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142-626: The " X Article " is an article, formally titled " The Sources of Soviet Conduct ", written by George F. Kennan and published under the pseudonym "X" in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs magazine. It introduced the term " containment " to widespread use and advocated the strategic use of that concept against the Soviet Union . It expanded on ideas expressed by Kennan in a confidential February 1946 telegram, formally identified by Kennan's State Department number, " 511 ", but informally dubbed

284-522: A belief in Moscow that it was war we were after, that we had settled for its inevitability, that it was only a matter of time before we would unleash it." In September 1952, Kennan made a statement that cost him his ambassadorship. In an answer to a question at a press conference, Kennan compared his conditions at the ambassador's residence in Moscow to those he had encountered while interned in Berlin during

426-599: A decisive role in getting Portugal's approval for the use of the Azores Islands by American naval and air forces during World War II. Initially confronted with clumsy instructions and lack of coordination from Washington, Kennan took the initiative by personally talking to President Roosevelt and obtained from the President a letter to the Portuguese premier, Salazar , that unlocked the concession of facilities in

568-770: A demilitarized and neutral state in the Cold War . Elbridge Durbrow Durbrow was born in San Francisco , California . Durbrow graduated from Yale University in 1926 with a degree in philosophy . He then continued his education at Stanford University , the University of Dijon in France, The Hague Academy of International Law in the Netherlands, the École Libre des Sciences Politiques in Paris and finally

710-527: A description of how the Soviet leaders were shaped by Marxism-Leninism, serving as the "pseudo-scientific justification" for why Stalin and the other leaders ought to remain in power despite lacking popular support. At times quoting Edward Gibbon 's The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire , he writes that the Soviet leaders' "aggressive intransigence" against the outside world compelled them "to chastise

852-650: A federation needed to be established in western Europe to counter Soviet influence in the region and to compete against the Soviet stronghold in eastern Europe. Kennan served as deputy head of the mission in Moscow until April 1946. Near the end of that term, the Treasury Department requested that the State Department explain recent Soviet behavior, such as its disinclination to endorse the International Monetary Fund and

994-522: A hostile world in order to legitimize his autocratic rule. Stalin thus used Marxism-Leninism as a "justification for the Soviet Union's instinctive fear of the outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifice they felt bound to demand  ... Today they cannot dispense with it. It is the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability". The solution

1136-482: A hurry. Like the Church, it is dealing in ideological concepts which are of long-term valididty   ... It has no right to risk the existing achievements of the revolution for the sake of vain baubles of the future." ...   the possibility remains (and in the opinion of this writer it is a strong one) that Soviet power, like the capitalist world of its conception, bears within it the seeds of its own decay, and that

1278-471: A hydro-electricity transmission system, and a nationwide telephone system, the attempt to impose "good government" on Greece was less successful. The Greek economy was historically dominated by a rentier system in which a few wealthy families, a highly politicized officer corps and the royal family controlled the economy for their own benefit. Kennan's advice to open up the Greek economy was completely ignored by

1420-703: A job at the legation in Prague . After the occupation of the Czechoslovak Republic by Nazi Germany at the beginning of World War II , Kennan was assigned to Berlin. There, he endorsed the United States' Lend-Lease policy but warned against any notion of American endorsement of the Soviets, whom he considered unfit allies. He was interned in Germany for six months after Germany, followed by

1562-423: A larger readership than was typical for a classified document, with readers including ambassador to Cuba Henry Norweb , British diplomat Frank Roberts , General George C. Marshall and President Truman. The long telegram was quickly read and accepted by Washington bureaucrats as the best explanation of Soviet behavior. Policymakers, military officials and intelligence analysts generally came to understand that

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1704-414: A letter of February 4, writing, "I really can not write anything of value on Russia for publication under my own name. If you would be interested in an anonymous article, or one under a pen name,   ... I might be able to make the necessary arrangements." Armstrong replied on March 7, agreeing to Kennan's suggestion, writing that the "disadvantage of anonymity" was outweighed by the potential importance of

1846-745: A major 19th century expert on Imperial Russia and author of Siberia and the Exile System , a well-received 1891 account of the Czarist prison system. During the course of his diplomatic career, Kennan would master a number of other languages, including German, French, Polish, Czech, Portuguese, and Norwegian. In 1931 Kennan was stationed at the legation in Riga, Latvia , where, as third secretary , he worked on Soviet economic affairs. From his job, Kennan "grew to mature interest in Russian affairs". When

1988-504: A message before dictating a final version to his secretary, Dorothy Hessman, on February 22, 1946. Finishing late at night, he took the message to the Mokhovaya code room in Moscow and had it telegraphed back to Washington. The message was quickly dubbed the "long telegram" because, at a little over 5,000 words, it was the longest telegram sent in the history of the State Department. Identified as "511" by Kennan's State Department number,

2130-655: A more assertive and militaristic quality, causing Kennan to lament what he believed was an abrogation of his previous assessments. In 1950, Kennan left the State Department —except for a brief ambassadorial stint in Moscow and a longer one in Yugoslavia —and became a realist critic of U.S. foreign policy . He continued to analyze international affairs as a faculty member of the Institute for Advanced Study from 1956 until his death in 2005 at age 101. Kennan

2272-714: A mother. He was never close to his father or stepmother; however, he was close to his older sisters. At the age of eight, he went to Germany to stay with his stepmother in order to learn German. He attended St. John's Military Academy in Delafield , Wisconsin, and arrived at Princeton University in the second half of 1921. Unaccustomed to the elite atmosphere of the Ivy League , the shy and introverted Kennan found his undergraduate years difficult and lonely. After receiving his bachelor's degree in history in 1925, Kennan considered applying to law school, but decided it

2414-599: A policy of containment of Soviet expansion during the Cold War . He lectured widely and wrote scholarly histories of the relations between the USSR and the United States. He was also one of the group of foreign policy elders known as "The Wise Men". During the late 1940s, his writings confirmed the Truman Doctrine and inspired the U.S. foreign policy of containing the USSR. His " Long Telegram " from Moscow in 1946 and

