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27-474: According to the "Plan West" ( Plan Zachód , the code name for the Polish mobilization plan) it was to be composed of units mobilized as the second and third waves, and its main purpose was to cooperate with the nearby armies " Łódź " and " Kraków ". It was being mobilized in two groups after the outbreak of hostilities. It consisted of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry brigade and a battalion of tanks. Once ready, it

54-611: A city disputed between Poland and Lithuania, and a small Polish force, primarily elite units of Border Defence Corps , was detached to secure that region. The plan assumed that Polish forces would be able to hold for several months but would be pushed back by the German numerical and technical superiority, which was estimated to be two or three to one. Then, the Western Allies (France and the United Kingdom), obliged by

81-545: A possible deep, flanking, eastward push from Prussia and Slovakia , but that push was assigned high priority in the German plan ( Fall Weiss ). A controversy involved the decision whether Polish forces should defend the lengthy borders or should withdraw east and south and try to defend a shorter line, backed with rivers. Although the second plan was more militarily sound, political considerations outweighed them, as Polish politicians were concerned that Germany could be satisfied with occupation of some disputed territories (like

108-579: The 10th Motorized Cavalry Brigade belonged to the Prusy Army. In late July 1939, Marshall Śmigły-Rydz decided to move this unit to Kraków Army . The northern group, seriously damaged in the battles of Piotrków and Tomaszów Mazowiecki (September 5 - September 6) was forced to cross the Vistula. The southern group, much less organized and poorly commanded, fought in the Battle of Iłża , after which it

135-640: The Franco-Polish alliance and the Polish–British Common Defence Pact ), would launch an offensive from the west, which would draw enough German forces away from the east to allow Polish forces to launch a counteroffensive. The plan correctly assumed the size, location and most of the directions of attack by the enemy. When the Germans attacked, however, the second and further defensive lines and related items were not fully defined by

162-581: The Free City of Danzig , the Polish Corridor and Silesia ) and then push for an early end of the war after it had occupied those territories. The western regions were also the most densely populated ones and had major industrial centres, which were crucial for mobilization and any continued military production of equipment and supply for the Polish Army. Even with the decision to protect

189-738: The Invasion of Poland . Furthermore, Skwarczynski was a freemason , member of a Masonic Lodge in Wilno . Skwarczynski was born on 17 November 1888 in the village of Wierzchnia , Kalusz County, Austrian Galicia . He studied architecture at Lwow Polytechnic , and was an active member of Polish paramilitary organizations, such as the Union of Active Struggle and the Riflemen's Association . In 1914, he joined Polish Legions in World War I . Appointed to

216-434: The Polish Corridor between German Pomerania and Prussia. After German annexation of parts of Czechoslovakia and changes of borders, Polish planners revised the plan with the expectation that a main thrust would originate from Silesia through Piotrków and Łódź towards Warsaw and Kraków . The Polish planners correctly predicted the direction of most German thrusts, with one crucial exception: they assigned low priority to

243-676: The Soviet invasion of Poland and lack of promised aid from the Western Allies , contributed to the Polish defeat by 6 October 1939. Stanis%C5%82aw Skwarczy%C5%84ski Stanisław Eugeniusz Skwarczyński (1888–1981) was a soldier of the Austro-Hungarian Army , officer of Polish Legions in World War I , and General brygady of the Polish Army . He fought in several conflicts, including World War I , Polish-Czechoslovak War , Polish-Ukrainian War , Polish-Soviet War and

270-697: The Wehrmacht in the Battle of Radom , after which he ordered 12th Infantry Division to disperse and abandon its heavy equipment, including 50 cannons. Together with a number of soldiers, he managed to cross the Vistula , and join the units which moved southwards, to the Romanian Bridgehead . Captured by the Germans during the Battle of Tomaszow Lubelski , he was sent to Oflag Dorsten , where he remained until liberation. In April 1945, he went to London , and remained in exile until his death. After

297-549: The Southern Group was commanded by General Stanisław Skwarczyński . Plan Zach%C3%B3d Plan West ( Polish : Plan Zachód ) was a military plan of the Polish Army of the Second Polish Republic , for defence against invasion from Nazi Germany . It was designed in the late 1930s. While Józef Piłsudski was the dictator of Poland, planning concentrated on a possible attack on Poland from

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324-448: The armies "Łódź" and "Krakow," but they failed to predict the fast pace of the German advance. Therefore, in Polish plans "Armia Prusy" was to be fully mobilized only by 14 September 1939, while in reality, it needed to be ready as soon as the late night of 3 September 1939. As Polish historians Czesław Grzelak and Henryk Stańczyk wrote: "Polish planners miscalculated the speed of the advance of German panzer and motorized units, and plans for

351-470: The borders, the fact that Poland was virtually encircled from three sides by the Germans caused the decision that some areas were almost impossible to defend and so had to be abandoned early on. That was the case for the northwestern Pomorze Voivodeship and Poznań Voivodeship . A separate force, the Land Coastal Defence , was to protect key parts of the coast as long as possible, and most of

378-478: The conflict were based on the experiences of the First World War". The Poles were surprised by how fast they would have to fall back to prevent the destruction of their units. This miscalculation led to the capture of the city of Łódź - a major setback to the Polish plan of defending the country west from the Vistula river at least until October 1939. More surprising should be that the "Polish schedule"

