Saltivka ( Ukrainian : Салтiвка ) is a large residential area located in the northeastern region of Kharkiv in eastern Ukraine . It covers most of the eponymous Saltivskyi District with parts extending into the Kyivskyi District and Nemyshlyanskyi District . It is sometimes called the Saltivskyi Masyv, as it realizes a soviet urban planning concept which consist of several different neighborhoods with similar architectural design. Despite its reputation as a deprived residential area with outdated and dilapidated housing, more than a third of Kharkiv's total population resides within its boundaries. According to various estimates, some 400–800,000 people used to live there, making it one of the largest residential areas in Ukraine.
85-516: The name of the neighborhood is derived from the road that leads to Staryi Saltiv and Verkhnii Saltiv in Chuhuiv Raion . The exact borders of the area aren't well defined, traditionally it refers to a part of the city located between the Kharkiv river and its tributary Nemyshlia [ uk ] , though some might exclude from it the areas not covered by soviet tower blocks. Prior to
170-454: A 100 percent collectivization rate, the more collectivized region's 1933 mortality rate increases by 58 per thousand relative to its 1927–1928 mortality rate". Naumenko believes the disagreement between her and Tauger is due to a "gulf in training and methods between quantitative fields like political science and economics and qualitative fields like history" noting that Tauger makes no comments on one of her paper's results section. Tauger made
255-538: A counter-reply to this reply by Naumenko. Tauger argues in his counter reply that Naumenko's attempt to correspond collectivization rates to famine mortality fails because "there was no single level of collectivization anywhere in the USSR in 1930, especially in the Ukrainian Republic" and that "since collectivization changed significantly by 1932–1933, any connection between 1930 and 1933 omits those changes and
340-580: A new law entered into force which abolished this status, and Staryi Saltiv became a rural settlement. The settlement is connected by roads with Kharkiv and with Vovchansk . [REDACTED] Media related to Staryi Saltiv at Wikimedia Commons Holodomor The Holodomor , also known as the Ukrainian Famine , was a human-made famine in Soviet Ukraine from 1932 to 1933 that killed millions of Ukrainians . The Holodomor
425-426: A priest were publicly prosecuted in Kharkiv , then capital of Soviet Ukraine. Fifteen of the accused were executed, and 248 with links to the defendants were sent to the camps. Ukrainian Youth Association was also considered a "sub-division" of the "Union for Freedom of Ukraine" and thus its members were also trialed. Other notable Ukrainian processes included "People's Revolutionary Socialist Party" trial in 1930 (it
510-716: A pro-Soviet cosmopolitan leader of Ivan Pavlovsky yet purges of the Church reignited during the Great Purge . Changes in cultural politics also occurred. First soviet show trial in Ukraine in connection to the member of the Ukrainian Socialist-Revolutionary Party has taken place as early as 1921. Yet, the first show trial related to Ukraine in the period of the First five-year plan was
595-596: A result of the Holodomor of the Ukrainian people, carried out by the USSR government in 1932–1933. The number of identified victims was 219 people. Until 18 July 2020, Staryi Saltiv belonged to Vovchansk Raion . The raion was abolished in July 2020 as part of the administrative reform of Ukraine, which reduced the number of raions of Kharkiv Oblast to seven. The area of Vovchansk Raion was merged into Chuhuiv Raion. In
680-422: A result of this policy, and one historian asserts that these deaths constitute a crime against humanity . In contrast, historian Stephen Kotkin argues that the sealing of the Ukrainian borders caused by the internal passport system was in order to prevent the spread of famine-related diseases. Between January and mid-April 1933, a factor contributing to a surge of deaths within certain regions of Ukraine during
765-639: A trial in 1928 in North Caucasus Krai , known as Shakhty Trial . Prior to this in October 1925 Shakhty Okrug (previously part of Donets Governorate ) was transferred from Ukrainian SSR to RSFSR and thus the trial was held in Moscow.Yet, one of the central ones, was the "Union for the Freedom of Ukraine" Trial in which 45 intellectuals, higher education professors, writers, a theologian and
850-416: A yield of 68.9 million tons. (Note that a single ton of grain is enough to feed three people for one year.) Historian Mark Tauger has suggested that drought and damp weather were causes of the low harvest. Mark Tauger suggested that heavy rains would help the harvest while Stephen Wheatcroft suggested it would hurt it which Natalya Naumenko notes as a disagreement in scholarship. Another factor which reduced
