Swami ( [sʋaːmiː] ; Sanskrit : स्वामी , romanized : svāmī ; sometimes abbreviated sw. ) in Hinduism is an honorific title given to an ascetic who has chosen the path of renunciation ( sanyāsa ), or has been initiated into a religious monastic order of Vaishnavas . It is used either before or after the subject's name (usually an adopted religious name). An alternative form, swamini ( svāmini ), is sometimes used by female renunciates.
74-473: The meaning of the Sanskrit root of the word swami is "[he who is] one with his self " ( swa stands for "self"), and can roughly be translated as "he/she who knows and is master of himself/herself". The term is often attributed to someone who has achieved mastery of a particular yogic system or demonstrated profound devotion ( bhakti ) to one or more Hindu gods . The Oxford English Dictionary gives
148-405: A teleology , and sometimes as having a theory of forms . While actuality is linked by Aristotle to his concept of a formal cause , potentiality (or potency) on the other hand, is linked by Aristotle to his concepts of hylomorphic matter and material cause . Aristotle wrote for example that "matter exists potentially, because it may attain to the form; but when it exists actually, it is then in
222-413: A consensus, it has been described as having become "orthodox". This and similar more recent publications are the basis of the following summary. Kosman (1969) and Coope (2009) associate this approach with W. D. Ross . Sachs (2005) points out that it was also the interpretation of Averroes and Maimonides . This interpretation is, to use the words of Ross that "it is the passage to actuality that
296-626: A criminal." The potencies which persist in a particular material are one way of describing "the nature itself" of that material, an innate source of motion and rest within that material. In terms of Aristotle's theory of four causes , a material's non-accidental potential is the material cause of the things that can come to be from that material, and one part of how we can understand the substance ( ousia , sometimes translated as "thinghood") of any separate thing. (As emphasized by Aristotle, this requires his distinction between accidental causes and natural causes.) According to Aristotle, when we refer to
370-560: A definition. Two examples of energeiai in Aristotle's works are pleasure and happiness ( eudaimonia ). Pleasure is an energeia of the human body and mind whereas happiness is more simply the energeia of a human being a human. Kinesis , translated as movement , motion , or in some contexts change, is also explained by Aristotle as a particular type of energeia . See below. Entelechy , in Greek entelécheia ,
444-657: A fixed self, while stating that holding the view "I have no self" is also mistaken. This is an example of the Middle Way charted by the Buddha and the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. That absence of a self definition is directed to avoid clinging to the "I", seek reality and attain detachment , and it is found in many passages of the oldest Buddha sutras , recorded in the Pali Canon , such as this: "Bhikkhus, form
518-430: A governing source is above the material it works on. Knowledge [ epistēmē ], in its being-at-work , is the same as the thing it knows, and while knowledge in potency comes first in time in any one knower, in the whole of things it does not take precedence even in time. This does not mean that at one time it thinks but at another time it does not think, but when separated it is just exactly what it is, and this alone
592-538: A kind of convenient fiction , like a center of gravity , which is convenient as a way of solving physics problems, although they need not correspond to anything tangible — the center of gravity of a hoop is a point in thin air. People constantly tell themselves stories to make sense of their world, and they feature in the stories as a character, and that convenient but fictional character is the self. Aaron Sloman has proposed that words like self , selves , herself , itself , themselves , myself , etc. do not refer to
666-430: A knife had a soul, the act of cutting would be that soul, because 'cutting' is part of the essence of what it is to be a knife. More precisely, the soul is the "first activity" of a living body. This is a state, or a potential for actual, or 'second', activity. "The axe has an edge for cutting" was, for Aristotle, analogous to "humans have bodies for rational activity," and the potential for rational activity thus constituted
740-443: A living being, and while claiming that it did not exist apart from the body, he considered its so-called " intellect " part to be immortal and perpetual, in contrast to its organism-dependent vegetative/nutritive and perceptual functions. In his theory of causes and of act and potency , Aristotle emphasizes beings in relation to their actual manifestation, and in turn the soul was also defined by its actual effects. For instance, if
814-627: A matter of characterizing the loose cohesion of one's personal experience. (Note that in the Appendix to the Treatise , Hume said without elaboration that he was dissatisfied with his account of the self, yet he never returned to the issue.) The paradox of the Ship of Theseus can be used as an analogy of the self as a bundle of parts in flux. Daniel Dennett has a deflationary theory of the "self". Selves are not physically detectable. Instead, they are
