The " Red Patch " is a distinguishing marking worn by United States Marines of the Logistics Specialist (0441) MOS (formerly 0481 Landing Support Specialist).
161-451: The red patch dates back to the early days of WWII during the Battle of Guadalcanal . After the initial assault on the beachhead, follow-on troops came ashore and confusion on the beach led to landing support Marines (then known as shore party) and infantrymen getting mixed together. Some shore party Marines went inland along with infantry battalions, while some infantrymen were left behind on
322-555: A naval mine . Informed that Makigumo was immobilized, Hashimoto ordered her abandoned and scuttled ( 09°15′S 159°47′E / 9.250°S 159.783°E / -9.250; 159.783 ). During the return trip, the Reinforcement Unit was attacked by CAF aircraft at 08:00, but sustained no damage and arrived at the Shortlands without further incident at 12:00 on 2 February. On 4 February, Patch ordered
483-419: A tug to take Chicago under tow and ordered Giffen's task force to return to base the next day. Six destroyers were left behind to escort Chicago and the tugboat. At 16:00 on 30 January, a flight of 11 Mitsubishi torpedo bombers from the 751 Air Group , based at Kavieng and staging through Buka , attacked the force towing Chicago . Fighter aircraft from Enterprise shot down eight of them, but most of
644-529: A 90-minute battle ( 09°13′S 159°40′E / 9.217°S 159.667°E / -9.217; 159.667 ). Leaving his cruisers at Kavieng, Mikawa gathered all 21 of his destroyers at the Japanese naval base in the Shortlands on 31 January to begin the evacuation runs. Rear Admiral Shintaro Hashimoto was placed in charge of this group of destroyers, titled the Reinforcement Unit. The "R" Area Air Force's 60 floatplanes were tasked with scouting for
805-522: A Japanese naval base in the Shortland Islands. The Japanese destroyers were usually able to make round trips down "The Slot" ( New Georgia Sound ) to Guadalcanal and back in a single night throughout the campaign, which minimized their exposure to daytime Allied air attack. These runs became known as the "Tokyo Express" to Allied forces, and were labeled "rat transportation" by the Japanese. While troops could be transported in this manner, most of
966-523: A Marine aviator who was killed during the Battle of Midway. By 18 August the airfield was ready for operation. Five days' worth of food had been landed from the transports, which, along with captured Japanese provisions, gave the Marines a total of 14 days' supply of food. To conserve supplies, the troops were limited to two meals per day. Allied troops encountered a severe strain of dysentery soon after
1127-409: A US destroyer near Guadalcanal. The withdrawal was carried out on the nights of 1, 4, and 7 February by destroyers. At a cost of one destroyer sunk and three damaged, the Japanese evacuated 10,652 men from Guadalcanal. During the evacuation 600 died and 3,000 more required extensive hospital care. On 9 February, Allied forces realized that the Japanese were gone and declared Guadalcanal secure, ending
1288-614: A base, Japanese long-range bombers could threaten the sea lines of communication and maritime trade & transportation routes from the west coast of the Americas to the populous east coast of Australia. By August, the Japanese had about 900 naval troops on Tulagi and nearby islands, and 2,800 personnel (including 2,200 Korean forced laborers and trustees, as well as Japanese construction specialists) on Guadalcanal. These bases were meant to protect Japan's major naval base at Rabaul , threaten Allied supply and communication lines, and establish
1449-453: A destroyer as the screening force – under Nobutake Kondō to provide distant cover for Ke around Ontong Java in the northern Solomons. The evacuation runs were to be carried out by Mikawa's 8th Fleet, consisting of heavy cruisers Chōkai and Kumano , light cruiser Sendai , and 21 destroyers. Mikawa's destroyers were charged with conducting the evacuation. Yamamoto expected that at least half of Mikawa's destroyers would be sunk during
1610-531: A failed attack on Port Moresby over the Kokoda track . The second major Japanese offensive was stopped at the Battle of Midway . Both sides suffered significant losses in carrier aircraft and aircrew during these engagements. Crucially, while the Americans were able to reconstitute their naval air strength in relatively short order, the Japanese ultimately proved unable to do so. These strategic victories allowed
1771-535: A few units available to allocate to Guadalcanal. Of these, the 35th Infantry Brigade under Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi was at Palau , the 4th (Aoba) Infantry Regiment under Major General Yumio Nasu was in the Philippines and the 28th (Ichiki) Infantry Regiment, under the command of Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki , was berthed on transport ships near Guam . These units began to move towards Guadalcanal via Truk and Rabaul immediately, but Ichiki's regiment, being
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#17328011676421932-618: A point at which they could threaten Australia, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast. The first offensive was thwarted in the naval Battle of the Coral Sea , which was a tactical stalemate but a strategic Allied victory in retrospect. It was the Allies' first major victory against the Japanese and significantly reduced the offensive capability of Japan's carrier forces. However, the battle did not temper Japan's audacious offensive military posture for several crucial months, with Japanese forces attempting
2093-418: A reconnaissance mission with a secondary objective of contacting a group of Japanese troops that U.S. forces believed might be willing to surrender. Soon after the patrol landed, a nearby platoon of Japanese naval troops attacked it and almost completely wiped it out. In response, on 19 August, Vandegrift sent three companies of the U.S. 5th Marine Regiment to attack the Japanese troop concentration west of
2254-567: A repeat of the disastrous defeat at Savo Island suffered by Australian and American surface vessels on 9 August. Transport Division 12 (Trans Div 12), consisting of six obsolete World War I-era Wickes -class destroyers converted to high-speed transports , were the most heavily armed U.S. surface ships operating in Ironbottom Sound during this time. Their torpedo tubes were retrofitted to hold landing craft boats , enough to carry over 100 extra Marines for rapid transportation. They landed
2415-479: A resupply convoy to Guadalcanal supported by most of his warship forces, separated into five task forces . These five task forces included two fleet carriers, two escort carriers, three battleships, 12 cruisers, and 25 destroyers. Screening the approach of the transport convoy was Task Force 18 (TF 18), under Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen , with three heavy and three light cruisers, two escort carriers, and eight destroyers. A fleet carrier task force, centered on
2576-411: A shore bombardment by the destroyers USS Wilson and Anderson , the Americans successfully crossed the river but did not immediately press the advance westward. The Ke air superiority campaign began in mid-January with nightly harassment attacks on Henderson Field by 3–10 aircraft, causing little damage. On 20 January, a lone Kawanishi H8K bombed Espiritu Santo Naval Base . On 25 January,
2737-476: A single night, thereby minimizing their exposure to CAF air attack. These high speed warship runs to Guadalcanal occurred throughout the campaign and were later called the " Tokyo Express " by Allied forces and "Rat Transportation" by the Japanese. Using forces delivered to Guadalcanal in this manner, the IJA tried three times to retake Henderson Field, but was defeated each time. After the third failure, an attempt by
2898-469: A single rehearsal landing prior to leaving for Guadalcanal on 31 July. The commander of the Allied expeditionary force was U.S. Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher , Commander of Task Force 61 (whose flag was on the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga ). Commanding the amphibious forces was U.S. Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner . Vandegrift led the 16,000 Allied (primarily U.S. Marine) infantry earmarked for
3059-604: A staging area for a planned offensive against Fiji , New Caledonia and Samoa ( Operation FS ). The Japanese planned to deploy 45 fighters and 60 bombers to Guadalcanal. In the overall strategy for 1942, these aircraft would provide ground-based air cover for Japanese naval forces advancing farther into the South Pacific. The Allied plan to invade the southern Solomons was conceived by U.S. Admiral Ernest King , Commander in Chief, United States Fleet . He proposed
3220-462: The 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment , was landed by boat west of the Matanikau near Kokumbuna village on 27 August with the mission of attacking Japanese units in the area, much as in the first Matanikau action of 19 August. The Marines were impeded by difficult terrain, hot sun, and well-emplaced Japanese defenses. The next morning, the Marines found that the Japanese defenders had departed during