935-653: Is zamoryty , 'kill or drive to death'. In English, the Holodomor has also been referred to as the artificial famine , terror-genocide and the great famine . It was used in print in the 1930s in Ukrainian diaspora publications in Czechoslovakia as Haladamor , and by Ukrainian immigrant organisations in the United States and Canada by 1978; in the Soviet Union , of which Ukraine
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#17327979156521020-680: Is no definitive documentation that Stalin directly ordered the mass murder of Ukrainians. Barkan et al. state that the term Holodomor was "introduced and popularized by the Ukrainian diaspora in North America before Ukraine became independent" and that the term 'Holocaust' in reference to the famine "is not explained at all." The famine affected the Ukrainian SSR as well as the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (a part of
1105-454: Is no party, but a parliament, a caricature of a parliament. Instead of directing the districts, Kosior is always waffling between the directives of the CC VKP(b) and the demands of the district Party committees and waffled to the end. Lenin was right, when he said that a person who lacks the courage at the necessary moment to go against the current cannot be a real Bolshevik leader. Bad from
1190-462: Is now Ukraine. Matters in Ukraine are now extremely bad. Bad from the standpoint of the Party line. They say that there are two oblasts of Ukraine (Kyiv and Dnipropetrovs'k, it seems) where almost 50 raikomy [district Party committees] have come out against the plan of grain procurements, considering them unrealistic. In other raikomy , they confirm, the matter is no better. What does this look like? This
1275-451: Is responsible for up to 52% of Holodomor excess deaths . At every [train] station there was a crowd of peasants in rags, offering icons and linen in exchange for a loaf of bread. The women were lifting up their infants to the compartment windows—infants pitiful and terrifying with limbs like sticks, puffed bellies, big cadaverous heads lolling on thin necks. — Arthur Koestler , Hungarian-British journalist It has been proposed that
1360-441: Is therefore invalid". Tauger also criticizes Naumenko's ignoring of statistics Tauger's presented where "in her reply she completely ignored the quantitative data [Tauger] presented in [his] article" in which she against the evidence "denied that any famines took place in the later 1920s". To counter Naumenko's claim that collectivization explains the famine Tauger argues ( in his words) how agro-environmental disasters better explain
1445-550: The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine , Saltiv was occupied by Russian forces early in the invasion, and became the scene of renewed fighting in the Battle of Kharkiv (2022) . In 2 May 2022, an American defense official corroborated Ukrainian defense officials that Staryi Saltiv was retaken by the Ukrainian Armed Forces . Until 26 January 2024, Staryi Saltiv was designated as an urban-type settlement . On this day,
1530-654: The Book of the Great Drawing in 1627, and in 1639 it was inhabited by the Cossacks of Hetman Yakov Ostryanytsia. With their departure in 1641, Saltiv is again mentioned as a settlement on the high right bank of the Seversky Donets River and only in 1650 Chuhuiv villagers began to serve here. In 1652, a royal decree settled 19 boyar children. In 1660, a new wooden fort was built on the old settlement and
1615-483: The OGPU secret police. Although nominally targeting collective farms failing to meet grain quotas and independent farmers with outstanding tax-in-kind, in practice the punishment was applied to all residents of affected villages and raions, including teachers, tradespeople, and children. In the end 37 out of 392 districts along with at least 400 collective farms where put on the "black board" in Ukraine, more than half of
1700-650: The Ukrainian SSR at the time) in spring 1932, and from February to July 1933, with the most victims recorded in spring 1933. The consequences are evident in demographic statistics: between 1926 and 1939, the Ukrainian population increased by only 6.6%, whereas Russia and Belarus grew by 16.9% and 11.7% respectively. The number of Ukrainians as ethnicity decreased by 10%. From the 1932 harvest, Soviet authorities were able to procure only 4.3 million tons of grain, as compared with 7.2 million tons obtained from
1785-594: The Union of Soviet Writers in Ukraine. The term holodomor may have first appeared in print in the Soviet Union on 18 July 1988, when Musiyenko's article on the topic was published. Holodomor is now an entry in the modern, two-volume dictionary of the Ukrainian language, published in 2004, described as "artificial hunger, organised on a vast scale by a criminal regime against a country's population." According to Elazar Barkan, Elizabeth A. Cole, and Kai Struve,
