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29-1198: TNW may refer to: Tactical nuclear weapon , a nuclear weapon which is designed to be used on a battlefield in military situations Tonsawang language (ISO 639 code: tnw) Trans Nation Airways (ICAO airline code: TNW) Ethiopian airline Jumandy Airport (IATA airport code: TNW) in Tena, Napo Province, Ecuador Mayor Galo de la Torre Airport (IATA airport code: TNW) defunct airport in Tena, Napo Province, Ecuador Tin Creek Airport (FAA airport code: TNW) in Farewell Lake, Alaska, USA; see List of airports in Alaska Warsaw Scientific Society (Polish: Towarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie ) aka "TNW" Tarifverbund Nordwestschweiz , Swiss public transit tariff network /ᵗnʷ/ Latin-script trigraph (tnw) for Arrernte, see List of Latin-script trigraphs Team Ninja Warrior , U.S. TV series based on SASUKE/Ninja Warrior telesport The Next Web ,

58-544: A W89 thermonuclear warhead . It was conceived in 1980 as a successor to both the UUM-44 SUBROC and RUR-5 ASROC anti-submarine missiles. The Sea Lance was to be available in two versions, known as UUM-125A and RUM-125A. The former would be a submarine-launched version, the latter surface-launched. It was cancelled in 1990 as its importance was obviated by the collapse of the Soviet Union . In 1982, Boeing

87-402: A strategic nuclear weapon has a yield from 100 kilotons to over a megaton , with much larger warheads available. Use of tactical nuclear weapons against similarly-armed opponents may carry a significant danger of escalating the conflict beyond anticipated boundaries, from the tactical to the strategic . The existence and deployment of small, low-yield tactical nuclear warheads could be

116-456: A concept ("escalate to de-escalate") of using both tactical and strategic nuclear threats and strikes to de-escalate or cause an enemy to disengage from a conventional conflict threatening what Russia considers a strategic interest. The lowered threshold for use of nuclear weapons by Russia is disputed by other experts. Ten NATO member countries have advanced a confidence-building plan for NATO and Russia that could lead to treaties to reduce

145-515: A dangerous encouragement to forward-basing and pre-emptive nuclear warfare , as nuclear weapons with destructive yields of 10 tons of TNT (e.g., the W54 warhead design) might be used more willingly at times of crisis than warheads with yields of 100 kilotons . The use of tactical nuclear weapons presents a risk of escalating the conflict until it reaches a tipping point that provokes the use of strategic nuclear weapons such as ICBMs . Additionally,

174-584: A large part of the peak nuclear weapons stockpile levels during the Cold War . The risk that use of tactical nuclear weapons could unexpectedly lead to a rapid escalation of a war to full use of strategic weapons has led to proposals being made within NATO and other organizations to place limitations on—and make more transparent—the stockpiling and use of tactical weapons. As the Cold War came to an end in 1991,

203-521: A return of US-owned and -operated, short range, low yield nuclear weapons (called "tactical" by the US military) to provide a local strategic deterrent to the North's growing domestically-produced nuclear arsenal and delivery systems. Some tactical nuclear weapons have specific features meant to enhance their battlefield characteristics, such as variable yield , which allow their explosive power to be varied over

232-478: A small tactical nuclear weapon (e.g., the M29 Davy Crockett ) were in imminent danger of being overwhelmed by enemy forces, he could request permission to fire it and, due to decentralized control of warhead authorization, his request might quickly be granted during a crisis. For these reasons, stockpiles of tactical nuclear warheads in most countries' arsenals have been dramatically reduced c. 2010, and

261-587: A tactical nuclear weapon either against Ukraine or in a demonstration strike over unpopulated areas, given that the course of the war does not seem favorable to what the Kremlin anticipated, and several members of the Russian government have threatened the use of nuclear weapons. On 25 March 2023, President Putin announced the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. Russia would maintain control of

290-519: A website Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with the title TNW . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=TNW&oldid=890110680 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Pages with plain IPA Short description

319-436: A wide range for different situations, or enhanced radiation weapons (the so-called " neutron bombs "), which are meant to maximize ionizing radiation exposure and to minimize blast effects. Strategic missiles and bombers are assigned preplanned targets including enemy airfields, radars, and surface-to-air defenses, not only counterforce strikes on hardened or wide area bomber, submarine, and missile bases. The strategic mission

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348-568: Is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Tactical nuclear weapon Tactical nuclear weapons include gravity bombs , short-range missiles , artillery shells , land mines , depth charges , and torpedoes which are equipped with nuclear warheads. Also in this category are nuclear armed ground-based or shipborne surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and air-to-air missiles . Small, two-man portable or truck-portable tactical weapons (sometimes misleadingly referred to as suitcase nukes ), such as

377-487: Is no exact definition of the "tactical" category in terms of range or yield of the nuclear weapon . The yield of tactical nuclear weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons, but larger ones are still very powerful, and some variable-yield warheads serve in both roles. For example, the W89 200 kiloton warhead was intended to arm both the tactical Sea Lance anti-submarine rocket-propelled depth charge and

406-403: Is to eliminate the enemy nation's national defenses to enable following bombers and missiles to threaten the enemy nation's strategic forces, command, and economy more realistically, rather than targeting mobile military assets in nearly real time by using tactical weapons that are optimized for time-sensitive strike missions that are often close to friendly forces. Tactical nuclear weapons were

