The Unification Decree was a political measure adopted by Francisco Franco in his capacity of Head of State of Nationalist Spain on April 19, 1937. The decree merged two existing political groupings, the Falangists and the Carlists , into a new party - the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista (FET y de las JONS). As all other parties were declared dissolved at the same time, the FET became the only legal party in Nationalist Spain. It was defined in the decree as a link between state and society and was intended to form the basis for an eventual totalitarian regime. The head of state – Franco himself – was proclaimed party leader, to be assisted by the Junta Política and Consejo Nacional. A set of decrees which followed shortly after appointed members to the new executive.
187-785: The merger was imposed upon the Falange Española de las JONS and the Carlist Traditionalist Communion . Leaders of both parties – Manuel Hedilla of the Falange and Manuel Fal Conde of the Carlists – were outmaneuvered by Franco, who divided, deceived, and misled them and finally left them no option but to comply with unification on his own terms, and they along with other political opponents were subsequently marginalized. The Unification Decree ensured Franco's total political dominance and secured at least
374-509: A fascist or parafascist state, but an institution of Catholic or traditional significance. This continued to be so even after the unification, to the point where Pemán commented to the president of the Junta —who by then was already Jordana — that the Culture and Education Commission that he presided over became "refuge and headquarters of all that remains outside the single party". Although
561-625: A triumvirate formed by Ramiro Ledesma, Ruiz de Alda and José Antonio Primo de Rivera, while the secondary General Secretary position was given to Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta . It attracted a considerable number of prominent intellectuals, including Pedro Mourlane Michelena, Rafael Sánchez Mazas , Ernesto Giménez Caballero , Eugenio Montes, José María Alfaro, Agustín de Foxa, Luys Santa Marina, Samuel Ros, Jacinto Miquelarena and Dionisio Ridruejo . Martin Blinkhorn [ es ] has recognised at least four different ideological strands within
748-480: A Carlist-military alliance. The Falangists saw the Nationalist effort very much in terms of a syndicalist revolution, with Falange the only genuine live political force amidst remnants of old, pathetically antiquated other parties. Both CT and FE considered the army – even though viewed with some suspicion as respectively liberal or reactionary – a necessary tool to gain control of all Spain, but they expected
935-465: A Republican prison, giving him martyr status among the Falangists. This conviction and sentence was possible because he had lost his parliamentary immunity after his party did not have enough votes during the last elections. Hedilla played an important role in seizing the town of Corunna, bringing in well-armed Falangists to help rebels secure the town and partaking in some of the worst repression of
1122-652: A ban on slaughtering animals outside municipal slaughterhouses. The Act stated that it was: responsible for all matters related to the current bases and labor agreements and the study of new guidelines for the welfare of the workers and their collaboration with the other elements of production. Its headquarters were in Burgos . According to the Act: its mission shall be to ensure the continuation of public works in progress, to undertake new projects where indispensable, to re-establish transportation lines of all kinds, to organize
1309-813: A centuries-old historical process. The first task, given to the new party, was rather modest: organize nursing courses. The leaders of Carlism and the original Falange assumed a highly skeptical wait-and-see stand. Franco made some effort to lure both. He sent very respectful letters to Don Javier and suggested that the exiled Fal be made ambassador in Vatican , yet in general terms he left the regent no option but to accept unification. Eventually Franco consented to Don Javier's request and allowed Fal back in Spain, met him in August and vaguely offered him high posts, which Fal politely declined. Both Don Javier and Fal considered Rodezno
1496-401: A civic “Acción Ciudadana”. All these concepts were resemblant of Primo de Rivera state party, Unión Patriótica, the amorphous and bureaucratic structure built from scratch and organized around general values such as patriotism, discipline, work, law and order. It is not clear whether Franco has ever considered seriously any of the above options; it seems that by late 1936 he started to opt for
1683-544: A corporative state yet he could have not distinguished between the regimes in Italy, Austria , Portugal and Germany . It seems that at that time he expected that the Falangists and the Carlists would work out the merger terms themselves; in a letter to Rome Nicolás Franco claimed that both parties were in midst of negotiations, that the talks were going on well and that the major problem was Don Javier, unwilling to cede power. Contemporary scholar concludes that Franco considered
1870-609: A deal agreed by both parties might be better than a solution imposed by the military. Exchange of public statements at the turn of 1936 and 1937 immediately revealed major differences: an article by Carlist pundit presented both as partners, but in response Hedilla declared that Traditionalists were most likely to be absorbed by Falange. First informal consultation talks were staged by compromise-minded politicians in January 1937 and were re-opened in February, though in both parties there
2057-454: A decree-law declaring null and void all concessions made by any authority. The regulation has been the subject of diverse interpretations by historians, but the Germans perceived it as an attack on their interests because it prevented HISMA money from being invested in the purchase of mining interests. The Junta Técnica explained to them that the objective was to stop the concessions made by
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#17327658510462244-458: A different formula, based not on a general political amalgam but formatted along more specific lines. In November he confessed in private that perhaps the Falangist doctrine could be incorporated without the Falange. The same month in liaison with Hedilla he asked the party head of Servicio Exterior section to propose terms of would-be merger with the Carlists; there is no outcome known, though it
2431-407: A failure. One argument put forward is that it failed to actually unify all Nationalist political groupings; Carlism and Alfonsism survived as autonomous forces and soon new ones started to emerge. Another argument is that the newly created state party, Falange Española Tradicionalista, has never become the vehicle of popular mobilization, a platform of forging a political course and a social backbone of
2618-403: A formal political unity within the Nationalist zone, albeit not one of genuine affection. It in reality represented the absorption of Carlist offshoots into a subsequently domesticated and subordinated Falange. Most scholars consider unification to have been a stepping stone towards a semi-fascist state. This augmented Falange served as Spain's sole legal party for the next 38 years, becoming one of
2805-590: A former mechanic, as many of the first generation leaders were dead or incarcerated by the Republicans. Among them was Primo de Rivera, who was a government prisoner. As a result, he was referred to among the leadership as el Ausente , ("the Absent One"). After being sentenced to death on 18 November 1936, José Antonio Primo de Rivera was executed on 20 November 1936 (a date since known as 20-N in Spain) in
2992-489: A government. There was a Secretariat of Foreign Relations headed by the diplomat Francisco Serrat , but it was Sangroniz who really acted as minister in the shadow together with Nicolás Franco . However, General Franco could use different collaborators for his negotiations, but he always reserved for himself the predominant role in diplomacy. In June 1937, the debt to Germany already amounted to 150 million marks and Hitler openly expressed his intention to obtain
3179-610: A half-traitor, though they preferred not to burn the bridges; in the second half of 1937 they focused on saving what could have been saved – related institutions, newspapers, buildings – from takeover by FET. In case of the original Falange its leaders from the anti-Hedillista “legitimist” faction, some released from jail, preferred to remain on the sidelines and not to engage; this was the case of Agustín Aznar, Sancho Dávila, Dionisio Ridruejo , Fernando González Vélez, Rafael Garcerán or Francisco Moreno, who viewed unification as “killing two authentic beings to create an artificial one”. During
3366-528: A large funeral and was hailed as "the first victim of fascism in Spain." Rico's killers seemed to have acted on their own initiative without informing their superiors and an escalation of violence soon followed; José Antonio had to put his foot down to prevent some Falangists from assassinating Indalecio Prieto and from blowing up the Socialists' headquarters in Madrid. The party was initially organised as
