Hispania Citerior (English: "Hither Iberia", or "Nearer Iberia") was a Roman province in Hispania during the Roman Republic . It was on the eastern coast of Iberia down to the town of Cartago Nova, today's Cartagena in the autonomous community of Murcia , Spain . It roughly covered today's Spanish autonomous communities of Catalonia and Valencia . Further south was the Roman province of Hispania Ulterior ("Further Spain" or "Further Iberia"), named as such because it was further away from Rome.
143-767: The two provinces were established in 197 BC, four years after the end of the Second Punic War (218–201 BC). During this war Scipio Africanus defeated the Carthaginians at the Battle of Ilipa (near Seville) in 206 BC. This led to the Romans taking over the Carthaginian possessions in southern Spain and on the east coast up to the River Ebro . Several governors of Hispania Citerior commanded wars against
286-690: A Carthaginian army in New Carthage (modern Cartagena ) and led it northwards along the Iberian coast in May or June. It entered Gaul and took an inland route, to avoid the Roman allies to the south. At the battle of Rhone Crossing , Hannibal defeated a force of local Gauls which sought to bar his way. A Roman fleet carrying the Iberian-bound army landed at Rome's ally Massalia (modern Marseille ) at
429-621: A chance to regroup. The majority of Romans were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. It was feared that, if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, Rome's allies might defect to the Carthaginian side for self-preservation. Therefore, when Fabius came to the end of his term, the Senate did not renew his dictatorial powers and command was given to consuls Gnaeus Servilius Geminus and Marcus Atilius Regulus . In 216 BC, when elections resumed, Gaius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus were elected as consuls, placed in command of
572-530: A crested helmet made of animal sinews. Most Gallic foot warriors likely had no protection other than large shields, and the typical Gallic weapon was a long slashing sword. The Numidian cavalry were very lightly equipped, lacking saddles and bridles for their horses, and wearing no armor but carrying small shields, javelins and possibly a knife or a longer blade. In contrast, the heavier Iberian peninsular cavalry carried round shields, swords, javelins and thrusting spears. The similarly heavy Gallic cavalry added
715-464: A deeper formation than usual, while Hannibal used the double envelopment tactic and surrounded his enemy, trapping the majority of the Roman army, who were then slaughtered. The loss of life on the Roman side meant it was one of the most lethal single days of fighting in history; Adrian Goldsworthy equates the death toll at Cannae to "the massed slaughter of the British Army on the first day of
858-474: A distance and avoided close combat. The latter cavalry were usually Numidians . The close-order Libyan infantry and the citizen-militia would fight in a tightly packed formation known as a phalanx . On occasion some of the infantry would wear captured Roman armour, especially among Hannibal 's troops. Both Iberia and Gaul provided large numbers of experienced infantry and cavalry. These infantry were unarmoured troops who would charge ferociously, but had
1001-434: A distance, a short sword and a 90-centimetre (3 ft) shield. The rest were equipped as heavy infantry , with body armour , a large shield and short thrusting swords . They were divided into three ranks: the front rank also carried two javelins, while the second and third ranks were equipped with a thrusting spear instead. Legionary sub-units and individual legionaries both fought in relatively open order . It
1144-619: A fleet of 60 quinqueremes ; and established supply depots at Ariminum and Arretium in preparation for marching north later in the year. Two armies of four legions each, two Roman and two allied but with stronger than usual cavalry contingents, were formed. One was stationed at Arretium and one on the Adriatic coast; they would be able to block Hannibal's possible advance into central Italy and were positioned to move north to operate in Cisalpine Gaul. In early spring 217 BC
1287-505: A force of 18,000. Despite these losses, the Romans besieged Capua , the Carthaginians' key ally in Italy. Hannibal offered battle to the Romans; Livy's account of the subsequent fighting is unclear, but the Romans seem to have suffered heavy casualties while the Carthaginians were unable to lift the siege. Hannibal then assaulted the Romans' siege works, but was again unable to relieve the city. In 211 BC Hannibal again offered battle to
1430-470: A force of Numidian cavalry to Sicily, which was led by the skilled Liby-Phoenician officer Mottones, who inflicted heavy losses on the Roman army through hit-and-run attacks. A fresh Roman army attacked the main Carthaginian stronghold on the island, Agrigentum , in 210 BC and the city was betrayed to the Romans by a discontented Carthaginian officer. The remaining Carthaginian-controlled towns then surrendered or were taken through force or treachery and
1573-597: A general reading suggests he meant the whole panoply of arms and armor, and even tactical organization. Apart from his description of the battle itself, when later discussing the subject of the Roman legion versus the Greek phalanx , Polybius says that "...against Hannibal, the defeats they suffered had nothing to do with weapons or formations" because "Hannibal himself... discarded the equipment with which he had started out [and] armed his troops with Roman weapons". Gregory Daly
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#17327729151421716-448: A newly raised army of unprecedented size and directed to engage Hannibal. Polybius wrote: The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. ...Most of their wars are decided by one consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great
1859-439: A position on the opposite side, 2 km (1.2 mi) away from the main camp. The purpose of this second camp was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass those of the enemy. The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second day (August 1) Hannibal, aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle, but Paullus refused. When his request
2002-568: A reputation for breaking off if a combat was protracted. The Gallic cavalry, and possibly some of the Iberians, wore armour and fought as close-order troops; most or all of the mounted Iberians were light cavalry. Slingers were frequently recruited from the Balearic Islands. The Carthaginians also employed war elephants ; North Africa had indigenous African forest elephants at the time. Garrison duty and land blockades were
2145-411: A single afternoon on the field of Cannae, even if the battle did degenerate into a massacre in its final stages?". Livy recorded Hannibal's losses at "about 8,000 of his bravest men." Polybius reports 5,700 dead: 4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Hispanics and Africans, and 200 cavalry. Never when the city was in safety was there so great a panic and confusion within the walls of Rome. I shall therefore shrink from
2288-542: A straight line, he took the central companies of Hispanics and Celts and advanced with them, keeping the rest of them in contact with these companies, but gradually falling off, so as to produce a crescent-shaped formation, the line of the flanking companies growing thinner as it was prolonged, his object being to employ the Africans as a reserve force and to begin the action with the Hispanics and Celts." Polybius described
2431-581: A third province, Hispania Lusitania . Hispania is the Latin term given to the Iberian Peninsula . The term can be traced back to at least 200 BC, when it was used by the poet Quintus Ennius . The word is possibly derived from the Punic אי שפן "I-Shaphan" meaning "coast of hyraxes ", in turn a misidentification on the part of Phoenician explorers of its numerous rabbits as hyraxes. According to
