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Operation Greif

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Operation Greif (English: Griffin) ( German : Unternehmen Greif ) was a special operation commanded by Waffen-SS commando Otto Skorzeny during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II . The operation was the brainchild of Adolf Hitler , and its purpose was to capture one or more of the bridges over the Meuse river before they could be destroyed. German soldiers, wearing captured British and U.S. Army uniforms and using captured Allied vehicles, were to cause confusion in the rear of the Allied lines. A lack of vehicles, uniforms and equipment limited the operation and it never achieved its original aim of securing the Meuse bridges. Skorzeny's post-war trial set a precedent clarifying article 4 of the Geneva Convention : as the German soldiers removed the Allied uniforms before engaging in combat, they were not to be considered francs-tireurs .

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139-631: There was an earlier Nazi military operation that used this name, namely an anti-partisan operation conducted by the German Army , begun on 14 August 1942, in the vicinity of Orsha and Vitebsk in the Soviet Union. Skorzeny had become one of Hitler's favorites following the success of Operation Panzerfaust in which he had supervised the kidnapping of Miklós Horthy, Jr. , the son of Hungary's Regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy , to force Horthy's resignation. Following his return to Germany, Skorzeny

278-508: A "C" suffix added on to the "M10" designation, called "17pdr M10" or "Achilles Ic". Most of the vehicles converted were the 3in SPM M10 Mk II, as the duck bill counterweight balanced the heavy gun better. The gun mantlet needed modification to accept the barrel. Although the 17-pounder was a similar bore to the 3-inch gun M7, it had a longer barrel and used a larger propellant charge giving far superior armor penetrating capabilities. Using

417-516: A brand new unit for what Hitler named Operation Greif. Within four days he sent his plans for Panzer Brigade 150 to Jodl. Despite asking for 3,300 men he was given an immediate go-ahead and promised full support. The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht issued an order on 25 October requesting suitable soldiers for the operation with "knowledge of the English language and also the American dialect" which

556-475: A consequence, on 17 December Skorzeny attended a staff conference at the 6th Panzer Army 's HQ, and suggested that his brigade be used as a normal army unit. This was agreed, and he was ordered to assemble south of Malmedy and report to the 1st SS Panzer Division's HQ in Ligneuville  [ fr ] . On 21 December 1944 this brigade, under Skorzeny's command tried to take Malmedy. Several assaults of

695-461: A contemporary tank. The idea was to use speed and agility as a defense, rather than thick armor, to bring a powerful self-propelled gun into action against enemy tanks. Or more precisely, to use speed to deploy ahead of the attacking enemy, take up camouflaged and protected firing positions on their flanks if possible, and then open fire. If unable to destroy the enemy force or to force them to retreat, then mobility would be used to avoid enemy fire until

834-548: A contract to sell the SA50 guns and ammunition. The M10s were repaired and entered service in 1955. After the 1956 war , It is believed that Israel may have captured several from Egypt that received the diesel engines of captured Egyptian Sherman tanks. They were withdrawn from service by 1966. The Egyptian Army had a small number of ex-British M10s, 3-inch and 17-pdr versions, and used them in 1948 against Israel. Israel captured some of them. The M10's open-topped turret left

973-463: A counterinsurgent needs to choose two goals out of three. Relying on economic theory , this is what Zambernardi labels the "impossible trilemma" of counterinsurgency. Specifically, the impossible trilemma suggests that it is impossible to simultaneously achieve: 1) force protection, 2) distinction between enemy combatants and non-combatants, and 3) the physical elimination of insurgents. According to Zambernardi, in pursuing any two of these three goals,

1112-403: A degree that victory is easy or assured for the regular forces. However, in many modern rebellions, one does not see rebel fighters working in conjunction with regular forces. Rather, they are home-grown militias or imported fighters who have no unified goals or objectives save to expel the occupier. According to Liddell Hart, there are few effective counter-measures to this strategy. So long as

1251-458: A firing squad on 23 December. Three more Germans were also tried on 23 December and shot at Henri-Chapelle on 26 December, seven more men were tried on 26 December and executed at Henri-Chapelle on 30 December, and three others were tried on 31 December and executed at Huy on 13 January 1945. These executions were carried out by the U.S. First Army . All of these commissions were appointed by Lieutenant General Courtney Hodges , commanding general of

1390-590: A full 360 degrees. Total M10 losses in the European Theater of Operations to all causes were 539. Despite not adhering strictly to the tank destroyer doctrine, the M10 still achieved impressive scores against enemy tanks. A US Army study of 39 tank destroyer battalions found that each destroyed, on average, 34 tanks, 17 towed guns, and 16 pillboxes. The tank destroyer battalions in the Third Army claimed

1529-459: A nervous military policeman. Two more U.S. soldiers were killed and several wounded as late as 2 January 1945 when an armor task force from the U.S. 6th Armored Division moving into the Wardin area of Bastogne opened fire on the U.S. 35th Infantry Division in a case of mistaken identity. (According to Paul Fussell , an uncorrected typographical error on U.S. identity cards could serve as a tell:

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1668-541: A prime example the French occupation of Spain during the Napoleonic wars . Whenever Spanish forces managed to constitute themselves into a regular fighting force, the superior French forces beat them every time. However, once dispersed and decentralized, the irregular nature of the rebel campaigns proved a decisive counter to French superiority on the battlefield. Napoleon 's army had no means of effectively combating

1807-445: A reason for the insurgents to continue until victory. Trường Chinh , second in command to Ho Chi Minh of Vietnam , wrote in his Primer for Revolt : The guiding principle of the strategy for our whole resistance must be to prolong the war. To protract the war is the key to victory. Why must the war be protracted? ... If we throw the whole of our forces into a few battles to try to decide the outcome, we shall certainly be defeated and

1946-449: A set of wedge-shaped counterweights weighing 3,700 pounds total was designed by Fisher. The wedge-shaped weights began to be added to new vehicles at Fisher on 25 January 1943. By late December 1942, a second lock was added to the turret and a stirrup-shaped gun cradle was added to the rear deck to secure the gun for travel. Since the track grousers could not be stored on the rear of the turret anymore, grouser racks that could be attached to

2085-717: A single M10 was tested with an Oilgear hydraulic traversing motor that could traverse the turret even without the counterweights, but this modification was not pursued as the production contracts were reaching their end. Production of 4,993 M10s by the Fisher Body division of General Motors at the Fisher Tank Arsenal in Grand Blanc , Michigan ran from September 1942 through December 1943. Ford Motor Company built 1,038 M10A1s from October 1942 until September 1943. From September to November 1943, Fisher built

2224-520: A state must forgo some portion of the third objective. In particular, a state can protect its armed forces while destroying insurgents, but only by indiscriminately killing civilians as the Ottomans , Italians , and Nazis did in the Balkans, Libya, and Eastern Europe. It can choose to protect civilians along with its own armed forces instead, avoiding so-called collateral damage, but only by abandoning

