98-469: USS Higbee (DD/DDR-806) was a Gearing -class destroyer in the United States Navy during World War II . She was the first U.S. warship named for a female member of the U.S. Navy , being named for Chief Nurse Lenah S. Higbee (1874–1941), a pioneering Navy nurse who served as Superintendent of the U.S. Navy Nurse Corps during World War I . Higbee was launched 13 November 1944 by
196-451: A Mark 37 Gun Fire Control System with a Mark 25 fire control radar linked by a Mark 1A Fire Control Computer stabilized by a Mark 6 8,500 rpm gyro. This fire control system provided effective long-range anti-aircraft (AA) or anti-surface fire. Twelve 40 mm (1.57 in) Bofors guns in two quad and two twin mounts and 11 20 mm (0.79 in) Oerlikon cannons in single mounts were also equipped. The initial design retained
294-831: A Naval Reserve Force destroyer homeported in Long Beach, CA and Seattle, WA, as a unit of DesRon 37. In 1978 Higbee had the highest score for NGFS (Naval Gunfire Support) of any ship in the US Navy and was featured in Surface Warfare magazine for this distinction. Higbee was decommissioned and struck from the Navy list on 15 July 1979. Higbee was sunk as a target on 24 April 1986, around 130 nmi (240 km; 150 mi) west of San Diego at 32°28′0.4″N 119°58′0.7″W / 32.466778°N 119.966861°W / 32.466778; -119.966861 . One of her anchors
392-530: A U.S.-supported coup which resulted in the death of Diem). Shortly before Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, he had begun a limited withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. forces before the end of 1963. Johnson's views were likewise complex, but he had supported military escalation as a means of challenging what was perceived to be the Soviet Union 's expansionist policies. The Cold War policy of containment
490-704: A "people's war" on the South at a session in January 1959, and on July 28, North Vietnamese forces invaded Laos to maintain and upgrade the Ho Chi Minh trail , in support of insurgents in the south. The rebellion, headed by the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF, or Viet Cong ) under the direction of North Vietnam, had intensified by 1961. About 40,000 communist soldiers infiltrated
588-603: A 20-kilometer (12 mi) limit claimed by French Indochina in 1936. Moreover it officially claimed a 12 nmi limit, which is practically identical to the old 20 km French claim, after the incidents of August, in September 1964. The North Vietnamese stance is that they always considered a 12 nautical mile limit, consistent with the positions regarding the law of the sea of both the Soviet Union and China, their main allies. On August 4, another DESOTO patrol off
686-575: A British journalist after the war that "at that time ... many people ... were looking for any excuse to initiate bombing". George Ball stated that the mission of the destroyer warship involved in the Gulf of Tonkin incident "was primarily for provocation." According to Ray McGovern , CIA analyst from 1963 to 1990, the CIA, "not to mention President Lyndon Johnson, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy all knew full well that
784-562: A North Vietnamese after action report. Later analysis showed those communications to have concerned the recovery of torpedo boats damaged in the August 2 attack and North Vietnamese observations of (but not participation in) the August 4 U.S. actions. Shortly before midnight, on August 4, Johnson interrupted national television to make an announcement in which he described an attack by North Vietnamese vessels on two U.S. Navy warships, Maddox and Turner Joy , and requested authority to undertake
882-458: A cable in which he acknowledged that the second attack may not have happened and that there may actually have been no Vietnamese craft in the area: "Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox . Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken." ... And ultimately it
980-466: A confusing picture although certain that the original ambush was bona fide." It is likely that McNamara did not inform either the president or Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp Jr. about Herrick's misgivings or Herrick's recommendation for further investigation. At 18:00 Washington time (05:00 in the Gulf of Tonkin), Herrick cabled yet again, this time stating, "the first boat to close the Maddox probably launched
1078-465: A direct hit from a five-inch shell from Maddox ; its torpedo malfunctioned at launch. Four USN F-8 Crusader jets launched from Ticonderoga and 15 minutes after Maddox had fired her initial warning shots, attacked the retiring P-4s, claiming one was sunk and one heavily damaged. Maddox suffered only minor damage from a single 14.5 mm bullet from a P-4's KPV heavy machine gun into her superstructure. Retiring to South Vietnamese waters, Maddox
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#17328010653161176-644: A military response. Johnson's speech repeated the theme that "dramatized Hanoi/ Ho Chi Minh as the aggressor and which put the United States into a more acceptable defensive posture." Johnson also referred to the attacks as having taken place "on the high seas", suggesting that they had occurred in international waters. He emphasized commitment to both the American people, and the South Vietnamese government. He also reminded Americans that there
1274-492: A misfire within the mount, when the air attack occurred, which resulted in the wounding of four US sailors. The second MiG-17 flown by Nguyen Van Bay B (the "B" to differentiate from the more famous ace pilot Nguyen Van Bay ) went on to bomb the light cruiser USS Oklahoma City , causing only minor damage. Higbee was repaired at Subic Bay in the Philippines, with the wrecked gun mount removed, to be replaced later and