2574-486: A vast booty of gold, silver and siege artillery . He released the captured population and liberated the Iberian hostages held there by the Carthaginians, in an attempt to ensure the loyalty of their tribes. In the spring of 208 BC Hasdrubal moved to engage Scipio at the battle of Baecula . The Carthaginians were defeated, but Hasdrubal was able to withdraw the majority of his army and prevent any Roman pursuit; most of his losses were among his Iberian allies. Scipio
2717-461: A wedge that drove deeper and deeper into the Carthaginian semicircle, driving itself into an alley formed by the African infantry on the wings. At this decisive point, Hannibal ordered his African infantry to turn inwards and advance against the Roman flanks, creating an encirclement in one of the earliest known examples of a pincer movement . When the Carthaginian cavalry attacked the Romans in
2860-414: Is inclined to the view that Libyan infantry would have copied the Iberian use of the sword during their fighting there and so were armed similarly to the Romans. Peter Connolly has argued that they were armed as a pike phalanx . This has been disputed by Head, because Plutarch states they carried spears shorter than the Roman triarii and by Daly because they could not have carried an unwieldy pike at
3003-473: Is the best surviving source for this part of the war. Several of the city states in southern Italy allied with Hannibal, or were captured when pro-Carthaginian factions betrayed their defences. These included the large city of Capua and the major port city of Tarentum (modern Taranto). Two of the major Samnite tribes also joined the Carthaginian cause. By 214 BC the bulk of southern Italy had turned against Rome, although there were many exceptions and
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#17327729151423146-466: The hastati , ready to push forward at first contact to ensure the Romans presented a unified front. As Polybius wrote, "the maniples were nearer each other, or the intervals were decreased... and the maniples showed more depth than front". Even though they outnumbered the Carthaginians, this depth-oriented deployment meant that the Roman lines had a front of roughly equal size to their numerically inferior opponents. The typical style of Roman warfare
3289-499: The Aetolian League , a coalition of Greek city states which was already at war with Macedonia. In 205 BC this war ended with a negotiated peace. A rebellion in support of the Carthaginians broke out on Sardinia in 213 BC, but it was quickly put down by the Romans. Prior to 215 BC Sicily remained firmly in Roman hands, blocking the ready seaborne reinforcement and resupply of Hannibal from Carthage. Hiero II ,
3432-862: The Battle of the Metaurus . At the battle of Ilipa in 206 Scipio permanently ended the Carthaginian presence in Iberia. Scipio invaded Carthaginian Africa in 204 BC, compelling the Carthaginian Senate to recall Hannibal's army from Italy. The final engagement of the war took place between armies under Scipio and Hannibal at Zama in 202 and resulted in Hannibal's defeat and in Carthage suing for peace . The peace treaty dictated by Rome stripped Carthage of all of its overseas territories and some of its African ones. An indemnity of 10,000 silver talents
3575-532: The Celtiberians who lived to the west of this province. In the late first century BC Augustus reorganised the Roman provinces in Hispania. Hispania Citerior was replaced by the larger province of Hispania Tarraconensis , which included the territories the Romans had subsequently conquered in central, northern and north-western Hispania. Augustus also renamed Hispania Ulterior as Hispania Baetica and created
3718-547: The First Punic War was the issue of control of the independent Sicilian city state of Messana (modern Messina ). In 264 BC Carthage and Rome went to war. The war was fought primarily on Sicily and its surrounding waters; the Romans also unsuccessfully invaded North Africa in 256 BC. It was the longest continuous conflict and the greatest naval war of antiquity, with immense materiel and human losses on both sides. In 241 BC, after 23 years of war,
3861-582: The Sibylline Books , dispatching a delegation led by Quintus Fabius Pictor to consult the Delphic oracle in Greece, and burying four people alive as a sacrifice to their gods. To raise two new legions , the authorities lowered the draft age and enlisted criminals, debtors and even slaves. Despite the extreme loss of men and equipment, and a second massive defeat later that same year at Silva Litana ,
4004-480: The battle of Insubria in 203 BC. After a Roman army invaded the Carthaginian homeland in 204 BC, defeating the Carthaginians in two major battles and winning the allegiance of the Numidian kingdoms of North Africa, Hannibal and the remnants of his army were recalled. They sailed from Croton and landed at Carthage with 15,000–20,000 experienced veterans. Mago was also recalled; he died of wounds on
4147-578: The 37 with which he left Iberia – some time in November; the Romans had already gone into their winter quarters. Hannibal's surprise entry into the Italian peninsula led to the cancellation of Rome's planned campaign for the year: an invasion of Africa. Shortly after arriving in Italy the Carthaginians captured the chief city of the hostile Taurini (in the area of modern Turin ) and seized its food stocks. In late November 218 BC
4290-632: The Adriatic coast, then turned south into Apulia , hoping to win over some of the ethnic Greek and Italic cities of southern Italy. News of the defeat again caused a panic in Rome. The head of the embassy that was sent to Carthage right before the war broke out in 218 BC, Quintus Fabius Maximus, was elected dictator by the Roman Assembly and adopted the " Fabian strategy " of avoiding pitched battles, relying instead on low-level harassment to wear
4433-563: The Carthaginian army was the personal tie each group had with Hannibal. Rome's forces used typical Roman equipment including pila (heavy javelins) and hastae (thrusting spears) as weapons as well as traditional bronze helmets, bodyshields and body armor. In contrast, the Carthaginian army used a variety of equipment. The Iberians fought with falcatas , while Celtiberians and Lusitanians used straight gladii , as well as javelins and various types of spears . For defense, warriors from Hispania carried large oval shields and often wore
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4576-526: The Carthaginian cavalry routed the cavalry and light infantry of the Romans at the battle of Ticinus . As a result, most of the Gallic tribes declared for the Carthaginian cause and Hannibal's army grew to more than 40,000 men. The Senate ordered the army in Sicily north to join the force already facing Hannibal, thus abandoning the plan to invade Africa. The combined Roman force under the command of Sempronius
4719-500: The Carthaginian forces in Iberia were divided into three armies which were deployed apart from each other, the Romans split their forces. This strategy resulted in two separate battles in 211, usually referred to jointly as the battle of the Upper Baetis . Both battles ended in complete defeat for the Romans, as Hasdrubal had bribed the Romans' mercenaries to desert. The Roman survivors retreated to their coastal stronghold north of
4862-501: The Carthaginian ranks. Appian and Livy say Hannibal sent a small contingent of 500–600 mercenaries to pretend to desert to the Roman side. Those men, Celtiberians according to Appian and Numidians according to Livy, handed their weapons to the Romans as a sign of good will while retaining hidden short swords in their clothes. Once the battle started, following Hannibal's plans, the mercenaries attacked, stealing weapons and shields from their victims and causing chaos and confusion in
5005-475: The Carthaginians caught a Roman army off guard outside Herdonia, heavily defeating it after its commander accepted battle . Livy then has Hannibal fighting the inconclusive battle of Numistro , although modern historians doubt his account. The Romans stayed on Hannibal's heels, fighting another pitched battle at Canusium in 209 BC and again suffering heavy losses. This battle enabled another Roman army to approach Tarentum and capture it by treachery . In
