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40-460: Not to be confused with Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty . Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) may refer to: START I , signed on July 31, 1991 START II , signed January 3, 1993 START III , never signed New START , signed on April 8, 2010 Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with

80-438: A ballistic missile deploys multiple warheads above a single aimpoint which then drift apart, producing a cluster bomb-like effect. These warheads are not individually targetable. The advantage of an MRV over a single warhead is the increased effectiveness due to the greater coverage; this increases the overall damage produced within the center of the pattern, making it far greater than the damage possible from any single warhead in

120-490: A covert purpose to map mass concentrations and determine local gravity anomalies , in order to improve accuracies of ballistic missiles. Accuracy is expressed as circular error probable (CEP). This is the radius of the circle that the warhead has a 50 percent chance of falling into when aimed at the center. CEP is about 90–100 m for the Trident II and Peacekeeper missiles. A multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) system for

160-621: A miniaturized physics package and a lower mass re-entry vehicle, both of which are highly advanced technologies. As a result, single-warhead missiles are more attractive for nations with less advanced or less productive nuclear technology. The United States first deployed MRV warheads on the Polaris A-3 SLBM in 1964 on the USS Daniel Webster . The Polaris A-3 missile carried three warheads each having an approximate yield of 200 kilotonnes of TNT (840 TJ). This system

200-459: A new Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile , striking Dnipro . Analysts stated the missile used a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), likely marking their first use in combat. The night attack was reported to see six sequential vertical flashes, each comprising a cluster of up to six individual projectiles. Ukraine's air force initially claimed an intercontinental ballistic missile (range greater than 5,500 km)

240-596: A series of meetings beginning in Helsinki , with the American delegation headed by Gerard C. Smith , director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency . Subsequent sessions alternated between Vienna and Helsinki. McNamara played a significant role with working to reduce the arms race between the U.S. and Soviet Union. There were two distinct ways in which he worked to govern the nuclear threat. First, he thought

280-566: A single reentry vehicle system, as part of its obligations under the New START treaty. The military purpose of a MIRV is fourfold: MIRV land-based ICBMs were considered destabilizing because they tended to put a premium on striking first . The world's first MIRV—US Minuteman III missile of 1970—threatened to rapidly increase the US's deployable nuclear arsenal and thus the possibility that it would have enough bombs to destroy virtually all of

320-609: Is an exoatmospheric ballistic missile payload containing several warheads , each capable of being aimed to hit a different target. The concept is almost invariably associated with intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying thermonuclear warheads , even if not strictly being limited to them. An intermediate case is the multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) missile which carries several warheads which are dispersed but not individually aimed. All nuclear-weapon states except Pakistan and North Korea are currently confirmed to have deployed MIRV missile systems. The first true MIRV design

360-566: Is because of their first-strike capability that land-based MIRVs were banned under the START II agreement. START II was ratified by the Russian Duma on 14 April 2000, but Russia withdrew from the treaty in 2002 after the US withdrew from the ABM treaty . In a MIRV, the main rocket motor (or booster ) pushes a "bus" into a free-flight suborbital ballistic flight path. After the boost phase,

400-409: Is crucial because doubling the accuracy decreases the needed warhead energy by a factor of four for radiation damage and by a factor of eight for blast damage. Navigation system accuracy and the available geophysical information limits the warhead target accuracy. Some writers believe that government-supported geophysical mapping initiatives and ocean satellite altitude systems such as Seasat may have

440-705: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and an interim agreement between the two countries. Although SALT II resulted in an agreement in 1979 in Vienna , the US Senate chose not to ratify the treaty in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan , which took place later that year. The Supreme Soviet did not ratify it either. The agreement expired on December 31, 1985, and was not renewed, although both sides continued to respect it. The talks led to

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480-839: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Interim Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms . The two sides also agreed to a number of basic principles regarding appropriate conduct. Each recognized the sovereignty of the other; agreed to the principle of noninterference; and sought to promote economic, scientific, and cultural ties of mutual benefit and enrichment. Nixon

520-626: The Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and negate any significant retaliation. Later on the US feared the Soviet's MIRVs because Soviet missiles had a greater throw-weight and could thus put more warheads on each missile than the US could. For example, the US MIRVs might have increased their warhead per missile count by a factor of 6 while the Soviets increased theirs by a factor of 10. Furthermore,

560-473: The Strategic Air Command 's (SAC) arsenal and replace them with the new Minuteman IIIs outfitted with a MIRV payload, increasing their overall effectiveness. The smaller power of the warheads used (W62, W78 and W87) was offset by increasing the accuracy of the system, allowing it to attack the same hard targets as the larger, less accurate, W56. The MMIII was introduced specifically to address