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#1732764706457888-603: A proper kind of activity or work which, if achieved, would be their proper end. Greek for end in this sense is telos , a component word in entelecheia (a work that is the proper end of a thing) and also teleology . This is an aspect of Aristotle's theory of four causes and specifically of formal cause ( eidos , which Aristotle says is energeia ) and final cause ( telos ). In essence this means that Aristotle did not see things as matter in motion only, but also proposed that all things have their own aims or ends. In other words, for Aristotle (unlike modern science), there
962-462: A sense, a thing that exists potentially does not exist; but, the potential does exist. And this type of distinction is expressed for several different types of being within Aristotle's categories of being. For example, from Aristotle's Metaphysics , 1017a: Within the works of Aristotle the terms energeia and entelecheia , often translated as actuality, differ from what is merely actual because they specifically presuppose that all things have
1036-420: A special type of entity, but provide powerful syntactical mechanisms for constructing utterances that repeatedly refer to the same thing without tedious and obscure repetition of names or other referring expressions. The spiritual goal of many traditions involves the dissolving of the ego , in contrast to the essential Self, allowing self-knowledge of one's own true nature to become experienced and enacted in
1110-414: A tendency towards being-at-work in a particular way that would be their proper and "complete" way. Sachs explains the convergence of energeia and entelecheia as follows, and uses the word actuality to describe the overlap between them: Just as energeia extends to entelecheia because it is the activity which makes a thing what it is, entelecheia extends to energeia because it
1184-502: A thing can be said to have. Aristotle did not consider all possibilities the same, and emphasized the importance of those that become real of their own accord when conditions are right and nothing stops them. Actuality, in contrast to potentiality, is the motion, change or activity that represents an exercise or fulfillment of a possibility, when a possibility becomes real in the fullest sense. Both these concepts therefore reflect Aristotle's belief that events in nature are not all natural in
1258-460: A true sense. As he saw it, many things happen accidentally, and therefore not according to the natural purposes of things. These concepts, in modified forms, remained very important into the Middle Ages , influencing the development of medieval theology in several ways. In modern times the dichotomy has gradually lost importance, as understandings of nature and deity have changed. However
1332-414: Is kinesis " as opposed to any potentiality being an actuality. The argument of Ross for this interpretation requires him to assert that Aristotle actually used his own word entelecheia wrongly, or inconsistently, only within his definition, making it mean "actualization", which is in conflict with Aristotle's normal use of words. According to Sachs (2005) this explanation also can not account for
1406-472: Is a cognate word. This Hinduism-related article is a stub . You can help Misplaced Pages by expanding it . Philosophy of self#Self in Eastern traditions The philosophy of self examines the idea of the self at a conceptual level. Many different ideas on what constitutes self have been proposed, including the self being an activity, the self being independent of the senses, the bundle theory of
1480-401: Is a distinction between the various features of a person and the mysterious self that supposedly bears those features. When we start introspecting, "we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement". It is plain, that in
1554-428: Is a distinction between things with a natural cause in the strongest sense, and things that truly happen by accident. He also distinguishes non-rational from rational potentialities (e.g. the capacity to heat and the capacity to play the flute, respectively), pointing out that the latter require desire or deliberate choice for their actualization. Because of this style of reasoning, Aristotle is often referred to as having
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#17327647064571628-545: Is a species is being-at-work-staying-itself ( entelecheia ), of which the only other species is thinghood. The being-at-work-staying-itself of a potency ( dunamis ), as material, is thinghood. The being-at-work-staying-the-same of a potency as a potency is motion. The actuality-potentiality distinction in Aristotle is a key element linked to everything in his physics and metaphysics. Aristotle describes potentiality and actuality, or potency and action, as one of several distinctions between things that exist or do not exist. In
1702-435: Is a three-ring circus of a word, at the heart of everything in Aristotle's thinking, including the definition of motion. Sachs therefore proposed a complex neologism of his own, "being-at-work-staying-the-same." Another translation in recent years is "being-at-an-end" (which Sachs has also used). Entelecheia , as can be seen by its derivation, is a kind of completeness, whereas "the end and completion of any genuine being
