Misplaced Pages

#422577

123-643: Operation Boomerang was a partially successful air raid by the United States Army Air Forces ' (USAAF) XX Bomber Command against oil refining facilities in Japanese-occupied Dutch East Indies during World War II . The attack took place on the night of 10/11 August 1944 and involved attempts to bomb an oil refinery at Palembang and lay mines to interdict the Musi River . The raid formed part of

246-933: A segregated basis. A flight training center was set up at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama . Despite the handicap—caused by the segregation policy—of not having an experienced training cadre as with other AAF units, the Tuskegee Airmen distinguished themselves in combat with the 332nd Fighter Group . The Tuskegee training program produced 673 black fighter pilots, 253 B-26 Marauder pilots, and 132 navigators. The vast majority of African-American airmen, however, did not fare as well. Mainly draftees , most did not fly or maintain aircraft. Their largely menial duties, indifferent or hostile leadership, and poor morale led to serious dissatisfaction and several violent incidents. Women served more successfully as part of

369-585: A "disturbing failure to follow through on orders". To streamline the AAF in preparation for war, with a goal of centralized planning and decentralized execution of operations, in October 1941 Arnold submitted to the WDGS essentially the same reorganization plan it had rejected a year before, this time crafted by Chief of Air Staff Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz . When this plan was not given any consideration, Arnold reworded

492-476: A Chief of Air Staff and three deputies. This wartime structure remained essentially unchanged for the remainder of hostilities. In October 1944 Arnold, to begin a process of reorganization for reducing the structure, proposed to eliminate the AC/AS, Training and move his office into OC&R, changing it to Operations, Training and Requirements (OT&R) but the mergers were never effected. On 23 August 1945, after

615-538: A Zone of Interior "training and supply agency", but from the start AAF officers viewed this as a "paper" restriction negated by Arnold's place on both the Joint and Combined Chiefs, which gave him strategic planning authority for the AAF, a viewpoint that was formally sanctioned by the War Department in mid-1943 and endorsed by the president. The Circular No. 59 reorganization directed the AAF to operate under

738-566: A blueprint. After war began, Congress enacted the First War Powers Act on 18 December 1941 endowing President Franklin D. Roosevelt with virtual carte blanche to reorganize the executive branch as he found necessary. Under it, on 28 February 1942, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9082 , based on Marshall's recommendation and the work of McNarney's committee. The EO changed Arnold's title to Commanding General, Army Air Forces effective 9 March 1942, making him co-equal with

861-470: A change of mood at the War Department, and of dubious legality. By November 1941, on the eve of U.S. entry into the war, the division of authority within the Army as a whole, caused by the activation of Army GHQ a year before, had led to a "battle of memos" between it and the WDGS over administering the AAF, prompting Marshall to state that he had "the poorest command post in the Army" when defense commands showed

984-521: A commanding general who reported directly to the Army Chief of Staff . The AAF administered all parts of military aviation formerly distributed among the Air Corps, General Headquarters Air Force, and the ground forces' corps area commanders and thus became the first air organization of the U.S. Army to control its own installations and support personnel. The peak size of the AAF during World War II

1107-457: A complex division of administrative control performed by a policy staff, an operating staff, and the support commands (formerly "field activities" of the OCAC). The former field activities operated under a "bureau" structure, with both policy and operating functions vested in staff-type officers who often exercised command and policy authority without responsibility for results, a system held over from

1230-609: A controversial move, the AAF Technical Training Command began leasing resort hotels and apartment buildings for large-scale training sites (accommodation for 90,000 existed in Miami Beach alone). The leases were negotiated for the AAF by the Corps of Engineers, often to the economic detriment of hotel owners in rental rates, wear and tear clauses, and short-notice to terminate leases. In December 1943,

1353-731: A defense reorganization in the post-war period resulted in the passage by the United States Congress of the National Security Act of 1947 with the creation of an independent United States Air Force in September 1947. In its expansion and conduct of the war, the AAF became more than just an arm of the greater organization. By the end of World War II, the Army Air Forces had become virtually an independent service. By regulation and executive order, it

SECTION 10

#1732780745423

1476-429: A deleterious effect on operational training and threatened to overwhelm the capacity of the old Air Corps groups to provide experienced cadres or to absorb graduates of the expanded training program to replace those transferred. Since 1939 the overall level of experience among the combat groups had fallen to such an extent that when the demand for replacements in combat was factored in, the entire operational training system

1599-720: A general autonomy within the War Department (similar to that of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy ) until the end of the war, while its commanders would cease lobbying for independence. Marshall, a strong proponent of airpower, understood that the Air Force would likely achieve its independence following the war. Soon after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, in recognition of importance of

1722-698: A major reorganization and consolidation on 29 March 1943. The four main directorates and seventeen subordinate directorates (the "operating staff") were abolished as an unnecessary level of authority, and execution of policies was removed from the staffs to be assigned solely to field organizations along functional lines. The policy functions of the directorates were reorganized and consolidated into offices regrouped along conventional military lines under six assistant chiefs of air staff (AC/AS): Personnel; Intelligence; Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R); Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MM&D); Plans; and Training. Command of Headquarters AAF resided in

1845-528: A maximum effort raid on Anshan in China, which Arnold had accorded the highest priority. Planning for the attack on Palembang began in May 1944. Due to the very long distance which was to be flown and the need to stage through Ceylon, the operation required more planning and preparations than any of the other raids conducted by XX Bomber Command. USAAF and British Royal Air Force personnel worked together to complete