3381-487: The 1st Raider Battalion , under Merritt A. Edson (Edson's Raiders), and the 1st Parachute Battalion from Tulagi and Gavutu to Guadalcanal. These units added about 1,500 troops to Vandegrift's original 11,000 men defending Henderson Field. The 1st Parachute Battalion, which had suffered heavy casualties in the Battle of Tulagi and Gavutu–Tanambogo in August, was placed under Edson's command. The other relocated battalion,
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#17328011676423542-419: The 25th Infantry Division , under Major General J. Lawton Collins , attacked several hills, designated Hills 87, 88, and 89 by the Americans, that formed a ridge that dominated Kokumbona. Encountering much lighter resistance than anticipated, the Americans seized the three hills by the morning of 22 January. Shifting forces to exploit the unexpected breakthrough, Collins quickly continued the advance and captured
3703-450: The 701 Air Group took off from Rabaul carrying torpedoes to attack Giffen's force, now located between Rennell Island and Guadalcanal. The torpedo bombers attacked Giffen's ships in two waves between 19:00 and 20:00. Two torpedoes hit the heavy cruiser USS Chicago , causing heavy damage and bringing her to a dead stop. Three of the Japanese aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft fire from Giffen's ships. In response, Halsey sent
3864-419: The Battle of Tarawa . The red patch measures 3 in × 1 in (7.6 cm × 2.5 cm) on the trousers, worn 2.5 in (6.4 cm) below the cargo pocket, centered, and 1 in × 1 in (2.5 cm × 2.5 cm) on the front of the eight point cover, centered. A 1 in × 1 in (2.5 cm × 2.5 cm) patch is supposed to be worn on the front and rear of
4025-441: The Battle of Tassafaronga on 30 November. Another destroyer plus a submarine were sunk and two destroyers damaged by American PT boat and CAF air attacks during subsequent resupply missions from 3–12 December. Compounding the navy's frustration, very few of the supplies carried on these missions reached IJA forces on the island. Combined Fleet leaders began telling their army counterparts the losses and damage to warships engaged in
4186-653: The Dutch East Indies , Wake Island , Gilbert Islands , New Britain and Guam . The U.S. was joined in the war against Japan by several of the Allied powers , including the British Empire and the Dutch government-in-exile , both of which had also been attacked by Japan. The Japanese made two attempts to continue their offensive and extend their outer defensive perimeter in the south and central Pacific to
4347-942: The European theater . An early obstacle was the desire of both the U.S. Army and the Roosevelt administration to initiate offensive action in Europe prior to a large-scale operation in the Pacific. In addition, it was initially unclear who would command the campaign: Tulagi lay in the area under the command of General Douglas MacArthur , whereas the Santa Cruz Islands lay in Admiral Chester W. Nimitz 's Pacific Ocean Area , which would also supply almost all Allied offensive forces that would be staged, supplied and covered from that area. Both problems were overcome, and
4508-659: The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was unable to use large, slow transport ships to deliver troops and supplies to the island. Instead, warships based at Rabaul and the Shortland Islands were used to carry forces to Guadalcanal. The Japanese warships, mainly light cruisers and destroyers from the Eighth Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa , were usually able to make the round trip down " The Slot " to Guadalcanal and back in
4669-554: The Kevlar helmet , but this practice has fallen into disuse. [REDACTED] This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Marine Corps . Battle of Guadalcanal Army: 19,200 dead, of whom 8,500 were killed in combat The Guadalcanal campaign , also known as the Battle of Guadalcanal and codenamed Operation Watchtower by American forces,
4830-616: The Lunga River , just south of Henderson Field. The ridge offered a natural avenue of approach to the airfield, commanded the surrounding area, and was almost undefended. On 11 September, the 840 men of Edson's battalion were deployed onto and around the ridge and began digging in. On the night of 12 September, Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion attacked the Raiders between the Lunga River and ridge, forcing one Marine company to fall back to
4991-546: The Pacific Theater of World War II . Pioneer battalions were sometimes used to relieve infantry battalions on the front lines and were often involved in heavy fighting in places such as Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal. One of the more notable shore party Marines was 1st Lt. Alexander Bonnyman Jr., executive officer of the 2nd Battalion 8th Marines ' Shore Party, who received the Medal of Honor for his actions during
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5152-542: The Santa Cruz Islands (codename Huddle ), Tulagi (codename Watchtower ), and "adjacent positions". Guadalcanal (codename Cactus ), which eventually became the focus of the operation, was not even mentioned in the early directive, and only later took on the operation name Watchtower . Tulagi, although small, had a large natural harbor that was ideal for a float-plane base; Florida Island also had to be taken, as it dominated Tulagi. Guadalcanal, much larger than
5313-584: The " Cactus Air Force " (CAF) after the Allied code name for Guadalcanal. In response to the landings on Guadalcanal, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGH) assigned the Imperial Japanese Army 's (IJA) 17th Army , a corps -sized command headquartered at Rabaul under the command of Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake , the task of retaking Guadalcanal. Because of the threat by CAF aircraft,
5474-519: The " Cactus Air Force ", after the Allied codename for Guadalcanal, Cactus . The Marine fighters went into action the next day, which also saw the first of what would become almost-daily Japanese bomber air raids on the airfield. On 22 August five U.S. Army Bell P-400 Airacobras and their pilots arrived at Henderson Field. In response to the Allied landings, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assigned
5635-603: The "First Battle of the Matanikau", was the first of several major actions around the Matanikau River during the campaign. On 20 August, the escort carrier USS Long Island delivered a squadron of 19 Grumman F4F Wildcats and a squadron of 12 Douglas SBD Dauntlesses to Henderson Field. The airfield's rudimentary nature meant that carrier aircraft, designed for rough landings on flight decks at sea, were more suited for use on Henderson Field than ground-based planes. The aircraft based at Henderson became known as
5796-460: The "Guadalcanal matter" was resolved. Hyakutake prepared to send more troops to Guadalcanal for another attempt to recapture Henderson Field. As the Japanese regrouped west of the Matanikau, the U.S. forces concentrated on shoring up and strengthening their Lunga defenses. On 14 September Vandegrift moved another battalion ( 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment ) from Tulagi to Guadalcanal. On 18 September, an Allied naval convoy delivered 4,157 men from
5957-622: The "Ilu River" on U.S. Marine maps) on the east side of the Lunga perimeter in the early morning hours of 21 August. Jacob Vouza , a Solomon Islands Coastwatcher scout, warned the Americans of the impending attack minutes before Ichiki's assault, which was subsequently defeated with heavy losses to the Japanese. After daybreak, the Marine units counterattacked Ichiki's surviving troops, killing many more of them. The dead included Ichiki, though it has been claimed that he committed seppuku after realizing
6118-555: The 161st Infantry Regiment to replace the 147th at the front and resume the advance westward. The Yano battalion retreated to new positions at the Segilau River and troops were sent to block the advance of George's force along the south coast. Meanwhile, Halsey's carrier and battleship task forces remained just beyond Japanese air attack range about 300 mi (260 nmi; 480 km) south of Guadalcanal. Kondō sent two of his force's destroyers, Asagumo and Samidare , to
6279-580: The 20th. The 38th's retirement would be covered by the 2nd Infantry Division , in place on Guadalcanal since October 1942, and the Yano Battalion, both of which would then follow the 38th westward. Any troops unable to move were encouraged to kill themselves to "uphold the honor of the Imperial Army". Patch initiated a new offensive just as the 38th Division began to withdraw from the inland ridges and hills that it had occupied. On 20 January,
6440-450: The 2nd Division's survivors escaped. Still fearing a renewed and reinforced Japanese offensive, Patch committed the equivalent of only one regiment at a time to attack the Japanese forces west of Kokumbona, keeping the rest near Lunga Point to protect the airfield. The terrain west of Kokumbona favored the Japanese efforts to delay the Americans as the rest of the 17th Army continued its withdrawal towards Cape Esperance. The American advance