2363-461: A sub-caliber tungsten carbide penetrator encased within a steel jacket and aluminum body and ballistic "windshield". By March 1945, about 18,000 rounds of this special ammunition had been delivered to the European Theater, 58 percent of which were 3-inch projectiles. The M42A1 high explosive shell was used for indirect artillery fire or against fortifications and soft targets like infantry in trenches or antitank guns. The M88 hexachloroethane smoke shell

2502-606: A successful counterinsurgency: In "The Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency", Dr. David Kilcullen , the Chief Strategist of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the U.S. State Department in 2006, described a framework for interagency cooperation in counterinsurgency operations. His pillars – Security, Political and Economic – support the overarching goal of Control, but are based on Information: This

2641-587: A tank destroyer mounting a 3-inch gun, initially focusing the most interest on two: Meanwhile, as the final design developments of these two tank destroyers were underway, the Ordnance Department became dissatisfied and in November 1941 issued an additional specification for a tank destroyer with a 3-inch gun in a rotating turret. Design work began immediately. The 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage T35 combined an early-production M4A2 medium tank hull with

2780-577: A whole string of false orders which will upset communications and attack morale. Skorzeny was well aware that under the Hague Convention of 1907 , any of his men captured while wearing U.S. uniforms could be executed as spies and this possibility caused much discussion with Generaloberst Jodl and Field Marshal von Rundstedt . The timing of the Ardennes Offensive meant that Skorzeny had only five or six weeks to recruit and train

2919-430: Is "the totality of actions aimed at defeating irregular forces ". The Oxford English Dictionary defines counterinsurgency as any "military or political action taken against the activities of guerrillas or revolutionaries" and can be considered war by a state against a non-state adversary . Insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged since ancient history . However, modern thinking on counterinsurgency

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3058-530: Is a sociological phenomenon that constrains the habits of a military (in this case, the Nigerian military) to the long-established, yet increasingly ineffective, ideology of the offensive in irregular warfare. As Omeni writes, Whereas the Nigerian military's performance against militias in the Niger Delta already suggested the military had a poor grasp of the threat of insurgent warfare; it was further along

3197-401: Is because perception is crucial in developing control and influence over population groups. Substantive security, political and economic measures are critical but to be effective they must rest upon, and integrate with a broader information strategy. Every action in counterinsurgency sends a message; the purpose of the information campaign is to consolidate and unify this message. ... Importantly,

3336-763: Is not known why his trial was delayed until May 1945, and it is unclear who ordered his death sentence to be carried out. His execution was carried out by the U.S. Ninth Army . After World War II, Skorzeny was tried as a war criminal at the Dachau Trials in 1947 for allegedly violating the laws of war during the Battle of the Bulge. He and nine officers of the Panzerbrigade 150 were charged with improperly using U.S. uniforms "by entering into combat disguised therewith and treacherously firing upon and killing members of

3475-400: Is not primarily military, but a combination of military, political and social actions under the strong control of a single authority. Galula proposes four "laws" for counterinsurgency: Galula contends that: A victory [in a counterinsurgency] is not the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization. ... A victory is that plus the permanent isolation of

3614-406: Is throw overboard 99 percent of the literature on counterinsurgency, counter guerrilla, counterterrorism, and the like. Since most of it was written by the losing side, it is of little value. In examining why so many counterinsurgencies by powerful militaries fail against weaker enemies, Van Creveld identifies a key dynamic that he illustrates by the metaphor of killing a child. Regardless of whether

3753-725: The Place de L'Etoile , at 1,800 m. French M10s also saw action on the French-German border around Strasbourg and in southern Germany; the Free French First Army led by General De Lattre received some when they were a part of the Sixth United States Army Group . French M10s were operated along similar lines as US tank destroyer units, although initially with five vehicles per platoon instead of four. Approximately 52 M10s were supplied to

3892-678: The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion destroyed 30 German tanks, although 20 M3s and 7 M10s were lost. The M10 did not see much anti-tank action for the rest of the North African campaign, and instead was used as mobile fire support. During tank fighting in the Normandy campaign , the M10's 3-inch gun was proven to be ineffective against the thick frontal armor of the German Panther medium tank. On 6 July 1944, Eisenhower's headquarters requested that all M10 battalions be converted to

4031-731: The Chicago Cubs were in the American League and a captain spending a week in detention after he was caught wearing German boots. General Omar Bradley was repeatedly stopped in his staff car by checkpoint guards who seemed to enjoy asking him such questions. The Skorzeny commando paranoia also contributed to tragic instances of mistaken identity which were very common. All over the Ardennes , U.S. soldiers attempted to persuade suspicious U.S. military policemen that they were genuine GIs . On 20 December, two U.S. soldiers were killed by

4170-529: The General Motors 6046 , a twin engine formed from two Detroit Diesel 6-71 inline engines mated to a single output. The tandem engine produced 375 horsepower (280 kW) at 2,100 rpm. One advantage of the GM 6046 was that the engines could be disconnected at will from the output and run independently. If one of the engines was damaged or destroyed, it could be disconnected and the other engine used to move

4309-639: The Pacific war , due to the lack of serious Japanese tank opposition, US Army M10s were not used as tank destroyers, but as mobile artillery and infantry support. The M10 proved unpopular in the Pacific due to its open turret, which left it vulnerable to Japanese close-assault antitank tactics. The United States supplied 1,648 M10s to the British Army via the Lend-Lease program. The British gave them

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4448-504: The Republic of China . The M10 is often referred to by the nickname "Wolverine", an unofficial name that sometimes appeared in wartime Chrysler advertising, but that was not used by U.S. troops; the M10 was never officially assigned a nickname or referred to with one when used by American soldiers, who simply called it a "TD" (a nickname for any tank destroyer in general) beyond its formal designation. U.S. combined arms doctrine on

4587-571: The Royal Artillery . Typically, two batteries had M10s while the other two batteries had the towed 17-pounder gun. One tactical theory was that the two towed batteries would form a gun line, while an M10 battery remained mobile on each flank to drive or lead enemy tanks to the static gun line. In practice, UK batteries were frequently separated in Normandy, M10s being seconded to British tank brigades equipped with Churchill tanks armed with

4726-579: The Soviet Union through Lend-Lease. They were used to form two self-propelled artillery regiments (SPA). The first was the 1223rd Self-propelled Artillery Regiment of the 29th Tank Corps , part of the 5th Guards Tank Army . This unit served on the 3rd Belorussian Front in 1944, taking part in summer campaigns in Belorussia, the Baltic, and East Prussia. The 1239th Self-propelled Artillery Regiment

