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89-531: Lost Heroes may refer to: Bletchley Park’s Lost Heroes , a 2011 programme on BBC Lost Heroes ( ロストヒーローズ ) a 2012 video game in the Compati Hero series "Lost Heroes" (episode) , the series finale of The Batman released in 2008 See also [ edit ] Isle of Lost Heroes , a fictional setting in the 1995 book Mydnight's Hero Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and

178-601: A German strategic offensive was halted before it could break through enemy defences and penetrate to its strategic depths . Though the Red Army had succeeded in winter offensives previously, their counter-offensives after the German attack at Kursk were their first successful summer offensives of the war. The battle has been called the "last gasp of Nazi aggression". As the Battle of Stalingrad slowly ground to its conclusion,

267-774: A discussion in which the OKW Operations Staff suggested abandoning the offensive, Hitler further postponed the operation until 3 July then, on 1 July, Hitler announced 5 July as the launch date of the offensive. A three-month quiet period had descended upon the Eastern Front as the Soviets prepared their defences and the Germans attempted to build up their forces. The Germans used this period for specialised training of their assault troops. All units underwent training and combat rehearsals. The Waffen-SS had built

356-622: A fluid manner. On 6 February 1943, Manstein met with Hitler at his headquarters in Görlitz (now Gierłoż, Poland ) to discuss the proposals he had previously sent. He received an approval from Hitler for a counteroffensive against the Soviet forces advancing in the Donbas region. On 12 February 1943, the remaining German forces were reorganised. To the south, Army Group Don was renamed Army Group South and placed under Manstein's command. Directly to

445-420: A full-scale duplicate Soviet strong point that was used to practice the techniques for neutralizing such positions. The panzer divisions received replacement men and equipment and attempted to get back up to strength. The German forces to be used in the offensive included 12 panzer divisions and 5 panzergrenadier divisions, four of which had tank strengths greater than their neighbouring panzer divisions. However,

534-472: A further 20,200 anti-tank and 9,097 anti-personnel mines in its second defensive belt. Furthermore, mobile obstacle detachments were tasked with laying more mines directly in the path of advancing enemy armoured formations. These units, consisting of two platoons of combat engineers with mines at division level and one company of combat engineers normally equipped with 500–700 mines at corps level, functioned as anti-tank reserves at every level of command. In

623-411: A letter dated 8 April, Zhukov warned that the Germans would attack the salient with a strong armoured force: We can expect the enemy to put [the] greatest reliance in this year's offensive operations on his tank divisions and air force, since his infantry appears to be far less prepared for offensive operations than last year ... In view of this threat, we should strengthen the anti-tank defences of

712-556: A possible German attack in the Kursk sector. Stalin and some senior officers were eager to strike first once the rasputitsa ended, but a number of key officers, including Deputy Supreme Commander Georgiy Zhukov , recommended a strategic defensive before going on the offensive. In a letter to the Stavka and Stalin, on 8 April, Zhukov wrote: In the first phase the enemy, collecting their best forces—including 13–15 tank divisions and with

801-513: A series of counterstrokes into the flanks of the Soviet armoured formations, with the goal of destroying them while retaking Kharkov and Kursk. The II SS Panzer Corps had arrived from France in January 1943, refitted and up to near full strength. Armoured units from the 1st Panzer Army of Army Group A had pulled out of the Caucasus and further strengthened Manstein's forces. The operation

890-484: A total staff of 118, organised in three shifts working round the clock. The logical structure of the Tunny system was worked out by mathematician Bill Tutte in the spring of 1942. Tunny had 12 wheels, and was more advanced, complex, faster and far more secure than the well-known 3-4 wheeled Enigma machine . The Germans were convinced that the Tunny cipher system was unbreakable. Tunny was the cipher system which carried only

979-417: A trap where their armoured power would be destroyed, thus creating the conditions for a major Soviet counteroffensive. They decided to meet the enemy attack by preparing defensive positions to wear out the German groupings before launching their own offensive. Preparation of defences and fortifications began by the end of April, and continued until the German attack in early July. The two-month delay between