2556-580: A policy of containing Soviet interests as the best response. Historian Louis Halle writes that the timing of the long telegram's appearance was important, "[coming] right at a time when the Department   ... was floundering about, looking for new intellectual moorings." He continues that the telegram served as "a new and realistic conception to which it might attach itself." Gaddis and historian Wilson D. Miscamble both believe that Halle overstates Kennan's impact on State Department thinking, emphasizing that

2698-498: A private meeting. Kennan's explanation that the article had been "cleared for publication by the competent official committee" satisfied Marshall, "[b]ut it was long, I suspect, before he recovered from his astonishment over the strange ways of the department he now headed." Political commentator Walter Lippmann responded to the article, published in the New York Herald Tribune across fourteen different columns,

2840-629: A reunified Germany would cause difficulties only for the Soviets. In May 1949, a distorted version of Plan A was leaked to the French press with the principal distortion being that the United States was willing to pull out of all of Europe in exchange for a reunified and neutral Germany. In the ensuing uproar, Acheson disallowed Plan A. Kennan lost influence with Acheson, who in any case relied much less on his staff than Marshall had. Kennan resigned as director of policy planning in December 1949 but stayed in

2982-405: A rush for copies of Foreign Affairs . He had not identified Kennan as "X" in his column, but proved responsible for revealing Kennan's identity; Forrestal had let Krock see the draft copy sent to Foreign Affairs which still contained Kennan's name at its end. Other diplomats suspected Kennan's authorship due to the piece's distinct prose as well as the quoting of Edward Gibbon. As the rumor spread,

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3124-586: A system of alliances. Kennan argued in a paper that the mainland of Asia be excluded from the "containment" policies, writing that the United States was "greatly overextended in its whole thinking about what we can accomplish and should try to accomplish" in Asia. Instead, he argued that Japan and the Philippines should serve as the "cornerstone of a Pacific security system". Acheson approved Program A shortly after he took up office as Secretary of State, writing in

3266-568: A university for graduate studies. Instead, he was selected for a linguist training program that would give him three years of graduate-level study without having to quit the service. In 1929, Kennan began his program in history, politics, culture, and the Russian language at the Oriental Institute of the University of Berlin . In doing so, he followed in the footsteps of his grandfather's younger cousin, George Kennan (1845–1924),

3408-670: The Azores . In January 1944, he was sent to London, where he served as counselor of the American delegation to the European Advisory Commission , which worked to prepare Allied policy in Europe. There, Kennan became even more disenchanted with the State Department, which he believed was ignoring his qualifications as a trained specialist. However, within months of beginning the job, he was appointed deputy chief of

3550-678: The Harold Pratt House in New York City . The theme of the meeting was "Soviet Foreign Relations", presented to a small group and designated as " not for attribution ". Kennan did not prepare a written speech, having given dozens of similar talks in the years before. In his talk, he discussed the Soviet leaders' perspectives on the rest of the world, rooted in both their Marxist-Leninist ideology and Russian history. The Soviets justified their dictatorship by pointing to external enemies, most of which were imaginary. For change to occur,

3692-639: The Marshall Plan . Soon after his concepts had become U.S. policy, Kennan began to criticize the foreign policies that he had helped articulate. By late 1948, Kennan became confident that the US could commence positive dialogue with the Soviet government. His proposals were dismissed by the Truman administration, and Kennan's influence waned, particularly after Dean Acheson was appointed Secretary of State in 1949. Soon thereafter, U.S. Cold War strategy assumed

3834-752: The NATO Council in Paris and later as a government adviser to the National War College and the Air University . Durbrow retired from his 38-year diplomatic career in 1968. He spent the next two decades writing and lecturing on foreign affairs . Throughout the 1970s, he served as the chairman of the American Foreign Policy Institute and as the director of the Center for International Strategic Studies and

3976-701: The United States Ambassador to South Vietnam . At the time, the US had a minor military and political presence in Vietnam to prevent communism from taking over the region. Durbrow had a difficult time in his ambassadorial role. He often had to work with the authoritarian regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and the corruption and ineffective policymaking that accompanied it. South Vietnamese officers, disgruntled with Diem's government, tried to persuade Durbrow into joining anti-Diem groups. Durbrow began to feel uneasy about Diem's authority, had to refuse because

4118-712: The University of Chicago , where he studied international economics and finance . Durbrow began his career in the US Foreign Service by serving as Vice Consul at the American embassy in Poland . He rose through the service's ranks over the next decade and served in Bucharest , Naples , Rome , Lisbon , and Moscow . In 1941, Durbrow became the assistant chief of the US State Department 's Eastern European affairs division. In 1944, Durbrow

4260-777: The Western world . From 1948 to 1950, he served as an adviser to the National War College in Washington, DC, and spent the next two years as director of the Foreign Service's personnel division. In 1952, he was sent to Italy , where he served as deputy chief of mission to the US ambassador to Italy, Clare Boothe Luce . Two years later, he was promoted to the diplomatic rank of career minister . On March 14, 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower named Durbrow as

4402-523: The World Bank . Kennan responded on February 22, 1946, by sending a lengthy 5,363-word telegram (sometimes cited as being more than 8,000 words), commonly called " The Long Telegram ", from Moscow to Secretary of State James Byrnes outlining a new strategy for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The ideas Kennan expressed in the Long Telegram were not new but the argument he made and

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4544-455: The " long telegram " for its size. Kennan composed the long telegram in response to inquiries about the implications of a February 1946 speech by Joseph Stalin . Though the speech was in line with previous statements by Stalin, it provoked fear in the American press and public; Time magazine called it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day ". The long telegram explained Soviet motivations by recounting

4686-585: The "China card" strategy, Kennan argued that the United States should work to divide the Sino-Soviet bloc which had the potential to dominate Eurasia, and to this end should give China's seat on the UN Security Council to the People's Republic of China. In the atmosphere of rage and fury caused by the "loss of China" in 1950, it was politically impossible for the Truman administration to recognize

4828-569: The "X" article in an The New York Times column of July 8. Krock suggested that the main thrust of "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" was "exactly that adopted by the American government after appeasement of the Kremlin proved a failure", and wrote that the piece's author had clearly studied the Soviet Union "at the closest range possible for a foreigner". Krock concludes that the author's views "closely resemble those marked 'Top Secret' in several official files in Washington." Krock's column resulted in

