The II SS Panzer Corps was a German Waffen-SS armoured corps which saw action on both the Eastern and Western Fronts during World War II . It was commanded by Paul Hausser during the Third Battle of Kharkov and the Battle of Kursk in 1943 and by Wilhelm Bittrich on the Western Front in 1944.
96-534: For one of the largest tank battles in military history, see Battle of Prokhorovka . Prokhorovka ( Russian : Про́хоровка ) is the name of several inhabited localities in Russia . Urban localities Prokhorovka, Belgorod Oblast , a settlement in Prokhorovsky District of Belgorod Oblast Rural localities Prokhorovka, Irkutsk Oblast ,
192-754: A village in Osinsky District of Irkutsk Oblast Prokhorovka, Kaliningrad Oblast , a settlement in Nizovsky Rural Okrug of Guryevsky District of Kaliningrad Oblast Prokhorovka, Orenburg Oblast , a selo in Konstantinovsky Selsoviet of Sharlyksky District of Orenburg Oblast Prokhorovka, Rostov Oblast , a selo in Proletarskoye Rural Settlement of Krasnosulinsky District of Rostov Oblast Prokhorovka, Tula Oblast ,
288-636: A bridgehead across the Northern Donets River . They eventually succeeded by the morning of 6 July, but the delay in their advance kept them from protecting the east flank of the II SS-Panzer Corps. Late on 6 July, the 5th Guards Tank and 5th Guards Armies of the Steppe Front began moving up from their reserve position. The 5th Guards Tank Army covered the 320–390 kilometres (200–240 mi) over three days, and arrived at
384-676: A connection with Army Group F in the Balkans and to secure communications east and northwards from Trieste and Rijeka . In these operations, according to the corps headquarters' medical department, the corps suffered total losses of 936 men. According to Croat authors, in the first phase against partisans on the Istrian peninsula ( Unternehmen Istrien ), some 2000 partisans and 2000 civilians were killed by German forces, and additional 1200 were arrested, with some 400 transported to concentration camps. In November 1943, Leibstandarte returned to
480-520: A limited advance and secure Storozhevoe and Lamki just outside Prokhorovka, then it and Das Reich were to wait until Totenkopf 's attack had disrupted the Soviet positions, after which Leibstandarte was to attack the main Soviet defences on the southwest slope of Prokhorovka. To Leibstandarte 's right, elements of Das Reich were also to advance eastward to the high ground south of Prokhorovka, then turn south away from Prokhorovka to roll up
576-466: A panzergrenadier battalion on the opposite side of the ditch. Peiper's surviving panzergrenadiers engaged the Soviet infantry and attacked the Soviet tanks with Hafthohlladung magnetic anti-tank grenades . Twenty of his battalion's half-tracks were lost in the fighting, some destroyed in ramming the much heavier Soviet tanks in an effort to stop them. Eventually, due to heavy Soviet pressure and dangerously exposed flanks, Leibstandarte withdrew from
672-459: A result of the frontal attack, the army's corps fought heavy battles against large enemy tank forces during which they were forced to assume defence." Rotmistrov was forced to shift the 18th and 29th Tank Corps over to defence and reinforce them with infantry. They dug more trenches, dug in some of their tanks, laid new minefields, prepared anti-tank strong points and massed their artillery. The 10th Guards Mechanised and 24th Guards Tank Brigades of
768-452: A three-hour battle the Tigers engaged the Soviet tanks at ranges from 1,000 metres down to point-blank, inflicting heavy losses on the Soviet tankers and repelling their attack. None of the Tigers were lost. Elements of the 170th Tank Brigade later engaged the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment, which was already fighting the 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades. Despite losing its commander and about 30 tanks in
864-820: A village in Prokhorovsky Rural Okrug of Novomoskovsky District of Tula Oblast [REDACTED] Index of articles associated with the same name This set index article includes a list of related items that share the same name (or similar names). If an internal link incorrectly led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Prokhorovka&oldid=1255562712 " Category : Set index articles on populated places in Russia Hidden categories: Articles containing Russian-language text Articles with short description Short description
960-601: Is different from Wikidata All set index articles Battle of Prokhorovka II SS-Panzer Corps 5th Guards Tank Army Other units on 12 July on 12 July The Battle of Prokhorovka was fought on 12 July 1943 near Prokhorovka , 87 kilometres (54 mi) southeast of Kursk , in the Soviet Union , during the Second World War. Taking place on the Eastern Front , the engagement
1056-649: The Wehrmacht since the Battle of Stalingrad , which would precipitate the collapse of the entire southern sector of the Eastern Front. Faced with a prospect of a new Stalingrad before the Allied invasion of France would even begin, Adolf Hitler was forced to yield to Field Marshal Erich von Manstein 's demands for powerful reinforcements that would de-blockade the 1st Panzer Army. As reinforcements, he provided
SECTION 10
#17327724665951152-401: The 2nd Tank Corps , which had been reinforced by the 9th Guards Airborne Division and 301st Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, both from the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps. Totenkopf was resisted by the 31st Tank Corps, the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps' 95th Guards Rifle Division , and the 11th Motorised Rifle Brigade of the 10th Tank Corps. To the south of Leibstandarte , the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and