4865-707: The US Department of State as the Policy Advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Salam al-Zaubai . In his book, When Bad States Win: Rethinking Counterinsurgency Strategy , he found little evidence to support the ‘hearts and minds’ approach to counterinsurgency. “There is little robust generalizable evidence that population-centric approaches are effective,” he argued. M10 tank destroyer The M10 tank destroyer, formally known as 3-inch gun motor carriage M10 or M10 GMC ,

5004-526: The University of Michigan . Berman, Shapiro, and Felter have outlined the modern information-centric model. In this framework, the critical determinant of counterinsurgent success is information about insurgents provided to counterinsurgents, such as insurgent locations, plans, and targets. Information can be acquired from civilian sources (human intelligence, HUMINT ), or through signals intelligence ( SIGINT ). Dr. Jeffrey Treistman previously served with

5143-542: The armed forces of the United States ". They were also charged with participation in wrongfully obtaining U.S. uniforms and Red Cross parcels consigned to U.S. prisoners of war from a prisoner-of-war camp. Acquitting all defendants, the military tribunal drew a distinction between using enemy uniforms during combat and for other purposes including deception; it could not be shown that Skorzeny had actually given any orders to fight in U.S. uniforms. Skorzeny said that he

5282-626: The general purpose 75 mm gun just as were British 17 pounder conversions. The Free French received at least 227 M10s, 155 of them through Lend-Lease. They served first in Italy, then in France and Germany. During the liberation of Paris in August 1944, a single M10 of General Leclerc's 2nd Armored Division named "Siroco" disabled a Panther in the Place de la Concorde from under the Arc de Triomphe on

5421-541: The 3-inch Gun M7 could fire five types of ammunition: The M79 AP shot could penetrate 92 mm of homogeneous armor angled at 30 degrees from the vertical at 1,000 yards. The M62 APCBC/HE-T shell was capable of penetrating 88 mm of homogeneous armor under the same conditions The T4 (later M93) HVAP shot was rare and was used in small numbers beginning in September 1944. It could penetrate 135 mm of homogeneous armor at 30 degrees and 1,000 yards. This shot featured

5560-670: The 3-inch gun M7 (also derived from the M1918 gun) from the M6 Heavy Tank in a cast, circular, open-topped turret. Using lessons learned from combat reports from the Philippines , the armor on the sides and rear of the upper hull was changed from flat to sloped plates. This new test vehicle was designated the 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage T35E1 . Prototypes of these two vehicles were delivered to Aberdeen Proving Ground in April 1942, and

5699-498: The 3-inch gun M7 in the M5 mount. The gunner stood or sat on the left side of the gun, and aimed it using the M51 or M70G telescope. An M12A4 panoramic telescope was also provided on the right side of the turret for indirect fire use. The M10 carried 54 rounds of 3-inch ammunition, 48 of which were stowed in four racks in the sponsons, and 6 rounds in the upper rear of the turret. For combat use,

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5838-597: The APDS round, the gun performance was increased by about 50%. The 17pdr SP was used by the British, Canadian and Polish armies in Italy and northwest Europe. As well as service with British forces in Northwest Europe, they were retained post-war. Those not upgunned were stripped of their turrets and used as artillery tractors. In British service, as self-propelled anti-tank guns, the M10 was operated by regiments of

5977-638: The Allied Supreme Command at SHAEF at Paris. It was not until 10 December that Skorzeny's own commanders were made aware of the brigade's true plans. Panzerbrigade 150 was to attempt to capture at least two of the bridges over the Meuse river at Amay , Huy , and Andenne before they could be destroyed, the troops to begin their operation when the Panzer advance reached the High Fens , between

6116-512: The Americans were more than willing to believe this story and Eisenhower was reportedly "unamused" by having to spend Christmas 1944 isolated for security reasons. After several days of confinement, he left his office, angrily declaring he had to get out and that he didn't care if anyone tried to kill him. Pernass, Billing, and Schmidt were given a military trial at Henri-Chapelle on 21 December and were sentenced to death; they were executed by

6255-579: The Ardennes and the Eifel highlands. The three groups ( Kampfgruppe X, Kampfgruppe Y, and Kampfgruppe Z) would then move towards the separate bridges. The Einheit Steilau commando unit had been assembled from the brigade's best English speakers, but few of them had much if any experience of undercover operations or sabotage. There was little time to train them properly, but they were given short courses in demolition and radio skills, studied

6394-521: The Army selected the T35E1 for further development on 2 May 1942. The side and rear upper hull armor of the T35E1 was reduced from 1 inch (25 mm) to 0.75 inches (19 mm) in order to reduce the weight of the vehicle. The staff at Aberdeen Proving Ground was worried that the armor of the T35E1 was too thin, and so bosses for appliqué armor panels were added to the hull sides, glacis , and turret sides. As

6533-619: The Idea to up-gun the M10 with the modern SA50 gun which was considered an improvement. The first batch arrived in 1951, being in very bad shape. Some years later, as the M10's guns were worn out, Israel decided to install QF 17-pounder These were called the M50 Achillies. Israel requested the assistance of France to develop the new tank in 1953. After building the prototype, France taught Israel how to do it themselves and provided their technical knowledge related to this development along with

6672-688: The M10 by the end of the war. The plans to retain any towed battalions at all were canceled after their generally poor performance and high losses in 1944, especially during the Battle of the Bulge . In the Italian campaign, as in northern Europe, the M10s were normally attached to infantry or armored units as infantry support or mobile artillery, more so the latter because of the general lack of German armor in that theater. Many US divisional commanders asked for their M10s to be replaced with fully armored tanks. In

6811-424: The M10 lacked the extra 1 ⁄ 2 -inch floor plate under the driver's and assistant driver's stations that provided them additional protection from mines. The glacis plate was 1 + 1 ⁄ 2 inches (38 mm) thick, sloped at 55 degrees from the vertical. The sides and rear of the upper hull were 3 ⁄ 4 inch (19 mm) thick, sloped at 38 degrees from the vertical. The rear upper hull plate

6950-402: The M10's armor ranged from 3 ⁄ 8 to 2 + 1 ⁄ 4  in (10 to 57 mm). The lower hull, being modified from that of a standard M4A2 or M4A3 Sherman tank, had 1-inch-thick (25 mm) armor on the sides and rear, and a 1 ⁄ 2 -inch-thick (13 mm) floor. The rounded, cast transmission cover was 2 inches (51 mm) thick. In a departure from its M4 Sherman parent,

7089-593: The Nigerian Army has struggled in COIN due to capabilities shortcomings, holds some merit. However, a full-spectrum analysis of the Nigeria case suggests that this popular dominant narrative scarcely scratches the surface of the true COIN challenge. This population-centered challenge, moreover, is one that militaries across the world continue to contend with. And in attempting to solve the COIN puzzle, state forces over

