In philosophy and the arts , a fundamental distinction is between things that are abstract and things that are concrete . While there is no general consensus as to how to precisely define the two, examples include that things like numbers , sets , and ideas are abstract objects, while plants , dogs , and planets are concrete objects. Popular suggestions for a definition include that the distinction between concreteness versus abstractness is, respectively: between (1) existence inside versus outside space-time ; (2) having causes and effects versus not; 3) being related, in metaphysics , to particulars versus universals ; and (4) belonging to either the physical versus the mental realm (or the mental-and-physical realm versus neither). Another view is that it is the distinction between contingent existence versus necessary existence; however, philosophers differ on which type of existence here defines abstractness, as opposed to concreteness. Despite this diversity of views, there is broad agreement concerning most objects as to whether they are abstract or concrete, such that most interpretations agree, for example, that rocks are concrete objects while numbers are abstract objects.
22-467: Meinong may refer to: Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), Austrian philosopher Meinong District , a Hakka district in Kaohsiung, Taiwan Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title Meinong . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to
44-507: A Meinongian theory of objects, while others (e.g., Karel Lambert ) have defended the uselessness of such a theory. Meinong is also seen to be controversial in the field of philosophy of language for holding the view that " existence " is merely a property of an object, just as color or mass might be a property. Closer readers of his work, however, accept that Meinong held the view that objects are "indifferent to being" and that they stand "beyond being and non-being". On this view Meinong
66-476: A particular type of thing. The "type" of which it is a part is in itself an abstract object. The abstract–concrete distinction is often introduced and initially understood in terms of paradigmatic examples of objects of each kind: Abstract objects have often garnered the interest of philosophers because they raise problems for popular theories. In ontology , abstract objects are considered problematic for physicalism and some forms of naturalism . Historically,
88-601: A professor at the University of Graz and was later promoted as chair of its philosophy department. During his tenure, he founded the Graz Psychological Institute (Grazer Psychologische Institut; founded in 1894) and the Graz School of experimental psychology. Meinong supervised the doctorates of Christian von Ehrenfels (founder of Gestalt psychology ) and Adalbert Meingast , as well as
110-565: A recent addition to the philosophical faculty. Meinong would later claim that his mentor did not directly influence his shift into philosophy, though he did acknowledge that during that time Brentano may have helped him improve his progress in philosophy. Meinong studied under Brentano with Edmund Husserl , who would also become a notable and influential philosopher. Both their works exhibited parallel developments, particularly from 1891 to 1904. Both are recognized for their respective contribution to philosophical research. In 1882, Meinong became
132-412: A third realm, different from the external world or from internal consciousness . (See Popper's three worlds .) Another popular proposal for drawing the abstract–concrete distinction contends that an object is abstract if it lacks causal power. A causal power has the ability to affect something causally. Thus, the empty set is abstract because it cannot act on other objects. One problem with this view
154-422: Is expressly denying that existence is a property of an object. For Meinong, what an object is, its real essence , depends on the properties of the object. These properties are genuinely possessed whether the object exists or not, and so existence cannot be a mere property of an object. Meinong holds that objects can be divided into three categories on the basis of their ontological status. Objects may have one of
176-482: Is not a mode of being at all. Rather, to be "given" is just to be an object. Being-given, termed "absistence" by J. N. Findlay , is better thought of as a mode of non-being than as a mode of being. Absistence, unlike existence and subsistence, does not have a negation; everything absists. (Note that all objects absist, while some subset of these subsist, of which a yet-smaller subset exist.) The result that everything absists allows Meinong to deal with our ability to affirm
198-488: Is said to have been coined by Willard Van Orman Quine . Abstract object theory is a discipline that studies the nature and role of abstract objects. It holds that properties can be related to objects in two ways: through exemplification and through encoding. Concrete objects exemplify their properties while abstract objects merely encode them. This approach is also known as the dual copula strategy . The type–token distinction identifies physical objects that are tokens of
220-463: Is that it is not clear exactly what it is to have causal power. For a more detailed exploration of the abstract–concrete distinction, see the relevant Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article. Recently , there has been some philosophical interest in the development of a third category of objects known as the quasi-abstract. Quasi-abstract objects have drawn particular attention in the area of social ontology and documentality . Some argue that