1968-505: A multiplicity of branches and organizations, reduced the WDGS greatly in size, and proportionally increased the representation of the air forces members on it to 50%. In addition to dissolving both Army General Headquarters and the chiefs of the combat arms , and assigning their training functions to the Army Ground Forces, War Department Circular 59 reorganized the Army Air Forces, disbanding both Air Force Combat Command and

2091-523: A perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department General Staff (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine. A strategy stressing precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed, long-range bombers emerged, formulated by the men who would become its leaders. A major step toward

2214-471: A proposal for creation of an air staff, unification of the air arm under one commander, and equality with the ground and supply forces. Arnold's proposal was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects, rehashing its traditional doctrinal argument that, in the event of war, the Air Corps would have no mission independent of support of the ground forces. Marshall implemented a compromise that

2337-589: A separate air force came in March 1935, when the command of all combat air units within the Continental United States (CONUS) was centralized under a single organization called the "General Headquarters Air Force" . Since 1920, control of aviation units had resided with commanders of the corps areas (a peacetime ground forces administrative echelon), following the model established by commanding General John J. Pershing during World War I. In 1924,

2460-615: A series of attacks on Japanese-occupied cities in South East Asia that XX Bomber Command conducted as an adjunct to its primary mission of bombing Japan . The command raided the Japanese city of Nagasaki on the same night as Operation Boomerang. Fifty-four Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers were dispatched from an airfield in British Ceylon on 10 August, of which 39 reached the Palembang area. Attempts to bomb

2583-473: A standard of combat proficiency had barely surpassed the total originally authorized by the first expansion program in 1940. The extant training establishment, in essence a "self-training" system, was inadequate in assets, organization, and pedagogy to train units wholesale. Individual training of freshly minted pilots occupied an inordinate amount of the available time to the detriment of unit proficiency. The ever-increasing numbers of new groups being formed had

SECTION 20

#1732780745423

2706-428: A structure for the additional command echelons required by a vastly increased force, and to end an increasingly divisive administrative battle within the Army over control of aviation doctrine and organization that had been ongoing since the creation of an aviation section within the U.S. Army Signal Corps in 1914. The AAF succeeded both the Air Corps, which had been the statutory military aviation branch since 1926 and

2829-458: A temporary, nonstandard, headquarters in August 1944. This provisional fighter wing was set up to separate control of its P-38 groups from its P-51 groups. This headquarters was referred to as "XV Fighter Command (Provisional)". Eight air divisions served as an additional layer of command and control for the vast organization, capable of acting independently if the need arose. Inclusive within

2952-861: Is the direct predecessor of the United States Air Force , today one of the six armed forces of the United States . The AAF was a component of the United States Army , which on 2 March 1942 was divided functionally by executive order into three autonomous forces: the Army Ground Forces , the United States Army Services of Supply (which in 1943 became the Army Service Forces ), and the Army Air Forces. Each of these forces had

3075-443: The 101st , 102nd and 103rd Air Defense Regiments and the 101st Machine Cannon Battalion. Each of the air defense regiments was equipped with twenty Type 88 75 mm AA guns . They may have also each included a machine cannon battery and a searchlight battery. In January 1944 the 9th Air Division was established as part of efforts to strengthen Sumatra's air defenses. The Palembang Air Defense Headquarters had been re-designated

3198-471: The Air Transport Command made deliveries of almost 270,000 aircraft worldwide while losing only 1,013 in the process. The operation of the stateside depots was done largely by more than 300,000 civilian maintenance employees, many of them women, freeing a like number of Air Forces mechanics for overseas duty. In all facets of the service, more than 420,000 civilian personnel were employed by

3321-456: The Army Service Forces , but the AAF increasingly exerted influence on the curricula of these courses in anticipation of future independence. African-Americans comprised approximately six per cent of this force (145,242 personnel in June 1944). In 1940, pressured by Eleanor Roosevelt and some Northern members of Congress , General Arnold agreed to accept blacks for pilot training, albeit on

3444-550: The Battle of Palembang . Dutch engineers attempted to wreck the oil refineries during the invasion to prevent the Japanese from being able to use them, but production was restarted by the end of 1942. In early 1944, Allied intelligence estimated that the Pladjoe (Plaju) refinery at Palembang was the source of 22 percent of Japan's fuel oil for ships and industrial facilities, and 78 percent of its aviation gasoline . In late 1943,

3567-585: The Bay of Bengal during the return flight to India and were forced to ditch . The attack on Palembang arose from debates concerning how to best utilize the B-29s which preceded the approval of Operation Matterhorn. During late 1943 and early 1944, serious consideration was given to initially using the B-29s to attack merchant shipping and oil facilities in South East Asia from bases in northern Australia and New Guinea . The final plan for Operation Matterhorn approved by

3690-594: The Palembang Defense Unit , and was assigned to the 9th Air Division upon that command's formation. At around this time, the unit was expanded to also include fighter aircraft . The 21st and 22nd Fighter Regiments of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Force were responsible for intercepting Allied aircraft. The 101st, 102nd and 103rd Antiaircraft Regiments and 101st Machine Cannon Battalion remained, and had been supplemented by

3813-567: The Quartermaster Corps and then by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers , because of a lack of familiarity with Air Corps requirements. The outbreak of war in Europe and the resulting need for a wide variety of facilities for both operations and training within the Continental United States necessitated comprehensive changes of policy, first in September 1941 by giving the responsibility for acquisition and development of bases directly to

Operation Boomerang - Misplaced Pages Continue

3936-615: The United States Air Force , James Robinson Risner and Charles E. Yeager . Air crew needs resulted in the successful training of 43,000 bombardiers , 49,000 navigators , and 309,000 flexible gunners, many of whom also specialized in other aspects of air crew duties. 7,800 men qualified as B-29 flight engineers and 1,000 more as radar operators in night fighters , all of whom received commissions. Almost 1.4 million men received technical training as aircraft mechanics, electronics specialists, and other technicians. Non-aircraft related support services were provided by airmen trained by

