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36-493: Alexius Meinong Ritter von Handschuchsheim (17 July 1853 – 27 November 1920) was an Austrian philosopher , a realist known for his unique ontology and theory of objects. He also made contributions to philosophy of mind and theory of value . Alexius Meinong's father was officer Anton von Meinong (1799–1870), who was granted the hereditary title of Ritter in 1851 and reached the rank of Major General in 1858 before retiring in 1859. From 1868 to 1870, Meinong studied at

72-504: A Meinongian theory of objects, while others (e.g., Karel Lambert ) have defended the uselessness of such a theory. Meinong is also seen to be controversial in the field of philosophy of language for holding the view that " existence " is merely a property of an object, just as color or mass might be a property. Closer readers of his work, however, accept that Meinong held the view that objects are "indifferent to being" and that they stand "beyond being and non-being". On this view Meinong

108-419: A distinction between what he calls primary and secondary occurrences of denoting phrases. Since definite descriptions are just quantificational devices on Russell's view, they can enter into scope relations with other logical operators. In the case of negative existentials, there is an ambiguity between two different (primary and secondary) readings of the quantificational assertion. For example, Russell uses

144-600: A professor at the University of Graz and was later promoted as chair of its philosophy department. During his tenure, he founded the Graz Psychological Institute (Grazer Psychologische Institut; founded in 1894) and the Graz School of experimental psychology. Meinong supervised the doctorates of Christian von Ehrenfels (founder of Gestalt psychology ) and Adalbert Meingast , as well as

180-493: A proposition in which x is a constituent and where x , the variable, is essentially and wholly undetermined." Then everything , nothing and something ("the most primitive of denoting phrases") are to be interpreted as follows: where E stands for everything, N stands for nothing and S stands for something. All is taken as primitive and indefinable and the others are defined in terms of it. Russell emphasises that denoting phrases can have no meaning apart from that which

216-560: A recent addition to the philosophical faculty. Meinong would later claim that his mentor did not directly influence his shift into philosophy, though he did acknowledge that during that time Brentano may have helped him improve his progress in philosophy. Meinong studied under Brentano with Edmund Husserl , who would also become a notable and influential philosopher. Both their works exhibited parallel developments, particularly from 1891 to 1904. Both are recognized for their respective contribution to philosophical research. In 1882, Meinong became

252-511: A secondary occurrence." Contemporarily, it is customary to discuss Russell's primary/secondary distinction in the more logically exact terms of wide and narrow scope. The scope distinction regards the operator that, on one reading, modifies only the subject, and on the other, modifies the entire sentence. Russell resolves the problem of ambiguity in propositional attitude reports in a similar manner. He refers to an example similar to Frege's puzzle about identity: " George IV wondered whether Scott

288-553: Is a semantically complex expression that can serve as the grammatical subject of a sentence. Paradigmatic examples include both definite descriptions ("the shortest spy") and indefinite descriptions ("some sophomore"). A phrase does not need to have a denotation to be a denoting phrase: "the greatest prime number" is a denoting phrase in Russell's sense even though there is no such thing as the greatest prime number. According to Russell's theory, denoting phrases do not contribute objects as

324-543: Is an essay by Bertrand Russell . It was published in the philosophy journal Mind in 1905. In it, Russell introduces and advocates his theory of denoting phrases, according to which definite descriptions and other "denoting phrases ... never have any meaning in themselves, but every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning." This theory later became the basis for Russell's descriptivism with regard to proper names, and his view that proper names are "disguised" or "abbreviated" definite descriptions . In

360-407: Is assigned to them within the propositions in which they occur, all of which are meaningful. This is the foundation of Russell's theory of descriptions as he proceeds to illustrate. The phrase "the father of Charles II (F) was executed (E)" is interpreted as the following quantificational assertion: In other words, there is one and only one thing x such that x is the father of Charles II and x

396-420: Is expressly denying that existence is a property of an object. For Meinong, what an object is, its real essence , depends on the properties of the object. These properties are genuinely possessed whether the object exists or not, and so existence cannot be a mere property of an object. Meinong holds that objects can be divided into three categories on the basis of their ontological status. Objects may have one of

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432-613: Is interpreted as saying that descriptions may "refer" to one definite object, then it could be that Russell actually recognised the two distinct uses of definite descriptions (attributive and referential) that Keith Donnellan later proposed. In any case, after clarifying the sense of the term "denoting phrase" and providing several examples to illustrate the idea, Russell explains the epistemological motivations for his theory. Russell believes at this point that there are essentially two modes of knowing: knowledge by description and knowledge by (direct) acquaintance . Knowledge by acquaintance