1776-504: Is a traditional translation, but its normal meaning in Latin is 'anything which is currently happening.' The two words energeia and entelecheia were coined by Aristotle, and he stated that their meanings were intended to converge. In practice, most commentators and translators consider the two words to be interchangeable. They both refer to something being in its own type of action or at work, as all things are when they are real in
1850-546: Is also sometimes used for things like musical instruments. Throughout his works, Aristotle clearly distinguishes things that are stable or persistent, with their own strong natural tendency to a specific type of change, from things that appear to occur by chance. He treats these as having a different and more real existence. " Natures which persist" are said by him to be one of the causes of all things, while natures that do not persist, "might often be slandered as not being at all by one who fixes his thinking sternly upon it as upon
1924-643: Is also the surname of the Bairagi caste in Haryana , Uttar Pradesh , and Rajasthan . In Bengali , the word (pronounced [ˈʃami] ), while carrying its original meaning, also has the meaning of " husband " in another context. The word also means "husband" in Malay , in which it is spelled suami , and in Khmer , Assamese and Odia . The Thai word for "husband", sami ( สามี ) or swami ( สวามี )
1998-419: Is an ordinary Greek word for possibility or capability. Depending on context, it could be translated 'potency', 'potential', 'capacity', 'ability', 'power', 'capability', 'strength', 'possibility', 'force' and is the root of modern English words dynamic , dynamite , and dynamo . In his philosophy, Aristotle distinguished two meanings of the word dunamis . According to his understanding of nature there
2072-470: Is deathless and everlasting (though we have no memory, because this sort of intellect is not acted upon, while the sort that is acted upon is destructible), and without this nothing thinks. This has been referred to as one of "the most intensely studied sentences in the history of philosophy." In the Metaphysics , Aristotle wrote at more length on a similar subject and is often understood to have equated
2146-462: Is found implicitly the notion of potency and act in his cosmological presentation of becoming ( kinēsis ) and forces ( dunamis ), linked to the ordering intellect , mainly in the description of the Demiurge and the "Receptacle" in his Timaeus . It has also been associated to the dyad of Plato's unwritten doctrines , and is involved in the question of being and non-being since from
2220-546: Is from the De Anima , translated by Joe Sachs, with some parenthetic notes about the Greek. The passage tries to explain "how the human intellect passes from its original state, in which it does not think, to a subsequent state, in which it does." He inferred that the energeia / dunamis distinction must also exist in the soul itself: ...since in nature one thing is the material [ hulē ] for each kind [ genos ] (this
2294-439: Is its being-at-work" ( energeia ). The entelecheia is a continuous being-at-work ( energeia ) when something is doing its complete "work". For this reason, the meanings of the two words converge, and they both depend upon the idea that every thing's "thinghood" is a kind of work, or in other words a specific way of being in motion. All things that exist now, and not just potentially, are beings-at-work, and all of them have
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2368-490: Is no longer merely a potentiality, but is a potentiality which has been put to work. The potentiality to see exists sometimes as active or at-work, and sometimes as inactive or latent. Coming to motion, Sachs gives the example of a man walking across the room and explains as follows: Sachs (1995 , pp. 78–79), in his commentary of Aristotle's Physics Book III gives the following results from his understanding of Aristotle's definition of motion: The genus of which motion
2442-412: Is not self.... is form permanent or impermanent?..." Both Western and Eastern civilizations have been occupied with self-knowledge and underscored its importance particularly citing the paradoxical combination of immediate availability and profound obscurity involved in its pursuit. For Socrates , the goal of philosophy was to " know thyself ". Lao Tzu , in his Tao Te Ching , says "Knowing others
2516-434: Is not-self. Were form self, then this form would not lead to affliction, and one could have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.' And since form is not-self, so it leads to affliction, and none can have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my form be not thus.'... Bhikkhus, feeling is not-self... Bhikkhus, perception is not-self... Bhikkhus, determinations are not-self... Bhikkhus, consciousness ( vijñāna )
2590-411: Is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum . While he was imprisoned in a castle, Avicenna wrote his famous " floating man " thought experiment to demonstrate human self-awareness and the substantiality of the soul . His thought experiment tells its readers to imagine themselves suspended in
2664-649: Is partly derived from the fact that we view ourselves as rational agents . This school rejects that self-knowledge is merely derived from observation as it acknowledges the subject as authoritative on account of his ability as an agent to shape his own states. Potentiality and actuality In philosophy , potentiality and actuality are a pair of closely connected principles which Aristotle used to analyze motion , causality , ethics , and physiology in his Physics , Metaphysics , Nicomachean Ethics , and De Anima . The concept of potentiality, in this context, generally refers to any "possibility" that
