The UGM-27 Polaris missile was a two-stage solid-fueled nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). As the United States Navy 's first SLBM, it served from 1961 to 1980.
162-607: In the mid-1950s the Navy was involved in the Jupiter missile project with the U.S. Army , and had influenced the design by making it squat so it would fit in submarines. However, they had concerns about the use of liquid fuel rockets on board ships, and some consideration was given to a solid fuel version, Jupiter S. In 1956, during an anti-submarine study known as Project Nobska , Edward Teller suggested that very small hydrogen bomb warheads were possible. A crash program to develop
324-617: A MIRV missile is). The three warheads were stated to be equivalent in destructive power to a single one-megaton warhead due to their spread out pattern on the target. The first Polaris submarine outfitted with MRV A-3's was the USS Daniel Webster in 1964. Later the Polaris A-3 missiles (but not the ReBs) were also given limited hardening to protect the missile electronics against nuclear electromagnetic pulse effects while in
486-585: A 26 November 1956 memorandum, recently appointed US Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson attempted to end the fighting. His solution was to limit the Army to weapons with 200-mile (320 km) range, and those involved in surface-to-air defense to only 100 miles (160 km). The memo also placed limits on Army air operations, severely limiting the weight of the aircraft it was allowed to operate. To some degree this simply formalized what had largely already been
648-782: A 55 foot (17 m) version, finally settled on the 58 foot (18 m) version. On 2 December 1955, the secretaries of the Army and Navy publicly announced the dual Army–Navy program to create a land- and sea-based MRBM. In April 1956, as part of a widespread effort to assign names to various missile projects, the Army's effort was given the name "Jupiter" and the Air Force's became "Thor". Redstone provided an accuracy of 980 feet (300 m) at its maximum range, which, when combined with its large warhead, allowed it to attack hard targets like protected airbases, bridges, command and control sites, as well as other strategic targets like railway marshaling yards and pre-attack concentration areas. This
810-554: A 7 lb (3.2 kg) American-born rhesus monkey , Able, and an 11 oz (310 g) South American squirrel monkey , Baker . The monkeys rode in the nose cone of the missile to an altitude of 300 miles (480 km) and a distance of 1,500 miles (2,400 km) down the Atlantic Missile Range from Cape Canaveral. They withstood accelerations of 38 g (370 m/s ) and were weightless for about nine minutes. A top speed of 10,000 mph (4.5 km/s)
972-518: A Jupiter center section until discovering a suitable type for both the LOX and fuel tanks. The third Jupiter, also numbered AM-1, was quickly equipped with the baffles and launched on 31 May, slightly over a month after AM-1B, traveling a full 1,247 nautical miles (2,309 km; 1,435 mi) downrange. This version had a slightly improved S-3 engine with 139,000 pounds-force (620,000 N) thrust. AM-2 flew from LC-26A on 28 August, and successfully tested
1134-739: A Polaris A-1 on 20 July 1960. Fifty-two days later, the Soviet Union made its first successful underwater launch of a submarine ballistic missile in the White Sea, on 10 September 1960 from the same converted Project 611 ( NATO reporting name Zulu-IV class) submarine that first launched the R-11FM. The Soviets were only a year behind the US with their first SSBN, the ill-fated K-19 of Project 658 (Hotel class), commissioned in November 1960. However,
1296-409: A Special Project Office to develop Jupiter for the Navy in late 1955. The Jupiter missile's large diameter was a product of the need to keep the length short enough to fit in a reasonably-sized submarine. At the seminal Project Nobska conference in 1956, with Admiral Burke present, nuclear physicist Edward Teller stated that a physically small one-megaton warhead could be produced for Polaris within
1458-611: A conceptual design that would take a Maritime Administration type C4-S-1a hull and convert it into a Jupiter missile launch ship, which was given the hull symbols YAG-58 then EAG-155 ; the conversion would later be canceled. The requirement for shipboard storage and launching dictated the size and shape of the Jupiter. The original Army design was 92 feet (28 m) long and 95 inches (2,400 mm) in diameter. The Navy stated they were not interested in anything longer than 50 feet (15 m). The ABMA team responded by increasing
1620-619: A continuous dead reckoning update of the submarine's position between position fixes via other methods, such as LORAN . This was especially important in the first few years of Polaris, because Transit was not operational until 1964. By 1965 microchips similar to the Texas Instruments units made for the Minuteman II were being purchased by the Navy for the Polaris. The Minuteman guidance systems each required 2000 of these, so
1782-448: A crane on the movable gantry. Just to the north of the launch area was the Air Force's LC-17 for Thor, and LC-18 used for Thor and the Navy's Vanguard . After the Army's head start, the Air Force had since caught up and attempted its first Thor launch on 26 January 1957, which ended with the missile exploding on the launch pad. Jupiter test flights commenced with the launch of AM-1A (ABMA Missile 1A) on 1 March 1957 from LC-5. This missile
SECTION 10
#17327872905861944-425: A decision to organize mobile ballistic missile units would in logic have led to transferring the operational use of the weapon back to the Army – where it should have been all the time. To offset the possibility of air attack, the systems were upgraded to allow a launch within 15 minutes of a launch order. Rocketdyne tested the first S-3 engine at their Santa Susana, California facilities in November 1955. A mock-up
2106-489: A different target. Although the US did not commission any new SSBNs from 1967 through 1981, it did introduce two new SLBMs. Thirty-one of the 41 original US SSBNs were built with larger diameter launch tubes with future missiles in mind. In the early 1970s the Poseidon (C-3) missile entered service, and those 31 SSBNs were backfitted with it. Poseidon offered a massive MIRV capability of up to 14 warheads per missile. Like
2268-464: A different way from submarine-launched cruise missiles . Modern submarine-launched ballistic missiles are closely related to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), with ranges of over 5,500 kilometres (3,000 nmi), and in many cases SLBMs and ICBMs may be part of the same family of weapons. The first practical design of a submarine -based launch platform was developed by the Germans near
2430-519: A dramatic improvement over the Redstone's roughly 200 miles (320 km). As Rocketdyne continued working on the LR89, it appeared that it could be improved to increase thrust over the promised 120,000 pounds-force (530,000 N). In 1954, the Army asked Rocketdyne to provide a similar design with a thrust of 135,000 pounds-force (600,000 N). During this same period, the weight of nuclear warheads
2592-446: A failsafe. They did this with the development of gas and air propulsion of the missile out of the submerged tube as well. The first Polaris missile tests were given the names “AX-#” and later renamed “A1X-#”. Testing of the missiles occurred: It was in between these two tests that the inertial guidance system was developed and implemented for testing. At the time that the Polaris project went live, submarine navigation systems accuracy
2754-594: A few years, and this prompted Burke to leave the Jupiter program and concentrate on Polaris in December of that year. Polaris was spearheaded by the Special Project Office's Missile Branch under Rear Admiral Roderick Osgood Middleton, and is still under the Special Project Office. Admiral Burke later was instrumental in determining the size of the Polaris submarine force, suggesting that 40–45 submarines with 16 missiles each would be sufficient. Eventually,
2916-574: A hardware check-out flight, was launched in February 1993, and the second flight, a STARS I reentry vehicle experiment, was launched in August 1993. The third flight, a STARS II development mission, was launched in July 1994, with all three flights considered to be successful by BMDO. The Secretary of Defense conducted a comprehensive review in 1993 of the nation's defense strategy, which drastically reduced
3078-634: A heat shield test. The MJ-2 flight was planned as a maximum dynamic pressure qualification test of the production Mercury spacecraft with a chimpanzee on board. In April 1958, under the command of President Eisenhower , the U.S. Department of Defense notified the Air Force it had tentatively planned to deploy the first three Jupiter squadrons (45 missiles) in France. However, in June 1958 the new French President Charles de Gaulle refused to accept basing any Jupiter missiles in France. This prompted U.S. to explore
