voting patterns during the elections offer important insights into the internal politics of the party. Members of Nasr and Pasdaran, the two largest and most powerful numerically and politically, dominated the process as well as the two emergent factions. While Nasr maintained its cohesiveness, most other smaller organisations were divided. All former members of Nasr in

9075-401: The mainly Shi'ite Tajik ( Qizilbash ) Afshar neighborhood of Kabul, slaughtering and raping inhabitants and burning homes. Sayyaf, who was allied with the de jure Kabul government of Burhanuddin Rabbani , did not deny the abductions of Hazara civilians, but merely accused the Hezb-i Wahdat militia of being an agent of the theocratic Iranian government. Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi , leader of

9196-442: The military victory of the former Nasr forces. One after the other the smaller parties were pressured or coaxed to join the process. In November 1989, the remnant of Behisthi's Shuray-e Ittefaq also joined. His decision to participate in the unification process was a turning point in the development of clerical leadership in the Hazarajat, as it symbolized the recognition of Khomeinist hegemony by important non-Khomeinist elements of

9317-463: The more powerful ones demanded greater power and a share of the positions in the unified party. Eventually the latter argument prevailed; Nasr and Pasdaran persuaded other organizations to concede to proportional representation. Smaller parties were pressured and even intimidated into joining the process. Many groups had no other choice than joining it: the cost of standing outside would have been unbearable. The following two examples provide insight into

9438-549: The negotiation process. Three days of deliberations in the party's central council in Bamyan produced a new strategy: working out an alliance of the country's historically deprived ethnic communities. This new strategy was to be pursued with the military commanders of various communities in the provinces rather than with the leaders in Peshawar. Government officials of various ethnic communities were also contacted to join or support

9559-406: The negotiations and announced to conquer Kabul alone. Hekmatyar moved his troops to Kabul, and was allowed into the town soon after 17 April. The other mujahideen groups also entered Kabul, on 24 April, to prevent Hekmatyar from taking over the city and the country. This ignited a civil war between five or six rival armies, most of them backed by foreign states. Several Mujahideen groups proclaimed

9680-458: The new alliance. The new strategy was communicated with various political and military players in the country through delegations and representatives. Fifty delegations were dispatched to several parts of the country, including the Panjshir valley and the northern province of Balkh . Members of the delegations were tasked with exploring a common political strategy for collectively bargaining over

9801-520: The new appointments. The role of external players, particularly that of Rabbani's government, was crucial. It is believed that the Rabbani government had been working through their contacts with Akbari to undermine Mazari and turn Hezb-e Wahdat into an ally. Mazari strongly suspected Akbari of trying to undermine him. A few weeks after the party elections, in response to an alleged coup plan by Akbari and sections of Harakat Islami against him, Mazari ordered his troops to attack and expel all his opponents from

9922-406: The new legal and political environment. As mentioned earlier, Hezb-e Wahdat's military structure disintegrated under the Taliban, and as a result in late 2001 the organisation was in no way comparable to other anti-Taliban organisations in terms of military structure and hardware. Its leaders lacked the political and military resources to reorganise their fighters on any significant scale. In June 2005

10043-401: The new party was more promising for the political future of the Hazaras or because the pressure to join was so strong that it could not be resisted. The party's core could resist the pressure to join mainly because it was located outside the region. However, it did lose a substantial section of its Hazara following to Hezb-e Wahdat, a fact underlining the growing importance of ethnic identities in

10164-482: The new political circumstances, the party needed to adapt to the new political realities in the country. The new political order established under the auspices of the international community required the military-political organisations to transform into civilian political parties. This entailed disbanding their military wings, disarming under the UN -led Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programme and operating under

10285-474: The only major military structure controlled by the party, the Ninth Corps, was disbanded, ending financial support from the centre to Wahdat's military wing. Lacking resources and with a weak organisation, the party saw its military activities almost come to a halt; only in northern Afghanistan did some elements of it survive. Wahdat's weakness vis-à-vis other, better resourced military-political organisations