3553-528: A left-wing revolution but poverty alleviation and to end class struggle by using a new, vertical, syndicalist structure under the Falange. The party desired to attract people from all social classes, whether or not they had been members of left-wing organisations; the Falange viewed conflict between political parties as a consequence of liberalism and democracy. They hoped this unification would make Spain powerful again and allow Spain to launch further imperial acquisitions. However, historian Stanley Payne argues that
3740-537: A locally known Rioja politician José Mazón Sainz (36). The ten was complete with Pedro González-Bueno , an Alfonsist closer to Serrano rather than to the party mainstream (41). Out of 22 individuals who formed pre-unification executive bodies of FE and CT only Hedilla and Rodezno were listed; except Rodezno and Arellano none had earlier parliamentary experience. The decree which followed shortly adopted original Falangist motives – yoke and arrows , Cara al sol , black-red banner, “camarada”-style addressing – as motives of
3927-459: A massive rally of youth, staged in October in Burgos and intended as display of unity, turned into embarrassment when in front of Franco a multi-thousand crowd broke into a “blue” Falangist part and a “red” Carlist part. The unificated Carlist leaders were getting increasingly disappointed about their marginalization while the original Navarrese executive – still operational – addressed Franco with
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#17327658510464114-602: A message of complaint and asked for some sort of rectification. In the second half of 1937 many Carlist local leaders who initially engaged in the emerging FET structures were now bombarding their men in Junta Política with letters of outrage, complaining about lack of Falangist give and take and demanding immediate intervention. Violent street clashes between Falangists and Carlists (both unificated and non-unificated) were not rare, with hundreds of arrests following. In October 1937 Franco decided to set up Consejo Nacional ,
4301-490: A military man, a decision that marked a clear tendency of Franco to rely politically on his subordinates. The initial choice was Fidel Dávila , a brigadier general who, at the same time, was appointed chief of the General Staff . He was the only member of the dismissed National Defense Junta who continued to hold a position in the new administration. Dávila has the image of a bureaucrat among some historians, but
4488-402: A more decisive role. In contact with the conspirators from the prison of Alicante, where he was imprisoned, he alternated communiqués begging for a prompt uprising, with conditions to join the conspiracy that the military did not meet. Finally, an announcement on 17 July called on his organizations to join the coup, accepting an auxiliary role. The command of the party rested upon Manuel Hedilla ,
4675-509: A narrative. In Falangist ranks – which consisted in overwhelming majority of new recruits unrelated to pre-war revolutionary syndicalism – the unification was viewed simply as absorption of Carlism and adoption of new leadership, though a number of Falangist public demonstrations against the unification took place in several cities. In Carlist ranks the mood differed from sheer enthusiasm to protest; some requeté units considered abandoning their frontline positions. Many settled for what they perceived
4862-429: A new joint declaration was signed committing mutual aid in the exchange of raw materials, foodstuffs and manufactured goods. The next day, Spain undertook to pay the war debt in marks at 4% interest. The HISMA -ROWAK companies dominated trade and the new German ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer , arrived with the task of controlling all Spanish foreign trade with priority for Germany. On October 9, 1937, Franco passed
5049-454: A new party would be greatly transformed afterwards, it would accept Traditionalist doctrine and some Carlist symbols, and it would be headed by a triumvirate, possibly including Don Javier. The negotiations did not produce any agreement, most likely because Rodezno did not have the mandate from Fal and Don Javier. The meetings were also flavored with a Juanista spirit, especially that the Falangists were represented among others by Pemán . Though
5236-550: A party of pathetic failures half-sold to parliamentarism was the object of massive propaganda onslaught on part of both Falange and Comunión. Franco first mentioned unification in October, but during 5 months he apparently struggled to work out its terms; in February he was stuck with laborious comparison of José Antonio 's and Víctor Pradera 's works, in handwritten notes on the margins trying to identify points of convergence. The process gained momentum in late winter of 1937; most scholars relate it to arrival of Ramón Serrano Suñer ,
5423-438: A perfect postal and telegraphic communications service throughout the occupied region, as well as the necessary personnel for these services. Chaired by Mauro Serret , it was composed of civil servant engineers, so it did not have a political profile either. It was, undoubtedly, the one with the most purely political composition. It was presided over by José María Pemán , but his lack of interest in bureaucratic work meant that
5610-412: A political agreement with the generals. The only party which did close a deal, the Carlists, secured an ambiguous agreement with the head of the conspiracy, General Emilio Mola ; it specified terms of access to the coup rather than a future political regime. Initial statements issued by various generals during the first days of the following rebellion remained politically vague; on territories controlled by
5797-516: A political dictatorship. Until April 1937 right-wing political parties remained legal and though martial law imposed grave restrictions on their activity it was to some extent tolerated; afterwards all political entities except FET were outlawed, while FET itself was formatted as organization fully controlled by Franco and his bureaucracy. Licensing of political activity was no longer the result of temporary hardships related to war and military administration but became an intrinsic and fundamental feature of
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5984-486: A process of centralization, unity and efficiency, as opposed to the division and waste of resources present on the Republican side . The following year 1937 would be a difficult one in military terms, but one of great consolidation of the political power of the neophyte dictator. The Junta was headed by a president in charge not only of directing the institution, but also of serving as a channel of communication with
6171-530: A result, in the early spring of 1937 situation was getting increasingly complex. Franco and Serrano were working on unification terms, to be imposed upon Falange and Comunión; both parties tried to agree their own terms as measure of defense against anticipated military dictate; both Falangist and Carlist executives were internally divided with one faction conspiring against another, in Falange the conflict unfolding along mostly personal lines and in Carlism related to
6358-462: A situation or "not receiving in some way relief proportional to his family needs". The determination of those in charge of the Junta to solve pressing problems made them uncomfortable with certain formalities imposed by pre-existing legislative precepts, such as the existence of contentious-administrative appeals or the obligation to request a report from the Council of State . The characteristics of
6545-613: A spirit of discipline, unity and sacrifice that was very useful for the war. However, the "restorationist" policy was applied in a much more moderate way than it would later be. There are few examples of this attitude of restoration of religious and moral values in the first months of the Junta . On December 23, 1936, the production, trade and dissemination of pornographic material was prohibited, but also of "socialist, communist, libertarian and, in general, dissolving literature". Texts of this type were to be kept in official libraries to be consulted only in exceptional cases. The personnel of
6732-587: A truce comparable to that offered by Carlos VII to the Madrid government in course of the Spanish–American War . Most other politicians complied; Gil-Robles ordered dissolution of Acción Popular while Yanguas and Goicoechea declared their total support; it was only the JAP commander Luciano de la Calzada who protested and was condemned to internal exile. Many party papers demonstrated perhaps genuine enthusiasm, while various juntas, alcaldias and other groups flooded
6919-479: A “masterstroke” or “golpe maestro”. First, it ensured at least formal political unity which greatly contributed to the eventual Nationalist triumph in the Civil War. Second, it marginalized autonomous centers of power which potentially might have posed a challenge to military dictatorship and which indeed in early 1937 started to demonstrate such ambitions. Third, it retained loyalty of volunteer militias recruited by
7106-489: Is likely that he hinted at a would-be merger also to Rodezno. In December 1936 the military propaganda enforced the “Una Patria Un Estado Un Caudillo” slogan, made mandatory in sub-titles of all newspapers issued in the Nationalist zone, including the Falangist and the Carlist ones. By the same time the party militias were formally militarized and subjected to army control, even though their Falangist and Carlist political flavor