4970-655: The "conspicuous but misleading 'X' article". In the article, Kennan uses the term "counterforce" rather than "counter-pressure" and does not explain its meaning, something he admitted in his memoirs led to confusion for readers. Kennan reassessed his views on perimeter defense after the article was published, instead shifting to the idea of "strongpoint defense", in which defense was instead focused on particular areas. Kennan recalled in his memoirs that his "entire diplomatic experience took place in rather high northern latitudes". Thomas Borstelmann writes that Kennan's few experiences outside of Europe contributed to his detestation of

5112-523: The "long telegram" The Soviet leaders reached these illogical sentiments, he explained, because "...   at the bottom of the Kremlin 's view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity." The authority of previous Russian rulers was "archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries". This understanding of Russian history

5254-422: The "long telegram," Kennan's well-timed article appearing in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs under the pseudonym "X", titled " The Sources of Soviet Conduct ", did not begin by emphasizing "traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity"; instead, it asserted that Stalin's policy was shaped by a combination of Marxist–Leninist ideology, which advocated revolution to defeat the capitalist forces in

5396-719: The 38th parallel into North Korea, an act that Kennan considered dangerous, he engaged in intense arguments with Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East Dean Rusk , who apparently endorsed Acheson's goal to forcibly unite the Koreas. On 21 August 1950, Kennan submitted a long memo to John Foster Dulles who at the time was engaged in working on the U.S-Japanese peace treaty in which he went beyond American-Japanese relations to offer an outline of his thinking about Asia in general. He called U.S. policy thinking about Asia as "little promising" and "fraught with danger". About

5538-407: The Department was already moving towards a more adversarial position against the Soviets, though Miscamble concedes, "there can be no doubt that Kennan's cable exercised a catalytic effect upon departmental thinking especially as regards the possibility of the United States achieving any non-adversary relationship with the Soviet Union." If none of my previous literary efforts had seemed to evoke even

5680-548: The Far East. Though the long telegram was a classified document, it circulated widely enough that a copy leaked out to Soviet intelligence. Stalin was among its readers and called on his American ambassador , Nikolai Novikov , to send a similar telegram from Washington to Moscow . Ghostwritten by Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov , the piece was sent on September 27, 1946. Representative of Stalin's opinions, Novikov's telegram argued in part: "The foreign policy of

5822-483: The Greek elite. Kennan supported France's war to regain control of Vietnam as he argued that control of Southeast Asia with its raw materials was critical to the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan, but by 1949, he changed his views, becoming convinced that the French would never defeat the Communist Viet Minh guerrillas. In 1949, Kennan suggested what became known as "Program A" or "Plan A" for

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5964-448: The Greek government fighting a civil war against Communist guerrillas, though he argued against military aid. The historian John Iatrides argued that Kennan's claim that the Soviet Union would go to war if the United States gave military aid to Greece is hard to square with his claim that the Soviet Union was too weak to risk war, and the real reason for his opposition to military aid was that he did not regard Greece as very important. As

6106-752: The Korean War, Kennan wrote that American policies were based upon what he called "emotional, moralistic attitudes" which "unless corrected, can easily carry us toward real conflict with the Russians and inhibit us from making a realistic agreement about that area". He supported the decision to intervene in Korea, but wrote that "it is not essential to us to see an anti-Soviet Korean regime extended to all of Korea." Kennan expressed much fear about what General Douglas MacArthur might do, saying he had "wide and relatively uncontrolled latitude...in determining our policy in

6248-516: The People's Republic of China. The " Loss of China ", as it has become known in the United States, prompted a fierce right-wing backlash led by Republican politicians such as Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy , who used the "loss of China" as a convenient club with which to beat the Democratic Truman administration. Truman, Acheson, and other high officials such as Kennan were all accused of being criminally negligent at best in permitting

6390-407: The Russians were not "westernized" but instead "17th century semi-Asiatic people". Borstelmann further writes that Kennan's perspectives on race were not unique to him but were instead common in his contemporary American policymaking circles. George F. Kennan George Frost Kennan (February 16, 1904 – March 17, 2005) was an American diplomat and historian. He was best known as an advocate of

6532-538: The Soviet Union must be a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.... Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the Western world is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and manœuvres of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence. The goal of his policy

6674-482: The Soviet Union's primary foreign policy goal was world domination under a Communist state. Historian John Lewis Gaddis writes that the ultimate impact of the long telegram is that it "became the basis for United States strategy toward the Soviet Union throughout the rest of the Cold War", and that it "won [Kennan] the reputation of being the government's foremost Soviet expert". In 1967, Kennan reflected "My reputation

6816-493: The Soviet Union, who defended the Great Purge and other aspects of Stalin's rule. Kennan did not have any influence on Davies' decisions, and Davies himself even suggested that Kennan be transferred out of Moscow for "his health". Kennan again contemplated resigning from the service, but instead decided to accept the Russian desk at the State Department in Washington. A man with a high opinion of himself, Kennan began writing

6958-638: The Soviet Union. More important, Plan A required the approval of the British and French governments, but neither was in favor of Program A, complaining it was far too early to end the occupation of Germany. Both public opinion in Britain and even more so in France were afraid of what might happen if the Allies loosened their control over Germany just four years after the end of World War II, and for reasons of geography and history, did not share Kennan's assurance that

7100-421: The Soviet party structure would undergo a period of immense strain eventually resulting in "either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power." The publication of the "X" article soon began one of the more intense debates of the Cold War. Walter Lippmann , a leading American commentator on international affairs, strongly criticized the "X" article. Lippmann argued that Kennan's strategy of containment

7242-500: The Soviets as primarily a military threat, noting that "they were not like Hitler ." Kennan's opinion was that this misunderstanding all came down to one sentence in the "X" article where I said that wherever these people, meaning the Soviet leadership, confronted us with dangerous hostility anywhere in the world, we should do everything possible to contain it and not let them expand any further. I should have explained that I didn't suspect them of any desire to launch an attack on us. This

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7384-705: The State Department as one of the government's foremost Soviet experts. After hearing Kennan speak about Soviet foreign relations at the Council on Foreign Relations in January 1947, international banker R. Gordon Wasson suggested that he share his views in an article for Foreign Affairs . Kennan revised a piece he had submitted to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal in late January 1947, but his role in government precluded him from publishing under his name. His superiors granted him approval to publish