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#17327979156521870-419: The 1931 harvest. Rations in towns were drastically cut back, and in winter 1932–1933 and spring 1933, people in many urban areas starved. Urban workers were supplied by a rationing system and therefore could occasionally assist their starving relatives in the countryside, but rations were gradually cut. By spring 1933, urban residents also faced starvation. It is estimated 70% to 80% of all famine deaths during
1955-530: The 1932–1933 grain exports amounted to 1.8 million tonnes, which would have been enough to feed 5 million people for one year. The collectivization and high procurement quota explanation for the famine is somewhat called into question by the fact that the oblasts of Ukraine with the highest losses were Kyiv and Kharkiv , which produced far lower amounts of grain than other sections of the country. Historian Stephen G. Wheatcroft lists four problems Soviet authorities ignored during collectivization that would hinder
2040-553: The 1960s, Saltivka was called Saltivsky village , and consisted of a few small scattered areas with three-story buildings (Tyurinka, Stara Saltivka, Shevchenky, Selyshche imeni Kirova). Saltivka was conceived from the start as a purely residential neighborhood according to the Soviet concept of creating so-called sleeping districts in large industrial cities. Saltivka has almost no industrial compounds, but there are many shops and markets for residents. The neighborhood includes one of
2125-579: The CP(b) of Ukraine Decree of 8 February 1933 said no hunger cases should have remained untreated. The Ukrainian Weekly , which was tracking the situation in 1933, reported the difficulties in communications and the appalling situation in Ukraine. Local authorities had to submit reports about the numbers suffering from hunger, the reasons for hunger, number of deaths from hunger, food aid provided from local sources, and centrally provided food aid required. The GPU managed parallel reporting and food assistance in
2210-491: The Holodomor has been described as a "Ukrainian Holocaust". They assert that since the 1990s the term Holodomor has been widely adopted by anti-communists in order to draw parallels to the Holocaust . However this term has been criticized by some academics, as the Holocaust was a heavily documented, coordinated effort by Nazi Germany and its collaborators to eliminate certain ethnic groups such as Jews. By contrast, there
2295-472: The Holodomor in eight analyzed Oblasts in the Soviet Union occurred in the first seven months of 1933. The first reports of mass malnutrition and deaths from starvation emerged from two urban areas of the city of Uman , reported in January 1933 by Vinnytsia and Kyiv oblasts . By mid-January 1933, there were reports about mass "difficulties" with food in urban areas, which had been undersupplied through
2380-702: The Kuban and Ukraine. Soviet authorities blamed the exodus of peasants during the famine on anti-Soviet elements, saying that "like the outflow from Ukraine last year, was organized by the enemies of Soviet power." There was a wave of migration due to starvation and authorities responded by introducing a requirement that passports be used to go between republics and banning travel by rail. During March 1933 GPU reported that 219,460 people were either intercepted and escorted back or arrested at its checkpoints meant to prevent movement of peasants between districts. It has been estimated that there were some 150,000 excess deaths as
2465-572: The North Caucasus, and only 43 in the Central Black Earth Oblast (out of 1,630 total). Reports two years prior recorded over 4,000 unrests in Ukraine, while in other agricultural regions - Central Black Earth, Middle Volga, Lower Volga, and North Caucasus - the numbers were sightly above 1,000. OGPU's summaries also cited public proclamations of Ukrainian insurgents to restore the independence of Ukraine , while reports by
2550-496: The Saltivka neighborhood, along with its depot. The area is additionally served by four lines of the Kharkiv tram system . One the city's two tram depots is also located in the area, it was once the largest in the former Soviet Union , with an area of 20.8 hectares, however it was almost completely destroyed by russian artillery bombardment. There are also many trolley, bus, and marshrutka (mini bus) stations and lines that serve
2635-403: The Soviet Union (identity cards) was introduced on 27 December 1932 to deal with the exodus of peasants from the countryside. Individuals not having such a document could not leave their homes on pain of administrative penalties, such as internment in labour camps ( Gulag ). On 22 January 1933, Joseph Stalin signed a secret decree restricting travel by peasants after requests for bread began in