1248-672: The 5th Guards Mechanised Corps , and the 53rd Guards Tank Regiment of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Other units of the Voronezh Front also joined the group on its way south. In doing so, Rotmistrov committed over half of his army's reserves before the Battle of Prokhorovka had begun. The German forces involved in the Battle of Prokhorovka were from the three Waffen-SS divisions of the II SS-Panzer Corps: Leibstandarte , Das Reich , and Totenkopf . On
1344-465: The 8th Air Corps . The German offensive, originally slated to commence in the beginning of May, was postponed several times as the German leadership reconsidered and vacillated over its prospects, as well as to bring forward more units and equipment. The Soviet leadership, through their intelligence agencies and foreign sources, learned about the German intentions, and therefore the multiple delays by
1440-411: The I SS Panzer Corps was created during that same month. In July 1943, the corps took part in the failed Operation Citadel , spearheading the 4th Panzer Army 's attack in the southern sector. The corps' three SS divisions were involved in the Battle of Prokhorovka at the edge of the German penetration into the salient. After the operation was cancelled in light of its failure, the corps was ordered to
1536-698: The Italian front in August. Only one division, the Leibstandarte ended up being transferred along with the corps personnel, taking part in operations to disarm Italian troops. The remaining combat divisions remained on the Eastern Front to deal with the developing threats from the Soviet Belgorod–Kharkov offensive operation . Between 20 September and 20 of November 1943 the corps conducted operations against Yugoslav Partisans in order to establish
1632-484: The Komsomolets State Farm, but due to continuous air attacks, they were unable to advance any further and shifted to the defence." The tank brigade also reported: "our own air cover was fully absent until 13:00." The 5th Guards Tank Army reported: "the enemy's aircraft literally hung above our combat formations throughout the entire battle, while our own aircraft, and particularly the fighter aviation,
1728-618: The Oktyabrsky State Farm and established firmer defensive lines 1 kilometre (0.62 mi) to the south. The 2nd and 17th Air Armies flew 893 sorties compared to the German 8th Air Corps's 654 sorties over the southern part of the salient. Of note, most of the Soviet sorties flown that day were flown against the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to the west and the III Panzer Corps to the south. Low clouds in
1824-469: The Wehrmacht from capturing Prokhorovka and breaking through the third defensive belt, the last heavily fortified one. Having failed to achieve his objective, Hitler, despite the advice of his commanders, cancelled Operation Citadel and began redeploying his forces to deal with new pressing developments elsewhere. The Red Army went on a general offensive by conducting Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev on
1920-408: The 29th Tank Corps' 31st and 32nd Tank Brigades: "About 150–200 meters in front of me appeared fifteen, then thirty, then forty tanks. Finally there were too many of them to count." The Soviet armour, firing on the move, charged down the western slopes of Hill 252.2 into the panzer company, and a tank battle ensued. Rotmistrov's tactic to close at high speed disrupted the control and co-ordination of
2016-515: The 48th Rifle Corps' 183rd Rifle Division opposed the advance of Das Reich . By day's end on 11 July Leibstandarte had advanced deep into the Soviet third defensive belt. They had moved up the Psel corridor, cleared Soviet resistance at the Oktyabrsky ("October") State Farm (Russian: Совхоз Октябрьский ), crossed a 15-foot (4.6 m)-deep anti-tank ditch at the base of Hill 252.2 and seized
SECTION 20
#17327724665952112-540: The 5 July – 150 sorties – down from 1,071 on 5 July, but the small Ju 87G contingent proved effective. Luftwaffe liaison officers allotted to German ground forces were able to guide the close air support units to carry out pinpoint attacks. SG 1 and Panzerjägerstaffel / JG 51 flew 248 attack missions, virtually all of them in support of the II SS-Panzer Corps. The 31st Tank Brigade, 29th Tank Corps , reported: "We suffered heavy losses in tanks through enemy artillery and aircraft. At 10:30 our tanks reached
2208-451: The 5th Guards Mechanised Corps made preparations to push Totenkopf back the next morning. Stalin was very disappointed and infuriated by the early reports of heavy Soviet losses in the battle and on the evening of 12 July, he berated Rotmistrov via a phone call. The same evening, he dispatched Zhukov, who had been overseeing Operation Kutuzov, to Vatutin's headquarters as Stavka representative, in order to assume control of coordinating
2304-410: The 5th Guards Tank Army just days earlier was detrimental to it in two major ways: the tank unit commanders did not have an opportunity to reconnoitre the terrain they would be travelling across, and the supporting artillery was unable to site and spot their fire. Late on the evening of 11 July, Hausser, the commander of the II SS-Panzer Corps, issued orders for the next day's advance on Prokhorovka. It
