The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks ( SALT ) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union . The Cold War superpowers dealt with arms control in two rounds of talks and agreements: SALT I and SALT II .
118-464: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Linebacker was the codename of a U.S. Seventh Air Force and U.S. Navy Task Force 77 air interdiction campaign conducted against North Vietnam from 9 May to 23 October 1972, during
236-466: A cease-fire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violated the Logan Act , banning private citizens from intruding into official government negotiations with a foreign nation, and thus constituted treason. While the discussion following splits into military and political/civil strategies, that is a Western perspective. North Vietnamese forces took a more grand strategic view than did
354-779: A centre of gravity built around gradual and small-scale erosion of US capabilities, closing the enormous technological disadvantage with surprise attacks and strategies, while building and consolidating political control over the rural areas of South Vietnam. See the protracted warfare model . Despite differences in were both sides believe their centres of gravity were, the NVA and Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative throughout this period, choosing when and were to attack, and being capable of controlling their losses quite widely. They were estimated to have initiated 90% of all contacts and engagement firefights, in which 46% of all engagements were NVA/VC ambushes against US forces. A different study by
472-563: A conventional, combined-arms conquest against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , and taking and holding land permanently. Military developments in this period should be considered in several broad phases that do not fit neatly into a single year: Some fundamental decisions about U.S. strategy, which would last for the next several years, took place in 1965. Essentially, there were three alternatives: Even with these three approaches, there
590-647: A defensive line that held the PAVN at bay, but it was only a temporary respite. Although the conventional attack by the PAVN, which included the extensive use of armor and heavy artillery, riveted the attention of the allies on the northern provinces, it was only the first of three such operations that were launched that spring. On 5 April, a PAVN force of 20,000 crossed the border from their sanctuaries in Cambodia in another three-division, combined arms force to attack Bình Long Province , north of Saigon . They quickly seized
708-549: A figurehead. COL Bùi Tín led a reconnaissance mission of specialists reporting directly to the Politburo, who said, in a 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, that he saw the only choice was escalation including the use of conventional troops, capitalizing on the unrest and inefficiency from the series of coups in the South. The Politburo ordered infrastructure improvements to start in 1964. In February and March 1964, confirming
826-465: A graduated scale of intensity, ranging from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations, and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV operations against South Vietnam and Laos, to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number of DRV military and economic targets. In the absence of all-out strikes by the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not include attacks on population centers or
944-604: A guerilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on 24 February. MG Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity; while today's United States Special Operations Command has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic Unified Combatant Command . Today, officers from
1062-534: A land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam. Once the elections were over, North Vietnam developed a new plan to move from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia, in central Vietnam (i.e., ARVN II Corps Tactical Zone ), with a goal of driving through to the seacoast over Highway 19 , splitting South Vietnam in half. For this large operation,
1180-492: A massive conventional military operation that was being conducted on three fronts simultaneously, involving the equivalent of 15 divisions and 600 tanks. As the North Vietnamese continued to gain ground in three of South Vietnam's four military regions, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff updated their contingency plans (drawn up before the bombing halt of 1968) for the resumption of bombing in the north and recommended it to
1298-555: A matter of establishing a viable, sustainable political structure for South Vietnam, rather than radically improving the short-term security situation. It saw the Minh-Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some of the most disliked aspects of the Diem government. During this time, the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental; they were resulting from
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#17327720907771416-560: A maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation. Two days later, the Minh Tho government was overthrown. Col. Don Si Nguyen brought in battalions of engineers to improve the Trail, principally in Laos, with up-to-date Soviet and Chinese construction equipment, with a goal, over several years, of building a supply route that could pass 10 to 20,000 soldiers per month. At this time,
1534-732: A mining operation since 1965. On 5 May, Nixon ordered the Joint Chiefs to prepare to execute the aerial mining portion of the Duck Hook plan within three days under the operational title Pocket Money . At precisely 09:00 (local time) on 9 May, six US Navy A-7 Corsair IIs and three A-6 Intruders from the USS Coral Sea flew into Haiphong harbor and dropped thirty-six 1,000-pound (450 kg) Mark-52 and Mark-55 naval mines into its waters. They were protected from attacks by Vietnam People's Air Force (VPAF) MiG fighter aircraft by
1652-549: A month over two rail lines and eight major roads that linked it with North Vietnam. On 10 May Operation Linebacker began with mass bombing operations against North Vietnam by tactical fighter aircraft of the Seventh Air Force and Task Force 77. Their targets included the railroad switching yards at Yên Viên and the Paul Doumer Bridge, on the northern outskirts of Hanoi. A total of 414 sorties were flown on