6601-418: The 3rd Provisional Marine Brigade (the 7th Marine Regiment plus a battalion from the 11th Marine Regiment and some additional support units), 137 vehicles, tents, aviation fuel, ammunition, rations, and engineering equipment to Guadalcanal. These crucial reinforcements allowed Vandegrift, beginning on 19 September, to establish an unbroken line of defense around the Lunga perimeter. While covering this convoy,
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6762-500: The Allied expeditionary force to arrive unseen by the Japanese on the night of 6 August and morning of 7 August, taking the defenders by surprise. This is occasionally referred to the "Midnight Raid on Guadalcanal". A Japanese patrol aircraft from Tulagi had searched the general area that the Allied invasion fleet was moving through, but was unable to spot the Allied fleet due to severe storms and heavy clouds. The landing force split into two groups, with one group assaulting Guadalcanal and
6923-406: The Allied offensive, the Japanese made several attempts between August and November to retake Henderson Field. Three major land battles, seven large naval battles (five nighttime surface actions and two carrier battles), and almost daily aerial battles culminated in the decisive Naval Battle of Guadalcanal in early November, with the defeat of the last Japanese attempt to bombard Henderson Field from
7084-601: The Allies believed to be an imminent offensive. The departure of TF 18 from the Guadalcanal area removed a significant potential threat to the Ke operation. At 18:30 on 29 January, two corvettes from the Royal New Zealand Navy , Moa and Kiwi , intercepted the Japanese submarine I-1 , which was attempting a supply run, off of Kamimbo on Guadalcanal. The two corvettes rammed and sank I-1 after
7245-538: The Allies to transition to a more offensive stance in the Pacific theater, and attempt to seize the strategic initiative from Japan. The Allies chose the Solomon Islands (a protectorate of the United Kingdom), specifically the southern islands of Guadalcanal , Tulagi and Florida Island , as their first target, designated Task One (codename Pestilence ), with the initial objectives of occupying
7406-616: The American carrier Wasp , after refueling, positioned herself east of Guadalcanal, expecting Japanese movement to the area. No Japanese forces made any movement towards the area, however, and the Wasp was left idle. The Americans had won a modest tactical victory with the destruction of the Ryūjō, destroying some 75 Japanese aircraft while losing 25 of their own. The forced withdrawal of Tanaka's troop convoy also bought valuable breathing room for
7567-455: The Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General George C. Marshall , gave the operation his full support, despite MacArthur's command being unable to directly assist in the operation and the U.S. Navy taking full operational responsibility. As a result, and in order to preserve the unity of command, the boundary between MacArthur's South West Pacific Area and Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Area was shifted 60 miles (97 km) to 360 miles (580 km) to
7728-553: The Eleventh Air Fleet and the Eighth Fleet. Regardless, Tanaka's persistent destroyer operations gradually increased the strength of the forces available to Kawaguchi on the island. A combination of inability and unwillingness prevented Allied naval commanders from frequently challenging Japanese naval forces at night, so the Japanese effectively controlled the seas around the Solomon Islands after sunset. Conversely,
7889-661: The IGH's operations section, arrived at Rabaul for discussions about future plans concerning New Guinea and Guadalcanal. Hitoshi Imamura , commander of the 8th Area Army in charge of IJA operations in New Guinea and the Solomons, did not directly recommend a withdrawal from Guadalcanal but openly and clearly described the current difficulties involved with any further attempts to retake the island. Imamura also stated that any decision to withdraw should include plans to evacuate as many of
8050-507: The IJN and IJA officers at Rabaul appeared to support abandoning Guadalcanal. Around this time, Japan's War Ministry informed the IGH that there was insufficient shipping to support both the effort to retake Guadalcanal and transport strategic resources to maintain Japan's economy and military forces. On 19 December, a delegation of IGH staff officers led by IJA Colonel Joichiro Sanada , chief of
8211-480: The IJN sent 58 Zero fighters on a daylight raid to Guadalcanal. In response, the CAF sent aloft eight Wildcat and six P-38 fighters, which shot down four Zeros without loss. A second large raid was conducted on 27 January by nine Kawasaki Ki-48 "Lily" light bombers escorted by 74 Nakajima Ki-43 "Oscar" fighters from the IJA's 6th Air Division from Rabaul. Twelve Wildcats, six P-38s, and 10 P-40s from Henderson met
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#17328011676428372-485: The IJN to deliver the rest of the IJA 38th Infantry Division and its heavy equipment failed during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal from 12 to 15 November. Because of this failure, the Japanese cancelled their next planned attempt to recapture Henderson Field. In mid-November, Allied forces attacked the Japanese at Buna-Gona in New Guinea. Japanese Combined Fleet naval leaders, headquartered at Truk and under
8533-511: The Japanese aircraft were able to release their torpedoes before crashing. One torpedo hit the destroyer USS La Vallette , causing heavy damage. Four more torpedoes hit Chicago , sinking her. The transport convoy reached Guadalcanal and successfully unloaded its cargo on 30–31 January. The rest of Halsey's warships took station in the Coral Sea south of the Solomons to wait for the approach of any Japanese warship forces supporting what
8694-406: The Japanese defenders to retreat into the jungle. In Tasimboko, Edson's troops discovered Kawaguchi's main supply depot, including large stockpiles of food, ammunition, medical supplies, and a powerful shortwave radio. After destroying everything in sight, aside from some documents and equipment that were carried back with them, the Marines returned to the Lunga perimeter. Intelligence gathered from
8855-583: The Japanese might be retreating to the south coast of Guadalcanal, on the morning of 1 February Patch landed a reinforced battalion of army and Marine troops, about 1,500 men under the command of Colonel Alexander George, at Verahue on Guadalcanal's south coast. The U.S. troops were delivered to the landing location by a naval transport force of six landing craft tanks and one transport destroyer ( USS Stringham ), escorted by four other destroyers (the same destroyers that were to have joined TF 18 three days earlier). A Japanese reconnaissance aircraft spotted
9016-437: The Lunga perimeter. On 8 August, a Japanese destroyer from Rabaul delivered 113 naval reinforcement troops to the Matanikau position. On the evening of 12 August, a 25-man U.S. Marine patrol, led by Division D-2 Lieutenant Colonel Frank Goettge and primarily consisting of intelligence personnel, landed by boat west of the U.S. Marine Lunga perimeter, east of Point Cruz and west of the Japanese perimeter at Matanikau River, on
9177-458: The Marines ashore understrength (as some transports in the Allied fleet had retreated without disemarking all of their troops), and without much of their heavy equipment and provisions. Mikawa's decision not to attempt to destroy the Allied transport ships when he had the opportunity proved to be a crucial strategic mistake. The 11,000 Marines on Guadalcanal initially concentrated on forming a loose defensive perimeter centered around Lunga Point and
9338-482: The Marines back to within a quarter mile of the airfield. At this stage, as the intensity of the battle reached its apex, small groups of Japanese soldiers managed to break through Edson's lines, with some reaching the edge of the airfield itself. Several Japanese soldiers were killed as they attempted to climb onto and destroy parked aircraft, and General Vandegrift's command post even came under direct attack at dawn, with several Japanese infiltrators killed within sight of
9499-431: The Marines suffering 104. On 15 September at Rabaul, Hyakutake learned of Kawaguchi's defeat and forwarded the news to Imperial General Headquarters in Japan. In an emergency meeting, the senior Japanese IJA and IJN command staffs concluded that "Guadalcanal might develop into the decisive battle of the war". The results of the battle now began to exert significant strategic impact on Japanese operations in other areas of
9660-499: The Matanikau. One company attacked across the sandbar at the mouth of the Matanikau River while another crossed the river 1,000 meters (1,100 yd) inland and attacked the Japanese forces located in Matanikau village. The third landed by boat further west and attacked Kokumbuna village. After briefly occupying the two villages, the three Marine companies returned to the Lunga perimeter, having killed about 65 Japanese soldiers while losing four Marines. This action, sometimes referred to as