7293-494: Is no agreement whether unification broke the backbone of Carlism and commenced its long period of agony, or whether it merely severely weakened the movement which later regained some strength, in the 1960s again started to pose challenge to Franco's political designs, and collapsed due to profound social changes of late Francoism. Falange Espa%C3%B1ola de las JONS The Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista ( transl. Spanish Falange of
7480-484: Is not entirely clear whether unification was a hastily rushed provisional measure triggered by displays of Falangist and Carlist ambitions or rather a carefully prepared step which had matured in Franco's mind for some time. It is open to debate whether FET was initially intended to harbor a generally vague political program so that doctrinal rigidity did not stand in the way of getting “neutral mass” affiliated, or whether it
7667-407: Is only at that point that Hedilla realized the urgency; the parties agreed they would keep talking and confirmed no interference of a 3rd party would be accepted. On April 12 Franco met a few Rodeznistas and informed them that decreed unification was the matter of days, its details – not revealed to the Carlists – yet to be finalized. Their mild reservations were brushed away and they were assured there
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7854-414: Is only one intervention by Enrique Suñer on March 27, 1937, in which he expressed his wish that the educational reforms he was studying would be addressed soon. However, Franco was much more concerned with the direction and course of the war than with matters of government. The seizures of their goods from revolutionary and pro-government organizations and their sympathizers were a source of income for
8041-555: The Primera Línea (" first line "), and it had a detailed training manual, probably prepared by the retired Lieutenant Colonel Luis Arrendondo, which carried instructions for guerilla warfare. While the Falange was not prepared for such a serious activity at the time, the document was well-publicised and convinced the Spanish Left that fascism was a serious threat in Spain. The Falange also had its own intelligence service,
8228-524: The Servicio de Información del Movimiento ("Information service of the movement"). The group had access to a variety of weapons, firearms and explosives. A few months before the war began, several artillery officers began providing military training to Falangist militants. The Falange's male membership was accompanied by a female auxiliary, the Sección Femenina ("female section"). Led by
8415-586: The Compañía de Jesús , as had been requested by traditionalist sectors in Granada . However, the Junta never reached a decision on the matter. At other times one can perceive in his decisions a barracks-like and arbitrary tone reminiscent of the Dictatorship . A decree-law of early 1937 sought to solve the problem of unemployment, ordering the civil governors to prevent a single Spaniard from being in such
8602-611: The Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS . The commission made the final decision, without the possibility of appeal. On November 19, 1936, a regulation of the Junta was published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado , which created a secretariat for the president and a major officer's bureau . The predominance of military men in the main positions was very marked. Dávila and later Jordana were career military officers. In contrast,
8789-519: The Army of Africa , played a decisive role in the negotiations with France and was High Commissioner. His political significance was greater than Dávila's because he had been a member of Primo de Rivera's Military Directory . Of monarchist ideas, he was considered liberal in that context, mainly because his age and training distanced him notably from fascism . He was loyal, hard-working and honest, and enjoyed Franco's confidence. It seems that Jordana
8976-606: The Caudillo to "facilitate the dispatch and knowledge of the Head of State". Thus, the Secretariat was a key body for the exercise of power through which all legal norms had to pass and, although Dávila presided over the Junta , the real power was in the hands of Nicolás Franco . Consequently, three months after the coup d'état , rebel Spain showed the appearance of being a new State in which all parties collaborated in
9163-467: The Falangists . Consequently, at the beginning of October 1937, Jordana advised Franco either to carry out a profound renovation of the Junta or to form a proper government. In this he coincided with the opinion of Serrano, who by then had become Franco's main political advisor. Although Franco was slow to put the advice into practice, as early as October he announced the forthcoming formation of
9350-541: The Iberian Anarchist Federation ). The Falange, through its leader and co-founder, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, collaborated in the different conspiracies and military attempts to overthrow the Republic. In the last months, with the conspiracy that would lead to the uprising that was already underway, and with the Falange virtually excluded, Primo de Rivera was actively trying to get it to play
9537-402: The Junta did not receive remuneration other than the positions they had previously held. The provisional nature of the body was evident at all times and derived from the widespread belief that the seizure of Madrid was imminent. This was noticeable in some specific cases. In spite of the autonomy with which it acted, Queipo de Llano asked in mid-December 1936 if he should return his goods to
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#17327658510469724-482: The Junta was in Burgos . Although its composition in commissions was reminiscent of an incipient cabinet , it was made up of second-rate personalities who were mainly in charge of routine administrative functions. Since Franco was the supreme instance for all matters, all the agencies had to send to the Secretaría General del Jefe del Estado the background of the matters that had to be approved by
9911-443: The Junta ; that the functioning of the Junta was very defective; that it did not have control of the press; that foreign affairs were in the hands of José Antonio Sangróniz ; that Queipo de Llano acted with total autonomy and without obeying anyone; and that there was a clear political divergence between a Junta in which the military, Catholics and primorriveristas predominated and a Movement controlled by Serrano Súñer and
10098-537: The Junta Técnica reveal that Franco took the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera as a reference point at that time. All legal norms — Statutes , decree-laws, decrees , orders and even circulars— had to be approved by Franco. The proposals could come from the Junta, but also from the secretariats or from the governor general, which soon produced a backlog. Of the 160 norms approved during 1936, some ninety came from
10285-492: The Junta Técnica del Estado . The civilians appointed to head specific sections of this quasi-government "resembled the traditional Right" and were recruited from Alfonsist, Carlist, and other generic conservative ranks, with no specific party background prevailing. The regime permitted limited political proselytizing but kept politicians in check; CEDA head Gil-Robles was forced to remain in Portugal , Infante Juan, championed by
10472-596: The Republican zone, in September 1936 Falange formed a provisional Junta de Mando composed of largely inexperienced young leaders and headed by Manuel Hedilla ; the party kept developing its structures, building youth, female, children, propaganda, paramilitary, student, syndicate, sanitary and other sections. By late 1936 Falange supplied some 55% of all volunteers and clearly outpaced the Carlists; apart from former CEDA or Renovación militants, also some right-wing republicans started to join Falange in order to counterbalance
10659-512: The Spanish Civil War . It was one of the main institutions that made up the first governmental organization created by Franco. Although it was divided into sectorial commissions, it was not a real government and was composed of personalities with little political relevance. It was successively presided over by Generals Dávila and Jordana . It disappeared with the creation of Franco's first proper government in February 1938. After
10846-608: The Traditionalist Communion in April 1937 to form the similarly named Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS (FET y de las JONS). In 1934, Falange Española (FE) merged with the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista (JONS) of Onésimo Redondo and Ramiro Ledesma , becoming the 'Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista'. During and after the 1933 election campaign, members of both
11033-595: The Alfonsists were not admitted they realized what was going on; their most active politicians, José María Areilza and Pedro Sainz-Rodriguez , kept advocating unification in talks with both FE and CT men, apparently calculating that within a multi-party merger they would be better off than marginalized outside the new organization. At that time also Gil-Robles concluded that all parties must disappear in “amplísimo movimiento nacional” and seemed prepared to accept unification, though from above rather than from below; CEDA as