5148-544: The Carthaginians crossed the Apennines unopposed, taking a difficult but unguarded route. Hannibal attempted to draw the main Roman army under Gaius Flaminius into a pitched battle by devastating the area they had been sent to protect provoking Flaminius into a hasty pursuit. Hannibal set an ambush and in the battle of Lake Trasimene completely defeated the Roman army, killing 15,000 Romans, including Flaminius, and taking 10,000 prisoners . A cavalry force of 4,000 from
5291-559: The Carthaginians were defeated. Under the Roman-dictated Treaty of Lutatius Carthage ceded its Sicilian possessions to Rome. Rome exploited Carthage's distraction during the Truceless War against rebellious mercenaries and Libyan subjects to break the peace treaty and annex Carthaginian Sardinia and Corsica in 238 BC. Under the leadership of Hamilcar Barca , Carthage defeated the rebels in 237 BC. With
5434-501: The Carthaginians. Another 2,000 Roman fugitives were rounded up at the unfortified village of Cannae by Carthaginian cavalry commanded by Carthalo, 7,000 fell prisoner in the smaller Roman camp and 5,800 in the larger. Although Livy does not cite his source by name, it is likely to have been Quintus Fabius Pictor , a Roman historian who fought in and wrote about the Second Punic War. It is Pictor whom Livy names when reporting
5577-451: The Ebro, from which the Carthaginians again failed to expel them. Claudius Nero brought over reinforcements in 210 BC and stabilised the situation. In 210 BC Publius Cornelius Scipio , arrived in Iberia with further Roman reinforcements. In a carefully planned assault in 209 BC he captured the lightly defended centre of Carthaginian power in Iberia, New Carthage, seizing
5720-485: The Greek cities of southern Italy ( Magna Graecia ) submitted. During this period of Roman expansion, Carthage, with its capital in what is now Tunisia , had come to dominate southern Iberia , much of the coastal regions of North Africa, the Balearic Islands , Corsica , Sardinia and the western half of Sicily. By 264 BC Carthage was the dominant external power on Sicily, and Carthage and Rome were
5863-601: The Hispanic and Celtic horsemen facing the Romans dismounting due to the lack of space to fight on horseback, and called the struggle "barbaric" in the sense of its utter brutality. When the Carthaginian cavalry got the upper hand, they cut down their Roman opponents without giving quarter. On the other flank the Numidians engaged in a way that merely kept the Roman allied cavalry occupied. Hasdrubal kept his victorious Hispanic and Gallic cavalry under control and did not chase
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6006-402: The Iberian tribes was too fragile and the Roman forces in the area too strong for him to execute the planned movement. In 215 Hasdrubal eventually acted, besieging a pro-Roman town and offering battle at Dertosa , where he attempted to use his cavalry superiority to clear the flanks of the Roman army while enveloping their centre on both sides with his infantry. However, the Romans broke through
6149-672: The Macedonian king, Philip V , pledged his support to Hannibal, initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome in 215 BC. The Romans were concerned that the Macedonians would attempt to cross the Strait of Otranto and land in Italy. They strongly reinforced their navy in the area and despatched a legion to stand guard, and the threat petered out. In 211 BC Rome contained the Macedonians by allying with
6292-628: The Po and appropriating large areas of the best land. Most of the Gauls resented this intrusion. During 218 BC there was some naval skirmishing in the waters around Sicily; the Romans repulsed a Carthaginian attack and captured the island of Malta . In Cisalpine Gaul (modern northern Italy), the major Gallic tribes attacked the Roman colonies there, causing the settlers to flee to their previously established colony of Mutina (modern Modena ), where they were besieged. A Roman relief force broke through
6435-407: The Roman camp. However, the veracity of this part is disputed. Ancient historians rarely provide the precise dates for the events they describe. For example, Livy provides no explicit dates for any of the battles of the Second Punic War. Macrobius , citing the Roman annalist Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius , states the battle was fought ante diem iiii nones Sextilis , or 2 August. The months of
6578-407: The Roman historian Cassius Dio , the people of the region came from many different tribes and did not share a common language or a common government. This Spain location article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Second Punic War The Second Punic War (218 to 201 BC) was the second of three wars fought between Carthage and Rome , the two main powers of
6721-466: The Romans appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus as dictator to deal with the threat. Fabius used attrition warfare against Hannibal, cutting off his supply lines and avoiding pitched battles . These tactics proved unpopular with the Romans who, as they recovered from the shock of Hannibal's victories, began to question the wisdom of the Fabian strategy , which had given the Carthaginian army
6864-430: The Romans approached Cannae, some of Hannibal's light infantry and cavalry ambushed them. Varro repelled the attack and continued slowly on his way to Cannae. This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered the confidence of the Roman army, perhaps leading to overconfidence on Varro's part. Paullus was opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he
7007-456: The Romans by marching his army overland from Iberia, through Gaul and over the Alps to Cisalpine Gaul (modern northern Italy). Reinforced by Gallic allies he obtained crushing victories over the Romans at the battles of Trebia (218) and Lake Trasimene (217). Moving to southern Italy in 216 Hannibal defeated the Romans again at the battle of Cannae , where he annihilated the largest army
7150-412: The Romans could still field multiple armies, which in total greatly outnumbered his own forces. The greatest gain was the second largest city of Italy, Capua, when Hannibal's army marched into Campania in 216 BC. The inhabitants of Capua held limited Roman citizenship and the aristocracy was linked to the Romans via marriage and friendship, but the possibility of becoming the supreme city of Italy after
7293-556: The Romans had ever assembled. After the death or capture of more than 120,000 Roman troops in less than three years, many of Rome's Italian allies , notably Capua , defected to Carthage, giving Hannibal control over much of southern Italy. As Syracuse and Macedonia joined the Carthaginian side after Cannae, the conflict spread. Between 215 and 210 BC the Carthaginians attempted to capture Roman-held Sicily and Sardinia, but were unsuccessful. The Romans took drastic steps to raise new legions: enrolling slaves, criminals and those who did not meet
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#17327729151427436-518: The Romans refused to surrender to Hannibal. His offer to ransom survivors was brusquely refused. The Romans fought for 14 more years until they achieved victory at the Battle of Zama . Shortly after the start of the Second Punic War, Hannibal crossed into Italy by traversing the Pyrenees and the Alps during the summer and early autumn of 218 BC. He quickly won major victories over the Romans at Trebia and at Lake Trasimene . After these losses,
7579-426: The Romans stormed Syracuse in a surprise night assault and captured several districts of the city. Meanwhile, the Carthaginian army was crippled by plague . After the Carthaginians failed to resupply the city, the rest of Syracuse fell in the autumn of 212 BC; Archimedes was killed by a Roman soldier. Carthage sent more reinforcements to Sicily in 211 BC and went on the offensive. In 211 BC Hannibal sent
7722-459: The Second Punic War is the historian Polybius ( c. 200 – c. 118 BC ), a Greek sent to Rome in 167 BC as a hostage. He is best known for The Histories , written sometime after 146 BC. Polybius's work is considered broadly objective and largely neutral between Carthaginian and Roman points of view. Polybius was an analytical historian and wherever possible interviewed participants, from both sides, in