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7228-624: The Skorzeny brigade were eventually successfully repelled by the U.S. defenders. This would constitute the only noticeable attempt from the Germans to take Malmedy during the Battle of the Bulge. Skorzeny described the activities of the Einheit Stielau in an interview with the U.S. Army in August 1945 following his surrender. According to him, four units of reconnaissance commandos and two units of demolition commandos were sent out during

7367-591: The TDs could withdraw, preferably to move up and deploy for another ambush. Direct combat in the open against tanks was to be avoided whenever possible. After the formation of the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center at Camp Hood , Texas in November 1941, the Army began testing to standardize on a configuration for the new tank destroyer battalions . The Tank Destroyer board began to examine several hundred Ordnance Department prototype proposals for

7506-668: The Turkish forces off. In both the preceding cases, the insurgents and rebel fighters were working in conjunction with or in a manner complementary to regular forces. Such was also the case with the French Resistance during World War II and the National Liberation Front during the Vietnam War . The strategy in these cases is for the irregular combatant to weaken and destabilize the enemy to such

7645-655: The U.S. First Army pursuant to authority delegated to him by General Omar Bradley, Commanding General of the Twelfth U.S. Army Group on the instructions of General Dwight Eisenhower, commanding the European Theater of Operations, United States Army . The team's leader of Operation Greif, Günther Schulz, was tried by a military commission sometime in May 1945 and executed near the German city of Braunschweig on 14 June. It

7784-454: The advance of friendly units, and setting up an antitank defense once the objective was secured. The combat debut of the M10 came on 23 March 1943, during the Battle of El Guettar , in the Tunisian campaign part of the larger North African campaign . The M10 was initially successful as its M7 3-inch gun could destroy most German tanks then in service. During the battle, M10s of the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion and M3 Gun Motor Carriages of

7923-448: The appliqué armor bosses on the hull were added to vehicles beginning in early April 1943. The M10 initially lacked any provision for indirect fire. In May 1943, an azimuth indicator and gunner's quadrant were added to the M10. The grouser racks and indirect fire equipment were often retrofitted to earlier vehicles. By late June 1943, it was realized that Fisher's initial counterweights were too heavy. Two newly designed counterweights reduced

8062-443: The cast turret was found to be difficult to manufacture, the design of the turret was changed to a sloped pentagonal shape made of welded armor plate. In June 1942, the modified T35E1 was standardized as the 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage M10 . By fall 1943, with its M5 and M9 competitors being eliminated from the design competition and their production contracts cancelled, the M10 was to become the United States' primary tank destroyer of

8201-408: The child started the fight or how well armed the child is, an adult in a fight with a child will feel that he is acting unjustly if he harms the child and foolish if the child harms him; he will, therefore, wonder if the fight is necessary. Van Creveld argues that "by definition, a strong counterinsurgent who uses his strength to kill the members of a small, weak organization of insurgents – let alone

8340-426: The city, killing between 10-25,000 people, including many women and children. Asked by reporters what had happened, Hafez al-Assad exaggerated the damage and deaths, promoted the commanders who carried out the attacks, and razed Hama's well-known great mosque, replacing it with a parking lot. With the Muslim Brotherhood scattered, the population was so cowed that it would be years before opposition groups dared to disobey

8479-428: The civilian population by which it is surrounded, and which may lend it support – will commit crimes in an unjust cause," while "a child who is in a serious fight with an adult is justified in using every and any means available – not because he or she is right, but because he or she has no choice". Every act of insurgency becomes, from the perspective of the counterinsurgent, a reason to end the conflict, while also being

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8618-454: The correct password. It was Schmidt who gave credence to a rumor that Skorzeny intended to capture General Dwight Eisenhower and his staff. A document outlining Operation Greif's elements of deception (though not its objectives) had earlier been captured by the U.S. 106th Infantry Division near Heckhuscheid , and because Skorzeny was already well known for rescuing Italian dictator Benito Mussolini ( Operation Oak ) and Operation Panzerfaust,

8757-437: The crew vulnerable to artillery and mortar fire and fragments. The 893rd Tank Destroyer Battalion took many casualties from artillery fire and tree bursts and lost 16 of 24 M10s during the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest . The crew was also exposed to sniper fire and infantry close assault, such as grenades thrown through the open turret, or attacks from upper story-windows, especially in urban warfare and wooded areas. However,

8896-416: The decades have tried a range of tactics. Starting in the early 2000s, micro-level data has transformed the analysis of effective counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Leading this work is the "information-centric" group of theorists and researchers, led by the work of the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC) group at Princeton University , and the Conflict and Peace, Research and Development (CPRD) group at

9035-478: The designation 3inch Self-propelled Mount M10 (3-in SPM M10). The M10 with the "wedge" counterweight was known as the "3in SPM M10 Mk I" and the M10 with the "duck bill" counterweight was the "3in SPM M10 Mk II". 1,017 of the vehicles were up-gunned with the powerful 17-pounder (76.2mm) gun from May 1944 to April 1945. Within the Department of Tank Design both the 3-inch and 17-pounder versions were known as "Achilles". The 17-pounder conversions were designated with

9174-567: The destruction of 686 tanks and 238 self-propelled guns. The highest-scoring tank destroyer battalion in the European Theater, the 823rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, claimed to have destroyed 113 panzers, including 27 Panthers and 18 Tigers, using towed guns and M10s. The 773rd Tank Destroyer Battalion also claimed to have destroyed 113 panzers, with the 702nd Tank Destroyer Battalion claiming 103. The 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion, which fought in North Africa, Italy, and Europe, claimed to have knocked out 155 tanks and self-propelled guns. Tank destroyers in

9313-404: The dynamics of revolutionary warfare. Counter-insurgency focuses on bridging these gaps. Insurgents take advantage of social issues known as gaps. When the gaps are wide, they create a sea of discontent, creating the environment in which the insurgent can operate. In The Insurgent Archipelago , John Mackinlay puts forward the concept of an evolution of the insurgency from the Maoist paradigm of

9452-446: The early war period. As there were fears that the production of M4A2 chassis would be inadequate for M10 production, an alternate design, the 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage M10A1 based on the M4A3 medium tank chassis, was also authorized for production. American tank destroyer doctrine emphasized speed and gun power over armor. As a result, the M10's armor was thin, which made it vulnerable to most German anti-tank weapons. The thickness of

9591-485: The end of the war. During World War II, the primary user of the M10 tank destroyer was the United States, but many supplied under Lend-Lease to the United Kingdom , Canada and Free French forces. Several dozen were also sent to the Soviet Union . Post-war, the M10 was given as military surplus to several countries, such as Belgium , Denmark , and the Netherlands , through the Mutual Defense Assistance Act or acquired through other means by countries like Israel and