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2720-448: The Soviet Union. Some historians conclude that the famine was deliberately engineered by Joseph Stalin to eliminate a Ukrainian independence movement. Others suggest that the famine was primarily the consequence of rapid Soviet industrialisation and collectivization of agriculture. A middle position is that the initial causes of the famine were an unintentional byproduct of the process of collectivization but once it set in, starvation
2805-478: The Soviet elite. Leon Trotsky , however, opposed the policy of forced collectivisation under Stalin and would have favoured a voluntary , gradual approach towards collective farming with greater tolerance for the rights of Soviet Ukrainians. This campaign of "colonizing" the peasantry had its roots both in old Russian Imperialism and modern social engineering of the nation state yet with key differences to
2890-592: The Soviet government. By 1 July 1933, around 1,141,000 tons of grain were kept in partially secret reserves which the government did not want to touch. Stephen Wheatcroft, Mark Tauger, and R.W. Davies conclude: "it seems certain that, if Stalin had risked lower levels of these reserves in spring and summer 1933, hundreds of thousands – perhaps millions – of lives could have been saved". In order to make up for unfulfilled grain procurement quotas in Ukraine, reserves of grain were confiscated from three sources including, according to Oleh Wolowyna, "(a) grain set side for seed for
2975-402: The Soviet leadership used the human-made famine to attack Ukrainian nationalism , and thus it could fall under the legal definition of genocide. For example, special and particularly lethal policies were adopted in and largely limited to Soviet Ukraine at the end of 1932 and 1933. According to Timothy Snyder , "each of them may seem like an anodyne administrative measure, and each of them
3060-593: The Soviet regime "that has neglected the lives of people for the achievement of economic and political goals". Holodomor literally translated from Ukrainian means "death by hunger", "killing by hunger, killing by starvation", or sometimes "murder by hunger or starvation." It is a compound of the Ukrainian holod , ' hunger ', and mor , ' plague '. The expression holodom moryty means "to inflict death by hunger." The Ukrainian verb moryty ( морити ) means "to poison, to drive to exhaustion, or to torment." The perfective form of moryty
3145-529: The USSR in 1932". Other scholars argue that in other years preceding the famine this was not the case. For example, Stanislav Kulchytsky claims Ukraine produced more grain in 1930 than the Central Black Earth Oblast , Middle and Lower Volga and North Caucasus regions all together, which had never been done before, and on average gave 4.7 quintals of grain from every sown hectare to the state—a record-breaking index of marketability—but
3230-502: The Ukrainian Communist Party (500,000 members, ha, ha) there are not a few (yes, not a few!) rotten elements that are conscious or unconscious Petliura adherents and in the final analysis agents of Pilsudski. If the situation gets any worse, these elements won't hesitate to open a front within (and outside) the Party, against the Party. Worst of all, the Ukrainian leadership doesn't see these dangers.... Set yourself
3315-430: The Ukrainian SSR. Many regional reports and most of the central summary reports are available from present-day central and regional Ukrainian archives. While scholars are in consensus that the cause of the famine was man-made, it remains in dispute whether the Holodomor was directed at Ukrainians and whether it constitutes a genocide , the point of contention being the absence of attested documents explicitly ordering
3400-498: The Ukrainian officials included information about the declining popularity and authority of the party among peasants. Oleh Wolowyna comments that peasant resistance and the ensuing repression of said resistance was a critical factor for the famine in Ukraine and parts of Russia populated by national minorities like Germans and Ukrainians allegedly tainted by "fascism and bourgeois nationalism" according to Soviet authorities. The collectivization and high procurement quota explanation for
3485-598: The administration of Staryi Saltiv settlement hromada , one of the hromadas of Ukraine. Population: 3,329 (2022 estimate). The name of the village is eponymously derived from the folklore word of Turkic origin "saltan", aka "sultan" in English. Most likely there was a proto-city here founded in the Middle Ages under the Khazar Kaghanate . The town of Saltiv was first mentioned as an old settlement in
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3570-442: The advancement of agricultural technology and ultimately contributed to the famine: Mark Tauger notes that Soviet and Western specialist at the time noted draught power shortages and lack of crop rotation contributed to intense weed infestations, with these both being also factors Stephen Wheatcroft lists as contributing to the famine. Natalya Naumenko calculated that reduced agriculture production in "collectivized" collective farms