1770-494: A more comprehensive bombing campaign which would include strikes against both Hanoi and Haiphong. The following day 18 B-52s struck Thanh Hóa 's Bai Thuong Air Base . Three more days followed before another strike, this time by another 18 bombers in a pre-dawn attack against an oil tank farm outside Haiphong. They were followed by more than 100 tactical aircraft attacking targets around Hanoi and Haiphong during daylight. Between 6 and 15 April, U.S. aircraft also struck and destroyed
1888-406: A not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup: They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in
2006-417: A perceived lack of stature among the generals who rose up to lead it after the original government of Diem was deposed. Coups in 1963 , January 1964 , September 1964 , December 1964 , and 1965 all shook faith in the government and reduced the trust of civilians. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the [North Vietnamese] Party concluded, the "United States was forced to introduce its own troops because it
2124-573: A political dau tranh argument: the U.S. was faced with two unacceptable alternatives: invading the North or continue a stalemate. Invasion of "a member country of the Socialist camp" would enlarge the war, which Giap said would cause the "U. S. imperialists...incalculable serious consequences." As for reinforcements, "Even if they increase their troops by another 50,000, 100,000 or more, they cannot extricate themselves from their comprehensive stalemate in
2242-538: A report on 2 January 1964, for the first operational phase to begin on 1 February. INR determined that the North Vietnamese had, in December, adopted a more aggressive stance toward the South, which was in keeping with Chinese policy. This tended to be confirmed with more military action and less desire to negotiate in February and March 1964 Duiker saw the political dynamics putting Lê Duẩn in charge and Ho becoming
2360-596: A series of meetings beginning in Helsinki , with the American delegation headed by Gerard C. Smith , director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency . Subsequent sessions alternated between Vienna and Helsinki. McNamara played a significant role with working to reduce the arms race between the U.S. and Soviet Union. There were two distinct ways in which he worked to govern the nuclear threat. First, he thought
2478-491: A total ARVN collapse and to protect American prestige during the upcoming summit meeting with Soviet general secretary Leonid Brezhnev , Nixon decided to risk a massive escalation of force. Due to the continuous withdrawal of American forces as part of the policy of Vietnamization , at the time of the invasion fewer than 10,000 U.S. combat troops remained in South Vietnam, and most of them were scheduled to leave within
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#17327720907772596-413: A total of 134 aircraft either over the north or as a direct result of Linebacker missions. 104 were lost in combat and 30 were destroyed in operational accidents. Losses by service were: USAF : – 70 total USN : – 54 total USMC : – 10 total Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963%E2%80%931969 Anti-Communist forces: Communist forces: United States : 409,111 (1969) During
2714-508: A twelve-day period between 24 June and 5 July. USAF pilots were hampered by use of the outdated "fluid four" tactical formations (a four-plane, two element formation in which only the leader did the shooting and in which the outside wingmen were vulnerable) dictated by service doctrine. Also contributing to the parity was a lack of air combat training against dissimilar aircraft, a deficient early warning system, and ECM pod formations that mandated strict adherence to formation flying. During August
2832-413: Is at hand." This once again placed Hanoi and Haiphong off-limits, and halted Linebacker operations. Air Force historian Earl Tilford has written that Linebacker was "a watershed in aerial warfare...it was the first modern aerial campaign in which precision guided munitions changed the way in which air power was used." It succeeded, where Rolling Thunder had failed, he claimed, for three reasons: Nixon
2950-922: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . The two sides also agreed to a number of basic principles regarding appropriate conduct. Each recognized the sovereignty of the other; agreed to the principle of noninterference; and sought to promote economic, scientific, and cultural ties of mutual benefit and enrichment. Nixon
3068-574: The Cold War in the 1960s, the United States and South Vietnam began a period of gradual escalation and direct intervention referred to as the " Americanization " of joint warfare in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War . At the start of the decade, United States aid to South Vietnam consisted largely of supplies with approximately 900 military observers and trainers. After the assassination of both Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy close to
3186-561: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separated the two Vietnams. This three-division force caught the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and their American allies unprepared. The PAVN force struck the defensive positions of the ARVN 3rd Division and threw it into disarray. ARVN forces then fell back, and a race began between both belligerents to the bridges at Đông Hà and Cam Lộ . By 4 April, ARVN officers had patched together
3304-463: The Gulf of Tonkin ), had four aircraft carriers assigned to it, but only two were available at any one time to conduct operations. Their air wings had approximately 140 aircraft. American and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (RVNAF) aircraft had been supporting the defense (weather permitting) since the beginning of the offensive. These strikes were conducted in support of ARVN forces, and included those of
3422-735: The Paul Doumer and Thanh Hóa bridges and the Yên Viên railway marshalling yard . This marked the introduction of laser-guided bombs against strategic targets in North Vietnam. Both bridges had previously been attacked unsuccessfully with conventional bombs and even missiles. The B-52s were then withdrawn from operations in the north and when they returned in June, their missions would be limited to South Vietnam. By mid-month, nearly all of North Vietnam had been cleared for bombing raids for
3540-572: The Republic of Korea and the U.S. to Thailand between 1 April and 11 May in Operation Constant Guard. Strategic Air Command (SAC) dispatched 124 B-52s from the U.S. to Guam bringing the total B-52 strength available for operations to 209. The USN cut short its port period for the carriers USS Kitty Hawk and USS Constellation and ordered USS Midway , USS America and USS Saratoga to augment