9730-425: The enemy by giving false orders, upsetting communications, and misdirecting troops. I want you to command a group of American and British troops and get them across the Meuse and seize one of the bridges. Not, my dear Skorzeny, real Americans or British. I want you to create special units wearing American and British uniforms. They will travel in captured Allied tanks. Think of the confusion you could cause! I envisage

9869-444: The enemy will win. On the other hand, if while fighting we maintain our forces, expand them, train our army and people, learn military tactics … and at the same time wear down the enemy forces, we shall weary and discourage them in such a way that, strong as they are, they will become weak and will meet defeat instead of victory. Van Creveld thus identifies "time" as the key factor in counterinsurgency. In an attempt to find lessons from

10008-434: The eve of World War II held that tanks should be designed to fulfill the role of forcing a breakthrough into enemy rear areas. Separate GHQ (General Headquarters) tank battalions would support infantry in destroying fixed enemy defenses, and armored divisions would then exploit the breakthrough to rush into the enemy's vulnerable rear areas. U.S. tanks were expected to fight any hostile tanks they encountered in their attack, but

10147-494: The fault of its governors." Consequently, he advocated clemency towards the population and good governance, to seek the people's "heart and love". Liddell Hart attributed the failure of counterinsurgencies to various causes. First, as pointed out in the Insurgency addendum to the second version of his book Strategy: The Indirect Approach , a popular insurgency has an inherent advantage over any occupying force. He showed as

10286-574: The few cases of successful counterinsurgency, of which he lists two clear cases: the British efforts during The Troubles of Northern Ireland and the 1982 Hama massacre carried out by the Syrian government to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood , he asserts that the "core of the difficulty is neither military nor political, but moral" and outlines two distinct methods. The first method relies on superb intelligence, provided by those who know

10425-478: The first few days of the attack, and three units went with the 1st SS Panzer Division, 12th SS Panzer Division, and 12th Volksgrenadier Division, with another three units accompanying Panzerbrigade 150's three groups. Skorzeny reported that one commando team entered Malmedy on 16 December, and another team managed to persuade a U.S. Army unit to withdraw from Poteau, Belgium the same day. Another team switched around road signs and sent an entire U.S. regiment in

10564-425: The front fenders, by maintenance units. The hull roof plate ranged from 3 ⁄ 4 inch (19 mm) thick over the driver's and assistant driver's stations and turret ring, to 3 ⁄ 8 inch (9.5 mm) thick over the engine compartment. The manually rotated turret of the M10 was a pentagonal shape. The sides were sloped 15 degrees inward from the vertical and were 1 inch (25 mm) thick. The rear of

10703-413: The front hull and provided with periscopes. The unique design of the hull hatches to clear the gun mantlet meant that the driver's view directly to the left side was obstructed. He was provided with a second periscope at the edge of the hull for this purpose. The commander, gunner, and loader were all located in the turret. The commander sat on a folding seat at the right rear. The gunner, on the left side of

10842-642: The golden age of insurgency to the global insurgency of the start of the 21st century. He defines this distinction as "Maoist" and "post-Maoist" insurgency. The third Marques of Santa Cruz de Marcenado (1684–1732) is probably the earliest author who dealt systematically in his writings with counterinsurgency. In his Reflexiones Militares , published between 1726 and 1730, he discussed how to spot early signs of an incipient insurgency, prevent insurgencies, and counter them, if they could not be warded off. Strikingly, Santa Cruz recognized that insurgencies are usually due to real grievances: "A state rarely rises up without

10981-406: The government. Thus the essence of counterinsurgency warfare is summed up by Galula as "Build (or rebuild) a political machine from the population upward." Robert Grainger Ker Thompson wrote Defeating Communist Insurgency in 1966, wherein he argued that a successful counterinsurgency effort must be proactive in seizing the initiative from insurgents. Thompson outlines five basic principles for

11120-441: The grassroots. The counterinsurgent reaches a position of strength when his power is embedded in a political organization issuing from, and firmly supported by, the population. With his four principles in mind, Galula goes on to describe a general military and political strategy to put them into operation in an area that is under full insurgent control: In a Selected Area 1. Concentrate enough armed forces to destroy or to expel

11259-463: The gun, normally stood to operate it, but he was also provided with a folding seat. The loader normally stood in the area behind the gun. A third folding seat was provided in the turret for the assistant driver in case he needed to assist the loader for any reason. Unlike the M4 tanks it was based upon, the M10 lacked an auxiliary generator , which forced the crew to run the main engines in order to recharge

11398-691: The hull and turret were made, the modified version was selected for production in June 1942 as the "3-inch Gun Motor Carriage M10". It mounted the 3-inch (76.2 mm) gun M7 in a rotating turret on a modified M4 Sherman tank chassis. It was built in two variants. The M10 GMC used the M4A2 Sherman chassis and the M10A1 used the M4A3 chassis. Production of the two models ran from September 1942 to December 1943 and October 1942 to November 1943, respectively. The M10

11537-443: The information campaign has to be conducted at a global, regional and local level — because modern insurgents draw upon global networks of sympathy, support, funding and recruitment. Kilcullen considers the three pillars to be of equal importance because unless they are developed in parallel, the campaign becomes unbalanced: too much economic assistance with inadequate security, for example, simply creates an array of soft targets for

11676-453: The institution of COIN within militaries and their tendency to reject the innovation and adaptation often necessary to defeat insurgency. These three features, furthermore, influence and can undermine the operational tactics and concepts adopted against insurgents. The COIN challenge, therefore, is not just operational; it also is cultural and institutional before ever it reflects on the battlefield. According to Omeni, institutional isomorphism

11815-485: The insurgency maintains popular support, it will retain all of its strategic advantages of mobility, invisibility, and legitimacy in its own eyes and the eyes of the people. So long as this is the situation, an insurgency essentially cannot be defeated by regular forces. David Galula gained his practical experience in counterinsurgency as a French Army officer in the Algerian War . His theory of counterinsurgency

11954-456: The insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population, but maintained by and with the population. ... In conventional warfare, strength is assessed according to military or other tangible criteria, such as the number of divisions, the position they hold, the industrial resources, etc. In revolutionary warfare, strength must be assessed by the extent of support from the population as measured in terms of political organization at

12093-471: The insurgents. Similarly, too much security assistance without political consensus or governance simply creates more capable armed groups. In developing each pillar, we measure progress by gauging effectiveness (capability and capacity) and legitimacy (the degree to which the population accepts that government actions are in its interest). The overall goal, according to this model, "is not to reduce violence to zero or to kill every insurgent, but rather to return

