67-482: The Narragansett land claim was one of the first litigations of aboriginal title in the United States in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. County of Oneida (1974), or Oneida I , decision. The Narragansett claimed a few thousand acres of land in and around Charlestown, Rhode Island , challenging a variety of early 19th century land transfers as violations of
134-672: A Native American gaming enterprise . The Narragansett tribe was "one of the most powerful tribes in New England" before settlers arrived in Rhode Island. The tribe was defeated in King Philip's War in 1675. The Rhode Island legislature passed a " detribalization " law in 1880. The Rhode Island Senate asked the Rhode Island Supreme Court to issue an advisory opinion on the law's constitutionality;
201-884: A Native American gaming enterprise . The tribe purchased 31 additional acres in Charlestown in 1991. After being denied a land use permit, the Narragansett attempted to convey the lands in trust to the Secretary of the Interior under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (which would have the effect of ending state and local jurisdiction). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Carcieri v. Salazar (2009) that only tribes that were under federal jurisdiction as of 1934 could do so. Aboriginal title in
268-402: A clear statement rule . The earliest and most widely acknowledged method of extinguishing aboriginal title was by treaty. Even fraud will not void the extinguishment of aboriginal title by the federal government (or by any actor, if the tribe waives the issue in the lower court). Some cases hold that an executive order may extinguish aboriginal title, although the dominant view is that
335-508: A clear statement —is plenary and exclusive. Such extinguishment is not compensable under the Fifth Amendment , although various statutes provide for compensation. Unextinguished aboriginal title provides a federal common law cause of action for ejectment or trespass , for which there is federal subject-matter jurisdiction . Many potentially meritorious tribal lawsuits have been settled by Congressional legislation providing for
402-445: A "long time". Unlike nearly all common law jurisdictions, the United States acknowledges that aboriginal title may be acquired post-sovereignty; a "long time" can mean as little as 30 years. However, the requirement of exclusivity may prevent any tribe from claiming aboriginal title where multiple tribes once shared the same area. Improper designation of an ancestral group may also bar acknowledgement. 'Cramer v. United States' (1923)
469-497: A final decision by a Court of Claims . Even before a final ICC judgement, if a tribe claims compensation on the theory that its lands were extinguished, it cannot later attempt to claim valid title to those lands. An ICC judgement acts as a bar to future claims, and an ICC payment conclusively establishes extinguishment (although, for timing purposes, the ICC has not jurisdiction to extinguish). Even though ICCA settlements are binding,
536-581: A joint opinion of Britain's Attorney General and Solicitor General regarding land purchases in India ) were circulated in the colonies, edited such that it appeared to apply to purchases from Native Americans. The Royal Proclamation was among the enumerated complaints in the Declaration of Independence : He has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose ... raising
603-513: A royal charter for Rhode Island in 1643 or 1644. The court next reviews a 1644 document by which the Naragansett's purported to "submit, subject, and give over ourselves, peoples, lands, rights, inheritances, and possessions whatsoever, in ourselves and our heires successively forever, unto the protection, care and government" of the King of England. The court did not claim this document affected
670-542: A title not even belonging to the Indians, though underlying the Indian title. Regulation is not appropriation. Finally, the court opined that the act might even have been valid if the Narragansett's were federally recognized: Be all that as it may, however, it seems to be recognized that a time may arrive when a tribe of Indians may become so degraded or reduced in numbers as to lose the power of self-government, and that then
737-416: A tribal right of occupancy is claimed." The Narragansett prevailed despite the heightened standard of review for a Rule 12(f) motion to strike, exceeding the standard the tribe would have had to carry at trial or on summary judgement. The tribe did not move to strike the defendant's claim that the United States was a necessary party (i.e., an argument that the Narragansett could not proceed without joining
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#1732780035665804-545: Is generally valid. The Second Circuit has held that states retained the power to purchase land directly from tribes during the Articles of Confederation period, and thus those purchases remain valid even if un-ratified by the federal government. The infamous Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) held that Congress's power to extinguish was plenary, notwithstanding Indian treaties to the contrary. While this decision has not been overruled per se , it has been modified in effect by
