189-712: The Commission on Rhodesian Opinion , also known as the Pearce Commission , was a British commission set up in 1971 to test the acceptability of a proposed constitutional settlement in Rhodesia . It was created by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home . The commission was popularly known as the Pearce Commission after its chairman, retired British judge Edward Pearce, Baron Pearce . The Pearce Commission reported in 1972 that although
378-648: A British territory in southern Africa that had governed itself since 1923, now regarded itself as an independent sovereign state . The culmination of a protracted dispute between the British and Rhodesian governments regarding the terms under which the latter could become fully independent, it was the first unilateral break from the United Kingdom by one of its colonies since the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776. The UK,
567-491: A strategic hamlets policy of the kind used in Malaya and Vietnam to restrict the influence of insurgents over the population of rural areas. Local people were forced to relocate to protected villages (PVs) which were strictly controlled and guarded by the government against rebel atrocities. The protected villages were compared by the guerrillas to concentration camps . Some contemporary accounts claim that this interference in
756-568: A "raw colonial"—when he took over, Smith's personal experience of the UK comprised four brief visits—he promised a harder line than Field in independence talks. The RF's replacement of Field drew criticism from the British Labour Party, whose leader Harold Wilson called it "brutal", while Nkomo described the new Smith Cabinet as "a suicide squad ... not interested in the welfare of all the people but only in their own". Smith said he
945-522: A Chinese military facility in Nanjing crossed into Rhodesia from Zambia, having been issued vague instructions to sabotage important installations and kill white farmers. Five were arrested by the Rhodesian security forces almost immediately. Another seven initially evaded capture and planned to destroy an electric pylon near Sinoia . Their explosive charges failed to detonate and were discovered by
1134-552: A category unto itself because of the "special quasi-independent status" it held. The Dominions Office , formed in 1925 to handle British relations with the dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Newfoundland , South Africa and the Irish Free State (the Statute of Westminster 1931 delineated the rights of the dominions more clearly in that year), also dealt with Southern Rhodesia, and Imperial Conferences included
1323-509: A change in policy to only include representatives from fully independent states. This decision, taken by Britain to preempt the possibility of open confrontation with Asian and black African leaders at the conference, deeply insulted Smith. Lord Malvern equated Britain's removal of Southern Rhodesia's conference seat with "kicking us out of the Commonwealth", while Welensky expressed horror at what he described as "this cavalier treatment of
1512-681: A clandestine trade network. From 1968 until 1970, there was virtually no further dialogue between Rhodesia and the UK. In a referendum in 1969, white voters approved a new constitution and the establishment of a republic, thereby severing Rhodesia's last links with the British Crown, duly declared in March 1970. This changed immediately after the election of Edward Heath , who reopened negotiations. Smith remained optimistic that Heath would do his utmost to remedy Anglo-Rhodesian relations, although disappointed that he continued to adhere publicly to
1701-590: A common interest in maintaining security ties in southern Africa, Salazar expressed a great deal of anger at Britain's refusal to support Portugal during the Indian annexation of Goa in 1961, admonishing Smith not to trust the British government. A Rhodesian Trade Office was opened in Lisbon in order to co-ordinate breaking the anticipated sanctions in the event of a unilateral declaration of independence later that year, which encouraged Smith not to compromise. In its turn,
1890-480: A country which has, since its creation, staunchly supported, in every possible way, Britain and the Commonwealth". At 10 Downing Street in early September 1964, impasse developed between Douglas-Home and Smith over the best way to measure black public opinion in Southern Rhodesia. A key plank of Britain's Southern Rhodesia policy was that the terms for independence had to be "acceptable to the people of
2079-485: A crisis. In the event, they were never exercised. A generally co-operative relationship developed between Whitehall and the colonial government and civil service in Salisbury , and dispute was rare. The 1923 constitution was drawn up in non-racial terms, and the electoral system it devised was similarly open, at least in theory. Voting qualifications regarding personal income, education and property, similar to those of
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#17327811908422268-599: A degree of economic expansion and industrialisation almost unrivaled in sub-Saharan Africa. Its natural abundance of mineral wealth—including large deposits of chromium and manganese—contributed to the high rate of conventional economic growth. However, most colonies in Africa, even those rich in natural resources, experienced difficulty in achieving similar rates of development due to a shortage of technical and managerial skills. Small, rotating cadres of colonial civil servants who possessed little incentive to invest their skills in
2457-512: A diversified economy with a strong manufacturing sector and iron and steel industries, and circumvent the normal British protectionist policy of supporting domestic industry in the metropole while discouraging industry in the colonies abroad. As the white population increased, so did capital imports, especially in the wake of the Second World War. This trend, too, stood in sharp contrast to most other colonial territories, which suffered
2646-439: A document rather than his word would be against the Commonwealth's "spirit of trust"—an argument that Field eventually accepted. "Let's remember the trust you emphasised", Smith warned, according to Field's account wagging his finger at Butler; "if you break that you will live to regret it." Southern Rhodesia attended the conference, which was held at Victoria Falls over a week starting from 28 June 1963, and among other things it
2835-649: A future British government might, if it were so inclined, go against previous conventions by legislating for Salisbury without its consent, withdrawing devolved powers or otherwise altering the Southern Rhodesian constitution. Fearing what the Labour Party might do if it won the next British general election (which was projected for late 1964), the Southern Rhodesians stepped up their efforts, hoping to win independence before Britain went to
3024-603: A handful of parliament seats, took a similar stance. The Conservative Party, while also following a policy of decolonisation, was more sympathetic to the Southern Rhodesian government's position, and included members who openly supported it. The Southern Rhodesian government found it bizarre that Britain was making independent states out of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which the Rhodesians considered to be less developed territories with little experience of self-rule, while withholding sovereign statehood from Southern Rhodesia,
3213-633: A head because Sandys persuaded Field not to forward it to Gibbs for ratification on the grounds that it had not been unanimously passed. Lord Salisbury , one of Southern Rhodesia's main supporters in Britain, despaired at Field's lack of action, telling Welensky that as he saw it "the simple time to have declared independence, whether right or wrong, would have been when the Federation came to an end". The RF hierarchy interpreted this latest backtrack by Field as evidence that he would not seriously challenge
3402-662: A luncheon at Buckingham Palace after the funeral—noticing the Rhodesian's absence, the Queen sent a royal equerry to Smith's hotel to retrieve him, reportedly causing Wilson much irritation—the two Prime Ministers inconclusively debated at 10 Downing Street. They differed on most matters, but agreed on a visit to Rhodesia the next month by Bottomley and the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner , to gauge public opinion and meet political and commercial figures. Bottomley and Gardiner visited Rhodesia from 22 February to 3 March, collected
3591-442: A major capital deficit due to revenues simply being repatriated to the metropole, leaving little capital to be invested locally. The considerable investment made by white Rhodesians in the economy financed the development of Southern Rhodesia's export industries as well as the infrastructure necessary to integrate it further with international markets. In August 1953, Southern Rhodesia merged with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland ,
3780-465: A more integrated political structure in theory, although not without qualification and equivocation. A greater degree of social and political equality, they argued, was acceptable once more black citizens had obtained higher educational and vocational standards. The second faction in the white community was wholly unwilling to concede the principle, much less the practice, of equality to the black population. Both groups remained opposed to majority rule in
3969-630: A multiracial provisional government , with Smith succeeded by moderate Abel Muzorewa , failed to appease international critics or halt the war. By December 1979 Muzorewa had secured an agreement with ZAPU and ZANU, allowing Rhodesia to briefly revert to colonial status pending new elections under British supervision. ZANU secured an electoral victory in 1980, and the country achieved internationally recognised independence in April 1980 as Zimbabwe . Rhodesia's largest cities were Salisbury (its capital city, now known as Harare) and Bulawayo . Prior to 1970,
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#17327811908424158-651: A new general election for May 1965 and, campaigning on an election promise of independence, won all 50 "A"-roll seats (the voters for which were mostly white). Josiah Gondo , leader of the United People's Party, became Rhodesia's first black Leader of the Opposition . Opening parliament on 9 June, Gibbs told the Legislative Assembly that the RF's strengthened majority amounted to "a mandate to lead
4347-573: A number of black Rhodesians who were accused of collaboration with the security forces. Nkomo's party, the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) announced that year that it had formed a military wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and "the decision to start bringing in arms and ammunition and to send young men away for sabotage training" had already been implemented. As early as 1960, ZAPU's predecessor,