7526-494: The State Department offered no comment. The Daily Worker , the newspaper of the Communist Party of the United States , broke the story on Kennan's identity, with a headline on July 9 that read: " 'X' Bared as State Dep't Aid [ sic ]: Calls for Overthrow of Soviet Government". Kennan's role in the State Department lent the article the authority of an official policy declaration. Though he had not intended

7668-468: The State Department's Committee on Unofficial Publications. Kennan made several minor corrections to the piece, along with scratching his name out and writing "X" in its place. He added a note on authorship, writing: "The author of this article is one who has had long experience with Russian affairs, both practically and academically, but whose position makes it impossible for him to write about them under his own name." Armstrong published Kennan's piece under

7810-465: The Truman Doctrine, which Lippmann opposed. Kennan's article was completed in late January 1947 and Truman announced his Doctrine in a March 12, 1947 speech. Despite this chronology, Gaddis writes: "there is no evidence that it influenced the drafting of that address and abundant evidence that Kennan had sought to remove the language in it to which Lippmann later objected." For Lippmann, however,

7952-686: The Truman administration's policy of supporting France in Vietnam , writing that the French were fighting a "hopeless" war, "which neither they nor we, nor both of us together, can win." About what he called the "rival Chinese regimes" (i.e. the People's Republic of China on the mainland and the Republic of China on Taiwan), Kennan predicated that the U.S. policy of supporting the Kuomintang government in Taiwan would "strengthen Peiping [Beijing]–Moscow solidarity rather than weaken it". Anticipating playing

8094-416: The U.S. began formal diplomacy with the Soviet government during 1933 after the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt , Kennan accompanied Ambassador William C. Bullitt to Moscow. By the mid-1930s, Kennan was among the professionally trained Russian experts of the staff of the United States Embassy in Moscow , along with Charles E. Bohlen and Loy W. Henderson . These officials had been influenced by

8236-404: The U.S. changed its hostility to Francisco Franco 's anti-communist regime in Spain in order to secure U.S. influence in the Mediterranean. Kennan had observed during 1947 that the Truman Doctrine implied a new consideration of Franco. His suggestion soon helped begin a new phase of U.S.–Spanish relations, which ended with military cooperation after 1950. Kennan played an important role in devising

8378-413: The US State Department as chargé d'affaires in Moscow, found the speech routine and reflective of previous statements from Stalin. With this in mind, he issued only a quick summary of the speech for the State Department. Despite the familiar statements from Stalin, the context in which they were made – including the Soviet Union's recent rejection of Bretton Woods and evidence of atomic espionage in

8520-473: The US government was still supported Diem. In 1960, Diem and his younger brother and chief political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu , accused Durbrow of supporting a failed coup attempt by paratroopers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam . Durbrow later recalled receiving a phone call from one of Diem's aides, who asked him to tell Diem to surrender or face a howitzer attack on the presidential palace. Durbrow refused, and no attack occurred. He later learned that

8662-506: The USSR. His appointment was endorsed strongly by the Senate. In many respects (to Kennan's consternation) the priorities of the administration emphasized creating alliances against the Soviets more than negotiating differences with them. In his memoirs, Kennan recalled, "So far as I could see, we were expecting to be able to gain our objectives  ... without making any concessions though, only 'if we were really all-powerful, and could hope to get away with it.' I very much doubted that this

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8804-417: The United States "to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world." Containment would prove its success in the long-term because the Soviet economy was rudimentary and the government leadership lacked procedures for orderly succession. Any disruption in Soviet politics held the possibility of "[changing

8946-403: The United States and Canada – alarmed officials in Washington. In a 1982 interview, former diplomat Elbridge Durbrow expressed that Stalin's speech had in effect said, "to hell with the rest of the world." US President Harry Truman was confused by the Soviet's policies, at times appearing belligerent and at others exercising self-restraint. Leaders were increasingly coming to the conclusion that

9088-490: The United States and Great Britain was destined to fail, and would either lead to war between them or a joint attack on the Soviet Union. The Soviets believed they would ultimately prevail in such a conflict, but would need to grow their strength and exploit the capitalists' tendency towards conflict amongst one another in the meantime. Kennan described these ideas as absurd, pointing out that capitalist countries were not failing and were not always in conflict. Further, he described

9230-468: The United States and its allies would need to "contain" the Soviets in a "non-provocative way". International banker R. Gordon Wasson attended the discussion and was impressed by Kennan, suggesting that the Council revise the talk for publication in their journal Foreign Affairs . Journal editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong had not attended the discussion but requested on January 10 that Kennan revise his talk into an article. Kennan responded to Armstrong in

9372-492: The United States need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a great nation. Surely, there was never a fairer test of national quality than this." Armstrong wrote to Kennan in May 1947: "It's a pleasure for an editor to deal with something that needs practically no revision.   ... I only wish for your sake as well as for ours that it could carry your name." The long delay between its writing and publication – some five months – meant

9514-455: The United States reflects the imperialistic tendencies of American monopolistic capitalism, [and] is characterized   ... by a striving for world supremacy." America would attempt to achieve supremacy by cooperating with Great Britain, but their cooperation was "plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting   ... It is quite possible that the Near East will become a center of Anglo-American contradictions that will explode

9656-412: The United States to do likewise, but as the Americans lacked bases in other Western European nations, this would hand the advantage to the Soviets. Finally, Kennan argued that the German people were very proud and would not stand having their nation occupied by foreigners forever, making a solution to the "German question" imperative. Kennan's solution was for the reunification and neutralization of Germany;

9798-536: The United States was initiating the Marshall Plan, Kennan and the Truman administration hoped that the Soviet Union's rejection of Marshall aid would strain its relations with its Communist allies in Eastern Europe. Kennan initiated a series of efforts to exploit the schism between the Soviets and Josip Broz Tito 's Yugoslavia. Kennan proposed conducting covert action in the Balkans to further decrease Moscow's influence. The administration's new vigorously anti-Soviet policy also became evident when, at Kennan's suggestion,

9940-414: The agreements now reached between the United States and England." Kennan provided commentary on Novikov's telegram in a 1991 piece for the journal Diplomatic History . He wrote in part, "These poor people, put on the spot, produced the thing," but "it was only a way of saying to their masters in Moscow: 'How true, sir! ' ". On January 7, 1947, Kennan spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations , based at