1372-610: A mission in South Vietnam. They were recruited for the job by the Norwegian intelligence officer Alf Martens Meyer. Martens Meyer, who was head of department at the military intelligence staff, operated on behalf of U.S. intelligence. The three skippers did not know who Meyer really was when they agreed to a job that involved them in sabotage missions against North Vietnam. Although the boats were crewed by South Vietnamese naval personnel, approval for each mission conducted under
1470-464: A new radar system, Mark 32 torpedo tubes, DASH ASW drone, and variable depth sonar (VDS). Importantly, it did not include ASROC. FRAM II ships included six DDRs and six DDEs that retained their specialized equipment (1960–1961), as well as four DDRs that were converted to DDs and were nearly identical to the Allen M. Sumner class FRAM IIs (1962–1963). The FRAM II ships retained all six 5-inch guns, except
1568-462: A pattern of six-month WestPac cruises alternating with upkeep and training out of San Diego. Operating with the 7th Fleet on her WestPac cruises, Higbee visited Australian and South Pacific ports frequently as well as engaging in fleet maneuvers with units of SEATO navies. Her home port was changed to Yokosuka , Japan , on 21 May 1960. From there Higbee continued to cruise in the Pacific and along
1666-665: A series of upgrades, until the 1970s. At that time many were sold to other nations, where they served many more years. 31 vessels were authorized on 9 July 1942: 4 vessels were authorized on 13 May 1942: 3 vessels were authorized on 27 March 1943 under the Vinson–Trammell Act : 114 vessels were authorized on 19 July 1943 under the 70% Expansion Act: (Of the missing numbers in this sequence - 722 to 741, 744 to 762, 770 to 781, and 857 were allocated to orders for Allen M. Sumner -class destroyers ; 792 to 804 were awarded to orders for Fletcher -class destroyers .) In March 1945,
1764-617: A target 14 July 1999. After the Gearing -class ships were retired from USN service, many were sold abroad, including over a dozen to the Republic of China Navy (ROCN) in Taiwan . These ships, along with Fletcher -class destroyers and Allen M. Sumner -class destroyers also acquired then, were upgraded under the Wu ;Chin ( Chinese : 武進 ) I, II, and III programs and known throughout
1862-555: A torpedo at the Maddox which was heard but not seen. All subsequent Maddox torpedo reports are doubtful in that it is suspected that sonarman was hearing the ship's own propeller beat" [ sic ]. In the face of growing uncertainties over the course of the day regarding whether the attack had occurred, the Johnson administration ended up basing its conclusion mostly on communications intercepts erroneously assessed to be North Vietnamese preparations to carry out an attack and
1960-608: Is on display outside of Naval Station Mayport 's medical building. Higbee earned one battle star for her service in World War II and seven battle stars for her service in the Korean War . [REDACTED] This article incorporates text from the public domain Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships . The entries can be found here and here . Gearing-class destroyer The Gearing class
2058-726: The Allen M. Sumner class's heavy torpedo armament of ten 21-inch (530 mm) torpedo tubes in two quintuple mounts, firing the Mark 15 torpedo . As the threat from kamikaze aircraft mounted in 1945, and with few remaining Japanese warships to use torpedoes on, most of the class had the aft quintuple 21-inch tube mounts replaced by an additional 40 mm quadruple mount (prior to completion on later ships) for 16 total 40 mm guns. Twenty-four ships (DD-742, DD743, 805-808, 829, 831-835, and 874-883) were ordered without torpedo tubes to allow for radar picket equipment; these were redesignated as DDRs in 1948. Following World War II most of
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#17328010653162156-474: The Allen M. Sumner class, built from 1943 until 1945. The main differences were that the Gearing s were 14 ft (4.3 m) longer in the midship section, allowing for increased fuel tankage for greater range, an important consideration in Pacific War . More importantly in the long run, the increased size of the Gearing s made them much more suitable for upgrades than the Allen M. Sumner s, as seen in
2254-642: The Bath Iron Works , Bath , Maine ; sponsored by Mrs. A. M. Wheaton, sister of the late Mrs. Higbee; and commissioned on 27 January 1945. Higbee immediately sailed to Boston , where she was converted to a radar picket destroyer. After shakedown in the Caribbean , she sailed for the Pacific on 24 May, joining Carrier Task Force 38 less than 400 miles from Tokyo Bay on 19 July. "Leaping Lenah", as she had been dubbed by her crew, screened
2352-624: The Gearing class were too small to accommodate. An upgraded version of DASH, QH-50D, remained in use by the United States Army until May 2006. FRAM I "A" Ships: (First 8 conversions) Removal of aft twin 5-inch gun mount (Mount 53). Group A ships also received two MK10/11 Hedgehogs fitted on each side of the bridge at the 01 level and had the MK-32 triple torpedo launchers aft of the second stack. FRAM I "B" Ships (remainder of conversions): Kept their forward 5-inch mount (Mount 51), lost
2450-507: The destroyer USS Maddox , while performing a signals intelligence patrol as part of DESOTO operations, was approached by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats of the 135th Torpedo Squadron. Maddox fired warning shots and the North Vietnamese boats attacked with torpedoes and machine gun fire. In the ensuing engagement, one U.S. aircraft (which had been launched from aircraft carrier USS Ticonderoga )