9821-513: The PT boats engaged in a series of running battles over the next three hours. Hashimoto's destroyers, with help from "R" Area aircraft, sank three of the PT boats. In the meantime, the transport destroyers arrived off of two pick-up locations at Cape Esperance and Kamimbo at 22:40 and 24:00 respectively. Japanese naval personnel ferried the waiting troops out to the destroyers in barges and landing craft. Rear Admiral Tomiji Koyanagi , second-in-command of
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#17328011676429982-417: The Pacific that the Japanese were preparing for a new offensive, called Ke , in either the Solomons or New Guinea. On 14 January, an Express mission of nine destroyers delivered the Yano Battalion, designated as the rear guard for the Ke evacuation, to Guadalcanal. The battalion, commanded by Major Keiji Yano, consisted of 750 infantry and a battery of mountain guns crewed by another 100 men. Accompanying
10143-841: The Pacific, most notably: the Solomon Islands campaign , New Guinea campaign , the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign , the Mariana and Palau Islands campaign , the Philippines campaign (1944–1945) , and the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign prior to the surrender of Japan in August, 1945. On 7 December 1941, Japanese forces attacked the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor , Hawaii . The attack killed almost 2,500 people and crippled much of
10304-623: The Pacific. In preparation for the offensive in the Pacific in May 1942, U.S. Marine Major General Alexander Vandegrift was ordered to move his 1st Marine Division from the United States to New Zealand. Other Allied land, naval and air units were sent to establish or reinforce bases in Fiji, Samoa, New Hebrides and New Caledonia. The island of Espiritu Santo , in the New Hebrides,
10465-477: The Pacific. Hyakutake realized that he could not send sufficient men and materiel to defeat the Allied forces on Guadalcanal while simultaneously supporting the major ongoing Japanese offensive on the Kokoda Track in New Guinea. Hyakutake, with the concurrence of General Headquarters, ordered his troops on New Guinea, who were within 30 miles (50 km) of their objective of Port Moresby, to withdraw until
10626-434: The Reinforcement Unit and helping defend against Allied PT boat attacks during the nighttime evacuation runs. Allied B-17 bombers attacked the Shortlands anchorage on the morning of 1 February, causing no damage and losing four aircraft to Japanese fighters. This same day, the IJA's 6th Air Division raided Henderson Field with 23 "Oscar"s and six "Lily"s but caused no damage and suffered the loss of one fighter. Believing that
10787-419: The Reinforcement Unit, described the evacuees: "They wore only the remains of clothes that were so soiled their physical deterioration was extreme. Probably they were happy but they showed no expression. Their digestive organs were so completely destroyed, we couldn't give them good food, only porridge." Another officer added that, "Their buttocks were so emaciated that their anuses were completely exposed, and on
10948-580: The Santa Cruz islands were (eventually) abandoned. The Japanese were aware, via signals intelligence , of the large-scale movement of Allied forces in the South Pacific Area, but concluded that the Allies were reinforcing either Australia or Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea. The Watchtower force, numbering 75 warships and transports (including vessels from the U.S. and Australia), assembled near Fiji on 26 July and conducted
11109-419: The Shortlands to replace the two destroyers lost in the first evacuation run. Hashimoto led the second evacuation mission with 20 destroyers south toward Guadalcanal at 11:30 on 4 February. The CAF attacked Hashimoto in two waves beginning at 15:50 with a total of 74 aircraft. Bomb near-misses heavily damaged Maikaze , and Hashimoto detached Nagatsuki to tow her back to Shortland. The CAF lost 11 aircraft in
11270-407: The Solomon Islands. In total, the Allies possessed around 539 aircraft available to oppose the Ke operation. By the first week of January, disease, starvation, and battle had reduced Hyakutake's command to about 14,000 troops, with many of them too sick and malnourished to fight. The 17th Army possessed three operable field cannon , with very little ammunition. In contrast, the Allied commander on
11431-516: The Tenaru battle was ending, more Japanese reinforcements were already on their way to Guadalcanal. Yamamoto had organized an extremely powerful naval expeditionary force, with goal of destroying any American fleet units in the Solomons, and subsequently eliminating Allied ground forces at Henderson Field. This force sortied from Truk on 23 August. Several other IJN units carrying reinforcements and supplies, as well as ships tasked with naval bombardment of
11592-493: The U.S. battleship fleet, precipitating formal declarations of war between the two nations the next day. The initial goals of the Japanese leadership were to neutralize the U.S. Navy , seize territories rich in natural resources, and establish strategic military bases with which to defend Japan's empire in the Pacific Ocean and Asia. Initially, Japanese forces captured the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya , Singapore, Burma,
11753-441: The U.S. aircraft carriers, and immediately retired to Rabaul without attempting to attack the (now defensless) Allied transports, fearing daytime air attacks on his vessels once the cover of darkness had been lost. Bereft of his carrier air cover and concerned about Japanese submarine & surface attacks against his degraded fleet, Turner decided to withdraw his badly mauled naval forces from the area on evening of 9 August. This left
11914-429: The U.S. aircrews shot down were rescued, while most of the Japanese aircrews were not recovered. The eight-hour round-trip flight from Rabaul to Guadalcanal, about 1,120 miles (1,800 km), seriously hampered Japanese efforts to establish air superiority over Henderson Field. Throughout the campaign, Rabaul-based Japanese aircrew were forced to fly almost 600 miles before engaging in combat with Allied pilots operating in
12075-424: The U.S. fighters time to take off and position themselves to attack the Japanese aircraft as they approached the island. The Japanese air forces were slowly losing a war of attrition in the skies above Guadalcanal. During this time, Vandegrift continued to direct efforts to strengthen and improve the defenses of the Lunga perimeter. Between 21 August and 3 September, he relocated three Marine battalions, including
12236-423: The U.S. lost 19 (including 14 carrier aircraft), both in combat and to accidents. After these aerial clashes, Fletcher became concerned about the unexpectedly high losses to his carrier fighter aircraft strength, anxious about the threat to his carriers from further Japanese air attacks, and worried about his ships' remaining fuel supply. Fletcher withdrew from the Solomon Islands area with his carrier task force on
12397-689: The Yano Battalion at the Marmura River. Yano's troops temporarily halted the CAM's advance and then slowly withdrew westward over the next three days. On 29 January, the Yano retreated across the Bonegi River, where soldiers from the 2nd Division had constructed another defensive position. The Japanese defenses at the Bonegi held up the American advance for almost three days. On 1 February, with help from
12558-492: The air, the 13th Air Force numbered 92 fighters and bombers under United States Army Brigadier General Nathan F. Twining and the CAF on Guadalcanal counted 81 aircraft under US Marine Brigadier General Francis P. Mulcahy . Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch was overall commander of Aircraft South Pacific. The air units of the fleet and escort carriers added another 339 aircraft. In addition, 30 heavy bombers were stationed in New Guinea with sufficient range to conduct missions over
12719-460: The aircraft carrier USS Wasp was scuttled after being struck by torpedoes from the Japanese submarine I-19 southeast of Guadalcanal. This stretched Allied naval airpower thin, with only one aircraft carrier ( USS Hornet ) remaining in operation in the entire South Pacific Area. Vandegrift also made some changes in the senior leadership of his combat units, transferring several officers who did not meet his performance standards off
12880-446: The airfield and surrounding area. During the landing operations on 7 and 8 August, Rabaul-based Japanese naval aircraft under the command of Yamada Sadayoshi attacked the Allied amphibious forces several times, setting fire the transport USS George F. Elliott (which sank two days later) and heavily damaging the destroyer USS Jarvis . Over the course of two days of air attacks, Japanese air units lost 36 aircraft, while
13041-549: The airfield by 16:00 on 8 August. The Japanese naval construction units and combat troops, under the command of Captain Kanae Monzen, had panicked after coming under naval bombardment and aerial bombing, and had abandoned the airfield and fled about 3 miles (5 km) west to the Matanikau River and Point Cruz area. Japanese troops left behind food, supplies, intact construction equipment and vehicles, and 13 dead at