3655-513: The area. 50°01′N 36°21′E / 50.017°N 36.350°E / 50.017; 36.350 Staryi Saltiv Staryi Saltiv ( Ukrainian : Старий Салтів , Russian : Старый Салтов ) is a rural settlement in Chuhuiv Raion of Kharkiv Oblast in Ukraine . It is located on the right bank of the Donets , which is dammed here as Pechenyhi Reservoir . Staryi Saltiv hosts
3740-888: The blacklisted farms being in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast alone. Every single raion in Dnipropetrovsk had at least one blacklisted village, and in Vinnytsia oblast five entire raions were blacklisted. This oblast is situated right in the middle of traditional lands of the Zaporizhian Cossacks . Cossack villages were also blacklisted in the Volga and Kuban regions of Russia. Some blacklisted areas in Kharkiv could have death rates exceeding 40% while in other areas such as Vinnytsia blacklisting had no particular effect on mortality. The passport system in
3825-480: The bulk of the buildings in Saltivka began in the 1970s. Few new buildings have been added since the 1990s, mostly near the Studentska and Saltivska metro stations. Saltivka was shelled on a daily basis and heavily damaged during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine . Saltivka is linked to the city center by the second line of Kharkiv Metro , called Saltivska. Four of the subway lines stations are located in
3910-594: The church and secularized church schools. By early 1930 75% of the Autocephalist parishes in Ukraine were persecuted by Soviet authorities. The GPU instigated a show trial which denounced the Orthodox Church in Ukraine as a "nationalist, political, counter-revolutionary organization" and instigated a staged "self-dissolution." However the Church was later allowed to reorganize in December 1930 under
3995-691: The efficacy of collective farms arguing Tauger's view goes against the consensus, she also states that the tenfold difference in death toll between the 1932-1933 Soviet famine and the Russian famine of 1891–1892 can only be explained by government policies, and that the infestations of pests and plant disease suggested by Tauger as a cause of the famine must also correspond such infestations to rates of collectivization due to deaths by area corresponding to this due Naumenko's findings that: "on average, if you compare two regions with similar pre-famine characteristics, one with zero collectivization rate and another with
4080-408: The ethnically Ukrainian Kuban region in the 1930s. A blacklisted collective farm, village, or raion (district) had its monetary loans and grain advances called in, stores closed, grain supplies, livestock, and food confiscated as a penalty, and was cut off from trade. Its Communist Party and collective farm committees were purged and subject to arrest, and their territory was forcibly cordoned off by
4165-420: The famine could have been greatly reduced or even eliminated" however (in his words) "if the regime had left that grain in Ukraine, then other parts of the USSR would have been even more deprived of food than they were, including Ukrainian cities and industrial sites, and the overall effect would still have been a major famine, even worse in "non-Ukrainian" regions." In fact in contrast to Naumenko's paper's claims
4250-424: The famine is called into question by the fact that the oblasts of Ukraine with the highest losses were Kyiv and Kharkiv , which produced far lower amounts of grain than other sections of the country. A potential explanation for this was that Kharkiv and Kyiv fulfilled and over fulfilled their grain procurements in 1930 which led to raions in these oblasts having their procurement quotas doubled in 1931 compared to
4335-446: The famine were an unintentional byproduct of the process of collectivization but once it set in, starvation was selectively weaponized and the famine was "instrumentalized" and amplified against Ukrainians as a means to punish Ukrainians for resisting Soviet policies and to suppress their nationalist sentiments . Some scholars suggest that the famine was a consequence of human-made and natural factors. The most prevalent man-made factor
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#17327979156524420-467: The famine. Early estimates of the death toll by scholars and government officials vary greatly. A joint statement to the United Nations signed by 25 countries in 2003 declared that 7 to 10 million died. However, current scholarship estimates a range significantly lower with 3.5 to 5 million victims. The famine's widespread impact on Ukraine persists to this day. Public discussion of the famine
4505-452: The fields. There were more than 200,000 people sentenced under this law. Stalin wrote a letter to Lazar Kaganovich on 11 September 1932, shortly before Kaganovich and Vyacheslav Molotov were appointed heads of special commissions to oversee the grain procurements in Ukraine and Kuban (a region populated primarily by ethnic Ukrainians at the time), in which Stalin urged Kaganovich to force Ukraine into absolute compliance: The main thing