871-802: The Nonintercourse Act , suing both the state and private land owners. Judge Raymond James Pettine of the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island granted the Narragansett 's motion to strike the state's affirmative defenses and denied the state's necessary party motion and motion to dismiss . Altogether, the court rejected the state's defenses of: sovereign immunity , laches , statute of limitations / adverse possession , estoppel by sale, operation of state law, and public policy . After
938-468: The Supremacy Clause ... that state statutes cannot supersede federally created rights has been applied with especial vigor to the question of Indian title as a result of the federal government's 'unique obligation toward the Indians." Thus, the court held that the state's attempt to disband the tribe in 1880 and the various state services provided to the tribe were irrelevant. The court held that
1005-599: The dicta of Marshall and the dissenting justices embraced a far broader view of aboriginal title . Johnson involved a pre-Revolutionary private conveyances from 1773 and 1775; Mitchel v. United States (1835) involved 1804 and 1806 conveyances in Florida under Spanish rule. In both cases, the Marshall Court continued to apply the rule that aboriginal title was inalienable , except to The Crown . The Indian Removal Act of 1830 established policy that resulted in
1072-659: The "surplus," as declared by the government, sold to non-Indians. Allotment ended in 1934. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971) extinguished all aboriginal title in Alaska (although the legitimacy of the act remains disputed by some Alaskan natives ). Indian Land Claims Settlements extinguished all aboriginal title in Rhode Island (1978) and Maine (1980). According to Prof. Stuart Banner: U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: [The Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
1139-592: The Act extinguished aboriginal title on all lands conveyed before those acts. Some of the statutes cited by the Fifth Circuit applied to Arkansas and Missouri as well. Indian reservation policy resulted in the extinguishment of all aboriginal title outside of reservations in Utah and Nevada by 1880, and Arizona and New Mexico by 1886. Atherton purchase Too Many Requests If you report this error to
1206-539: The Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. The Confederation Congress Proclamation of 1783 prohibited the extinguishment of aboriginal title without the consent of Congress. But, the states, particularly New York, purchased lands from tribes during this period without the consent of the federal government. These purchases were not tested in court until the 1970s and 1980s, when the Second Circuit held that
1273-683: The Confederation Congress had neither the authority under the Articles of Confederation nor the intent to limit the ability of states to extinguish aboriginal title within their borders; thus, the Proclamation was interpreted to apply only to the federal territories. States had lost the ability to extinguish aboriginal title with the ratification of the United States Constitution in 1788, which vested authority over commerce with American Indian tribes in
1340-696: The Eastern half of the United States, ... they needed less than 40 years for the Western half." Unlike the Eastern purchases, "some of the transactions in the West involved immense areas of land. More than 75 percent of Nevada, for example, was acquired in two bites; the large majority of Colorado in three. It was not long before the West was dotted with Indian reservations." Congress banned further Indian treaties by statute in 1871, but treaty-like instruments continued to be used to alienate Indian land and designate
1407-628: The Great Swamp Fight; the less celebrated tribe adopting and being known thenceforward by the more famous name of their once powerful neighbors, the Narragansetts. Next, the court reviewed the power of a sachem to conclude a land conveyance, remarking that they exercised "absolute monarchie over the people." The court next quoted extensively from Chief Justice John Marshall 's opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh (1823). By comparison,
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#17327800356651474-492: The Marshall Court, and there, Marshall dismissed the case for lack of original jurisdiction . Fletcher v. Peck (1810) and Johnson v. McIntosh (1823), the first and the most detailed explorations of the subject by Marshall, respectively, both arose out of collusive lawsuits , where land speculators deceived the court with a falsified case and controversy in order to elicit the desired precedent. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831) and Worcester v. Georgia (1832),
1541-468: The Narragansett's as punishment from some "injuries alleged." The Atherton purchase was re-recited in 1662. A 40-year dispute between Rhode Island and Connecticut followed over whose territory (and royal charter) included the Narragansett lands. Due to the expenses of this dispute, the opinion claims, the Rhode Island legislature in 1707 authorized a survey to identify vacant Naraggansett lands. In 1709, Rhode Island obtained some sort of conveyance to nearly all