3240-419: A length of 28.5 ft (8.7 m), a body diameter of 54 inches (1.4 m), and a launch weight of 28,800 pounds (13,100 kg). USS George Washington was the first fleet ballistic missile submarine ( SSBN in U.S. naval terminology) and she and all other Polaris submarines carried 16 missiles. Forty more SSBNs were launched in 1960 to 1966. Work on its W47 nuclear warhead began in 1957 at
3402-458: A less than reliable system and soon after both systems were replaced by the Trident. A proposed Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) program outlined a long-term plan which proposed the development of a longer-range missile designated as ULMS II, which was to achieve twice the range of the existing Poseidon (ULMS I) missile. In addition to a longer-range missile, a larger submarine (Ohio-class)
SECTION 20
#17327872905863564-406: A live strategic nuclear missile. The two stages were both steered by thrust vectoring . Inertial navigation guided the missile to about a 900 m (3,000-foot) CEP, insufficient for use against hardened targets. They were mostly useful for attacking dispersed military surface targets (airfields or radar sites), clearing a pathway for heavy bombers, although in the general public perception Polaris
3726-752: A lone Typhoon used as a testbed for new missiles (the R-39s unique to the Typhoons were reportedly scrapped in 2012). Upgraded missiles such as the R-29RMU Sineva (SS-N-23 Sineva) were developed for the Deltas. In 2013 the Russians commissioned the first Borei-class submarine , also called the Dolgorukiy class after the lead vessel. By 2015 two others had entered service. This class is intended to replace
3888-410: A missile suitable for carrying such warheads began as Polaris, launching its first shot less than four years later, in February 1960. As the Polaris missile was fired underwater from a moving platform, it was essentially invulnerable to counterattack. This led the Navy to suggest, starting around 1959, that they be given the entire nuclear deterrent role. This led to new infighting between the Navy and
4050-412: A new anti-submarine weapon. Livermore received the project. When Teller returned to Livermore, people were astonished by the boldness of Teller's promise. It seemed inconceivable with the current size of nuclear warheads, and Teller was challenged to support his assertion. He pointed out the trend in warhead technology, which indicated reduced weight to yield ratios in each succeeding generation. When Teller
4212-401: A new solid fuel rocket for spinup, replacing the older hydrogen peroxide model. AM-9 was launched on 10 October, the first Jupiter to carry the fully functional turbine exhaust roll control system. The flight failed however; a pinhole leak in the thrust transducer area started a thrust section fire and loss of vehicle control. The missile tumbled and broke up at T+49 seconds. Afterwards, there
4374-445: A new weapon bay housing three Mk 2 re-entry vehicles (ReB or Re-Entry Body in U.S. Navy and British usage); and the new W-58 warhead of 200 kt yield. This arrangement was originally described as a "cluster warhead" but was replaced with the term Multiple Re-Entry Vehicle (MRV). The three warheads, also known as "bomblets", were spread out in a "shotgun" like pattern above a single target and were not independently targetable (such as
4536-742: A range of 7,700 kilometres (4,200 nmi), entered service on the first Delta-I boat in 1972, before the Yankee class was even completed. A total of 43 Delta-class boats of all types entered service 1972–90, with the SS-N-18 on the Delta III class and the R-29RM Shtil (SS-N-23) on the Delta IV class. The new missiles had increased range and eventually multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles ( MIRV ), multiple warheads that could each hit
4698-579: A sea-based variant of the US Army Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missile , projecting four of the large, liquid-fueled missiles per submarine. Rear Admiral W. F. "Red" Raborn headed a Special Project Office to develop Jupiter for the Navy, beginning in late 1955. However, at the Project Nobska submarine warfare conference in 1956, physicist Edward Teller stated that a physically small one-megaton warhead could be produced for
4860-419: A small explosion went off in the liquid oxygen (LOX) pump, and as the missile sat there the LOX boiled off and threatened to burst the tanks. The day was saved when the foreman, Paul Kennedy, ran to the missile and connected a pressure line to drain the oxygen buildup in the tank. The problem was later traced to the lubricant used in the pump, which tended to burst into flames in contact with LOX. A new lubricant
5022-415: A smaller, more easily manipulated design. Edward Teller was one of the scientists encouraging the progress of smaller rockets. He argued that the technology needed to be discovered, rather than apply technology that is already created. Raborn was also convinced he could develop smaller rockets. He sent officers to make independent estimates of size to determine the plausibility of a small missile; while none of
UGM-27 Polaris - Misplaced Pages Continue
5184-497: A strategic exchange. This would especially be true if the Army launched a long-range weapon like Jupiter, which could reach cities in the Soviet Union and could not immediately be distinguished as attacking a military or civilian target. They suggested that any such launch would trigger a strategic response, and as such, the Army should not be given any long-range weapons. However, as von Braun's team went from success to success, and with Atlas still years from operational deployment, it
5346-476: A submarine or two through accidental explosions. But, then, there are some of us who enjoy, or at lease [sic] are acclimated to, the idea of risking our lives." All of this changed radically in the summer of 1956, when Project Nobska brought together leading scientists to consider antisubmarine warfare. As part of this workshop, Edward Teller stated that by 1963 a 1 megaton warhead would be reduced to only 600 pounds (270 kg). Rocketry experts at
5508-410: A submerged submarine, improving submarine survivability. The prime contractor for all three versions of Polaris was Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (now Lockheed Martin ). The Polaris program started development in 1956. USS George Washington , the first U.S. missile submarine, successfully launched the first Polaris missile from a submerged submarine on July 20, 1960. The A-2 version of
5670-502: Is disadvantageous in launching a missile from a moving platform in certain sea states. By mid-July 1956, the Secretary of Defense's Scientific Advisory Committee had recommended that a solid-propellant missile program be fully instigated but not using the unsuitable Jupiter payload and guidance system. By October 1956, a study group comprising key figures from Navy, industry and academic organizations considered various design parameters of
5832-503: Is still in service with the Russian Navy As of 2021 (it's expected to be phased out after 2030). Solid fuels, on the other hand, make logistics and storage simpler and are safer. Not only was the Jupiter a liquid fuel design, it was also very large; even after it was designed for solid fuel, it was still a whopping 160,000 pounds. A smaller, new design would weigh much less, estimated at 30,000 pounds. The Navy would rather develop
5994-541: The Cold War , as they can hide from reconnaissance satellites and fire their nuclear weapons with virtual impunity. This makes them immune to a first strike directed against nuclear forces, allowing each side to maintain the capability to launch a devastating retaliatory strike , even if all land-based missiles have been destroyed. This relieves each side of the necessity to adopt a launch on warning posture, with its attendant risk of accidental nuclear war. Additionally,
6156-510: The GPS satellite navigation system, the Transit system (later called NAVSAT), was developed because the submarines needed to know their position at launch in order for the missiles to hit their targets. Two American physicists at Johns Hopkins 's Applied Physics Laboratory (APL), William Guier and George Weiffenbach, began this work in 1958. A computer small enough to fit through a submarine hatch
6318-777: The Italian Navy , this did not lead to use. The Polaris missile was gradually replaced on 31 of the 41 original SSBNs in the U.S. Navy by the MIRV -capable Poseidon missile beginning in 1972. During the 1980s, these missiles were replaced on 12 of these submarines by the Trident I missile. The 10 George Washington - and Ethan Allen -class SSBNs retained Polaris A-3 until 1980 because their missile tubes were not large enough to accommodate Poseidon. With USS Ohio beginning sea trials in 1980, these submarines were disarmed and redesignated as attack submarines to avoid exceeding
6480-535: The Killian Committee championed the cause. The Committee took up the concept, and in September 1955 released a report calling for the development of a sea-based missile system. The Navy's interest in missiles had been greatly increased with the August 1955 appointment of Admiral Arleigh Burke to replace Carney. Burke was convinced the Navy had to get into the missile field as rapidly as possible, and