2548-476: The 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) limit and North Vietnamese resolve. These runs into North Vietnamese territorial waters coincided with South Vietnamese coastal raids and were interpreted as coordinated operations by the North, which officially acknowledged the engagements of August 2, 1964. Others, such as Admiral Sharp, maintained that U.S. actions did not provoke the August 2 incident. He claimed that
2646-879: The August 4 incident, Johnson had decided on retaliatory attacks (dubbed " Operation Pierce Arrow "). That same day he used the "hot line" to Moscow, and assured the Soviets he had no intent in opening a broader war in Vietnam. Early on August 5, Johnson publicly ordered retaliatory measures stating, "The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the government of South Vietnam will be redoubled by this outrage." One hour and forty minutes after his speech, aircraft launched from U.S. carriers reached North Vietnamese targets. On August 5, at 10:40, these planes bombed four torpedo boat bases and an oil-storage facility in Vinh . While Johnson's final resolution
2744-653: The China coast to strengthen American force in Asia. After two years duty in Japan, Higbee returned to her new home port, San Francisco , on 4 September 1962. On 1 April 1963 the destroyer entered the shipyard there for a fleet rehabilitation and modernization (FRAM) overhaul designed to improve her fighting capabilities and lengthen her life span as an active member of the fleet. Higbee was redesignated DD-806 on 1 June 1963. Ready for action on 3 January 1964, Higbee trained on
2842-622: The DDEs retained four 5-inch guns and a trainable Hedgehog in the No. 2 position. All FRAM IIs retained two Hedgehogs alongside either the No. 2 5-inch mount or the trainable Hedgehog mount. The four DDRs converted to DDs were armed with two new 21-inch torpedo tubes for the Mk. 37 ASW homing torpedo. Photographs of the six retained DDRs show no markings on the DASH landing deck, as well as a much smaller deckhouse than
2940-737: The DESOTO operations, had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961. In 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department and conducted by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group (MACV-SOG). For the maritime portion of the covert operation, a set of fast patrol boats had been purchased quietly from Norway and sent to South Vietnam. In 1963, three young Norwegian skippers traveled on
3038-596: The FRAM II ships were disposed of in 1969–1974. With ASROC continuing to provide a standoff ASW capability, the Gearing FRAM Is were retained in service for several years, with most being decommissioned and transferred to foreign navies 1973–1980. They were replaced as ASW ships by the Spruance -class destroyers , which were commissioned 1975–1983. These had the same ASW armament as a Gearing FRAM destroyer, with
USS Higbee - Misplaced Pages Continue
3136-565: The Fast Carrier Task Force 77 as their jets launched raids against Communist positions and supply lines. On 15 September she formed part of the shore bombardment and screening group for the amphibious operation at Inchon . Higbee returned to San Diego on 8 February 1951. In two subsequent stints in Korea, she continued to screen the carrier task force and carry out shore bombardment of enemy positions. In order to protect against
3234-493: The Gulf of Tonkin. Captain George Stephen Morrison was in command of local American forces from his flagship USS Bon Homme Richard . Maddox was under orders not to approach closer than eight miles (13 km) from North Vietnam's coast and four miles (6 km) from Hon Nieu island. When a MACV-SOG commando raid was being carried out against Hon Nieu, the ship was 120 miles (190 km) away from
3332-616: The Hanoi government (which, unlike the U.S. government, had to give permission at the highest levels for the conduct of such missions) probably assumed that they were all a coordinated effort to escalate military actions against North Vietnam. Daniel Ellsberg , who was on duty in the Pentagon the night of August 4, receiving messages from USS Maddox , reported that she was on a DESOTO mission near Northern Vietnamese territorial waters. On July 31, 1964, Maddox had begun her mission in
3430-484: The Johnson administration in the second half of 1964 focused on convincing the American public that there was no chance of war between the United States and North Vietnam. North Vietnam's General Giáp suggested that the DESOTO patrol had been sent into the gulf to provoke North Vietnam into giving the U.S. an excuse for escalation of the war. Various government officials and men aboard Maddox have suggested similar theories. U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball told
3528-466: The Mk 32 torpedo tubes and ASROC launched Mk. 44 homing ASW torpedoes . ASROC could also launch a nuclear depth charge . On 11 May 1962, Agerholm tested a live nuclear ASROC in the " Swordfish " test. In Navy slang, the modified destroyers were called "FRAM cans", "can" being a contraction of "tin can", the slang term for a destroyer or destroyer escort. The Gyrodyne QH-50C DASH was an unmanned anti-submarine helicopter, controlled remotely from
3626-441: The North Vietnamese coast in international waters . Maddox stated she had evaded a torpedo attack and opened fire with its five-inch (127 mm) guns, forcing the torpedo boats away. Two of the torpedo boats had come as close as 5 nautical miles (9.3 km; 5.8 mi) and released one torpedo each, but neither one was effective, coming no closer than about 100 yards (91 m) after Maddox evaded them. Another P-4 received