1608-667: The Narragansett's claim, the Act required the Secretary of the Interior to acquire approximately 900 acres of privately held land for the Narragansett and required the state to convey certain other publicly held lands to the Narragansett Corporation. The Act also created a $ 3.5 million settlement fund, funded by a federal appropriation. The Act also required the Governor to negotiate for the tribe an option to purchase additional privately held lands, exercisable by
1675-532: The Narragansett's land title. The court reviews the text of the royal charter, rebutting the argument that the charter was "evidence that the crown recognized the Indian title as paramount to their own." The court details the opposition of Williams and Rhode Island to the 1659 Atherton purchase from the Narragansett (through the sachem Coginaquand ) by settlers from Connecticut. The same group of settlers in September 1660 demanded and received another tract from
1742-655: The Non-Intercourse Act"; the court held just the opposite. Next, the court held that it was irrelevant that the tribe was incorporated under state law and that the tribe was not federally recognized. Finally, the court held that the proviso of the Nonintercourse Acts between 1793 and 1802—relating to "Indians living on lands surrounded by settlements"—holding that the proviso was only "addressed to transactions by individual Indians living in 'white' settlements and has no application to land to which
1809-491: The Secretary for the tribe, with the option payment not to exceed 5% of the fair market value of the lands and the total price not to exceed the amount of the settlement fund. That Act extinguished all aboriginal title in Rhode Island, including title held by other tribes. Thus, the Act extinguished the claim of the Seaconke Wampanoag Tribe , even though they were in no way compensated by the Act. The terms of
1876-680: The Supreme Court's decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho (1997) that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars any action that would have the effect of quieting title against a U.S. state . The parties reached a settlement on February 28, 1978, which—because it extinguished the tribe's aboriginal title—required Congressional legislation. Congress passed the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act (RICSA) on September 30, 1978. In exchange for extinguishing
1943-553: The United States The United States was the first jurisdiction to acknowledge the common law doctrine of aboriginal title (also known as " original Indian title " or " Indian right of occupancy "). Native American tribes and nations establish aboriginal title by actual, continuous, and exclusive use and occupancy for a "long time." Individuals may also establish aboriginal title, if their ancestors held title as individuals. Unlike other jurisdictions,
2010-426: The United States to the suit). However, the court rejected the defendant's necessary party motion under Rule 19(a), holding that the United States was a "necessary," but not an "indispensable" party. Thus, although the federal government could have brought the tribe's claim on its behalf, the tribe was also able to bring the claim on its own. However, the court did recognize that "all parties to this litigation to welcome
2077-574: The act applied in the entire United States. Indian reservation policy resulted in the extinguishment of all aboriginal title outside of reservations in Iowa , Minnesota , Texas , and Kansas by 1870, Wyoming , Nebraska , and Colorado by 1880, and Montana by 1886. The Fifth Circuit has held that the Louisiana Land Claims Act , requiring all persons with "incomplete title" to file claims, applied to aboriginal title. Thus,
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2144-569: The agreement extended state civil and criminal jurisdiction to the settlement lands. No state, federal, or local property tax was to be assessed on the lands. The Narragansett obtained federal recognition in 1983. After the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (1988), the RICSA was amended to render the lands non-gaming eligible in 1996. As of 2005, the Narragansett have been unsuccessful in their efforts to establish
2211-498: The boundaries of reservations. Language in an 1881 Indian Country bill—referring to "lands to which the original Indian title has never been extinguished"—was struck by its sponsors, who claimed that "there are no such lands in the United States." In 1887, the Dawes Act introduced an allotment policy, whereby communal reservation lands were divided into parcels held in fee simple (and thus alienable) by individual Indians, with
2278-741: The complete extinguishment of aboriginal title in Alabama and Mississippi (1832); Florida and Illinois (1833); Georgia , North Carolina , and Tennessee (1835) [the Treaty of New Echota ]; Indiana (1840); and Ohio (1842). This shift in policy resulted in all tribal lands being either ceded to the federal government or designated as an Indian reservation in Iowa , Minnesota , Texas , and Kansas by 1870; Idaho , Washington , Utah , Oregon , Nevada , Wyoming , Nebraska , and Colorado by 1880; and Montana , Arizona , and New Mexico by 1886. Whereas, "it had taken whites 250 years to purchase