12232-459: The last men being sent through the lines on 19 December; after this, the element of surprise had been lost and they reverted to wearing German uniforms. It was not an uncommon practice at the time to send camouflaged reconnaissance units behind enemy lines, but because of the impact of Operation Greif, every occurrence of this was attributed to Skorzeny's men. In addition, German infantry often salvaged any items of U.S. Army clothing they found, thus it

12371-526: The left front vehicle subfloor. Storage boxes in the turret held five Mk 2 grenade , five M18 smoke grenade , and two thermite grenades . The M10's heavy chassis did not conform to the quickly evolving tank destroyer doctrine of employing very light high-speed vehicles, and starting in the summer of 1944 it began to be supplemented by the fast M18 Hellcat . American tank destroyer doctrine called for tank destroyers to be kept in reserve and rushed forward to counter massed enemy armored attacks. In reality, this

12510-451: The line, as the military struggled against Boko Haram's threat, that the extent of this weakness was exposed. At best, the utility of force, for the Nigerian military, had become but a temporary solution against the threat of insurgent warfare. At worst, the existing model has been perpetuated at such high cost, that urgent revisionist thinking around the idea of counterinsurgency within the military institution may now be required. Additionally,

12649-531: The main body of armed insurgents. 2. Detach for the area sufficient troops to oppose an insurgent come back in strength, install these troops in the hamlets, villages, and towns where the population lives. 3. Establish contact with the population, control its movements in order to cut off its links with the guerrillas. 4. Destroy the local insurgent political organization. 5. Set up, by means of elections, new provisional local authorities. 6. Test those authorities by assigning them various concrete tasks. Replace

12788-643: The majority of his men spoke little to no English. Faced with these setbacks, Skorzeny scaled down Panzer Brigade 150 from three battalions to two and assembled the 150 best English speakers into a commando unit named Einheit Stielau . Skorzeny also recruited a company of SS- Jagdverbände "Mitte" and two companies from SS- Fallschirmjäger-Abteilung 600, and was given two Luftwaffe parachute battalions formerly of KG 200 , tank crews from Panzer regiments, and gunners from artillery units. A total of 2,500 men were eventually assembled at Grafenwöhr, 800 fewer than had been hoped. The final total of equipment assembled

12927-445: The margins of the theoretical debate – even though Africa today is faced with a number of deadly insurgencies. In Counter-insurgency in Nigeria , Omeni, a Nigerian academic, discusses the interactions between certain features away from the battlefield, which account for battlefield performance against insurgent warfare. Specifically, Omeni argues that the trio of historical experience, organisational culture (OC) and doctrine, help explain

13066-418: The military's decisive civil war victory, the pivot in Nigeria's strategic culture towards a regional role, and the institutional delegitimization brought about by decades of coups and political meddling, meant that much time went by without substantive revisionism to the military's thinking around its internal function. Change moreover, where it occurred, was institutionally isomorphic and not as far removed from

13205-558: The military's own origins as the intervening decades may have suggested. Further, the infantry-centric nature of the Nigerian Army 's battalions, traceable back to the Nigerian Civil War back in the 1960s, is reflected in the kinetic nature of the Army's contemporary COIN approach. This approach has failed to defeat Boko Haram in the way many expected. Certainly, therefore, the popular argument today, which holds that

13344-512: The mission of destroying massed enemy armored thrusts was assigned to a new branch, the Tank Destroyer Force developed in 1941. Tank destroyer units were meant to counter German blitzkrieg tactics. Rather than rely on a "thin cordon" of anti-tank guns which would be defeated by a concentrated attack, the tank destroyer units were to be held as a reserve behind the battleline (at the corps or army level), and were to move quickly to

13483-428: The natural and artificial environment of the conflict as well as the insurgents. Once such superior intelligence is gained, the counterinsurgents must be trained to a point of high professionalism and discipline such that they will exercise discrimination and restraint. Through such discrimination and restraint, the counterinsurgents do not alienate members of the populace besides those already fighting them, while delaying

13622-517: The new M36 as soon as possible. On 10 July 1944, the 899th Tank Destroyer Battalion blunted a German counterattack by the Panzer Lehr Division near Le Dézert and destroyed 12 Panthers, one Panzer IV , and one Sturmgeschütz III assault gun in a fierce two-day battle, most of it taking place at ranges of less than 200 m (220 yd). Due to the initial shock of encountering heavy German tanks, further changes were made in

13761-401: The objective of destroying the insurgents. Finally, a state can discriminate between combatants and non-combatants while killing insurgents, but only by increasing the risks for its own troops, because often insurgents will hide behind civilians, or appear to be civilians. So a country must choose two out of three goals and develop a strategy that can successfully accomplish them while sacrificing

13900-453: The open-topped turret gave excellent visibility, which was valuable for a vehicle that was tasked with finding enemy armored vehicles and other targets. The open top also made escape easier when the vehicle was hit and improved communications with accompanying infantry. The M10 had a very slow turret rotation speed, as the turret traverse was unpowered and the crew used a hand crank to rotate the turret. It took approximately 80 seconds to rotate

14039-426: The organization of the U.S. Army and its badges of rank and drill, and some were even sent to POW camps at Küstrin and Limburg to refresh their language skills through contact with U.S. POWs . Dressed in U.S. Army uniforms (the highest U.S. Army rank used was that of colonel), armed with U.S. Army weapons, and using U.S. Army jeeps, the commandos were given three missions: On 14 December, Panzerbrigade 150

14178-472: The overall system to normality — noting that 'normality' in one society may look different from normality in another. In each case, we seek not only to establish control, but also to consolidate that control and then transfer it to permanent, effective, and legitimate institutions." Military historian Martin van Creveld , noting that almost all attempts to deal with insurgency have ended in failure, advises: The first, and absolutely indispensable, thing to do

14317-555: The people as the fish swims in the sea. –Aphorism based on the writing of Mao Zedong Counterinsurgency is normally conducted as a combination of conventional military operations and other means, such as demoralization in the form of propaganda , Psy-ops , and assassinations . Counter-insurgency operations include many different facets: military , paramilitary , political , economic , psychological , and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency . To understand counterinsurgency, one must understand insurgency to comprehend

14456-635: The rebels, and in the end, their strength and morale were so sapped that when Wellington was finally able to challenge French forces in the field, the French had almost no choice but to abandon the situation. Counterinsurgency efforts may be successful, especially when the insurgents are unpopular. The Philippine–American War , the Shining Path in Peru, and the Malayan Emergency have been

14595-537: The regime again and, van Creveld argues, the massacre most likely saved the regime and prevented a bloody civil war . Van Creveld condenses al-Assad's strategy into five rules while noting that they could easily have been written by Niccolò Machiavelli : In "Counterinsurgency's Impossible Trilemma", Dr. Lorenzo Zambernardi, an Italian academic now working in the United States, clarifies the tradeoffs involved in counterinsurgency operations. He argues that counterinsurgency involves three main goals, but in real practice,