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1068-571: Is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Bletchley Park%E2%80%99s Lost Heroes The Testery used hand decrypting methods to break Tunny traffic. Within one year of its foundation, the Testery had deciphered 1.5 million texts by these methods. By the war's end in Europe in May 1945, the Testery had grown to nine cryptanalysts, a team of 24 ATS,

1157-525: The Battle of Kursk in the Soviet Union. General Dwight D. Eisenhower gave the best summary after World War II . He said that "Bletchley decrypts shortened the War by at least two years". Tunny played a very important role in all of this, a war which was costing at least 10 million lives a year. A great deal of this was down to Bill Tutte. The story of Enigma (declassified in the 1970s) is well known, but

1246-626: The Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 , a 2007 book by Marcus Luttrell Quest for Lost Heroes , a 1990 book by David Gemmell Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title Lost Heroes . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Lost_Heroes&oldid=1087295479 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description

1335-623: The Panther tank , but also the Ferdinand tank destroyer and greater numbers of the Tiger heavy tank. He postponed the operation in order to await their arrival. Receiving reports of powerful Soviet concentrations behind the Kursk area, Hitler further delayed the offensive to allow for more equipment to reach the front. With pessimism for Citadel increasing with each delay, in June, Alfred Jodl ,

1424-682: The Red Army moved to a general offensive in the south, in Operation Little Saturn . By January 1943, a 160-to-300-kilometre-wide (99 to 186 mi) gap had opened between German Army Group B and Army Group Don , and the advancing Soviet armies threatened to cut off all German forces south of the Don River , including Army Group A operating in the Caucasus . Army Group Center came under significant pressure as well. Kursk

1513-424: The 35 major Luftwaffe raids on Soviet airfields in the Kursk sector in June 1943 were against dummy airfields. According to historian Antony Beevor , in contrast, Soviet aviation apparently succeeded in destroying more than 500 Luftwaffe aircraft on the ground. The Soviet deception efforts were so successful that German estimates issued in mid-June placed the total Soviet armoured strength at 1,500 tanks. The result

1602-420: The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf", of Army Group South, had 223,907 men (149,271 combat soldiers) and 100,000–108,000 men (66,000 combat soldiers) respectively. The 2nd Army, that held the western side of the salient contained an estimated 110,000. In total, the German forces had a total strength of 777,000–779,000 men, and the three attacking armies contained 438,271 combat soldiers. Army Group South

1691-550: The 51st and 52nd – together equipped with 200 Panthers, for which the offensive had been delayed, were attached to the Großdeutschland Division in the XLVIII Panzer Corps of Army Group South. With the 51st and 52nd Battalions arriving on 30 June and 1 July, the two units had little time to perform reconnaissance or to orient themselves to the terrain they found themselves in. This was a breach of

1780-607: The Allied threat in the Mediterranean, rather than using them as a strategic reserve for the Eastern Front. As a result, Hitler cancelled the offensive at Kursk after only a week, in part to divert forces to Italy. Germany's heavy losses of men and tanks ensured that the victorious Soviet Red Army held a strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Battle of Kursk was the first time in the Second World War that

1869-562: The Central Front had been reconstructed from the Don Front , which had been part of the northern pincer of Operation Uranus and had been responsible for the destruction of the 6th Army at Stalingrad. The Central and Voronezh Fronts each constructed three main defensive belts in their sectors, with each subdivided into several zones of fortification. The Soviets employed the labour of over 300,000 civilians. Fortifying each belt

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1958-515: The Central Front, which was defending the northern face of the salient. Kluge refused, believing that his forces were too weak to launch such an attack. Further Axis advances were blocked by Soviet forces that had been shifted down from the Central Front to the area north of Belgorod. By mid-April, amid poor weather and with the German forces exhausted and in need of refitting, the offensives of Operational Order No. 5 were postponed. On 15 April, Hitler issued Operational Order No. 6, which called for