468-425: Is limited to the sense data of the phenomenal world and to one's own private inner experiences, while knowledge of everything else (other minds, physical objects, and so on) can be known only by way of general descriptions. Russell starts out by defining the "fundamental" notion of a propositional function . This is basically a modified version of Frege's idea of unsaturated concepts . Hence, " C ( x ) stands for

504-481: Is not a mode of being at all. Rather, to be "given" is just to be an object. Being-given, termed "absistence" by J. N. Findlay , is better thought of as a mode of non-being than as a mode of being. Absistence, unlike existence and subsistence, does not have a negation; everything absists. (Note that all objects absist, while some subset of these subsist, of which a yet-smaller subset exist.) The result that everything absists allows Meinong to deal with our ability to affirm

540-546: Is ontologically promiscuous and self-contradictory. Both of these criticisms stem from Meinong's theory that there is an object, whether it exists or subsists, for every set of properties. Therefore, there is an object that is both round and not round, or round and square. Russell argues that Meinong's theory entails conclusions such as "the present King of France" both exists and does not exist. However, Meinong does not attribute existence (or any other sort of being) to non-existent objects . Russell also accuses Meinong of violating

576-605: Is the author of Waverley ." In this case, it is obvious that King George is not wondering whether Scott is identical to Scott. Russell rejects Frege's solution of distinguishing between sense and reference. Quantificational descriptions are sufficient for him to handle the de dicto / de re ambiguities. So, for example, in the general case, the sentence "George IV wondered whether Scott is Sir Walter" can be interpreted as: where "..." stands for some definite description such as "the clever fellow who wrote Ivanhoe " and ....stands for something like "the elegant gentleman seated next to

612-478: The Akademisches Gymnasium , Vienna . In 1870, he entered the University of Vienna law school where he was drawn to Carl Menger 's lectures on economics. In summer 1874, he earned a doctorate in history by writing a thesis on Arnold of Brescia . It was during the winter term (1874–1875) that he began to focus on history and philosophy . Meinong became a pupil of Franz Brentano , who was then

648-600: The habilitation of Alois Höfler and Anton Oelzelt-Newin . Meinong wrote two early essays on David Hume , the first dealing with his theory of abstraction , the second with his theory of relations , and was relatively strongly influenced by British empiricism . He is most noted, however, for his edited book Theory of Objects (full title: Investigations in Theory of Objects and Psychology , German : Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie , 1904), which grew out of his work on intentionality and his belief in

684-484: The "being" of a thing, in virtue of which it may be an object of thought , from a thing's "existence", which is the substantive ontological status ascribed to—for example—horses but not to unicorns. Meinong called such nonexistent objects "homeless"; others have nicknamed their place of residence " Meinong's jungle " because of their great number and exotic nature. Historically, Meinong has been treated, especially by Gilbert Ryle , as an eccentric whose theory of objects

720-475: The 1920s, Frank P. Ramsey referred to the essay as "that paradigm of philosophy". In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry Descriptions , Peter Ludlow singled the essay out as " the paradigm of philosophy", and called it a work of "tremendous insight"; provoking discussion and debate among philosophers of language and linguists for over a century. For Russell, a denoting phrase

756-545: The Princess". In the de re case, the above sentence can be interpreted as follows instead: Finally, Russell suggests that fictional names such as " Apollo " can be treated as abbreviated definite descriptions that refer to nothing. All propositions that contain names of such fictional entities are to be treated in the same manner as the negative existentials described above. In his essay, "On Referring", P. F. Strawson criticised Russell's characterisation of statements where

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792-514: The alleged father may have been executed but the real father hadn't - therefore not satisfying the formula since F(x) and E(x) would not be the same.) In this way, Russell points out, it will turn out that all statements containing non-referring descriptions (e.g. "The present king of France is a great writer") are false. Russell's theory reduces all propositions that contain definite descriptions into forms that do not. He then criticises Alexius Meinong 's theory of objects which, according to Russell,

828-512: The case of "the present King of France is not bald." Here the two possible readings are: In the first case, the statement is false because it quantifies over non-existent entities. In the second case, the statement is true because it is not the case that there is a present King of France. "Thus all propositions in which 'the King of France' has a primary occurrence are false: the denials of such propositions are true, but in them 'the King of France' has