6642-849: The Naval Submarine Base King's Bay in Georgia was built for the Trident I-equipped force. Both the United States and the Soviet Union commissioned larger SSBNs designed for new missiles in 1981. The American large SSBN was the Ohio class , also called the "Trident submarine", with the largest SSBN armament ever of 24 missiles, initially Trident I but built with much larger tubes for the Trident II (D-5) missile , which entered service in 1990. The entire class
UGM-27 Polaris - Misplaced Pages Continue
6804-529: The PGM-11 Redstone missile, the US's first nuclear ballistic missile. While it was entering service, Wernher von Braun 's Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA) team at Redstone Arsenal began to consider an upgraded version using the LR89 rocket engine being developed by Rocketdyne for the Air Force's Atlas missile project. Using the LR89 and adding a second stage would allow the new design to reach 1,000 nautical miles (1,900 km; 1,200 mi),
6966-671: The SALT II strategic arms treaty limits. The Polaris missile program's complexity led to the development of new project management techniques, including the Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) to replace the simpler Gantt chart methodology. The Polaris missile replaced an earlier plan to create a submarine-based missile force based on a derivative of the U.S. Army Jupiter Intermediate-range ballistic missile . Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke appointed Rear Admiral W. F. "Red" Raborn as head of
7128-631: The U.S. Air Force , the latter responding by developing the counterforce concept that argued for the strategic bomber and ICBM as key elements in flexible response . Polaris formed the backbone of the U.S. Navy's nuclear force aboard a number of custom-designed submarines. In 1963, the Polaris Sales Agreement led to the Royal Navy taking over the United Kingdom 's nuclear role, and while some tests were carried out by
7290-601: The United States Space and Rocket Center in Huntsville , Alabama. Mercury-Jupiter was a proposed suborbital launch configuration consisting of a Jupiter missile carrying a Mercury capsule. Two flights were planned in support of Project Mercury . On July 1, 1959, less than a year after the October, 1958 program start date, the flights were canceled due to budget constraints. The MJ-1 flight would have been
7452-511: The boost phase . This was known as the A-3T ("Topsy") and was the final production model. The initial test model of the Polaris was referred to as the AX series and made its maiden flight from Cape Canaveral on September 24, 1958. The missile failed to perform its pitch and roll maneuver and instead just flew straight up, however the flight was considered a partial success (at that time, "partial success"
7614-455: The nuclear test series Operation Dominic . The first Soviet SSBN with 16 missiles was the Project 667A (Yankee class), which first entered service in 1967 with 32 boats completed by 1974. By the time the first Yankee was commissioned the US had built 41 SSBNs, nicknamed the " 41 for Freedom ". The short range of the early SLBMs dictated basing and deployment locations. By the late 1960s
7776-490: The 1950-1960s. A converted Project 611 (Zulu-IV class) submarine launched the world's first SLBM, an R-11FM (SS-N-1 Scud-A, naval variant of the SS-1 Scud ) on 16 September 1955. Five additional Project V611 and AV611 (Zulu-V class) submarines became the world's first operational ballistic missile submarines (SSBs) with two R-11FM missiles each, entering service in 1956–57. The United States Navy initially worked on
7938-546: The 1960s, under the 1962 Nassau Agreement that emerged from meetings between Harold Macmillan and John F. Kennedy , the United States would supply Britain with Polaris missiles, launch tubes, ReBs, and the fire-control systems . Britain would make its own warheads and initially proposed to build five ballistic missile submarines , later reduced to four by the incoming Labour government of Harold Wilson , with 16 missiles to be carried on each boat. The Nassau Agreement also featured very specific wording. The intention of wording
8100-553: The ABM screen around Moscow. Britain's submarines featured the Polaris A3T missiles, a modification to the model of the Polaris used by the U.S. from 1968 to 1972. Similar concerns were present in the U.S. as well, resulting in a new American defense program. The program became known as Antelope, and its purpose was to alter the Polaris. Various aspects of the Polaris, such as increasing deployment efficiency and creating ways to improve
8262-502: The ABMA team, under the direction of Fritz Mueller , could improve on that. This led to a period in which "The Army would lay down a particular accuracy, and wait for our arguments whether it was possible. We had to promise a lot, but were fortunate." This process ultimately delivered a superior design intended to provide 0.5 miles (0.80 km) accuracy at the full range, an order of magnitude better than Redstone and four times better than
SECTION 50
#17327872905868424-546: The Army as the NAA-150-200, became much better known by its Rocketdyne model number, S-3. Around the same time, the US Navy was looking for ways to join the nuclear club, and had been focusing mostly on cruise missiles and similar systems. Some consideration had been given to the use of ballistic missiles on ships, but Admiral Hyman Rickover , "father" of the nuclear submarine, was skeptical that this could be done, and
8586-635: The British Prime Minister is and has always been required for the use of British nuclear weapons, including SLBMs. The operational control of the Polaris submarines was assigned to another NATO Supreme Commander, the SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic), who is based near Norfolk, Virginia, although the SACLANT routinely delegated control of the missiles to his deputy commander in the Eastern Atlantic area, COMEASTLANT, who
8748-568: The Hotel class carried only three R-13 missiles (NATO reporting name SS-N-4) each and had to surface and raise the missile to launch. Submerged launch was not an operational capability for the Soviets until 1963, when the R-21 missile (SS-N-5) was first backfitted to Project 658 (Hotel class) and Project 629 (Golf class) submarines. The Soviet Union was able to beat the U.S. in launching and testing
8910-639: The Joint Army-Navy Ballistic Missile Committee approved by Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson in early November of that year. The first IRBM boasted a liquid-fueled design . Liquid fuel is compatible with aircraft; it was considered less compatible with submarines in the West, even though in the Soviet Navy liquid-fuelled SLBMs, none of which used cryogenic components, were in overwhelming majority, and R-29RMU2
9072-548: The Jupiter proposals) was the need to surface, and remain surfaced for some time, to launch. Submarines were very vulnerable to attack during launch, and a fully or partially fueled missile on deck was a serious hazard. The difficulty of preparing a launch in rough weather was another major drawback for these designs, but rough sea conditions did not unduly affect Polaris' submerged launches. It quickly became apparent that solid-fueled ballistic missiles had advantages over cruise missiles in range and accuracy, and could be launched from
9234-525: The Labour Party provided a clear platform on nuclear weapons, the Chevaline program found supporters. One such individual who supported modification to the Polaris was the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey . Despite the approval of the program, the expenses caused hurdles that augmented the time it took for the system to come to fruition. The cost of the project led to Britain's disbanding
9396-533: The Navy Secretariat decided to support SPO in heavily pushing for the new missile, now named Polaris by Admiral Raborn. There is a contention that the Navy's "Jupiter" missile program was unrelated to the Army program. The Navy also expressed an interest in Jupiter as an SLBM, but left the collaboration to work on their Polaris. At first, the newly assembled SPO team had the problem of making the large, liquid-fuel Jupiter IRBM work properly. Jupiter retained
9558-508: The Polaris A-3 was deployed on all US SSBNs with a range of 4,600 kilometres (2,500 nmi), a great improvement on the 1,900 kilometres (1,000 nmi) range of Polaris A-1. The A-3 also had three warheads that landed in a pattern around a single target. The Yankee class was initially equipped with the R-27 Zyb missile (SS-N-6) with a range of 2,400 kilometres (1,300 nmi). The US was much more fortunate in its basing arrangements than
9720-534: The Polaris A3T, retaining a limited ability to re-arm and put to sea the submarine that was in refit. When replaced by the Chevaline warhead, the sum total of deployed RVs and warheads was reduced to three boatloads. The original U.S. Navy Polaris had not been designed to penetrate anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses, but the Royal Navy had to ensure that its small Polaris force operating alone, and often with only one submarine on deterrent patrol, could penetrate