2047-480: The Central and Voronezh fronts, and assemble as soon as possible. Nearly all artillery, including howitzers, guns, anti-aircraft and rockets, were tasked with anti-tank defence. Dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns further strengthened the anti-tank defences. Anti-tank forces were incorporated into every level of command, mostly as anti-tank strong points with the majority concentrated on likely attack routes and

2136-576: The Chief of Staff at the OKW, instructed the armed forces propaganda office to portray the upcoming operation as a limited counteroffensive. Due to concerns of an Allied landing in the south of France or in Italy and delays in deliveries of the new tanks, Hitler postponed again, this time to 20 June. Zeitzler was profoundly concerned with the delays, but he still supported the offensive. On 17–18 June, following

2225-477: The Citadel offensive profitable, by May he shared Model's misgivings. Hitler called his senior officers and advisors to Munich for a meeting on 4 May. Hitler spoke for about 45 minutes on the reasons to postpone the attack, essentially reiterating Model's arguments. A number of options were put forth for comment: going on the offensive immediately with the forces at hand; delaying the offensive further to await

2314-477: The Eastern Front. In 1943, an offensive by the Soviet Central, Bryansk and Western Fronts against Army Group Centre was abandoned shortly after it began in early March, when the southern flank of the Central Front was threatened by Army Group South. Soviet intelligence received information about German troop concentrations spotted at Orel and Kharkov, as well as details of an intended German offensive in

2403-680: The Ferdinand tank destroyers, which lacked machine guns as secondary armament. The soldiers were also promised financial rewards for each tank destroyed, with the People's Commissariat of Defence providing a bounty of 1,000 roubles for each destroyed tank. The Soviets employed maskirovka (military deception) to mask defensive positions and troop dispositions and to conceal the movement of men and materiel. These included camouflaging gun emplacements, constructing dummy airfields and depots, generating false radio-traffic, and spreading rumours among

2492-459: The German area of control, centred on the city of Kursk. The heavy losses sustained by Germany since the opening of Operation Barbarossa had resulted in a shortage in infantry and artillery. Units were in total 470,000 men understrength. For the Wehrmacht to undertake an offensive in 1943, the burden of the offensive, in both attacking the Soviet defences and holding ground on the flanks of

2581-462: The German armaments industry . The Soviet government had foreknowledge of the German plans from the Lucy spy ring . Aware months in advance that the attack would fall on the neck of the Kursk salient, the Soviets built a defence in depth designed to wear down the German armoured spearhead . The Germans delayed the offensive while they tried to build up their forces and waited for new weapons, giving

2670-539: The German decision to attack the Kursk salient and its implementation allowed the Red Army ample time to thoroughly prepare. The Voronezh Front , commanded by Nikolai Vatutin , was tasked with defending the southern face of the salient. The Central Front, commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky , defended the northern face. Waiting in reserve was the Steppe Front , commanded by Ivan Konev . In February 1943,

2759-475: The II SS Panzer Corps under Paul Hausser . The XLVIII Panzer Corps , commanded by Otto von Knobelsdorff , would advance on the left while Army Detachment Kempf would advance on the right. The 2nd Army , under the command of Walter Weiss , would contain the western portion of the salient. On 27 April, Model met with Hitler to review and express his concern regarding intelligence which showed

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2848-462: The Kursk offensive operation, codenamed Zitadelle ("Citadel"), to begin on 3 May or shortly thereafter. The directive was drafted by Kurt Zeitzler , the OKH Chief of Staff. For the offensive to succeed it was deemed essential to attack before the Soviets had a chance to prepare extensive defences or to launch an offensive of their own. Some military historians have described the operation using

2937-728: The Kursk sector through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland . The Soviets verified the intelligence via their spy in Britain, John Cairncross , at the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park , who clandestinely forwarded raw decrypts directly to Moscow. Cairncross also provided Soviet intelligence with identifications of the Luftwaffe airfields in the region. Soviet politician Anastas Mikoyan wrote that on 27 March 1943, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin notified him of

3026-753: The Luftwaffe had seen earlier. The introduction of the Yakovlev Yak-9 and Lavochkin La-5 fighters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the Ilyushin Il-2 "Shturmovik" and the Pe-2 , had become available as well. The VVS also fielded large numbers of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant

3115-409: The Red Army and VVS formations would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort. For the operation, the Germans used four armies along with a large portion of their total tank strength on the Eastern Front. On 1 July, the 9th Army of Army Group Centre based in the northern side of the salient contained 335,000 men (223,000 combat soldiers); in the south,

3204-456: The Red Army constructing very strong positions at the shoulders of the salient and having withdrawn their mobile forces from the area west of Kursk. He argued that the longer the preparation phase continued, the less the operation could be justified. He recommended completely abandoning Citadel, allowing the army to await and defeat the coming Soviet offensive, or radically revising the plan for Citadel. Though in mid-April, Manstein had considered

3293-536: The Red Army time to construct a series of deep defensive belts and establish a large reserve force for counter-offensives, with one German officer describing Kursk as "another Verdun ". The battle was the final strategic offensive that the Germans were able to launch on the Eastern Front. Because the Allied invasion of Sicily began during the battle, Adolf Hitler was forced to divert troops training in France to meet

3382-489: The Soviet frontline troops and the civilian population in the German-held areas. Movement of forces and supplies to and from the salient took place at night only. Ammunition caches were carefully concealed to blend in with the landscape. Radio transmission was restricted and fires were forbidden. Command posts were hidden and motor transport in and around them forbidden. According to a Soviet General Staff report, 29 of

3471-425: The Soviet offensive potential for the summer of 1943, by cutting off and enveloping the forces that they anticipated would be in the Kursk salient. Hitler believed that a victory here would reassert German strength and improve his prestige with his allies , who he thought were considering withdrawing from the war. It was also hoped that large numbers of Soviet prisoners would be captured to be used as slave labour in

3560-591: The Soviets also launched powerful counterattacks the same day, one of which led to a large armoured clash, the Battle of Prokhorovka . On 3 August, the Soviets began the second phase of the Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of the Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation (Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, Полководец Румянцев ) against the German forces on the southern side of the salient. The Germans hoped to weaken

3649-538: The Soviets assembled a large number of lend-lease tanks. These included U.S.-manufactured M3 Lee medium tanks and British-built Churchill , Matilda II and Valentine infantry tanks. However, the T-34 made up the bulk of the Soviet armour. Without including the deeper reserves organised under the Steppe Front, the Soviets massed about 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft to defend

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3738-600: The Soviets concentrated 80% of their entire air fleet for use at the Battle of Kursk. According to some historians, the Soviets employed 40% of their manpower and 75% of their armoured forces to the battle. By 1943 the Luftwaffe's strength on the Eastern Front had started to weaken after Stalingrad, and the siphoning of resources to North Africa . The Luftwaffe forces in the east were further depleted with fighter units being shifted back to Germany to defend against

3827-579: The Steppe Front had an additional 573,195 men (449,133). Thus the total size of the Soviet force was 1,910,361 men, with 1,426,352 actual combat soldiers. Soviet armour strength included 4,869 tanks and 259 SPGs. Overall a third of the Soviet tanks at Kursk were light tanks , but in some units this proportion was considerably higher. Of the 3,600 tanks in the Central and Voronezh Fronts in July 1943, 1,061 were light as T-60 and T-70 tanks. With very thin armour and small guns, they were unable to effectively engage

3916-599: The Testery had been breaking Tunny for a year by hand, the Newmanry became active from July 1943 under Max Newman . Mathematicians in the Newmanry used machine methods to speed up breaking Tunny. Early on, a machine called Heath Robinson was produced, to help speed up one stage – breaking of the chi wheels, but the Robinson was slow and not reliable. In February 1944 a new machine called " Colossus " became operational; it

4005-540: The Testery. The Testery was hand code-breaking Tunny for 12 months before the Robinson machine was produced and for 19 months before Colossus operated. With the help of the Newmanry, the Testery broke up to 90% of the traffic given to them to work on in the Colossus period. The information provided by Tunny enabled the Allies to ascertain German movements, saving thousands of lives at critical junctures such as D-Day and