4536-531: A rebellion by English "kith and kin", or white Rhodesians of predominantly British descent and origin, many of whom still possessed sympathies and family ties to the United Kingdom. Wilson's refusal to consider a military option further encouraged Smith to proceed with his plans. Talks quickly broke down, and final efforts in October to achieve a settlement floundered; the Smith government remained unwilling to accept
4725-521: A rebellion". Smith and his ministers still pledged allegiance to Queen Elizabeth II, whose official portrait hung prominently behind them as they signed; the declaration even ended "God Save The Queen". Four junior members of the Cabinet—Lance Smith, Ian Dillon, Andrew Dunlop and P K van der Byl —did not sign, but were included in the official photograph. Whereas in the course of human affairs history has shown that it may become necessary for
4914-590: A republic in an unsuccessful attempt to win foreign recognition. The Rhodesian Bush War , a guerrilla conflict between the government and two rival communist-backed black Rhodesian groups, began in earnest two years later, and after several attempts to end the war Smith concluded the Internal Settlement with non-militant nationalists in 1978. Under these terms the country was reconstituted under black rule as Zimbabwe Rhodesia in June 1979, but this new order
5103-414: A republic on 2 March 1970. Under the new constitution, a president served as ceremonial head of state, with the prime minister nominally reporting to him. Some in Rhodesian government had hoped in vain that the declaration of a republic would finally prompt other nations to grant recognition. The years following Rhodesia's UDI saw an unfolding series of economic, military, and political pressures placed on
5292-713: A timetable for independence could be set. In 1964, growing white dissatisfaction with the ongoing negotiations played a major role in the ousting of Winston Field as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia . Field was succeeded by Ian Smith , chairman of the conservative Rhodesian Front Party and an outspoken critic of any immediate transition to majority rule. Smith, the colony's first Rhodesian-born leader, soon came to personify resistance to liberals in British government and those agitating for change at home. In September 1964, Smith visited Lisbon , where Portuguese prime minister António de Oliveira Salazar promised him "maximum support" if he should declare independence. Aside from
5481-583: A vast underground network of informants and supporters in northeastern Rhodesia. As a result of the erosion of Portuguese authority in Mozambique's border provinces due to the Mozambican War of Independence , ZANLA was also able to establish external sanctuaries there. It was also in the process of cultivating a military alliance with the leading black nationalist movement in Mozambique, the Front for
5670-513: A wide cross-section of opinions, including some from black Rhodesians, and on returning to Britain reported to the House of Commons that they were "not without hope of finding a way towards a solution that will win the support of all communities and lead to independence and prosperity for all Rhodesians". Bottomley also condemned black-on-black political violence, and dismissed the idea of introducing majority rule through military force. The RF called
5859-801: A year. Attempting to form a viable white opposition to the Rhodesian Front, the UFP resurrected itself around Welensky, renamed itself the Rhodesia Party, and entered the Arundel and Avondale by-elections that had been called for 1 October 1964. Perturbed by the prospect of having to face the political heavyweight Welensky in parliament at the head of the opposition, the RF poured huge resources into winning both of these former UFP safe seats, and fielded Clifford Dupont , Smith's deputy, against Welensky in Arundel. The RF won both seats comfortably, and
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6048-713: Is at stake ... I know I speak for everyone in these islands, all parties, all our people, when I say to Mr Smith, 'Prime Minister, think again'. Smith : After 43 years of proving our case we are told that we cannot be master in our own house. Is it not incredible that the British government has allowed our case to deteriorate into this fantastic position? ... I believe I should say to Mr Wilson: 'Prime Minister, think again!' -- Wilson and Smith called on each other through televised statements to "think again" on 13 October 1965 Amid renewed rumours of an impending Rhodesian UDI, Smith travelled to meet Wilson in London at
6237-617: The Bulawayo trade unionist Joshua Nkomo , renamed itself with each post-ban reorganisation, and by the start of 1962 was called the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU). Attempting to win black political support, Whitehead proposed a number of reforms to racially discriminatory legislation, including the Land Apportionment Act , and promised to implement these if his UFP won the next Southern Rhodesian election. But intimidation by ZAPU of prospective black voters impeded
6426-676: The Cape Qualified Franchise , were applied equally to all, but since most blacks did not meet the set standards, both the electoral roll and the colonial parliament were overwhelmingly from the white minority of about 5%. The result was that black interests were sparsely represented if at all, something that most of the colony's whites showed little interest in changing; they claimed that most blacks were uninterested in Western-style political process and that they would not govern properly if they took over. Bills such as
6615-628: The Cold War , Britain opposed the spread of Soviet and Chinese influence into Africa, but knew it would become an international pariah if it publicly expressed reservations or backed down on NIBMAR in the Southern Rhodesia question. Once the topic of Southern Rhodesia came to the fore in the UN and other bodies, particularly the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), even maintaining the status quo became regarded as unacceptable internationally, causing
6804-607: The Commonwealth , and the United Nations all deemed Rhodesia's UDI illegal, and economic sanctions, the first in the UN's history, were imposed on the breakaway colony. With the help of the Commonwealth Secretariat , members of the Commonwealth were able to cooperate and advise Rhodesian Africans on policy. Amid near-complete international isolation, Rhodesia continued as an unrecognised state with
6993-945: The Governor of Southern Rhodesia , to formally notify him of the UDI, Gibbs condemned it as an act of treason. After Smith formally announced the UDI on the radio, Governor Gibbs used his reserve power to dismiss Smith and his entire cabinet from office, on orders from the Colonial Office in Whitehall . However, Gibbs was unable to take any concrete actions to bring about a return to lawful colonial government. Rhodesian ministers simply ignored his notices, contending that UDI had made his office obsolete. Even so, Gibbs continued to occupy his official residence , Government House, in Salisbury until 1970, when he finally left Rhodesia, following
7182-570: The Land Apportionment Act of 1930 , which earmarked about half of the country for white ownership and residence while dividing the rest into black purchase, tribal trust and national areas, were variously biased towards the white minority. White settlers and their offspring provided most of the colony's administrative, industrial, scientific and farming skills, and built a relatively balanced, partially industrialised market economy , boasting strong agricultural and manufacturing sectors, iron and steel industries and modern mining enterprises. Everyday life
7371-580: The Republic of Rhodesia , was an unrecognised state in Southern Africa from 1965 to 1979. During this fourteen-year period, Rhodesia served as the de facto successor state to the British colony of Southern Rhodesia , and in 1980 it became modern day Zimbabwe . Southern Rhodesia had been self-governing since achieving responsible government in 1923. A landlocked nation, Rhodesia
7560-455: The Union of South Africa as a new province, but this having been rejected by registered voters in the 1922 government referendum , the territory was moulded into a prospective dominion instead. It was empowered to run its own affairs in almost all respects, including defence. Whitehall 's powers over Southern Rhodesia under the 1923 constitution were, on paper, considerable; the British Crown
7749-535: The Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), launched an armed insurgency against the government upon UDI, sparking the Rhodesian Bush War . Growing war weariness, diplomatic pressure, and an extensive trade embargo imposed by the United Nations prompted Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith to concede to majority rule in 1978. However, elections and
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7938-583: The status quo , its only remaining options were to trust in the Royal Commission or declare independence. When the terms for the commission's visit were presented to Smith, he found that contrary to what had been discussed during the British Prime Minister's visit, the Royal Commission would operate on the basis that the 1961 constitution was unacceptable to the British government, and that Britain would not commit itself to accepting
8127-487: The "Constitution of Rhodesia," and introduced the post of Officer Administering the Government , a viceregal figure empowered to sign passed legislation into law on behalf of the monarch if she did not appoint a Governor-General . The Rhodesian Cabinet waited in vain for Wilson's reply for the rest of 9 November and the next day. After briefly meeting Smith late on 10 November, Johnston warned Wilson that evening that
8316-468: The "five principles" – unimpeded progress to majority rule, assurance against any future legislation decidedly detrimental to black interests, "improvement in the political status" of local Africans, an end to official racial discrimination , and a political settlement that could be "acceptable to the whole population". Harold Wilson and his incoming Labour government took an even harder line on demanding that these points be legitimately addressed before
8505-629: The 1961 constitution so that the Royal Assent described therein would be exercised at the request of the Southern Rhodesian government rather than that of its British counterpart. This would both remove the possibility of British legislative interference and pave the way for an attempted assumption of independence by Order in Council. The RF's intention was partly to test whether or not the British would attempt to block this bill after Gibbs had granted Royal Assent to it, but this issue never came to
8694-444: The 1961 constitution, an impression confirmed to them by prior intergovernmental correspondence, particularly the oral promises they claimed to have received from Butler. When it did not prove forthcoming they felt cheated. Salisbury contended that its predominantly white legislature was more deserving of independence than the untried black Rhodesian leaders as it had proven its competence over decades of self-rule. The RF claimed that