9882-624: The Polaris Sales Agreement to cover the Polaris successor Poseidon due to its cost. The Ministry of Defence upgraded its nuclear missiles to the longer-ranged Trident after much political wrangling within the Callaghan Labour Party government over its cost and whether it was necessary. The outgoing Prime Minister James Callaghan made his government's papers on Trident available to Margaret Thatcher 's new incoming Conservative Party government, which took
SECTION 60
#173278729058610044-526: The Polaris guidance system may have used a similar number. To keep the price under control, the design was standardized and shared with Westinghouse Electric Company and RCA . In 1962, the price for each Minuteman chip was $ 50. The price dropped to $ 2 in 1968. This missile replaced the earlier A-1 and A-2 models in the U.S. Navy , and also equipped the British Polaris force. The A-3 had a range extended to 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 kilometres) and
10206-492: The Polaris missile was essentially an upgraded A-1, and it entered service in late 1961. It was fitted on a total of 13 submarines and served until June 1974. Ongoing problems with the W-47 warhead , especially with its mechanical arming and safing equipment, led to large numbers of the missiles being recalled for modifications, and the U.S. Navy sought a replacement with either a larger yield or equivalent destructive power. The result
10368-523: The Polaris system and trade-offs between different sub-sections. The estimate that a 30,000-pound missile could deliver a suitable warhead over 1500 nautical miles was endorsed. With this optimistic assessment, the Navy now decided to scrap the Jupiter program altogether and sought out the Department of Defense to back a separate Navy missile. A huge surfaced submarine would carry four "Jupiter" missiles, which would be carried and launched horizontally. This
10530-507: The Range Safety Officer could issue the flight termination command. Flying debris struck and damaged a Juno II on the adjacent LC-5. This particular launch was carrying a biological nose cone with mice and other specimens (which did not survive). Through the early 1960s, a number of Jupiters were launched by the forces of other countries, as well as the Air Force, as part of ongoing combat training. The last launch of this sort
10692-499: The Russian RSM-56 Bulava , which entered service in 2014. The world's first operational nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) was USS George Washington (SSBN-598) with 16 Polaris A-1 missiles, which entered service in December 1959 and conducted the first SSBN deterrent patrol November 1960 – January 1961. George Washington also conducted the first successful submerged SLBM launch with
10854-475: The STARS office acquired 117 first-stage and 102 second-stage surplus motors. As of December 1994, seven first-stage and five second-stage refurbished motors were available for future launches. BMDO is currently evaluating STARS as a potential long-range system for launching targets for development tests of future Theater Missile Defense 3 systems. STARS I was first launched in 1993, and from 2004 onwards has served as
11016-411: The Soviets, the US also desired a longer-range missile that would allow SSBNs to be based in CONUS. In the late 1970s the Trident I (C-4) missile with a range of 7,400 kilometres (4,000 nmi) and eight MIRV warheads was backfitted to 12 of the Poseidon-equipped submarines. The SSBN facilities (primarily a submarine tender and floating dry dock ) of the base at Rota, Spain were disestablished and
11178-523: The Soviets. Thanks to NATO and the US possession of Guam , US SSBNs were permanently forward deployed at Advanced Refit Sites in Holy Loch , Scotland, Rota, Spain , and Guam by the middle 1960s, resulting in short transit times to patrol areas near the Soviet Union. The SSBN facilities at the Advanced Refit Sites were austere, with only a submarine tender and floating dry dock . Converted merchant ships designated T-AKs ( Military Sealift Command cargo ships) were provided to ferry missiles and supplies to
11340-475: The Strategic Defense Initiative would be depleted by 1988. SSDC tasked Sandia National Laboratories , a Department of Energy laboratory, to develop an alternative launch vehicle using surplus Polaris boosters. The Sandia National Laboratories developed two STARS booster configurations: STARS I and STARS II. STARS I consisted of refurbished Polaris first and second stages and a commercially procured Orbis I third stage. It can deploy single or multiple payloads, but
11502-445: The U.S. Navy initially deployed the Trident C4 missile in the original set of its Ohio -class submarines, it was always planned to upgrade all of these submarines to the larger and longer-ranged Trident D5 missile—and that eventually, all of the C4 missiles would be eliminated from the U.S. Navy. This change-over has been completely carried out, and no Trident C4 missiles remain in service. PGM-19 Jupiter The PGM-19 Jupiter
11664-565: The UK, would likely have more warning of an impending attack. This is precisely the reason that the Army spent considerable effort on making Jupiter mobile, in order to make surprise attacks difficult without prior aerial reconnaissance missions. However, in November 1958, the Air Force decided Jupiter would be launched from fixed emplacements. Army General Maxwell Taylor argued this was done deliberately, noting that: ...a mobile missile needs Army-type troops to move, emplace, protect and fire it...
11826-607: The US with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in 1991. The US rapidly decommissioned its remaining 31 older SSBNs, with a few converted to other roles, and the base at Holy Loch was disestablished. Most of the former Soviet SSBN force was gradually scrapped under the provisions of the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement through 2012. By that time the Russian SSBN force stood at six Delta-IVs, three Delta-IIIs, and
11988-671: The USAF briefly considered training its Jupiter crews at Vandenberg AFB , California, it later decided to conduct all of its training at Huntsville . In June and September of the same year the Air Force activated two more squadrons, the 865th and 866th. In April 1959, the secretary of the Air Force issued implementing instructions to USAF to deploy two Jupiter squadrons to Italy. The two squadrons, totaling 30 missiles, were deployed at 10 sites in Italy from 1961 to 1963. They were operated by Italian Air Force crews, but USAF personnel controlled arming
12150-633: The United Kingdom paid an additional 5% of their total procurement cost of 2.5 billion dollars to the U.S. government as a research and development contribution. In 2002, the United States Navy announced plans to extend the life of the submarines and the D5 missiles to the year 2040. This requires a D5 Life Extension Program (D5LEP), which is currently underway. The main aim is to replace obsolete components at minimal cost by using commercial off
12312-487: The aging Deltas, and carries 16 solid-fuel RSM-56 Bulava missiles, with a reported range of 10,000 kilometres (5,400 nmi) and six MIRV warheads. The US is building a replacement for the Ohio class ; however, the first of the class wasn't laid down until October 2020. Ballistic missile submarines have been of great strategic importance for the United States, Russia, and other nuclear powers since they entered service in
12474-574: The agreement in this manner was to make it intentionally opaque. The sale of the Polaris was malleable in how an individual country could interpret it due to the diction choices taken in the Nassau Agreement. For the United States of America, the wording allowed for the sale to fall under the scope of NATO 's deterrence powers. On the other hand, for the British, the sale could be viewed as a solely British deterrent. The Polaris Sales Agreement
12636-459: The best INS designs being used by the Air Force. The system was so accurate that a number of observers expressed their skepticism about the Army's goals, with the WSEG suggesting they were hopelessly optimistic. The Air Force was dead set against Jupiter. They argued that nuclear weapons were not simply new artillery, and that their employment would immediately trigger a response that might result in
12798-491: The case in practice, but Jupiter fell outside the range limits and the Army was forced to hand them to the Air Force. The Air Force, of course, had no interest in taking over a weapon system they had long argued was not needed. However, ARPA's studies clearly showed it was an excellent system, and as it was ready to enter production, any Air Force thoughts about canceling it were immediately quashed. New orders for 32 prototypes and 62 operational missiles were soon placed, bringing
12960-607: The construction of the burn chambers. The later versions (the A-2, A-3, and B-3) were larger, weighed more, and had longer ranges than the A-1. The range increase was most important: The A-2 range was 1,500 nautical miles (2,800 kilometres), the A-3 2,500 nautical miles (4,600 kilometres), and the B-3 2,000 nautical miles (3,700 kilometres). The A-3 featured multiple re-entry vehicles ( MRVs ) which spread