3724-621: The North Vietnamese coast put the ship in international waters, as North Vietnam claimed only a 5 nautical miles (9.3 km; 5.8 mi) limit as its territory (or off of its off-shore islands). In addition, many nations had previously carried out similar missions all over the world, and the destroyer USS John R. Craig had earlier conducted an intelligence-gathering mission in similar circumstances without incident. Sharp's claims, however, included some factually incorrect statements. North Vietnam did not adhere to an 8-kilometer (5 mi) limit for its territorial waters; instead it adhered to
3822-401: The North Vietnamese coast was launched by Maddox and Turner Joy , to "show the flag" after the first incident. This time their orders indicated that the ships were to close to no less than 11 miles (18 km) from the coast of North Vietnam. During an evening of rough weather and heavy seas, the destroyers received radar, sonar, and radio signals that they believed signaled another attack by
3920-421: The North Vietnamese coast, and the coastal attacks were seen as a helpful way to get the North Vietnamese to turn on their coastal radars. For this purpose, it was authorized to approach the coast as close as 13 kilometers (8 mi) and the offshore islands as close as four; the latter had already been subjected to shelling from the sea. In his book, Body of Secrets , James Bamford , who spent three years in
4018-616: The North Vietnamese had tracked Maddox along the coast by radar and were thus aware that the destroyer had not actually attacked North Vietnam and that Hanoi (or the local commander) had ordered its craft to engage Maddox anyway. North Vietnamese general Phùng Thế Tài later claimed that Maddox had been tracked since July 31 and that she had attacked fishing boats on August 2 forcing the North Vietnamese Navy to "fight back". Sharp also noted that orders given to Maddox to stay 8 nautical miles (15 km; 9.2 mi) off
USS Higbee - Misplaced Pages Continue
4116-473: The North Vietnamese navy. For some two hours (from about 21:40 to about 23:35, local time) the ships fired on radar targets and maneuvered vigorously amid electronic and visual reports of enemies. Despite the Navy's claim that two attacking torpedo boats had been sunk, there was no wreckage, bodies of dead North Vietnamese sailors, or other physical evidence present at the scene of the alleged engagement. At 01:27 local time (13:27 Washington time), Herrick sent
4214-927: The ROCN as the Yang-class ( Chinese : 陽字號 ) destroyers as they were assigned names that all end with the word "Yang". The last batch of 7 WC-III program vessels, all of them Gearing class, were retired in the early 2000s. Under the most advanced Wu Chin III upgrade program, all World War II vintage weapons were removed and replaced with four Hsiung Feng II surface-to-surface missiles, ten SM-1 (box launchers), one 8-cell ASROC, one 76 mm (3 in) Otobreda gun , two Bofors 40 mm AA, one 20 mm Phalanx CIWS and two triple 12.75 in (324 mm) torpedo tubes . The DASH ASW drones were not acquired, but hangar facilities aboard those ships that had them were later used to accommodate of MD 500/ASW helicopters . After
4312-727: The Soviet hydrographic ship Gidrifon . Returning to South Vietnam in April, Higbee bombarded enemy positions near Cape St. Jacques and the mouth of the Saigon River . On 17 June she departed Yokosuka for the West Coast, arrived Long Beach, her new home port, on 2 July and operated out of there into 1967. In November 1966, Higbee and her squadron had R&R in Acapulco, Mexico, where Bob Hope did an unscheduled servicemen's show for
4410-566: The Tonkin Gulf incident. Time reported: "Through the darkness, from the West and south ... intruders boldly sped ... at least six of them ... they opened fire on the destroyers with automatic weapons, this time from as close as 2,000 yards." Time stated that there was "no doubt in Sharp's mind that the U.S. would now have to answer this attack", and that there was no debate or confusion within
4508-669: The U.S. ships had in fact been cooperating in the South Vietnamese attacks against North Vietnam. In 1962, the U.S. Navy began an electronic warfare support measures (intelligence gathering) program, conducted by destroyer patrols in the western Pacific, with the cover name DESOTO. The first missions in the Tonkin Gulf began in February 1964. While intelligence collected by DESOTO missions could be used by OPLAN-34A planners and commanders, they were separate programs not known to coordinate mission planning except to warn DESOTO patrols to stay clear of 34A operational areas. On July 29, 1964,
4606-503: The United States Navy as an intelligence analyst, writes that the primary purpose of the Maddox "was to act as a seagoing provocateur—to poke its sharp gray bow and the American flag as close to the belly of North Vietnam as possible, in effect shoving its five-inch cannons up the nose of the communist navy. ... The Maddox ' mission was made even more provocative by being timed to coincide with commando raids, creating
4704-479: The United States became more involved in the war that his claim began to gain support throughout the United States government. The U.S. government was still seeking evidence on the night of August 4 when Johnson gave his address to the American public on the incident; messages recorded that day indicate that neither Johnson nor McNamara was certain of an attack. Various news sources, including Time , Life and Newsweek , published articles throughout August on