4590-597: The first official use of famine was in a December 1987 speech by Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi , First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine , on the occasion of the republic's 70th anniversary. Another early public usage in the Soviet Union was in a February 1988 speech by Oleksiy Musiyenko, Deputy Secretary for ideological matters of the party organisation of the Kyiv branch of
4675-452: The harvest suggested by Tauger included endemic plant rust. However, in regard to plant disease Stephen Wheatcroft notes that the Soviet extension of sown area combined with lack of crop rotation may have exacerbated the problem, which Tauger also acknowledges in regard to the latter. Due to factional struggles with Bukharin wing of the party, peasant resistance to the NEP under Lenin , and
4760-434: The harvest that had been lost to crop "rust and smut", four reductions in grain procurement to Ukraine including a 39.5 million puds reduction in grain procurements ordered by Stalin, and that from Tauger's findings which are contrary to Naumenko's paper's claims the "per-capita grain procurements in Ukraine were less, often significantly less, than the per-capita procurements from the five other main grain-producing regions in
4845-611: The higher Ukrainian collectivization rates in Tauger's opinion actually indicate a pro-Ukrainian bias in Soviet policies rather than an anti-Ukrainian one: "[Soviet authorities] did not see collectivization as "discrimination" against Ukrainians; they saw it as a reflection of—in the leaders' view—Ukraine's relatively more advanced farming skills that made Ukraine better prepared for collectivization (Davies 1980a, 166, 187–188; Tauger 2006a)." Naumenko responded to some of Tauger's criticisms in another paper. Naumenko criticizes Tauger's view of
4930-642: The largest warehouse markets in Ukraine near the Akademika Barabashova station of the Kharkiv metro . The Barabashov marketplace, according to some sources, is the largest in Europe. Residential development was initiated by the Dipromisto Institute in 1963. Saltivka's residential panel buildings typically have 9, 12 and 16 floors, and more rarely, 5 floors. Separate high-rise buildings were constructed from 1967, and construction on
5015-443: The latter such as Soviet repression reflecting more the weakness of said state rather than its strength. In this vein by the summer of 1930, the government instituted a program of food requisitioning, ostensibly to increase grain exports. According to Natalya Naumenko, collectivization in the Soviet Union and lack of favored industries were primary contributors to famine mortality (52% of excess deaths), and some evidence shows there
5100-613: The national average increase in procurement rate of 9%. While Kharkiv and Kyiv had their quotas increased, the Odesa oblast and some raions of Dnipropetrovsk oblast had their procurement quotas decreased. According to Nataliia Levchuk of the Ptoukha Institute of Demography and Social Studies, "the distribution of the largely increased 1931 grain quotas in Kharkiv and Kyiv oblasts by raion was very uneven and unjustified because it
5185-413: The need for industrialization, Joseph Stalin declared a need to extract a "tribute" or "tax" from the peasantry. This idea was supported by most of the party in the 1920s. The tribute collected by the party took on the form of a virtual war against the peasantry that would lead to its cultural destruction and the relegating of the countryside to essentially a colony homogenized to the urban culture of
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#17327979156525270-400: The old stone foundations of the ancient Khazar fortress. According to data for 1864 in the state settlement, the center of Starosaltivska volost of Vovchansky district, 2544 people lived (1254 males and 1290 females), there were 448 households, there was an Orthodox church, distillery and brick factories, 4 annual fairs. As of 1914, the population had grown to 6,538. The village suffered as
5355-615: The paper argues demonstrates that ethnic discrimination across the board was centrally planned, ultimately concluding that 92% of famine deaths in Ukraine alone along with 77% of famine deaths in Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus combined can be explained by systematic bias against Ukrainians. Mark Tauger criticized Natalya Naumenko's work as being based on: "major historical inaccuracies and falsehoods, omissions of essential evidence contained in her sources or easily available, and substantial misunderstandings of certain key topics". For example, Naumenko ignored Tauger's findings of 8.94 million tons of