13122-604: The continental United States ( CONUS ) at risk. This resulted in only a small percentage of the Soviet force occupying patrol areas at any time, and was a great motivation for longer-range Soviet SLBMs, which would allow them to patrol close to their bases, in areas sometimes referred to as "deep bastions". These missiles were the R-29 Vysota series (SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-23), equipped on Projects 667B, 667BD, 667BDR, and 667BDRM (Delta-I through Delta-IV classes). The SS-N-8, with
13284-620: The decision to acquire the Trident C4 missile. A subsequent decision to upgrade the missile purchase to the even larger, longer-ranged Trident D5 missile was possibly taken to ensure that there was missile commonality between the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy , which was considerably important when the Royal Navy Trident submarines were also to use the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay . Even though
13446-596: The deployment of highly accurate missiles on ultra-quiet submarines allows an attacker to sneak up close to the enemy coast and launch a missile on a depressed trajectory (a non-optimal ballistic trajectory which trades off reduced throw-weight for a faster and lower path, effectively reducing the time between launch and impact), thus opening the possibility of a decapitation strike . Specific types of SLBMs (current, past and under development) include: Some former Russian SLBMs have been converted into Volna and Shtil' launch vehicles to launch satellites – either from
13608-484: The desired one-megaton thermonuclear warhead. This study brought Edward Teller from the recently formed nuclear weapons laboratory at Livermore and J. Carson Mark , representing the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory. Teller was already known as a nuclear salesman, but this became the first instance where there was a big betting battle where he outbid his Los Alamos counterpart. The two knew each other well: Mark
13770-436: The diameter to 105 inches (2,700 mm). This precluded it from being carried aboard contemporary cargo aircraft , limiting it to sea and road. Even with this change, they were unable to reduce its length enough to suit the Navy. They suggested that they begin with a 60 foot (18 m) long version and then scale it down as improvements in the engines were worked into the design. This was rejected, and after briefly considering
13932-529: The end of World War II involving a launch tube which contained a V-2 ballistic missile variant and was towed behind a submarine, known by the code-name Prüfstand XII . The war ended before it could be tested, but the engineers who had worked on it were taken to work for the United States ( Operation Paperclip ) and for the Soviet Union on their SLBM programs. These and other early SLBM systems required vessels to be surfaced when they fired missiles, but launch systems were adapted to allow underwater launching in
14094-517: The end of 1982. These were all in the Pacific, and the Guam SSBN base was disestablished; the first several Ohio -class boats used new Trident facilities at Naval Submarine Base Bangor , Washington . Eighteen Ohio -class boats were commissioned by 1997, four of which were converted as cruise missile submarines (SSGN) in the 2000s to comply with START I treaty requirements. The Soviet large SSBN
14256-517: The engine developed several sub-versions, finally reaching the design goal of 150,000 lbf in the S-3D model. The 135,000 pound engine, also used in the first Thor and Atlas tests, had conical thrust chambers, but the 150,000 pound model switched to bell-shaped thrust chambers. Unlike Thor and Atlas, which had two small vernier engines for roll control, Jupiter gimbaled the turbine exhaust. The early test model Jupiters had two small gas jets powered off
14418-500: The facility that is now called the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by a team headed by John Foster and Harold Brown . The Navy accepted delivery of the first 16 warheads in July 1960. On May 6, 1962, a Polaris A-2 missile with a live W47 warhead was tested in the "Frigate Bird" test of Operation Dominic by USS Ethan Allen in the central Pacific Ocean , the only American test of
14580-565: The final AX flight was conducted a year after the program began, 17 Polaris missiles had been flown of which five met all of their test objectives. The first operational version, the Polaris A-1, had a range of 1,400 nautical miles (2,600 kilometres) and a single Mk 1 re-entry vehicle, carrying a single W-47-Y1 600 kt nuclear warhead, with an inertial guidance system which provided a circular error probable (CEP) of 1,800 meters (5,900 feet). The two-stage solid propellant missile had
14742-625: The first SLBM with a live nuclear warhead, an R-13 that detonated in the Novaya Zemlya Test Range in the Arctic Ocean, doing so on 20 October 1961, just ten days before the gigantic 50 Mt Tsar Bomba 's detonation in the same general area. The United States eventually conducted a similar test in the Pacific Ocean on 6 May 1962, with a Polaris A-2 launched from USS Ethan Allen (SSBN-608) as part of
14904-432: The flight. Telemetry data sent back during the flight showed that the monkey survived the 10 g (100 m/s ) of launch, eight minutes of weightlessness and 40 g (390 m/s ) of reentry at 10,000 mph (4.5 km/s). The nose cone sank 1,302 nautical miles (2,411 km) downrange from Cape Canaveral and was not recovered. Another biological flight was launched on 28 May 1959. Aboard Jupiter AM-18 were
15066-522: The four pads. Jupiters were delivered to the Cape strapped to wheeled trailers and flown to the Cape's "Skid Strip" on C-124s. They were then moved to Hangar R at the Cape Industrial Area where the nose cone was mated with the missile, and electrical checkout was performed. It was then moved on the trailer to the pads, about 3.5 miles (5.6 km) south, where they were lifted to vertical by
15228-492: The gyroscopes they would be implementing. This 'Stable Platform' configuration did not account for the change in gravitational fields that the submarine would experience while it was in motion, nor did it account for the ever-altering position of the Earth. This problem raised many concerns, as this would make it nearly impossible for navigational readouts to remain accurate and reliable. A submarine equipped with ballistic missiles
15390-406: The military. He saw the Navy interest as a reasonable argument to continue the Army project in any event, and on 8 November 1955 approved both programs. The Air Force would develop IRBM No. 1, or SM-75 (for "strategic missile"), the Army would develop their design as IRBM No. 2 or SM-78 . The Navy would develop systems to launch the Army missile from ships and, later, submarines. BuShips completed
15552-461: The missile was later renamed Polaris , their first submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). Rickover, one of the few remaining skeptics, was won over by pointing out that a properly designed submarine was needed specifically for this role, and he would be called upon to produce it. Rickover was from that point on a staunch ally of the program. On 4 October 1957, the Soviets successfully launched Sputnik I from their R-7 Semyorka ICBM. The US
15714-499: The multiple payloads cannot be deployed in a manner that simulates the operation of a post-boost vehicle. To meet this specific need, Sandia developed an Operations and Deployment Experiments Simulator (ODES), which functions as a PBV. When ODES was added to STARS I, the configuration became known as STARS II. The development phase of the STARS program was completed in 1994, and BMDO provided about $ 192.1 million for this effort. The operational phase began in 1995. The first STARS I flight,
15876-497: The nuclear warheads. The deployed missiles were under command of 36th Strategic Interdiction Air Brigade ( 36ª Aerobrigata Interdizione Strategica , Italian Air Force) at Gioia del Colle Air Base , Italy. In October 1959, the location of the third and final Jupiter MRBM squadron was settled when a government-to-government agreement was signed with Turkey. The U.S. and Turkey concluded an agreement to deploy one Jupiter squadron on NATO's southern flank. One squadron totaling 15 missiles
16038-435: The number of Polaris submarines was fixed at 41 . The USS George Washington was the first submarine capable of deploying U.S. developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). The responsibility of the development of SLBMs was given to the Navy and the Army. The Air Force was charged with developing a land-based intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), while an IRBM which could be launched by land or by sea
16200-461: The number of STARS launches required to support National Missile Defense (NMD)2 and BMDO funding. Due to the launch and budget reductions, the STARS office developed a draft long-range plan for the STARS program. The study examined three options: When the STARS program was started in 1985 it was perceived that there would be four launches per year. Because of the large number of anticipated launches and an unknown defect rate for surplus Polaris motors,