600-501: The MRV cluster; this makes for an efficient area-attack weapon and makes interception by anti-ballistic missiles more challenging due to the number of warheads being deployed at once. Improved warhead designs allow smaller warheads for a given yield, while better electronics and guidance systems allow greater accuracy. As a result, MIRV technology has proven more attractive than MRV for advanced nations. Multiple-warhead missiles require both

640-550: The STARTs, or St rategic A rms R eduction T reaties, which consisted of START I , a 1991 completed agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and START II , a 1993 agreement between the United States and Russia which never entered into effect, both of which proposed limits on multiple-warhead capacities and other restrictions on each side's number of nuclear weapons. A successor to START I, New START ,

680-539: The Soviet construction of an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system around Moscow; MIRV allowed the US to overwhelm any conceivable ABM system without increasing the size of their own missile fleet. The Soviets responded by adding MIRV to their R-36 design, first with three warheads in 1975, and eventually up to ten in later versions. While the United States phased out the use of MIRVs in ICBMs in 2014 to comply with New START , Russia continues to develop new ICBM designs using

720-700: The Soviets could exclusively retain 308 of its so-called " heavy ICBM " launchers of the SS-18 type. A major breakthrough for the agreement occurred at the Vladivostok Summit Meeting in November 1974, when President Gerald Ford and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev came to an agreement on the basic framework for the SALT II agreement. The elements of the agreement were stated to be in effect until 1985. An agreement to limit strategic launchers

760-696: The Soviets tested a system for the SS-9 missile, otherwise known as the R-36 missile . A modified two-tier Moscow ABM system is still used. The United States built only one ABM site to protect a Minuteman base in North Dakota where the " Safeguard " Program was deployed. That base was increasingly more vulnerable to attacks by the Soviet ICBMs because of the advancement in Soviet missile technology. Negotiations lasted from November 17, 1969, to May 26, 1972, in

800-574: The U.S. alongside Soviet continued to make new ballistic missiles. The US nuclear arsenals was far too large at that point in history to even pose for arms limitation at that point. After a long deadlock, the first results of SALT I came in May 1971, when an agreement was reached over ABM systems. Further discussion brought the negotiations to an end in Moscow in 1972, when U.S. President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed both

840-465: The US had a much smaller proportion of its nuclear arsenal in ICBMs than the Soviets. Bombers could not be outfitted with MIRVs so their capacity would not be multiplied. Thus the US did not seem to have as much potential for MIRV usage as the Soviets. However, the US had a larger number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles , which could be outfitted with MIRVs, and helped offset the ICBM disadvantage. It

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880-530: The bus maneuvers using small on-board rocket motors and a computerized inertial guidance system . It takes up a ballistic trajectory that will deliver a re-entry vehicle containing a warhead to a target and then releases a warhead on that trajectory. It then maneuvers to a different trajectory, releasing another warhead, and repeats the process for all warheads. The precise technical details are closely guarded military secrets , to hinder any development of enemy counter-measures. The bus's on-board propellant limits

920-476: The development of additional fixed ICBM launchers. Likewise, the agreement would limit the number of MIRVed ballistic missiles and long range missiles to 1,320. However, the United States preserved its most essential programs like the Trident missile , along with the cruise missiles President Jimmy Carter wished to use as his main defensive weapon as they were too slow to have first strike capability. In return,

960-469: The distances between targets of individual warheads to perhaps a few hundred kilometers. Some warheads may use small hypersonic airfoils during the descent to gain additional cross-range distance. Additionally, some buses (e.g. the British Chevaline system) can release decoys to confuse interception devices and radars , such as aluminized balloons or electronic noisemakers. Accuracy

1000-579: The manufacture of strategic nuclear weapons . It was a continuation of the SALT I talks and was led by representatives from both countries. It was the first nuclear arms treaty to assume real reductions in strategic forces to 2,250 of all categories of delivery vehicles on both sides. The SALT II Treaty banned new missile programs, defined as those with any key parameter 5% better than in currently-employed missiles. That forced both sides to limit their new strategic missile types development and construction, such as

1040-409: The nature and course of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. nuclear disarmament and arms control policy, and to separate them from those practiced by Nixon’s predecessors. They also intended, through linkage, to make U.S. arms control policy part of détente. [...] His policy of linkage had in fact failed. It failed mainly because it was based on flawed assumptions and false premises, the foremost of which