2400-459: The 5th Guards Tank Army was present in the Prokhorovka area during the battle, as part of the formation had been sent south to check the advance of the III Panzer Corps. The Soviet armour of the 5th Guards Tank Army – including the newly attached 2nd Guards Tank Corps and 2nd Tank Corps, as well as the 5th Guards Mechanised Corps held in reserve – that faced the II SS-Panzer Corps on 12 July
2496-596: The German army high command, the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), allowed them a great deal of time to prepare their defences. Employing defence in depth , they constructed a series of defensive lines to wear down the attacking panzer formations. Three belts made up of extensive minefields , anti-tank ditches , and anti-tank gun emplacements were created; behind those were an additional three belts, which were mostly unoccupied and less fortified. The Voronezh Front , commanded by General Nikolai Vatutin , defended
2592-463: The German assault formations first appeared. Whereas the German 8th Air Corps assembled powerful concentrations over the Prokhorovka battlefield, the 17th Air Army spread its forces thinly, to support other sectors; the Soviets dominated the air over the 4th Panzer Army's flanks, leaving the skies over Prokhorovka clear. The 2nd Air Army's fighter aviation had been reduced to 266 aircraft, and this force
2688-529: The German intentions and so used the delay to prepare a series of defensive belts along the routes of the planned German offensive. The Soviet leadership also massed several armies deep behind their defences as the Stavka Reserve . The army group, the Steppe Front , was to launch counteroffensives once the German strength had dissipated. The 5th Guards Tank Army was the primary armoured formation of
2784-414: The German panzer forces had been severely weakened. Soviet intelligence reports issued from 8 to 9 July reported that defensive works were being constructed by German infantry on the flanks of the 4th Panzer Army, and that German armoured formations were not present in these locations, despite the fact that Soviet armoured formations were situated opposite these flanks. Voronezh Front headquarters supposed
2880-464: The German side, with Field Marshal Erich von Manstein arguing for a mobile defence that would give up terrain and allow the Soviet units to advance, while the German forces launched a series of sharp counterattacks against their flanks to inflict heavy attrition. But for political reasons, German Fuhrer Adolf Hitler insisted that the German forces go on the offensive, choosing the Kursk salient for
2976-455: The Germans must be reaching their limit, and on 10 July decided to set its counterattack to coincide with the planned Soviet counteroffensive on the northern side of the Kursk salient, Operation Kutuzov , which was set for 12 July. Starting on the morning of 10 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps began its attack towards Prokhorovka. Its 3rd SS-Panzergrenadier Division Totenkopf attacked across
Prokhorovka - Misplaced Pages Continue
3072-721: The Hungarian oilfields. The corps took part in Operation Spring Awakening , launched near Lake Balaton on 6 March 1945. After the failure of the offensive, the corps retreated, alongside the I SS and IV SS Panzer Corps , towards Vienna . After Soviet forces captured the city, individual units attempted to break out to the west. The elements of the corps surrendered to the U.S. Army on 8 May 1945. February — March 1943 — Third Battle of Kharkov July 1943 – Operation Citadel September 1943 October 1943 September — November 1944 — Allied advance towards
3168-416: The III Panzer Corps' drive northward, and in supporting the attack against the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps. Missions were flown in support of the attack of the 5th Guards Tank Army as well, but to a limited extent. The 2nd Air Army had some 472 aircraft operational on 12 July, while the 17th Air Army had 300 operational aircraft. At 05:45 on 12 July, Leibstandarte 's headquarters started receiving reports of
3264-565: The Prokhorovka area on the night of 9 July, and the 5th Guards Army's 33rd Guards Rifle Corps arrived at the settlement on the night of 10 July. Both armies completed their journey and deployment intact without any substantial interference from the Luftwaffe . Slow progress by the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps caused Hoth to shift elements of the II SS-Panzer Corps on 8 July to aid the XXXXVIII Corps' drive towards Oboyan and Kursk. On
3360-468: The Psel River and secured a bridgehead. The 1st SS-Panzergrenadier Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler captured Komsomolets State Farm and Hill 241.6. The 2nd SS-Panzergrenadier Division Das Reich defended the panzer corps' flank from Soviet armoured counterattacks. The II SS-Panzer Corps continued its attack towards Prokhorovka on 11 July. The advance of Leibstandarte was checked by
3456-405: The Psel River when they arrived. The plan originally envisioned elements of the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and III Panzer Corps joining in the attack towards Prokhorovka, but this could not be realised. The Soviet command, however, interpreted the change in direction to be a response to the heavy resistance the German forces had faced driving towards Oboyan, and incorrectly believed the change indicated