4059-437: The 101st Antiaircraft Balloon Regiment which operated barrage balloons . On the afternoon of 9 August, 56 B-29s from the 444th and 468th Bombardment Groups arrived at RAF China Bay after flying from Bengal. The strike force began to take off from China Bay at 4:45   p.m. on 10 August. A total of 54 B-29s were dispatched. While one of the aircraft returned to the base 40 minutes after taking off due to engine problems, it

4182-513: The 27 June targeting directive specified that the attack take place either at dawn or dusk. The meteorologist assigned to the operation recommended that the attack be made at night so that the B-29s could take advantage of favorable tailwinds . XX Bomber Command gained the Twentieth Air Force's agreement for this change. During the period in which the plan was prepared, several US intelligence agencies altered their views regarding

4305-537: The AAF created a reserve pool that held qualified pilot candidates until they could be called to active duty, rather than losing them in the draft. By 1944, this pool became surplus, and 24,000 were sent to the Army Ground Forces for retraining as infantry , and 6,000 to the Army Service Forces . Pilot standards were changed to reduce the minimum age from 20 to 18, and eliminated the educational requirement of at least two years of college. Two fighter pilot beneficiaries of this change went on to become brigadier generals in

4428-502: The AAF for the first time in its history, and then in April 1942 by delegation of the enormous task by Headquarters AAF to its user field commands and numbered air forces. In addition to the construction of new permanent bases and the building of numerous bombing and gunnery ranges, the AAF utilized civilian pilot schools, training courses conducted at college and factory sites, and officer training detachments at colleges. In early 1942, in

4551-468: The AAF reached a war-time peak of 783 airfields in the Continental United States. At the end of the war, the AAF was using almost 20 million acres of land, an area as large as Massachusetts , Connecticut , Vermont , and New Hampshire combined. By the end of World War II, the USAAF had created 16 numbered air forces ( First through Fifteenth and Twentieth ) distributed worldwide to prosecute

4674-590: The AAF. The huge increases in aircraft inventory resulted in a similar increase in personnel, expanding sixteen-fold in less than three years following its formation, and changed the personnel policies under which the Air Service and Air Corps had operated since the National Defense Act of 1920. No longer could pilots represent 90% of commissioned officers. The need for large numbers of specialists in administration and technical services resulted in

4797-529: The Air Corps expanded from 15 to 30 groups by the end of the year. On 7 December 1941 the number of activated combat groups had reached 67, with 49 still within the Continental United States. Of the CONUS groups (the "strategic reserve"), 21 were engaged in operational training or still being organized and were unsuitable for deployment. Of the 67 combat groups, 26 were classified as bombardment: 13 Heavy Bomb groups ( B-17 Flying Fortress and B-24 Liberator ), and

4920-557: The Air Corps found entirely inadequate, naming Arnold as acting "Deputy Chief of Staff for Air" but rejecting all organizational points of his proposal. GHQ Air Force instead was assigned to the control of Army General Headquarters, although the latter was a training and not an operational component, when it was activated in November 1940. A division of the GHQ Air Force into four geographical air defense districts on 19 October 1940

5043-480: The Air Corps in October 1940 saw fifteen new general officer billets created. By the end of World War II, 320 generals were authorized for service within the wartime AAF. The Air Corps operated 156 installations at the beginning of 1941. An airbase expansion program had been underway since 1939, attempting to keep pace with the increase in personnel, units, and aircraft, using existing municipal and private facilities where possible, but it had been mismanaged, first by

Operation Boomerang - Misplaced Pages Continue

5166-490: The Air Corps mission remain tied to that of the land forces. Airpower advocates achieved a centralized control of air units under an air commander, while the WDGS divided authority within the air arm and assured a continuing policy of support of ground operations as its primary role. GHQ Air Force organized combat groups administratively into a strike force of three wings deployed to the Atlantic , Pacific, and Gulf coasts but

5289-597: The Air Corps still had only 800 first-line combat aircraft and 76 bases, including 21 major installations and depots. American fighter aircraft were inferior to the British Spitfire and Hurricane , and German Messerschmitt Bf 110 and 109 . Ralph Ingersoll wrote in late 1940 after visiting Britain that the "best American fighter planes already delivered to the British are used by them either as advanced trainers—or for fighting equally obsolete Italian planes in

5412-492: The Air Corps years. The concept of an "operating staff", or directorates, was modeled on the RAF system that had been much admired by the observer groups sent over in 1941, and resulted from a desire to place experts in various aspects of military aviation into key positions of implementation. However functions often overlapped, communication and coordination between the divisions failed or was ignored, policy prerogatives were usurped by

5535-458: The Air Corps". A lawyer and a banker, Lovett had prior experience with the aviation industry that translated into realistic production goals and harmony in integrating the plans of the AAF with those of the Army as a whole. Lovett initially believed that President Roosevelt's demand following the attack on Pearl Harbor for 60,000 airplanes in 1942 and 125,000 in 1943 was grossly ambitious. However, working closely with General Arnold and engaging

5658-508: The Air Corps, while 82 per cent of enlisted members assigned to AAF units and bases had the Air Corps as their combat arm branch. While officially the air arm was the Army Air Forces , the term Air Corps persisted colloquially among the public as well as veteran airmen; in addition, the singular Air Force often crept into popular and even official use, reflected by the designation Air Force Combat Command in 1941–42. This misnomer