3658-635: The Tet Mau Than or Tong Kong Kich/Tong Kong Ngia (TCK/TCN, General Offensive-General Uprising ) One of the great remaining questions is if this was a larger plan into which the Battle of Khe Sanh and Tet Offensive were to fit. If there was a larger plan, to what extent were North Vietnamese actions in the period of this article a part of it? Douglas Pike believed the TCK/TCN was to have three main parts: Pike used Dien Bien Phu as an analogy for
Operation Linebacker - Misplaced Pages Continue
3776-955: The Vietnam War . Its purpose was to halt or slow the transportation of supplies and materials for the Nguyen Hue Offensive (known in the West as the Easter Offensive ), an invasion of the South Vietnam by the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) that had been launched on 30 March. Linebacker was the first continuous bombing effort conducted against North Vietnam since the end of Operation Rolling Thunder in November 1968. At midday on 30 March 1972, 30,000 PAVN troops, supported by regiments of tanks and artillery, rolled southward across
3894-533: The armed struggle ( dau trinh ) theory espoused by Võ Nguyên Giáp but opposed by the politically oriented Trường Chinh . Pike said he could almost hear Trường Chinh saying, "You see, it's what I mean. You're not going to win militarily on the ground in the South. You've just proven what we've said; the way to win is in Washington." Alternatively, Giáp, in September 1967, had written what might well have been
4012-521: The center of gravity of the opposition. Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara , in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the Second World War, the Communist military was the center of gravity of the opposition, rather than the political opposition or the security of the populace. In contrast, the North Vietnamese took
4130-400: The 1st Cav, so BG Man revised a plan to bring to try to fight the helicopter-mobile forces on terms favorable to the North Vietnamese. They fully expected to incur heavy casualties, but it would be worth it if they could learn to counter the new U.S. techniques, inflict significant casualties on the U.S. Army, and, if very lucky, still cut II CTZ in half. That planned movement was very similar to
4248-446: The American operation, they were not willing to jeopardize their thawing relationship with the U.S. and Hanoi's requests for support and aid from its socialist allies met with only cool responses. Operation Linebacker, the code name for the new interdiction campaign, would have four objectives: to isolate North Vietnam from its sources of supply by destroying railroad bridges and rolling stock in and around Hanoi and north-eastwards toward
4366-591: The Chinese frontier; the targeting of primary storage areas and marshalling yards; to destroy storage and transshipment points and to eliminate (or at least damage) the North's air defense system. With nearly 85 percent of North Vietnam's imports (which arrived by sea) blocked by Pocket Money , the administration and the Pentagon believed that this would cut its final lines of communication with its socialist allies. China alone shipped an average of 22,000 tons of supplies
4484-456: The December decision, there was more emphasis on military action and less attention to negotiation. As opposed to many analysts who believed the North was simply unaware of McNamara's "signaling"; INR thought that the North was concerned of undefined U.S. action on the North and sought Chinese support. If INR's analysis is correct, the very signals mentioned in the March 1965 McNaughton memo, which
4602-518: The Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which itself assumed it would attrit the counterinsurgents . An alternative view, considering overall security as the center of gravity, was shared by the Marine leadership and some other U.S. government centers of opinion, including Central Intelligence Agency , Agency for International Development , and United States Army Special Forces . Roughly until mid-1965,
4720-508: The PAVN created its first division headquarters, under then-brigadier general Chu Huy Man . This goal at first seemed straightforward, but was reevaluated when major U.S. ground units entered the area, first the United States Marine Corps at Da Nang , and then the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) , the "First Cav". In particular, the PAVN were not sure of the best tactics to use against the air assault capability of
4838-571: The PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans – but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes. By late 1966, however, North Vietnam began a buildup in the northwest area of the theater, in Laos, the southernmost part of the DRV, the DMZ, and in the northern part of the RVN. It is known that the North Vietnamese planned something called
Operation Linebacker - Misplaced Pages Continue
4956-574: The President, who approved it on 8 May. Shortly after his inauguration, Nixon had ordered the preparation of a contingency plan, one that would hopefully bring the Vietnam War to an end. Operation Duck Hook was to include an invasion of the North and included a proposal to mine its major harbors. The plan had been shelved at the time as too extreme but it had not been forgotten. The USN had also been updating its own contingency plans for just such
5074-558: The Republic of [South] Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis. Westmoreland complained that, "we are not engaging
5192-524: The SVN-US strategy still focused around pacification in South Vietnam , but it was increasingly irrelevant in the face of larger and larger VC conventional attacks. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam began to refer to the "two wars", one against conventional forces, and the other of pacification . The former was the priority for U.S. forces, as of 1965, assuming the South Vietnamese had to take
5310-420: The South Vietnamese state. This phase of the war lasted until the election of Richard Nixon and the change of U.S. policy to Vietnamization , or ending the direct involvement and phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military. One of the main problems that the joint forces faced was continuing weakness in the South Vietnamese government, along with
5428-463: The South. The U.S. would avoid further Geneva talks until it was established that they would not improve the Communist position. It was estimated that while there would be a strong diplomatic and propaganda response, the DRV and its allies would "refrain from dramatic new attacks, and refrain from raising the level of insurrection for the moment." The U.S/RVN and North Vietnam had strategic goals, with very different, and often inaccurate, definitions of