5440-401: The period was the relentless search for alleged hidden grain by the confiscation of all food stuffs from certain households, which Stalin implicitly approved of through a telegram he sent on 1 January 1933 to the Ukrainian government reminding Ukrainian farmers of the severe penalties for not surrendering grain they may be hiding. On the other hand, considerable grain reserves were held back by
5525-497: The rationing system, and deaths from starvation among people who were refused rations, according to the December 1932 decree of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party. By the beginning of February 1933, according to reports from local authorities and Ukrainian GPU (secret police), the most affected area was Dnipropetrovsk Oblast , which also suffered from epidemics of typhus and malaria . Odesa and Kyiv oblasts were second and third respectively. By mid-March, most of
5610-436: The regional discrepancies: "[Naumenko's] calculations again omit any consideration of the agro-environmental disasters that harmed farm production in 1932. In her appendices, Table C3, she does the same calculation with collectivization data from 1932, which she argues shows a closer correlation between collectivization and famine mortality (Naumenko 2021b, 33). Yet, as I showed, those agroenvironmental disasters were much worse in
5695-655: The regions with higher collectivization—especially Ukraine, the North Caucasus, and the Volga River basin (and also in Kazakhstan)—than elsewhere in the USSR. As I documented in my article and other publications, these were regions that had a history of environmental disasters that caused crop failures and famines repeatedly in Russian history." Tauger notes: "[Naumenko's] assumption that collectivization subjected peasants to higher procurements, but in 1932 in Ukraine this
5780-518: The reports of starvation originated from Kyiv Oblast. By mid-April 1933, Kharkiv Oblast reached the top of the most affected list, while Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Vinnytsia, and Donetsk oblasts, and Moldavian SSR were next on the list. Reports about mass deaths from starvation, dated mid-May through the beginning of June 1933, originated from raions in Kyiv and Kharkiv oblasts. The "less affected" list noted Chernihiv Oblast and northern parts of Kyiv and Vinnytsia oblasts. The Central Committee of
5865-470: The repression of the Orthodox Church to be a prong of genocide against Ukrainians when seen in correlation to the Holodomor famine. Collectivization did not just entail the acquisition of land from farmers but also the closing of churches, burning of icons, and the arrests of priests. Associating the church with the tsarist regime, the Soviet state continued to undermine the church through expropriations and repression. They cut off state financial support to
5950-408: The same period versus 1932 where three Russian regions delivered almost all of their procurements and Ukraine and North Caucasus did not. This can partially be explained by Ukrainian regions losing a third of their harvests and Russian regions losing by comparison only 15% of their harvest. Ultimately, Tauger states: "if the regime had not taken even that smaller amount grain from Ukrainian villages,
6035-494: The standpoint of the Soviet [state] line. Chubar is no leader. Bad from the standpoint of the GPU . Redens lacks the energy to direct the struggle with the counterrevolution in such a big and unique republic as Ukraine. If we do not now correct the situation in Ukraine, we could lose Ukraine. Consider that Piłsudski is not daydreaming, and his agents in Ukraine are much stronger than Redens or Kosior imagine. Also consider that within
6120-419: The starvation of any area in the Soviet Union. Some historians conclude that the famine was deliberately engineered by Joseph Stalin to eliminate a Ukrainian independence movement. Others suggest that the famine was primarily the consequence of rapid Soviet industrialisation and collectivization of agriculture. A middle position, held for example by historian Andrea Graziosi, is that the initial causes of
6205-512: The task of turning Ukraine in the shortest possible time into a fortress of the USSR, into the most inalienable republic. Don't worry about money for this purpose. The blacklist system was formalized in 1932 by the 20 November decree "The Struggle against Kurkul Influence in Collective Farms"; blacklisting, synonymous with a board of infamy, was one of the elements of agitation-propaganda in the Soviet Union , and especially Ukraine and
6290-573: The trial including 30,000 intellectuals, writers, teachers, and scientists. The "Decree About the Protection of Socialist Property", nicknamed by the farmers the Law of Spikelets , was enacted on 7 August 1932. The purpose of the law was to protect the property of the kolkhoz collective farms. It was nicknamed the Law of Spikelets because it allowed people to be prosecuted for gleaning leftover grain from