8883-430: The British by refusing to attend the conference until they pledged to grant his country full independence. According to Field, Smith and other RF politicians, Butler made several such guarantees orally to ensure their co-operation at the conference, but repeatedly refused to give anything on paper. The Southern Rhodesians claimed that Butler justified his refusal to give a written promise by saying that binding Whitehall to
9072-486: The British condition that the terms for independence had to be acceptable "to the people of the country as a whole"; Smith contended that this was met, while the UK and African Nationalist Rhodesian leaders held that it was not. After Wilson proposed in late October 1965 that the UK might safeguard future black representation in the Rhodesian parliament by withdrawing some of the colonial government's devolved powers, then presented terms for an investigatory Royal Commission that
9261-457: The British government are worthless ... such immoral behaviour on the part of the British government makes it impossible for me to continue negotiations with you with any confidence that our standards of fair play, honesty and decency will prevail." The two premiers were brought together in person in late January 1965, when Smith travelled to London for Sir Winston Churchill 's funeral. Following an episode concerning Smith's non-invitation to
9450-687: The British government continued referring to the country as Southern Rhodesia. This situation continued throughout the UDI period. The shortened name was used by many people including the British government in the House of Commons. Until after the Second World War , the landlocked British possession of Southern Rhodesia was not developed as an indigenous African territory, but rather as a unique state that reflected its multiracial character. This situation certainly made it very different from other lands that existed under colonial rule, as many Europeans had arrived to make permanent homes, populating
9639-593: The British government's Commonwealth Secretary Arthur Bottomley was only across the Zambezi in Lusaka at the time. While the chiefs conferred, Northern Rhodesia became independent Zambia on 24 October 1964, emulating Nyasaland, which had achieved statehood as Malawi three months earlier. Reasoning that it was no longer necessary to refer to itself as "Southern" in the absence of a northern counterpart, Southern Rhodesia began calling itself simply Rhodesia. The same day,
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#17327811908429828-405: The British government, rather than seriously undermine the Rhodesian security forces. Because Rhodesian exports were generally competitive and had previously been entitled to preferential treatment on the British market, the former colony did not recognise the need for escalating the pace of diversification before independence. Following the UDI, however, Rhodesia began to demonstrate that it had
10017-595: The British on the independence issue, and forced his resignation on 13 April 1964. Smith accepted the Cabinet's nomination to take his place. Smith, a farmer from the Midlands town of Selukwe who had been seriously wounded while serving in the British Royal Air Force during the Second World War, was Southern Rhodesia's first native-born Prime Minister. Regarded in British political circles as
10206-546: The British principles as they stood, implying instead that Rhodesia was already legally entitled to independence—a claim that was overwhelmingly endorsed by the predominantly white electorate in a referendum . Emboldened by the results of this referendum and the subsequent general election, the Rhodesian government threatened to declare independence without British consent. Harold Wilson countered by warning that such an irregular procedure would be considered treasonous , although he specifically rejected using armed force to quell
10395-429: The British simply ignored the whole exercise. On 27 October, Wilson released a firm statement regarding Britain's intended response to UDI, warning that Rhodesia's economic and political ties with Britain, the Commonwealth and most of the world would be immediately severed amid a campaign of sanctions if Smith's government went ahead with UDI. This was intended to discourage white Rhodesians from voting for independence in
10584-491: The Commonwealth, Whitehall attempted to negotiate a middle way between the two, but ultimately put international considerations first, regarding them as more important. At party level, the Labour Party, in opposition until October 1964, was overtly against Southern Rhodesian independence under the 1961 constitution and supportive of the black Rhodesian movement on ideological and moral grounds. The Liberal Party , holding
10773-633: The Commonwealth. The issue gained international attention in Africa and worldwide as a flashpoint for questions of decolonisation and racism. By the early 1960s, general consensus in the post-colonial UN—particularly the General Assembly , where the communist bloc and the Afro-Asian lobby were collectively very strong—roundly denounced all forms of colonialism, and supported communist-backed black nationalist insurgencies across southern Africa, regarding them as racial liberation movements. Amid
10962-624: The European, Coloured, and Asian communities of Rhodesia were in favour of the proposals, the African population rejected them. The commission was established on 25 November 1971, pursuant to the terms of the Proposals for Settlement agreed between the British and Rhodesian governments on 21 November 1971. The settlement recognised Rhodesia's 1969 constitution as the legal frame of government, while agreeing that gradual legislative representation
11151-422: The Federation a dominion in 1956, he was rebuffed. The opposition Dominion Party responded by repeatedly calling for a Federal unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) over the next few years. Following Lord Malvern's retirement in late 1956, his successor Sir Roy Welensky pondered such a move on at least three occasions. Attempting to advance the case for Southern Rhodesian independence, particularly in
11340-426: The Federation's senior partner, which had already been self-governing for four decades and which was one of the most prosperous and developed countries in Africa. The principle of majority rule, the basis for this apparent inconsistency, was considered irrelevant by the Southern Rhodesians. They had presumed that in the event of Federal dissolution they would be first in line for independence without major adjustments to
11529-539: The Federation, officially announced Nyasaland's right to secede in December 1962. Four months later, he informed the three territories that he was going to convene a conference to decide the Federation's future. As Southern Rhodesia had been the UK's legislative partner in forming the Federation in 1953, it would be impossible (or at least very difficult) for Britain to dissolve the union without Southern Rhodesia's co-operation. Field could therefore potentially hamstring
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#173278119084211718-675: The Federation, resolving that it had become untenable. In February 1962, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations , Duncan Sandys , secretly informed the Nyasaland nationalist leader Hastings Banda that secession would be allowed. A few days later, he horrified Welensky by telling him that "we British have lost the will to govern". "But we haven't", retorted Julian Greenfield , Welensky's Law Minister. Macmillan's Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State , R A Butler , who headed British oversight of
11907-503: The Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). On December 21, a group of ZANLA insurgents under Rex Nhongo crossed into Rhodesia from Mozambique and raided an isolated commercial farm . In the successive months, this attack was followed by a succession of raids on white farmers throughout the northeastern districts of the country and resulted in several casualties among the security forces. The propaganda value of these raids, coupled with
12096-997: The National Democratic Party (NDP), had established informal contacts with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia , and discussed the possibility of obtaining military training in Eastern Europe for its members. In July 1962, Nkomo visited Moscow and discussed plans for a ZAPU-led armed uprising in Rhodesia. He made formal requests for Soviet funding and arms for ZIPRA, explaining that "for these purposes ZAPU needs arms, explosives, revolvers...the party also needs money to bribe persons who guard important installations, to carry out sabotage". The Soviets agreed to supply ZAPU with limited funds beginning in 1963, and increased its level of financial support after UDI. In 1963, ZIPRA also made its first formal request to
12285-624: The Portuguese, Rhodesians, and South Africans as the spearhead of a communist thrust into southern Africa. ZAPU's attempts to implement its armed struggle were hamstrung by a factional split within the party between 1962 and 1963. A number of ZAPU dissidents rejected Nkomo's authority and formed their own organisation, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), with Ndabangingi Sithole as its president and Robert Mugabe as its general secretary. By August 1964, ZANU
12474-414: The Prime Minister then lost his party's confidence by failing to pursue a possible route to at least de facto independence devised by Desmond Lardner-Burke , a lawyer and RF MP for Gwelo . During March 1964, the Legislative Assembly in Salisbury considered and passed Lardner-Burke's motion that the Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs , should submit a petition to the Queen requesting alteration of Section 111 of
12663-409: The Rhodesia Party soon faded away. Spurred on by this success, Smith organised the indaba for 22 October, and called a general independence referendum for 5 November 1964. Meanwhile, Wilson wrote a number of letters to black Southern Rhodesians, assuring them that "the Labour Party is totally opposed to granting independence to Southern Rhodesia so long as the government of that country remains under
12852-472: The Rhodesian Cabinet Secretary Gerald B Clarke on 23 December that "talk of a unilateral declaration of independence is bound to throw a shadow of uncertainty on the future financial relations between the two governments". Smith was furious, seeing this as blackmail, and on 13 January 1965 wrote to Wilson: "I am so incensed at the line of your High Commissioner's letter that I am replying directly to you ... It would appear that any undertakings given by
13041-437: The Rhodesian Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle , which would report its findings to both the British and Rhodesian Cabinets. Wilson confirmed in the House of Commons two days later that he intended to introduce direct British control over the Rhodesian parliamentary structure to ensure that progress was made towards majority rule. Stalemate drew closer as the Rhodesian Cabinet resolved that since Wilson had ruled out maintenance of