3552-414: The Psel in preparation for the assault. Leibstandarte placed its lightly armed 1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion in the 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) gap between it and Totenkopf to provide some flank protection. The unit was, later on 12 July, buttressed by the division's four remaining Tigers, commanded by SS-Untersturmführer Michael Wittmann . The main Soviet armoured formation involved in
3648-783: The SS Panzer Corps. In August, it was sent to northern France before taking part in Case Anton , the occupation of Vichy France in November, during which it captured Toulon . In early February 1943, the corps, under the command of SS- Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser , was attached to Army Group South in Ukraine and participated in the Third Battle of Kharkov . The corps was renamed II SS Panzer Corps in June 1943, after
3744-782: The Soviet Union, with the corps remaining in Slovenia , Istria, and Northern Italy. In January 1944, the corps was ordered to the Alençon area of France to refit. In March 1944, during the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive in Ukraine, the entire 1st Panzer Army , numbering over 200,000 personnel, was encircled by the Red Army in the Kamenets–Podolsky pocket . This encirclement was the largest catastrophe facing
3840-425: The Soviet attack and re-established the line, forcing the Soviet tanks to withdraw to the village of Andreyevka. The advance of Soviet armour down Hill 252.2 was disrupted when they reached the anti-tank ditch at the base of the hill. A number of tanks crashed into the 15-foot deep ditch while others moved along the edge looking for a way to cross. Heavy fire was exchanged between the Soviet tanks and two companies of
3936-450: The Soviet defences opposing the III Panzer Corps' advance and force a gap. The 8th Air Corps was to concentrate its effort to supporting the advance of the II SS-Panzer Corps, with the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to the west assigned limited air resources. The 5th Guards Army and 5th Guards Tank Army of the Steppe Front had been brought up from reserve and reassigned to the Voronezh Front on 8 and 11 July respectively. On 11 July, Vatutin ordered
Prokhorovka - Misplaced Pages Continue
4032-592: The Soviet forces around Prokhorovka. Leibstandarte was to strengthen its front line and co-ordinate its attack on Prokhorovka from the south with Totenkopf 's attack from the northwest. Das Reich was to consolidate and strengthen its front line and prepare for an offensive operation to link up with the III Panzer Corps. II SS Panzer Corps The II SS Panzer Corps was formed to take command of SS Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" , SS Division "Das Reich" , and SS Division "Totenkopf" in July 1942 as
4128-460: The Soviet formations. They were joined by Focke-Wulf Fw 190 single engine fighter-bombers and Henschel Hs 129 twin-engined ground-attack aircraft, both equipped with 30 mm (1.2 in) anti-tank cannon. In particular, the Hs 129 formations from SG 1 inflicted grievous losses on Soviet tanks. The Stuka wings, StG 2 and StG 77 , made their weakest contribution to the Kursk operation since
4224-477: The Soviet tank formations and also greatly reduced their accuracy. In a three-hour battle, the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment engaged the attacking Soviet tanks and repulsed them, reporting that they destroyed about 62 Soviet tanks. Later that afternoon, tanks from the 31st Tank Brigade and the 53rd Motorised Brigade overran elements of the 1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion and reached Komsomolets State Farm, threatening Leibstandarte 's lines of communication and
4320-419: The Soviets launched their counteroffensives: Operation Kutuzov on the northern side and a coinciding one on the southern side. On the southern side of the salient near Prokhorovka, the 5th Guards Tank Army engaged the II SS-Panzer Corps of the 4th Panzer Army, resulting in a large clash of armoured fighting vehicles . The 5th Guards Tank Army suffered significant losses in the attack, but succeeded in preventing
4416-481: The Steppe Front. On 5 July 1943, the Wehrmacht launched its offensive. On the northern side of the salient, the German forces bogged down within four days. On the southern side, the German 4th Panzer Army , with Army Detachment Kempf on its eastern flank, attacked the Soviet defences of the Voronezh Front . They made slow but steady progress through the Soviet defensive lines. After a week of fighting,
4512-593: The U.S. 82nd Airborne Division and the British XXX Corps in Nijmegen . The corps suffered heavy losses in the ensuing counteroffensive in early October against the Allied salient on the island. In preparation for the Ardennes Offensive , the corps was placed in reserve of the 6th Panzer Army and committed on 21 December 1944 near St. Vith . After the northern assault stalled, the corps
4608-653: The West to the East. It played the main role in de-blockading the encircled 1st Panzer Army in the Kamenets–Podolsky pocket. After rescuing the better part of the 1st Panzer Army, the corps then participated in the attempts to de-blockade the trapped German garrison of the 4th Panzer Army in the town of Tarnopol , which was declared to be a fortress ( Festung ) by Hitler. However, the Red Army had prepared defences there and
