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Operation Utah

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American intervention 1965

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100-459: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Utah was a US Marine Corps and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) operation that took place northwest of Quảng Ngãi , lasting from 4–7 March 1966, during

200-492: A Scout Sniper assigned to the Scout Sniper Platoon, was killed in action. The second occurred during a dismounted combat patrol, 9 Aug., when Staff Sgt. Brandon Dodson, a platoon sergeant with Baker Co., stepped on an improvised explosive device. Dodson was severely injured, but he maintains a positive attitude and is committed toward his recovery at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center. On 1 October 2014,

300-696: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between

400-567: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of

500-449: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want

600-615: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break

700-609: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down

800-885: A daily basis, 1/7 personnel conducted mounted and dismounted urban patrols, cordon knocks, Main Supply Route (MSR) security, sweep operations and border security to clear the battalion's Area of Operation (AO) of enemy insurgents. In March 2006, 1/7 again deployed to Iraq and operated near the Iraqi-Syrian border, conducting dismounted urban patrols, weapons cache sweeping and vehicle checkpoints. The battalion returned in September 2006. 1/7 returned to Western Al Anbar in August 2007. Assigned to AO Hīt , "Task Force 1/7" conducted thousands of combat patrols and weapon cache sweeps. TF 1/7 found over 22,000 pieces of ordnance during

900-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that

1000-668: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected

1100-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against

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1200-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised

1300-611: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,

1400-529: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating

1500-448: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive

1600-610: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in

1700-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after

1800-663: The 7th Marine Regiment of the United States Marine Corps . It is currently based at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center Twentynine Palms . Consisting of approximately 1,000 Marines, it is part of the 1st Marine Division . Famous Marines who have served in 1/7 include General Raymond G. Davis , General James Mattis , Lieutenant General Lewis "Chesty" Puller , and Gunnery Sergeant John Basilone . Note that unlike other infantry battalions in

1900-521: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked

2000-607: The Medal of Honor for defending his exposed position from a comprehensive Japanese assault using only a machine gun. Throughout the remainder of the war, the "First Team" distinguished itself throughout many campaigns, including the Battle of Cape Gloucester , the Battle of Peleliu and the Battle of Okinawa . At the end of the war in the Pacific, 1/7 deployed to China as an element of Operation Beleaguer to assist in repatriation of

2100-683: The Meritorious Unit Commendation Streamer three times. Corporal Larry Eugene Smedley , Delta Company /1/7, was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for action that took place on 20 December 1967, and Private First Class Ralph Dias , Delta Company, 1/7, was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for action that took place in November 1969. In 1998, Robert R. Ingram was awarded the Medal of Honor by President Bill Clinton for his actions on 28 March 1966, while he

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2200-512: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for

2300-470: The Vietnam War . Following the conclusion of Operation Double Eagle , the ARVN 2nd Division received intelligence that the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) 21st Regiment had moved into the area northwest of Quảng Ngãi. The plan was for the ARVN 1st Airborne Battalion to secure a landing zone at Chau Nhai, 15 km northwest of Quảng Ngãi and the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines would then deploy into

2400-864: The "First Team" distinguished itself in battle fighting its way to and from the Chosin Reservoir and in the First Battle of the Hook ; Lt Col Raymond C. Davis of the battalion received the Medal of Honor for fighting at the Chosin Reservoir in North Korea. Following the cessation of hostilities in Korea and through 1965, 1/7 spent time both in Camp Pendleton and Okinawa while maintaining its combat readiness. In August 1965, 1/7

2500-610: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command

2600-1195: The ARVN 30 killed and 120 wounded and the PAVN 600 killed and 5 captured. [REDACTED]  This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Marine Corps . Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive

2700-775: The Al Anbar province. Assigned to Fallujah and Al-Karmah , it was tasked to maintain security in the area with close cooperation with Iraqi police, the Iraqi Army and Provincial Security Forces. Upon departing the region in August and September 2009, 1/7 turned over the AO to Iraqi control before returning to the United States. In March 2012, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines deployed to Sangin District, Helmand Province, Afghanistan to conduct counterinsurgency operations and support

2800-582: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for

2900-554: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in

3000-508: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of

3100-487: The Company L 3/1 Marines and ARVN 1st Airborne captured Hill 50. Company M 3/1 Marines and ARVN 5th Airborne attempted to outflank PAVN positions east of Hill 50 but were unable to do so by nightfall and withdrew to night defensive positions. 3/1 Marines had lost 32 killed and 90 wounded during the day's fighting. At 08:30 2/4 Marines began landing and were met with intense anti-aircraft fire causing 2 UH-34s to crash-land in

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3200-627: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,

3300-537: The Marine Corps but also for 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, because of their previous deployment there. They were involved in the central Helmand liftoff to support our U.K. brothers as they picked up and moved out of Lashkar Gah. They were involved in elections prep from both the primary elections and the runoff elections." Amidst the battalion's success came two devastating incidents. The first incident occurred while providing security, 25 June, when Sgt. Thomas Spitzer,