13230-443: The Rhodesian Trade Office in Lisbon functioned as a de facto embassy and caused tension with London, which objected to Rhodesia conducting its own foreign policy. As land-locked Rhodesia bordered the Portuguese colony of Mozambique , Salazar's promise of "maximum support" from Portugal in breaking the anticipated sanctions gave Smith more grounds for self-confidence in his talks with London. Smith ruled out acceptance for all five of
13419-526: The Rhodesian capital, Salisbury , preferring to conduct diplomatic activities through "accredited representatives". This allowed the South African and Portuguese governments to maintain they were continuing to respect British sovereignty while also accepting the practical authority of the Smith administration. Initially, the Rhodesian state retained its pledged loyalty to Queen Elizabeth II , recognising her as Queen of Rhodesia. When Smith and Deputy Prime Minister Clifford Dupont visited Sir Humphrey Gibbs ,
13608-422: The Rhodesian government's sense of alienation from Britain and the Commonwealth to deepen. In his memoirs, Smith accused the British of "resorting to politics of convenience and appeasement". Wilson, meanwhile, became exasperated by what he saw as Rhodesian inflexibility, describing the gap between the two governments as "between different worlds and different centuries". Wilson : We are not giving up. Too much
13797-630: The Rhodesians found unacceptable, Smith and his Cabinet declared independence. Calling this treasonous, the British colonial governor , Sir Humphrey Gibbs , formally dismissed Smith and his government, but they ignored him and appointed an " Officer Administering the Government " to take his place. While no country recognised the UDI, the Rhodesian High Court deemed the post-UDI government legal and de jure in 1968. The Smith administration initially professed continued loyalty to Queen Elizabeth II , but abandoned this in 1970 when it declared
13986-458: The Rhodesians seemed poised to declare independence in the morning. The British Prime Minister tried repeatedly to call Smith, but did not get through until Smith was already chairing a Cabinet meeting on the independence issue around 08:00 Central Africa Time (06:00 in London) on 11 November. Wilson attempted to talk Smith out of unilateral action by telling him the status quo could continue, and
14175-413: The Rhodesians used one phrase verbatim —"a respect for the opinions of mankind" —but no reference was made to the assertion that " all men are created equal ", nor to the " consent of the governed ", two omissions later stressed by a number of commentators. Attached to the declaration of independence was a copy of the 1961 constitution amended for the circumstances, which became the 1965 constitution. In
14364-486: The Royal Commission under the terms they had agreed in Salisbury and to commit the British government to accepting its ruling, but Wilson did not immediately reply. On 9 November, the Rhodesian Cabinet sent a letter to Queen Elizabeth II , assuring her that Rhodesia would remain loyal to her personally "whatever happens". The Rhodesian Minister for Justice and Law and Order, Desmond Lardner-Burke , presented
14553-441: The Royal Commission, the Rhodesian government had Gibbs announce a state of emergency the same day on the grounds that black Rhodesian insurgents were reportedly entering the country. Smith denied that this foreshadowed a declaration of independence, but the publishing of his letter to Wilson in the press provoked a worldwide storm of speculation that UDI was imminent. Smith wrote again to Wilson on 8 November, asking him to appoint
14742-620: The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister alongside those of the dominions from 1932 . This unique arrangement continued following the advent of Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences in 1944. Southern Rhodesians of all races fought for Britain in the Second World War , and the colonial government gradually received more autonomy regarding external affairs. During the immediate post-war years, Southern Rhodesian politicians generally thought that they were as good as independent as they were, and that full autonomy in
14931-524: The Southern Rhodesian electorate as the "independence constitution" under which Southern Rhodesia would become a dominion on a par with Australia, Canada and New Zealand if the Federation dissolved. White dissenters included Ian Smith , MP for Gwanda and Chief Whip for the governing United Federal Party (UFP) in the Federal Assembly, who took exception to the constitution's omission of an explicit promise of Southern Rhodesian independence in
15120-534: The Soviet Union for military training. The Soviets began training ZIPRA militants in guerrilla warfare in early 1964. Nkomo's public endorsement of a violent strategy confirmed white politicians' opposition to ZAPU and fed their negative attitudes towards black nationalists at large. In response to the formation of ZIPRA, the Rhodesian government banned ZAPU, driving that party's supporters underground. It also passed draconian security legislation restricting
15309-833: The UFP's efforts to win their support, and much of the white community saw Whitehead as too radical, and soft on what they saw as black extremism. In the December 1962 Southern Rhodesian election , the UFP was defeated by the Rhodesian Front (RF), a newly formed alliance of conservative voices headed by Winston Field and Ian Smith, in what was widely considered a shock result. Field became Prime Minister, with Smith as his deputy. Meanwhile, secessionist black Rhodesian parties won electoral victories in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and Harold Macmillan 's Conservative administration in Britain moved towards breaking up
15498-763: The UK government a great deal of embarrassment. In the Commonwealth context, too, Britain knew that simply granting independence to Southern Rhodesia was out of the question as many of the Afro-Asian countries were also Commonwealth members. Statehood for Salisbury without majority rule would split the Commonwealth and perhaps cause it to break up, a disastrous prospect for British foreign policy. The Commonwealth repeatedly called on Britain to intervene directly should Southern Rhodesian defiance continue, while liberals in Britain worried that if left unchecked Salisbury might drift towards South African-style apartheid . Anxious to avoid having to choose between Southern Rhodesia and
15687-483: The UK. A significant majority of white Rhodesian residents were either British immigrants or of British ancestry, and many held a special affection for the British Empire. However, the UK's refusal to grant them independence on their terms further confirmed their opposition to a political settlement on British terms, and fed their negative attitudes towards British interference in Rhodesian politics at large. In
15876-733: The UN further iterated that these sanctions were mandatory, and member states were explicitly barred from purchasing Rhodesian export goods, namely tobacco, chromium, copper, asbestos, sugar, and beef. The British government, having already adopted extensive sanctions of its own, dispatched a Royal Navy squadron to monitor oil deliveries in the port of Beira in Mozambique, from which a strategic pipeline ran to Umtali in Rhodesia. The warships were to deter "by force, if necessary, vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for (Southern) Rhodesia". Some Western nations, such as Switzerland, and West Germany , which were not UN member states, continued to conduct business openly with Rhodesia –
16065-656: The UN sanctions. In 1971, the Byrd Amendment was passed in the United States, permitting American firms to go on importing Rhodesian chromium and nickel products as normal. Despite the poor showing of sanctions, Rhodesia found it nearly impossible to obtain diplomatic recognition abroad. In 1970, the United States declared it would not recognise UDI "under [any] circumstances". South Africa and Portugal, Rhodesia's largest trading partners, also refused to extend diplomatic recognition, and did not open embassies in
16254-528: The United Kingdom on 11 November 1965. The new nation, identified simply as Rhodesia, initially sought recognition as an autonomous realm within the Commonwealth of Nations , but reconstituted itself as a republic in 1970. Following the declaration of independence in 1965, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution that called upon all states not to grant recognition to Rhodesia. Two African nationalist parties,
16443-530: The United Kingdom's direct sphere of influence for some time, and the facade of continued British rule was rendered a constitutional fiction by UDI. In light of these circumstances, Wilson quickly realised his ability to assert direct leverage over the incumbent Rhodesian government was limited. On 12 October 1965, the United Nations General Assembly had noted the repeated threats of the Rhodesian authorities "to declare unilaterally
16632-526: The United Kingdom, with a President acting as ceremonial head of state, while a Prime Minister headed the Cabinet as head of government. The official name of the country, according to the constitution adopted concurrently with the UDI in November 1965, was Rhodesia. This was not the case under British law , however, which considered the territory's legal name to be Southern Rhodesia , the name given to
16821-523: The United Nations or the Labour Party would also do so. He stressed that such a move towards accommodation with Smith might hurt the Conservatives' chances in the British general election the next month, and suggested that it might be in Smith's best interests to wait until after the election to continue negotiations. Smith accepted this argument. Douglas-Home assured Smith that a Conservative government would settle with him and grant independence within
17010-513: The Wind of Change caused the Southern Rhodesian military's traditional British and American suppliers to impose an informal embargo, and prompted Whitehall and Washington to stop sending Southern Rhodesia financial aid around the same time. In June 1964, Douglas-Home informed Smith that Southern Rhodesia would not be represented at the year's Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, despite Salisbury's record of attendance going back to 1932, because of
17199-598: The ZANLA leadership criticised ZIPRA's continued fixation with winning a major conventional engagement, arguing that the failed incursions demonstrated the futility of engaging the Rhodesian military in the type of pitched battles in which it held an indisputable advantage. ZIPRA's failure to obtain support from the locals was also noted, and ZANLA began implementing a long-term covert politicisation programme to cultivate civilian support throughout its future area of operations. By December 1972, ZANLA had cached arms and established
17388-409: The ZANLA to acquire more sophisticated weaponry, thereby increasing the military pressure that the guerrillas were able to place on Rhodesia. Until 1972, containing the guerrillas was little more than a police action. Even as late as August 1975 when Rhodesian government and black nationalist leaders met at Victoria Falls for negotiations brokered by South Africa and Zambia, the talks never got beyond