10406-549: The organizations to unite. Several attempts to make peace and ensure stability failed. Alliances and coalitions were crafted and dismantled. The most important and effective of them were the Shura-ye Etelaf , an alliance of eight major organizations formed in Tehran , Iran in 1985. It was the most effective attempt to achieve unity of action by the leaderships of the organizations and was to become an important precedent for

10527-438: The outskirts of Kabul in the direction of Logar province . The Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin had been driven out of Kabul, but were still within artillery range. In May 1992 Hekmatyar started a bombardment campaign against the capital, firing thousands of rockets supplied by Pakistan . In addition to the bombardment campaign, Hekmatyar's forces had overrun Pul-e-Charkhi prison while still in the centre of Kabul, and had set free all

10648-507: The party and to act in solidarity with all Islamic organizations of the Sunnis. The language of the manifesto clearly indicates that Wahdat was to be, at least predominately, a Shiite organization, despite references to solidarity and cooperation with the Sunni organizations. It demanded an equal status for Shiite jurisprudence alongside the Hanafi school, dominant among Sunnis in the country. As

10769-420: The party leadership, generating further rifts. This was a real test of political tolerance of the more conservative section of the clergy. While the party was created to unify the predominantly Islamist and clerical organizations, in Kabul it confronted groups of educated Hazaras much larger than had been the case in the provinces; these were also mostly leftist and relatively well organized. The question of whether

10890-682: The party should accept these individuals divided the party leadership. The ulema (Scholars) needed the knowledge and experiences of these educated Hazaras to help the party adjust to an urban political setting. The party suffered from a chronic shortage of members who had benefited from a modern education. Furthermore, most of the clerics had little familiarity with the politics of Kabul. Most of them were educated in religious centers in Iran and Iraq and had mainly engaged in politics in rural Hazarajat. Finally, Wahdat fighters lacked military skills suitable to an urban environment. Despite that, many key figures in

11011-403: The party suffered from serious structural problems and ideological differences. Ideologically, most Hezb-e Wahdat leaders were political Islamists. In a way the formation of the party was the culmination of a process of Islamisation of the Hazara anti-Soviet resistance groups in Afghanistan. The process was accompanied by the gradual rise to dominance of the clergy in the political leadership of

11132-513: The party was seen unfavorably by the Iranian authorities who had for years tried to promote a more pan- Shiite political Islamism during the period of jihad. Husain Ibrahimi, the representative of the Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Afghan affairs at that time, is alleged to have tried to prevent the formation of Hizb-e Wahdat in order to maintain his influence. Eventually, once the party

11253-400: The party. Consequently, the election of secretary general gained a paramount importance for both sides in the civil war to maintain or change the political alignments of the party in their favour. The elections were held amid a climate of distrust and violence. By gaining 43 votes (out of 82 members of the central council present), Abdul Ali Mazari was re-elected as leader. Akbari with 33 votes

11374-411: The political direction of the party. The venue for the forthcoming elections also proved to be contentious. Akbari was pressing for the elections to be held in Bamyan where he felt stronger. By contrast, Mazari and his supporters pushed for elections in Kabul where he had cultivated a larger support base among urbanised Hazaras. Given the political differences and personal rivalries between the two leaders,

11495-452: The political leadership of Hazara society risked being undermined. While a few of Wahdat's founders continued to exercise leadership and political power, most others were not as lucky. The failure to revive party structures left many of them politically marginalised. Second rank officials of Hezb-e Wahdat, such as most members of the central council, have mostly been unable to find a state job. Many of them opted to reside in their home areas in

11616-474: The political leadership over military commanders within the region. Conversely, the previous coalition-building efforts were centered in Iran and were often under the direct influence of the Iranian authorities. Once it was formed, its leaders faced the challenge of convincing their representatives at the Shuray-e Eatelaf and officials of the Iranian government, who were more at ease with dealing with

11737-509: The preparations for the party's leadership election in September 1994. The election was held amid a heightened competition between the two contending figures for leadership of the party. The party was experiencing its most difficult internal power struggle since it had been formed. New political fault lines were emerging as the party leaders tried to define and articulate their political agendas in Kabul. Both sides were determined to win in order to dominate leadership positions and consequently change