16362-456: The ocean 149 nautical miles (276 km; 171 mi) downrange. These failures were traced to an inadequate turbopump design that resulted in a string of failures in the Jupiter, Thor, and Atlas programs, all of which used a variant of the same Rocketdyne engine. Testing then paused for five months while Rocketdyne came up with a number of fixes and the Army retrofitted all its Jupiters with the redesigned pumps. In spite of these failures, Jupiter
16524-488: The officers could agree on a size, their findings were encouraging nonetheless. The U.S. Navy began work on nuclear-powered submarines in 1946. They launched the first one, the USS Nautilus in 1955. Nuclear powered submarines were the least vulnerable to a first strike from the Soviet Union. The next question that led to further development was what kind of arms the nuclear-powered submarines should be equipped with. In
16686-455: The penetrative power were specific items considered in the tests conducted during the Antelope program. The British's uncertainty with their missiles led to the examination of the Antelope program. The assessments of Antelope occurred at Aldermaston . Evidence from the evaluation of Antelope led to the British decision to undertake their program following that of the United States. The result
16848-579: The possibility of deploying the missiles in Italy and Turkey. The Air Force was already implementing plans to base four squadrons (60 missiles) under Project Emily —subsequently redefined as 20 Royal Air Force squadrons each with three missiles—of PGM-17 Thor IRBMs in Britain on airfields stretching from Yorkshire to East Anglia . In 1958, the United States Air Force activated the 864th Strategic Missile Squadron at ABMA. Although
17010-410: The program in 1977. The system became operational in mid-1982 on HMS Renown , and the last British SSBN submarine was equipped with it in mid-1987. Chevaline was withdrawn from service in 1996. Though Britain adopted the Antelope program methods, no input on the design came from the United States. Aldermaston was solely responsible for the Chevaline warheads. The British did not ask to extend
17172-437: The project began with an above-water launch goal. They decided to continue the development of an underwater launch, and developed two ideas for this launch: wet and dry. Dry launch meant encasing the missile in a shell that would peel away when the missile reached the water's surface. Wet launch meant shooting the missile through the water without a casing. While the Navy was in favor of a wet launch, they developed both methods as
17334-410: The relatively small, solid-fueled Polaris missile , and this prompted the Navy to leave the Jupiter program in December of that year. Soon Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke concentrated all Navy strategic research on Polaris , still under Admiral Raborn's Special Project Office. All US SLBMs have been solid-fueled while all Soviet and Russian SLBMs have been liquid-fueled except for
17496-412: The same meeting suggested that an intermediate-range weapon carrying one of these weapons could be built using solid propellant . Even in this case, the missile would be much smaller than Jupiter; Jupiter was expected to weigh 160,000 pounds (73,000 kg), while estimates of a solid-fuel missile with similar range were closer to 30,000 pounds (14,000 kg), along with a similar reduction in size which
17658-553: The separation of the rocket body from the reentry vehicle section before splashing down at 1,460 nautical miles (2,700 km; 1,680 mi). AM-3 flew from LC-26B on 23 October, including the ablative heat shield and the new ST-90 INS. This test flew a planned distance of 1,100 nautical miles (2,000 km; 1,300 mi). AM-3A launched on 26 November and all went according to plan until T+101 seconds when engine thrust abruptly terminated. The missile broke up at T+232 seconds. On 18 December, AM-4 lost thrust T+117 seconds and fell into
17820-538: The shelf (COTS) hardware; all the while maintaining the demonstrated performance of the existing Trident II missiles. STARS, the Strategic Target System program, is a BMDO program managed by the U. S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC). It began in 1985 in response to concerns that the supply of surplus Minuteman I boosters used to launch targets and other experiments on intercontinental ballistic missile flight trajectories in support of
17982-500: The short, squat shape intended to fit in naval submarines. Its sheer size and volatility of its fuel made it very unsuited to submarine launching and was only slightly more attractive for deployment on ships. The missile continued to be developed by the Army's German team in collaboration with their main contractor, Chrysler Corporation. SPO's responsibility was to develop a sea-launching platform with necessary fire control and stabilization systems for that very purpose. The original schedule
18144-432: The site. Submarine-launched ballistic missile A submarine-launched ballistic missile ( SLBM ) is a ballistic missile capable of being launched from submarines . Modern variants usually deliver multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), each of which carries a nuclear warhead and allows a single launched missile to strike several targets. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles operate in
18306-703: The sites. With two rotating crews per boat, about one-third of the total US force could be in a patrol area at any time. The Soviet bases, in Severomorsk (near Murmansk ) for the Arctic - Atlantic theater in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky for the Pacific theater, required their SSBNs to make a long transit (e.g., through NATO-monitored waters in the Atlantic) to their mid-ocean patrol areas to hold
18468-441: The smaller LC-4 on 20 April 1955, with the launch of the seventh Redstone from LC-6. Envisioning an extended test program, a second set of similar pads began construction in 1956, LC-26 A and B; the only major difference was the blockhouse was located slightly further away, about 400 feet (120 m). In late 1957 a set of parallel railway tracks running just east of the pads was added, allowing an A-frame gantry to be rolled to any of
18630-537: The standard booster for trials of the Ground-Based Interceptor . From the early days of the Polaris program, American senators and naval officers suggested that the United Kingdom might use Polaris. In 1957 Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh Burke and First Sea Lord Louis Mountbatten began corresponding on the project. After the cancellations of the Blue Streak and Skybolt missiles in
18792-543: The start was that the internecine fighting between the Army and Air Force was leading to significant duplication of effort, with little to show for it. The Department of Defense responded by creating the Advanced Research Projects Agency ( ARPA ), whose initial mission was to look over all of the ongoing projects and select ones based solely on their technical merits. At the same time, the fighting had begun to have negative political effects. In
18954-539: The summer of 1956, the navy sponsored a study by the National Academy of Sciences on anti-submarine warfare at Nobska Point in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, known as Project NOBSKA . The navy's intention was to have a new missile developed that would be lighter than existing missiles and cover a range up to fifteen hundred miles. A problem that needed to be solved was that this design would not be able to carry
19116-470: The support of a number of influential theorists, notably Henry Kissinger , and was seized on as a uniquely Army mission. The original goal for the new longer-range design was to match Redstone's accuracy at the Jupiter's much-extended range. That is, if Redstone could reach 980 ft (300 m) at 200 miles (320 km), the new design would provide a circular error probable on the order of 4.3 miles (7 km). As development continued, it became clear
19278-430: The total number of Jupiters to be built to 94. The first, hand-built at ABMA, would be delivered by the end of FY57, and the first production models from Chrysler's Michigan Ordnance Missile Plant near Warren, Michigan between FY58 and FY61. A primary complaint about Jupiter was that the design's shorter range placed it within relatively easy striking distance of Soviet weapons, both missiles and aircraft. Thor, based in
19440-570: The turbine exhaust, the gimbaled exhaust pipe not being introduced until late 1958. In 1954 Test Laboratory director Karl Heimburg began construction of the Static Test Stand for Redstone testing. This was still under construction when it was re-purposed for Jupiter, and finally completed in January 1957. A Jupiter was installed in the stand that month, and fired for the first time on 12 February 1957. This almost ended in disaster when
19602-515: The validity of Teller's prediction in the Navy's eyes. Whether the warhead was half or one megaton mattered little so long as it fitted the missile and would be ready by the deadline. Almost four decades later, Teller said, referring to Mark's performance, that it was “an occasion when I was happy about the other person being bashful.” When the Atomic Energy Commission backed up Teller's estimate in early September, Admiral Burke and