11220-497: The Alfonsists, was asked to leave Spain, Prince Xavier of Bourbon-Parma , the Carlist pretender to the throne, was permitted only a brief stay in Spain, and the leader of the Comunión Tradicionalista, Fal Conde, was exiled with inflated charges advanced. Military censorship prevented dissemination of pieces deemed excessively related to party propaganda and encouraged these kept within limits of general adhesion to
11407-580: The Austria-based Don Alfonso Carlos , perished in late September 1936 and was succeeded by a regent, France-based Don Javier . The latter met Franco twice in 1936 and both leaders remained highly skeptical about each other; Franco preferred to speak to the experienced Navarrese leader, conde Rodezno . Like Falange, the Carlists tried to make their best of the autonomy allowed by the military administration; in October 1936 their propaganda paid more attention to Don Javier assuming
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#173276585104611594-628: The CEDA youth organisation, JAP, joining the Falange (though this was a small number compared to JAP's total membership of 225,000). The left-wing Popular Front government persecuted the Falange and imprisoned the Marqués de Estella on 6 July 1936. In turn, the Falange joined the conspiracy to overthrow the Second Spanish Republic , supporting the military revolt ultimately led by Francisco Franco and continuing to do so throughout
11781-795: The Carlist Obra Nacional Corporative scheme and in some regions Acción Popular and Renovación sections fused with the Carlists. In Navarre the Carlists ran sort of an own state structure. Initial statements of the military remained extremely vague politically, and frequently repeated phrases referring to patriotic unity resembled banal old-style clichés rather than an articulated political concept. Since right-wing parties were not dissolved by Junta de Defensa it might have been understood that some sort of limited multi-party regime might be maintained. As late as in September 1936 Franco declared that following military victory he would hand over power to “any national movement” supported by
11968-418: The Civil War the party functioned exactly as it was designed to. There are other questions related to unification which remain open to debate. It is not agreed whether FET was created as a stepping stone towards a Fascistoid/Fascist state or whether it was set up principally to eliminate any competitive centers of power and served rather traditional objectives of securing dictatorial powers of one individual. It
12155-673: The Councils of the National Syndicalist Offensive ; FE de las JONS ) was a fascist political party founded in Spain in 1934 as merger of the Falange Española and the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista . FE de las JONS, which became the main fascist group during the Second Spanish Republic, ceased to exist as such when, during the Civil War , General Francisco Franco merged it with
12342-585: The Falange and JONS had been killed; on 9 February 1934, Matías Montero was murdered while selling Falangist newspapers, becoming a martyr for the small movement. By June 1934, ten of them were dead, killed primarily by the Socialists but also with an anarchist contribution; the Socialists had no intention of allowing a fascist movement to develop in Spain, fearing such a movement would crush them as had happened in Germany and Italy. The Falangists initially fought back ineffectively (resulting in their being ridiculed by
12529-421: The Falange defended "legitimate" productive capitalism while denouncing what they regarded usurious, financial and speculative capitalism. This view was compatible with private property but not with the abuses perpetrate against the lower classes, whom the Falange believed should be saved from the misery in which they lived (referring specifically to landless peasants and day labourers). The party thus did not desire
12716-462: The Falange had no desire to actually conquer territory (with de Rivera viewing the age of conquest as at an end) but instead their idea of an empire actually meant increasing Spanish cultural power , particularly in Latin America where Spain could act as a kind of Hispanic cultural leader. There was also the prospect of forming a type of federation with Portugal . The party had a militia,
12903-502: The Falange retaliated and on 13 March, several fascist gunman attempted to kill Luis Jiménez de Asúa , a well-known Socialist leader and law professor who was also one of the authors of the Republican Constitution. While he survived, a member of his police escort was fatally wounded. On 16 April, Falangists opened fire with submachineguns against workers in the centre of Madrid, killing three and wounding forty. During
13090-555: The Falange was shunned by other right -leaning parties in the Spanish general election of 1936 . Its candidates ran in 19 electoral districts (out of 60). There were some 83,000 people voting for Falangist candidates, but given 1 voter was entitled to a number of votes, the party obtained 0.11% of all votes cast. The only district where FE exceeded 1% of votes was Valladolid (1.63%); in three other districts (Caceres, Cadiz and La Coruna) it gained more than 0.5% of votes. Primo de Rivera (who
13277-417: The Falange, a somewhat ecumenical party, from the fusion until the expulsion of Ledesma: conservatism espoused by monarchists such as Francisco Moreno Herrera, marquis of Eliseda; the authoritarian Catholicism of Onésimo Redondo; the radical (and anti-clerical ) national syndicalism of Ramiro Ledesma; and the distinctive elitist regenerationism of José Antonio Primo de Rivera. In October 1934,
13464-428: The Falangists considered Carlism a half-dead prehistoric reactionary relic, while the Carlists viewed the Falangists simply as “red scum”. In practical terms after July 1936 relations between the two were ambiguous; technically allies within the Nationalist conglomerate, they nevertheless competed for posts, assets and recruits. While politicians and front-line militias remained on at least correct if not amicable terms, in
13651-460: The Falangists nor the Carlists decided to oppose the unification openly and the most intransigent groupings opted merely for non-participation. Key Falangist and Carlist assets – volunteer militia units, formally incorporated into the army but still maintaining their political identity and in mid-1937 amounting to 95,000 men - remained loyal to the military leadership. As a result of unification, no major political discrepancies were allowed to surface in
13838-465: The Falangists proposed that Comunión gets incorporated, though they conceded to a future Traditionalist monarchy, some separate Carlist features until 6 months after the war and the party youth named “requeté”. Carlists suggested a merger of equals into an entirely new party based on Traditionalist principles, headed by a triumvirate or with Don Javier as a regent; the formation would be dissolved following installation of Traditionalist monarchy. No agreement
14025-460: The Falangists tamed and viewed the Carlists, as usual inflexible and intransigent, as the chief obstacle; he was also increasingly irritated by their “tono de soberanía”. However, he was also annoyed by socially radical Falangist propaganda; in February censorship scrapped publication of an earlier José Antonio's speech, which contained the promise of “dismantling capitalism”; few major Falangist politicians were briefly detained for trying to disseminate
14212-566: The Franco Salamanca headquarters with messages of adhesion. First steps to consolidate the new party were taken in late April and May 1937, though their mechanism is not entirely clear; it remains obscure whether they were engineered by administration or by the Junta. Franco initially attended its weekly meetings but soon ceased doing so; it was Serrano who served as a link between him and the party executive. The post of temporary secretary went to López Bassa; other most active figures in
14399-516: The José Antonio's sister Pilar , this latter subsidiary organization claimed more than a half million members by the end of the civil war and provided nursing and support services for the Nationalist forces. During the spring of 1936, when police persecution of the Falange (including the Women's Section) was at its height, the organisation was described by Rivera as the only Falangist section that
14586-519: The July coup, a career military officer Darío Gazapo Valdés (46), and one oddball vaguely related to the party with – or at least it might have seemed so – literary rather than political ambitions, Ernesto Giménez Caballero (38). There were 4 Carlists, all of them Rodeznistas: Tomás Domínguez Arévalo (conde Rodezno, 55), his lieutenant Luis Arellano Dihinx (31), rather detached member of Carlist executive Tómas Dolz de Espejo (conde de la Florida, 58) and
14773-503: The Junta declared martial law , which theoretically prevented any political activity. On September 13 the Junta issued a decree which dissolved all Popular Front parties and those opposed to "the patriotic movement". Soon afterwards it condemned "political partisanship" though not "specific ideologies", stating that the future government would introduce "the only politics and the only unionization possible" and prohibited all political or trade union activities. This ban on political activity