17577-401: The absence of a "Northern" Rhodesia, the continued use of "Southern" was superfluous. It passed legislation to become simply Rhodesia, but the British government refused to approve this on the grounds that the country's name was defined by British legislation, so could not be altered by the colonial government. Salisbury went on using the shortened name in an official manner nevertheless, while
17766-474: The accompanying statement to be made by Smith. The final version of the declaration of independence was prepared by a sub-committee of civil servants headed by Gerald Clarke, the Cabinet Secretary, with the United States Declaration of Independence of 1776, the only other such proclamation ever issued by British colonials, used as a model. Strongly alluding to Thomas Jefferson 's text throughout,
17955-414: The assistance of South Africa and (until 1974) Portugal . The Rhodesian government, which mostly comprised members of the country's white minority of about 5%, was indignant when, amid the UK colonial government's Wind of Change policies of decolonisation , African colonies to the north without comparable experience of self-rule quickly advanced to independence during the early 1960s while Rhodesia
18144-539: The bloody civil wars, military coups and other disasters that plagued the new majority-ruled African states to the north, many of which had become corrupt, autocratic or communist one-party states very soon after independence, showed that black Rhodesian leaders were not ready to govern. Influenced strongly by the white refugees who had fled south from the Congo , it presented chaotic doomsday scenarios of what black Rhodesian rule in Southern Rhodesia might mean, particularly for
18333-553: The collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique in 1974–1975, it was no longer viable for the Smith regime to sustain white minority rule indefinitely. By this time, even South Africa's Vorster had come to this view. While Vorster was unwilling to make concessions to his own country's black people, he concluded that white minority rule was not sustainable in a country where black people outnumbered white people 22:1. In 1976, there were 270,000 Rhodesians of European descent and six million Africans. International business groups involved in
18522-539: The colony's proud war record on Britain's behalf, and expressed a wish in the Cold War context to form an anti-communist, pro- Western front in Africa alongside South Africa and Portugal. These factors combined with what RF politicians and supporters saw as British decadence, chicanery and betrayal to create the case they put forward that UDI, while dubious legally and likely to provoke international uproar, might nevertheless be in their eyes justifiable and necessary for
18711-493: The commander of the Rhodesian Army , Major-General John "Jock" Anderson, resigned, announcing publicly that he was doing so because of his opposition to UDI, which he said he could not go along with because of his oath of allegiance to the Queen. Interpreting this as a sign that Smith intended to declare independence if a majority backed it in the referendum, Wilson wrote a stiff letter to Smith on 25 October, warning him of
18900-494: The consequences of UDI, and demanding "a categorical assurance forthwith that no attempt at a unilateral declaration of independence on your part will be made". Smith expressed confusion as to what he had done to provoke this, and ignored it. When the indaba ended on 26 October, the chiefs and headmen returned a unanimous decision to support the government's stand for independence under the 1961 constitution, attesting in their report that "people who live far away do not understand
19089-461: The control of the white minority". Labour defeated the Conservatives by four seats in the British general election on 15 October 1964, and formed a government the next day. Both Labour and the Conservatives told Smith that a positive result at the indaba would not be recognised by Britain as representative of the people, and the Conservatives turned down Salisbury's invitation to send observers. Smith pressed on, telling parliament that he would ask
19278-426: The country (e.g. Lonrho ) transferred their support from the Rhodesian government to black nationalist parties. Business leaders and politicians feted Nkomo on his visits to Europe. ZANU also attracted business supporters who saw the course that future events were likely to take. Funding and arms support provided by supporters, particularly from the Soviet Union and its allies in the latter 1970s, allowed both ZIPRA and
19467-413: The country as a whole"—agreeing to this, Smith suggested that white and urban black opinion could be gauged through a general referendum of registered voters, and that rural black views could be obtained at a national indaba (tribal conference) of chiefs and headmen. Douglas-Home told Smith that although this proposal satisfied him personally, he could not accept it as he did not believe the Commonwealth,
19656-568: The country in 1898 during the British South Africa Company 's administration of the Rhodesias , and retained by the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia after the end of company rule in 1923. This naming dispute dated back to October 1964, when Northern Rhodesia became independent from the UK and concurrently changed its name to Zambia . The Southern Rhodesian colonial government in Salisbury felt that in
19845-464: The country that eventually brought about majority rule, a totality of these factors rather than any one the reason for introducing change. In 2005, a conference at the London School of Economics that discussed Rhodesia's independence concluded that UDI was sparked by an existing racial conflict complicated by Cold War intrigues. Critics of UDI maintained that Ian Smith intended to safeguard
20034-414: The country to its full independence", and announced that the new government had informed him of its intent to open its own diplomatic mission in Lisbon , separate from the British embassy there. The British and Rhodesians argued about this unilateral act by Salisbury, described by the historian J R T Wood as the "veritable straw in the wind", alongside the independence issue until Portugal accepted
20223-507: The creation of one united dominion in south-central Africa, emulating the Federation of Australia half a century before. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland , defined in its constitution as indissoluble, began in 1953, mandated by the results of a mostly white referendum , with Southern Rhodesia, the most developed of the three territories, at its head, Huggins as Federal Prime Minister and Salisbury as Federal capital. Coming at
20412-435: The declaration of a republic. He had effectively been superseded before then; the Smith government stated that if the Queen did not appoint a Governor-General, it would name Dupont as " Officer Administering the Government ". Smith had intended to have Dupont named Governor-General, but Queen Elizabeth II would not even consider this advice. With few exceptions, the international community backed Whitehall's assertion that Gibbs
20601-550: The demographic content of the territory enough they could have a stronger position from which to petition the British government for more autonomy. Believing full dominion status to be effectively symbolic and "there for the asking", Prime Minister Godfrey Huggins (in office from 1933 to 1953) twice ignored British overtures hinting at dominionship, and instead pursued an initially semi-independent Federation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland , two colonies directly administered from London. He hoped that this might set in motion
20790-400: The electorate along the lines of "one taxpayer, one vote"—which would enfranchise about half a million, but still leave most of the nation voteless—in return for a grant of independence. Wilson said this was insufficient, and countered that future black representation might be better safeguarded by Britain's withdrawal from the colonial government of the power it had held since 1923 to determine
20979-544: The event of Federal dissolution, the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead brokered the 1961 constitution with Britain, which he thought would remove all British powers of reservation over Southern Rhodesian bills and acts, and put the country on the brink of full sovereignty. Despite its containing no independence guarantees, Whitehead, Welensky and other proponents of this constitution presented it to
21168-508: The event of Federal dissolution, and ultimately resigned his post in protest. A referendum of the mostly white electorate approved the new constitution by a majority of 65% on 26 July 1961. The final version of the constitution included a few extra provisions inserted by the British, one of which—Section 111—reserved full powers to the Crown to amend, add to or revoke certain sections of the Southern Rhodesian constitution by Order in Council at
21357-403: The eyes of the Smith administration, this document removed Whitehall's remaining authority over Rhodesia and made Rhodesia a de jure independent state. However, the Smith government still professed loyalty to Elizabeth II, and accordingly the document reconstituted Rhodesia as a Commonwealth realm with Elizabeth as " Queen of Rhodesia ". The new constitution created the concept of allegiance to
21546-444: The federation was dissolved at the end of December 1963. Although prepared to grant formal independence to Southern Rhodesia (now Rhodesia), the British government had adopted a policy of no independence before majority rule (NIBMR), dictating that colonies with a significant, politically active population of European settlers would not receive independence except under conditions of majority rule . White Rhodesians balked at
21735-484: The final report. Smith said these conditions amounted to a "vote of no confidence in [the commission] before they commenced", and therefore rejected them. "The impression you left with us of a determined effort to resolve our constitutional problem has been utterly dissipated", he wrote to Wilson on 5 November. "It would seem that you have now finally closed the door which you publicly claimed to have opened." Amid frantic efforts by Beadle and others on both sides to revive
21924-467: The first constitution for the new Colony of Southern Rhodesia came into force. Under this constitution, Southern Rhodesia was given the right to elect its own thirty-member legislature , premier , and cabinet—although the British Crown retained a formal veto over measures affecting natives and dominated foreign policy. Over the course of the next three decades, Southern Rhodesia experienced
22113-455: The five principles of independence, and the British government argued it would settle for nothing less. On 11 November 1965 the Cabinet of Rhodesia issued a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). The UDI was immediately denounced as an "act of rebellion against the Crown" in the United Kingdom, and Wilson promised that the illegal action would be short-lived. However, given its self-governing status Rhodesia had no longer been within