1080-400: The need to avoid the deployment of an ABM system from both countries. To do this, the second thing he believed was the only way to limit the tension was to have many negotiations and discussion about deterrence, holding each other responsible for keeping peace through full communication. One problem that he ran into was that limitation strategies weren't working and open to full of critiques, and

1120-483: The northeastern border of the Continental United States to the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. In addition, SALT I limited the number of SLBM capable submarines that NATO and the United States could operate to 50 with a maximum of 800 SLBM launchers between them. If the United States or NATO were to increase that number, the Soviets could respond with increasing their arsenal by

1160-718: The same amount. The strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States were changing in character in 1968. The total number of missiles held by the United States had been static since 1967 at 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs but there was an increasing number of missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads being deployed. MIRVs carried multiple nuclear warheads, often with dummies , to confuse ABM systems, making MIRV defense by ABM systems increasingly difficult and expensive. Both sides were also permitted to increase their number of SLBM forces but only if they disassembled an equivalent number of older ICBMs or SLBM launchers on older submarines. One of

1200-445: The technology. The introduction of MIRV led to a major change in the strategic balance. Previously, with one warhead per missile, it was conceivable that one could build a defense that used missiles to attack individual warheads. Any increase in missile fleet by the enemy could be countered by a similar increase in interceptors. With MIRV, a single new enemy missile meant that multiple interceptors would have to be built, meaning that it

1240-488: The terms of the treaty required both countries to limit the number of deployment sites protected by an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system to one each. The idea of that system was to prevent a competition in ABM deployment between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had deployed such a system around Moscow in 1966, and the United States announced an ABM program to protect twelve ICBM sites in 1967. After 1968,

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty - Misplaced Pages Continue

1280-582: The title Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Strategic_Arms_Reduction_Treaty&oldid=543602053 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Negotiations commenced in Helsinki , in November 1969. SALT I led to

1320-589: The unit had been stationed on the island since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. In light of those developments, Carter withdrew the treaty from consideration in January 1980, and the US Senate never consented to ratification although terms were honored by both sides until 1986. SALT II was superseded by START I in 1991. Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle A multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle ( MIRV )

1360-750: Was also used by the Royal Navy who also retained MRV with the Chevaline upgrade, though the number of warheads in Chevaline was reduced to two due to the ABM counter-measures carried. The Soviet Union deployed 3 MRVs on the R-27U SLBM and 3 MRVs on the R-36P ICBM. Refer to atmospheric re-entry for more details. On November 21, 2024, as part of the Russian invasion of Ukraine , Russia launched

1400-449: Was much less expensive to increase the attack than the defense. This cost-exchange ratio was so heavily biased towards the attacker that the concept of mutual assured destruction became the leading concept in strategic planning and ABM systems were severely limited in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in order to avoid a massive arms race . In June 2017 the United States finished converting its Minuteman III missiles back to using

1440-675: Was proposed and was eventually ratified in February 2011. SALT I is the common name for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Agreement signed on May 26, 1972. SALT I froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers at existing levels and provided for the addition of new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers only after the same number of older intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and SLBM launchers had been dismantled. SALT I also limited land-based ICBMs that were in range from

1480-583: Was proud that his diplomatic skills made him achieve an agreement that his predecessors had been unable to reach. Nixon and Kissinger planned to link arms control to détente and to the resolution of other urgent problems through what Nixon called "linkage". David Tal argues: The linkage between strategic arms limitations and outstanding issues such as the Middle East, Berlin and, foremost, Vietnam thus became central to Nixon's and Kissinger's policy of détente. Through employment of linkage, they hoped to change

1520-686: Was reached in Vienna on June 18, 1979, and was signed by Brezhnev and Carter at a ceremony held in the Redoutensaal of the Hofburg Palace . Six months after the signing, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan , and in September, the United States discovered that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Cuba. Although Carter claimed that the Soviet brigade had been deployed to Cuba only recently,

1560-555: Was that the Soviet Union wanted strategic arms limitation agreement much more than the United States did. The agreement paved the way for further discussion regarding international cooperation and a limitation of nuclear armaments, as seen through both the SALT II Treaty and the Washington Summit of 1973 . SALT II was a series of talks between American and Soviet negotiators from 1972 to 1979 that sought to curtail

1600-606: Was the Minuteman III , first successfully tested in 1968 and introduced into actual use in 1970. The Minuteman III held three smaller W62 warheads, with yields of about 170 kilotons of TNT (710 TJ) each in place of the single 1.2 megatons of TNT (5.0 PJ) W56 used on the Minuteman II. From 1970 to 1975, the United States would remove approximately 550 earlier versions of the Minuteman ICBM in

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