5781-554: The Army Chief of Staff. This "contrast between theory and fact is...fundamental to an understanding of the AAF." The roots of the Army Air Forces arose in the formulation of theories of strategic bombing at the Air Corps Tactical School that gave new impetus to arguments for an independent air force, beginning with those espoused by Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell that led to his later court-martial . Despite

5904-496: The Army General Headquarters had the power to detach units from AFCC at will by creating task forces, the WDGS still controlled the AAF budget and finances, and the AAF had no jurisdiction over units of the Army Service Forces providing "housekeeping services" as support nor of air units, bases, and personnel located outside the continental United States. Arnold and Marshall agreed that the AAF would enjoy

6027-427: The B-29s returned to base. Operation Boomerang produced mixed results. Photos of the Pladjoe refinery taken on 19 September indicated that a single building had definitely been destroyed in the raid, though several others were assessed as "probables". The mine-laying element of the attack was successful: three ships totalling 1,768 tons were sunk, four others were damaged and the Japanese were unable to transport oil via

6150-658: The GHQ Air Force, which had been activated in 1935 to quiet the demands of airmen for an independent Air Force similar to the Royal Air Force which had already been established in the United Kingdom . Although other nations already had separate air forces independent of their army or navy (such as the Royal Air Force and the German Luftwaffe ), the AAF remained a part of the Army until

6273-557: The General Staff planned for a wartime activation of an Army general headquarters (GHQ), similar to the American Expeditionary Forces model of World War I , with a GHQ Air Force as a subordinate component. Both were created in 1933 when a small conflict with Cuba seemed possible following a coup d'état but was not activated. The activation of GHQ Air Force represented a compromise between strategic airpower advocates and ground force commanders who demanded that

SECTION 50

#1732780745423

6396-530: The Joint Chiefs of Staff in April specified that while XX Bomber Command would focus on Japan, it was to also attack Palembang. These raids were to be staged through airfields in British Ceylon. The inclusion of Palembang in the plan represented a compromise between the strategists who wanted to concentrate the force against Japan and those who wished to focus it on oil targets. For planning purposes,

6519-464: The Low Countries in May 1940, Roosevelt asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation of nearly a billion dollars, a production program of 50,000 aircraft a year, and a military air force of 50,000 aircraft (of which 36,500 would be Army). Accelerated programs followed in the Air Corps that repeatedly revised expansion goals, resulting in plans for 84 combat groups, 7,799 combat aircraft, and

6642-527: The Middle East. That is all they are good for." RAF crews he interviewed said that by spring 1941 a fighter engaging Germans had to have the capability to reach 400 mph in speed, fight at 30,000–35,000 feet, be simple to take off, provide armor for the pilot, and carry 12 machine guns or six cannons, all attributes lacking in American aircraft. Following the successful German invasion of France and

6765-616: The Musi River for a month until minesweeping was complete. Subsequently, B-29s frequently laid mines as part of efforts to blockade Japan. Despite the failure of Operation Boomerang to fully achieve its goals, it demonstrated that XX Bomber Command was now capable of conducting complex operations and the B-29s could safely travel long distances over water. XX Bomber Command believed that Operation Boomerang had been unsuccessful, based on analysis of post-strike photos. The command continued to be reluctant to attack Palembang and recommended to

6888-399: The Musi River; the accuracy of this attack was assessed as "excellent" in a post-attack report. This was the first time B-29s had been used as minelayers . Of the fifteen B-29s which failed to reach the Palembang area, three attacked other targets. A pair of B-29s bombed the oil town of Pangkalanbrandan in northern Sumatra and another struck an airfield near the town of Djambi . Several of

7011-469: The Musi), the bombers were to be loaded with only 1 short ton (910 kg) of bombs or mines each and have their fuel tanks filled to capacity. Planning for the attack was completed on 1 August. It was designated Operation Boomerang, possibly in the hope that all of the aircraft would return from their long flights. An attack by XX Bomber Command on the Japanese city of Nagasaki was scheduled to take place on

7134-543: The Office of Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC), eliminating all its training and organizational functions, which removed an entire layer of authority. Taking their former functions were eleven numbered air forces (later raised to sixteen) and six support commands (which became eight in January 1943). The circular also restated the mission of the AAF, in theory removing from it responsibility for strategic planning and making it only

7257-926: The Twentieth Air Force on 24 August that its facilities at China Bay be abandoned. Approval to do so was granted on 3 October, though the Twentieth Air Force directed that the aircraft fueling system remain in place. No other B-29 attacks were conducted through Ceylon. The USAAF official history noted that modifying the base for only a single operation was "a glaring example of the extravagance of war". XX Bomber Command attacked several other cities in South East Asia during 1944 and early 1945; these included multiple raids on Japanese-occupied Singapore which required even longer flights than those to reach Palembang. The Eastern Fleet's aircraft carriers raided oil facilities in Sumatra several times between November 1944 and January 1945. These included two attacks on Palembang conducted as part of Operation Meridian in January 1945. On 24 January

7380-728: The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved a proposal to begin the strategic air campaign against the Japanese home islands and East Asia by basing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers in India and establishing forward airfields in China. The main element of this strategy, designated Operation Matterhorn , was to construct airstrips near Chengdu in inland China which would be used to refuel B-29s traveling from bases in Bengal en route to targets in Japan. Operation Matterhorn

7503-545: The WAACs and WACs as AAF personnel, more than 1,000 as Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs), and 6,500 as nurses in the Army Air Forces, including 500 flight nurses. 7,601 "Air WACs" served overseas in April 1945, and women performed in more than 200 job categories. The Air Corps Act of July 1926 increased the number of general officers authorized in the Army's air arm from two to four. The activation of GHQAF in March 1935 doubled that number to eight and pre-war expansion of