4802-613: The United States nor the State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. The accords, which were signed by other participants including the Viet Minh, mandated a temporary ceasefire line, which separated southern and northern Vietnam to be governed by the State of Vietnam and the Viet Minh respectively. The accords called for a general election by July 1956 to create a unified Vietnamese state. The accords allowed free movement of
4900-741: The West Coast until departing for Japan on 30 June and reached her new homeport, Yokosuka, on 18 July. During the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in August, the destroyer screened carriers of Task Force 77 (TF 77) in the South China Sea . In February 1965 Higbee supported the 9th Marine Brigade at Da Nang , Vietnam . In May she participated in Project Gemini recovery in the Western Pacific. On 1 September Higbee helped to rescue
4998-559: The West Coast. On her second WestPac cruise, Higbee escorted the heavy cruiser Toledo (CA-133) as they paid official visits to the recently constituted governments of India and Pakistan in the summer of 1948. When Communist troops plunged into South Korea in June 1950, Higbee , redesignated DDR-806 on 18 March 1949, was immediately deployed to the Korean coast with the 7th Fleet . Most of her Korean War duty came in screening
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#17328010653165096-767: The Yang-class destroyers were decommissioned, the SM-1 launch boxes were moved to Chi Yang -class frigates to improve their anti-air capability. DDR-878 Five Gearing -class destroyers are preserved as museum ships: two in the United States, one in South Korea, one in Taiwan, and one in Turkey. The ROKS Jeon Buk (DD-916) (formerly the USS ; Everett F. Larson ) was scrapped in December 2021, leaving five survivors out of
5194-713: The addition of improved sonar and a piloted helicopter, initially the Kaman SH-2 Seasprite , and from 1984, the Sikorsky SH-60 Seahawk . Some Gearing s served in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) from 1973, remaining in commission with a partial active crew to provide training for Naval reservists. The last Gearing -class destroyer in US naval service was William C. Lawe , a FRAM I, decommissioned and struck 1 October 1983, and expended as
5292-447: The administration regarding the incident. The use of the set of incidents as a pretext for escalation of U.S. involvement followed the issuance of public threats against North Vietnam, as well as calls from American politicians in favor of escalating the war. On May 4, 1964, William Bundy had called for the U.S. to "drive the communists out of South Vietnam", even if that meant attacking both North Vietnam and communist China. Even so,
5390-468: The attack, the Johnson administration relied on the wrongly interpreted National Security Agency communications intercepts to conclude that the attack was real. While doubts regarding the perceived second attack have been expressed since 1964, it was not until years later that it was shown conclusively never to have happened. In the 2003 documentary The Fog of War , the former United States Secretary of Defense , Robert S. McNamara , admitted that there
5488-544: The attacked area. In July 1964, "the situation along North Vietnam's territorial waters had reached a near boil", because of South Vietnamese commando raids and airborne operations that inserted intelligence teams into North Vietnam, as well as North Vietnam's military response to these operations. On the night of July 30, 1964, South Vietnamese commandos attacked a North Vietnamese radar station on Hòn Mê island. According to Hanyok, "it would be attacks on these islands, especially Hòn Mê, by South Vietnamese commandos, along with
5586-472: The carriers as their planes launched heavy air attacks against the Japanese mainland until the end of hostilities on 15 August. She helped clear Japanese mine fields and supported the occupation forces for the following seven months, finally returning to San Diego on 11 April 1946. The post-war years saw Higbee make two peacetime Western Pacific cruises as well as participate in fleet exercises and tactical training maneuvers during both these cruises and off
5684-418: The class had their AA and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) armament upgraded. The 40 mm and 20 mm guns were replaced by two to six 3-inch (76 mm)/50 caliber guns in up to two twin and two single mountings. One depth charge rack was removed and two Hedgehog ASW mortar mounts added. The K-guns were retained. Nine additional (for a total of 35) ships were converted to radar picket destroyers (DDR) in
5782-421: The crew from Arsinoe after the French tanker had grounded off Scarborough Shoals in the South China Sea. The remainder of September was spent in naval gunfire support off South Vietnam. On the return voyage to home port, the ship saw short duty as Station Ship Hong Kong. While in Hong Kong, Princess Margaret was piped aboard the ship. While operating northeast of Luzon in late January 1966, Higbee sighted
5880-549: The crews. The first half of 1967 was spent in the yards at Mare Island for a major refit before returning to the Vietnam theater. On 19 April 1972 Higbee became the first US warship to be bombed during the Vietnam War, when two VPAF (also known as the NVAF- North Vietnamese Air Force ) MiG-17s from the 923rd Fighter Regiment attacked, one of which, piloted by Le Xuan Di, dropped a 250 kilogram (500 lb) bomb onto Higbee ' s rear 5-inch gun mount, destroying it. The 5-inch gun crew had been outside their turret, due to