10082-400: The aide had been forced to make the call. In April 1961, President John F. Kennedy formed a committee to assess the political, military, and socioeconomic situation in Vietnam, in the hope of determining what it would take to keep Communism out of South Vietnam. On April 16, Kennedy replaced Durbrow with Frederick Nolting , who supported appeasement. Later, Durbrow served as a delegate to

10224-764: The ailing George Marshall during 1949 and 1950. Acheson did not regard the Soviet "threat" as chiefly political, and he saw the Berlin Blockade starting in June 1948, the first Soviet test of a nuclear weapon in August 1949, the Communist revolution in China a month later, and the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950, as evidence. Truman and Acheson decided to delineate the Western sphere of influence and to create

10366-415: The article to be a comprehensive statement on American foreign policy, a piece in the 21 July issue of Newsweek explained that the "X" article provided a rationale for both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and "[charted] the course that this country is likely to pursue for years to come." Marshall, concerned by the amount of attention both Kennan and the article were drawing, spoke with Kennan in

10508-399: The article. Taking time off from the State Department, Kennan worked as a lecturer at the National War College . His work left him little time to write a new essay, so he searched for previous work to repurpose. In January 1946, Forrestal had asked Kennan for an analysis of a piece by Smith College professor Edward F. Willett entitled "Dialectical Materialism And Russian Objectives". Kennan

10650-402: The assumption of Soviet menace implied by NSC   68. Kennan opposed the building of the hydrogen bomb and the rearmament of Germany, which were policies encouraged by the assumptions of NSC   68. During the Korean War (which began when North Korea invaded South Korea in June 1950), when rumors started circulating in the State Department that plans were being made to advance beyond

10792-461: The basin of world power." To oppose them, the United States would need long-term strategies to contain Soviet expansionary ambitions. Containment against the Soviets, Kennan explains, would require an application of "counter-force" along shifting points of geographical and political interests. This "perimeter defense" concept, in which all geographic areas were considered of equal importance, required

10934-478: The capitalist nations as much as possible, including efforts to "disrupt national self confidence, to hamstring measures of national defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, to stimulate all forms of disunity." He opined that the Soviets ultimately have no expectation of reconciliation with the West. Kennan concluded not by offering specific courses of action, but instead offered more general solutions, such as

11076-431: The chief agent of containment. "My thoughts about containment," said Kennan in a 1996 interview to CNN , "were of course distorted by the people who understood it and pursued it exclusively as a military concept; and I think that that, as much as any other cause, led to [the] 40 years of unnecessary, fearfully expensive and disoriented process of the Cold War". Additionally, the administration made few attempts to explain

11218-639: The climate of hysteria caused by the "loss of China" was enough to lead the FBI to begin investigating him as a Soviet spy. Speaking of the Paton Davies case, Kennan warned that "We have no protection against this happening again", leading him to wonder what diplomat would be investigated next for treason. Kennan found the atmosphere of hysteria, which was labeled as "McCarthyism" in March 1950 by cartoonist Herbert Block, to be deeply uncomfortable. Acheson's policy

11360-404: The contumacy" which they had provoked. In order to maintain power, the Soviet leaders would need to maintain the illusion of external threats: ...   the [Soviet] leadership is at liberty to put forward for tactical purposes any particular thesis which it finds useful to the cause at any particular moment and to require the faithful and unquestioning acceptance of that thesis by the members of

11502-563: The department as counselor until June 1950. In January 1950, Acheson replaced Kennan with Nitze, who was much more comfortable with the calculus of military power. Afterwards, Kennan accepted an appointment as Visitor to the Institute for Advanced Study from fellow moderate Robert Oppenheimer , director of the institute. In October 1949, the Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong won the Chinese Civil War and proclaimed

11644-459: The distinction between Soviet influence and international Communism to the U.S. public. "In part, this failure reflected the belief of many in Washington," writes historian John Lewis Gaddis , "that only the prospect of an undifferentiated global threat could shake Americans out of their isolationist tendencies that remained latent among them." In a PBS television interview with David Gergen in 1996, Kennan again reiterated that he did not regard

11786-467: The doctrine's policy. Retrospective commentators dispute the impact of the article; Henry Kissinger referred to it as "the diplomatic doctrine of the era", but some historians write that its impact in shaping governmental policy has been overstated. Joseph Stalin , General Secretary and de facto leader of the Soviet Union , spoke at the Bolshoi Theatre on February 9, 1946, the night before

11928-609: The drafting of the Marshall Plan. Although Kennan regarded the Soviet Union as too weak to risk war, he nonetheless considered it an enemy capable of expanding into Western Europe through subversion, given the popular support for Communist parties in Western Europe, which remained demoralized by the devastation of the Second World War. To counter this potential source of Soviet influence, Kennan's solution

12070-408: The existing quid pro quo strategy was ineffective against the Soviets, but had no replacement strategy. Durbrow and another diplomat, H. Freeman Matthews – both readers of Kennan's earlier telegrams – were confused by Kennan's relative silence about the speech. On 13 February, Matthews drafted a message, signed by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes , asking for an analysis. The message described

12212-425: The faintest tinkle from the bell at which they were aimed, this one, to my astonishment, struck it squarely and set it vibrating with a resonance that was not to die down for many months. – Kennan reflecting on the long telegram, 1967 Offering a different perspective, Matthews notes in a letter of March 12, 1946, that the administration had already moved in the direction of not catering to Soviet interests before

12354-477: The final draft of the piece until 11 April – a month after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine – he did not revise it, despite having disagreements with sections of the Doctrine. Kennan's position in the State Department made him hesitant to offer any public clarification, and he would not respond until the publication of the first volume of his memoirs in 1967. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" widely introduced

12496-507: The first deputy for foreign affairs at the National War College and then strongly influenced his decision to publish the "X" article . Meanwhile, in March 1947, Truman appeared before Congress to request funding for the Truman Doctrine to fight Communism in Greece. "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Unlike

12638-405: The first draft of his memoirs at the age of 34 when he was still a relatively junior diplomat. In a letter to his sister Jeannette in 1935, Kennan expressed his disenchantment with American life, writing: “I hate the rough and tumble of our political life. I hate democracy; I hate the press... I hate the ‘peepul’; I have become clearly un-American". By September 1938, Kennan had been reassigned to