19764-650: The warheads about a common target, and the B-3 was to have penetration aids to counter Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile defenses. The U.S. Navy began to replace Polaris with Poseidon in 1972. The B-3 missile evolved into the C-3 Poseidon missile , which abandoned the decoy concept in favor of using the C3's greater throw-weight for larger numbers (10–14) of new hardened high-re-entry-speed reentry vehicles that could overwhelm Soviet defenses by sheer weight of numbers, and its high speed after re-entry. This turned out to be
19926-651: Was a programme called Chevaline that added multiple decoys, chaff , and other defensive countermeasures . Its existence was only revealed in 1980, partly because of the cost overruns of the project, which had almost quadrupled the original estimate given when the project was finally approved in January 1975. The program also ran into trouble when dealing with the British Labour Party . Their Chief Scientific Adviser, Solly Zuckerman , believed that Britain no longer needed new designs for nuclear weapons and no more nuclear warhead tests would be necessary. Though
20088-530: Was a strategic second-strike retaliatory weapon. To meet the need for greater accuracy over the longer ranges the Lockheed designers included a reentry vehicle concept, improved guidance, fire control, and navigation systems to achieve their goals. To obtain the major gains in performance of the Polaris A3 in comparison to early models, there were many improvements, including propellants and material used in
20250-503: Was adequate for existing weapons systems. Initially, developers of Polaris were set to utilize the existing 'Stable Platform' configuration of the inertial guidance system. Created at the MIT Instrumentation Laboratory, this Ships Inertial Navigation System (SINS) was supplied to the Navy in 1954. The developers of Polaris encountered many issues from the outset of the project, including the outdated technology of
20412-483: Was always a British admiral. Polaris was the largest project in the Royal Navy's peacetime history. Although in 1964 the new Labour government considered cancelling Polaris and turning the submarines into conventionally armed hunter-killers, it continued the program as Polaris gave Britain a global nuclear capacity—perhaps east of Suez —at a cost £150 million less than that of the V bomber force. By adopting many established, American, methodologies and components Polaris
20574-429: Was aware of these efforts and had already talked to the press about it, suggesting that if the Soviets launched a satellite first it would be no big deal. To their surprise, the press exploded in rage over the affair. Having spent over a decade working on similar missiles, like Atlas , the fact that the Soviets could beat them was a serious blow, and prompted a deep review of the ongoing programs. One problem noted from
20736-470: Was by the Italian Air Force, CM-106, which took place from LC-26B on 23 January 1963. Jupiter missiles were used in a series of suborbital biological test flights . On 13 December 1958, Jupiter AM-13 was launched from Cape Canaveral , Florida with a Navy-trained South American squirrel monkey named Gordo on board. The nose cone recovery parachute failed to operate and Gordo did not survive
20898-415: Was clear that Jupiter represented a threat to the Air Force's desired hegemony over strategic forces. This led to them starting their own MRBM program Thor , in spite of having repeatedly dismissed the medium-range role in the past. The fighting between the Army and Air Force grew through 1955 and 1956 until practically every missile system the Army was involved in was being attacked in the press. The Navy
21060-470: Was concerned from the start about Jupiter's cryogenic propellants , but at the time there was no other option. Given the size and weight of contemporary nuclear weapons, only a large liquid-fuel rocket engine provided the energy needed to meet the Navy's range goal of launching from safe areas in the Atlantic Ocean. They justified the risk thus: We were prepared to take the chance that we might lose
21222-459: Was converted to use Trident II by the early 2000s. Trident II offered a range of over 8,000 kilometres (4,300 nmi) with eight larger MIRV warheads than Trident I. When the USS ; Ohio (SSBN-726) commenced sea trials in 1980, two of the first ten US SSBNs had their missiles removed to comply with SALT treaty requirements; the remaining eight were converted to attack submarines (SSN) by
21384-435: Was declared operational on 15 January 1958. Taking the time to also fully rate the engine to 150,000 lbf, the new engine was first flown on AM-5 on 18 May 1958 from LC-26B, reaching a planned 1,247 nautical miles (2,309 km; 1,435 mi). AM-5 also carried the real nose cone design, which separated from the rocket body, spun up the warhead, and separated to allow the warhead to continue on its own. The warhead section
21546-454: Was delivered to ABMA in January 1956, followed by the first prototype engines in July 1956. Testing of these engines began in September 1956 at ABMA's new Power Plant Test Stand. This demonstrated a number of problems with unstable combustion, leading to the failure of four engines by November. To continue testing, the engine was temporarily derated back to 135,000 lbf and was successfully tested at this level in January 1957. Continued work on
21708-656: Was deployed at five sites near İzmir , Turkey from 1961 to 1963, operated by USAF personnel, with the first flight of three Jupiter missiles turned over to the Türk Hava Kuvvetleri (Turkish Air Force) in late October 1962, but USAF personnel retaining control of nuclear warhead arming. On four occasions between mid-October 1961 and August 1962, Jupiter mobile missiles carrying 1.4 megatons of TNT (5.9 PJ) nuclear warheads were struck by lightning at their bases in Italy. In each case, thermal batteries were activated, and on two occasions, tritium - deuterium "boost" gas
21870-509: Was developed in 1958, the AN/UYK-1 . It was used to interpret the Transit satellite data and send guidance information to the Polaris, which had its own guidance computer made with ultra miniaturized electronics, very advanced for its time, because there wasn't much room in a Polaris—there were 16 on each submarine. The Ship's Inertial Navigation System (SINS) was developed earlier to provide
22032-578: Was equipped with a parachute and was recovered by the Navy some 28 nautical miles (52 km; 32 mi) from its predicted splashdown point. AM-6B included both the production nose cone and the ST-90 INS during its launch from LC-26B on 17 July 1958. This time the Navy recovered it only 1.5 nautical miles (2.8 km; 1.7 mi) from its planned splashdown point 1,241 nautical miles (2,298 km; 1,428 mi) downrange. AM-7 flew 1,207 nautical miles (2,235 km; 1,389 mi) on 27 August, testing
22194-439: Was equipped with the lower-thrust interim engine. The vehicle performed well until past 50 seconds into launch when control started to fail, leading to breakup at T+73 seconds. It was deduced that turbopump exhaust was sucked up by the partial vacuum in the area behind the missile and began to burn in the tail section. The heat burned through the control wiring, so extra insulation was added there on future flights. An identical AM-1B
22356-488: Was finished on time and within budget. On 15 February 1968, HMS Resolution , the lead ship of her class , became the first British vessel to fire a Polaris. All Royal Navy SSBNs have been based at Faslane , only a few miles from Holy Loch . Although one submarine of the four was always in a shipyard undergoing a refit, recent declassifications of archived files disclose that the Royal Navy deployed four boatloads of reentry vehicles and warheads, plus spare warheads for
22518-499: Was in keeping with the Army's view of nuclear weapons, which was in effect more powerful artillery . They saw the weapons as part of a large-scale battle in Europe, in which both sides would use nuclear weapons during a limited war that did not include the use of strategic weapons on each other's cities. In that case, "if wars were to be kept limited, such weapons would have to be capable of hitting only tactical targets." This approach saw
22680-480: Was injected into the warhead pits , partially arming them. After the fourth lightning strike on a Jupiter MRBM, the USAF placed protective lightning strike-diversion tower arrays at all of the Italian and Turkish Jupiter MRBM missiles sites. In 1962, a Bulgarian MiG-17 reconnaissance airplane was reported to have crashed into an olive grove near one of the U.S. Jupiter missile launch sites in Italy, after overflying
22842-456: Was introduced, along with a series of changes to the test stand to help retain control in these situations. Kurt Debus had led the construction of launch pads for Redstone missiles at Cape Canaveral, Florida , building the twin LC-5 and LC-6 pads about 500 feet (150 m) apart with a common blockhouse located 300 feet (91 m) away between the two. Redstone testing moved to these pads from