4094-604: The advance, would have to be carried primarily by the panzer divisions. On 10 March, Manstein presented a plan whereby the German forces would pinch off the Kursk salient with a rapid offensive commencing as soon as the spring rasputitsa had subsided. On 13 March, Hitler signed Operational Order No. 5, which authorised several offensives, including one against the Kursk salient. As the last Soviet resistance in Kharkov petered out, Manstein attempted to persuade Günther von Kluge , commander of Army Group Centre, to immediately attack

4183-505: The armoured formations and the limitations of German industry to replace losses. General Heinz Guderian argued strongly against the operation, stating "the attack was pointless". The conference ended without Hitler coming to a decision, but Citadel was not aborted. Three days later, OKW , Hitler's conduit for controlling the military, postponed the launch date for Citadel to 12 June. Following this meeting, Guderian continued to voice his concerns over an operation that would likely degrade

4272-426: The arrival of new and better tanks; radically revising the operation, or cancelling it altogether. Manstein advocated an early attack, but requested two additional infantry divisions, to which Hitler responded that none were available. Kluge spoke out strongly against postponement and discounted Model's intelligence. Albert Speer , the minister of Armaments and War Production, spoke about the difficulties of rebuilding

4361-549: The attacking formations to disengage and redeploy to the south to counter the threat of the advancing German forces under Manstein. Exhaustion of both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, coupled with the loss of mobility due to the onset of the spring rasputitsa , resulted in the cessation of operations for both sides by mid-March. The counteroffensive left a Soviet salient extending 250 kilometres (160 mi) from north to south and 160 kilometres (99 mi) from east to west into

4450-411: The battlefield from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point had been reached in the land battle, to render close air support . The changing strengths between the two opponents prompted the Luftwaffe to make operational changes for the battle. Previous offensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwaffe raids against opposing airfields to achieve aerial superiority. By this point in

4539-434: The course of the operation. Fuel was the most significant limiting factor. To help build up supplies for the support of Citadel, the Luftwaffe greatly curtailed its operations during the last week of June. Despite this conservation of resources, the Luftwaffe did not have the resources to sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began. For Citadel, the Luftwaffe confined its operations to

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4628-588: The direct support of the forces on the ground. In this mission the Luftwaffe continued to make use of the Junkers Ju 87 "Stuka" dive-bombers. A new development to this aircraft was the "Bordkanone" 3,7 cm cannon, one of which could be slung under each wing of the Stuka in a gun pod . Half of the Stuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equipped with these Kanonenvogel (literally "cannon-bird") tankbuster aircraft. The air groups were also strengthened by

4717-435: The escalating Allied bombing campaign . By the end of June, only 38.7 percent of the Luftwaffe's total aircraft remained in the east. In 1943 the Luftwaffe could still achieve local aerial superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of German aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were slated for Citadel. The goal of the Luftwaffe remained unchanged. The priority was to gain aerial supremacy , then to isolate

4806-424: The exception of a small area in the immediate environs of Kursk. The combined depth of the three main defensive zones was about 40 kilometres (25 mi). The six defensive belts on either side of Kursk were 130–150 kilometres (81–93 mi) deep. If the Germans managed to break through these defences they would still be confronted by additional defensive belts to the east, manned by the Steppe Front. These brought

4895-473: The force was markedly deficient in infantry divisions, which were essential to hold ground and to secure the flanks. By the time the Germans initiated the offensive, their force amounted to around 777,000 men, 2,451 tanks and assault guns (70 percent of the German armour on the Eastern Front) and 7,417 guns and mortars . The Battle of Kursk would engulf more than 70% of Germany's military force on

4984-532: The frontal armour of German medium and heavy tanks or AFVs. The most capable Soviet tank at Kursk was the T-34. However, the original version was armed only with a 76.2mm gun, which struggled against uparmoured Panzer IVs, and the frontal armour of Tigers and Panthers was essentially impenetrable. Only the SU-122 and SU-152 self-propelled guns had the power to destroy the Tiger at short range, but they were not equal to