14960-532: The Junta in line with Rodezno's advice and he discussed with Hedilla the name of the party, with “Falange Española de Tradición” a viable option as late as mid-April. Terms of the unification came as unpleasant if not nasty surprise to most Falangist and Carlist politicians, especially that they differed from earlier sketchy plans presented by Franco to Hedilla and Rodezno. The Falangists might have been satisfied with their apparent predominance in terms of program and symbols, yet except Hedilla none of their heavyweights
15147-511: The Junta turned out to be Fernando González Vélez (a Falangist old-shirt appointed in place of Hedilla) and Giménez Caballero. Top provincial party posts were filled with a Carlist and a Falangist alternating as delegado and secretario; 22 provincial jefaturas went to the Falangists and 9 to the Carlists. The Carlist and pre-unification Falange press departments were told to stop party propaganda. By May 9. provincial jefes were demanded to submit inventory of pre-unification party assets and in mid-May
15334-421: The Nationalist military, it did manage to maintain its own identity; their uniforms and correspondence maintained their own Falangist insignia, while the traditional term ¡presente! was used to refer to fallen comrades in reports and logs. None of the vanquished parties in the war suffered such a toll of deaths among their leaders as did the Falange. 60% of the pre-war Falangist membership lost their lives in
15521-500: The Nationalist zone printed the entire address on April 19. The actual unification decree was first disseminated by Radio Nacional in repeated broadcasts aired during April 19, though exact hour of the first broadcast is not clear. On April 20 the document appeared as Decreto número 255 in Boletín Oficial del Estado and was dated April 19; the same day and during the next few days it was reproduced in all newspapers issued in
15708-502: The Nationalist zone, a stark contrast with raging competition and conflicts which plagued the Republican coalition; scholars underline that at least formal political unity greatly contributed to final Nationalist victory in 1939. Another result of the unification was transformation of political regime in the Nationalist zone; before it might have been perceived as a strong military leadership, afterwards it started to assume features of
15895-464: The Nationalist zone. On explicit order of the Franco headquarters the decree was read in frontline units on April 21. Another decree, numbered 260 and dated April 22, was published on April 23; it contained names of individuals appointed to the first executive of the new party, Junta Política or Secretariado. One more decree followed shortly; it defined salute, insignia, anthem, banner, slogan and address code; it also allowed party militias incorporated into
16082-751: The Plaza Mayor that left two Falangists dead and order had to be restored by the Civil Guard. On 18 April, Hedilla arranged a meeting at the Falange council in which he was elected leader. After Francisco Franco seized power on 19 April 1937, he united under his command the Falange with the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista with the Unification Decree , forming the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS ( FET y de las JONS ), whose official ideology
16269-512: The Popular Front government, sixty-seven Falangists were killed, compared to forty-one during the previous two years. In turn, the Falange killed sixty-four leftists, mostly socialists and communists. To survive against increased government persecution, the movement adopted a communist-style cell structure of three members per cell. One of the reasons the organisation survived was due to a large influx of new members, with 15,000 members of
16456-556: The Spanish National Defense Junta , naming General Franco generalissimo of the armies and head of the State government. On October 1 Franco officially took office. Although he had only been named head of government, all the official media spoke from the beginning of "head of state", thus increasing his power. His main priority was to achieve military victory and he was in no hurry to form a real government. He
16643-479: The Spanish iron ore. The following month, taking advantage of the battle of Brunete , the Germans obtained some economic advantages. Ambassador von Faupel and the new president of the Junta , Jordana , signed a document on June 12 in which the rebels undertook to sign a trade agreement with Germany, to inform it of their economic contacts with other states and to give it most-favored-nation treatment. On July 15
16830-578: The Valencia government, but the Germans were suspicious of Spanish-British commercial relations. Germany was seeking the recognition of property titles in seventy-three mining concessions thanks to the debt money managed by the Montana consortium, something that the October decree-law had prevented. To get around the obstacle, they asked that the Germans be put on an equal footing with the Spaniards for
17017-417: The actual fascists. The massive influx of opportunists swamped the "old shirts" – nearly half of the pre-war veterans had died during the initial stages of the rebellion and several of its key leaders were either dead or captured, thus the swollen membership proved extremely awkward for the organisation. Other Nationalist later mocked the influx of former leftists in " Failange " (a portmanteau with FAI ,
17204-577: The army and the navy. Moreover, in January the Junta reached to the German NSDAP and the Italian PNF seeking a political understanding behind the back of the military; they vaguely suggested that “Franco is [only] for today”. In the early 20th century Carlism was a second-rate force; like Falange it benefited from radicalization of the mid-1930s, though unlike Falange it enjoyed major appeal only in some regions of Spain. The Carlist pretender,
17391-487: The army to be politically passive and each claimed exclusive right to define political content of the future state. The most dynamic political power was Falange; a 1933-born third-rate party known mostly for street violence and as a point of reference for Spanish Fascism , in the atmosphere of rapid radicalization of 1936 it attracted tens and soon hundreds of thousands of mostly young people. With its leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera and many other top activists trapped in
17578-729: The army to use their own symbols until the end of the war. The unification decree announced in its first point that "Falange Española" and "Requetés" are integrated into one "political entity" led by Franco and named " Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS ". Another paragraph declared that all members of "Falange Española" and "Comunión Tradicionalista" are affiliated in the new organization, with other willing Spaniards also entitled to join. The decree dissolved “all other political organizations and parties”, though it did not specify explicitly whether FE and CT were dissolved as well. The second point defined Jefe del Estado, Junta Política (Secretariado) and Consejo Nacional as executive bodies. Junta
17765-505: The astute man impressed with Italian Fascism who immediate replaced conventional Nicolas Franco as Caudillo's key adviser. Generalísimo was also increasingly concerned with both Falange and Carlism assuming a bolder tone; in March Don Javier and Hedilla addressed him with letters which blended declarations of loyalty with demands, while Falangist congresses drafted grand schemes which demonstrated designs for political hegemony. As
17952-508: The beginning of January 1938 weakened Franco's position against the demands of his allies. The Junta Técnica had no direct involvement in the more violent repression, which was carried out by the Armed Forces and directly supervised by Franco in his capacity as commander-in-chief. General Martínez Anido , famous for his persecution of anarchists in the early 1920s, was appointed director of Internal Security on October 31, 1937, but
18139-693: The body vaguely specified in the Unification Decree as part of the FET executive; he opted for simple nominations. The list of 50 nominees as announced in the media was organized according to an order probably intended to rank them in terms of prestige and importance, with Pilár Primo de Rivera (Falange), Rodezno (Carlism), Queipo de Llano (military) and José Mariá Pemán (Alfonsism) heading the list. There were 24 Falangists appointed, this time including many “legitimists”; among 12 Carlists there were mostly Rodeznistas but also Fal Conde and few of his followers;
18326-451: The champion of all political life in the Nationalist zone. In few years it turned out that instead of a platform unifying all major political forces the FET became a Falange-dominated structure controlled by state bureaucracy. Independently minded leaders of the original Falange like Aznar or González Veléz were disciplined and at times jailed in case they went off limits and the others like Fernández Cuesta realized that Falangist hegemony in