7865-481: The Second Punic War is missing after 216 BC or only exists in fragmentary form. As a result, the main source for much of the war is the account written by the Roman historian Livy . This is commonly used by modern historians where Polybius's account is not extant. Livy relied heavily on Polybius, but wrote in a more structured way, with more details about Roman politics; he was also openly pro-Roman. His accounts of military encounters are often demonstrably inaccurate;
8008-870: The Senate". Later Roman and Greco-Roman historians largely follow Livy's figures. Appian gave 50,000 killed and "a great many" taken prisoner. Plutarch agreed, "50,000 Romans fell in that battle... 4,000 were taken alive in the field and 10,000 in the camps of both consuls". Quintilian : "60,000 men were slain by Hannibal at Cannae". Eutropius : "20 officers of consular and praetorian rank, 30 senators, and 300 others of noble descent, were taken or slain, as well as 40,000-foot-soldiers, and 3,500 horse". Some modern historians, while rejecting Polybius's figure as flawed, are willing to accept Livy's figure. Other historians have come up with far lower estimates. In 1891, Cantalupi proposed Roman losses of 10,500 to 16,000. Samuels in 1990 also regarded Livy's figure as far too high, on
8151-602: The Sicilian grain supply to Rome and its armies was resumed. For 11 years after Cannae the war surged around southern Italy as cities went over to the Carthaginians or were taken by subterfuge and the Romans recaptured them by siege or by suborning factions within to give them entry. Hannibal repeatedly defeated Roman armies, but wherever his main army was not active the Romans threatened Carthaginian-supporting towns or sought battle with Carthaginian or Carthaginian-allied detachments; frequently with success. By 208 BC many of
8294-536: The Somme offensive in 1916". Only about 15,000 Romans, most of whom were from the garrisons of the camps and had not taken part in the battle, escaped death. Following the defeat, Capua and several other Italian city-states defected from the Roman Republic to Carthage. As news of this defeat reached Rome, the city was gripped in panic. Authorities resorted to extraordinary measures, which included consulting
8437-480: The armies in the battle of Cannae . The Roman legions forced their way through Hannibal's deliberately weak centre, but Libyan heavy infantry on the wings swung around their advance, menacing their flanks. Hasdrubal Gisco led the Carthaginian cavalry on the left wing and routed the Roman cavalry opposite, then swept around the rear of the Romans to attack their cavalry on the other wing. The heavily outnumbered Carthaginian infantry held out until Hasdrubal charged into
8580-432: The attacking Roman forces. By doing so, he had turned the strength of the Roman infantry into a weakness. While the front ranks were gradually advancing, the bulk of the Roman troops began to lose their cohesion, as troops from the reserve lines advanced into the growing gaps. Soon they were compacted together so closely that they had little space to wield their weapons. In pressing so far forward in their desire to destroy
8723-410: The battle, and much of the blame for the defeat has been laid on his shoulders. His low origins seem to be exaggerated in the sources, and Varro may have been made a scapegoat by the aristocratic establishment. He lacked the powerful descendants that Paullus had, descendants who were willing and able to protect his reputation—most notably his grandson Scipio Aemilianus , the patron of Polybius, one of
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#17327729151428866-434: The besieging Roman forces, this time they declined to leave their fortifications. In desperation Hannibal again assaulted them and again failed to break through. He next marched his army towards Rome, hoping to compel the Romans to abandon the siege to defend it; however, the besieging force stayed in place and Capua fell soon afterwards. The city was stripped of its political autonomy and placed under Roman appointees. In 210
9009-709: The bloodletting. Only 14,000 Roman troops managed to escape, including Scipio Africanus , who managed to escape the encirclement with 500 men, most of whom had cut their way through to the nearby town of Canusium . Polybius writes that of the Roman and allied infantry, 70,000 were killed, 10,000 captured, and "perhaps" 3,000 survived. He also reports that of the 6,000 Roman and allied cavalry, only 370 survived. Livy wrote, "Forty-five thousand and five hundred foot, two thousand seven hundred horse, there being an equal number of citizens and allies, are said to have been slain." He also reports that 3,000 Roman and allied infantry and 1,500 Roman and allied cavalry were taken prisoner by
9152-520: The brink of collapse. Within a few weeks of Cannae a Roman army of 25,000 was ambushed by Boii Gauls in Cisalpine Gaul at the battle of Silva Litana and annihilated. Fabius became consul in 215 BC and was re-elected in 214 BC. Little has survived of Polybius's account of Hannibal's army in Italy after Cannae. Livy gives a fuller record, but according to Goldsworthy "his reliability is often suspect", especially with regard to his descriptions of battles; many modern historians agree, but nevertheless his
9295-422: The casualties at the Battle of Trebia . In addition to the consul Paullus, Livy recorded that among the dead were 2 quaestors , 29 of the 48 military tribunes , some of consular rank, including the consul of the previous year, Gnaeus Servilius Geminus , and the former Magister equitum , Marcus Minucius Rufus , and 80 "senators or men who had held offices which would have given them the right to be elected to
9438-411: The center of the field. The wind from the east blew dust in the Romans' faces and obscured their vision. While the wind was not a major factor, the dust that both armies created would have been potentially debilitating to sight. Although it made seeing difficult, troops would still have been able to see others in the vicinity. The dust was not the only psychological factor involved in battle. Because of
9581-421: The centre of the Carthaginian line and then defeated each wing separately, inflicting severe losses. It was no longer possible for Hasdrubal to reinforce Hannibal in Italy. The Carthaginians suffered a wave of defections of local Celtiberian tribes to Rome. The Roman commanders captured Saguntum in 212 BC and in 211 BC hired 20,000 Celtiberian mercenaries to reinforce their army. Observing that
9724-530: The cities and territories which had joined the Carthaginian cause had returned to their Roman allegiance. Fabius captured the Carthaginian-allied town Arpi in 213 BC. In 212 BC Hannibal destroyed the Roman army of Centenius Penula at the battle of the Silarus in northwest Lucania. Later the same year, Hannibal defeated another Roman army at the battle of Herdonia , with 16,000 men lost from
9867-847: The classicist Adrian Goldsworthy says Livy's "reliability is often suspect", and the historian Phillip Sabin refers to Livy's "military ignorance". Other, later, ancient histories of the war exist, although often in fragmentary or summary form. Modern historians usually take into account the writings of Diodorus Siculus and Cassius Dio , two Greek authors writing during the Roman era ; they are described by John Lazenby as "clearly far inferior" to Livy, but some fragments of Polybius can be recovered from their texts. The Greek moralist Plutarch wrote several biographies of Roman commanders in his Parallel Lives . Other sources include coins, inscriptions, archaeological evidence and empirical evidence from reconstructions. Most male Roman citizens were liable for military service and would serve as infantry ,