11858-452: The region, and in fact it marked the final victory of the clerical Islamists. By unifying under the new name they further consolidated their political dominance. The Wahdat manifesto emphasized the continuation and intensification of efforts for the creation of an Islamic government based on the Quran and Sunnah . It called for further efforts to incorporate all other genuine Shiite groups into

11979-420: The rest of 1992, hundreds of rockets hit Kabul, thousands, mostly civilians, were killed, half a million people fled the city. In 1993, the rivalling militia factions continued their fights over Kabul, several cease-fires and peace accords failed. According to Human Rights Watch , in the period 1992–95, five different mujahideen armies contributed to heavily damaging Kabul, though other analysts blame especially

12100-2721: The rights of Hazaras and continued to undermine Karim Khalili. The personalisation of leadership was not limited to Mohaqiq and Khalili and resulted in the fragmentation of the party into the following four splinter organizations. 1.Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Afghanistan ( Karim Khalili ) 2. Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Mardum-e Afghanistan ( Muhammad Mohaqiq ) 3. Hezb-e Wahdat Milli Islami Afghanistan ( Muhammad Akbari ) 4. Hezb-e Wahdat Islami Millat-e Afghanistan (Qurban Ali Erfani) Most of these terms are loanwords from Arabic . Afghan Civil War (1992%E2%80%931996) [REDACTED]   Islamic State of Afghanistan [REDACTED] Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (until late 1994) [REDACTED] Khalq (pro Gulbuddin factions, until late 1994) Supported by: [REDACTED]   Pakistan [REDACTED] Hezb-i Wahdat (after Dec. 1992) Supported by: [REDACTED]   Iran [REDACTED] Junbish-i Milli (Jan. 1994-Aug. 1994) Supported by: [REDACTED]   Uzbekistan Regional Kandahar Militia Leaders [REDACTED] Afghan Army and Airforce Remnants (allegedly, until October 1992) [REDACTED]   Taliban (from late 1994) [REDACTED] Burhanuddin Rabbani [REDACTED] Ahmad Shah Massoud [REDACTED] Naqib Alikozai [REDACTED] Ismail Khan [REDACTED] Mulavi Younas Khalis [REDACTED] Abdul Haq [REDACTED] Haji Abdul Qadeer [REDACTED] Jalaluddin Haqqani [REDACTED] Abdul Rasul Sayyaf [REDACTED] Mohammad Nabi [REDACTED] Sibghatullah Mojaddedi [REDACTED] Ahmed Gailani [REDACTED] Abdul Rahim Wardak [REDACTED] Muhammad Asif Muhsini [REDACTED] Hussain Anwari [REDACTED] Abdul Ali Mazari [REDACTED] Sayyid Ali Beheshti [REDACTED] Karim Khalili [REDACTED] Abdul Rashid Dostum [REDACTED] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar [REDACTED] Abdul Jabar Qahraman (until 1993) [REDACTED] Mohammad Aslam Watanjar (until 1992) [REDACTED] Abdul Ali Mazari [REDACTED] Sayyid Ali Beheshti [REDACTED] Karim Khalili [REDACTED] Shafi Hazara [REDACTED] Abdul Rashid Dostum Gul Agha Sherzai [REDACTED] Mullah Omar [REDACTED] Osama bin Laden [REDACTED] Ayman al-Zawahiri [REDACTED] Shahnawaz Tanai (alleged by northern alliance, denied by Tanai) The 1992–1996 Afghan Civil War , also known as

12221-564: The rights of minorities in future political arrangements. The delegations to Panjshir and the north of the country reached important agreements with Massoud and the future leaders of the emergent Junbish-e Milli Islami, which underpinned a new political agreement that became known as Paiman-e Jabalu-Seraj, or the Jabalu-seraj agreement named after the area in Parwan province where one of the final negotiations took place in April 1992. Massoud