242-480: The Akademisches Gymnasium , Vienna . In 1870, he entered the University of Vienna law school where he was drawn to Carl Menger 's lectures on economics. In summer 1874, he earned a doctorate in history by writing a thesis on Arnold of Brescia . It was during the winter term (1874–1875) that he began to focus on history and philosophy . Meinong became a pupil of Franz Brentano , who was then
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#1732784053189264-602: The habilitation of Alois Höfler and Anton Oelzelt-Newin . Meinong wrote two early essays on David Hume , the first dealing with his theory of abstraction , the second with his theory of relations , and was relatively strongly influenced by British empiricism . He is most noted, however, for his edited book Theory of Objects (full title: Investigations in Theory of Objects and Psychology , German : Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie , 1904), which grew out of his work on intentionality and his belief in
286-487: The "being" of a thing, in virtue of which it may be an object of thought , from a thing's "existence", which is the substantive ontological status ascribed to—for example—horses but not to unicorns. Meinong called such nonexistent objects "homeless"; others have nicknamed their place of residence " Meinong's jungle " because of their great number and exotic nature. Historically, Meinong has been treated, especially by Gilbert Ryle , as an eccentric whose theory of objects
308-524: The defining subject matter of metaphysics or philosophical inquiry more broadly. To the extent that philosophy is independent of empirical research, and to the extent that empirical questions do not inform questions about abstracta, philosophy would seem especially suited to answering these latter questions. In modern philosophy , the distinction between abstract and concrete was explored by Immanuel Kant and G. W. F. Hegel . Gottlob Frege said that abstract objects, such as propositions, were members of
330-418: The following three modalities of being and non-being: Certain objects can exist (mountains, birds, etc.); others cannot in principle ever exist, such as the objects of mathematics (numbers, theorems, etc.): such objects simply subsist. Finally, a third class of objects cannot even subsist, such as impossible objects (e.g. square circle, wooden iron, etc.). Being-given is not a minimal mode of being, because it
352-415: The intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Meinong&oldid=1058555542 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Alexius Meinong Alexius Meinong Ritter von Handschuchsheim (17 July 1853 – 27 November 1920)
374-527: The most important ontological dispute about abstract objects has been the problem of universals . In epistemology , abstract objects are considered problematic for empiricism . If abstracta lack causal powers and spatial location, how do we know about them? It is hard to say how they can affect our sensory experiences, and yet we seem to agree on a wide range of claims about them. Some, such as Ernst Mally , Edward Zalta and arguably, Plato in his Theory of Forms , have held that abstract objects constitute
396-514: The non-being ( Nichtsein ) of an object. Its absistence is evidenced by our act of intending it, which is logically prior to our denying that it has being. Meinong distinguishes four classes of "objects": To these four classes of objects correspond four classes of psychological acts: Abstract object Abstract objects are most commonly used in philosophy , particularly metaphysics, and semantics . They are sometimes called abstracta in contrast to concreta . The term abstract object
418-485: The over-adherence to the platonist duality of the concrete and the abstract has led to a large category of social objects having been overlooked or rejected as nonexistent because they exhibit characteristics that the traditional duality between concrete and abstract regards as incompatible. Specifically, the ability to have temporal location, but not spatial location, and have causal agency (if only by acting through representatives). These characteristics are exhibited by
440-458: The possibility of intending nonexistent objects . Whatever can be the target of a mental act , Meinong calls an "object." His theory of objects , now known as "Meinongian object theory," is based around the purported empirical observation that it is possible to think about something, such as a golden mountain, even though that object does not exist. Since we can refer to such things, they must have some sort of being. Meinong thus distinguishes
462-473: Was allegedly dealt a severe blow in Bertrand Russell 's essay " On Denoting " (1905) (see Russellian view ). However, Russell himself thought highly of the vast majority of Meinong's work and, until formulating his theory of descriptions , held similar views about nonexistent objects . Further, recent Meinongians such as Terence Parsons and Roderick Chisholm have established the consistency of
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#1732784053189484-415: Was an Austrian philosopher , a realist known for his unique ontology and theory of objects. He also made contributions to philosophy of mind and theory of value . Alexius Meinong's father was officer Anton von Meinong (1799–1870), who was granted the hereditary title of Ritter in 1851 and reached the rank of Major General in 1858 before retiring in 1859. From 1868 to 1870, Meinong studied at
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