2345-621: The consolidated cases, Judge Pettine rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution . Pettine found that the tribe's claims fell with the Ex parte Young (1908) exception to state sovereign immunity, citing Supreme Court precedents involving suits over possession of land. The court distinguished "suits seeking
2412-401: The content of aboriginal title is not limited to historical or traditional land uses. Aboriginal title may not be alienated , except to the federal government or with the approval of Congress. Aboriginal title is distinct from the lands Native Americans own in fee simple and occupy under federal trust . The power of Congress to extinguish aboriginal title—by "purchase or conquest," or with
2479-421: The court claims, Roger Williams "denied the justice of the white man's laws as to Indian lands [which] very largely ignored the right of the Indian." The court quoted with approval Williams' claim that the land of Rhode Island was not "purchased or obtained" but rather obtained from " Cannonicus but by gift." Only out of a desire to avoid conflicts with neighboring colonies, the court proceeds, did Williams obtain
2546-419: The court remarks: Some of the reasoning in the foregoing opinion seems to us faulty and not well grounded. ... It is a very strained interpretation to say that the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, even in combination with the treaty-making power, carries with it the power to appropriate title to land belonging to the states, an ultimate title, resembling in some respects a reversionary interest;
2613-511: The decision, Congress settled the claim with the Rhode Island Claims Settlement Act (RICSA), the first of many Indian Land Claims Settlements , extinguishing all aboriginal title in Rhode Island in exchange for $ 3.5 million. The Narragansett claim was "the first of the eastern land claims to be settled." The Narragansett received federal recognition in 1983 and have unsuccessfully attempted to establish
2680-411: The defendant's purported affirmative defenses would not defeat the tribe's claim if it proved the elements of a prima facie case; in other words, they were not affirmative defenses. The court also rejected the defendant's attempts to rebut the elements of the tribe's prima facie case. First, the court rejected the state's argument that "aboriginal title alone does not mean a title having the protection of
2747-630: The defendants would violate the Nonintercourse Act . Citing Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton (1st Cir. 1975) and other various Supreme Court decisions, the court held that the Nonintercourse Act applied to the lands in question. The court rejected all the defendant's affirmative defenses: laches, statute of limitations/adverse possession, estoppel by sale, operation of state law, and public policy. The court noted that: "The broad principle dictated by
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2814-610: The earliest deeds in the Eastern states purport to commemorate such transactions. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 changed matters, reserving for the Crown the exclusive right of preemption, requiring all such purchases to have Royal approval. It was also an attempt to restrain colonial settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains (see map). Forged versions of the Pratt-Yorke opinion of 1757 (in its authentic form,
2881-462: The extinguishment of aboriginal title as well as monetary compensation or the approval of gaming and gambling enterprises . Large-scale compensatory litigation first arose in the 1940s, and possessory litigation in the 1970s. Federal sovereign immunity bars possessory claims against the federal government, although compensatory claims are possible by statute. The Eleventh Amendment bars both possessory and compensatory claims against states , unless
2948-524: The federal government intervenes . The US Supreme Court rejected nearly all legal and equitable affirmative defenses in 1985. However, the Second Circuit —where most remaining possessory claims are pending—has held that laches bars all claims that are "disruptive." Before 1763, the Colonial history of the United States was characterized by private purchases of lands from Indians. Many of
3015-612: The federal government. Congress codified this prohibition in the Nonintercourse Acts of 1790, 1793, 1796, 1799, 1802, and 1833. The Marshall Court (1801—1835) issued some of the earliest and most influential opinions on the status of aboriginal title in the United States, most of them authored by Chief Justice John Marshall . But, without exception, the remarks of the Court on aboriginal title during this period are dicta . Only one indigenous litigant ever appeared before