18513-485: The civil governors, provincial delegates of public order and supplies, managers of companies related to war production and even certain mayoralties. No member of the Falange Española de las JONS held any position in the Junta , while there was a very significant percentage of monarchists, both Alfonsists and traditionalists . Therefore, the Junta Técnica was not at any time a body that helped to create
18700-406: The cost of being pushed to the sidelines. Historians debate whether the original Falange “was killed”, “castrated” and “committed suicide” during the unification process - i.e. it ceased to be an autonomous, revolutionary movement - and FET should be considered an entirely new entity, or whether the party was rather transformed and FET should be viewed as some sort of continuity of FE. Similarly, there
18887-407: The death of the leader of the military uprising in a plane crash, General José Sanjurjo , General Emilio Mola and General Miguel Cabanellas created a National Defense Junta on July 25, 1936, headed by the latter, which would be in charge of both directing military operations and politically leading the rebel movement . Major General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer was appointed president because he
19074-442: The decrees were written; on April 11 Franco told Serrano to finalize the terms and it appears that even on April 18 there were “two or three minor things” to be completed. Neither the Carlists nor the Falangists were admitted to editorial work and they learned the actual terms of the merger once the decrees had been announced publicly. However, they were sounded on some issues; Franco changed the set of his original Carlist appointees to
19261-466: The direction unified under a Jefe Nacional (National Chief) in the person of José Antonio and developed the political program known as "the 27 Points". In November 1934, the marquis of Eliseda, a financial backer of the party, left the Falange over disagreements with party proposals in regards to state-church relations, which he deemed "frankly heretical". His departure left the party without its main income and propaganda apparatus. Inner tensions over
19448-445: The draft of the political program continued. The power struggle between Ramiro Ledesma, who espoused a radical and anti-capitalist vision; and José Antonio Primo de Rivera , who held a more conservative and aristocratic one, eventually led to the expulsion of Ledesma in January 1935. The party also had difficulties in achieving in economic solvency. Although, in principle, it received support from large financiers and landowners, this
19635-510: The economic situation in the second half of 1937. He played an important role in the promulgation of the Decree of October 9, 1937, which abolished the mining concessions made earlier and imposed a maximum of 25% foreign capital in the owning companies. This regulation was seen by the Germans as a challenge to their interests. According to the Act creating the Junta , its function was: to establish
19822-493: The ensuing Spanish Civil War . With the eruption of the Civil War in July 1936, the Falange fought on the side of the Nationalist faction against the Second Spanish Republic , expanding rapidly from several thousand to several hundred thousand. Many people joined the Falange out of fear of persecution – former leftists and centrists rushed to join and tried to avert suspicion of their loyalties by being more fascist than
20009-454: The entire national territory has been dominated. Both the terminology and the provisional nature of the institution are typical of military language, which seeks the creation of a kind of rearguard quartermaster to solve the most immediate problems, but subordinated to the fundamental objective of obtaining military victory. The new Junta was not a real government. It was probably considered that it would be an instrument of civilian support for
20196-521: The eyes of the Spanish right. Tension arose between the left and right wings of the Falange and the German ambassador encouraged Hedilla to resist the middle-class take over of the organisation. On the night of 16 April 1937, Hedilla's followers (though not Hedilla himself) attempted to seize the Falangist's headquarters in Salamanca from the rightists led by Sancho Dávila, resulting in a gun battle around
20383-540: The foreign currencies, shares , bonds and gold in their possession. The new authorities controlled all foreign transactions. All exports were collected in strong foreign currencies, which were deposited within three days at the Military Delegation of the Treasury. The exports helped to pay for the war effort. The Burgos Royal Mint obtained substantial resources from the jewelry and securities donated by
20570-450: The future regime of Spain. Few months into the civil war it was already evident that the balance of power among right-wing parties underwent a major shake-up. The decomposed CEDA, Renovación and Agrarians were dwarfed by Comunión Tradicionalista and Falange Española, two groupings responsible for some 80% of volunteers in ranks of the Nationalist party militias . It was their efficiency as recruitment structures which mattered to Franco and
20757-413: The gunfight left two people dead. At this point Franco's security detained most of these involved except Hedilla, who on April 18 was confirmed by the rump Falangist Consejo as the new Jefe Nacional. Hedilla rushed to Franco's headquarters and was greeted cordially; the two appeared on balcony, where Franco improvised a brief speech; it might have contained first public declaration of unification. At 10:30 PM
20944-568: The head of state were also military. Hence this attempt to dispense with the ideological component, as well as the barracks-like tone of the regulatory provisions issued. It is significant that one of the first norms of the Junta consisted in the reestablishment of the courts of honor within the Army, which had been suppressed by Azaña's military reform. The early implementation of measures aimed at purging dissidents can also be considered of military origin. A decree-law of December 9, 1936 regulated
21131-414: The head of state. The latter was the ultimate decision-maker in all matters. According to the operating rules of the Junta , published on October 6, he was to confer at least once a week with the presidents of the commissions. The president of the Junta would communicate with the Caudillo through direct dispatches, although he could also delegate this function to others. The president was at all times
21318-491: The idea of reproducing a Fascist scheme. During late winter and early spring of 1937 Franco talked to Italian Fascist heavyweights Farinacci , Cantalupo and Danzi; all tried to inspire him towards a long-term solution modelled after Italy, based on the concept of a monopolist Partido Nacional Español state party. None was particularly impressed by Franco and they considered him politically bewildered; Farinacci noted with disgust that Franco uttered some disorganized phrases about
21505-399: The indispensable norms for the continuation of agricultural activities and to prepare the revaluation of land products, the establishment of family estates, agricultural cooperatives and the improvement of peasant life. It was composed exclusively of agricultural engineers , which also gave it an eminently technical profile. Its president was Eufemio Olmedo. In the fall of 1936 it established
21692-436: The instrumental pillars of Franco's regime . The military conspirators of 1936 did not produce any clear vision of a political regime which would follow the coup; in the short run, some administrative powers were to stay with provincial civil committees, composed of most representative or most committed individuals. The key right-wing factions in Spain were rather loosely involved in the plot, and almost none of them concluded
21879-464: The late 1930s and the early 1940s; former CEDA politicians were not welcome. In terms of program the initial propaganda focused on unity or got trapped in contradictions, like “revolutionary program which stems from Spanish tradition”; the Italians were perplexed about weight of the religious ingredient and considered the program a chaotic amalgam which did not merit the name of “Fascism”. Eventually FET
22066-526: The latter had headed the Ministry of Finance during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera . One of the functions of the commission was to contribute to the provisioning of the Army. Bau was the Catalan who held the highest political office in this period. In economic matters he had liberal ideas and was opposed to state interventionism. As in the case of Amado , his expertise contributed to the improvement of
22253-780: The list contained 8 Alfonsists, some of them eminent, 5 high-ranking military men and 1 former CEDA politician, Serrano Suñer. Among the appointees 12 had earlier Cortes experience. The appointments marked the end of the constituent phase of Falange Española Tradicionalista. Though the balance of power within the new state party was yet to be established and though its actual political line initially remained vague, some key features were already set and would not be subject to change; firm personal leadership of Franco, predominance of original Falange and its syndicalism, decorative role of formal collective executive bodies like Junta Política or Consejo Nacional and general dependence on state administrative bureaucratic structures. The key outcome of unification