13202-428: The airfield, moving what supplies had been brought ashore within the perimeter, and completing the construction of the airfield. Over four days of intense effort, the supplies were moved from the landing beaches to dispersed dumps within the defensive perimeter. Work began on the airfield immediately, mainly using captured Japanese equipment. On 12 August the airfield was named Henderson Field after Lofton R. Henderson ,
13363-443: The amphibious landings. The troops sent to Guadalcanal were fresh from military training, armed with legacy bolt-action M1903 Springfield rifles and a meager 10-day supply of ammunition. Because of the need to get the troops into battle quickly, the Allied planners had reduced their supplies from 90 days to only 60. The men of the 1st Marine Division began referring to the coming battle as "Operation Shoestring". Bad weather allowed
13524-413: The area, positioned themselves to attack Henderson Field. These ships were spotted by two American destroyer-transports, who believed at first that they were a submarine. A U.S. patrol plane also misidentified the destroyers as an enemy submarine and dropped flares over the area, accidentally silhouetting Little and Gregory in the nighttime conditions. The Japanese destroyers immediately fired on and sunk
13685-489: The area. The Japanese lost the Ryūjō , along with dozens of carrier aircraft and most of their aircrew; meanwhile, the Americans lost a handful of planes and Enterprise was damaged, requiring two months to repair in Hawaii. Unable to safely land on Enterprise's ruined flight deck, much of her remaining aircraft instead flew to Guadalcanal and reinforced the beleaguered American air units at Henderson Field. Concurrently to
13846-531: The army of their intentions in this regard. As December began, the Japanese experienced considerable difficulty in keeping their troops on Guadalcanal resupplied because of Allied air and naval attacks on the Japanese supply chain of ships and bases. The few supplies delivered to the island were not enough to sustain Japanese troops who, by 7 December, were losing about 50 men each day to malnutrition, disease, and Allied ground or air attacks. The Japanese had delivered almost 30,000 army troops to Guadalcanal since
14007-481: The attention of American pilots. The aircraft from the two fleet carriers would then attack the American fleet while it lacked air cover. Simultaneously, the U.S. carrier task force under Fletcher approached Guadalcanal to counter the Japanese offensive efforts. On 24 August, the two carrier forces located and launched strikes against the other. The Japanese had two fleet carriers, the Shōkaku and Zuikaku , as well as
14168-559: The battalion was Lieutenant Colonel Kumao Imoto , representing the 8th Area Army, who was to deliver the evacuation order and plan to Hyakutake. The 17th Army had not yet been informed of the decision to withdraw. CAF and 13th Air Force air attacks on the nine destroyers during their return trip damaged destroyers Arashi and Tanikaze and destroyed eight Japanese fighters escorting the convoy. Five American aircraft were shot down. Late on 15 January, Imoto reached 17th Army's headquarters at Kokumbona and informed Hyakutake and his staff of
14329-805: The beach. It is not known for certain who made the decision, but a device was created in order to distinguish the shore party Marines: a red patch on the trousers and hat, referred to by Marines as a cover, (a patch was not put on the blouse because many Marines did not wear them due to the heat of the South Pacific). Around the same time, Naval Shore Parties, now known as Beachmaster Unit One began to wear yellow patches on their uniforms, as they do today. Shore party Marines were either assigned to pioneer battalions or as part of an infantry battalion's shore party. Pioneer battalions consisted of shore party Marines, combat engineers, and heavy equipment operators and were in charge of establishing beach support areas in
14490-738: The brigade's supply base at Taivu. Meanwhile, native scouts under the direction of Martin Clemens , a coastwatcher officer in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate Defence Force and the British district officer for Guadalcanal, brought reports to the U.S. Marines of Japanese troops at Taivu near the village of Tasimboko. Edson subsequently planned a raid on the Japanese troop concentration at Taivu. On 8 September, after being dropped off near Taivu by boat, Edson's men captured Tasimboko and forced
14651-570: The buildup of ships and aircraft at Truk, Rabaul, and the Shortland Islands. Allied analysts determined that the increased radio traffic in the Marshalls was a deception meant to divert attention from an operation about to take place in either New Guinea or the Solomons. Allied intelligence personnel misinterpreted the nature of the operation; on 26 January, the Allied Pacific Command 's intelligence section informed Allied forces in
14812-401: The campaign began, but by December only about 20,000 of that number were still alive; of those, only around 12,000 remained more or less fit for combat duty, with the rest incapacitated by battle wounds, disease, or malnutrition. The IJN continued to suffer losses and damage to its ships in attempting to keep the Japanese on Guadalcanal resupplied. One destroyer was sunk by American warships at
14973-413: The captured documents indicated that at least 3,000 Japanese troops were on the island, planning to initiate a large-scale ground assault on the airfield in short order. Edson, along with Colonel Gerald C. Thomas , Vandegrift's operations officer, correctly anticipated that the main Japanese attack would fall upon Lunga Ridge, a narrow, grassy, 1,000-yard-long (900 m) coral ridge that ran parallel to
15134-410: The carrier Enterprise , steamed about 250 mi (220 nmi; 400 km) behind TF 18. In addition to protecting the supply convoy, TF 18 was charged with rendezvousing with a force of four U.S. destroyers, stationed at Tulagi , at 21:00 on 29 January in order to conduct a sweep up "The Slot" north of Guadalcanal the next day to screen the unloading of the transports at Guadalcanal. As
15295-468: The carrier air battle, on 25 August, Tanaka's convoy (headed by the flagship Jintsū ) was attacked near Taivu Point by Cactus Air Force aircraft based at Henderson Field. After suffering heavy damage during the battle, including the sinking of one of the transports, the convoy was forced to divert to the Shortland Islands in the northern Solomons in order to transfer the surviving troops to destroyers for later delivery to Guadalcanal. A Japanese transport
15456-553: The central Solomons. On 28 December, General Hajime Sugiyama and Admiral Osami Nagano personally informed Emperor Hirohito of the decision to withdraw from Guadalcanal. On 31 December, the Emperor formally endorsed the decision. On 3 January, IGH informed the 8th Area Army and the Combined Fleet of the decision to withdraw from Guadalcanal. By 9 January, the Combined Fleet and 8th Area Army staffs together completed
15617-466: The closest, arrived in the area first. A "First Element" of Ichiki's unit, consisting of about 917 soldiers, was landed by IJN destroyers at Taivu Point, east of the Lunga perimeter, after midnight on 19 August, then conducted a 9-mile (14 km) night march west toward the Marine perimeter. Underestimating the strength of Allied forces on Guadalcanal, Ichiki's unit conducted a nighttime frontal assault on Marine positions at Alligator Creek (often called
15778-482: The command of Colonel Akinosuke Oka , to Kamimbo, west of the Lunga perimeter. On 7 September, Kawaguchi issued his attack plan to "rout and annihilate the enemy in the vicinity of the Guadalcanal Island airfield". Kawaguchi's plan called for the forces under his command, split into three divisions, to approach the Lunga perimeter inland, culminating with a surprise night attack. Oka's forces would attack
15939-424: The commander of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing , U.S. Marine Brigadier General Roy Geiger , arrived with his staff and took command of all air operations at Henderson Field. Air battles between the Allied aircraft at Henderson and Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul continued almost daily. Between 26 August and 5 September, the U.S. lost about 15 aircraft to the Japanese's approximately 19. More than half of
16100-430: The course of the previous days, both by Allied submarines and aerial reconnaissance, but a combination of misidentification of ships and the Allied leadership's dismissal of Japanese night fighting capability contributed to an air of complacence and ignorance among the Allied surface fleet that proved disastrous. Japanese submarine activity and air attack continued to be the main source of concern to Turner and his staff, not
16261-569: The day, persisted for the next several months of the campaign. Between 29 August and 4 September, Japanese light cruisers, destroyers, and patrol boats were able to land almost 5,000 troops at Taivu Point, including most of the 35th Infantry Brigade, much of the Aoba (4th) Regiment, and the rest of Ichiki's regiment. General Kawaguchi, who landed at Taivu Point on 31 August, was placed in command of all Japanese forces on Guadalcanal. A barge convoy took another 1,000 soldiers of Kawaguchi's brigade, under