5546-548: The Soviet and Chinese reaction to the escalation. Hours before Nixon's speech announcing the mining, Kissinger had delivered a letter to Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin which outlined the U.S. plan, but which also made clear Nixon's willingness to proceed with the summit. The next day, Nixon shook the hand of Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev at the White House . Although Moscow and Beijing publicly denounced
5664-699: The Soviets could exclusively retain 308 of its so-called " heavy ICBM " launchers of the SS-18 type. A major breakthrough for the agreement occurred at the Vladivostok Summit Meeting in November 1974, when President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev came to an agreement on the basic framework for the SALT II agreement. The elements of the agreement were stated to be in effect until 1985. An agreement to limit strategic launchers
5782-696: The Soviets tested a system for the SS-9 missile, otherwise known as the R-36 missile . A modified two-tier Moscow ABM system is still used. The United States built only one ABM site to protect a Minuteman base in North Dakota where the " Safeguard " Program was deployed. That base was increasingly more vulnerable to attacks by the Soviet ICBMs because of the advancement in Soviet missile technology. Negotiations lasted from November 17, 1969, to May 26, 1972, in
5900-574: The U.S. alongside Soviet continued to make new ballistic missiles. The US nuclear arsenals was far too large at that point in history to even pose for arms limitation at that point. After a long deadlock, the first results of SALT I came in May 1971, when an agreement was reached over ABM systems. Further discussion brought the negotiations to an end in Moscow in 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed both
6018-483: The U.S. and South Vietnam with a protracted warfare model , in their concept of dau tranh , or "struggle", where the goal coupling military and political initiatives alongside each-other; there are both military and organisational measures that support the political goal. Following the Tet Offensive and with US Withdrawal, once the United States was no longer likely to intervene, the North Vietnamese changed to
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#17327720907776136-479: The U.S. had little intelligence collection capability to detect the start of this project. Specifically, MACV-SOG , under Russell, was prohibited from any operations in Laos, although SOG was eventually authorized to make cross-border operations. Before the operations scheduled by the Krulak committee could be attempted, there had to be an organization to carry them out. An obscure group called MACV-SOG appeared on
6254-632: The U.S. may have only reinforced in the minds of many Vietnamese that his government drew its support not from the people, but from the United States. The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the ARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Some policy-makers in Washington began to believe that Diem
6372-617: The VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diem. During this period, INR observed, in a 23 December paper, the U.S. needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the Strategic Hamlet Program, since it was getting much more accurate – if pessimistic – from the new government than it had from Diem. Secretary McNamara, however, testified to the House Armed Service Committee, on 27 December, that only
6490-470: The VC with sufficient frequency or effectiveness to win the war in Vietnam." He said that American troops had shown themselves to be superb soldiers, adept at carrying out attacks against base areas and mounting sustained operations in populated areas. Yet, the operational initiative— decisions to engage and disengage—continued to be with the enemy. In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it
6608-462: The air wings of the carriers USS Coral Sea and USS Hancock . The bad weather limited the ability of the U.S. aircraft to assist in stemming the North Vietnamese onslaught. By 6 April, at naval and air bases around the globe, American forces were put on alert and ships and aircraft squadrons began moving toward Southeast Asia. The U.S. began a rapid build-up of airpower. The USAF deployed 176 F-4s and 12 F-105 Thunderchiefs from bases in
6726-412: The allied Viet Cong fought back, keeping to countryside strongholds while the anti-communist allied forces tended to control the cities. The most notable conflict of this era was the 1968 Tet Offensive , a widespread campaign by the communist forces to attack across all of South Vietnam; while the offensive was largely repelled, it was a strategic success in seeding doubt as to the long-term viability of
6844-560: The beginning of Freedom Train in April to the end of June 1972 the United States lost 52 aircraft over North Vietnam: 17 to missiles; 11 to anti-aircraft weapons; three to small arms fire; 14 to MiGs; and seven to unknown causes. During the same time period, the RVNAF lost ten aircraft. 63 VPAF aircraft were destroyed during the same time period. North Vietnam claimed that it had shot down 651 aircraft and sunk or set on fire 80 U.S. warships during
6962-528: The bombing campaign was reflected by the sharp increase in the number of strike and support sorties flown in Southeast Asia as a whole: from 4,237 for all services, including the RVNAF, during the month preceding the invasion, to 27,745 flown in support of ARVN forces from the beginning of April to the end of June (20,506 of them flown by the Air Force). B-52s provided an additional 1,000 sorties during
7080-401: The campaign had been successful in its interdiction effort. USAF General Robert N. Ginsburgh, of the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force , summed up the attitudes of U.S. commanders by remarking that Linebacker had "a greater impact in its first four months of operation than Rolling Thunder had in three and one-half years." Although Kissinger may have announced that peace was at hand, it
7198-450: The campaign. Navy pilots, employing a mutually supporting "loose deuce" tactical formation and many with TOPGUN training, claimed a kill ratio of 6:1 in their favor in May and June, such that after that the VPAF rarely engaged them thereafter. In contrast, the USAF experienced a 1:1 kill ratio through the first two months of the campaign, as seven of its eventual 24 Linebacker air-to-air losses occurred without any corresponding VPAF loss in