22440-414: The marginalized parties and did not weaken the Nationalist frontline strength. Fourth, it created a vehicle for control and channeling of popular political mobilization. Fifth, it strengthened personal position of Franco and apart from the role of military commander and head of administration made him also the champion of domestic Nationalist politics. There are some scholars who tend to consider unification
22627-459: The members of the commissions were mostly civilians. This was very much reminiscent of Primo de Rivera's Military Directory . However provisional it was, the regime instituted was essentially military. It was not only Generalissimo Franco who was head of state and the pinnacle of power; the president of the Junta Técnica , the Secretary of War, the governor general and the secretary general of
22814-423: The military rebels had initially avoided attacking republicanism , the revolutionary outbreak in the republican zone provoked a growing political radicalization in the rebel ranks. Already in the autumn of 1936, a cultural counter-revolution unparalleled in 20th century Europe was taking place. There was a public return to religion and a demand for the restoration of traditional values. This moral restoration fostered
23001-459: The military until the end of the war, which was then foreseen to be near. The Junta was organized as follows: The structure of the Junta was reminiscent of Primo de Rivera's Military Directory , with the creation of seven commissions in place of the ministries and similar to the latter's committees. It was also reminiscent of the Dictatorship in the desire for these bodies to be non-political and " arbitrista ". The main headquarters of
23188-449: The military, although it was chaired by Andrés Amado , an Alfonsist monarchist whose experience gave the body a somewhat more political character. He was a financial expert who had collaborated with Calvo Sotelo during the dictatorship . According to the writings left by Franco , Amado opposed the maintenance of the exchange rate of the peseta . However, the caudillo insisted on the need to keep its value high. Although his doctrine
23375-496: The military. Initially volunteers constituted 38% of all troops available to the Nationalists on the peninsula; as conscription was getting implemented by November this figure went down to 25%. Both groupings were increasingly viewing themselves as future masters of new Spain. The Carlists considered themselves exclusive political partners of the military as agreed back in July 1936; they saw the Nationalist faction as basically
23562-449: The monarchist Carlists. Franco kept meeting Hedilla, listened to his advice and even made some effort to flatter him, yet he usually denied Hedilla's requests. The Falangist executive, itself divided mostly along personalist lines between Hedillistas and so-called “legitimists”, were getting increasingly frustrated about military domination; in early 1937 they empowered Hedilla to demand total political hegemony with military control reduced to
23749-529: The most outstanding activity of the commission was the purge of the teaching staff. In order to carry it out, political ideas and behavior were evaluated, but also religious ideas, the professional methodology used and the teachers' own private lives. To do so, they relied on reports from parish priests, mayors, the Civil Guard , solvent parents, military organizations and, after the Unification , from
23936-425: The nationalist principles, calls for the establishment of those administrative bodies which, dispensing with unnecessary bureaucratic development, respond to the characteristics of authority, unity, speed and austerity. The temporality of the new organization was evident from the addition: without taking as definitive the one currently in place, even if it is an announcement of the permanent one to be established once
24123-535: The new government might implement the "national revolution" and ordered his militants to abstain from hostile acts against the government, it was not to last. On 6 March, four members of the Falangist trade union, CONS, who failed to support a leftist strike were killed. On 11 March, two law students, one Falangist and the other Carlist, were shot to death, allegedly by the Socialist Youth of Spain . Since there had been six Falange-affiliated deaths in five days,
24310-413: The new party started to take over their bank accounts. Also in mid-May specialized sections of the new party started to emerge with personal appointments made, again with visible Falangist predominance, be it Sección Femenina or Milicia Nacional. Civil governors organized rallies supposed to demonstrate fraternization of the unified parties. Official propaganda kept exalting the unification as glorious end to
24497-472: The new party; its uniform was to be a combination of a Falangist blue shirt and a Carlist red beret. It is not entirely clear who was responsible for ultimate shape of the unification documents, but most scholars tend to attribute at least most of the authorship to Serrano Suñer; apparently the Generals Mola and Queipo de Llano were consulted earlier on the drafts or the draft. It is not known when
24684-504: The original Falange, though it might be subject to changes and improvements. The new party was defined as “link between the state and the society”. The decree which nominated members of Junta Política listed 10 names. Among 5 Falangists there were 3 “old-shirts”; Manuel Hedilla (35 years), a businessman Joaquín Miranda González (43) and an officer with loyalties divided between the army and the party, Ladislao López Bassa (32); they were accompanied by one fresh Falangist who had joined after
24871-404: The party archives; until 1942 this figure grew to 1,450. The Falangists were clearly gaining the upper hand. The party statutes, released in August, defined multiple specialized sections of the organisation; out of 14 delegaciones created only 3 were headed by the Carlists. At one point Giménez suggested a formal purge, a proposal rejected by Franco. Most gatherings demonstrated lingering divisions;
25058-441: The people, which might have hinted at some electoral procedure and political competition. However, in October he started to make private comments about a possible forced political unification. Terms of such a unification remained extremely unclear; some like Goicoechea supported a general “patriotic front”, some suggested a personalist “Partido Franquista” and people in caudillo's close entourage like Nicolás Franco preferred rather
25245-571: The population. Only at the end of 1937 was it totally controlled by the Junta Técnica del Estado . As a result of the plane crash that took the life of General Mola on June 3, 1937, Franco decided that his replacement in command of the Army of the North would be Dávila . To relieve him at the head of the Junta , he appointed General Francisco Gómez-Jornada . Like his predecessor, he had fought in Cuba and Morocco , where he became Chief of Staff of
25432-399: The prevailing mood was this of disorientation. Many tended to view the news as introduction of some vague bureaucratic structure above the existing Falangist and Carlist organizations. Most did not realize the arbitrary nature of unification and believed that it was fully agreed and endorsed by their respective leaders, especially that the official propaganda and censorship clearly advanced such
25619-509: The print anyway. Theoretical platforms of Falange and Comunión were strikingly distinct. The former advanced a syndicalist revolution and vehement Spanish nationalism , both to be incorporated in an omnipotent state; the latter were committed to a loose monarchy, society entrenched in traditional roles and de-centralized state accommodating local Basque and Catalan liberties. Though both were equally hostile to democracy, parliamentarism and socialism, they did not hold each other in high regard;
25806-561: The purge of the civil service. This predominantly military character would be pointed out years later by Ramón Serrano Súñer with these words: Throughout the war, the civilian command was auxiliary and subordinate to the military command; at least until the constitution of the first Government (...). Most of the services were militarized (...) Also the different sections of the so-called Junta Técnica —latent ministries constituted in Burgos— were under military control; as were military most of
25993-528: The purposes of the law. The Spaniards refused, saying that the Mining Law in force only allowed the presence of 20 to 25% of foreign capital, and that it imposed that the directors should be Spanish. They recommended waiting for the formation of the new government. On December 15 and 16, 1937, Von Stohrer met with Sangróniz and Nicolás Franco, from whom he demanded the 73 mining concessions on which HISMA had an option to purchase. Both refused to authorize all
26180-410: The rear fistfights and clashes between Carlists and Falangists were by no means rare and at times they escalated into gunfights; they mutually sabotaged their rallies and denounced each other to military authorities. Since late 1936 Carlist and Falangist leaders got wind of unification idea, vaguely nurtured by Franco. Unsure about its terms and whether resistance was a viable option, they concluded that