12780-403: The first few months of hostilities between the United States and Germany. While his statement was not unfounded, the Soviets interpreted it as an implied analogy with Nazi Germany . The Soviets then declared Kennan persona non grata and refused to allow him to re-enter the USSR. Kennan acknowledged retrospectively that it was a "foolish thing for me to have said". Kennan was very critical of

12922-472: The first which appeared on September 2, 1947. Lippmann's analysis was widely read and collected in his 1947 book, The Cold War . Lippmann critiqued the article as having presented a "strategic monstrosity", providing the Soviets with the initiative in any conflict, resulting in the United States depending on "a coalition of disorganized, disunited, feeble or disorderly nations, tribes and factions." Lippmann incorrectly concluded that Kennan's article had inspired

13064-494: The government in Beijing, and giving China's United Nations seat to the People's Republic was the closest the United States could go in building a relationship with the new government. About the ostensible subject of his paper, Kennan called Japan the "most important single factor in Asia". Kennan advocated a deal with the Soviet Union where in exchange for ending the Korean War the United States would ensure that Japan would remain

13206-436: The history of Russian rulers as well as the ideology of Marxism–Leninism . It argued that the Soviet leaders used the ideology to characterize the external world as hostile, allowing them to justify their continued hold on power despite a lack of popular support. Washington bureaucrats quickly read the confidential message and accepted it as the best explanation of Soviet behavior. The reception elevated Kennan's reputation within

13348-454: The idea that the United States and Great Britain would deliberately enter into a war against the Soviets as the "sheerest nonsense". Soviet policy will really be dominated by [the] pursuit of autarchy for [the] Soviet Union and Soviet-dominated adjacent areas taken together.   ... [The Soviets are likely to turn] a cold official shoulder   ... to the principle of general economic collaboration among nations. – George F. Kennan ,

13490-420: The long telegram, pointing to a speech Byrnes delivered on 28 February, drafted before Byrnes had read Kennan's message. In the speech, Byrnes explains: "We will not and we cannot stand aloof if force or threat is used contrary to the purposes of the [ United Nations ] Charter.   ... If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve

13632-484: The long-time director of the State Department's division of East European Affairs, Robert F. Kelley . They believed that there was little basis for cooperation with the Soviet Union, even against potential adversaries. Meanwhile, Kennan studied Stalin's Great Purge , which would affect his opinion of the internal dynamics of the Soviet regime for the rest of his life. Kennan found himself in strong disagreement with Joseph E. Davies , Bullitt's successor as ambassador to

13774-465: The margin of Kennan's paper that the "division of Germany was not an end onto itself". However, Plan A encountered massive objections from the Pentagon, who saw it as abandoning West Germany to the Soviet Union, and from within the State Department, with the diplomat Robert Murphy arguing that the mere existence of a prosperous and democratic West Germany would be destabilizing to East Germany, and hence

13916-443: The message is divided into five sections, covering the Soviet Union's background, current features, future prospects and the implications these would have for the United States. It opens with an apology for its length but qualifies the necessity of responding to all the then pressing concerns at once. Kennan begins by laying out the world from the Soviet perspective, splitting it into socialist and capitalist sectors. The alliance between

14058-430: The mission in Moscow upon request of W. Averell Harriman , the ambassador to the USSR. In Moscow, Kennan again felt that his opinions were being ignored by President Truman and policymakers in Washington. Kennan tried repeatedly to persuade policymakers to abandon plans for cooperation with the Soviet government in favor of a sphere of influence policy in Europe to reduce the Soviets' power there. Kennan believed that

14200-429: The movement as a whole. This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. The Soviets, however, were not prepared to attempt an immediate overthrow of the West, it being implicit in their ideology that capitalism would inevitably fail. They would instead turn their focus to the long-term goal of "[filling] every nook and cranny available to it in

14342-691: The necessity of maintaining courage and self-confidence in interactions with the Soviets. Managing the threat would require "the same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort". He wrote that, compared to Nazi Germany , the Soviets are much more patient and often risk averse. Russia's being weaker than the West, not having regular procedures for replacing leaders, having absorbed too many territories, failing to inspire its people, and being overly reliant on negative propaganda, meant that "we may approach calmly and with good heart [the] problem of how to deal with Russia." Kennan emphasized

14484-519: The need of educating the American public about the threat of international communism. Keeping Western society strong was important to ward off the expansive tendencies of communism: "The greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping." Matthews sent Kennan a cable praising the telegram, describing it as "magnificent", adding, "I cannot overestimate its importance to those of us here struggling with

14626-472: The north Asian and western Pacific areas", which Kennan viewed as a problem as he felt MacArthur's judgement was poor. Kennan's 1951 book American Diplomacy, 1900–1950 , strongly criticized American foreign policy of the last 50 years. He warned against U.S. participation and reliance on multilateral, legalistic and moralistic organizations such as the United Nations. Despite his influence, Kennan

14768-800: The other Axis states , declared war on the United States in December 1941. In September 1942 Kennan was assigned to the legation in Lisbon , Portugal, where he begrudgingly performed a job administering intelligence and base operations. In July 1943 Bert Fish , the American Ambassador in Lisbon, suddenly died, and Kennan became chargé d'affaires and the head of the American Embassy in Portugal. While in Lisbon Kennan played

14910-403: The outside world and Stalin's determination to use the notion of "capitalist encirclement" in order to legitimize his regimentation of Soviet society so that he could consolidate his political power. Kennan argued that Stalin would not (and moreover could not) moderate the supposed Soviet determination to overthrow Western governments. Thus: ... the main element of any United States policy toward

15052-571: The peace of the world." Matthews explains that long telegram would instead serve as the administration's rationale for subsequent actions. Historian Melvyn P. Leffler points out that before the long telegram had circulated widely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had already resolved in February 1946 that "collaboration with the Soviet Union should stop short not only of compromise of principle but also of expansion of Russian influence in Europe and in

15194-623: The people of Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America: "He tended to lump them together as impulsive, fanatical, ignorant, lazy, unhappy, and prone to mental disorders and other biological deficiencies." In the first of his memoirs, published in 1967, Kennan links Soviet despotism to its leaders "attitude of Oriental secretiveness and conspiracy". In a 1942 lecture, he explained that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 revealed