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#17327720907777316-488: The department of defence breaks down the types of engagements from a periodic study here. William Westmoreland , and to a lesser extent Maxwell Taylor , rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated by the DRV leadership, mirror-imaging that they would be reasonable by American standards, and see that they could not prevail against steady escalation. They proposed to defeat an enemy, through attrition of his forces, who guided by
7434-422: The development of additional fixed ICBM launchers. Likewise, the agreement would limit the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles and long range missiles to 1,320. However, the United States preserved its most essential programs like the Trident missile , along with the cruise missiles President Jimmy Carter wished to use as his main defensive weapon as they were too slow to have first strike capability. In return,
7552-490: The end of 1963 and Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and amid continuing political instability in the South, the Lyndon Johnson Administration made a policy commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese regime directly. The American military forces and other anti-communist SEATO countries increased their support, sending large scale combat forces into South Vietnam; at its height in 1969, slightly more than 400,000 American troops were deployed. The People's Army of Vietnam and
7670-530: The first day of the operation, 120 by the Air Force and 294 by the Navy and they encountered the heaviest single day of air-to-air combat during the Vietnam War. The U.S claimed 11 VPAF MiGs (four MiG-21s and seven MiG-17s ) and two Air Force F-4s shot down. The VPAF confirmed two MiG-21s, three MiG-17s and one MiG-19 shot down, and they claimed 7 F-4s were shot down (after the war, 5 F-4s shot down were confirmed) Anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile firings also brought down two USN aircraft (one of which
7788-400: The first time in over three years. Air Force and Navy commanders and pilots were relieved that Nixon (unlike President Johnson ) left the operational planning to local commanders and loosened the targeting restrictions that had hampered Operation Rolling Thunder. Between 1 May and 30 June B-52s, fighter-bombers, and gunships had flown 18,000 sorties against formidable anti-aircraft defenses with
7906-547: The fleet so that four or more carrier air wings could conduct missions simultaneously. 7th Fleet assets in local waters were thereby increased from 84 to 138 ships. USAF tactical strikes against North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel were authorized on 5 April under the nickname Freedom Train . The first mass B-52 raid directed against the north was conducted on 10 April when 12 B-52s, supported by 53 attack aircraft, struck petroleum storage facilities around Vinh . By 12 April, Nixon had informed Kissinger that he had decided on
8024-476: The four northern provinces of South Vietnam and dropped 40,000 tons of ordnance in the Battle of An Lộc. Between March and May, B-52 sortie rates had climbed from 700 to 2,200 per month and they had dropped 57,000 tons of bombs in Quảng Trị Province alone. During Freedom Train and Linebacker proper, B-52s had dropped 150,237 tons of bombs on the North while Air Force and Navy tactical aircraft had flown 1,216 sorties and dropped another 5,000 tons of ordnance. From
8142-423: The four torpedo boats were sunk. It was one of the few ship-to-ship naval battles of the war. The stalled offensive in the South and the devastation in North Vietnam had helped to convince Hanoi to return to the bargaining table by early August. The meetings produced new concessions from Hanoi which promised to end the deadlock that had plagued negotiations since their inception in 1968. Gone were Hanoi's demands for
8260-414: The guided-missile cruisers Chicago and Long Beach , with several destroyers including the guided-missile destroyer USS Berkeley launching Operation Custom Tailor and by supporting flights of F-4 Phantoms. The reason for the precise timing of the strike became apparent when Nixon simultaneously delivered a televised speech explaining the escalation to the American people: "The only way to stop
8378-400: The heavy cruiser USS Newport News , the guided missile cruiser USS Providence , and the destroyers USS Robison and USS Rowan conducted a brief night raid against the North Vietnamese forces protecting the port of Haiphong. After the bombardment, the ships were threatened by four Soviet-built torpedo boats. Joined by two aircraft from the USS Coral Sea , three of
8496-688: The incident, and at least some North Vietnamese naval patrols were deployed against these. Possible consequences of such actions, although not explicitly addressing the OPPLAN34A operations, were assessed by the United States Intelligence Community in late May, on the assumption The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, with the GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently include overt US military actions. They would be on
8614-703: The introduction of real-time early warning systems, increased aircrew combat experience and degraded VPAF ground control interception capabilities reversed the trend to a more favorable, with 4:1 kill ratio were claimed. During the operation, each side would ultimately claim favourable kill ratios. A total of 201 air battles took place between American and Vietnamese planes in 1972 sorties. The VPAF lost 47 MiGs (including 26 MiG-21s, 5 MiG-19s and 16 MiG-17s ) and they claimed 90 U.S. aircraft were shot down, including 74 F-4 fighters and two RF-4C (MiG-21s shot down 67 enemy aircraft, MiG-17s shot down 11 and MiG-19s shot down 12 enemy aircraft Linebacker saw several other "firsts". On
8732-467: The killing is to take the weapons of war out of the hands of the international outlaws of North Vietnam.". The mines were activated five days after their delivery to allow any vessels then in port to escape without damage. Over the next three days other US carrier-based aircraft laid 11,000 more mines into North Vietnam's secondary harbors, blockading all maritime commerce for the country. Before and during Pocket Money , Nixon and Kissinger had worried about
8850-505: The lead in pacification. Arguably, however, there were three wars: There were, however, changes in the overall situation from early 1964 to the winter of 1965–1966, from 1966 to late 1967, and from late 1968 until the U.S. policy changes with the Nixon Administration. Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse
8968-468: The loss of 29 aircraft. The U.S. also now began what North Vietnamese historians have described as "using devious political and diplomatic schemes...to cut back the amount of aid being supplied to us by socialist nations". On 20 April Kissinger met secretly with Brezhnev in Moscow. Unwilling to jeopardize the normalisation of relations with the West and wary of Washington's growing relationship with Beijing , Brezhnev agreed to apply pressure to Hanoi to end
9086-579: The manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons . It was a continuation of the SALT I talks and was led by representatives from both countries. It was the first nuclear arms treaty to assume real reductions in strategic forces to 2,250 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides. The SALT II Treaty banned new missile programs, defined as those with any key parameter 5% better than in currently-employed missiles. That forced both sides to limit their new strategic missile types development and construction, such as
9204-409: The nature and course of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. nuclear disarmament and arms control policy, and to separate them from those practiced by Nixon’s predecessors. They also intended, through linkage, to make U.S. arms control policy part of détente. [...] His policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because it was based on flawed assumptions and false premises, the foremost of which
9322-400: The need to avoid the deployment of an ABM system from both countries. To do this, the second thing he believed was the only way to limit the tension was to have many negotiations and discussion about deterrence, holding each other responsible for keeping peace through full communication. One problem that he ran into was that limitation strategies weren't working and open to full of critiques, and
9440-658: The next six months. The number of combat aircraft stationed in Southeast Asia was less than half that of its peak strength in 1968–1969. At the beginning of 1972, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had only three squadrons of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II fighter-bombers and one squadron of Cessna A-37 Dragonfly light attack aircraft, a total of 76 aircraft, stationed in South Vietnam. Another 114 fighter-bombers were located at bases in Thailand . 83 B-52s were stationed at U-Tapao RTAFB , Thailand and at Andersen Air Force Base , Guam . The U.S. Navy (USN)'s Task Force 77 (stationed in
9558-594: The next two days, the ARVN would succeed with Operation Thang Lang-Hai Yen 79 on the Dinh Tuong–Kien Phuong Sector border, killing 99 VC, followed the next day by an attack on a training camp in Quảng Ngãi, killing 50. These successes, however, must be balanced by the Buddhist crisis and the increased instability of Diem. After Diem's fall in November 1963 , INR saw the priority during this period as more
9676-483: The northeastern border of the Continental United States to the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. In addition, SALT I limited the number of SLBM capable submarines that NATO and the United States could operate to 50 with a maximum of 800 SLBM launchers between them. If the United States or NATO were to increase that number, the Soviets could respond with increasing their arsenal by
9794-475: The offensive and negotiate seriously. Brezhnev then arranged for another secret meeting between Kissinger and Hanoi's lead negotiator Le Duc Tho , to be held on 2 May in Paris. On the day, the two men met for a session that Kissinger later described as "brutal and insulting." The North Vietnamese, sensing victory, were in no mood to make concessions. As a result of this meeting and the fall of Quảng Trị City Nixon
9912-787: The opening day of the operation, USN Lieutenant Duke Cunningham and his radar intercept officer, Lieutenant (j.g.) William P. Driscoll became the first U.S. air aces of the Vietnam War when they shot down their fifth MiG. On 28 August, the USAF gained its first ace when Captain Richard S. Ritchie downed his fifth enemy aircraft. Twelve days later, Captain Charles B. DeBellevue (who had been Ritchie's backseater during four of his five victories) downed two more MiGs, bringing his total to six. On 13 October another weapons officer, Captain Jeffrey S. Feinstein ,
10030-420: The operation. Linebacker had played a crucial role in blunting the northern offensive by drying up its vital sources of supply. PAVN had evolved into a conventional military force, and such a force depended upon a complex logistical system, which made it vulnerable to aerial attack. By September, imports into North Vietnam were estimated at 35 to 50 percent below what they had been in May, bolstering claims that
10148-557: The organization charts. Its overt name was "MACV Studies and Operations Group". In reality, it was the Special Operations Group, with CIA agent programs for the North gradually moving under MACV control – although SOG almost always had a CIA officer in its third-ranking position, the second-in-command being an Air Force officer. The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators with Asian experience in general. Ironically, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman , who had been
10266-509: The ouster of South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and his replacement by a coalition government in which the Viet Cong would participate. The U.S. on its part agreed to a cease fire in place which conceded that PAVN soldiers could remain in South Vietnam after a peace agreement. The diplomatic impasse was broken and Nixon ordered a halt to all bombing above the 20th parallel on 23 October and on 26 October Kissinger announced that "peace
10384-523: The plan was Abrams' desire to utilize the available bombers (with their all-weather capability) to support the ARVN defense. Nixon and Kissinger considered a plan offered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be both unimaginative and lacking in aggression. On 4 April, Nixon authorized the bombing of North Vietnam (which had been limited to reprisal raids just above the DMZ) up to the 18th parallel . To prevent