14734-638: The remaining 375 M10A1s. Fisher also completed a further 300 M10A1 hulls without turrets in January 1944 for direct conversion to M36 tank destroyers . From January to June 1944, 209 M10A1 vehicles were subsequently converted to M35 Prime Movers by removing the turret and adding the necessary equipment for them to tow the 8-inch Gun M1 and 240 mm Howitzer M1 1,413 M10A1s, including the 300 hulls manufactured in January 1944, and 724 M10s were eventually converted into M36 tank destroyers . The M10 tank destroyer had an open-topped manually traversed turret mounting

14873-507: The requirements, including only two Sherman tanks in poor condition, and Skorzeny had to use German substitutes, five tanks (Panzer V " Panther ") and six armored cars. The brigade was also flooded by Polish and Russian equipment sent by units who had no idea what the request was for. To make matters worse, Skorzeny had only 10 men who spoke perfect English and had some knowledge of U.S. idioms, 30–40 more spoke English well but had no knowledge of slang, 120–150 who spoke English moderately well, but

15012-461: The rest of the Army's vehicles (gasoline). By the time the test results were released in February 1944, the Army was committed to using the M10 overseas. As a result, the M10A1 was kept in the United States for training. The M10 and M10A1 had a crew of five; commander, gunner, loader, driver, and assistant driver. The driver and assistant driver (who also operated the vehicle's radio) were seated in

15151-541: The second method exemplified by the Hama massacre . In 1982, the regime of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad was on the point of being overwhelmed by the countrywide insurgency of the Muslim Brotherhood . Al-Assad sent a Syrian Army division under his brother Rifaat to the city of Hama , known to be the center of the resistance. Following a counterattack by the Brotherhood, Rifaat used his heavy artillery to demolish

15290-449: The site of any massed enemy tank breakthrough. They would maneuver aggressively and using ambush tactics to destroy enemy tanks; charging or chasing enemy tanks was explicitly prohibited. This led to a requirement for very fast, well-armed vehicles. Though equipped with turrets (unlike most self-propelled anti-tank guns of the day), the typical American design was more heavily gunned, but more lightly armored, and thus more maneuverable, than

15429-634: The sites of failed insurgencies. Hart also points to the experiences of T. E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt during World War I as another example of the power of the rebel/insurgent. Though the Ottomans often had advantages in manpower of more than 100 to 1, the Arabs ' ability to materialize out of the desert, strike, and disappear again often left the Turks reeling and paralyzed, creating an opportunity for regular British forces to sweep in and finish

15568-408: The softs and the incompetents, give full support to the active leaders. Organize self-defense units. 7. Group and educate the leaders in a national political movement. 8. Win over or suppress the last insurgent remnants. According to Galula, some of these steps can be skipped in areas that are only partially under insurgent control, and most of them are unnecessary in areas already controlled by

15707-680: The struggle in Northern Ireland had cost the United Kingdom three thousand fatal casualties. Of the three thousand, about seventeen hundred were civilians...of the remaining, a thousand were British soldiers. No more than three hundred were terrorists, a ratio of three to one. If the prerequisites for the first method – excellent intelligence, superbly trained and disciplined soldiers and police, and an iron will to avoid being provoked into lashing out – are lacking, van Creveld posits that counterinsurgents who still want to win must use

15846-597: The tank destroyer force in late September 1944. American officials requested that of the 52 battalions then committed to the European theater, 20 be converted to the M36, 20 retain the M10 or M18 at the discretion of their commanders, and the 12 towed battalions be re-equipped with the (then-prototype) T5 90 mm towed gun. By October 1944, the improved 90 mm Gun Motor Carriage M36 began to arrive in Europe, and mostly replaced

15985-462: The third objective. Zambernardi's theory posits that to protect populations, which is necessary to defeat insurgencies and to physically destroy an insurgency, the counterinsurgent's military forces must be sacrificed, risking the loss of domestic political support. Another writer who explores a trio of features relevant to understanding counterinsurgency is Akali Omeni. Within the contemporary context, COIN warfare by African militaries tends to be at

16124-461: The time when the counterinsurgents become disgusted by their own actions and demoralized. General Patrick Walters, the British commander of troops in Northern Ireland, explicitly stated that his objective was not to kill as many terrorists as possible but to ensure that as few people on both sides were killed. In the vast majority of counterinsurgencies, the "forces of order" kill far more people than they lose. In contrast and using very rough figures,

16263-405: The top of a genuine card read "Not a pass. For indentification [sic] purposes only." Fussell suggests that a German preparing the disguises of the commandos could not resist correcting the spelling on their false cards to read "identification". Fussell does not cite a particular example.) In all, 44 German soldiers wearing U.S. uniforms were sent through U.S. lines, and all but eight returned, with

16402-443: The total weight to 2,500 pounds and better distributed the weight of the gun. They resembled an upside-down "duck bill" shape when viewed from the side. To accommodate the new weights, the design of the upper rear of the turret was changed from sloped inwards to nearly vertical. In July 1943, the appliqué armor bosses on the hull sides and turret were dropped from production. The bosses on the glacis were retained. In late September 1943,

16541-433: The turret on a slope of more than four degrees. As an attempt to improve the figure to fifteen degrees, the Army ordered that the track grousers and antiaircraft machine gun be stored on the rear of the turret. This did not solve the balance problem, and on 21 December 1942, triangular "quick fix" turret counterweights made of lead, mild steel, or cast iron were authorized. The mild steel parts weighed 2,400 pounds. Meanwhile,

16680-408: The turret was also 1 inch thick. The partial roof on the front third of the turret opening was 3 ⁄ 4 inch (19 mm) thick. The triangular cast gun shield sported the thickest armor on the vehicle, 2 + 1 ⁄ 4 inches (57 mm). It was sloped at 45 degrees from the vertical and horizontal. The M10 and M10A1 were mechanically identical except for their power plants. The M10 used

16819-427: The vehicle's batteries. The engine noise and smoke could attract enemy fire, especially in close quarters, where the M10 was vulnerable due to its thin armor and open-topped turret. The lack of an auxiliary generator was rectified with the introduction of the M36 tank destroyer. Soon after reaching production, it was realized that the barrel of the 3-inch gun M7 was too heavy, to the point where it prevented traverse of

16958-469: The vehicle. The engine of the M10A1 was the Ford GAA , an 8-cylinder derivative of an ill-fated V-12 aircraft engine project. It produced 450 horsepower (340 kW) at 2,600 rpm. When tested side by side in September 1943, the M10A1 was judged to have superior automotive performance to the M10. Even though it produced only slightly less torque, the M10A1's engine was far lighter, and used a common fuel like