10010-637: The consul Claudius Nero . They reinforced the Romans under the second consul, Marcus Salinator , who were already facing Hasdrubal. This combined Roman force attacked at the battle of the Metaurus and destroyed the Carthaginian army, killing Hasdrubal. This battle confirmed Roman dominance in Italy and marked the end of their Fabian strategy. Without the expected reinforcement Hannibal's forces were compelled to evacuate allied towns and withdraw to Bruttium . In 205 BC Mago Barca, another of Hannibal's younger brothers, landed in Genua in north-west Italy with
10153-520: The controlled retreat that ultimately made possible Hannibal's pincer movement. Meanwhile, infantry from Punic Africa was on the wings at the very edge of his infantry line. This infantry would remain cohesive and attack the Roman flanks. Hasdrubal led the Hispanic and Gallic cavalry on the left (south near the river Aufidus) of the Carthaginian army. By placing the flank of his army on the Aufidus, Hannibal prevented this flank from being overlapped by
10296-488: The day of battle) and 8,000 of several tribes of Hispania , including Iberians , Celtiberians and Lusitanians . Hannibal's cavalry also came from diverse backgrounds. He commanded 4,000 Numidian , 2,000 Iberian peninsular, 4,000 Gallic and 450 Libyan- Phoenician cavalry. Hannibal had an auxiliary skirmisher contingent consisting of 1,000–2,000 Balearic slingers and 6,000 mixed-nationality javelinmen, possibly including Lusitanians among them. The uniting factor for
10439-511: The enemy to win a tactical victory. Hannibal had deployed his forces based on the particular fighting qualities of each unit, taking into consideration both their strengths and weaknesses. This aspect of Hannibal's leadership was highlighted in the use of a Spanish unit, the Balearic slingers, whom he placed behind the infantry to hurl their ranged missiles into the masses of Roman troops. He placed his Iberians , Celtiberians and Gauls in
10582-442: The events he wrote about. Modern historians consider Polybius to have treated the relatives of Scipio Aemilianus , his patron and friend, unduly favourably but the consensus is to accept his account largely at face value. The modern historian Andrew Curry sees Polybius as being "fairly reliable"; Craige Champion describes him as "a remarkably well-informed, industrious, and insightful historian". Much of Polybius's account of
10725-592: The evidence led P.S. Derow to identify the equivalent Julian date as 1 July 216 BC. Other authorities have suggested other Julian dates. Figures for troops involved in ancient battles are often unreliable, and Cannae is no exception. They should be treated with caution, especially those for the Carthaginian side. The Carthaginian army was a combination of warriors from numerous regions, and may have numbered between 40,000 and 50,000. Their infantry comprised an estimated 8,000 Libyans , 5,500 Gaetulian , 16,000 Gauls , mainly Boii and Insubres (8,000 were left at camp
10868-462: The evident Roman disasters proved too strong a temptation. The treaty between them and Hannibal can be described as an agreement of friendship, since the Capuans had no obligations. When the port city of Locri defected to Carthage in the summer of 215 BC it was immediately used to reinforce the Carthaginian forces in Italy with soldiers, supplies and war elephants. It was the only time during
11011-409: The fact that it commanded the surrounding district". The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of him. After two days' march, they found him on the left bank of the river Aufidus , and encamped 8 km (5 miles) away. Varro, in command on the first day, is presented by contemporary sources as a man of reckless nature and hubris , who was determined to defeat Hannibal. As
11154-439: The fighting, and Iberian and Gallic forces fought on both sides. There were three main military theatres during the war: Italy, where Hannibal defeated the Roman legions repeatedly, with occasional subsidiary campaigns in Sicily, Sardinia and Greece; Iberia, where Hasdrubal , a younger brother of Hannibal, defended the Carthaginian colonial cities with mixed success before moving into Italy; and Africa, where Rome finally won
11297-406: The flanks at the crucial moment, and encircle the overextended Romans. The Romans were in front of the hill leading to Cannae and hemmed in on their right flank by the river Aufidus, so that their left flank was the only viable means of retreat. In addition, the Carthaginian forces had maneuvered so that the Romans would face east. Not only would the morning sun shine low into the Romans' eyes, but
11440-440: The four-horned saddle , with the wealthier ones being clad in mail, a Gallic invention. Skirmishers acting as light infantry carried either slings or javelins. The Balearic slingers , who were famous for their accuracy, carried short, medium and long slings used to cast stones or bullets. They may have carried a small shield or simple leather pelt on their arms, but this is uncertain. Hannibal himself, like many Roman officers on
11583-406: The full complement of the legions deployed would have been in excess of 100,000 men, plus, as always, a similar number of allied troops. The majority were deployed in southern Italy in field armies of approximately 20,000 men each. This was insufficient to challenge Hannibal's army in open battle, but sufficient to force him to concentrate his forces and to hamper his movements. During 215 BC
11726-414: The greatest tactical feats in military history and one of the worst defeats in Roman history, and it cemented Hannibal's reputation as one of antiquity's greatest tacticians. Having recovered from their losses at Trebia (218 BC) and Lake Trasimene (217 BC), the Romans decided to engage Hannibal at Cannae , with approximately 86,000 Roman and allied socii troops . They massed their heavy infantry in
11869-495: The grounds that the cavalry would have been inadequate to prevent the Roman infantry escaping to the rear. He doubts that Hannibal even wanted a high death toll, as much of the army consisted of Italians whom Hannibal hoped to win as allies. Micheal Clodfelter also doubts the casualties of the Romans, citing the scarcity and unreliability of ancient sources, with him expressing that "are we really supposed to believe that Hannibal’s 50,000 Carthaginians slaughtered 48,000–70,000 Romans on
12012-399: The invader down, until Rome could rebuild its military strength. Hannibal was left largely free to ravage Apulia for the next year. Fabius was unpopular at this period with parts of the Roman army, public and the senate, for avoiding battle while Italy was being devastated by the enemy: there was awareness that his tactics would not lead to a quick end to the war. Hannibal marched through
12155-495: The legions from behind. As a result, the Roman infantry was surrounded with no means of escape. At least 67,500 Romans were killed or captured. Miles describes Cannae as "Rome's greatest military disaster". Toni Ñaco del Hoyo describes the Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae as the three "great military calamities" suffered by the Romans in the first three years of the war. Brian Carey writes that these three defeats brought Rome to
12298-456: The main sources of this history. In the spring of 216 BC Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae, in the Apulian plain, placing himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. As Polybius noted, the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but
12441-674: The majority of Rome's allies in central Italy remained loyal. All except the smallest towns were too well fortified for Hannibal to take by assault, and blockade could be a long-drawn-out affair, or if the target was a port, impossible. Carthage's new allies felt little sense of community with Carthage, or even with each other. They increased the number of places which Hannibal's army was expected to defend from Roman retribution, but provided relatively few fresh troops to assist him in doing so. Such Italian forces as were raised resisted operating away from their home cities and performed poorly when they did. An important part of Hannibal's campaign in Italy