5978-443: The early 1950s; these typically received only one 3-inch twin mount to save weight for radar equipment, as did the wartime radar pickets. Nine ships were converted to escort destroyers (DDE), emphasizing ASW. Carpenter was the most thorough DDE conversion, with 4 3-inch/70 caliber guns in twin enclosed mounts, two Weapon Alpha launchers, four new 21-inch torpedo tubes for the Mark 37 ASW torpedo , and one depth charge rack. In
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#17328010653166076-415: The evidence of any armed attack on the evening of Aug. 4, 1964, the so-called 'second' Tonkin Gulf incident, was highly dubious. ... During the summer of 1964, President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were eager to widen the war in Vietnam. They stepped up sabotage and hit-and-run attacks on the coast of North Vietnam." Maddox , carrying electronic spying gear, was to collect signals intelligence from
6174-505: The impression that the Maddox was directing those missions ..." Thus, the North Vietnamese had every reason to believe that Maddox was involved in these actions. John McNaughton suggested in September 1964 that the U.S. prepare to take actions to provoke a North Vietnamese military reaction, including plans to use DESOTO patrols North. William Bundy's paper dated September 8, 1964, suggested more DESOTO patrols as well. By early afternoon of August 4, Washington time, Herrick had reported to
6272-458: The incident of August 4 was based on bad naval intelligence and misrepresentations of North Vietnamese communications. The official US government claim is that it was based mostly on erroneously interpreted communications intercepts. The outcome of the incident was the passage by U.S. Congress of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution , which granted U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson the authority to assist any Southeast Asian country whose government
6370-497: The late 1950s and early 1960s, 79 of the Gearing -class destroyers underwent extensive modernization overhauls, known as FRAM I , which were designed under project SCB 206 to convert them from an anti-aircraft destroyer to an anti-submarine warfare platform. FRAM I removed all of the DDR and DDE equipment, and these ships were redesignated as DDs. FRAM I and FRAM II conversions were completed 1960–1965. Eventually all but three Gearing s received FRAM conversions. The FRAM I program
6468-416: The next day, August 2, Maddox , which had a top speed of 28 knots, resumed her routine patrol, and three North Vietnamese P-4 torpedo boats with a top speed of 50 knots began to follow Maddox . The boats were from Squadron 135, commanded by Le Duy Khoai, with the boats commanded by brothers Van Bot, Van Tu, and Van Gian. Intercepted communications indicated that the vessels intended to attack Maddox . As
6566-401: The night before it launched actions against North Vietnamese facilities on Hòn Mê and Hòn Ngư islands, the MACV-SOG had launched a covert long-term agent team into North Vietnam, which was promptly captured. On August 1 and 2, flights of CIA-sponsored Laotian fighter-bombers (piloted by Thai mercenaries) attacked border outposts well within southwestern North Vietnam. According to Edwin Moïse,
6664-399: The ninety eight ships built. Gulf of Tonkin Incident American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Gulf of Tonkin incident ( Vietnamese : Sự kiện Vịnh Bắc Bộ )
6762-404: The orders for 36 of the above vessels were cancelled, and 11 more orders were cancelled in August 1945. Following the close of World War II , 7 further vessels were cancelled in 1946: The first ship was laid down in August 1944, while the last was launched in March 1946. In that time the United States produced 98 Gearing -class destroyers. The Gearing class was a seemingly minor improvement of
6860-454: The plan came directly from Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp Jr. , CINCPAC in Honolulu , who received his orders from the White House . After the coastal attacks began, Hanoi , the capital of North Vietnam, lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the terms of the Geneva Accords, but the U.S. denied any involvement. Four years later, Secretary McNamara admitted to Congress that
6958-418: The population between the north and south for three hundred days. They also forbade the political interference of other countries in the area, the creation of new governments without the stipulated elections, and foreign military presence. By 1961, South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem faced significant discontent among some quarters of the southern population, including some Buddhists who were opposed to
7056-572: The possibility of Communist Chinese invasion of Nationalist China , Higbee also participated in patrol of Formosa Straits . Returning to the States on 30 June 1953, she entered the Long Beach Yard for a six-month modernization which saw major structural alterations made, including an enlarged Combat Information Center, new height-finding radar, and an improved anti-aircraft battery. The radar picket destroyer's peacetime duty then fell into
7154-610: The proximity of the Maddox , that would set off the confrontation", although the Maddox did not participate in the commando attacks. In this context, on July 31, Maddox began patrols of the North Vietnamese coast to collect intelligence, coming within a few miles of Hòn Mê island. A U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Ticonderoga , was also stationed nearby. By August 1, North Vietnamese patrol boats were tracking Maddox , and several intercepted communications indicated that they were preparing to attack. Maddox retreated, but