15336-603: The piece did not discuss either of the recent communist uprisings in Greece and Turkey , nor did it mention the Truman Doctrine . The piece was due for inclusion in Foreign Affairs ' next issue, July 1947. With a little over 19,000 subscribers and an expensive cover price for the time of $ 1.25 (equivalent to $ 17 in 2023), the magazine did not circulate widely. The July issue did not deviate from regular buying trends, until journalist Arthur Krock drew attention to

15478-437: The piece provided it was released anonymously; Foreign Affairs attributed the article only to "X". Expressing similar sentiments to that of the long telegram, the piece was strong in its anti-communism , introducing and outlining a basic theory of containment. The article was widely read; though it does not mention the Truman Doctrine , having mostly been written before Truman's speech, it quickly became seen as an expression of

15620-428: The piece was "not only an analytical interpretation of the sources of Soviet conduct. It is also a document of primary importance on the sources of American foreign policy – of at least that part of it which is known as the Truman Doctrine." Because of the rushed nature in which Kennan had written the article, he regretted some views expressed within and agreed with some of Lippmann's critiques. Though Kennan did not send

15762-413: The plans for American economic aid to Greece, insisting upon a capitalist mode of development and upon economic integration with the rest of Europe. In the case of Greece, most of the Marshall Plan aid went towards rebuilding a war-devastated country that was already very poor even before World War II. Though Marshall Plan aid to Greece was successful in building or rebuilding ports, railroads, paved roads,

15904-443: The press and public's reaction having been, "to a degree not hitherto felt", and expressed: "We should welcome receiving from you an interpretive analysis of what we may expect in the way of future implementation of these announced policies." W. Averell Harriman , having recently returned from his ambassadorship to the Soviet Union , spoke to Kennan and encouraged him to write a thorough analysis. Kennan probably wrote rough drafts of

16046-418: The problem." Byrnes praised it as well, writing he had read it "with the greatest interest" and describing it as "a splendid analysis". Harriman was less enthused, calling it "fairly long, and a little bit slow reading in spots." He nonetheless sent a copy to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal . Forrestal was largely responsible for the spread of the long telegram, sending copies across Washington. It gained

16188-490: The reunification of Germany, stating the partition of Germany was unsustainable in the long run. Kennan argued that the American people would sooner or later grow tired of occupying their zone in Germany and would inevitably demand the pull-out of U.S. troops. Or alternatively Kennan predicted the Soviets would pull their forces out of East Germany, knowing full well that they could easily return from their bases in Poland, forcing

16330-488: The sprouting of these seeds is well advanced. – "X" (Kennan), The Sources of Soviet Conduct , Section III The end result of containment would allow for "either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power". The indefinite frustration the Soviets were bound to face would necessitate their adjustment to the reality of their situation. The strategy would require the United States to manage its own issues successfully, with Kennan concluding that: "To avoid destruction

16472-426: The state] overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies." Containment was particularly suited for use against the Soviets, Kennan thought, because of their Marxist-Leninist ideology, which encourages a patience not evident with leaders like Napoleon or Adolf Hitler . He continues: "...   the Kremlin is under no ideological compulsion to accomplish its purposes in

16614-476: The subsequent 1947 article " The Sources of Soviet Conduct " argued that the Soviet regime was inherently expansionist and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to the United States. These texts provided justification for the Truman administration 's new anti-Soviet policy. Kennan played a major role in the development of definitive Cold War programs and institutions, notably

16756-469: The supposed loss. One of Kennan's closest friends, the diplomat John Paton Davies Jr. found himself under investigation in November 1949 as a Soviet spy for his role in the process, an allegation that would destroy his career and which horrified Kennan. What especially disturbed Kennan was that Paton Davies was accused of treason for predicting in a report that Mao would win the Chinese Civil War, which in

16898-491: The symbolic 1946 Supreme Soviet election . The speech did not discuss foreign policy, but instead made pledges to expand industry. He justified the expansion by pointing to Marxist–Leninist theory, warning that capitalism possessed a predisposition towards conflict. Stalin's speech provoked fear in the American press and public, with Time magazine calling it "the most warlike pronouncement uttered by any top-rank statesman since V-J Day ." George F. Kennan , then working for

17040-505: The term "containment". Reflecting on the article in his 1979 memoir, Henry Kissinger writes, "George Kennan came as close to authoring the diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history." Gaddis writes that Kennan's silence in the face of Lippmann's critiques resulted in the idea of containment becoming "synonymous, in the minds of most people who knew the phrase, with Truman's doctrine". Gaddis further writes that some have misinterpreted Kennan's views by placing undue emphasis on

17182-408: The title "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", removing Kennan's note and leaving only the "X" as an identifier. ...   it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. – "X" (Kennan), The Sources of Soviet Conduct , Section II Kennan's piece opens with

17324-544: The vivid language he used in making it came at an opportune moment. At the "bottom of the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity". After the Russian Revolution, this sense of insecurity became mixed with communist ideology and "Oriental secretiveness and conspiracy". Soviet international behavior depended mainly on the internal necessities of Joseph Stalin 's regime; according to Kennan, Stalin needed

17466-470: The withdrawal of most of the British, American, French and Soviet forces from Germany with the exception of small enclaves near the border that would be supplied by sea; and a four-power commission from the four occupying powers that would have the ultimate say while allowing the Germans to mostly govern themselves. Kennan's influence rapidly decreased when Dean Acheson became Secretary of State, succeeding

17608-497: The words of his later 'X' article, was that Soviet pressure had to "be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points". The long telegram dispatch brought Kennan to the attention of Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal , a major advocate of a confrontational policy with regard to the Soviets, the United States' former wartime ally. Forrestal helped bring Kennan back to Washington, where he served as

17750-409: Was "a strategic monstrosity" that could "be implemented only by recruiting, subsidizing, and supporting a heterogeneous array of satellites, clients, dependents, and puppets". Lippmann argued that diplomacy should be the basis of relations with the Soviets; he suggested that the U.S. withdraw its forces from Europe and reunify and demilitarize Germany. Meanwhile, it was soon revealed informally that "X"