5073-520: The general offensive which would finally finish off his main force. Stalin consulted with his frontline commanders and senior officers of the General Staff from 12 to 15 April 1943. In the end he and the Stavka agreed that the Germans would probably target Kursk. Stalin believed the decision to defend would give the Germans the initiative, but Zhukov countered that the Germans would be drawn into

5162-608: The heaviest German ammunition expenditure on the Eastern Front up to that point, with 236,915 tons consumed in July and 254,648 in August. The previous peak had been 160,645 tons in September 1942. The Red Army used two Fronts for the defence of Kursk, and created a third front behind the battle area which was held as a reserve. The Central and Voronezh Fronts fielded 12 armies, with 711,575 men (510,983 combat soldiers) and 625,591 men (446,236 combat soldiers) respectively. In reserve,

5251-515: The highest concentration in the first main defensive belt. The minefields at Kursk achieved densities of 2,500 anti-personnel and 2,200 anti-tank mines per kilometre, six times the density used in the defence of Moscow . For example, the 6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front, was spread out over nearly 64 kilometres (40 mi) of front and was protected by 69,688 anti-tank and 64,430 anti-personnel mines in its first defensive belt with

5340-675: The highest grade of intelligence: messages from the German Army Headquarters in Berlin and the top generals and field marshals on all fronts. Some were signed by Hitler himself. Tens of thousands of Tunny messages were intercepted by the British and broken at Bletchley Park by Captain Roberts and his fellow codebreakers in the Testery. These messages contained much vital insight into top-level German thinking and planning. After

5429-494: The methods of the Panzerwaffe , considered essential for the successful use of armour. Though led by experienced panzer commanders, many of the tank crews were new recruits and had little time to become familiar with their new tanks, let alone train together to function as a unit. The two battalions came direct from the training ground and lacked combat experience. In addition, the requirement to maintain radio silence until

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5518-474: The north, Army Group B was dissolved, with its forces and areas of responsibility divided between Army Group South and Army Group Centre. Manstein inherited responsibility for the massive breach in the German lines. On 18 February, Hitler arrived at Army Group South headquarters at Zaporizhia just hours before the Soviets liberated Kharkov , and had to be hastily evacuated on the 19th. Once given freedom of action, Manstein intended to utilise his forces to make

5607-416: The objective of pinching off the Kursk salient with attacks on the base of the salient from north and south simultaneously. After the German offensive stalled on the northern side of the salient, on 12 July, the Soviets commenced their Kursk Strategic Offensive Operation with the launch of Operation Kutuzov ( Russian : Кутузов ) against the rear of the German forces on the same side. On the southern side,

5696-506: The occupied area behind Army Group Centre destroyed 298 locomotives, 1,222 railway wagons and 44 bridges, and in the Kursk sector there were 1,092 partisan attacks on railways. These attacks delayed the build-up of German supplies and equipment, and required the diversion of German troops to suppress the partisans, delaying their training for the offensive. Central Partisan Headquarters coordinated many of these attacks. In June Soviet Air Forces (VVS) flew over 800 sorties at night to resupply

5785-416: The panzer forces that he had been attempting to rebuild. He considered the offensive, as planned, to be a misuse of the panzer forces, as it violated two of the three tenets he had laid out as the essential elements for a successful panzer attack - surprise, deployment in mass, and suitable terrain. In his opinion, the limited German resources in men and materiel should be conserved, as they would be needed for

5874-468: The partisan groups operating behind Army Group Centre. The VVS also provided communication and sometimes even daylight air-support for major partisan operations. Special training was provided to the Soviet infantry manning the defences to help them overcome the tank phobia that had been evident since the start of the German invasion. Soldiers were packed into trenches and tanks were driven overhead until all signs of fear were gone. This training exercise

5963-490: The pending defence of western Europe. In a meeting with Hitler on 10 May he asked, Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is? The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not. What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk, or even more, on the Eastern Front? Hitler replied, "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach." Guderian concluded, "In that case your reaction to