16422-418: The decision to withdraw from the island. Grudgingly accepting the order on the 16th, the 17th Army staff communicated the Ke evacuation plan to their forces on the 18th. The plan directed the 38th Division, which was currently defending against an American offensive on ridges and hills in the interior of the island, to disengage and withdraw towards Cape Esperance on the western end of Guadalcanal beginning on
16583-412: The destroyers that picked them up they suffered from constant and uncontrolled diarrhea." After embarking 4,935 soldiers, mainly from the 38th Division, the transport destroyers ceased loading at 01:58 and prepared to depart for the return trip to the Shortlands. About this time, Makigumo , one of the screening destroyers, was suddenly wracked by a large explosion, caused by either a PT boat torpedo or
16744-498: The embattled Allied troops on Guadalcanal. While the Enterprise was taken out of action for repair for several months, she would return to sea later in the campaign. Regardless, the temporary loss of the Enterprise was offset by the timely arrival of the carrier Hornet . Additionally, the reinforcement of Henderson Field by Enterprise ' s orphaned carrier aircraft served bolstered flagging ground-based Allied air strength in
16905-460: The escort carriers were too slow to allow Giffen's force to make the scheduled rendezvous, Giffen left the carriers behind with two destroyers at 14:00 on 29 January and steamed ahead. Giffen's force was being tracked by Japanese submarines, who reported on Giffen's location and movement to their naval headquarters units. Around mid-afternoon, based on the submarine's reports, 16 G4M from the 705 Air Group and 16 Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from
17066-413: The evening of 8 August. As a result of the loss of carrier-based air cover, Turner decided to withdraw his ships from Guadalcanal, even though less than half of the supplies and heavy equipment needed by the troops ashore had been unloaded. Turner planned to unload as many supplies as possible on Guadalcanal and Tulagi throughout the night of 8 August, and then depart with his ships early on 9 August. As
17227-404: The eventual goal was the American reconquest of the Philippines, from which American forces had been evicted in early 1942. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff created the South Pacific theater, with Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley taking command on 19 June, to direct the offensive in the Solomons. Nimitz, based at Pearl Harbor, was designated as overall Allied commander-in-chief for Allied forces in
17388-413: The first Marines onto Tulagi and later on Guadalcanal, conducted special operations missions with Marine Raiders , participated in anti-submarine warfare, and provided covering fire for the Marines on Guadalcanal. They also directly delivered crucial supplies to the Marines that helped to construct Henderson Field and to maintain the aircraft stationed there. On 30 August USS Colhoun (APD-2)
17549-542: The first evacuation run. Eleven destroyers were designated as transports screened by the other nine. The destroyers were attacked in the late afternoon near Vangunu by 92 CAF aircraft in two waves. Makinami , Hashimoto's flagship, was heavily damaged by a near miss. Four CAF aircraft were shot down. Hashimoto transferred to Shirayuki and detached Fumizuki to tow Makinami back to base. Eleven U.S. PT boats awaited Hashimoto's destroyers between Guadalcanal and Savo Island . Beginning at 22:45, Hashimoto's warships and
17710-508: The first week of February with a target completion date of 10 February. At the same time, Japanese air and naval forces would conduct conspicuous maneuvers and minor attacks around New Guinea and the Marshall Islands along with deceptive radio traffic to try to confuse the Allies as to their intentions. Yamamoto detailed aircraft carriers Jun'yō and Zuihō , battleships Kongō and Haruna – with four heavy cruisers and
17871-582: The general. Nonetheless, Kawaguchi's units were spent, and the main Japanese attack on Edson's positions ground to a halt. The supporting attacks by the Kuma Battalion and Oka's unit at other locations on the Lunga perimeter were likewise defeated. On 14 September, Kawaguchi led the survivors of his shattered brigade on a five-day march west to the Matanikau Valley to join with Oka's unit. In total Kawaguchi's forces lost about 850 killed, with
18032-499: The growing Allied airpower at Henderson Field (which was further reinforced on September 11-12 by 24 Wildcats that had been made homeless by the torpedoing of the carrier Saratoga in early September by IJN submarine I-26 ) meant that any Japanese vessel within range (200 miles or 320 kilometres) of Guadalcanal in daylight was at great risk from air attack. This tactical situation, wherein Japanese naval forces operated freely at night and Allied aircraft enjoyed local air superiority during
18193-478: The heavy equipment and supplies, such as heavy artillery, vehicles, food and ammunition, could not. In addition, this activity tied up destroyers that the IJN desperately needed to escort convoys elsewhere in the Pacific. The Byzantine nature of the Japanese navy's command setup in the region exacerbated these logistical problems; Tanaka was receiving contradictory orders from both the Combined Fleet headquarters as well as two rival subordinate naval commands at Rabaul,
18354-613: The immediate area of Henderson Field. This, combined with the fact that the Japanese navy did not systematically rotate their veteran pilots out of combat zones, steadily exhausted & depleted Japanese airpower in the region. From a strategic standpoint, the overall quality of Japanese aviation in the Solomons deteriorated as worn-out veteran pilots were replaced by inexperienced aircrew with minimal combat experience. Australian coastwatchers on Bougainville and New Georgia islands were often able to provide Allied forces on Guadalcanal with advance notice of inbound Japanese air strikes, allowing
18515-647: The island and promoting junior officers who had proven themselves to take their place. One of these was the recently promoted Colonel Merritt Edson, who was placed in command of the 5th Marine Regiment. Operation Ke Operation Ke ( ケ号作戦 , Ke-gō Sakusen ) was the largely successful withdrawal of Japanese forces from Guadalcanal , concluding the Guadalcanal Campaign of World War II . The operation took place between 14 January and 7 February 1943, and involved both Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) forces under
18676-491: The island had been reduced from 36,000 to 11,000 through starvation, disease, and battle casualties. IJN forces were also suffering heavy losses attempting to reinforce and resupply the ground forces on the island. These losses, plus the projected resources needed for further attempts to recapture Guadalcanal, were affecting strategic security and operations in other areas of the Japanese Empire . The decision to withdraw
18837-721: The island, US Army Major General Alexander Patch , fielded a combined force of US Army and US Marines, designated the XIV Corps , totaling 50,666 men. At Patch's disposal were 167 artillery weapons, including 75 mm (2.95 in) , 105 mm (4.13 in) , and 155 mm (6.1 in) howitzers , and plentiful stocks of shells. On 1 January, the Japanese military changed their radio communication codes, making it more difficult for Allied intelligence , which had previously partially broken Japanese radio ciphers, to divine Japanese intentions and movement. As January progressed, Allied reconnaissance and radio traffic analysis noted
18998-430: The island, sortied from both Truk and Rabaul. Three slow transport ships departed from Truk on 16 August, carrying the remaining 1,400 soldiers from Ichiki's (28th) Infantry Regiment plus 500 naval marines from the 5th Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force . The transports were guarded by 13 warships commanded by Japanese Rear Admiral Raizō Tanaka , who planned to land the troops on Guadalcanal on 24 August. To cover
19159-431: The landing of these troops and provide support for the operation to retake Henderson Field from Allied forces, Yamamoto directed Chūichi Nagumo to sortie with a carrier force from Truk on 21 August and sail toward the southern Solomon Islands. Nagumo's force included three carriers and 30 other warships. Yamamoto would send the light carrier Ryūjō to act as bait, ahead of the rest of the Japanese fleet, in order to draw
19320-466: The landings, with one in five Marines afflicted by mid-August. Although some of the Korean construction workers surrendered to the Marines, most of the remaining Japanese and Korean personnel gathered just west of the Lunga perimeter on the west bank of the Matanikau River and subsisted mainly on coconuts. A Japanese naval outpost was also located at Taivu Point, about 35 kilometers (22 mi) east of
19481-608: The light carrier Ryūjō , with a total of 177 carrier-based aircraft. The American forces had two carriers, the Saratoga and Enterprise , and their 176 aircraft. The Japanese light carrier Ryūjō , offered as bait to Allied naval aircraft, was hit by several 1,000-pound (450 kg) bombs and an aerial torpedo; she was abandoned by her crew and sank that night. The two Japanese fleet carriers were not attacked, but Japanese aircraft successfully attacked Enterprise , badly damaging her flight deck. Both fleets subsequently retreated from