12342-546: The same ethnic groups, cutting across the ideological divide between the mujahedin and the PDPA officials. In the meantime, negotiations on the formation of an interim government led by the Sunni organizations based in Peshawar excluded the Hazara alliance based in Tehran. The combined effect of these developments among the Hazara organizations was greater awareness of the need for more collective and assertive bargaining with their Sunni counterparts if they were to be taken seriously. It

12463-708: The side of the Taliban. In 1992–93, Kabul , the factions of Hezb-i Wahdat, Ittehad-e Islami, Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, would regularly target civilians with attacks, intentionally fire rockets into occupied civilian homes, or random civilian areas. In January–June 1994, 25,000 people died in Kabul due to fighting, with targeted attacks on civilian areas, between an alliance of Dostum's (Junbish-i Milli) with Hekmatyar's (Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin) against Massoud's (Jamiat-e Islami) forces. In 1993–95, leaders of Jamiat-e Islami, Junbish-i Milli, Hezb-i Wahdat and Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, could not stop their commanders from committing murder , rape and extortion . Even

12584-491: The various warlords in north Afghanistan descended to such horridness. In 1992–95, Kabul was heavily bombarded and damaged. Some analysts emphasize the role of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin in "targeting and destroying half of Kabul" or in heavy bombardments especially in 1992. But Human Rights Watch in two reports stated that nearly all armies participating in the 1992–95 period of war contributed to "destroying at least one-third of Kabul, killing thousands of civilians, driving

12705-432: The war. The Taliban , a new militia formed with support from Pakistan and ISI, became dominant in 1995-96. It captured Kandahar in late-1994, Herat in 1995, Jalalabad in early-September 1996, and Kabul by late-September 1996. The Taliban fought the newly-formed Northern Alliance in the subsequent 1996-2001 civil war . Kabul's population fell from two million to 500,000 during the 1992–1996 war; 500,000 fled during

12826-463: The western part of the capital. Consequently, Akbari, his supporters and his allies in Harakat were forced to flee into areas controlled by Massoud in the north of the capital. While the exact details of the alleged plot remain unknown, Mazari later claimed that Qasim Fahim, then Rabbani's head of the intelligence department, was working with Akbari to militarily force him out of leadership. According to

12947-421: Was against this background that a more radical demand for unification and merger of all existing political-military organizations into a single party dominated the politics of the region. Several meetings were held throughout the region in which the nature and composition of the new party and the role of existing organizations in it were debated extensively. In August 1988, the provincial center of Bamyan fell into

13068-858: Was an Afghan political movement under Mohammad Yunus Khalis , who separated from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami and formed his own resistance group in 1979. After the fall of the Communist regime in 1992, Khalis participated in the Islamic Interim Government. He was a member of the Leadership Council (Shura-ye Qiyaadi), but held no other official post. Instead of moving to Kabul, he chose to remain in Nangarhar . His party controlled major parts of this politically and strategically important province. The Taliban brought Nangarhar under their control in September 1996 and Khalis

13189-513: Was backed by Uzbekistan . Uzbek President Islam Karimov was keen to see Dostum controlling as much of Afghanistan as possible, especially in the north along the Uzbek border. Dostum's men would become an important force in the fall of Kabul in 1992. In April 1992, the opposition forces began their march to Kabul against the government of Najibullah. Dostum had allied himself with the opposition commanders Ahmad Shah Massoud and Sayed Jafar Naderi ,

13310-406: Was chosen as head of the new council, Mohammad Mohaqiq from Hezb-e Wahdat as his deputy and General Dostum as commander of its military affairs. The alliance of Wahdat, Junbesh and Massoud's Shuray-e Nezar, or Supervisory Council, collapsed as they attempted to take control of Kabul. Similarly, the political arrangements among the Sunni mujahedin organisations also fell apart, turning the city into