6052-409: The problem is the correct one. Leave it alone." Despite reservations, Hitler remained committed to the offensive. He and the OKW, early in the preparatory phase, were hopeful that the offensive would revitalise German strategic fortunes in the east. As the challenges offered by Citadel increased, he focused more and more on the expected new weapons that he believed were the key to victory: principally

6141-629: The recent arrival of the Henschel Hs 129 , with its 30 mm MK 103 cannon , and the F-subtype ground attack ("jabo") version of the Focke-Wulf Fw 190 . In the months preceding the battle, Luftflotte 6 supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The VVS formations encountered displayed better training, and were flying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness and skill than

6230-676: The remainder amply spread out elsewhere. Each anti-tank strong-point typically consisted of four to six anti-tank guns, six to nine anti-tank rifles, and five to seven heavy and light machine guns. They were supported by mobile obstacle detachments as well as by infantry with automatic firearms . Independent tank and self-propelled gun brigades and regiments were tasked with cooperating with the infantry during counterattacks. Soviet preparations also included increased activity of Soviet partisans , who attacked German communications and supply lines. The attacks were mostly behind Army Group North and Army Group Centre. In June 1943, partisans operating in

6319-418: The salient, driving south to the hills east of Kursk, securing the rail line from Soviet attack. Army Group South would commit the 4th Panzer Army, under Hermann Hoth , and Army Detachment Kempf , under Werner Kempf , to pierce the southern face of the salient. This force would drive north to meet the 9th Army east of Kursk. Manstein's main attack was to be delivered by Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, spearheaded by

6408-401: The salient. This amounted to 26 percent of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26 percent of its mortars and artillery, 35 percent of its aircraft and 46 percent of its tanks. One source states that in the Battle of Stalingrad the Soviets used fourteen field armies and one tank army, while at Kursk they used twenty-two full-strength field armies and five tank armies. According to one source,

6497-468: The start of the attack meant that the Panther units had little training in battalion-level radio procedures. Furthermore, the new Panthers were still experiencing problems with their transmissions, and proved mechanically unreliable. By the morning of 5 July, the units had lost 16 Panthers due to mechanical breakdown, leaving only 184 available for the launching of the offensive. July and August 1943 saw

6586-412: The story of Tunny, Germany's top-secret cipher machine, was only declassified in the 2000s. Most of the cryptanalysts in the Testery died before they could tell their stories. For the first time, on 25 October 2011, a BBC Timewatch programme titled Code-breakers: Bletchley Park’s Lost Heroes , about the Testery, Tunny, Bill Tutte and Tommy Flowers, was produced, featuring testimony from Jerry Roberts. By

6675-408: The success of Citadel, but problems with supply shortfalls hampered their preparations. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the Luftwaffe's ability to build up essential stockpiles of petrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlike Red Army units there were no reserves of aircraft that could be used to replace damaged aircraft over

6764-443: The support of a large number of aircraft—will strike Kursk with their Kromskom-Orel grouping from the north-east and their Belgorod-Kharkov grouping from the south-east... I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to an offensive in the near future in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to

6853-403: The term blitzkrieg (lightning war); other military historians do not use the term in their works on the battle. Operation Citadel called for a double envelopment , directed at Kursk, to surround the Soviet defenders of five armies and seal off the salient. Army Group Centre would provide General Walter Model 's 9th Army to form the northern pincer. It would cut through the northern face of

6942-471: The total depth of the defences to nearly 300 kilometres (190 mi). The Voronezh and Central Fronts dug 4,200 kilometres (2,600 mi) and 5,000 kilometres (3,100 mi) of trenches respectively, laid out in criss-cross pattern for ease of movement. The Soviets built more than 686 bridges and about 2,000 kilometres (1,200 mi) of roads in the salient. Red Army combat engineers laid 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines , with

7031-467: The war . It was one of the costliest battles of the Second World War, the single deadliest armoured battle in history, and the opening day of the battle, 5 July, was the single costliest day in the history of aerial warfare . The battle was also marked by fierce house-to-house fighting and hand-to-hand combat . The battle began with the launch of the German offensive Operation Citadel ( German : Unternehmen Zitadelle ), on 5 July, which had