SECTION 60

#1732780745423

7626-430: The air forces and to avoid binding legislation from Congress, the War Department revised the army regulation governing the organization of Army aviation, AR 95–5. Arnold assumed the title of Chief of the Army Air Forces , creating an echelon of command over all military aviation components for the first time and ending the dual status of the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force, which was renamed Air Force Combat Command (AFCC) in

7749-473: The air forces, commands and divisions were administrative headquarters called wings to control groups (operational units; see section below). As the number of groups increased, the number of wings needed to control them multiplied, with 91 ultimately activated, 69 of which were still active at the end of the war. As part of the Air Service and Air Corps, wings had been composite organizations, that is, composed of groups with different types of missions. Most of

7872-481: The airfield at China Bay was expected to be ready. Arnold issued XX Bomber Command with a new targeting directive on 27 June which specified that 50 B-29s be dispatched against Palembang as soon as the airfield was complete. Wolfe was transferred to a role in the United States on 4 July. Brigadier General LaVern G. Saunders took over the command on a temporary basis. Saunders decided to delay the attack on Palembang until mid-August to enable XX Bomber Command to first make

7995-528: The airfield during and immediately after the war: A number of Fleet Air Arm squadrons also used China Bay: The airfield was bombed by the Japanese on 9 April 1942 during World War II . The airfield was upgraded to accommodate the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) Boeing B-29 Superfortress over the first half of 1944. After these upgrades were complete it was used to stage the B-29 attack force for

8118-481: The annual addition to the force of 30,000 new pilots and 100,000 technical personnel. The accelerated expansion programs resulted in a force of 156 airfields and 152,125 personnel at the time of the creation of the Army Air Forces. In its expansion during World War II, the AAF became the world's most powerful air force. From the Air Corps of 1939, with 20,000 men and 2,400 planes, to the nearly autonomous AAF of 1944, with almost 2.4 million personnel and 80,000 aircraft,

8241-401: The area and the bomber which had been tasked with illuminating the refinery with flares did not reach the area. Instead, the bombardiers aimed their bombs using radar or visual sightings through breaks in the clouds. American airmen reported seeing some explosions and fires, but strike photos taken from the bombers were indistinct. Eight B-29s descended below the clouds to drop two mines each in

8364-447: The attack involve all 112 of XX Bomber Command's aircraft, and be conducted during the day. The command sought to have this directive modified on the grounds that dispatching so many aircraft from a single airfield would mean that the force would need to be separated into several waves. Splitting the force in this way would further complicate the operation, and was considered likely to lead to higher losses. Arnold accepted this argument, and

8487-406: The bombers which had to turn back did so after running low on fuel. Japanese forces attacked the B-29s while they were in the Palembang area, without success. Antiaircraft guns and rockets were fired at the bombers, and the American airmen sighted 37 Japanese aircraft. Some of the fighters pursued the bombers for 350 miles (560 km). None of the B-29s were damaged. One of the B-29s ditched into

8610-522: The capacity of the American automotive industry brought about an effort that produced almost 100,000 aircraft in 1944. The AAF reached its wartime inventory peak of nearly 80,000 aircraft in July 1944, 41% of them first line combat aircraft, before trimming back to 73,000 at the end of the year following a large reduction in the number of trainers needed. The logistical demands of this armada were met by

8733-430: The capitulation of Japan, realignment took place with the complete elimination of OC&R. The now five assistant chiefs of air staff were designated AC/AS-1 through -5 corresponding to Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, Materiel and Supply, and Plans. Most personnel of the Army Air Forces were drawn from the Air Corps. In May 1945, 88 per cent of officers serving in the Army Air Forces were commissioned in

8856-518: The commanders of GHQ Air Force and the Air Corps, Major Generals Frank M. Andrews and Oscar Westover respectively, clashed philosophically over the direction in which the air arm was moving, exacerbating the difficulties. The expected activation of Army General Headquarters prompted Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to request a reorganization study from Chief of the Air Corps Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold resulting on 5 October 1940 in

8979-573: The commanding generals of the new Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply , the other two components of the Army of the United States . The War Department issued Circular No. 59 on 2 March that carried out the executive order, intended (as with the creation of the Air Service in World War I) as a wartime expedient to expire six months after the end of the war. The three components replaced

9102-553: The country were transferred and taken over by the Ceylonese government in November 1957. RAF China Bay became RCyAF China Bay. When Ceylon became the republic of Sri Lanka it became SLAF Base China Bay in May 1972. The base was turned into the Sri Lanka Air Force Academy in March 1976. The academy was made an air force base in January 1987 due to the civil war . Passenger Cargo The base houses

9225-625: The creation of the Air Service Command on 17 October 1941 to provide service units and maintain 250 depots in the United States; the elevation of the Materiel Division to full command status on 9 March 1942 to develop and procure aircraft, equipment, and parts; and the merger of these commands into the Air Technical Service Command on 31 August 1944. In addition to carrying personnel and cargo,

9348-634: The creation of the Army Air Forces, caused an immediate reassessment of U.S. defense strategy and policy. The need for an offensive strategy to defeat the Axis Powers required further enlargement and modernization of all the military services, including the new AAF. In addition, the invasion produced a new Lend lease partner in Russia, creating even greater demands on an already struggling American aircraft production. An offensive strategy required several types of urgent and sustained effort. In addition to

9471-433: The crews of any B-29s which were forced to ditch. Royal Navy vessels involved included the light cruiser HMS  Ceylon , destroyer Redoubt and submarines Terrapin and Trenchant . The submarines were also used as navigation beacons . A total of 31 B-29s attempted to bomb the Pladjoe refinery. It proved difficult for their crews to locate the target, as no lights were showing in Palembang, patchy cloud covered