12584-482: The middle, alternating the ethnic composition between Hispanics and Gauls across the front line, with himself at the front and center alongside his brother Mago . Roman sources claim their placement was chosen for being the most expendable and unreliable troops, but modern reflections believe those forces were actually selected for their battle-hardening to carry the weight of the Punic side, as they would be tasked with
12727-456: The more numerous Romans. Hasdrubal was given 6,000–7,000 cavalry, and Hanno had 3,000–4,000 Numidians on the right. Hannibal intended that his cavalry, comprising mainly medium Hispanic cavalry and Numidian light horse, and positioned on the flanks, would defeat the weaker Roman cavalry and swing around to attack the Roman infantry from the rear as it pressed upon Hannibal's weakened center. His veteran African troops would then press in from
12870-443: The morning cold, had roused, as they were rising up, covered with blood, from the midst of the heaps of slain, were overpowered by the enemy. Some were found with their heads plunged into the earth, which they had excavated; having thus, as it appeared, made pits for themselves, and having suffocated themselves." Victor Davis Hanson claims that nearly six hundred legionaries were slaughtered each minute until darkness brought an end to
13013-407: The morning of the battle, as the forces drew up, a Carthaginian officer named Gisgo reportedly remarked to Hannibal that the size of the Roman army was astonishing. "There is one thing, Gisgo, yet more astonishing", Hannibal coolly replied, "which you take no notice of." He then explained, "In all those great numbers before us, there is not one man called Gisgo", provoking laughter that spread through
13156-400: The most common operations. When armies were campaigning, surprise attacks, ambushes and stratagems were common. More formal battles were usually preceded by the two armies camping 2–12 kilometres (1–7 mi) apart for days or weeks; sometimes forming up in battle order each day. If either commander felt at a disadvantage, they might march off without engaging. In such circumstances it
13299-477: The mouth of the Rhone, but Hannibal evaded the Romans and continued to Italy. The Carthaginians reached the foot of the Alps by late autumn and crossed them in 15 days, surmounting the difficulties of climate, terrain and the guerrilla warfare tactics of the native Ligurians. Hannibal arrived in Cisalpine Gaul with 20,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and an unknown number of elephants – the survivors of
13442-519: The northern boundary of the Carthaginian sphere of influence . At some time during the next six years Rome made a separate agreement with the city of Saguntum , which was situated well south of the Ebro. In 219 BC a Carthaginian army under Hannibal besieged Saguntum , and after eight months captured and sacked it. Rome complained to the Carthaginian government, sending an embassy headed by Quintus Fabius Maximus to its senate with peremptory demands. When these were rejected Rome declared war in
13585-410: The offensive in Iberia and were badly defeated but maintained their hold on the north-east. In 209 BC the new Roman commander Publius Scipio captured Carthago Nova , the main Carthaginian base in the peninsula. In 208 Scipio defeated Hasdrubal , although Hasdrubal was able to withdraw most of his troops into Gaul and then Cisalpine Gaul in spring 207 BC. This new Carthaginian invasion was defeated at
13728-425: The old tyrant of Syracuse of forty-five-years standing and a staunch Roman ally, died in 215 BC and his successor Hieronymus was discontented with his situation. Hannibal negotiated a treaty whereby Syracuse came over to Carthage, at the price of making the whole of Sicily a Syracusan possession. The Syracusan army proved no match for a Roman army led by Claudius Marcellus and by spring 213 BC Syracuse
13871-536: The opposing side, might have been wearing a bronze musculata and carrying a falcata as his personal sidearm. The equipment of the Libyan line infantry has been much debated. Duncan Head has argued in favor of short stabbing spears. Polybius states that the Libyans fought with equipment taken from previously defeated Romans. It is unclear whether he meant only shields and armor or offensive weapons as well, though
14014-501: The other Roman army was also defeated at the battle of Umbrian Lake and annihilated. The prisoners were badly treated if they were Romans; captured Latin allies were well treated by the Carthaginians and many were freed and sent back to their cities, in the expectation they would speak well of Carthaginian martial prowess and of their treatment. Hannibal hoped some of these allies could be persuaded to defect . The Carthaginians continued their march through Etruria , then Umbria , to
14157-419: The pre-Julian Roman calendar are known not to correspond to its namesake Julian day . For example, Livy records a lunar eclipse in 168 BC as occurring on 4 September, when astronomical calculations show it happened on Julian day 21 June of that year. This discrepancy arose from the failure of the pontifices to properly perform intercalations , either by accident or for political advantage. A review of
14300-454: The preeminent powers in the western Mediterranean. Relationships were good, the two states had several times declared their mutual friendship and there were strong commercial links. According to the classicist Richard Miles Rome's expansionary attitude after southern Italy came under its control combined with Carthage's proprietary approach to Sicily caused the two powers to stumble into war more by accident than design. The immediate cause of
14443-423: The ranks of their heavy infantry. As the Roman heavy infantry attacked, Hannibal stood with his men in the weak center and held them together in a controlled retreat. The crescent of Hispanic and Gallic troops buckled inwards as they gradually withdrew step by step. Knowing the superiority of the Roman infantry, Hannibal had instructed his infantry to withdraw deliberately, creating an even tighter envelopement around
14586-572: The rear and the African flanking echelons assailed them on their right and left, the advance of the Roman infantry was brought to an abrupt halt. The Romans were henceforth enclosed in a pocket with no means of escape. The Carthaginians created a wall and began to systematically massacre them. Polybius wrote: "as their outer ranks were continually cut down, and the survivors forced to pull back and huddle together, they were finally all killed where they stood." As Livy described, "So many thousands of Romans were dying... Some, whom their wounds, pinched by
14729-408: The remnants of his Spanish army. It soon received Gallic and Ligurian reinforcements. Mago's arrival in the north of the Italian peninsula was followed by Hannibal's inconclusive battle of Crotona in 204 BC in the far south of the peninsula. Mago marched his reinforced army towards the lands of Carthage's main Gallic allies in Cisalpine Gaul, but was checked by a large Roman army and defeated at
14872-440: The retreating Roman right wing. Instead, he led them to the other side of the field to attack the socii cavalry still fighting the Numidians. Assailed from both sides, the allied cavalry broke before Hasdrubal could charge into contact and the Numidians pursued them off the field. While the Carthaginian cavalry were in the process of defeating the Roman horsemen, the masses of infantry on both sides advanced towards each other in
15015-431: The retreating and seemingly collapsing line of Hispanic and Gallic troops, the Romans had ignored (possibly due to the dust) the African troops that stood uncommitted on the projecting ends of this now-reversed crescent. This also gave the Carthaginian cavalry time to drive the Roman cavalry off on both flanks and attack the Roman center in the rear. The Roman infantry, now stripped of protection on both its flanks, formed
15158-543: The richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping the devastation would draw Fabius into battle, but Fabius refused. The Roman populace derided Fabius as "the Delayer" (in Latin , Cunctator ) and in 216 BC elected new consuls: Gaius Terentius Varro , who advocated pursuing a more aggressive war strategy, and Lucius Aemilius Paullus , who advocated a strategy somewhere between Fabius's and that suggested by Varro. In