19642-466: The magnitude of his defeat, rather than dying in combat. In total, 789 of the original 917 members of the Ichiki Regiment's First Element were killed in the battle. About 30 survived the battle and joined Ichiki's rear guard of about 100, and these 128 Japanese returned to Taivu Point, notified 17th Army headquarters of their defeat and awaited further reinforcements and orders from Rabaul. As
19803-517: The major Japanese base at Rabaul while also supporting the Allied New Guinea campaign . The landings initiated the six-month-long Guadalcanal campaign. Taking the Japanese by surprise, by nightfall on 8 August the Marines secured Tulagi and nearby islands as well as the Japanese airfield under construction at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The Allies later renamed it "Henderson Field". Allied aircraft operating out of Henderson were called
19964-627: The naval and seaplane bases on the three islands fiercely resisted the Marine landings. With some difficulty, the Marines secured all three islands: Tulagi on 8 August, and Gavutu and Tanambogo by 9 August. The Japanese defenders were killed almost to the last man, and the Marines suffered 248 casualties. In contrast to Tulagi, Gavutu, and Tanambogo, the landings on Guadalcanal encountered much less resistance. At 09:10 on 7 August, Vandegrift and 11,000 U.S. Marines came ashore on Guadalcanal between Koli Point and Lunga Point. Advancing towards Lunga Point, they encountered scant Japanese resistance and secured
20125-405: The naval landing force. Believing that the force posed a threat to that night's scheduled evacuation run, an airstrike of 13 Aichi D3A 2 "Val" dive bombers escorted by 40 Zeros departed Buin, Bougainville to attack the ships. Mistaking the Japanese strike aircraft as friendly, the U.S. destroyers withheld fire until the "Val"s began their attack. Beginning at 14:53, destroyer USS De Haven
20286-430: The next two hills, 90 and 91, by nightfall, placing the Americans in position to isolate and capture Kokumbona and trap the Japanese 2nd Division. Reacting quickly to the situation, the Japanese hurriedly evacuated Kokumbona and ordered the 2nd Division to retire westward immediately. The Americans captured Kokumbona on 23 January. Although some Japanese units were trapped between the American forces and destroyed, most of
20447-693: The night, so the Marines returned to the Lunga perimeter by boat. These actions resulted in the loss of 20 Japanese and 3 Marines. Small Allied naval convoys arrived at Guadalcanal on 23 and 29 August, and 1 and 8 September to provide the Marines at Lunga with more food, ammunition, aircraft fuel, aircraft technicians, and other supplies. The convoy on 1 September also brought 392 Seabees to maintain and improve Henderson Field. In addition, on 3 September, Marine Aircraft Group 25 began airlifting high-priority cargo, including personnel, aviation gasoline, munitions, and other supplies, to Henderson Field. By 23 August, Kawaguchi's 35th Infantry Brigade reached Truk and
20608-434: The objective of using Guadalcanal and Tulagi as bases in supporting a campaign to eventually capture or neutralize the major Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain . The Japanese defenders, who had occupied those islands since May 1942, were outnumbered and overwhelmed by the Allies, who captured Tulagi and Florida, as well as the airfield—later named Henderson Field —that was under construction on Guadalcanal. Surprised by
20769-590: The offensive in order to deny the use of the islands to the Japanese as bases from which the supply routes between the United States and Australia could be threatened, and to use them as starting points for further Allied offensives in the South Pacific. With U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt 's tacit consent, King also advocated for an invasion of Guadalcanal. Due to the Roosevelt administration's support for Great Britain's proposal that priority be given to defeating Germany before Japan , Allied commanders in Pacific theater had to compete for personnel and resources with
20930-422: The operation. Supporting the air superiority portion of the operation were the IJN's 11th Air Fleet and the IJA's 6th Air Division, based at Rabaul with 212 and 100 aircraft, respectively. 64 aircraft from carrier Zuikaku ' s air group were also temporarily assigned to Rabaul. An additional 60 floatplanes from the IJN's "R" Area Air Force , based at Rabaul, Bougainville and the Shortland Islands, brought
21091-437: The other Tulagi, Florida, and other nearby islands. Allied warships bombarded the invasion beaches, while U.S. carrier aircraft bombed Japanese positions on the target islands and destroyed 15 Japanese seaplanes at their base near Tulagi. Tulagi and two nearby small islands, Gavutu and Tanambogo , were assaulted by 3,000 U.S. Marines under the command of Brigadier General William Rupertus . The 886 IJN personnel manning
21252-427: The other two islands and located to the south across the soon-to-be-named Ironbottom Sound , was added when it was discovered the Japanese were constructing an airbase there. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had occupied Tulagi in May 1942 and had constructed a seaplane base nearby. Allied concern grew when, in early July, the IJN began constructing a large airfield at Lunga Point on nearby Guadalcanal. From such
21413-475: The overall command of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, felt Allied advances in New Guinea posed a greater threat to the security of the Japanese Empire than an Allied military presence in the southern Solomons. Therefore, Combined Fleet naval staff officers began to prepare plans for abandoning Guadalcanal and shifting priorities and resources to operations around New Guinea. At this time, the navy did not inform
21574-428: The overall direction of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (IGH). Commanders of the operation included Isoroku Yamamoto and Hitoshi Imamura . The Japanese decided to withdraw and concede Guadalcanal to Allied forces for several reasons. All attempts by the IJA to recapture Henderson Field , the airfield on Guadalcanal in use by Allied aircraft, had been repulsed with heavy losses. Japanese ground forces on
21735-417: The overmatched American ships. 65 men from Little were killed and 24 men from Gregory were killed, including the commanding officer of Transport Division 12 and the commanding officers of both ships. Throughout August, small numbers of American aircraft and their crews continued to arrive at Guadalcanal. By the end of August, 64 planes of various types were stationed at Henderson Field. On 3 September,
21896-439: The perimeter from the west, while Ichiki's Second Echelon, renamed the Kuma Battalion, would attack from the east. The main attack would be conducted from the jungle south of the Lunga perimeter by Kawaguchi's "Center Body", numbering 3,000 men in three battalions. By 7 September, most of Kawaguchi's troops had departed Taivu to begin marching towards Lunga Point along the coastline. About 250 Japanese troops remained behind to guard
22057-571: The plan, officially called Operation Ke after a mora in Japanese Kana vocabulary, to execute the evacuation. The plan called for a battalion of IJA infantry to land by destroyer on Guadalcanal around 14 January to act as a rear guard during the evacuation. The 17th Army was to begin withdrawing to the western end of the island about 25 or 26 January. An air superiority campaign around the southern Solomons would begin on 28 January. The 17th Army would be picked up in three lifts by destroyers
22218-417: The raid over Guadalcanal. In the resulting action, the Japanese lost six fighters while the CAF lost one Wildcat, four P-40s, and two P-38s. The "Lily"s dropped their bombs on American positions around the Matanikau River , causing little damage. Believing that the Japanese were beginning a major offensive in the southern Solomons aimed at Henderson Field, Halsey responded by sending, beginning on 29 January,
22379-405: The reality that their ships could not safely operate in the Solomons in the daytime without first suppressing Allied airpower at Henderson Field. For six weeks, from early August to the end of September, the U.S. Navy largely avoided the waters off Tulagi and Guadalcanal, and was ordered not to resupply the Marines or provide escort duty for slow transport ships, as American naval commanders feared
22540-465: The region; meanwhile, ground-based Japanese pilots based at Rabaul were forced to undertake a grueling day-long round trip flight in order to make their attacks. Combined, this rendered daylight supply runs to Guadalcanal impossible for the Japanese. Only weeks before this, the Japanese had total control of the sea in this particular region; now they were forced to make supply runs only under the cover of darkness. Japanese naval commanders began to recognize