22302-509: The form of dominionship would make little difference to them. Post-war immigration to Southern Rhodesia, mainly from Britain, Ireland and South Africa, caused the white community to swell from 68,954 in 1941 to 221,504 in 1961. The black population grew from 1,400,000 to 3,550,000 over the same period. Rhodesian authorities actively promoted immigration and reproduction of whites to boost their numbers while encouraging family planning for blacks to curtail their numbers. They hoped that by altering
22491-467: The good of the country and region if an accommodation could not be found with Whitehall. Field's failure to secure independence concurrently with the end of the Federation caused his Cabinet's support for him to waver during late 1963 and early 1964. The RF caucus in January 1964 revealed widespread dissatisfaction with him on the grounds that the British seemed to be outwitting him. The Prime Minister
22680-728: The government and the increasingly militant black nationalists. After their public campaigns were initially suppressed, many black nationalists believed that negotiation was completely incapable of meeting their aspirations. Petrol bombings by politicised radicals became increasingly common, with the Zimbabwe Review observing in 1961, "for the first time home-made petrol bombs were used by freedom fighters in Salisbury against settler establishments." Between January and September 1962, nationalists detonated 33 bombs and were implicated in 28 acts of arson, and 27 acts of sabotage against communications infrastructure. The nationalists also murdered
22869-500: The independence of Southern Rhodesia, in order to perpetuate minority rule", and called upon Wilson to use all means at his disposal (including military force) to prevent the Rhodesian Front from asserting independence. After UDI was proclaimed, UN officials branded the Rhodesian government as an "illegal racist minority regime" and called on member states to voluntarily sever economic ties with Rhodesia, recommending sanctions on petroleum products and military hardware. In December 1966,
23058-405: The insurgents as "gangsters" in his commentary. The use of weapons and explosives sourced from communist states by the black nationalists also disguised the racial dynamics of the conflict, allowing white Rhodesians to claim that they were targets of Soviet-directed communist agitators rather than a domestic political movement. Smith and his supporters perceived themselves as collective defenders of
23247-517: The last minute. Following largely abortive talks with Wilson, the Rhodesian Prime Minister flew home on 12 October. Desperate to avert UDI, Wilson travelled to Salisbury two weeks later to continue negotiations. During these discussions, Smith referred to the last resort of a UDI on many occasions, though he said he hoped to find another way out of the quandary. He offered to increase black legislative representation by expanding
23436-541: The late 1950s and early 1960s, often collectively called the Wind of Change . Britain, France and Belgium vastly accelerated their withdrawal from Africa during this period, believing colonial rule to be no longer sustainable geopolitically or ethically. The idea of " no independence before majority rule ", commonly abbreviated to "NIBMAR", gained considerable ground in British political circles. When Huggins (who had been recently ennobled as Lord Malvern) asked Britain to make
23625-499: The late 19th century, the territory north of the Transvaal was chartered to the British South Africa Company , led by Cecil Rhodes . Rhodes and his Pioneer Column marched north in 1890, acquiring a huge block of territory that the company ruled until the early 1920s. In 1923, the company's charter was revoked, and Southern Rhodesia attained self-government and established a legislature . Between 1953 and 1963, Southern Rhodesia
23814-423: The latter had adopted NIBMR as a formal policy - the very circumstance UDI was carried out to avoid, and which white Rhodesians had struggled to resist since the onset of decolonisation. Black nationalist parties reacted with outrage at UDI, with one ZANU official stating, "...for all those who cherish freedom and a meaningful life, UDI has set a collision course that cannot be altered. 11 November 1965 [has] marked
24003-516: The latter remained the Smith government's largest trading partner in Western Europe until 1973, when it was admitted to the UN. Japan remained the chief recipient of Rhodesian exports outside the African continent, and Iran also supplied oil to Rhodesia in violation of the embargo. Portugal served as a conduit for Rhodesian goods, which it exported through Mozambique with false certificates of origin . South Africa, too, refused to observe
24192-417: The lives of local residents induced many of them who had previously been neutral to support the guerrillas. Rhodesia%27s Unilateral Declaration of Independence Second Phase (1972–1979) Related incidents Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence ( UDI ) was a statement adopted by the Cabinet of Rhodesia on 11 November 1965, announcing that Rhodesia (previously Southern Rhodesia )
24381-472: The local economy were insufficient to compensate for this disadvantage. Southern Rhodesia had negated the issue by importing a skilled workforce directly from abroad in the form of its disproportionately large European immigrant and expatriate population. For example, in 1951 over 90% of white Southern Rhodesians were engaged in what the British government classified as "skilled occupations", or professional and technical trades. This made it possible to establish
24570-421: The local populace, which immediately informed on their presence to Rhodesian officials. Within the month, the Rhodesian police and army had launched a counteroffensive codenamed Operation Nickel , killing forty-seven insurgents, capturing another twenty, and driving the survivors across the border into Botswana. An even larger ZIPRA column of over a hundred insurgents was intercepted in early 1968 and annihilated by
24759-494: The means of conducting the insurgency. ZIPRA favoured Soviet thinking, placing an emphasis on acquiring sophisticated weaponry in the hopes of winning a conventional battle like the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu . ZANLA placed greater emphasis on the politicisation of the local populace in the areas it operated, and favoured a more irregular style of warfare. In early April 1966, two groups of ZANLA insurgents recently trained at
24948-513: The mission in late September, much to Britain's fury and Rhodesia's delight. Hoping to bring Smith to heel by stonewalling him, Wilson's ministers deliberately delayed and frustrated the Rhodesian government in negotiations. Rhodesia was again excluded from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in 1965. The UK's refusal of aid, the Lisbon mission, the informal arms embargo and other issues combined with this to cause
25137-460: The near future. However, once Rhodesia had been introduced as a topic for discussion in international bodies, extension of the status quo became a matter of concern to the British government, which perceived the scrutiny as a serious embarrassment to the United Kingdom. After the federation was dissolved in December 1963, the then British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home , insisted that preconditions on independence talks hinge on what he termed
25326-476: The new settlement, if approved, would also implement an immediate improvement in black political status, offer a means to terminate racial discrimination, and provide a solid guarantee against retrogressive constitutional amendments. Implementation of the proposed settlement hinged on popular acceptance, but the Rhodesian government consistently refused to submit it to a universal referendum. A twenty four-member commission headed by an eminent jurist, Lord Pearce ,
25515-421: The operational level in Mozambique, the Portuguese could offer Rhodesia little decisive assistance. Portuguese military resources in Mozambique were preoccupied with FRELIMO and somewhat depleted by a decade of war, and little could be spared to assist a foreign ally. Rhodesia expected far more from South Africa, which possessed far greater military resources and infinitely more diplomatic influence abroad. After
25704-441: The original "five principles" proposed by Alec Douglas-Home, now foreign secretary . In November 1971, Douglas-Home renewed contacts with Salisbury and announced a proposed agreement that would be satisfactory to both sides – it recognised Rhodesia's 1969 constitution as the legal frame of government, while agreeing that gradual legislative representation was an acceptable formula for unhindered advance to majority rule. Nevertheless,
25893-543: The other two nations of common security interests based on the similarity of their restive internal situations. They saw strong parallels between their nation's position of being threatened by black nationalist insurgencies and the Portuguese predicament with FRELIMO in Mozambique, as well as to a lesser extent the insurgencies in South Africa and South West Africa . Under the auspices of the Alcora Exercise ,
26082-527: The people as a whole had been met. Smith wrote to Wilson the day after the referendum, asking him to send Bottomley to Salisbury for talks. Wilson replied that Smith should instead come to London. The British and Rhodesians exchanged often confrontational letters for the next few months. Alluding to the British financial aid pledged to Salisbury as part of the Federal dissolution arrangements, Wilson's High Commissioner in Salisbury, J B Johnston , wrote to
26271-409: The polls, and preferably not after Nyasaland. The Federation dissolved as scheduled at the end of 1963. The British government's refusal to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under the 1961 constitution was largely the result of the geopolitical and moral shifts associated with the Wind of Change , coupled with the UK's wish to avoid opprobrium and loss of prestige in the United Nations (UN) and
26460-563: The potential to develop a greater degree of economic self-sufficiency . After the Rhodesian Front began introducing incentives accorded to domestic production, industrial output expanded dramatically. A rigid system of countermeasures enacted to combat sanctions succeeded in blunting their impact for at least a decade. Over the next nine years Rhodesian companies, spiting the freezing of their assets and blocking of overseas accounts , also perfected cunning techniques of sanctions evasion through both local and foreign subsidiaries, which operated on
26649-580: The premise of NIBMR; many felt they had a right to absolute political control, at least for the time being, despite their relatively small numbers. They were also disturbed by the chaos of the post-colonial political transitions occurring in other African nations at the time, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo . A vocal segment of the white populace was open to the concept of gradually incorporating black Rhodesians into civil society and