9594-516: The date for the first attack on Palembang was set at 20 July 1944. Infrastructure works were undertaken in Ceylon to support the planned raids on Palembang. In March 1944, work began to modify four airfields on Ceylon to the standards needed for B-29s, RAF China Bay and RAF Minneriya being accorded the highest priority. These two airfields were scheduled to be ready by July. In April, when it became apparent that both could not be completed in time, it

9717-448: The development and manufacture of aircraft in massive numbers, the Army Air Forces had to establish a global logistics network to supply, maintain, and repair the huge force; recruit and train personnel; and sustain the health, welfare, and morale of its troops. The process was driven by the pace of aircraft production, not the training program, and was ably aided by the direction of Lovett, who for all practical purposes became "Secretary of

9840-469: The direct control of Headquarters Army Air Forces. At the end of 1942 and again in the spring of 1943 the AAF listed nine support commands before it began a process of consolidation that streamlined the number to five at the end of the war. These commands were: "In 1943 the AAF met a new personnel problem, to which it applied an original solution: to interview, rehabilitate, and reassign men returning from overseas. [To do this], an AAF Redistribution Center

9963-620: The directorates, and they became overburdened with detail, all contributing to the diversion of the directorates from their original purpose. The system of directorates in particular handicapped the developing operational training program (see Combat units below), preventing establishment of an OTU command and having a tendency to micromanage because of the lack of centralized control. Four main directorates—Military Requirements, Technical Services, Personnel, and Management Control—were created, each with multiple sub-directorates, and eventually more than thirty offices were authorized to issue orders in

10086-447: The dormant struggle for an independent United States Air Force. Marshall had come to the view that the air forces needed a "simpler system" and a unified command. Working with Arnold and Robert A. Lovett , recently appointed to the long-vacant position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, he reached a consensus that quasi-autonomy for the air forces was preferable to immediate separation. On 20 June 1941, to grant additional autonomy to

10209-555: The establishment of an Officer Candidate School in Miami Beach, Florida , and the direct commissioning of thousands of professionals. Even so, 193,000 new pilots entered the AAF during World War II, while 124,000 other candidates failed at some point during training or were killed in accidents. The requirements for new pilots resulted in a massive expansion of the Aviation Cadet program, which had so many volunteers that

10332-682: The famous iconic " Why We Fight " series, as an animated map graphic of equal prominence to that of the Army and Navy. The Air Corps at the direction of President Roosevelt began a rapid expansion from the spring of 1939 forward, partly from the Civilian Pilot Training Program created at the end of 1938, with the goal of providing an adequate air force for defense of the Western Hemisphere. An initial "25-group program", announced in April 1939, called for 50,000 men. However, when war broke out in September 1939

10455-407: The fleet's aircraft badly damaged the Pladjoe refinery, and on the 29th of the month serious damage was inflicted on the nearby Sungai Gerong refinery. The Japanese general who commanded the oil refineries at Palembang stated after the war that these attacks had inflicted much more damage than Operation Boomerang. The British official history states that at the end of March 1945 the refineries' output

10578-466: The force array. In the first half of 1942 the Army Air Forces expanded rapidly as the necessity of a much larger air force than planned was immediately realized. Authorization for the total number of combat groups required to fight the war nearly doubled in February to 115. In July it jumped to 224, and a month later to 273. When the U.S. entered the war, however, the number of groups actually trained to

10701-660: The ground forces by March 1942. In the spring of 1941, the success in Europe of air operations conducted under centralized control (as exemplified by the British Royal Air Force and the German Wehrmacht 's military air arm, the Luftwaffe ) made clear that the splintering of authority in the American air forces, characterized as " hydra -headed" by one congressman, had caused a disturbing lack of clear channels of command. Less than five months after

10824-525: The importance of Palembang. The USAAF's Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, and the Committee of Operations Analysts judged that the changing tactical situation in the Pacific and heavy losses of Japanese shipping meant that the Pladjoe refinery was no longer of critical importance to the Japanese war effort. XX Bomber Command staff wanted to cancel the mission, which they viewed as a distraction from

10947-449: The main effort against the Japanese steel industry. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to require that Palembang be attacked, and Arnold included it in another target directive issued in July. After it was confirmed that the facilities at China Bay would be complete by 4 August, Arnold directed that the raid be conducted by the 15th of the month. The date for the attack was set as 10 August. Several targets were specified. The primary target

11070-550: The name of the commanding general. Among the headquarters directorates were Technical Services, Air Defense, Base Services, Ground-Air Support, Management Control, Military Equipment, Military Requirements , and Procurement & Distribution. A "strong and growing dissatisfaction" with the organization led to an attempt by Lovett in September 1942 to make the system work by bringing the Directorate of Management Control and several traditional offices that had been moved to

11193-402: The new organization. The AAF gained the formal "Air Staff" long opposed by the General Staff, and a single air commander, but still did not have equal status with the Army ground forces, and air units continued to report through two chains of command. The commanding general of AFCC gained control of his stations and court martial authority over his personnel, but under the new field manual FM-5

11316-469: The oil refinery were largely unsuccessful, only a single building being confirmed destroyed. Mines dropped in the river connecting Palembang to the sea sank three ships and damaged four others. British air and naval forces provided search-and-rescue support for the American bombers. The Japanese antiaircraft guns and fighter aircraft assigned to defend Palembang failed to destroy any of the American bombers, but one B-29 ditched when it ran out of fuel. This