3082-405: The fourteenth day of October, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, or which may hereafter be made, of or with the Indians, shall be valid unless made under the authority and with the consent of the legislature. N.Y. Const. of 1894 art. 1, § 15 and N.Y. Const. of 1938 art I. § 13 provided: [Purchase of lands of Indians.]-No purchase or contract for the sale of lands in this State, made since
3149-473: The fourteenth day of October, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five; or which may hereafter be made, of, or with the indians, shall be valid, unless made under the authority, and with the consent of the Legislature. § 13 was repealed on November 6, 1962, by popular vote. The test for the acknowledgement of aboriginal title in the United States is actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for
3216-624: The judicial enforcement of the federal government's fiduciary duty . The rule of construction against extinguishment, even in the face of overlapping land grants, was based on the assumption that Congress would not lightly extinguish due to its " Christian charity ." Land grants themselves therefore do not extinguish aboriginal title, nor Indian usufructuary rights. Furthermore, land grants are interpreted narrowly to avoid overlapping with unextinguished aboriginal title. Extinguishment can be accomplished through res judicata . Extinguishment may also be effected through collateral estoppel following
3283-413: The legislature modified the prohibition to require the approval of a certain tribal counsel and a committee of the legislature in 1779. Controversial conveyances occurred in 1800, 1803, 1811, 1813, and 1818—plus "many others." From 1718 to 1840 various laws were passed exempting the Narragansett's from various forms of taxation, barring most suits against Narragansetts, and so on. In 1840 an Indian commission
3350-597: The local law must from necessity be extended over them. ... Even if the Narragansetts had ever been recognized by the United States as a tribe of Indians, it would seem as if the state would be authorized, by the necessities of the case, to take action. Two lawsuits by the Narragansett against the State of Rhode Island (C.A. No. 750005) and private landowners (C.A. No. 750006) were consolidated in front of Judge Pettine. The tribe claimed aboriginal title to lands in and around Charlestown, Rhode Island , and that any title claimed by
3417-488: The opinion summarizes much of the tribe's land and other dealings with the state up until that point. Additionally, the Senate certified the questions of: whether certain quitclaim deeds executed by the tribe were valid; whether the state could acquire valid title under the 1880 law; whether the tribe was abolished by the law; and whether those to whom the state conveyed title under the 1880 law had valid title. The court upheld
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#17327800356653484-452: The power lies with Congress. Extinguishment retroactively validates trespasses and removals of resources from aboriginal lands, and thus bars compensation (either statutory or constitutional) for those encroachments. Since 1790, states have not been able to extinguish aboriginal title. They cannot even foreclose on tribal lands due to the non-payment of taxes. However, extinguishment by state governments before between independence and 1790
3551-707: The return of specific property ... from suits asking money damages payable out of the public treasury." Because the tribes alleged that the state's actions violated the Indian Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause (via the Nonintercourse Act) of the Constitution, the tribe's claim was allowed under the Ex parte Young doctrine. The court did not reach the tribe's alternative argument that the state had consented to suit. Narragansett II preceded
3618-414: The sale of lands in this state, made since the fourteenth day of October, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, or which may hereafter be made, of or with the Indians in this state, shall be valid, unless made under the authority, and with the consent, of the legislature. N.Y. Const. of 1846 art. I, § 16 provided: [Indian lands.]—No purchase or contract for the sale of lands in this state, made since
3685-456: The sale of lands, made since the fourteenth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five, or which may hereafter be made with or of the said Indians, within the limits of this State, shall be binding on the said Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under the authority and with the consent of the legislature of this State. N.Y. Const. of 1821 art. VII, § 12 provided: [Indian lands.]—No purchase or contract for
3752-878: The scope of the settlement may be up for debate. The United States is bound by prior determinations as well. The Grand Canyon National Park Enlargement Act is an example of an act extinguishing aboriginal title. Indian removal policy resulted in the complete extinguishment of aboriginal title in Alabama and Mississippi (1832), Florida and Illinois (1833), Georgia , North Carolina , and Tennessee (1835) [the Treaty of New Echota ], Indiana (1840), and Ohio (1842). Indian Land Claims Settlements extinguished all aboriginal title in Rhode Island in 1978 and Maine in 1980. Similar, but non-statewide, acts extinguished some aboriginal title in Connecticut , Florida , Massachusetts , and New York . The Vermont Supreme Court has held, in actions where aboriginal title