13431-586: Was commanded by Ahmad Shah Massoud . During the Soviet–Afghan War, his role as a powerful mujahideen insurgent leader earned him the nickname of "Lion of Panjshir" ( شیر پنجشیر ) among his followers as he successfully resisted the Soviets from taking Panjshir Valley. In 1992 he signed the Peshawar Accord , a peace and power-sharing agreement, in the post-communist Islamic State of Afghanistan , and

13552-491: Was compounded. On the positive side, its leaders can claim credit for effectively having given up their military wing. The second and most pressing demand for reform came from within the Hazara political community. Reforming and reviving the party as the largest and most influential Hazara organisation was a central priority for most of the Hazara intellectual and clerical elites. Many educated Hazaras of various ideological backgrounds rushed to Kabul in 2002 and volunteered to play

13673-575: Was delayed until 1992 as a result of US pressure to cancel it. In April 1992, according to self-made Afghan historian Nojumi, the Inter-Services Intelligence helped Hekmatyar by sending hundreds of trucks loaded with weapons and fighters to the southern part of Kabul. In June 1992, Hekmatyar with his Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin ('Islamic party') troops started shelling Kabul. The Director of the Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies at

13794-464: Was elected as his first deputy. Similarly, agreements were reached on 20 other key appointments. Akbari's faction won the positions of heads of cultural and military committees, which they had strongly pressed for. He and his supporters believed that by dominating the cultural and military committees they could manipulate the war and propaganda machine of the party in favour of the Rabbani government, their external ally. Karim Khalili, who would later become

13915-443: Was formed, the Iranians decided to work with it and supported it in the early days of its existence. But, as the subsequent course of political developments (discussed below) shows, the party was to pursue a rather independent political strategy, often in conflict with Iranian policies and interests in the country. As the name Wahdat (Unity) indicates, the main objective of the party was to unify all Shiite mujahedin organizations under

14036-430: Was not welcomed by its Sunni counterparts in Peshawar. Instead, it was effectively excluded from the negotiations around the formation of a mujahedin government in Kabul, which were dominated by the Sunnis. A Hezb-e Wahdat delegation to Peshawar, sent to negotiate a possible inclusion in the process, returned to Bamyan badly disappointed. In a central council meeting in Bamyan, the delegation headed by Abdul Ali Mazari raised

14157-594: Was offered the position of prime minister in President Mujaddidi 's – paralyzed – 'interim government'. But this agreement shattered already on 29 May when Mujaddidi accused Hekmatyar of having rockets fired at his plane returning from Islamabad . By 30 May 1992, Jamiat-e Islami and Junbish-i Milli mujahideen forces were fighting against Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin again in southern Kabul. In May or early June, Hekmatyar started shelling all around Kabul, presumably with substantial support from

14278-517: Was reduced to leading a small fraction of the Shura in Nawur district of Ghazni. The ambition to integrate previously hostile organizations into a single party had achieved a great degree of success. Officially, all the previous organizations except Harakat were dissolved and their military structures were dismantled. A relatively stable political order was restored in the areas under its control. However,

14399-428: Was so appointed as the Minister of Defense as well as the government's main military commander. His militia fought to defend the capital Kabul against militias led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and other warlords who were bombing the city —and eventually the Taliban , who started to lay siege to the capital in January 1995 after the city had seen fierce fighting with at least 60,000 civilians killed. Hezb-e Islami Khalis

14520-467: Was supportive of the Taliban movement and had a close relationship with its commanders. The Sunni Pashtun Ittehad-e Islami bara-ye Azadi-ye Afghanistan ('Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan') of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was supported by Sunni Wahabbi Saudi Arabia , to maximize Wahhabi influence. After the forced withdrawal of the demoralised Soviet forces in 1989, and the overthrow of

14641-523: Was warmly received by Mohaqiq, who was deputy chair and Planning Minister of the Interim Administration, and other senior figures of the organisation. In the Transitional Administration, Khalili replaced Mohaqiq as a vice-president, becoming the highest Hazara official in the government. Until before the presidential election of 2005, Muhaqiq was at least officially heading the political affairs committee of Hezb-e Wahdat in Kabul. Their relationship, however, soon started unravelling. Apparently, Muhaqiq had adopted

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