4704-421: The armies of the Voronezh Front to go over to the offensive on the following day. This Soviet counterattack on the southern side of the Kursk salient was planned to coincide with the offensive against Oryol on the northern side, Operation Kutuzov. Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to destroy the German forces near Prokhorovka with his 5th Guards Tank Army, without allowing the German forces to withdraw southward. For
4800-536: The attack. On 15 April 1943 he authorised preparations for Unternehmen Zitadelle ( Operation Citadel ). The German offensive plan envisioned an assault at the base of the Kursk salient from both the north and south, with the intent of enveloping and destroying the Soviet forces in the salient. The two spearheads were to meet near the city of Kursk. From the south, the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps and General Paul Hausser 's II SS-Panzer Corps , forming
4896-433: The base of the salient from north and south simultaneously. The German offensive was delayed several times because of the vacillation of the leadership ( Hitler repeatedly delayed launching the attack so that more Tiger tanks could be delivered to the front, hoping that a technical advantage would help him win the offensive) and the addition of more forces and new equipment. The Soviet high command, Stavka , had learned of
SECTION 50
#17327724665954992-476: The battle was the 5th Guards Tank Army, which controlled five corps, two of which were Guards units , by 12 July: the 2nd Guards, 2nd, 5th Guards Mechanised, 18th and 29th Tank Corps. Altogether they fielded 793 tanks and 37 to 57 self-propelled guns for a total of approximately 840 armoured fighting vehicles. About two-thirds of these tanks were T-34s , while the remainder were T-70 light tanks, with some 31 to 35 Churchill heavy tanks as well. Not all of
5088-469: The battle, Rotmistrov ordered his tanks to move forward at high speed to engage the German armour in order to nullify the advantages the Tiger tanks had in the range and firepower of their 88 mm guns . He believed the more manoeuvrable T-34 medium tanks would be able to quickly close in and obtain effective flanking shots against the German heavy tanks. In fact, Soviet intelligence had greatly overestimated
5184-413: The day. Exhausted from the previous week's fighting, many were just starting their day at the outset of the attack. As the Soviet armour appeared, German outposts all across the corps' frontage began firing purple warning flares signalling a tank attack. Obersturmbannführer Rudolf von Ribbentrop , commander of a panzer company under the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment, stated that he knew at once a major attack
5280-449: The division's command post located at Hill 241.6. The Soviet tanks attacked the division's 1st SS-Panzer Artillery Regiment, killing some of the crews before they themselves were destroyed by direct fire from anti-tank teams. Wittmann's group of four Tigers provided support to the reconnaissance battalion in its effort to protect Leibstandarte 's left flank, and faced off with the 18th Tank Corps' advancing 181st Tank Brigade. In
5376-586: The entire II SS Panzer Corps (with the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions) from France in April 1944, as well as divisions from the Balkan Theatre of Operations . Called the "Hausser Attack Group", they were commanded by Hausser himself. This was the first major transfer of forces from France to the East since the creation of the Führer Directive 51 , which no longer allowed any transfers from
5472-438: The evening of 11 July, the serviceable armour strength of the II SS-Panzer Corps was 294 tanks and assault guns , which included 15 Tigers. The armoured strength of Leibstandarte , Das Reich , and Totenkopf were 77, 95, and 122 tanks and assault guns respectively. Ten of the Tigers were to the north of the Psel River with Totenkopf , four were with Leibstandarte , and Das Reich had just one. Leibstandarte had advanced
5568-435: The fight, by early afternoon the 170th Tank Brigade had forced the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment back to the Oktyabrsky State Farm and reached the position of the 1st SS-Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion. At around 18:00, the 170th and 181st Tank Brigades penetrated the German line connecting Totenkopf and Leibstandarte . Assault guns and panzers supporting Totenkopf 's 6th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment Theodor Eicke repelled
5664-488: The first defensive belt on the southern side of the salient and reached the second, although the plan was to breach the first two belts and reach the third on the first day. Nonetheless, the panzer corps' penetration caused great concern among Soviet commanders, compelling Vatutin to commit almost all of the Voronezh Front's operational reserves by the end of the first day. The III Panzer Corps met with stiff resistance as well and had great difficulty creating and maintaining
5760-460: The first echelon and 70 more in the second. Down from the slopes in front of Prokhorovka, the massed Soviet armour charged with five tank brigades of the 18th and 29th Tank Corps, firing as they came at Leibstandarte 's positions. As the Soviet tanks rolled down the slopes, they carried the men of the 9th Guards Airborne Division on their hulls (" tank desant "). The troops of Leibstandarte were not slated to go into action until later in