2738-479: Is still a potentiality." Or in other words: The Thomistic blend of actuality and potentiality has the characteristic that, to the extent that it is actual it is not potential and to the extent that it is potential it is not actual; the hotter the water is, the less is it potentially hot, and the cooler it is, the less is it actually, the more potentially, hot. As with the first interpretation however, Sachs (2005) objects that: One implication of this interpretation
2812-432: Is that whatever happens to be the case right now is an entelechia , as though something that is intrinsically unstable as the instantaneous position of an arrow in flight deserved to be described by the word that everywhere else Aristotle reserves for complex organized states that persist, that hold out against internal and external causes that try to destroy them. In a more recent paper on this subject, Kosman associates
2886-417: Is the end or perfection which has being only in, through, and during activity. Aristotle discusses motion ( kinēsis ) in his Physics quite differently from modern science . Aristotle's definition of motion is closely connected to his actuality-potentiality distinction. Taken literally, Aristotle defines motion as the actuality ( entelecheia ) of a "potentiality as such". What Aristotle meant however
2960-472: Is the means to the highest bliss." Absolute perfection is the consummation of Self-knowledge." A theory about self-knowledge describes the concept as the capacity to detect that the sensations, thoughts, mental states, and attitudes as one's own. It is linked to other concepts such as self-awareness and self-conception. The rationalist theory, which Immanuel Kant has inspired, also claims that our ability to achieve self-knowledge through rational reflection
3034-418: Is the subject of several different interpretations. A major difficulty comes from the fact that the terms actuality and potentiality, linked in this definition, are normally understood within Aristotle as opposed to each other. On the other hand, the "as such" is important and is explained at length by Aristotle, giving examples of "potentiality as such". For example, the motion of building is the energeia of
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3108-405: Is what is in potency all the particular things of that kind) but it is something else that is the causal and productive thing by which all of them are formed, as is the case with an art in relation to its material, it is necessary in the soul [ psuchē ] too that these distinct aspects be present; the one sort is intellect [ nous ] by becoming all things, the other sort by forming all things, in
3182-426: Is wisdom. Knowing the self is enlightenment. Mastering others requires force. Mastering the self requires strength." The case is the same for the seers of Upanishads , who maintained that the ultimate real knowledge involves an understanding of the essence of the self and the nature of God. Adi Shankaracharya , in his commentary on Bhagavad Gita says " Self-knowledge alone eradicates misery". "Self-knowledge alone
3256-621: The dunamis of the building materials as building materials as opposed to anything else they might become, and this potential in the unbuilt materials is referred to by Aristotle as "the buildable". So the motion of building is the actualization of "the buildable" and not the actualization of a house as such, nor the actualization of any other possibility which the building materials might have had. In an influential 1969 paper, Aryeh Kosman divided up previous attempts to explain Aristotle's definition into two types, criticised them, and then gave his own third interpretation. While this has not become
3330-654: The pre-socratics , as in Heraclitus 's mobilism and Parmenides ' immobilism . The mythological concept of primordial Chaos is also classically associated with a disordered prime matter (see also prima materia ), which, being passive and full of potentialities, would be ordered in actual forms, as can be seen in Neoplatonism , especially in Plutarch , Plotinus , and among the Church Fathers , and
3404-412: The "as such" in Aristotle's definition. Sachs (2005) associates this interpretation with Thomas Aquinas and explains that by this explanation "the apparent contradiction between potentiality and actuality in Aristotle's definition of motion" is resolved "by arguing that in every motion actuality and potentiality are mixed or blended." Motion is therefore "the actuality of any potentiality insofar as it
3478-464: The "clarity and vividness" of things. Diodorus Siculus in 60-30 BC used the term in a very similar way to Polybius. However, Diodorus uses the term to denote qualities unique to individuals. Using the term in ways that could translated as 'vigor' or ' energy ' (in a more modern sense); for society, 'practice' or 'custom'; for a thing, 'operation' or 'working'; like vigor in action. Already in Plato it
3552-500: The Soul). Aristotle also believed that there were four sections of the soul: the calculative and scientific parts on the rational side used for making decisions, and the desiderative and vegetative parts on the irrational side responsible for identifying our needs. A division of the soul's functions and activities is also found in Plato's tripartite theory . The problem of one in many is also remembered by Aristotle, nonetheless: If then