7252-412: The resolution was read and presented to Congress, Morse began to fight it. He contended in speeches to Congress that the actions taken by the United States were actions outside the constitution and were "acts of war rather than acts of defense." Morse's efforts were not immediately met with support, largely because he revealed no sources and was working with very limited information. It was not until after
7350-433: The rule of Diem's Catholic supporters. Viet Minh political cadres , who were legally campaigning for the promised elections between 1955 and 1957, were suppressed by the government. In March 1956, the North Vietnamese leadership approved tentative measures to revive the southern insurgency in December 1956. A communist-led uprising began against Diem's government in April 1957. The North Vietnamese Communist Party approved
7448-446: The second [attack]. I think it is now clear [the second attack] did not occur ... –Defense Secretary Robert McNamara , 1996 One hour later, Herrick sent another cable, stating, "Entire action leaves many doubts except for apparent ambush at beginning. Suggest thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." In response to requests for confirmation, at around 16:00 Washington time, Herrick cabled, "Details of action present
7546-508: The second mount (Mount 52) and kept their aft 5-inch mount (Mount 53). In place of mount 52, a practice 5-inch reloading machine was installed with the MK-32 triple torpedo launchers aft of the loader. Group B ships also received greater ASROC and torpedo storage areas next to the port side of the DASH hangar. The FRAM II program was designed primarily for the Allen M. Sumner class destroyer, but sixteen Gearing s were upgraded as well. This upgrade program included life-extension refurbishment,
7644-517: The ship. The drone could carry two Mark 44 homing ASW torpedoes. During this era the ASROC system had an effective range of only 5 nautical miles (9.3 km; 5.8 mi), but the DASH drone allowed the ship to deploy ASW attack to sonar contacts as far as 22 nmi (41 km; 25 mi) away. However, DASH proved unreliable in shipboard service, with over half of the USN's 746 drones lost at sea. This
7742-438: The ships approached from the southwest, Maddox changed course from northeasterly to southeasterly and increased speed to 25 knots. As the torpedo boats neared, Maddox fired three warning shots. The North Vietnamese boats then attacked, and Maddox radioed she was under attack from the three boats, closing to within 10 nautical miles (19 km; 12 mi), while located 28 nautical miles (52 km; 32 mi) away from
7840-492: The ships opened fire on radar returns that had been preceded by communications intercepts, which US forces claimed meant an attack was imminent. The commander of the Maddox task force, Captain John Herrick , reported that the ships were being attacked by North Vietnamese boats when, in fact, there were no North Vietnamese boats in the area. While Herrick soon reported doubts regarding the task force's initial perceptions of
7938-492: The south from 1961 to 1963. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred during the first year of the Johnson administration. While U.S. President John F. Kennedy had originally supported the policy of sending military advisers to Diem, he had begun to alter his thinking by September 1963, because of what he perceived to be the ineptitude of the Saigon government and its inability and unwillingness to make needed reforms (which led to
8036-478: The structural damage repaired. Although there were no official aircraft losses reported by either side during the aerial attack, witnesses aboard accompanying USN vessel's deploying defensive measures, claimed one of the attacking MiGs with a hit by a surface-to-air missile fired from the cruiser USS Sterett . Higbee' s first peacetime duty was as a member of Destroyer Squadron 27 homeported in Long Beach, California. Her later years (after May, 1975) were spent as
8134-505: The wartime radar picket subclass, the 1950s radar picket destroyer (DDR) and escort destroyer (DDE) conversions, and the Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM) conversions 1960-1965. As designed, the Gearing class's armament was identical to that on the Allen M. Sumner class. Three twin 5 in (127 mm)/38 caliber Mark 38 dual purpose (DP) mounts constituted the main battery. The 5-inch guns were guided by
8232-510: The waters of the Gulf of Tonkin . Originally, US military claims blamed North Vietnam for the confrontation and the ostensible, but in fact imaginary, incident on August 4. Later investigation revealed that the second attack never happened. The National Security Agency , an agency of the US Defense Department, had deliberately skewed intelligence to create the impression that an attack had been carried out. On August 2, 1964,
8330-573: Was a series of 98 destroyers built for the U.S. Navy during and shortly after World War II . The Gearing design was a minor modification of the Allen M. Sumner class , whereby the hull was lengthened by 14 ft (4.3 m) at amidships, which resulted in more fuel storage space and increased the operating range. The first Gearings were not ready for service until mid-1945 and saw little service in World War II. They continued serving, with