5856-415: The flank and rear of the 5th Guards Tank Army. Early on 12 July, Vatutin ordered Rotmistrov to send reinforcements to the Soviet 7th Guards and 69th Armies facing the III Panzer Corps. He organised a task force under the command of his deputy, Major General Kuzma Trufanov , which consisted of the 26th Guards Tank Brigade from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, the 11th and 12th Guards Mechanised Brigades from
SECTION 60
#17327724665955952-431: The greatest number of tanks in the attack, with the 18th Tank Corps fielding 190 tanks and self-propelled guns, and the 29th Tank Corps fielding 212 tanks and self-propelled guns. Infantry support to the 18th and 29th Tank Corps was provided by the 9th Guards Airborne Division. A portion of the 18th Tank Corps was directed against the eastern flank of Totenkopf 's 6th SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment Theodor Eicke . On
6048-532: The hill itself after a brief but bloody battle, leaving them only 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) south of Prokhorovka. To its northwest, the panzergrenadiers of Totenkopf had achieved a bridgehead across the Psel and tanks had been brought across, but they had yet to take Hill 226.6 and there was a 5-kilometre (3.1 mi) gap between Totenkopf and Leibstandarte . To the south of Leibstandarte , Das Reich had also met stiff resistance and lagged behind some 4 kilometres (2.5 mi). With its advance, Leibstandarte
6144-530: The initiative first and attack the German forces inside the Soviet Union, but they were convinced by a number of key commanders, including the Deputy Supreme Commander Georgy Zhukov , to assume a defensive posture instead. This would allow the German side to weaken themselves in attacking prepared positions, after which the Soviet forces would be able to respond with a counteroffensive. Strategic discussions also occurred on
6240-409: The last shells fell at 08:30, Rotmistrov radioed the code words "Stal! Stal! Stal!" ("Steel, Steel, Steel!") – the order to commence the attack. With that the Soviet armour of the 5th Guards Tank Army began their advance. In total, about 500 tanks and self-propelled guns of the 5th Guards Tank Army attacked the positions of the II SS-Panzer Corps on 12 July, doing so in two waves, with 430 tanks in
6336-456: The left and right wings of the 4th Panzer Army commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth , would drive northward. The III Panzer Corps of Army Detachment Kempf was to protect Hoth's right flank. The 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf were under Army Group South , commanded by von Manstein. Air support over the southern portion of the offensive was provided by Colonel General Otto Deßloch 's Luftflotte 4 and its major air formation,
6432-546: The morning and thunderstorms in the afternoon inhibited air operations over Prokhorovka for both sides. Over the Prokhorovka battlefield the Luftwaffe gained control of the air. Formations of Junkers Ju 87 Stukas, including a small number of the G-2 variants, experimentally equipped with twin 3.7 cm (1.5 in) Bordkanone BK 3,7 cannon in gun pods , that were commanded by Staffelkapitän Hans-Ulrich Rudel , attacked
6528-414: The morning of 5 July 1943 and met heavy resistance. There were far more Soviet anti-tank guns, minefields, anti-tank ditches and overall Soviet resistance than had been anticipated, making a breakthrough more difficult to achieve. Furthermore, from the outset they were subjected to frequent counterattacks from Soviet tank units. Despite this, by the end of 5 July the II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced through
6624-416: The most deeply towards Prokhorovka and was situated in the centre of the German position. A railway line, with a 30-feet high railbed, divided Leibstandarte 's area into north and south. The bulk of the division was positioned to the north of the rail line, including the division's 1st SS-Panzer Regiment and 2nd SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, as well as its reconnaissance, artillery and command units. To
6720-408: The night of 12 July, Vatutin ordered Soviet forces to prevent any further German advance on Prokhorovka, destroy German forces that had advanced along the northern bank of the Psel River, and stop the III Panzer Corps from making further progress. Orders issued by the German command for 13 July instructed Totenkopf to consolidate its gains of the previous day and then attack into the flank and rear of
6816-471: The northern bank of the Psel River to reach the Kartashyovka–Prokhorovka road, 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) northwest of Prokhorovka in accordance with plan. It was in position to outflank the Soviet forces at Prokhorovka, but was under pressure from Soviet attacks and its hold on the forward ground was tenuous. Forced onto the defensive by the attacks of the 2nd Guards and 2nd Tank Corps, Das Reich
6912-405: The northern side of the Kursk salient concluded that a breakthrough on the northern side of the salient was unlikely. Nevertheless, they decided to continue their offensive to maintain pressure and inflict casualties, thereby tying down the Soviet forces there. Any level of success for Operation Citadel now depended on a breakthrough being achieved by the 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf on