23004-463: Was kept on a tight schedule and the only influence that changed this was the USSR's launching of Sputnik on October 4, 1957. This caused many working on the project to want to accelerate development. The launch of a second Russian satellite and pressing public and government opinions caused Secretary Wilson to move the project along more quickly. The Navy favored an underwater launch of an IRBM, although
23166-565: Was named head of the theoretical division of Los Alamos in 1947, a job that was originally offered for Teller. Mark was a cautious physicist and no match for Teller in a bidding war. At the NOBSKA summer study, Edward Teller made his famous contribution to the FBM program. Teller offered to develop a lightweight warhead of one-megaton strength within five years. He suggested that nuclear-armed torpedoes could be substituted for conventional ones to provide
23328-623: Was of little to no use if operators had no way to direct them. The Polaris developers then turned to a guidance system that had been abandoned by the U.S. Air Force, the XN6 Autonavigator. Developed by the Autonetics Division of North American Aviation for the U.S. Air Force Navaho , the XN6 was a system designed for air-breathing cruise missiles , but by 1958 had proved useful for installment on submarines. A predecessor to
23490-514: Was of paramount importance to a submarine design. The Navy announced their desire to develop their own missile that summer, initially under the name Jupiter-S. After intensive follow-up studies, the Navy withdrew from the Jupiter program in December 1956. This was officially announced by the Army in January 1957. In its place, the Navy began development of what was then known as the Fleet Ballistic Missile Program, and
23652-508: Was only one more failure in the Jupiter program, AM-23 on 15 September 1959, which developed a leak in a nitrogen bottle that led to depressurization of the RP-1 tank and almost immediate loss of control at liftoff. The missile wobbled from side to side and the RP-1 tank began to break apart starting at T+7 seconds. The Jupiter flipped upside down, dumping out the contents of the RP-1 tank, followed by total vehicle breakup at T+13 seconds, just before
23814-494: Was probably the never-built SSM-N-2 Triton program. However, a history of the Army's Jupiter program states that the Navy was involved in the Army program, but withdrew at an early stage. Originally, the Navy favored cruise missile systems in a strategic role, such as the Regulus missile deployed on the earlier USS Grayback and a few other submarines, but a major drawback of these early cruise missile launch systems (and
23976-403: Was proposed to replace the submarines currently being used with Poseidon. The ULMS II missile system was designed to be retrofitted to the existing SSBNs, while also being fitted to the proposed Ohio-class submarine. In May 1972, the term ULMS II was replaced with Trident. The Trident was to be a larger, higher-performance missile with a range capacity greater than 6000 miles. Under the agreement,
24138-420: Was questioned about the application of this to the FBM program, he asked, ‘Why use a 1958 warhead in a 1965 weapon system?’ Mark disagreed with Teller's prediction that the desired one-megaton warhead could be made to fit the missile envelope within the timescale envisioned. Instead, Mark suggested that half a megaton would be more realistic and he quoted a higher price and a longer deadline. This simply confirmed
24300-440: Was quickly readied and launched on 26 April. AM-1B's flight went entirely according to plan up to T+70 seconds when the missile started becoming unstable in flight and finally broke up at T+93 seconds. The failure was deduced to have been the result of propellant slosh due to bending modes induced by the steering maneuvers needed to perform the flight trajectory. The solution to this problem involved testing several types of baffles in
24462-413: Was rapidly falling, and by combining this engine with a warhead of 2,000 pounds (910 kg) they could build a single-stage missile able to reach 1,500–1,700 miles (2,400–2,700 km) while being significantly less complicated and easier to handle in the field than a two-stage model. This engine was continually upgraded, ultimately reaching 150,000 pounds-force (670,000 N). This last model, known to
24624-455: Was reached during their 16-minute flight. After splashdown the Jupiter nosecone carrying Able and Baker was recovered by the seagoing tug USS Kiowa (ATF-72). The monkeys survived the flight in good condition. Able died four days after the flight from a reaction to anesthesia while undergoing surgery to remove an infected medical electrode. Baker lived for many years after the flight, finally succumbing to kidney failure on 29 November 1984 at
24786-508: Was signed on April 6, 1963. In return, the British agreed to assign control over their Polaris missile targeting to the SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander, Europe), with the provision that in a national emergency when unsupported by the NATO allies, the targeting, permission to fire, and firing of those Polaris missiles would reside with the British national authorities. Nevertheless, the consent of
24948-457: Was tasked to the Navy and Army. The Navy Special Projects (SP) office was at the head of the project. It was led by Rear Admiral William Raborn . On September 13, 1955, James R. Killian , head of a special committee organized by President Eisenhower, recommended that both the Army and Navy come together under a program aimed at developing an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). The missile, later known as Jupiter, would be developed under
25110-640: Was the Chrysler Corporation . The Jupiter was originally designed by the US Army , which was looking for a highly accurate missile designed to strike enemy states such as China and the Soviet Union . The US Navy also expressed an interest in the design as an SLBM but left the collaboration to work on their solid-fuel Polaris . Jupiter retained the short, squat shape intended to fit in submarines. Jupiter traces its history ultimately to
25272-608: Was the Project 941 Akula , famous as the Typhoon-class (and not to be confused with the Project 971 Shchuka attack submarine , called "Akula" by NATO). The Typhoons were the largest submarines ever built at 48,000 tons submerged. They were armed with 20 of the new R-39 Rif (SS-N-20) missiles with a range of 8,300 kilometres (4,500 nmi) and 10 MIRV warheads. Six Typhoons were commissioned in 1981–89. New SSBN construction terminated for over 10 years in Russia and slowed in
25434-482: Was the W-58 warhead used in a "cluster" of three warheads for the Polaris A-3, the final model of the Polaris missile. One of the initial problems the Navy faced in creating an SLBM was that the sea moves, while a launch platform on land does not. Waves and swells rocking the boat or submarine, as well as possible flexing of the ship's hull, had to be taken into account to properly aim the missile. The Polaris development
25596-485: Was the first nuclear armed , medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) of the United States Air Force (USAF). It was a liquid-propellant rocket using RP-1 fuel and LOX oxidizer, with a single Rocketdyne LR79-NA (model S-3D) rocket engine producing 667 kilonewtons (150,000 lb f ) of thrust. It was armed with the 1.44 megatons of TNT (6.0 PJ) W49 nuclear warhead. The prime contractor
25758-458: Was to have a ship-based IRBM system ready for operation evaluation by January 1, 1960, and a submarine-based one by January 1, 1965. However, the Navy was deeply dissatisfied with the liquid fuel IRBM. The first concern was that the cryogenic liquid fuel was not only extremely dangerous to handle, but launch-preparations were also very time-consuming. Second, an argument was made that liquid-fueled rockets gave relatively low initial acceleration, which
25920-466: Was used for any missile test that returned usable data). The next flight on October 15 failed spectacularly when the second stage ignited on the pad and took off by itself. Range Safety blew up the errant rocket while the first stage sat on the pad and burned. The third and fourth tests (December 30 and January 9) had problems due to overheating in the boattail section. This necessitated adding extra shielding and insulation to wiring and other components. When
26082-514: Was well aware that the Air Force would oppose any such endeavor. Instead, he approached the Army, and found that the proposed Jupiter fit the range goals needed by the Navy. The issue of who would be given the go-ahead to build an IRBM by this time had reached the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who proved unable to reach a decision. This forced the Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson to move ahead without an official recommendation from
26244-453: Was worried it would take up funding needed elsewhere. Another skeptic of missiles was the Chief of Naval Operations , Robert B. Carney . Lower-ranking Navy officials became increasingly interested when the Army and Air Force began serious development of their long-range missiles. In an attempt to bypass high-ranking Navy officials, who remained uninterested in the concept, the Navy liaison to
#585414