15301-404: The same assignment. However, the Senate feared a real threat, and deployed not just four legions to the field but all eight, including allies. Ordinarily, each of the two consuls would command his own portion of the army, but since the two armies were combined into one, Roman law required them to alternate their command on a daily basis. The traditional account puts Varro in command on the day of
15444-419: The same number of foot soldiers but 900 cavalry per legion—more than triple the legion numbers. Eight legions—some 40,000 Roman soldiers and an estimated 2,400 cavalry—formed the core of this massive new army. Livy quotes one source stating the Romans added only 10,000 men to their usual army. The two consuls were each assigned two of the four legions to command, unusually employing all four legions at once on
15587-562: The same time as a heavy Roman-style shield. The conventional deployment for armies of the time was placement of infantry in the center, with the cavalry in two flanking wings. The Romans followed this convention fairly closely, but chose extra depth rather than breadth for the infantry in hopes of breaking quickly through the center of Hannibal's line . Varro knew how the Roman infantry had managed to penetrate Hannibal's center at Trebia , and he planned to recreate this on an even greater scale. The principes were stationed immediately behind
15730-531: The siege, but was then ambushed and itself besieged. An army had previously been raised by the Romans to campaign in Iberia, but the Roman Senate detached one Roman and one allied legion from it to send to north Italy. Recruiting fresh troops to replace these delayed the army's departure for Iberia until September. At the same time a Roman army in Sicily under the consul Sempronius Longus was preparing for an invasion of Africa. Meanwhile, Hannibal assembled
15873-521: The silver mines, agricultural wealth, manpower , military facilities such as shipyards , and territorial depth to stand up to future Roman demands with confidence. Hamilcar ruled as a viceroy and was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal , in 229 BC and then his son, Hannibal, in 221 BC. In 226 BC the Ebro Treaty was agreed with Rome, specifying the Ebro River as
16016-523: The somewhat distant battle location, both sides were forced to fight on little sleep. Another Roman disadvantage was thirst caused by Hannibal's attack on the Roman encampment during the previous day. Furthermore, the massive number of troops would have led to an overwhelming amount of background noise. All of these psychological factors made battle especially difficult for the infantrymen. The light infantry on both sides engaged in indecisive skirmishing, inflicting few casualties and quickly withdrawing through
16159-403: The southeasterly winds would blow sand and dust into their faces as they approached the battlefield. Hannibal's deployment of his army, based on his perception of the terrain and understanding of the capabilities of his troops, proved decisive. As the armies advanced on one another, Hannibal gradually extended the center of his line, as Polybius described: "After thus drawing up his whole army in
16302-411: The spring of 207 BC Hasdrubal Barca repeated the feat of his elder brother by marching an army across the Alps. He invaded Cisalpine Gaul with an army of 35,000 men, intending to join forces with Hannibal, but Hannibal was unaware of his presence. The Romans facing Hannibal in southern Italy tricked him into believing the whole Roman army was still in camp, while a large portion marched north under
16445-400: The spring of 216 BC Hannibal seized the large supply depot at Cannae on the Apulian plain. The Roman Senate authorised the raising of double-sized armies by Varro and Paullus, a force of 86,000 men, the largest in Roman history up to that point. Paullus and Varro marched southward to confront Hannibal and encamped 10 km (6 mi) away. Hannibal accepted battle on the open plain between
16588-566: The spring of 218 BC. Since the end of the First Punic War Rome had also been expanding, especially in the area of north Italy either side of the River Po known as Cisalpine Gaul . Roman attempts to establish towns and farms in the region from 232 BC led to repeated wars with the local Gallic tribes, who were finally defeated in 222. In 218 the Romans pushed even further north, establishing two new towns, or "colonies", on
16731-551: The suppression of the rebellion, Hamilcar understood that Carthage needed to strengthen its economic and military base if it were to confront Rome again; Carthaginian possessions in Iberia (modern Spain and Portugal) were limited to a handful of prosperous coastal cities in the south and Hamilcar took the army which he had led in the Truceless War to Iberia in 237 BC and carved out a quasi-monarchical, autonomous state in southern and eastern Iberia. This gave Carthage
16874-483: The task, and not attempt to relate what in describing I must make less than the reality. The consul and his army having been lost at the Trasimenus the year before, it was not one wound upon another which was announced, but a multiplied disaster, the loss of two consular armies, together with the two consuls: and that now there was neither any Roman camp, nor general nor soldiery: that Apulia and Samnium, and now almost
17017-399: The usual property qualification; this vastly increased the number of men they had under arms. For the next decade the war in southern Italy continued, with Roman armies slowly recapturing most of the Italian cities that had joined Carthage. The Romans established a lodgement in north-east Iberia in 218 BC; the Carthaginians repeatedly attempted and failed to reduce it. In 211 the Romans took
17160-506: The voyage and some of his ships were intercepted by the Romans, but 12,000 of his troops reached Carthage. The Roman fleet continued on from Massala in the autumn of 218 BC, landing the army it was transporting in north-east Iberia, where it won support among the local tribes. The Romans' lodgement between the Ebro and the Pyrenees blocked the route from Iberia to Italy, making the despatch of reinforcements from Iberia to Hannibal difficult. A Carthaginian attack in late 218 BC
17303-483: The war Carthage reinforced Hannibal. A second force, under Hannibal's youngest brother Mago , was meant to land in Italy in 215 BC but was diverted to Iberia after a major Carthaginian defeat there. Meanwhile, the Romans took drastic steps to raise new legions: enrolling slaves, criminals and those who did not meet the usual property qualification. By early 215 BC they were fielding at least 12 legions; by 214 BC 18; and by 213 BC 22. By 212 BC
17446-431: The war. The First Punic War had ended in a Roman victory in 241 BC after 23 years and enormous losses on both sides. After the war Carthage expanded its holdings in Iberia where in 219 BC a Carthaginian army under Hannibal besieged, captured and sacked the pro-Roman city of Saguntum . In early 218 BC Rome declared war on Carthage, beginning the Second Punic War. Later that year, Hannibal surprised
17589-537: The war. The Carthaginian fleet rarely put to sea, and when it did it was usually to escort transport ships; it rarely acted aggressively. This gave the Romans naval superiority for the duration of the war. The Roman Republic had been aggressively expanding in the southern Italian mainland for a century and had conquered peninsular Italy south of the Arno River by 270 BC, after the Pyrrhic War when
17732-450: The weak Carthaginian center as deployed in a crescent, curving out toward the Romans in the middle with the African troops on their flanks in echelon formation . It is believed that the purpose of this formation was to break the forward momentum of the Roman infantry, and delay its advance before other developments allowed Hannibal to deploy his African infantry most effectively. While the majority of historians feel that Hannibal's action