435-601: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists , as a result of the effectiveness and acceptability of USAF use of precision munitions with little collateral damage in the Kosovo conflict in what amounted to strategic destruction once only possible with nuclear weapons or massive bombing, Vladimir Putin , then-secretary of Security Council of Russia , formulated

464-552: The Special Atomic Demolition Munition and the Davy Crockett recoilless rifle (recoilless smoothbore gun) have been developed, but the difficulty of combining sufficient yield with portability could limit their military utility. In wartime, such explosives could be used for demolishing "chokepoints" to enemy offensives, such as at tunnels , narrow mountain passes, and long viaducts . There

493-494: The US and USSR withdrew most of their tactical nuclear weapons from deployment and disposed of them. The thousands of tactical warheads wielded by both sides in the late-1980s declined to an estimated 230 American and 1,000 to 2,000 Russian Federation warheads in 2021, although estimates for Russia vary widely. The yield varies for a tactical nuclear weapon from a fraction of a kiloton to approximately 50 kilotons. In comparison,

522-469: The strategic bomber -launched SRAM II stand off missile. Modern tactical nuclear warheads have yields up to the tens of kilotons, or potentially hundreds, several times that of the weapons used in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki . Specifically on the Korean Peninsula , with a nuclear North Korea facing off against a NPT -compliant South Korea , there have been calls to request

551-408: The intended area, the payload would separate from the missile, then deploy a parachute to decelerate the warhead or torpedo. Both missiles were initially planned to carry a depth charge with a 200 kiloton W89 thermonuclear warhead . Such a yield would have given the missile a lethal radius against submarines of around 10 kilometres (6.2 mi). This massive warhead, combined with the fact that

580-631: The lowest selectable yield of a tactical B61 (Mod 3 and Mod 4) is 0.3 kilotons (300 tons), modern PAL mechanisms ensure that centralized political control is maintained over each weapon, including their destructive yields. With the introduction of the B61 Mod 12, the United States will have four hundred identical nuclear bombs whose strategic or tactical nature will be set purely by the mission and target as well as type of aircraft on which they are carried. According to several reports, including by

609-449: The missile prior to launch. After being fired, the capsule would float to the surface where the rocket would ignite and its fins would deploy. An inertial guidance system would direct the missile to the general location of the target. Initial plans were to have the surface-launched version operate in a similar manner: launched from the Mk 41 vertical launching system . When the missile reached

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638-522: The nuclear weapons deliveries were completed that October. In May 2024, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would be holding drills with tactical nuclear weapons, days after responding to comments from senior Western officials. UUM-125 Sea Lance The UUM-125 Sea Lance , known early in development as the Common ASW Standoff Weapon , was to be an American standoff anti-submarine missile , initially intended to carry

667-514: The smallest types have been completely eliminated. Additionally, the increased sophistication of "Category F" PAL mechanisms and their associated communications infrastructure mean that centralized control of tactical nuclear warheads (by the country's most senior political leaders) can now be retained, even during combat. Some variable yield nuclear warheads such as the B61 nuclear bomb have been produced in both tactical and strategic versions. Whereas

696-592: The tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. As of 2012 , NATO was moving forward with a plan to upgrade its tactical nuclear weapons with precision guidance that would make them equivalent to strategic weapons in effects against hardened targets, and to carry them on stealth aircraft that are much more survivable against current air defenses. During the Russian invasion of Ukraine , there has been constant speculation about whether Russia 's president Vladimir Putin will use

725-402: The tactical nuclear weapons most likely to be used first (i.e., the smallest, low-yield weapons such as nuclear artillery dating from the 1960s) have usually been under less stringent political control at times of military combat crises than strategic weapons. Early Permissive action links (PALs) could be as simple as a mechanical combination lock. If a relatively junior officer in control of

754-521: The target would be unable to detect the missile until the payload hit the water, made it virtually impossible for a target to escape. In the mid-1980s, a conventional variant of this missile was proposed which would carry the new Mark 50 torpedo submarine-seeking weapon. This version was dubbed the UUM-125B. A contract for the full-scale development of the Sea Lance was awarded in 1986. In 1988, it

783-505: The weapons. As of May 2023 the weapons are a small number of Iskander missile warheads. Russia plans to finish a “storage facility” for tactical nuclear weapons by July 1. President Putin told Russian state television: "There is nothing unusual here either…Firstly, the United States has been doing this for decades. They have long deployed their tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of their allied countries ." In December 2023, Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko announced that

812-658: Was awarded the main contract to develop the system, named the Sea Lance. By the following year, it had become apparent that developing two different versions of the missile was too ambitious, and further development of the RUM-125 was suspended. The RUM-139, a vertical-launch model of the ASROC, was developed as a stopgap weapon in this role. The Sea Lance was to be housed inside a watertight capsule which could be launched from an ordinary 21 inch torpedo tube. The Mk 117 digital fire-control system provided targeting information to

841-427: Was decided to proceed again with the surface-launched RUM-125 version. The nuclear warhead was canceled in favor of a purely conventional missile. In 1990, the entire program was canceled as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today the U.S. Navy attack submarines do not have any long-range supersonic stand-off anti-submarine weapon, while U.S. Navy surface warships do have the new, vertical-launch version of

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