10502-779: The same amount. The strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States were changing in character in 1968. The total number of missiles held by the United States had been static since 1967 at 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs but there was an increasing number of missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads being deployed. MIRVs carried multiple nuclear warheads, often with dummies , to confuse ABM systems, making MIRV defense by ABM systems increasingly difficult and expensive. Both sides were also permitted to increase their number of SLBM forces but only if they disassembled an equivalent number of older ICBMs or SLBM launchers on older submarines. One of
10620-509: The same period. The North was feeling the pressure, admitting in the official PAVN history that "between May and June only 30 percent of supplies called for in our plan actually reached the front-line units." In total, 41,653 Linebacker missions dropped 155,548 tons of bombs. In addition to interdicting the road and rail system of North Vietnam, Linebacker also systematically attacked its air defense system. The VPAF, with approximately 200 interceptors, strongly contested these attacks throughout
10738-514: The south but died, possibly of natural causes, in 1967; Thanh may very well have been among those couple of dozen. Thanh was replaced by Trần Văn Trà . Trà's analysis (see above) was that while the concept of the General Offensive-General Uprising was drawn up by the Politburo in 1965, the orders to implement it did not reach the operational headquarters until late October 1967. Pike described it as consistent with
10856-692: The southern part of our country." Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty Negotiations commenced in Helsinki , in November 1969. SALT I led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. Although SALT II resulted in an agreement in 1979 in Vienna , the US Senate chose not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan , which took place later that year. The Supreme Soviet did not ratify it either. The agreement expired on December 31, 1985, and
10974-473: The special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War. To understand factors that contributed to the heightened readiness in the Gulf, it must be understood that MACV-SOG OPPLAN 34A naval operations had been striking the coast in the days immediately before
11092-429: The successful PAVN maneuver in 1975. The resulting campaign is called the Battle of Ia Drang , with a followup at the Battle of Bong Son , but Ia Drang actually had three major phases: In the larger Battle of Bong Son approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, 1st Cav drew their own lessons from what they believed the PAVN developed as countertactics to air assault , and used obvious helicopters to cause
11210-488: The terms of the treaty required both countries to limit the number of deployment sites protected by an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system to one each. The idea of that system was to prevent a competition in ABM deployment between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had deployed such a system around Moscow in 1966, and the United States announced an ABM program to protect twelve ICBM sites in 1967. After 1968,
11328-441: The third phase, although Dien Bien Phu was an isolated, not urban, target. Losing elite troops during the Tet Offensive never let them develop the "second wave" or "third phase" "We don't ever know what the second wave was; we have never been able to find out because probably only a couple of dozen people knew it." The description of the three fighting methods is consistent with the work of Nguyễn Chí Thanh , who commanded forces in
11446-541: The town of Lộc Ninh and then surrounded the town of An Lộc , cutting the road to the capital. On 12 April, the PAVN struck again, this time moving in from eastern Laos and seizing a series of border outposts around Đắk Tô in Kon Tum Province in the Central Highlands . The PAVN then proceeded east toward the provincial capital of Kon Tum . Hanoi had initiated the offensive to coincide with
11564-480: The use of nuclear weapons. Further assumptions is that the U.S. would inform the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union that these attacks were of limited purpose, but show serious intent by additional measures including sending a new 5,000 troops and air elements to Thailand; deploying strong air, naval, and ground strike forces to the Western Pacific and South China Sea; and providing substantial reinforcement to
11682-410: The winter monsoon, when continuous rain and low cloud cover made air support difficult. The initial U.S. response to the offensive was lackadaisical and confused. The Pentagon was not unduly alarmed and the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam and Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam , General Creighton W. Abrams , were both out of the country. President Richard Nixon 's first response
11800-627: Was a grinding war of attrition, with no decision, as death and destruction ground along. For example, on 23 March 1964, ARVN forces in Operation Phuong Hoang 13-14/10, Dien Phong Sector, raids a VC battalion in a fortified village, killing 126. On 13 April, however, the VC overran Kien Long (near U Minh Forest ), killing 300 ARVN and 200 civilians. On 25 April, GEN Westmoreland was named to replace GEN Harkins; an ARVN ambush near Plei Ta Nag killed 84 VC. Ambassador Lodge resigned on 23 June, with General Taylor named to replace him. In
11918-402: Was an immediate impact on the battlefield in South Vietnam. Shelling by PAVN artillery dropped off by one-half between 9 May and 1 June. This slowdown was not due to an immediate shortage of artillery shells, but rather to a desire to conserve ammunition. U.S. intelligence analysts believed that PAVN had enough stockpiled supplies to sustain their campaigns throughout the autumn. The intensity of
12036-459: Was credited with his fifth MiG, making him the final Air Force ace. Although Linebacker was largely carried out by air, naval forces were also deployed to provide counter-battery fire against enemy targets along the coast and other important logistical areas and in support of ground troops. One such operation was Operation Lion's Den, or "The Battle of Haiphong Harbor". On 27 August 1972, Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III took with him his ship,
12154-400: Was decisive in his actions and gave the military greater latitude in targeting; American airpower was forcefully and appropriately used; and the immense difference in the technology utilized made Linebacker the first bombing campaign in a "new era" of aerial warfare. During and immediately following the PAVN offensive, U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps aviators had flown 18,000 sorties in