6375-410: Was a constituent republic , any references to the famine were dismissed as anti-Soviet propaganda , even after de-Stalinization in 1956, until the declassification and publication of historical documents in the late 1980s made continued denial of the catastrophe unsustainable. Discussion of the Holodomor became possible as part of the Soviet glasnost ("openness") policy in the 1980s. In Ukraine,
6460-603: Was banned in the Soviet Union until the glasnost period initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the 1980s. Since 2006, the Holodomor has been recognized by Ukraine and 33 other UN member states, the European Parliament , and 35 of the 50 states of the United States as a genocide against the Ukrainian people carried out by the Soviet government. In 2008, the Russian State Duma condemned
6545-564: Was certainly presented as such at the time, and yet each had to kill." Other sources discuss the famine in relation to a project of imperialism or colonialism of Ukraine by the Soviet state. According to a Centre for Economic Policy Research paper published in 2021 by Andrei Markevich, Natalya Naumenko, and Nancy Qian, regions with higher Ukrainian population shares were struck harder with centrally planned policies corresponding to famine such as increased procurement rate, and Ukrainian populated areas were given lower numbers of tractors which
6630-661: Was changes made to agriculture because of rapid industrialisation during the First Five Year Plan . There are also those who blame a systematic set of policies perpetrated by the Soviet government under Stalin designed to exterminate the Ukrainians. According to historian Stephen G. Wheatcroft , the grain yield for the Soviet Union preceding the famine was a low harvest of between 55 and 60 million tons, likely in part caused by damp weather and low traction power, yet official statistics mistakenly reported
6715-515: Was claimed that this was an illegal armed insurgent organisation created in December 1929, which existed in Ukraine and Chechnya ) and "Ukrainian National Center" trial in 1931 (another non-existent counter-revolutionary organisation). In RSFSR at that time some other show trials such as Industrial Party Trial (1930) and the 1931 Menshevik Trial were held. The total number is not known, but tens of thousands of people are estimated to have been arrested, exiled, and/or executed during and after
6800-413: Was clearly not the case" as "grain procurements both total and per-capita were much lower in Ukraine than anywhere else in the USSR in 1932". Soviet institutions Policies Collectivization in the Soviet Union , including the Ukrainian SSR, was not popular among the peasantry, and forced collectivisation led to numerous peasant revolts . The OGPU recorded 932 disturbances in Ukraine, 173 in
6885-440: Was discrimination against ethnic Ukrainians and Germans. In Ukraine collectivisation policy was enforced, entailing extreme crisis and contributing to the famine. In 1929–1930, peasants were induced to transfer land and livestock to state-owned farms, on which they would work as day-labourers for payment in kind. Food exports continued during the famine, albeit at a reduced rate. In regard to exports, Michael Ellman states that
6970-440: Was done disproportionally to the percentage of wheat sown area and their potential grain capacity." Several repressive policies were implemented in Ukraine immediately preceding, during, and proceeding the famine, including but not limited to cultural-religious persecution the Law of Spikelets , Blacklisting , the internal passport system , and harsh grain requisitions. Coiner of the term genocide , Raphael Lemkin considered
7055-427: Was part of the wider Soviet famine of 1930–1933 which affected the major grain-producing areas of the Soviet Union . While scholars are in consensus that the cause of the famine was man-made, it remains in dispute whether the Holodomor was directed at Ukrainians and whether it constitutes a genocide , the point of contention being the absence of attested documents explicitly ordering the starvation of any area in
7140-411: Was selectively weaponized and the famine was "instrumentalized" and amplified against Ukrainians as a means to punish Ukrainians for resisting Soviet policies and to suppress their nationalist sentiments . Ukraine was one of the largest grain-producing states in the USSR and was subject to unreasonably high grain quotas compared to the rest of the USSR. This caused Ukraine to be hit particularly hard by
7225-422: Was unable to fulfill the grain quota for 1930 until May 1931. Ukraine produced a similar amount of grain in 1931; however, by the late spring of 1932 "many districts were left with no reserves of produce or fodder at all". Despite this, according to statistics gathered by Nataliia Levchuk, Ukraine and North Caucasus Krai delivered almost 100% of their grain procurement in 1931 versus 67% in two Russian Oblasts during
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