17097-419: The wrong direction. As a result, U.S. troops began asking other soldiers questions that they felt only Americans would know the answers to in order to flush out the German infiltrators, which included naming certain states' capitals, sports and trivia questions related to the U.S., etc. This practice resulted in U.S. brigadier general Bruce Clarke being held at gunpoint for some time after he incorrectly said

17236-535: Was also less than had been hoped; only enough U.S. Army weapons had been found to equip the commando unit, and only four U.S. Army scout cars, 30 jeeps, and 15 trucks were found, the difference being made up with German vehicles painted in U.S. olive drab with Allied markings applied. Only a single Sherman tank was available, and the brigade's Panther tanks were disguised as M10 tank destroyers by removing their cupolas and disguising their hulls and turrets with thin sheet metal. The problem of recognition by their own forces

17375-538: Was an American tank destroyer of World War II . After US entry into World War II and the formation of the Tank Destroyer Force , a suitable vehicle was needed to equip the new battalions. By November 1941, the Army requested a vehicle with a gun in a fully rotating turret after other interim models were criticized for being too poorly designed. The prototype of the M10 was conceived in early 1942 and delivered in April that year. After appropriate changes to

17514-539: Was assembled near Bad Münstereifel and on the afternoon of 16 December it moved out, advancing behind the three attacking Panzer divisions, the 1st SS Panzer Division , the 12th SS Panzer Division , and the 12th Volksgrenadier Division , with the aim of moving around them when they reached the High Fens. However, when the 1st SS Panzer Division failed to reach the start point within two days, Skorzeny realized that Operation Greif's initial aims were now doomed. As

17653-473: Was crucial, and they were to identify themselves by various methods: displaying a small yellow triangle at the rear of their vehicles; tanks keeping their guns pointing in the nine o'clock position; troops wearing pink or blue scarves and removing their helmets; and flashes from a blue or red torch at night. As the brigade prepared for action, rumors began to fly that they were to relieve the besieged towns of Dunkirk or Lorient , capture Antwerp , or to capture

17792-467: Was developed during decolonization . During insurgency and counterinsurgency, the distinction between civilians and combatants is often blurred. Counterinsurgency may involve attempting to win the hearts and minds of populations supporting the insurgency. Alternatively, it may be waged in an attempt to intimidate or eliminate civilian populations suspected of loyalty to the insurgency through indiscriminate violence. The guerrilla must swim in

17931-496: Was not out of the question that regular German troops might be killed or captured wearing items of U.S. uniforms. So great was the confusion caused by Operation Greif that the U.S. Army "saw spies and saboteurs everywhere". Perhaps the largest panic was created when a German commando team was captured near Aywaille on 17 December. Comprising Unteroffizier Manfred Pernass, Oberfähnrich Günther Billing, and Gefreiter Wilhelm Schmidt, they were captured when they failed to give

18070-427: Was not the case and M10 battalions were attached, often semi-permanently, to infantry and armored divisions to provide additional direct and indirect fire support. Typical missions included providing indirect artillery fire by augmenting divisional artillery units, following and supporting the lead elements of an infantry assault, attacking obstacles such as fortifications and enemy vehicles (including tanks) that hampered

18209-474: Was numerically the most important U.S. tank destroyer of World War II. It combined thin but sloped armor with the M4's reliable drivetrain and a reasonably potent anti-tank gun mounted in an open-topped turret. Despite its obsolescence in the face of newer German tanks like the Panther medium tank and the introduction of more powerful and better-designed types as replacements, the M10 remained in service until

18348-769: Was part of the 16th Tank Corps , 2nd Tank Army. It fought in Belorussia and Poland in 1944. In 1944, during the Battle of the Bulge , Operation Greif was a plan developed by the Nazis to infiltrate behind the Allies lines. They made various modifications to make approximately ten Panther tanks look as similar as possible to the American M10, known as the "Panther M10" or the " Ersatz M10" ( Ersatz meaning 'replacement' or 'substitute' in German). Israel bought M10s from scrapyards and dumping grounds in Europe after 1948. They came

18487-539: Was passed on to every headquarters on the Western Front, and this request soon became known to the Allies. The new brigade needed U.S. Army vehicles, weapons and uniforms; OB West was asked to find 15 tanks, 20 armored cars, 20 self-propelled guns, 100 jeeps, 40 motorcycles, 120 trucks, and British and U.S. Army uniforms all to be delivered to the brigade's training camp which had been set up at Grafenwöhr in eastern Bavaria. The equipment delivered fell short of

18626-409: Was stowed on brackets in the right rear of the turret for use by the vehicle commander. The other four crew members were armed with M1 carbines , each carrying as much ammunition on their person as they saw fit. An M1903 Springfield rifle with 60 rounds of ammunition was stowed next to the assistant driver, and an adapter for the rifle and ten M9 rifle grenades for use against tanks were stowed under

18765-464: Was summoned to meet Hitler at his headquarters at Rastenburg in East Prussia on 22 October 1944. After congratulating Skorzeny, Hitler outlined the planned Ardennes Offensive and the role he was to play in it. Hitler informed Skorzeny that the Americans had used 3 captured German tanks with German markings in the Battle of Aachen. For this reason, he asked him to set up a similar unit. Skorzeny

18904-470: Was to form a special brigade, Panzer Brigade 150 , whose purpose would be to capture one or more of the bridges over the Meuse river before they could be destroyed. Hitler informed him that he had decided that this could be accomplished more quickly and with fewer losses if Skorzeny and his men wore U.S. uniforms. Hitler also remarked that small units disguised in enemy uniforms could cause great confusion among

19043-435: Was told by German legal experts that as long as he did not order his men to fight in combat while wearing U.S. uniforms, such a tactic was a legitimate ruse of war . A surprise defense witness was F. F. E. Yeo-Thomas , a former Allied SOE agent, who testified that he and his operatives wore German uniforms behind enemy lines. Counter-insurgency Counterinsurgency ( COIN , or NATO spelling counter-insurgency )

19182-508: Was used for storage of the vehicle's pioneer and maintenance tools: a 5-pound (2.3 kg) axe, a 5-foot (1.5 m) crowbar, a mattock handle and head, a double-sided 10-pound (4.5 kg) sledgehammer, and a track tensioning wrench. The sides and rear of the upper hull featured angled extensions or covers over the upper run of track. These extensions often got in the way of fitting "duckbill" extended end connectors, used to reduce ground pressure on soft ground, and were often removed, along with

19321-465: Was used to create smoke screens, or to flush enemy infantry out of buildings or fortified positions. A .50 caliber (12.7 mm) Browning M2HB heavy machine gun could be mounted on the top rear of the turret for use against enemy infantry and for anti-aircraft use. The ammuntion (300 rounds in 50-round boxes) was stowed under the vehicle subfloor. The crew had personal weapons for self-defense. A Thompson submachine gun with 460 rounds of ammunition

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