17875-410: The wealthier equites providing a cavalry component. Traditionally, when at war the Romans would raise four legions , each of 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry. Approximately 1,200 of the infantry, poorer or younger men unable to afford the armour and equipment of a standard legionary , served as javelin -armed skirmishers , known as velites . They carried several javelins, which would be thrown from
18018-524: The western Mediterranean in the 3rd century BC. For 17 years the two states struggled for supremacy, primarily in Italy and Iberia , but also on the islands of Sicily and Sardinia and, towards the end of the war, in North Africa. After immense materiel and human losses on both sides, the Carthaginians were once again defeated. Macedonia , Syracuse and several Numidian kingdoms were drawn into
18161-433: The whole of Italy, were in the possession of Hannibal. No other nation surely would not have been overwhelmed by such an accumulation of misfortune. For a brief period, the Romans were in complete disarray. Their best armies in the peninsula had been destroyed, the few remnants severely demoralized, and the only remaining consul (Varro) completely discredited. As the story goes, Rome declared a national day of mourning as there
18304-678: Was a direct threat to the city. When they did, they fought as well-armoured heavy infantry armed with long thrusting spears, although they were notoriously ill-trained and ill-disciplined. In most circumstances Carthage recruited foreigners to make up its army. Many were from North Africa and these were frequently referred to as "Libyans". The region provided several types of fighters, including: close-order infantry equipped with large shields, helmets, short swords and long thrusting spears ; javelin-armed light infantry skirmishers; close-order shock cavalry also known as "heavy cavalry" carrying spears; and light cavalry skirmishers who threw javelins from
18447-527: Was a key engagement of the Second Punic War between the Roman Republic and Carthage , fought on 2 August 216 BC near the ancient village of Cannae in Apulia , southeast Italy . The Carthaginians and their allies, led by Hannibal , surrounded and practically annihilated a larger Roman and Italian army under the consuls Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro . It is regarded as one of
18590-400: Was besieged . Both Polybius' and Livy's accounts of the siege focus on Archimedes ' invention of war machines to counteract Roman siege warfare, which was already made difficult by the strong defences of the city. A large Carthaginian army led by Himilco was sent to relieve the city in 213 BC and several further Sicilian cities deserted the Romans. In the spring of 212 BC
18733-401: Was deliberate, some have called this account fanciful, and claim that the actions of the day represent either the natural curvature that occurs when a broad front of infantry marches forward, or the bending back of the Carthaginian center from the shock action of meeting the heavily massed Roman center. The battle began with a fierce cavalry engagement on the flanks. Polybius described many of
18876-508: Was difficult to force a battle if the other commander was unwilling to fight. Forming up in battle order was a complicated and premeditated affair, which took several hours. Infantry were usually positioned in the centre of the battle line, with light infantry skirmishers to their front and cavalry on each flank. Many battles were decided when one side's infantry force was attacked in the flank or rear and they were partially or wholly enveloped . Both states possessed large fleets throughout
19019-412: Was lured into combat by Hannibal on ground of his choosing at the battle of the Trebia . The Carthaginians encircled the Romans and only 10,000 out of 40,000 were able to fight their way to safety. Having secured his position in Cisalpine Gaul by this victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter among the Gauls. The latter joined his army in large numbers, bringing it up to 50,000 men. There
19162-523: Was not able to prevent Hasdrubal from leading his depleted army over the western passes of the Pyrenees into Gaul. In 207 BC, after recruiting heavily in Gaul, Hasdrubal crossed the Alps into Italy in an attempt to join his brother, Hannibal, but was defeated before he could. Battle of Cannae The Battle of Cannae ( / ˈ k æ n i , - eɪ , - aɪ / ; Latin: [ˈkanːae̯] )
19305-416: Was prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open ground, despite the Romans' numerical strength. This was especially true since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry, in both quality and quantity. Despite these misgivings, Paullus thought it unwise to withdraw the army after the initial success, and camped two-thirds of the army east of the river Aufidus, sending the remainder to fortify
19448-403: Was rejected, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of water from the Aufidus to the Roman troops, sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass water-bearing soldiers that were found outside the camp fortifications. According to Polybius, Hannibal's cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the supply of water to the Roman camp. On
19591-416: Was repelled at the battle of Cissa . In 217 BC 40 Carthaginian and Iberian warships were beaten by 35 Roman and Massalian vessels at the battle of Ebro River , with the loss of 29 Carthaginian ships. In 216 Hasdrubal received orders from Carthage to move into Italy and join up with Hannibal to put pressure on the Romans in their homeland. Hasdrubal demurred, arguing that Carthaginian authority over
19734-400: Was shock when news of the defeat reached Rome, but this calmed once Sempronius arrived, to preside over the consular elections in the usual manner. The consuls-elect recruited further legions, both Roman and from Rome's Latin allies; reinforced Sardinia and Sicily against the possibility of Carthaginian raids or invasion; placed garrisons at Tarentum and other places for similar reasons; built
19877-402: Was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field. Rome typically employed four legions each year, each consisting of 4,000 foot soldiers and 200 cavalry. Per contemporary Roman sources, for the first time ever the Senate introduced eight legions, each consisting of 5,000 foot soldiers and 300 cavalry, with allied troops numbering
20020-442: Was the long-standing Roman procedure to elect two men each year as senior magistrates , known as consuls , who in time of war would each lead an army. An army was usually formed by combining two Roman legions with a similarly sized and equipped pair of legions provided by their Latin allies . These legions usually had a larger attached complement of cavalry than Roman ones. Carthaginian citizens only served in their army if there
20163-469: Was to attempt to fight the Romans by using local resources; raising recruits from among the local population. His subordinate Hanno was able to raise troops in Samnium in 214 BC, but the Romans intercepted these new levies in the battle of Beneventum and eliminated them before they rendezvoused with Hannibal. Hannibal could win allies, but defending them against the Romans was a new and difficult problem, as
20306-640: Was to be paid over 50 years. Carthage was prohibited from waging war outside Africa, and in Africa only with Rome's express permission. Henceforth it was clear Carthage was politically subordinate to Rome. Rome used Carthaginian military activity against the Numidians as a pretext to declare war again in 149 BC starting the Third Punic War . In 146 BC the Romans stormed the city of Carthage , sacked it, slaughtered most of its population and completely demolished it . The most reliable source for
20449-458: Was to continuously push with the infantry in the center and attempt to overpower the enemy line. Despite what these tactics might suggest, the center was not commanded by either of the two consuls, but by Geminus Servilius. The consuls commanded the two wings, Terentius Varro the left and Aemilius Paullus the right. Hannibal understood that the Romans fought their battles like this, and he took his outnumbered army and strategically placed them around
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