3400-510: The Marine Corps, 1/7 does not follow the traditional usage of the NATO phonetic alphabet for naming their companies. Suicide Charley uses an outdated spelling of "Charlie" in reference to their history. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment was created on 1 April 1921 in San Diego , California. In September 1924, the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was deactivated with its personnel being absorbed by

3500-522: The Marines called for an emergency resupply mission and despite heavy anti-aircraft fire two helicopters succeeded in dropping munitions to the Marines. At 01:30 the PAVN attacked the Marine perimeter but were forced back by small arms and artillery fire. On the morning of 6 March the Marines and ARVN withdrew with minimal opposition from their night positions to allow for an air and artillery bombardment of

3600-405: The Marines withdrew under the cover of air and artillery strikes to night-defensive positions. The PAVN probed the Marine positions at night and helicopter resupply missions were met with anti-aircraft fire. The Marines launched a night assault on an anti-aircraft position killing at least 20 PAVN and continuous air support and artillery fire was directed against PAVN positions and trails leading into

3700-495: The Marines, who turned and moved to support the ARVN. As the Marines advanced on Hill 50 they came under intense fire from an estimated force of 2 PAVN Battalions, the lines were so close that the Marines were unable to call in air and artillery support. A gap developed between the Marines left flank and the ARVN as the ARVN refused to moved forward and the PAVN exploited this gap cutting off two platoons of Company F for several hours until supported by Company H. As darkness approached

3800-476: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV

3900-508: The PAVN positions lasting more than 2 hours. When the bombardment concluded the Marines and ARVN advanced, but it became clear that most of the PAVN had slipped away the previous night. The Marines found more than 100 PAVN bodies on Hill 50 and an extensive tunnel and bunker complex inside the hill which had served as the PAVN Regimental command post. Operation Utah concluded on 7 March, the Marines had suffered 98 dead and 278 wounded,

4000-531: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in

4100-457: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was

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4200-640: The Stadium Complex in Mogadishu on 25 January 1993. The following night, Lance Corporal Anthony Botello was killed while on point, during a night patrol in the city. Botello was the only other marine besides PFC Domingo Arroyo ( 3rd Battalion 11th Marines ) to be killed in action in Somalia; 1/7 turned over their mission and area of operations in Mogadishu to the 10th Baluch Battalion on 24 April 1993 and returned to Twentynine Palms. In January 2003, 1/7

4300-547: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to

4400-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on

4500-491: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at

4600-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,

4700-571: The U.S. Army and took up positions in the city of An Najaf. After countless extensions, the battalion returned to Twentynine Palms, on 5 October 2003. In August 2004, 1/7 deployed once more, but this time to Western Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom II. There the battalion conducted security operations in the cities and roadways along the Euphrates River and Syrian border to include Husaybah, Karabilah, Sadah, Ubaydi, Al Qa'im, Haditha, Hit and Haqlania. Involved in combat operations on

4800-511: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of

4900-593: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,

5000-457: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,

5100-581: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of

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5200-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,

5300-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend

5400-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from

5500-484: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of

5600-473: The area. Realising that the PAVN planned to stand and fight, commanding general of Task Force Delta, Brigadier general Jonas M. Platt , ordered the deployment of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines north of 2/7 Marines and their deployment was completed by 18:00. In addition the next morning the 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines was to be inserted 2.5 km south of 2/7 Marines, while the ARVN 37th Ranger Battalion supported by M113s would establish blocking positions to

5700-478: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive

5800-434: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve

5900-410: The battalion rejoined the 1st Marine Division, to see their first action of the war at Guadalcanal . Under its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller , the battalion distinguished itself many times over for valor, and bravery held its positions against the onslaught of a regiment of seasoned Japanese attackers. It was also during this campaign that Sgt "Manila John" Basilone was awarded

6000-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among

6100-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about

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6200-522: The defeated Japanese military to Japan. Following World War II, the "First of the Seventh" was sent to Camp Pendleton in California where it was deactivated on 5 March 1947. However, in response to the invasion of South Korea by the communist North Korea , the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines was again called into action. On 21 September 1950, 1/7 carried out an amphibious landing at Inchon . Once more

6300-588: The deployment and captured over 200 suspected terrorists and criminals. TF 1/7 was partnered with two Iraqi infantry battalions and two police districts. The training and development of the Iraqi units was so successful that the city of Hit was the first city within the Al Anbar Province to be returned to Iraqi control. The battalion returned to Twentynine Palms in March 2008. In February 2009, 1/7 returned to