11439-526: The only loss from the operation. The mission lasted about nineteen hours and the mining of the Musi is considered the longest combat mission of the war. The attack on Nagasaki which was undertaken on the night of 10/11 August in conjunction with Operation Boomerang was unsuccessful. The city was bombed by 24 B-29s, but little damage was inflicted. Two other bombers turned back after departing the forward airfields in China, and three attacked secondary targets. All of

11562-479: The operating staff, including the Air Judge Advocate and Budget Officer, back under the policy staff umbrella. When this adjustment failed to resolve the problems, the system was scrapped and all functions combined into a single restructured air staff. The hierarchical "command" principle, in which a single commander has direct final accountability but delegates authority to staff, was adopted AAF-wide in

11685-961: The operational command was designated by the Roman numeral of its parent numbered air force. For instance, the Eighth Air Force listed the VIII Bomber Command and the VIII Fighter Command as subordinate operational commands. Roman numbered commands within numbered air forces also included "support", "base", and other services commands to support the operational units, such as the VIII Air Force Service and VIII Air Force Composite Commands also part of Eighth Air Force during its history. The Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces did not field subordinate commands during World War II. Fifteenth Air Force organized

11808-479: The preparations. The British supplied fuel for the operation and met the costs of upgrading the Ceylon airfields under Reverse Lend-Lease arrangements. RAF China Bay, including its accommodation facilities and transport vehicles, was virtually given over to the USAAF. The RAF also donated whiskey rations to the Americans. The plans for the operation evolved over time. The Twentieth Air Force initially ordered that

11931-524: The proposal the following month which, in the face of Marshall's dissatisfaction with Army GHQ, the War Plans Division accepted. Just before Pearl Harbor, Marshall recalled an Air Corps officer, Brig. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney , from an observer group in England and appointed him to chair a "War Department Reorganization Committee" within the War Plans Division, using Arnold's and Spaatz's plan as

12054-442: The rejection of Arnold's reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement ( ABC-1 ) refuted the General Staff's argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces. A struggle with the General Staff over control of air defense of the United States had been won by airmen and vested in four command units called "numbered air forces", but the bureaucratic conflict threatened to renew

12177-488: The rest Medium and Light groups ( B-25 Mitchell , B-26 Marauder , and A-20 Havoc ). The balance of the force included 26 Pursuit groups (renamed fighter group in May 1942), 9 Observation (renamed Reconnaissance ) groups, and 6 Transport (renamed Troop Carrier or Combat Cargo ) groups. After the operational deployment of the B-29 Superfortress bomber, Very Heavy Bombardment units were added to

12300-524: The role of the Army Air Forces, Arnold was given a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff , the planning staff that served as the focal point of American strategic planning during the war, in order that the United States would have an air representative in staff talks with their British counterparts on the Combined Chiefs . In effect the head of the AAF gained equality with Marshall. While this step

12423-424: The same night as the raid on Palembang. The USAAF official history states that it was hoped that attacking two targets 3,000 miles (4,800 km) apart would have a psychological impact on the Japanese. The Imperial Japanese Army was responsible for defending the oil fields on Sumatra against air attack. The Palembang Air Defense Headquarters had been formed in March 1943 for this purpose, and initially comprised

12546-509: The sea 90 miles (140 km) from China Bay on its return flight after running out of fuel. Its crew were able to send an SOS signal before ditching, which led Allied forces to conduct an intensive search of the area. One of the bomber's gunners was killed, and the other members of the crew were rescued on the morning of 12 August. While the Allied planners had expected that several B-29s would need to ditch due to fuel shortages, this proved to be

12669-696: The unsuccessful Operation Boomerang raid on oil refineries at Palembang , Dutch East Indies in August 1944. After independence , the British maintained two military airfields in Ceylon, the RAF station at Katunayake and the Royal Navy base in Trincomalee , and camps at Diyatalawa . The naval base in Trincomalee included the airfield in China Bay. It was opened to civilian flights in 1952. All British military airfields/barracks and sites in

12792-494: The war, plus a general air force within the continental United States to support the whole and provide air defense. The latter was formally organized as the Continental Air Forces and activated on 15 December 1944, although it did not formally take jurisdiction of its component air forces until the end of the war in Europe. Half of the numbered air forces were created de novo as the service expanded during

12915-461: The war-time Army Air Forces. The AAF was willing to experiment with its allotment from the unpopular Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAACs) and became an early and determined supporter of full military status for women in the Army ( Women's Army Corps or WACs). WACs serving in the AAF became such an accepted and valuable part of the service they earned the distinction of being commonly (but unofficially) known as "Air WACs". Nearly 40,000 women served in

13038-575: The war. Some grew out of earlier commands as the service expanded in size and hierarchy (for example, the V Air Support Command became the Ninth Air Force in April 1942), and higher echelons such as United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) in Europe and U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific became necessary to control the whole. Within numbered air forces, operational commands were created to divide administrative control of units by function (eg fighters and bombers). The numbering of

13161-404: The wings of World War II, however, were composed of groups with like functions (denoted as bombardment , fighter , reconnaissance , training , antisubmarine , troop carrier , and replacement ). The six support commands organized between March 1941 and April 1942 to support and supply the numbered air forces remained on the same chain of command echelon as the numbered air forces, under

13284-622: Was a remarkable expansion. Robert A. Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air, together with Arnold, presided over an increase greater than for either the ground Army or the Navy, while at the same time dispatching combat air forces to the battlefronts. "The Evolution of the Department of the Air Force" – Air Force Historical Studies Office The German invasion of the Soviet Union , occurring only two days after