12272-457: Was finalized around 20 December, under joint MACV-CIA leadership; the subsequent MACV-SOG organization had not yet been created. There were five broad categories, to be planned in three periods of 4 months each, over a year: Lyndon Johnson agreed with the idea, but was cautious. He created an interdepartmental review committee, under Major General Victor Krulak , on 21 December, to select the least risky operations on 21 December, which delivered
12390-518: Was flown by aces Duke Cunningham and William P. Driscoll ). By the end of the month, American aircraft had destroyed 13 bridges along the rail lines running from Hanoi to the Chinese border. Another four were destroyed between the capital and Haiphong, including the notorious Thanh Hóa Bridge. Several more bridges were brought down along the rail line leading to the south toward the DMZ. Targets were then switched to petroleum and oil storage and transportation networks and North Vietnamese airfields. There
12508-542: Was incapable of defeating the communists, and some even feared that he might make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon . This was accomplished on 2 November 1963, when the CIA allegedly aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow Diem. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000. OPPLAN 34A
12626-468: Was losing the war. It had lost the political game in Vietnam." Robert McNamara suggests that the overthrow of Dương Văn Minh by Nguyễn Khánh , in January 1964, reflected differing U.S. and Vietnamese priorities. And since we still did not recognize the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and North Vietnamese as nationalist in nature, we never realized that encouraging public identification between Khanh and
12744-471: Was not going to come easily. American bombers would once again return to the skies of North Vietnam in 1972 during Operation Linebacker II before the American commitment to the Vietnam War came to an end. (Air-to-air losses only, claimed by the U.S) According to the VPAF, they lost 47 MiGs in aircombat (including 26 MiG-21s, 5 MiG-19s and 16 MiG-17s) Between 10 May and 23 October 1972, the United States lost
12862-570: Was not renewed, although both sides continued to respect it. The talks led to the STARTs, or St rategic A rms R eduction T reaties, which consisted of START I , a 1991 completed agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and START II , a 1993 agreement between the United States and Russia which never entered into effect, both of which proposed limits on multiple-warhead capacities and other restrictions on each side's number of nuclear weapons. A successor to START I, New START ,
12980-415: Was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician Trường Chinh stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khrushchev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must seize the opportunities to win victories in
13098-518: Was prepared to up the ante, stating that "the bastards have never been bombed like they're going to be bombed this time". On 27 April, ARVN defenses in Quảng Trị Province began to collapse. Due to conflicting orders from their high command, ARVN units joined an exodus of refugees heading southwards, abandoning Quảng Trị city. PAVN forces entered the city on the same day as the meeting between Kissinger and Le Duc Tho. The PAVN offensive had become
13216-619: Was proposed and was eventually ratified in February 2011. SALT I is the common name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement signed on May 26, 1972. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels and provided for the addition of new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers only after the same number of older intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and SLBM launchers had been dismantled. SALT I also limited land-based ICBMs that were in range from
13334-583: Was proud that his diplomatic skills made him achieve an agreement that his predecessors had been unable to reach. Nixon and Kissinger planned to link arms control to détente and to the resolution of other urgent problems through what Nixon called "linkage". David Tal argues: The linkage between strategic arms limitations and outstanding issues such as the Middle East, Berlin and, foremost, Vietnam thus became central to Nixon's and Kissinger's policy of détente. Through employment of linkage, they hoped to change
13452-629: Was reached in Vienna on June 18, 1979, and was signed by Brezhnev and Carter at a ceremony held in the Redoutensaal of the Hofburg Palace . Six months after the signing, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan , and in September, the United States discovered that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Cuba. Although Carter claimed that the Soviet brigade had been deployed to Cuba only recently,
13570-484: Was still significant doubt, in the U.S. government, that the war could be ended with a military solution that would place South Vietnam in a strongly anticommunist position. In July, two senior U.S. Department of State officials formally recommended withdrawal to President Lyndon B. Johnson ; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara , at the same time, saw the situation as bad but potentially retrievable with major escalation. Westmoreland's "ultimate aim", was: To pacify
13688-555: Was that the Soviet Union wanted strategic arms limitation agreement much more than the United States did. The agreement paved the way for further discussion regarding international cooperation and a limitation of nuclear armaments, as seen through both the SALT II Treaty and the Washington Summit of 1973 . SALT II was a series of talks between American and Soviet negotiators from 1972 to 1979 that sought to curtail
13806-549: Was to consider a three-day attack by Boeing B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers on Hanoi and the port city of Haiphong . His National Security Advisor , Dr. Henry Kissinger , convinced Nixon to reconsider, since he did not want to jeopardize the formalization of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty ( SALT I ) with the Soviet Union , that was due to be signed in May. Another stumbling block to
13924-425: Was very much concerned with Chinese involvement, may have brought it closer. There were numerous ARVN and VC raids, of battalion size, for which only RVN losses or body count is available. They took place roughly monthly. In the great casualty lists of a war, 100–300 casualties may not seem an immense number, but these have to be considered as happening at least once a month, with a population of perhaps 10 million. It
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