26838-458: The privileges of an entrenched colonial ruling class at the expense of the impoverished black population. Smith defended his actions by claiming that the black Rhodesian majority was too inexperienced at the time to participate in the complex administrative process of what was, by contemporary African standards, a reasonably industrialised state. At large, UDI further hardened the white population's attitudes towards majority rule and relations with
27027-431: The problems of our country". This verdict was rejected by the nationalist movement on the grounds that the chiefs received governmental salaries; the chiefs countered that the black MPs in parliamentary opposition also received such salaries, but still opposed the government. Malvern, who was becoming perturbed by the RF's actions, dismissed the indaba as a "swindle", asserting that the chiefs no longer had any real power;
27216-523: The procedural phase. Rhodesian representatives made it clear they were prepared to fight an all out war to prevent majority rule. However, the situation changed dramatically after the end of Portuguese colonial rule in Mozambique in 1975. Rhodesia now found itself almost entirely surrounded by hostile states and even South Africa, its only real ally, pressed for a settlement. Having let slip one chance after another of reaching an accommodation with more moderate black leaders, Rhodesia's whites seem to have made
27405-417: The referendum, for which the RF campaign slogan was "Yes means Unity, not UDI". Wilson was pleased when Douglas-Home, his leading opponent in the House of Commons, praised the statement as "rough but right". On 5 November 1964, Rhodesia's mostly white electorate voted "yes" to independence under the 1961 constitution by a margin of 89%, prompting Smith to declare that the British condition of acceptability to
27594-537: The request of the British government. This effectively negated the relinquishment of British powers described elsewhere in the document, but the Southern Rhodesians did not initially notice it. The black Rhodesian movement in Southern Rhodesia, founded and organised by urban black elites during the late 1950s, was repeatedly banned by the colonial government because of the political violence, industrial sabotage and intimidation of potential black voters that characterised its campaign. The principal nationalist group, led by
27783-426: The rest of the Cabinet with a draft for the declaration of independence on 5 November 1965. When Jack Howman , Minister of Tourism and Information, said that he was also preparing a draft, the Cabinet decided to wait to see his version too. The ministers agreed that if an independence proclamation were issued, they would all sign it. On 9 November, the Cabinet jointly devised an outline for the proclamation document and
27972-690: The right to assembly and granting the security forces broad powers to crack down on suspected political subversives. For the first time, the death sentence was also introduced for any act of politically inspired terrorism which involved arson or the use of explosives. The emergence of guerrilla warfare and acts of urban insurrection by the black nationalist parties in Rhodesia allowed racial politics to be elevated into an issue of law and order in white Rhodesian public discourse. To Smith and his government, black nationalists were stateless dissidents whose primary motives were not political, but crime and perpetuating lawlessness; for example, Smith preferred to describe
28161-707: The security forces, who tracked the insurgents to a nearby ranch on April 28. All seven were cornered and killed after a brief firefight; this event is considered to be the first engagement of the Rhodesian Bush War . The action at Sinoia has been commemorated by supporters of the guerrillas since as " Chimurenga Day ", and occupies a place of pride in ZANU hagiography. In August 1967, a large and better-equipped column of almost seventy ZIPRA insurgents infiltrated Rhodesia from Zambia, bolstered by recruits from an allied South African militant organisation, uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The insurgents failed to cultivate prior contacts with
28350-456: The security forces. A third ZIPRA incursion attempt in July 1969 met with similarly catastrophic results. Thereafter, ZIPRA abandoned the notion of attempting to infiltrate the country with large groups of insurgents equipped only with small arms; it limited itself to more irregular forms of warfare until it could stockpile enough heavy weaponry to mount a major conventional invasion. For its part,
28539-423: The size and makeup of its parliament. The Rhodesians were horrified by this prospect, particularly as Wilson's suggestion of it seemed to them to have removed the failsafe alternative of keeping the status quo . Before the British Prime Minister left Rhodesia on 30 October 1965, he proposed a Royal Commission to gauge public opinion in the colony regarding independence under the 1961 constitution, possibly chaired by
28728-456: The start of October 1965, telling the press that he intended to resolve the independence issue once and for all. Both the British and the Rhodesians were surprised by the large numbers of Britons who came out to support Smith during his visit. Smith accepted an invitation from the BBC to appear on its Twenty-Four Hours evening news and current affairs programme, but Downing Street blocked this at
28917-448: The start of the decolonisation period, the Federation of self-governing Southern Rhodesia with two directly ruled British protectorates was later described by the British historian Robert Blake as "an aberration of history—a curious deviation from the inevitable course of events". The project faced black opposition from the start, and ultimately failed because of the shifting international attitudes and rising black Rhodesian ambitions of
29106-547: The success of ZANLA's politicisation campaign, denied intelligence to the security forces and furnished more recruits for the insurgents. In response, the Rhodesian security forces began coordinating operations in Mozambique with the Portuguese army to intercept ZANLA insurgents before they could cross the border. The practical alliances between ZIPRA and MK, and later ZANLA and FRELIMO, prompted Rhodesia to look increasingly towards South Africa and Portugal for active assistance. Rhodesian politicians frequently reminded officials in
29295-671: The three countries' bureaucracies began routinely sharing information and seeking common diplomatic positions. Lieutenant General Alan Fraser, a senior strategist in the South African Defence Force wrote in 1970, "there can be no doubt in any of our minds that we have a common enemy: we, i.e. Portugal, the RSA and Rhodesia. Unless we are to lay ourselves open to the possibility of defeat in detail, we must fight this enemy jointly—if not simultaneously." Nevertheless, aside from intelligence-sharing and some limited coordination on
29484-429: The towns as traders or settling to farm the most productive soils. In 1922, faced with the decision to join the Union of South Africa as a fifth province or accept nearly full internal autonomy, the electorate cast its vote against South African integration. In view of the outcome of the referendum, the territory was annexed by the United Kingdom on 12 September 1923. Shortly after annexation, on 1 October 1923,
29673-403: The traditional two minutes' silence to remember the fallen of the two World Wars, Smith declared Rhodesia independent and signed the proclamation document, with Dupont and the other 10 ministers of the Cabinet following. The timing was intended to emphasise the sacrifices Rhodesia had made for Britain in wartime. As Ken Flower later said, "the rebellion was made to appear as though it was not
29862-514: The traditional values of the British Empire against the twin threats of international communism, manifested through the Soviet Union's support for black nationalist militants, and the social and political decadence of the West. Often repeated appeals to the Christian heritage of their pioneer ancestors in "defending the free world " and sustaining "Western civilisation" reflected these beliefs. This
30051-696: The tragic choice of facing black nationalism over the barrel of a gun rather than the conference table. The downhill road toward a race war in Rhodesia is becoming increasingly slippery with blood. At this point, ZANU's alliance with FRELIMO and the porous border between Mozambique and eastern Rhodesia enabled large-scale training and infiltration of ZANU/ZANLA fighters. The governments of Zambia and Botswana were also emboldened sufficiently to allow resistance movement bases to be set up in their territories. Guerrillas began to launch operations deep inside Rhodesia, attacking roads, railways, economic targets and isolated security force positions, in 1976. The government adopted
30240-446: The tribal chiefs and headmen "to consult their people in the traditional manner", then hold the indaba as planned. On 22 October 196 chiefs and 426 headmen from across the country gathered at Domboshawa , just north-east of Salisbury, and began their deliberations. Smith hoped that Britain, having taken part in such indabas in the past, might send a delegation at the last minute, but none arrived, much to his annoyance, particularly as
30429-412: The turning point of the struggle for freedom in that land from a constitutional and political one to primarily a military struggle." It would, however, be several years before the nationalists adopted armed struggle as their primary strategy for obtaining political power. Violent tactics at this time were intended to create opportunities for external intervention , either by the international community or
30618-587: The two argued inconclusively about the proposed Royal Commission. Returning to his Cabinet meeting, Smith reported the conversation to his ministers, and, after debating for a while, the Cabinet came to the conclusion that Wilson was simply attempting to buy more time and that there was no sign of actual progress. Smith asked if Rhodesia should declare its independence, and had each Cabinet minister answer in turn . According to Smith's account, "each one, quietly but firmly, without hesitation, said: 'Yes'." At 11:00 local time on 11 November 1965, Armistice Day , during
30807-399: The two other British Central African territories, to form the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland – a loose association that placed defence and economic direction under a central government but left many domestic affairs under the control of its constituent territories. As it began to appear that decolonisation was inevitable and indigenous black populations were pressing heavily for change,
30996-471: The unicameral Legislative Assembly was predominantly white, with a small number of seats reserved for black representatives. Following the declaration of a republic in 1970, this was replaced by a bicameral Parliament , with a House of Assembly and a Senate . The bicameral system was retained in Zimbabwe after 1980. Aside from its racial franchise , Rhodesia observed a Westminster system inherited from