3626-411: The active intellect with being the " unmoved mover " and God . Nevertheless, as Davidson remarks: Just what Aristotle meant by potential intellect and active intellect – terms not even explicit in the De Anima and at best implied – and just how he understood the interaction between them remains moot to this day. Students of the history of philosophy continue to debate Aristotle's intent, particularly
3700-489: The air, isolated from all sensations, which includes no sensory contact with even their own bodies. He argues that, in this scenario, one would still have self-consciousness . He thus concludes that the idea of the self is not dependent on any physical thing , and that the soul should not be seen in relative terms , but as a primary given , a substance . This argument was later refined and simplified by René Descartes in epistemic terms when he stated: "I can abstract from
3774-652: The beginning of Buddhist philosophy , several schools of interpretation assumed that a self cannot be identified with the transient aggregates, as they are non-self, but some traditions questioned further whether there can be an unchanging ground which defines a real and permanent individual identity, sustaining the impermanent phenomena; concepts such as Buddha-nature are found in the Mahayana lineage, and of an ultimate reality in dzogchen tradition, for instance in Dolpopa and Longchenpa . Although Buddhists criticize
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#17327647064573848-434: The course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire
3922-401: The definition of motion. He writes: The man with sight, but with his eyes closed, differs from the blind man, although neither is seeing. The first man has the capacity to see, which the second man lacks. There are then potentialities as well as actualities in the world. But when the first man opens his eyes, has he lost the capacity to see? Obviously not; while he is seeing, his capacity to see
3996-404: The essence of a human soul. He states: "Soul is an actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being besouled", and also "When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal". Aristotle used his concept of the soul in many of his works; his main work on the subject is De Anima (On
4070-626: The etymology as: Hindi svāmī 'master, lord, prince', used by Hindus as a term of respectful address, < Sanskrit svāmin in same senses, also the idol or temple of a god. As a direct form of address, or as a stand-in for a swami's name, it is often rendered Swamiji (also Swami-ji or Swami Ji ). In modern Gaudiya Vaishnavism , Swami is also one of the 108 names for a sannyasi given in Bhaktisiddhanta Sarasvati 's Gaudiya Kanthahara , along with Goswami , also traditionally used as an honorific title. Swami
4144-600: The form." Teleology is a crucial concept throughout Aristotle's philosophy. This means that as well as its central role in his physics and metaphysics, the potentiality-actuality distinction has a significant influence on other areas of Aristotle's thought such as his ethics, biology and psychology. The active intellect was a concept Aristotle described that requires an understanding of the actuality-potentiality dichotomy. Aristotle described this in his De Anima (Book 3, Chapter 5, 430a10-25) and covered similar ground in his Metaphysics (Book 12, Chapter 7-10). The following
4218-403: The fullest sense, and not just potentially real. For example, "to be a rock is to strain to be at the center of the universe, and thus to be in motion unless constrained otherwise." Energeia is a word based upon ἔργον ( ergon ), meaning 'work'. It is the source of the modern word energy but the term has evolved so much over the course of the history of science that reference to
4292-521: The immutable ātman of Hinduism , some Buddhist schools problematized the notion of an individual personhood; even among early ones, such as the Pudgala view, it was approached implicitly in questions such as "who is the bearer of the bundle?", "what carries the aggregates?", "what transmigrates from one rebirth to another?" or "what is the subject of self-improvement and enlightenment?". The Buddha in particular attacked all attempts to conceive of
4366-446: The modern term is not very helpful in understanding the original as used by Aristotle. It is difficult to translate his use of energeia into English with consistency. Joe Sachs renders it with the phrase "being-at-work" and says that "we might construct the word is-at-work-ness from Anglo-Saxon roots to translate energeia into English". Aristotle says the word can be made clear by looking at examples rather than trying to find
4440-549: The nature of a thing, we are referring to the form or shape of a thing, which was already present as a potential, an innate tendency to change, in that material before it achieved that form. When things are most "fully at work" we can see more fully what kind of thing they really are. Actuality is often used to translate both energeia ( ἐνέργεια ) and entelecheia ( ἐντελέχεια ) (sometimes rendered in English as entelechy ). Actuality comes from Latin actualitas and
4514-529: The question whether he considered the active intellect to be an aspect of the human soul or an entity existing independently of man. Already in Aristotle's own works, the concept of a distinction between energeia and dunamis was used in many ways, for example to describe the way striking metaphors work, or human happiness. Polybius about 150 BC, in his work the Histories uses Aristotle's word energeia in both an Aristotelian way and also to describe