13407-589: Was a subordinate agency of the United States Department of War (as were the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces) tasked only with organizing, training, and equipping combat units and limited in responsibility to the continental United States. In reality, Headquarters AAF controlled the conduct of all aspects of the air war in every part of the world, determining air policy and issuing orders without transmitting them through

13530-542: Was also used on official recruiting posters (see image above) and was important in promoting the idea of an "Air Force" as an independent service. Jimmy Stewart , a Hollywood movie star serving as an AAF pilot, used the terms "Air Corps" and "Air Forces" interchangeably in the narration of the 1942 recruiting short " Winning Your Wings " . The term "Air Force" also appeared prominently in Frank Capra 's 1945 War Department indoctrination film " War Comes to America " , of

13653-581: Was concurrent with the creation of air forces to defend Hawaii and the Panama Canal . The air districts were converted in March 1941 into numbered air forces with a subordinate organization of 54 groups. The likelihood of U.S. participation in World War II prompted the most radical reorganization of the aviation branch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with

13776-445: Was decided to concentrate on China Bay. This airfield was capable of accommodating 56 B-29s by mid-July and was fully operational by the time Operation Boomerang was conducted. Shortly after XX Bomber Command's first attack on Japan, made against Yawata on the night of 15/16 June, Arnold pressed Wolfe to attack Palembang as part of the follow-up raids. In his reply, Wolfe noted that it would not be possible to do so until 15 July, when

13899-498: Was established on 7 August 1943, and given command status on 1 June 1944. as the AAF Personnel Distribution Command. This organization was ordered discontinued, effective 30 June 1946." The primary combat unit of the Army Air Forces for both administrative and tactical purposes was the group , an organization of three or four flying squadrons and attached or organic ground support elements, which

14022-502: Was never officially recognized by the United States Navy , and was bitterly disputed behind the scenes at every opportunity, it nevertheless succeeded as a pragmatic foundation for the future separation of the Air Force. Under the revision of AR 95–5, the Army Air Forces consisted of three major components: Headquarters AAF, Air Force Combat Command, and the Air Corps. Yet the reforms were incomplete, subject to reversal with

14145-426: Was only a third. United States Army Air Forces The United States Army Air Forces ( USAAF or AAF ) was the major land-based aerial warfare service component of the United States Army and de facto aerial warfare service branch of the United States during and immediately after World War II (1941–1947). It was created on 20 June 1941 as successor to the previous United States Army Air Corps and

14268-456: Was over 2.4 million men and women in service and nearly 80,000 aircraft by 1944, and 783 domestic bases in December 1943. By " V-E Day ", the Army Air Forces had 1.25 million men stationed overseas and operated from more than 1,600 airfields worldwide. The Army Air Forces was created in June 1941 to provide the air arm greater autonomy in which to expand more efficiently, to provide

14391-495: Was repaired within two hours, and took off again bound for Sumatra. The bombers' journey to Sumatra was uneventful. The aircraft flew individually on a direct course from China Bay to Siberoet island off the west coast of Sumatra. Upon reaching Siberoet, the bombers changed course, and headed for the Palembang area. Several British warships from the Eastern Fleet and RAF aircraft were positioned along this route to rescue

14514-464: Was small in comparison to European air forces. Lines of authority were difficult, at best, since GHQ Air Force controlled only operations of its combat units while the Air Corps was still responsible for doctrine, acquisition of aircraft, and training. Corps area commanders continued to exercise control over airfields and administration of personnel, and in the overseas departments, operational control of units as well. Between March 1935 and September 1938,

14637-553: Was the Pladjoe refinery and the secondary target the nearby Pangkalan refinery. The Indarung Cement Plant at Padang was the last resort target for aircraft unable to reach Palembang. Part of the force was tasked with dropping naval mines to interdict the Musi through which all the oil produced at Palembang was shipped. Due to the extreme range from Ceylon to the targets and back (3,855 miles (6,204 km) to Palembang and 4,030 miles (6,490 km) to where mines were to be dropped into

14760-592: Was the only USAAF raid on the strategically important oil facilities at Palembang. The oil facilities were attacked by aircraft operating from British aircraft carriers in January 1945. At the time of the Pacific War , the Sumatran city of Palembang in the Dutch East Indies was a major oil production center. The city and its oil refineries were captured by Japanese forces in mid-February 1942 during

14883-460: Was the rough equivalent of a regiment of the Army Ground Forces . The Army Air Forces fielded a total of 318 combat groups at some point during World War II, with an operational force of 243 combat groups in 1945. The Air Service and its successor the Air Corps had established 15 permanent combat groups between 1919 and 1937. With the buildup of the combat force beginning 1 February 1940,

15006-788: Was threatened. China Bay Airport Originally built by the British and known as RAF China Bay, it was transferred to the Royal Ceylonese Air Force which later became the Sri Lanka Air Force . During the 1920s the British built an airfield in China Bay in eastern Ceylon . The Royal Air Force (RAF) established an airfield called RAF Station China Bay in March 1942 which operated Consolidated Liberator bombers, Hawker Hurricane & Supermarine Spitfire fighters, Consolidated Catalina & Short Sunderland flying boats during its lifetime. A number of RAF squadrons and other units were stationed at

15129-602: Was to be conducted by the Twentieth Air Force's XX Bomber Command. The head of the USAAF, General Henry "Hap" Arnold , directly commanded the Twentieth Air Force as he had established it as an independent strategic bombing force which reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff rather than the combat theater commanders in the Pacific. Brigadier General Kenneth Wolfe led XX Bomber Command. XX Bomber Command conducted its first combat mission, against Bangkok , on 5 June 1944. During this operation, two B-29s ran out of fuel over

#422577