864-429: The constituents of the singular propositions in which they occur. Denotation, in other words, is a semantically inert property, in this view. Whereas Frege held that there were two distinct parts (or aspects) of the meaning of every term, phrase, or sentence (its sense and reference : Sinn and Bedeutung ), Russell explicitly rejects the notion of sense ( Sinn ), and gives several arguments against it. However, at

900-456: The described system, Württemberg introduced orders of merit beginning in the late 18th century, which also conferred nobility as "Ritter von" but kept the title limited to the recipient's lifetime (see Military Order of Max Joseph ). This German history article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . This Austrian history article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . On Denoting " On Denoting "

936-416: The following three modalities of being and non-being: Certain objects can exist (mountains, birds, etc.); others cannot in principle ever exist, such as the objects of mathematics (numbers, theorems, etc.): such objects simply subsist. Finally, a third class of objects cannot even subsist, such as impossible objects (e.g. square circle, wooden iron, etc.). Being-given is not a minimal mode of being, because it

972-497: The law of non-contradiction by asserting that the " round square " is both round and not round. Meinong, on the other hand, maintains that the laws of logic do not apply to such phenomena as "impossible" objects that have no being. One of the fundamental puzzles that Russell hopes to resolve with the theory of descriptions is the problem of non-referring expressions or, as they are now called, negative existentials . He finally explains how his theory resolves this problem after invoking

1008-512: The non-being ( Nichtsein ) of an object. Its absistence is evidenced by our act of intending it, which is logically prior to our denying that it has being. Meinong distinguishes four classes of "objects": To these four classes of objects correspond four classes of psychological acts: Ritter For its historical association with warfare and the landed gentry in the Middle Ages , the title of Ritter can be considered roughly equal to

1044-412: The object does not exist, such as "the present King of France", as being wrong. Such statements, Strawson held, are neither true nor false but, rather, absurd. Strawson believed that, contrary to Russell, use does determine the meaning of a sentence. To give the meaning of an expression is to "give general directions for its use." Because of this, Strawson argued that, were someone to say the King of France

1080-455: The possibility of intending nonexistent objects . Whatever can be the target of a mental act , Meinong calls an "object." His theory of objects , now known as "Meinongian object theory," is based around the purported empirical observation that it is possible to think about something, such as a golden mountain, even though that object does not exist. Since we can refer to such things, they must have some sort of being. Meinong thus distinguishes

1116-563: The title of "Ritter von" was bestowed upon citizens who deserved more than the plain "von" but were not considered deserving enough as to be given a barony and designated as " Freiherr ". Even today, members of the Central European Order of St. George , which goes back to Emperor Maximilian and was later reactivated by the Habsburgs after its dissolution by Nazi Germany , are "Ritter" (knights). In addition to

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1152-602: The titles of " Knight ", but it is hereditary like the British title of " Baronet ". The wife of a Ritter was called a " Frau " (in this sense "Lady") and not Ritterin. In heraldry, from the late 18th century, a Ritter was often indicated by the use of a coronet with five points, But not everyone who was a Ritter and displayed arms made use of such a coronet. In the Austrian Empire and in Austria-Hungary ,

1188-413: The very beginning of the article, Russell distinguishes between cases where "a phrase may be denoting and yet not denote anything (e.g. 'the present King of France')" (there was no king of France at the time of Russell's article) and cases where they may denote "one definite object (such as ' the present King of England ')" (Edward VII was the king of England at the time of Russell's article). If this passage

1224-472: Was allegedly dealt a severe blow in Bertrand Russell 's essay " On Denoting " (1905) (see Russellian view ). However, Russell himself thought highly of the vast majority of Meinong's work and, until formulating his theory of descriptions , held similar views about nonexistent objects . Further, recent Meinongians such as Terence Parsons and Roderick Chisholm have established the consistency of

1260-404: Was executed. So, if C represents any statement at all about the father of Charles II, the statement 'C (the father of Charles II)' always implies: It follows that if there is not one and only one entity that satisfies the above, then every proposition that contains the descriptions in a primary occurrence is false. (If the mother of Charles II was ‘unfaithful’ the statement may be false, because

1296-437: Was wise, we would not say their statement is true or false, but, rather, decide they must be under a misapprehension since, normally, the question would not arise as there is no King of France. Strawson also argued that we often need to know the use of a word to understand its meaning, such as in statements of the form, "The table is covered with books." In normal use, the expression would be referring to one particular table. It

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