7008-420: The number of Tigers employed by the German side during the Battle of Kursk. Soviet air support in the southern part of the salient was provided by the 2nd Air Army and the 17th Air Army , commanded by Lieutenant General Stepan Krasovsky and Lieutenant General Vladimir Sudets , respectively. However, the bulk of the air support was committed in support of Soviet units attacking the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps to
7104-524: The numbers of Ferdinand Jagdpanzer tank destroyers and Tiger tanks possessed by the II SS-Panzer Corps. In actuality there were no Ferdinands with the 4th Panzer Army or Army Group South, as they were all deployed on the northern side of the Kursk salient with the 9th Army. Soviet tank crews frequently mistook the versions of Panzer IV tanks that were armed with the 7.5 cm KwK 40 anti-tank gun, which also had extra armour added to their turret, for Tigers; therefore Soviet reports tended to overestimate
7200-652: The operations of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts. A commission was dispatched to investigate the cause of the high losses and the role of Rotmistrov and his plans in the battle; its findings were completed and submitted to Stalin two weeks later, and initially considering sacking Rotmistrov and hauling him before a military tribunal , Stalin eventually changed his mind after the Chief of the General Staff Aleksandr Vasilevsky interceded. On
7296-505: The relief operation ultimately failed. After this, the corps was moved into the reserve of the newly created Army Group North Ukraine . In mid-June 1944, the corps was ordered back west to take part in the Battle of Normandy , arriving to the invasion front in late June 1944. The corps was involved in heavy fighting against the British 21st Army Group in the Battle for Caen . During this period, SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich
7392-414: The same day, the Soviet units counterattacked the II SS-Panzer Corps with several tank corps. These attacks did not destroy the panzer corps as hoped, but slowed its progress. By the end of 8 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps had advanced about 29 kilometres (18 mi) and broken through the first and second defensive belts. On the following day, 9 July, a meeting of the commanders of the German forces on
7488-443: The sound of many tank engines as the Soviet tanks moved into their assembly areas for the attack. At around 06:50, elements of Leibstandarte 's 1st SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment nudged forward and drove the Soviet infantry out of Storozhevoe, while elements of the division's 2nd SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment fanned out from the Oktyabrsky State Farm. The Soviet forces began a preparatory artillery barrage at around 08:00, and as
7584-403: The south of the rail line was Leibstandarte 's 1st SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment, along with the division's 1st SS- Panzerjäger Battalion. Das Reich was positioned to the south of Leibstandarte , and it protected the southern flank of the II SS-Panzer Corps. Totenkopf was positioned to the northwest of Leibstandarte . Totenkopf 's 3rd SS-Panzer Regiment had largely crossed over
7680-420: The southeastern wing of the 5th Guards Tank Army, Rotmistrov deployed the 120 tanks of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. Later on 12 July during the battle, the 26th Guards Tank Brigade of that tank corps with its estimated 40 tanks were sent south to face the III Panzer Corps. The remainder of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, supported by the remnants of the 2nd Tank Corps, was to attack Das Reich . Their infantry support
7776-420: The southern face of the salient. The Steppe Front , commanded by Colonel General Ivan Konev , formed the strategic reserve. It was to be held back east of the salient until the time was right for the Soviet counteroffensive. This formation included Lieutenant General Aleksey Zhadov 's 5th Guards Army and Lieutenant General Pavel Rotmistrov 's 5th Guards Tank Army . The Heer launched its attack on
7872-531: The southern side and continuing Operation Kutuzov on the northern side. The Soviet Union thus seized the strategic initiative on the Eastern Front, which it held for the rest of the war. After the conclusion of the battle for the Donets , as the spring rasputitsa (mud) season came to an end in 1943, both the German and Soviet commands considered their plans for future operations. The Soviet premier Joseph Stalin and some senior Soviet officers wanted to seize
7968-423: The southern side of the Kursk salient. On the evening of 9 July, the II SS-Panzer Corps was ordered to shift its own forward progress, from due north to the northeast, towards the settlement of Prokhorovka. Hoth had formulated this move, and had discussed it with Manstein since early May, as he expected large Soviet armoured reserve forces to arrive from the east, and he did not want his corps to be caught crossing
8064-561: The west of Prokhorovka and the III Panzer Corps to the southeast, and only limited numbers of aircraft were available to support 5th Guards Tank Army's attack. Rotmistrov's plans for a counterattack were threatened by events to the south. The III Panzer Corps managed to cross the Northern Donets at Rzhavets on the night of 11 July, and was about 18 kilometres (11 mi) southeast of Prokhorovka, and advancing northwards. This threat jeopardised Rotmistrov's entire plan by threatening