31185-412: The white community. Proponents of the RF stand downplayed black Rhodesian grievances regarding land ownership and segregation, and argued that despite the racial imbalance in domestic politics—whites made up 5% of the population, but over 90% of registered voters—the electoral system was not racist as the franchise was based on financial and educational qualifications rather than ethnicity. They emphasised
31374-435: The years prior to UDI, white Rhodesians increasingly saw themselves as beleaguered and threatened, perpetually insecure and undermined by the metropole, unable to rely on anybody but themselves. The policy of "No independence before majority rule" transformed the white community's relationship with the UK and increased its suspicions of the British government's untrustworthiness and duplicity in colonial affairs, especially since
31563-570: Was a unique case in the British Empire and Commonwealth : although a colony in name, it was internally self-governing and constitutionally not unlike a dominion . This situation dated back to 1923, when it was granted responsible government within the Empire as a self-governing colony, following three decades of administration and development by the British South Africa Company . Britain had intended Southern Rhodesia's integration into
31752-450: Was agreed to formally liquidate the Federation at the end of the year. In the House of Commons afterwards, Butler flatly denied suggestions that he had "oiled the wheels" of Federal dissolution with secret promises to the Southern Rhodesians. Field's government was startled by Britain's announcement in October 1963 that Nyasaland would become fully independent on 6 July 1964. While no date
31941-512: Was an acceptable formula for unhindered advance to majority rule. Nevertheless, the new settlement, if approved, would also implement an immediate improvement in black political status, offer a means to terminate racial discrimination, and provide a solid guarantee against retrogressive constitutional amendments. Rhodesia Rhodesia ( / r oʊ ˈ d iː ʒ ə / roh- DEE -zhə , / r oʊ ˈ d iː ʃ ə / roh- DEE -shə ; Shona : Rodizha ), officially from 1970
32130-480: Was appointed to study constitutional options open to the Rhodesian authorities as of April 1968, including on the topic of majority rule, but reopening negotiations with the British on a settlement was ruled out early on. The Waley Commission found that in practical as well as legal terms, "Europeans must surrender any belief in permanent European domination", pointing out that minority rule was not permanently sustainable. However, Waley also testified that majority rule
32319-473: Was banned by the Rhodesian government as well, which cited widespread acts of violent intimidation attributed to its members. ZANU's agenda was left-wing and pan-Africanist ; it demanded a one-party state with majority rule and the abolition of private property. Ethnic tensions also exacerbated the split: ZANU recruited almost solely from the Shona-speaking peoples of Rhodesia. Its chief support base
32508-403: Was bordered by Botswana ( Bechuanaland : British protectorate until 1966) to the southwest, Mozambique ( Portuguese province until 1975) to the east, South Africa to the south, and Zambia to the northwest. From 1965 to 1979, Rhodesia was one of two independent states on the African continent governed by a white minority of European descent and culture , the other being South Africa . In
32697-661: Was hardly an unusual opinion among white minorities in Southern Africa at the time; a dossier compiled by United States intelligence officials on the topic found that: many [southern African] whites....believe that the current social and political ferment throughout the continent is communist inspired and managed; that it would be no problem without communist instigation. They point to materiel and training provided by communist countries to insurgency groups operating against white minority governments in southern Africa. They see foreign-based black liberation groups operating against
32886-429: Was joined with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland . The rapid decolonisation of Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s alarmed a significant proportion of Southern Rhodesia's white population. In an effort to delay the transition to black majority rule , the predominantly white Southern Rhodesian government issued its own Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from
33075-427: Was marked by discrimination ranging from job reservation for whites to petty segregation of trains, post office queues and the like. Whites owned most of the best farmland, and had far superior education, wages and homes, but the schooling, healthcare, infrastructure and salaries available to black Rhodesians were nevertheless very good by African standards. In the wider Imperial context, Southern Rhodesia occupied
33264-447: Was no oppression of the majority by the minority or of [any] minority by the majority." Rhodesian resolve stiffened following a failure to reach a new settlement, with more radical elements of the Rhodesian Front calling for a republican constitution. During a two-proposition referendum held in 1969, the proposal for severing all remaining ties to the British Crown passed by a majority of 61,130 votes to 14,327. Rhodesia declared itself
33453-492: Was no way that a nation could rightly claim to be governing a particular territory – if it was waging a war against that territory. Beadle argued that due to Britain's economic war against Rhodesia, she could not (at the same point) be described as governing Rhodesia. The ruling set the precedent that despite the UDI, the incumbent Smith government "could lawfully do anything its predecessors could lawfully have done". A Salisbury commission chaired by prominent lawyer W.R. Waley
33642-402: Was not desirable immediately. Talks aimed at easing the differences between Rhodesia and the United Kingdom were carried out aboard Royal Navy vessels once in December 1966 and again in October 1968. Both efforts failed to achieve agreement, although Harold Wilson added a sixth principle to the five he had previously enunciated: "it would be necessary to ensure that, regardless of race, there
33831-419: Was pursuing a middle course between black Rhodesian rule and apartheid so that there would still be "a place for the white man" in Southern Rhodesia; this would benefit the blacks too, he claimed. He held that the government should be based "on merit, not on colour or nationalism", and insisted that there would be "no African nationalist government here in my lifetime". Salisbury's blunt refusal to be part of
34020-409: Was put under immense pressure to win the colony's independence. Field travelled to England later that month to press Douglas-Home and Sandys for independence, and raised the possibility of UDI on a few occasions, but returned empty-handed on 2 February. The RF united behind Field after Sandys wrote him a terse letter warning him of the likely Commonwealth reaction to a declaration of independence, but
34209-462: Was refused sovereignty under the newly ascendant principle of " no independence before majority rule " ("NIBMAR"). Most white Rhodesians felt that they were due independence following four decades of self-government, and that the British government was betraying them by withholding it. A stalemate developed between the British and Rhodesian prime ministers, Harold Wilson and Ian Smith respectively, between 1964 and 1965. The dispute largely surrounded
34398-493: Was rejected by the guerrillas and the international community. The Bush War continued until Zimbabwe Rhodesia revoked its UDI as part of the Lancaster House Agreement in December 1979. Following a brief period of direct British rule, the country was granted internationally recognised independence under the name Zimbabwe in 1980. The southern African territory of Rhodesia , officially Southern Rhodesia ,
34587-506: Was resoundingly negative. As many as thirty black Rhodesian chiefs and politicians voiced their opposition, prompting Britain to withdraw from the proposals on the grounds of the commission's report. As early as 1960, minority rule in Southern Rhodesia was already being challenged by a rising tide of political violence led by black African nationalists such as Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole . A sustained period of civil unrest between 1960 and 1965 further polarised relations between
34776-459: Was set for Northern Rhodesian statehood, it was generally surmised that it was going to follow shortly thereafter. Smith was promptly sent to London, where he held a round of inconclusive Southern Rhodesian independence talks with the new British Prime Minister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home . Around the same time, the presence and significance of Section 111 of the 1961 constitution emerged in Southern Rhodesia, prompting speculation in political circles that
34965-515: Was somewhat more influenced by the principles of Maoism than ZAPU, and a sympathetic Chinese government soon agreed to furnish weapons and training for ZANU's own war effort. After UDI, ZANU formed its own military wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). While ZANLA and ZIPRA both planned for an armed struggle against the Rhodesian government, their respective leadership disagreed on
35154-553: Was the Queen's only legitimate representative, and hence the only lawful authority in Rhodesia. In September 1968, the Appellate Division of the High Court of Rhodesia ruled that Ian Smith's administration had become the de jure government of the country, not merely the de facto one. To support his decision, Chief Justice Sir Hugh Beadle used several statements made by Hugo Grotius , who maintained that there
35343-686: Was the rural peasantry in the Mashonaland countryside. ZAPU did retain Shona members, even among its senior leadership following the split. However, thereafter it recruited predominantly from the Ndebele ethnic group. Due to ZAPU's close relationship with the Soviet Union, ZANU found itself ostracised by the Soviet bloc but soon found a new ally in the People's Republic of China . Its political ideology
35532-488: Was theoretically able to cancel any passed bill within a year, or alter the constitution however it wished. These reserved powers were intended to protect the indigenous black Africans from discriminatory legislation and to safeguard British commercial interests in the colony, but as Claire Palley comments in her constitutional history of the country, it would have been extremely difficult for Whitehall to enforce such actions, and attempting to do so would have probably caused
35721-416: Was therefore tasked with ascertaining public opinion on the subject. In 1972, the commission began interviewing interest groups and sampling opinions – although concern was expressed over the widespread apathy encountered. According to the commission, whites were in favour of the settlement, and Rhodesians of Coloured or Asian ancestry generally pleased, while the black response to the settlement's terms
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