6400-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of

6500-502: The east and the 5th Airborne Battalion would be landed in the original landing zone. At 05:00 the PAVN launched an attack on the ARVN 1st Airborne position near Hill 50 and the Marine artillery responded with more than 1900 rounds on the perimeter over two hours. At 07:30 3/1 Marines was ordered to move south to support the ARVN. As the 3/1 Marines approached the ARVN position at 10:30 they came under heavy fire from entrenched PAVN forces on and around Hill 50. After more than 3 hours fighting

6600-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of

6700-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of

6800-517: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming

6900-559: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in

7000-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What

7100-520: The landing zone and then both Battalions would move southeast along Route 527 with the ARVN patrolling north and the Marines patrolling south of Route 527. On the morning of 4 March Marine A-4s and F-4s and U.S. Air Force B-57s carried out airstrikes on the landing zone before the helicopter landings commenced at 09:00, however the incoming helicopters of Marine Aircraft Group 36 were met with intense anti-aircraft fire and one UH-1E gunship of VMO-6 and an F-4 from VMFA-531 were shot down. Despite

7200-424: The landing zone. One Company stayed to provide security for the downed helicopters while the other two Companies moved north to the site of the previous day's engagement where they established night positions. At 23:00 Company B from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines which had been moved into a blocking position northeast of the battle area was hit by intense PAVN mortar and small arms fire. Running short of ammunition

7300-534: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after

7400-525: The newly organized 4th Marine Regiment. For the next twenty years 1/7 was activated, reflagged, and disbanded on numerous occasions until being reborn on 1 January 1941. Just over a year after its rebirth, 1/7 deployed to take part in the Pacific Theater during World War II . 7th Marines and 1/11 were detached from the Division to form the 3rd Marine Brigade and were sent to Samoa . From where

7500-501: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found

7600-517: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that

7700-662: The persistent anti-aircraft fire by 10:30 the ARVN Airborne had been deployed to the landing zone and encountered little resistance on the ground. The landing of the Marines which commenced at approximately 10:40 was again met with heavy anti-aircraft fire and one UH-34 was shot down. By 13:00 the entire Battalion had been landed. As the ARVN moved out of the landing zone they encountered strong opposition around Chau Nhai and Hill 50 ( 15°13′12″N 108°43′01″E  /  15.22°N 108.717°E  / 15.22; 108.717 ) and by 13:30 they had called for support from

7800-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,

7900-599: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of

8000-476: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi

8100-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue

8200-550: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,

8300-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled

8400-477: The surrounding area in Sangin District. During the battalion's approximately seven-month-long deployment, the "First Team" was responsible for a number of successful missions throughout Helmand province. "They should be proud of what they contributed to the campaign," said Brig. Gen. Daniel Yoo. "They have been involved in everything from the northern Helmand retrograde from Sangin, which was historic for

8500-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for

8600-586: The transition of authority from U.S. forces to the Afghan National Security Forces. The battalion returned in October 2012. In March 2014, 1/7 again deployed to Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The battalion retrograded from Sangin district on 5 May 2014, and turned over security responsibility of the area to the Afghan National Army. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was the final Marine Corps unit to occupy FOB Sabit Qadam and

8700-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of

8800-521: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented

8900-633: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name

9000-489: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of

9100-485: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be

9200-604: Was an integral member of Task Force Ripper . As Desert Shield became Desert Storm, 1/7 participated in the diagonal thrust to the perimeter of Kuwait City , spearheading the liberation of Kuwait from Iraq . 1/7 returned to Twentynine Palms in California, in March 1991. On 11 December 1992, the first elements of 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, arrived at Mogadishu, Somalia for Operation Restore Hope . 1/7 operations were conducted in Baidoa, Bardera, Oddur, Afgoye and Mogadishu. The battalion relieved Task Force Mogadishu for occupation of

9300-595: Was assigned as a Navy hospital corpsman in B Company, 1/7. On 19 February 1970, in the Son Thang massacre just southwest of Danang , a five-man patrol from the battalion murdered five women and eleven children. One member of the team was convicted of premeditated murder, but served less than a year in prison The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, was the first unit to man defensive positions in Saudi Arabia during Operation Desert Shield in August 1990. The battalion

9400-455: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of

9500-411: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines#Vietnam War The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) is an infantry battalion of

9600-557: Was deployed on Operation Iraqi Freedom . It crossed the Kuwaiti border into Iraq on 18 March; its first mission was to seize the strategically prominent oil pumping and control station in Az Zubayr . This station was so important because more than 50% of Iraq's oil was controlled by it. 1/7 saw significant combat action on its way to Baghdad and in the streets of the Iraqi capital. On 23 April, 1/7 turned over control of their sector to

9700-488: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what

9800-490: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted

9900-553: Was once again called to service, this time in South Vietnam . The 1/7 commander, Lt. Colonel James P. Kelly, led the "First Team" in 1965-1966 as they participated in numerous combat operations such as Starlite , Piranha , Mameluke Thrust and Oklahoma Hills . During these operations and many others, 1/7 was honored repeatedly, earning the Presidential Unit Citation Streamer four times and

10000-562: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that

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