22701-512: The resupply effort threatened future strategic plans for protecting the Japanese Empire. Throughout November, Japan's top military leaders at the IGH in Tokyo continued to openly support further efforts to retake Guadalcanal from Allied forces. At the same time, lower-ranking staff officers began to discreetly discuss abandoning the island. Takushiro Hattori and Masanobu Tsuji , each of whom had recently visited Guadalcanal, told their colleagues on
22862-409: The ridge before the Japanese halted their attack for the night. The next night Kawaguchi faced Edson's 840 Raiders with 3,000 troops of his brigade, reinforced by an assortment of light artillery. The Japanese began their attack just after nightfall, with Kawaguchi's 1st Battalion assaulting Edson's right flank just to the west of the ridge. After breaking through the Marine lines, the battalion's assault
23023-536: The sea and to land enough troops on the island to retake it. In December, the Japanese abandoned their efforts to retake Guadalcanal and evacuated their remaining forces by 7 February 1943, in the face of an offensive by the U.S. Army 's XIV Corps . The Battle of Rennell Island , the last major naval engagement of the campaign, served to secure sufficient protection for much of the remaining Japanese force, by now significantly degraded by disease, starvation and combat casualties, to evacuate safely. The campaign followed
23184-485: The six-month campaign for control of the island. On 7 August 1942, the US 1st Marine Division landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi , and Florida Islands in the Solomon Islands . The landings on the islands were meant to deny their use by the Japanese as bases for threatening the supply routes between the US and Australia, and to secure the islands as starting points for a campaign with the eventual goal of capturing or neutralizing
23345-409: The soldiers from Guadalcanal as possible. Sanada returned to Tokyo on 25 December and recommended to the IGH that Guadalcanal be abandoned immediately and all priority given to the campaign in New Guinea. The IGH's top leaders agreed with Sanada's recommendation on 26 December and ordered their staffs to begin drafting plans for the withdrawal from Guadalcanal and establishment of a new defense line in
23506-439: The staff that any further attempt to retake the island was a lost cause. Ryūzō Sejima reported that the attrition of IJA troop-strength on Guadalcanal was so unexpectedly severe that future operations would be untenable. On 11 December two staff officers, IJN Commander Yuji Yamamoto and IJA Major Takahiko Hayashi, returned to Tokyo from Rabaul and confirmed Hattori's, Tsuji's, and Sejima's reports. They further reported that most of
23667-437: The successful Allied defensive actions at the Battle of the Coral Sea and the Battle of Midway in May and June 1942. Along with the battles at Milne Bay and Buna–Gona , the Guadalcanal campaign marked the Allies' transition from defensive operations to offensive ones, and effectively allowed them to seize the strategic initiative in the Pacific theater from the Japanese. The campaign was followed by other Allied offensives in
23828-581: The task of retaking Guadalcanal to the Imperial Japanese Army's (IJA) 17th Army , a corps -sized command based at Rabaul under the command of Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake . The army was to be supported by Japanese naval units, including the Combined Fleet under the command of Isoroku Yamamoto , which was headquartered at Truk . The 17th Army, at that time heavily involved in the Japanese campaign in New Guinea , had only
23989-413: The threat of Japanese surface action. As a result, during the Battle of Savo Island on the night of 9 August, Mikawa's force was able to surprise and sink one Australian and three American cruisers, as well as damage another American cruiser and two destroyers. The Japanese suffered only moderate damage to one cruiser. Despite this success, Mikawa was unaware that Fletcher was preparing to withdraw with
24150-607: The total number of Japanese aircraft involved in the operation to 436. The combined Japanese warship and naval air units in the area formed the Southeast Area Fleet , commanded by Jinichi Kusaka at Rabaul. Opposing the Japanese and under the command of United States Navy Admiral William Halsey Jr. , commander of Allied forces in the South Pacific, were fleet carriers USS Enterprise and USS Saratoga , six escort carriers , three fast battleships, four old battleships, 13 cruisers, and 45 destroyers. In
24311-422: The transports continued to unload on the night of 8–9 August, two groups of screening Allied cruisers and destroyers, under the command of British Rear Admiral Victor Crutchley , were surprised and defeated by a Japanese force of seven cruisers and one destroyer from the 8th Fleet based at Rabaul and Kavieng , commanded by Japanese Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa . The 8th fleet had been sighted at least 5 times over
24472-606: The west, effective from 1 August 1942. Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief William D. Leahy established two goals for 1942–1943: first, that Guadalcanal would be taken, in conjunction with an Allied offensive in New Guinea under MacArthur; and second, that the Admiralty Islands and Bismarck Archipelago , including the major Japanese base at Rabaul, would be captured as well. The directive held that
24633-520: Was a military campaign fought between 7 August 1942 and 9 February 1943 on and around the island of Guadalcanal in the Pacific theater of World War II . It was the first major land offensive by Allied forces against the Empire of Japan . On 7 August 1942, Allied forces, predominantly United States Marines , landed on Guadalcanal, Tulagi , and Florida Island in the southern Solomon Islands , with
24794-445: Was bombed by Japanese high-altitude horizontal bombers and sank with the loss of 51 men. On 4–5 September, USS Little (APD-4) and USS Gregory (APD-3) had finished landing a complement of Marine Raiders back onto Guadalcanal and proceeded to patrol the area for submarines, which had been surfacing and shelling the Marines nightly. Three Japanese destroyers, who did not know that enemy surface ships were patrolling
24955-454: Was endorsed by Emperor Hirohito on 31 December 1942. The operation began on 14 January 1943 with the delivery of a battalion of infantry troops to Guadalcanal to act as rearguard for the evacuation. Around the same time, IJA and IJN air forces began an air superiority campaign around the Solomon Islands and New Guinea. During the air campaign, a US cruiser was sunk in the Battle of Rennell Island . Two days later, Japanese aircraft sank
25116-548: Was eventually stopped by Marine units occupying the northern section of the ridge. Two companies from Kawaguchi's 2nd Battalion charged up the southern edge of the ridge and pushed Edson's troops back to Hill 123, in the center section of the ridge. Throughout the night the Marines at this position, supported by a battery of howizers brought up from Lunga Point, turned back wave after wave of frontal Japanese infantry attacks, several of which devolved into hand-to-hand combat. The weight of these repeated assaults eventually pressed
25277-487: Was hemmed into a corridor only 300–600 yd (270–550 m) wide between the ocean and the thick, inland jungle and steep coral ridges. The ridges, running perpendicular to the coast, paralleled numerous streams and creeks that crossed the corridor with "washboard regularity." On 26 January, a combined US Army and Marine unit called the Composite Army-Marine (CAM) Division advancing westward encountered
25438-525: Was loaded onto slow transport ships for the rest of the trip to Guadalcanal. The damage done to Tanaka's convoy during the Battle of the Eastern Solomons caused the Japanese to reconsider trying to deliver more troops to Guadalcanal via slow transport. Instead, the ships carrying Kawaguchi's soldiers were rerouted to Rabaul. From there, the Japanese planned to deliver Kawaguchi's unit to Guadalcanal using fast-moving destroyers at night, staging through
25599-450: Was rapidly hit by three bombs and sank almost immediately 2 mi (1.7 nmi; 3.2 km) south of Savo Island with the loss of 167 of her crew, including her captain. Destroyer USS Nicholas was damaged by several near-misses. Five "Val"s and three Zeros were lost to anti-aircraft fire and CAF fighters. The CAF lost three Wildcats in the engagement. Hashimoto departed the Shortlands at 11:30 on 1 February with 20 destroyers for
25760-422: Was selected as the headquarters and primary staging ground for the offensive, codenamed Operation Watchtower , with the commencement date set for 7 August. At first, only the seizure of Tulagi and the Santa Cruz Islands was planned, omitting a landing on Guadalcanal. After Allied reconnaissance discovered Japanese airfield construction efforts on Guadalcanal, its capture was added to the plan, and planned landings on
25921-438: Was sunk, and the older destroyer Mutsuki was so badly damaged that she had to be scuttled. Several other Japanese warships were damaged, including Tanaka's flagship Jintsū . At this point, Tanaka withdrew and rescheduled the supply run for the night of 28 August, to be carried out by the remaining destroyers. Japanese air raids against the Allied positions on Guadalcanal continued largely unabated during this time. On 25 August,
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