405-669: The east. It was only after Piłsudski's death in 1935 that the new Polish government and military re-evaluated the situation and decided that the current Polish plan for a Polish–German war, dating from the mid-1920s (Plan "S"), was inadequate and needed to be revised. However up to 1938, the priority remained in the east, not the west, and most Polish fortifications were being erected on the Polish–Soviet border. The first version predicted that Germans would attack from Pomerania towards Warsaw , with supporting thrusts from Silesia and Prussia , aiming at establishing an early link through

432-523: The plan, and none of its aspects had been subject to a military exercise. There were also other unfinished parts, particularly those dealing with communications and supplies. When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, Polish forces were dealt a significant defeat at the Battle of the Border , just as critics of the plan had predicted. Further factors, such as underestimating German mobility and blitzkrieg strategy and overestimating Polish mobility,

459-887: The post of battalion commandant of 1st Legions Infantry Regiment, he was on 15 June 1915 promoted to the rank of Poruchik . After the Oath crisis , Skwarczynski was forced to join Austro-Hungarian Army, from which he deserted. In 1918 – 1917, he was conspirational commandant of Łódź Area of Polish Military Organisation . In November 1918, Skwarczynski joined Polish Army, and soon afterwards, he became commandant of 3rd Battalion of 28th Kaniow Rifles Regiment. Together with his unit, he briefly fought against Czechoslovak forces in Cieszyn Silesia , to be transferred to Eastern Galicia, where Polish-Ukrainian conflict took place in late 1918 and 1919. On 15 April 1920 Skwarczynski

486-407: The southern group was to support Kraków Army by preparing the defence of central Vistula river area. Because of fast German advance both groups entered combat separately and most units did not reach full mobilization. Due to the deteriorating situation in the battle of the border , it was decided to push partially mobilized units of Prusy Army to the front as soon as possible. In original Polish plans,

513-885: The surface Polish Navy was to be evacuated to the United Kingdom as specified in the Peking Plan ( submarines were to engage the enemy in the Baltic Sea , according to the Worek Plan ). The main Polish defence line was to be formed on the regions of the Augustów Primeval Forest – Biebrza River – Narew River – Vistula River (and the towns of Modlin , Toruń , Bydgoszcz ) – Inowrocław Lakes – Warta River – Widawka River – town of Częstochowa – Silesian fortifications – town of Bielsko-Biała – town of Żywiec – village of Chabówka – and

540-688: The town of Nowy Sącz ). The second defensive line was based on the Augustów Forest - Biebrza River – Narew River – Bug River – Vistula River – and Dunajec River. Finally, the third defensive line involved retreating southeast towards the Romanian border and holding as long as possible in the region of the Romanian Bridgehead . The plan assumed the Soviet Union would be neutral, as a German–Soviet alliance seemed unlikely. The plan, however, allowed for Lithuania to try to take Wilno ,

567-530: Was cut off from the Vistula, encircled near Radom and destroyed (September 8–9). Units of the Army which retained cohesion or broke through the German lines later fought in the defense of Warsaw or joined the other Armies in the northern-central Poland. The army was commanded by General Stefan Dąb-Biernacki; his chief of staff was Tomasz Obertyński . Biernacki was in direct command of the Northern Group;

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594-508: Was followed by the French one year later; they did refuse to read the report pointing out mistakes of the Polish military, and drawing conclusions on how to avoid them in the future. The report was prepared by the Polish generals and handed to the French, and the British in their respective languages, in late 1939. The northern group was to back up the Łódź Army near Łódź and Sieradz , while

621-512: Was located in the area marked by the towns of Skarżysko-Kamienna - Opoczno - Radom . After detraining, the units of the Army were to take positions in the following towns: 44th I.D. - Sochaczew, 13th I.D - Regny , 19th I.D. - Tomaszów Mazowiecki, Wilno Cavalry Brigade - Piotrków Trybunalski, 29th I.D. - Sulejów , 36th I.D. - Opoczno, 12th I.D. - Końskie, 3rd I.D. - Skarżysko-Kamienna, 39th I.D. - Kozienice. Polish military strategists correctly predicted that German forces would try to push in between

648-572: Was named commandant of 2nd Battalion of 5th Legions Infantry Regiment. During the war with Soviet Union, he commanded 5th Legions Infantry Regiment, remaining in this post until 1926. On 14 February 1929 he was appointed commandant of 3rd Legions Infantry Division , stationed in Zamosc . On 25 October 1930 Skwarczynski was appointed to the prestigious post of commandant of elite 1st Legions Infantry Division , stationed in Wilno. On 1 January 1931 Skwarczynski

675-535: Was promoted to General brygady . In the late 1930s, he was actively involved in politics, as a supporter of the Sanacja movement. In 1938–39, he was the leader of Camp of National Unity , and in 1938 he officially opened the Sejm (Parliament]) of Poland. In late August 1939, Skwarczynski returned to active military service, and was appointed commandant of the so-called Intervention Corps (Korpus Interwencyjny), which

702-408: Was sent to the Polish Corridor , with the task to counter a possible German action in the Free City of Danzig . After a short time he was appointed commandant of Operational Group Wyszkow , but did not take this post. Instead, he became commandant of rear units of southern group of Prusy Army . Skwarczynski’s leadership in the Invasion of Poland was a complete failure. His forces were routed by

729-466: Was supposed to stop the main German thrust. The army, divided into two groups, northern and southern, was concentrated southwest of Warsaw (in the triangle between Kielce , Radom , and Tomaszów Mazowiecki ), as Marshall Edward Śmigły-Rydz was convinced that main German thrust would be directed at Warsaw, via Łódź . The Northern Group of the Prusy Army was planned to be concentrated in the area Koluszki - Łowicz - Skierniewice , while its southern group

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