8428-607: Was an extensive conversion for the Gearing -class destroyers. This upgrade included rebuilding the ship's superstructure, electronic systems, radar, sonar, and weapons. The second twin 5-inch gun mount and all previous AA guns and ASW equipment were removed. On several ships the two forward 5-inch mounts remained and the aft 5-inch mount was removed. Upgraded systems included SQS-23 sonar, SPS-10 surface search radar, two triple Mark 32 torpedo tubes , an 8-cell Anti-Submarine Rocket ( ASROC ) box launcher, and one QH-50C DASH ASW drone helicopter, with its own landing pad and hangar . Both
8526-549: Was an international confrontation that led to the United States engaging more directly in the Vietnam War . It consisted of a confrontation on August 2, 1964, when United States forces were carrying out covert amphibious operations close to North Vietnamese territorial waters, which triggered a response from North Vietnamese forces. The United States government falsely claimed that a second incident occurred on August 4, 1964, between North Vietnamese and United States ships in
8624-633: Was being drafted, U.S. Senator Wayne Morse attempted to hold a fundraiser to raise awareness about possible faulty records of the incident involving Maddox . Morse supposedly received a call from an informant who has remained anonymous urging Morse to investigate official logbooks of Maddox . These logs were not available before Johnson's resolution was presented to Congress. After urging Congress that they should be wary of Johnson's coming attempt to convince Congress of his resolution, Morse failed to gain enough cooperation and support from his colleagues to mount any sort of movement to stop it. Immediately after
8722-424: Was concluded that almost certainly the [August 4] attack had occurred. But even at the time there was some recognition of a margin of error, so we thought it highly probable but not entirely certain. And because it was highly probable—and because even if it hadn't occurred, there was strong feeling we should have responded to the first attack, which we were positive had occurred—President Johnson decided to respond to
8820-553: Was considered to be jeopardized by communist aggression. The resolution served as Johnson's legal justification for deploying U.S. conventional forces to South Vietnam and the commencement of open warfare against North Vietnam. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War . Neither
8918-420: Was damaged, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats were damaged, and four North Vietnamese sailors were killed, with six more wounded. There were no U.S. casualties. Maddox was "unscathed except for a single bullet hole from a [North] Vietnamese machine gun round". On August 3, 1964, destroyer USS Turner Joy joined Maddox and the two destroyers continued the DESOTO mission. On the evening of August 4,
9016-563: Was joined by the destroyer USS Turner Joy . The original account from the Pentagon Papers has been revised in light of a 2001 internal NSA historical study, which states: At 1500G, Captain Herrick (commander of Maddox ) ordered Ogier's gun crews to open fire if the boats approached within ten thousand yards. At about 1505G, Maddox fired three rounds to warn off the communist [North Vietnamese] boats. This initial action
9114-544: Was never reported by the Johnson administration, which insisted that the Vietnamese boats fired first. Maddox , when confronted, was approaching Hòn Mê Island, three to four nautical miles (nmi) (6 to 7 km) inside the 12 nautical miles (22 km; 14 mi) limit claimed by North Vietnam. This territorial limit was unrecognized by the United States. After the skirmish, Johnson ordered Maddox and Turner Joy to stage daylight runs into North Vietnamese waters, testing
9212-408: Was no attack on August 4. In 1995, McNamara met with former North Vietnamese Army General Võ Nguyên Giáp to ask what happened on August 4, 1964. "Absolutely nothing", Giáp replied. Giáp confirmed that the attack had been imaginary. In 2005, an internal National Security Agency historical study was declassified; it concluded that Maddox had engaged the North Vietnamese Navy on August 2, but that
9310-423: Was no desire for war. "A close scrutiny of Johnson's public statements ... reveals no mention of preparations for overt warfare and no indication of the nature and extent of covert land and air measures that already were operational." Johnson's statements were short to "minimize the U.S. role in the conflict; a clear inconsistency existed between Johnson's actions and his public discourse." Within thirty minutes of
9408-541: Was possibly due to inadequate maintenance support, as other services had few difficulties with DASH. By 1970, DASH had been withdrawn from FRAM I ships, though it was retained into the early 1970s on FRAM II ships, which lacked ASROC. A limitation of drones in ASW was the need to re-acquire the target at ranges beyond the effectiveness of the controlling ship's sonar. This led to shift to the LAMPS program of manned helicopters, which
9506-524: Was to be applied to prevent the fall of Southeast Asia to communism under the precepts of the domino theory . After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson ordered in more U.S. forces to support the Saigon government, beginning a protracted United States presence in Southeast Asia. A highly classified program of covert actions against North Vietnam, known as Operation Plan 34-Alpha , in conjunction with
9604-412: Was usually provided for DASH, so they may not have been equipped with DASH. Many of the Gearing s provided significant gunfire support in the Vietnam War . They also served as escorts for Carrier Battle Groups ( carrier strike groups from 2004) and Amphibious Ready Groups ( Expeditionary Strike Groups from 2006). DASH was withdrawn from ASW service in 1969, due to poor reliability. Lacking ASROC,
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