8160-439: Was about 616 tanks and self-propelled guns. In addition, five artillery regiments, one artillery brigade, and one anti-aircraft artillery division were attached to the 5th Guards Tank Army for the assault. The main attack of the 5th Guards Tank Army was conducted against Leibstandarte by its fresh 29th and 18th Tank Corps that had been brought up from the Soviet strategic reserve. These two Soviet tank corps together provided
8256-409: Was exposed on both of its flanks. Late on 11 July the 5th Guards Tank Army prepared for its forthcoming counterattack. Leibstandarte 's advance had disrupted Rotmistrov's preparations, as the assembly areas he intended to use for the tank army's 18th and 29th Tank Corps were in German hands by the end of the day, forcing him to hastily revise his plans and select new positions. The arrival of
8352-474: Was known that the Red Army had dug in many anti-tank guns on the southwest slopes of Prokhorovka, making a direct attack by Leibstandarte very difficult. The plan was for Totenkopf to capture Hill 226.6, and advance northeast along the Psel River to the Kartashyovka –Prokhorovka road, and then strike southeast into the flank and rear of Soviet forces at Prokhorovka. Leibstandarte was ordered to make
8448-626: Was part of the wider Battle of Kursk and occurred when the 5th Guards Tank Army of the Soviet Red Army attacked the II SS-Panzer Corps of the German Waffen-SS in one of the largest tank battles in history. In April 1943, the German leadership began preparing for Operation Citadel , with the objective of enveloping and destroying the Soviet forces in the Kursk salient by attacking and breaking through
8544-587: Was placed in command of the corps. In August 1944, the corps participated in the battles in and around the Falaise pocket . The corps then retreated across France. On 17 September 1944, the Allies launched Operation Market Garden , an airborne offensive aimed at capturing the Rhine bridge at Arnhem . The corps was involved in fighting against the British 1st Airborne Division in the Battle of Arnhem and also against
8640-600: Was provided by the 183rd Rifle Division. The western flank of the 5th Guards Tank Army, which faced Totenkopf , was defended by the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps' 42nd and 95th Guards Rifle Divisions, which were supported by the remnants of the 31st Tank Corps and the heavily depleted 23rd Guards Rifle Corps' 52nd Guards Rifle Division. The forces of the 5th Guards Mechanised Corps that were not sent south were held as reserve northwest of Prokhorovka, and they numbered about 113 tanks and self-propelled guns. Vatutin directed Soviet air assets to commit their main effort towards checking
8736-515: Was reported lost in combat with Soviet fighters; the rest were victims of Soviet ground-fire. In return, the 2nd Air Army reported 14 fighters damaged and destroyed (German fighter pilots claimed only seven; though they claimed 16 aircraft of all types shot down). Soviet bomber losses are unknown. By the end of the day, Leibstandarte still held Hill 252.2, but had been exhausted by the effort of turning back five Soviet tank brigades. To its left, Totenkopf had captured Hill 226.6 and advanced along
8832-503: Was totally insufficient." The 36th Tank Brigade lost its commander to an air attack. German domination of the Prokhorovka air space occurred for several reasons. During the initial stages of the battle it was Soviet tanks that were hit and burned, obscuring the battlefield which made it difficult for Soviet commanders to develop a clear picture of the situation. Added to that was the failure to provide air liaison officers with Red Army forces, who were then unable to call for air support when
8928-463: Was transferred south to take part in the attack on Bastogne . The corps' divisions suffered heavy losses in the battles against the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions . After the operation's failure, the corps returned to the defensive, seeing action against U.S. forces in the Eifel region. In February 1945, the corps was ordered to Hungary to take part in an offensive to recapture Budapest and
9024-458: Was unable to conduct its planned offensive manoeuvres. On the Soviet side, all the tank units under Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army involved in the battle on 12 July suffered heavy losses. Rotmistrov later wrote that the 29th Tank Corps lost 60 per cent of its armour and the 18th Tank Corps lost 30 per cent on 12 July. A Soviet General Staff report recorded: "Thus on 12 July, the 5th Guards Tank Army failed to accomplish its assigned mission. As
9120-452: Was underway. He ordered his company of seven Panzer IVs to follow him over a bridge across an anti-tank ditch. Crossing the bridge they fanned out on the lower slope of Hill 252.2. On the crest of the hill, Sturmbannführer Joachim Peiper 's 3rd Panzergrenadier Battalion of the 2nd SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment were being overrun. As Ribbentrop's tanks spread out, he and the 1st SS-Panzer Regiment were suddenly confronted by Soviet tanks of
9216-479: Was used in the fighter escort , not the air superiority role. The battle of Prokhorovka absorbed the 8th Air Corps' combat power to the extent it was unable to intervene to support the XXXXVIII Panzer Corps, enabling Soviet defences to defeat the attempted breakthrough in that sector. The posture, dispositions and tactics on 12 July led to few losses on either side in air combat . The 8th Air Corps reported 19 aircraft damaged and destroyed. Only one German aircraft
#594405