17892-484: Was Secretary of State, Kennan was more influential than he was at any other period in his career. Marshall valued his strategic sense and had him create and direct what is now named the Policy Planning Staff , the State Department's internal think tank. Kennan became the first Director of Policy Planning . Marshall relied heavily on him to prepare policy recommendations. Kennan played a central role in

18034-864: Was appointed as the chief of the Eastern European division of the State Department in Washington, DC . That year, he was also one of the American delegates at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference , which set up the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development , the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Bretton Woods system of money management. After World War II , Durbrow

18176-613: Was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin , to Kossuth Kent Kennan, a lawyer specializing in tax law, and Florence James Kennan. His father was a descendant of impoverished Scots-Irish settlers from 18th-century Connecticut and Massachusetts , and had been named after the Hungarian patriot Lajos Kossuth (1802–94). His mother died two months later due to peritonitis from a ruptured appendix, though Kennan long believed that she died after giving birth to him. The boy always lamented not having

18318-586: Was indeed Kennan. This information seemed to give the "X" article the status of an official document expressing the Truman administration's new policy toward Moscow. Kennan had not intended the "X" article as a prescription for policy. For the rest of his life, Kennan continued to reiterate that the article did not imply an automatic commitment to resist Soviet "expansionism" wherever it occurred, with little distinction of primary and secondary interests. The article did not make it obvious that Kennan favored employing political and economic rather than military methods as

18460-412: Was joined with the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Their obstinacy in dealing with the West was born out of necessity; seeing the rest of the world as hostile provided an excuse "for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for sacrifices they felt bound to demand". Until the Soviet Union either experienced consistent failures or their leader

18602-416: Was made. My voice now carried." In mid-April 1946, at Forrestal's insistence, Kennan received an appointment in the National War College as Deputy for Foreign Affairs. The Truman administration quickly accepted Kennan's conclusion that the Soviets had no reasonable grievances with the West and would never cooperate with capitalist states. It was therefore senseless to try and address Soviet concerns, leaving

18744-407: Was never really comfortable in government. He always regarded himself as an outsider and had little patience with critics. W. Averell Harriman , the U.S. ambassador in Moscow when Kennan was deputy between 1944 and 1946, remarked that Kennan was "a man who understood Russia but not the United States". In December 1951, President Truman nominated Kennan to be the next United States ambassador to

18886-425: Was persuaded that they were negatively affecting their nation's interest, the West could not expect any reciprocity from the Soviets. The Soviet government, Kennan continued, could be understood as occupying two distinct spaces: an official, visible government, and another operating without any official acknowledgement. While the former would participate in international diplomacy, the latter would attempt to undermine

19028-914: Was realized as NSC 68 , a classified report issued by the United States National Security Council in April 1950 and written by Paul Nitze , Kennan's successor as Director of Policy Planning. Kennan and Charles Bohlen , another State Department expert on Russia, argued about the wording of NSC   68, which became the basis of Cold War policy. Kennan rejected the idea that Stalin had a grand design for world conquest implicit in Nitze's report and argued that he actually feared overextending Russian power. Kennan even argued that NSC   68 should not have been drafted at all, as it would make U.S. policies too rigid, simplistic, and militaristic. Acheson overruled Kennan and Bohlen, endorsing

19170-459: Was right after the war, and it was absurd to suppose that they were going to turn around and attack the United States. I didn't think I needed to explain that, but I obviously should have done it. The "X" article meant sudden fame for Kennan. After the long telegram, he recalled later, "My official loneliness came in fact to an end  ... My reputation was made. My voice now carried." Between April 1947 and December 1948, when George C. Marshall

19312-447: Was the case." At Moscow, Kennan found the atmosphere even more regimented than on his previous trips, with police guards following him everywhere, discouraging contact with Soviet citizens. At the time, Soviet propaganda charged the U.S. with preparing for war, which Kennan did not wholly dismiss. "I began to ask myself whether  ... we had not contributed  ... by the overmilitarization of our policies and statements  ... to

19454-517: Was to direct economic aid and covert political help to Japan and Western Europe to revive Western governments and assist international capitalism; by doing so, the United States would help to rebuild the balance of power. In June 1948, Kennan proposed covert assistance to left-wing parties not oriented toward Moscow and to labor unions in Western Europe in order to engineer a rift between Moscow and working-class movements in Western Europe. In 1947, Kennan supported Truman's decision to extend economic aid to

19596-405: Was to strengthen Western institutions in order to render them invulnerable to the Soviet challenge while awaiting the mellowing of the Soviet regime. Using propaganda and culture was vital to Kennan, it was important that America presented itself correctly to foreign audiences and the Soviets would limit the cultural cross contamination of America and USSR. Kennan's new policy of containment , in

19738-550: Was to withdraw all U.S. forces from Europe. "The settlement reached would give the Kremlin sufficient reassurance against the establishment of regimes in Eastern Europe hostile to the Soviet Union, tempering the degree of control over that area that the Soviet leaders felt it necessary to exercise". Kennan further argued that the United States would have to perform this containment alone, but if it could do so without undermining its own economic health and political stability,

19880-605: Was too expensive and instead opted to apply to the newly formed United States Foreign Service . He passed the qualifying examination and after seven months of study at the Foreign Service School in Washington, he obtained his first job as a vice consul in Geneva , Switzerland . Within a year, he was transferred to a post in Hamburg , Germany . In 1928, Kennan considered quitting the Foreign Service to return to

20022-556: Was unimpressed with the work, but decided that rather than denigrating the piece he would instead publish a new analysis. The paper, titled "Psychological Background of Soviet Foreign Policy", was around six thousand words. In late January 1946 he sent it to Forrestal, who described it as "extremely well-done" before sending it on to General Marshall. In a letter of March 10 to John T. Connor , an aide of Forrestal, Kennan inquired as to whether it would be appropriate to publish this piece anonymously in Foreign Affairs . Forrestal agreed, as did

20164-673: Was vocal in his opposition for the diplomatic recognition of new governments in Hungary , Romania , and Bulgaria because of their communist origins. In 1946, he left that position to succeed George F. Kennan as the Counselor of Embassy and Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow , under the US ambassador to the Soviet Union and future CIA Director , Walter Bedell Smith . Durbrow warned Smith and others of Soviet expansionism and efforts to break up

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