7120-465: The war Red Army equipment reserves were extensive and the Luftwaffe commanders realised that aircraft could be easily replaced, making such raids futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned. In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers flying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted during Citadel. The Luftwaffe command understood that their support would be crucial for

7209-841: The war's end in Europe in May 1945, the Testery had grown to nine cryptanalysts, a team of 24 ATS, a total staff of 118, organised in three shifts working round the clock. Battle of Kursk Günther von Kluge Hermann Hoth Werner Kempf Walter Model Otto Deßloch Robert Ritter von Greim Heinz Guderian Alfred Jodl Vasily Sokolovsky Konstantin Rokossovsky Aleksandr Vasilevsky Nikolai Vatutin Ivan Konev Pavel Rotmistrov Sergei Rudenko Kirill Moskalenko Markian Popov Alexander Novikov The Battle of Kursk

7298-536: Was a major World War II Eastern Front battle between the forces of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union near Kursk in southwestern Russia during the summer of 1943, resulting in a Soviet victory. The Battle of Kursk is the single largest battle in the history of warfare . It ranks only behind the Battle of Stalingrad several months earlier as the most often-cited turning point in the European theatre of

7387-408: Was an interconnected web of minefields, barbed-wire fences, anti-tank ditches , deep entrenchments for infantry, anti-tank obstacles , dug-in armoured vehicles, and machine-gun bunkers. Behind the three main defensive belts were three more belts prepared as fallback positions; the first was not fully occupied or heavily fortified, and the last two, though sufficiently fortified, were unoccupied with

7476-511: Was equipped with more armoured vehicles , infantry and artillery than the 9th Army of Army Group Center. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" had 1,377 tanks and assault guns, while the 9th Army possessed 988 tanks and assault guns. German industry produced 2,816 tanks and self-propelled guns between April and June, of which 156 were Tigers and 484 Panthers. At Kursk, a total of 259 Panther tanks, about 211 Tigers, and 90 Ferdinands were used. The two new Panther battalions –

7565-459: Was hastily prepared and did not receive a name. Later known as Third Battle of Kharkov , it commenced on 21 February, as 4th Panzer Army under General Hoth launched a counter-attack. The German forces cut off the Soviet mobile spearheads and continued the drive north, retaking Kharkov on 15 March and Belgorod on 18 March. A Soviet offensive launched on 25 February by the Central Front against Army Group Centre had to be abandoned by 7 March to allow

7654-506: Was not only a vast underestimation of Soviet strength, but a misperception of Soviet strategic intentions. The main tank of the Soviet tank arm was the T-34 medium tank, on which the Red Army attempted to concentrate production. The tank arm also contained large numbers of the T-70 light tank. For example, the 5th Guards Tank Army roughly contained 270 T-70s and 500 T-34s. In the salient itself

7743-440: Was referred to by the soldiers as "ironing". In combat, the soldiers would spring up in the midst of the attacking infantry to separate them from the spearheading armoured vehicles. The separated armoured vehicles – now vulnerable to infantry armed with PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles, demolition charges and molotov cocktails – could then be disabled or destroyed at point-blank range. These types of attacks were mostly effective against

7832-500: Was retaken by the Soviets on 8 February 1943, and Rostov on 14 February. The Soviet Bryansk , Western , and newly created Central Fronts prepared for an offensive which envisioned the encirclement of Army Group Centre between Bryansk and Smolensk . By February 1943 the southern sector of the German front was in strategic crisis. Since December 1942, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had been strongly requesting "unrestricted operational freedom" to allow him to use his forces in

7921-411: Was the world's first electronic computer. Colossus was designed and built in only ten months by Tommy Flowers of the G.P.O. (Post Office). This had far greater capacity and speed than the Robinson and so the whole breaking process became much faster. The Colossus was essential for making the very fast counts needed to work out the "de-chis", but the psi-wheels and motor-wheels were still broken by hand in

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