3819-531: The several States, and with the Indian tribes; Relevant federal statutes include: N.Y. Const. of 1777 art. XXXVII provided: And whereas it is of great importance to the safety of this State that peace and amity with the Indians within the same be at all times supported and maintained; and whereas the frauds too often practiced towards the said Indians, in contracts made for their lands, have, in divers instances, been productive of dangerous discontents and animosities: Be it ordained, that no purchases or contracts for
3886-473: The statute and answered all the questions in the affirmative. The court began with an attack upon the Narragansett's status as indigenous: The people in Rhode Island, in our day, calling themselves Narragansetts, are, properly speaking, not Narragansetts at all, but, at best, only a decayed remnant of the Niantics, a tribe tributary to the Narragansetts, with whom the survivors of the latter took refuge after
3953-430: The tribe cannot unify its aboriginal title with purchased fee simple to reconstitute " Indian Country " for the purposes of tribal sovereignty in the United States . Similarly, states can tax and exercise criminal jurisdiction in alienated tribal land, whether or not the tribe reacquires it. Nor can Indians tax non-Indians who own land in fee simple otherwise within their jurisdiction. Courts has not been receptive to
4020-406: The vacant lands, which were within the area claimed by Connecticut. The opinion next reviews the Rhode Island statutes which prohibited the acquisition of Indian lands without the consent of the colony. Two such ratifications occurred in 1659 and 1682. From 1713 to 1773, a variety of legislation was passed regarding the lands of Ninigret . Due to the succession disputes following Ninigret's death,
4087-553: The view that aboriginal title was converted to fee simple during the rule of other countries (e.g. Russia in Alaska). The Nonintercourse Act does not prohibit leases. The modern test for extinguishment of aboriginal title was most thoroughly explained in United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R. Co. (1941): extinguishment must come from Congress, or a part of the federal government properly delegated by Congress, and must satisfy
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#17327800356654154-405: The voluntary intervention of the United States, and it therefore extends a standing invitation to the United States to do so." The defendants also filed a motion to dismiss, claiming the suit was a nonjusticiable political question , which the court denied. Citing Baker v. Carr (1962), the court found that the action did not meet the elements of a political question. In a second opinion for
4221-477: Was a result of this process. The act called for the purchase of all remaining tribal lands and reservations, dissolved the tribe, and ended all law's conferring special legal status on Narragansetts. The opinion briefly considers the mentions of Indians in the Articles of Confederation and United States Constitution and finds no obstacle to the 1880 act in those texts of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence up to that time. Regarding Worcester v. Georgia (1832),
4288-421: Was apparent that the Narragansett tribe had become extinct in all but name. Its members had even ceased to be red men, for their complexions had been darkened by the plentiful infusion of negro blood, or bleached by the admixture of blood from Caucasian veins. In 1852, a committee was formed to consider proposals to terminate the Narragansett's tribal status, which was suggested in 1857, 1859, and 1866. The 1880 law
4355-416: Was appointed whose responsibilities included overseeing further conveyances of land. According to the court: The hold of the Narragansetts, even in civil matters, grew more and more feeble, and they gradually became more and more dependent upon the state, until their moribund condition as a tribe became apparent even to themselves. ... For at least 30 years before the passage of [the 1880 law under review], it
4422-491: Was raised as a defense by criminal defendants, that all aboriginal title in Vermont was extinguished when Vermont became a state. Commentators have criticized these decisions as inconsistent with federal law. Some eastern states argued that the Nonintercourse Act did not apply in the original colonies, or at least not in tribal areas surrounded by settlements. The First and Second Circuits have rejected this view, holding that
4489-439: Was the first Supreme Court decision to acknowledge the doctrine of individual aboriginal title, not held in common by tribes. Individual aboriginal title may be an affirmative defense to crimes such as trespassing on US Forest Service lands. However, a claimant asserting individual aboriginal title must show that his or her ancestors held aboriginal title as individuals . Where tribal land has previously been dispossessed,
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