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#17327647064574588-422: The same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects." In Hume's view, these perceptions do not belong to anything. Rather, Hume compares the soul to a commonwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing elements. The question of personal identity then becomes
4662-593: The self, the self as a narrative center of gravity, and the self as a linguistic or social construct rather than a physical entity. The self (or its non-existence) is also an important concept in Eastern philosophy , including Buddhist philosophy . Most philosophical definitions of self—per Descartes , Locke , Hume , and William James —are expressed in the first person . A third person definition does not refer to specific mental qualia but instead strives for objectivity and operationalism . To another person,
4736-399: The soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it
4810-674: The subsequent medieval and Renaissance philosophy , as in Ramon Lllull 's Book of Chaos and John Milton 's Paradise Lost . Plotinus was a late classical pagan philosopher and theologian whose monotheistic re-workings of Plato and Aristotle were influential amongst early Christian theologians. In his Enneads he sought to reconcile ideas of Aristotle and Plato together with a form of monotheism , that used three fundamental metaphysical principles, which were conceived of in terms consistent with Aristotle's energeia / dunamis dichotomy, and one interpretation of his concept of
4884-423: The supposition of all external things, but not from the supposition of my own consciousness." David Hume pointed out that we tend to think that we are the same person we were five years ago. Although we have changed in many respects, the same person appears present as was present then. We might start thinking about which features can be changed without changing the underlying self. Hume, however, denies that there
4958-566: The terminology has also been adapted to new uses, as is most obvious in words like energy and dynamic . These were words first used in modern physics by the German scientist and philosopher, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz . Aristotle's concept of entelechy retains influence on recent concepts of biological " entelechy ". "Potentiality" and "potency" are translations of the Ancient Greek word dunamis ( δύναμις ). They refer especially to
5032-437: The view of Aquinas with those of his own critics, David Charles, Jonathan Beere, and Robert Heineman. Sachs (2005) , amongst other authors (such as Aryeh Kosman and Ursula Coope ), proposes that the solution to problems interpreting Aristotle's definition must be found in the distinction Aristotle makes between two different types of potentiality, with only one of those corresponding to the "potentiality as such" appearing in
5106-405: The way an individual behaves and speaks reflects their true inner self and can be used to gain insight into who they really are. Therefore, the intentions of another individual can only be inferred from something that emanates from that individual. The particular characteristics of the self determine its identity . Aristotle , following Plato , defined the psyche as the core essence of
5180-400: The way an active condition [ hexis ] like light too makes the colors that are in potency be at work as colors [ to phōs poiei ta dunamei onta chrōmata energeiai chrōmata ]. This sort of intellect is separate, as well as being without attributes and unmixed, since it is by its thinghood a being-at-work , for what acts is always distinguished in stature above what is acted upon, as
5254-482: The way the word is used by Aristotle, as a concept contrasting with "actuality". The Latin translation of dunamis is potentia , which is the root of the English word "potential"; it is also sometimes used in English-language philosophical texts. In early modern philosophy, English authors like Hobbes and Locke used the English word power as their translation of Latin potentia . Dunamis
5328-402: The world. This is variously known as enlightenment , nirvana , presence, and the "here and now". Hume's position is similar to Indian Buddhists’ theories and debates about the self, which generally considers a bundle theory to describe the mind phenomena grouped in aggregates ( skandhas ), such as sense-perceptions , intellective discrimination ( saṃjñā ), emotions and volition . Since
5402-407: Was both a weak sense of potential, meaning simply that something "might chance to happen or not to happen", and a stronger sense, to indicate how something could be done well . For example, "sometimes we say that those who can merely take a walk, or speak, without doing it as well as they intended, cannot speak or walk." This stronger sense is mainly said of the potentials of living things, although it
5476-503: Was coined by Aristotle and transliterated in Latin as entelechia . According to Sachs (1995 , p. 245): Aristotle invents the word by combining entelēs ( ἐντελής , 'complete, full-grown') with echein (= hexis , to be a certain way by the continuing effort of holding on in that condition), while at the same time punning on endelecheia ( ἐνδελέχεια , 'persistence') by inserting telos ( τέλος , 'completion'). This
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