26367-427: The rebels local commanders appointed mayors or auxiliary civilian bodies composed mostly of locally recognized right-wing personalities, typically those associated with CEDA , Alfonsism , Carlism, or the defunct Spanish Patriotic Union . The top executive body of the rebel government, the Junta de Defensa Nacional , was set up on July 23 as an instrument of administration and intendancy rather than politics. On July 30
26554-470: The rebels. To manage them, the Junta created in January 1937 a Central Administrative Commission of Seized Goods in charge of their management. The provincial authorities also had to deal with this task. In November 1936, a Foreign Currency Committee was created to control the foreign currencies of other countries. In March 1937, the Committee granted a period of one month for everyone to declare
26741-495: The regency than to Franco assuming the state jefatura, and in late 1936 headlines of Carlist press exalted the exiled leader Fal Conde as caudillo, reserving for Franco only small-font notes at the bottom of the page. In December the Carlists launched their own syndicalist scheme. In early 1937 Carlism started to demonstrate agglutinatory appeal; some CEDA politicians discussed merger, a small Partido Nacionalista Español merged indeed, an independent syndicalist organization CESE joined
26928-403: The regent or errors committed by their unificated leaders, who prematurely decided to withdraw). Many questions remain in relation to the unificated parties themselves. It is not entirely clear why the Carlists and the original Falange succumbed to the unification pressure, with various motives quoted: Franco's strategy of first carving out tractable politicians and then misleading them as to what
27115-521: The regime, e.g. Gil-Robles' order that JAP must fully follow military command or RE head Antonio Goicoechea 's call for a "patriotic front". Franco himself kept meeting with right-wing politicians, usually ignoring the intransigent ones and speaking only to these deemed tractable. No political plans were discussed. In general, his guests were expected to mobilize civilian support for the regime with no political commitment offered in return, except that in an unspecified future "the people" would be free to decide
27302-468: The regime; instead it rather discouraged popular activism, served as mere transmission belt from administration and turned into a bureaucratic machinery which attracted mostly opportunists and careerists. Others responded that first, the role of FET in the Francoist Spain evolved over decades and it was principally determined in the early 1940s, not in the very initial phase, and second, that during
27489-416: The rest of the political right) but eventually they formed their own death squads. After the tenth fascist, Juan Cuéllar, was killed and had his corpse abused in Madrid on 10 June 1934 during a confrontation with socialists, the Falangists attacked a group of Socialist Youth, killing a young woman, Juanita Rico, who was alleged to have abused the corpse, and seriously wounding two other socialists. Rico received
27676-624: The right which did experience growth, and at a dramatic rate, were the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista and the Falange Española de las JONS. Comunión Tradicionalista ( 10 mandates ) openly operated its national and provincial war councils, its key asset being volunteer militia units, the Requetés , which in the first months of the war claimed 20,000 men. The Falange, which in February obtained only 0.4% of
27863-400: The sales en bloc. On the 20th, von Stohrer, accompanied by Johannes Bernhardt , met with General Franco himself. The latter, in a bitter conversation, repeated his brother's refusal. Around January 25, 1938, the ambassador met with Jordana, president of the Junta Técnica . Jordana again refused a block authorization, although he promised to study each case individually. The fall of Teruel at
28050-500: The same day, April 18, Franco announced the unification in a radio broadcast; The long speech was formatted as historiosophic lecture on Spanish past with special attention paid to national unity as maintained throughout centuries. Referring to “nuestro movimiento” the speech at one point hailed great contribution of Falange, Traditionalism and “otras fuerzas” to note that “we have decided to finalize this unifying work”, to revert to grandiloquent paragraphs later on. Most newspapers issued in
28237-732: The state party was possible only given Franco was acknowledged as the unquestionable leader and source of all power. Comunión opted for semi-clandestine autonomous identity; Fal did not accept his seat in Consejo and Don Javier expelled from the party all these who had accepted without his earlier consent. Instead of unification, the merger turned into Franco-domesticated Falange absorbing Carlist offshoots , who either (like Iturmendi ) renounced their former identity or (like Bilbao ) retained it as vague general outlook or (like Rodezno) withdrew after some time anyway. The Alfonsists engaged half-heartedly, then got divided and eventually mostly of them left in
28424-415: The summer and fall of 1937 Serrano kept negotiating with them and eventually secured their cautious engagement, the access by some dubbed as suicide of the original Falange; others note that at this point the original Falange signed a pact with Franco, and its notary was Serrano. It was strengthened once the original Secretary General, Raimundo Fernández Cuesta , made it from the Republican zone and in October
28611-522: The suspension of all CEDA political activity. Though some of CEDA heavyweights remained politically active, Juventudes de Acción Popular (JAP), CEDA's youth wing and formerly its most dynamic organ, reorganized in September 1936 as a paramilitary force with few thousand members. Renovación Española (13 mandates) and Partido Agrario (11 mandates) were also in decay, with the Alfonsists of RE in particular being preoccupied with engineering schemes related to Infante Juan, Count of Barcelona . The two groups on
28798-497: The system. The change enhanced position of Francisco Franco further on and started to shape the system as his personal political dictatorship. Until April he was the supreme army commander and the head of state, the roles which defined his position in military and administrative, but not in strictly political terms. The Unification Decree, which outlined political monopoly of FET and named Jefe del Estado as its leader, formally set up also political personal supremacy of Franco and made him
28985-411: The terms came as a bucket of cold water. In few days he and his men visited Franco to voice their unease, yet they remained tractable and did not mount explicit protest or opposition. Some key Carlist politicians resigned, including the requeté head Zamanillo; the Carlist tycoons from the onset skeptical about the merger welcomed the decree with deafening silence. Among local leaders and the rank-and-file
29172-559: The three secretariats. This reveals the limitations that the Junta's commissions had despite their paraministerial pretensions. In fact, the system of government more closely resembled that of the Ancien Régime with its office secretaries. The few surviving records of the meetings of the presidents of the Junta show that they dealt with matters of little political interest. They did not address reforms of importance, but limited themselves to trying to respond to pressing needs. There
29359-413: The truth is that he had fought in the wars of Cuba and Morocco , where he had demonstrated his ability. He had a certain monarchical significance but he was, above all, a professional military man. Even smaller in stature than Franco, he was, according to Admiral Cervera, "pure, austere and Spanish" and maintained a monarchist Catholicism similar to that of Mola . It was mainly composed of members of
29546-489: The unification strategy. In mid-March the Carlists already sensed urgency, apparently aware that unification was no longer a distant perspective but an immediate future. In late March the Rodezno-led group of leaders which tended to accept a merger outmaneuvered Don Javier and Fal and in circumstances which bordered internal coup within Carlism forced them to accept the strategy, or at least not to oppose it openly. Franco
29733-433: The unified party would look like, overwhelming military pressure, Falangist and Carlist illusions that they could outsmart Franco or their leaders having been ready to sacrifice what they considered secondary features in order to achieve the common goal of defeating the Republicans. It remains to be debated who was better off: Falange, which achieved hegemony at the cost of losing autonomy, or Carlism, which retained autonomy at
29920-399: The unified party. Franco had sought to control the Falange after a clash between Hedilla and his main critics within the group, the legitimistas of Agustín Aznar and Sancho Dávila y Fernández de Celis , that threatened to derail the Nationalist war effort. The new uniform consisted of the Carlist red beret and the Falangist blue shirt. While the Falange was increasingly integrated into
30107-486: The votes and lost its previously held one seat in the Cortes, experienced enormous growth in subsequent months and would come to be the most dynamic of party on the right. Its party structures functioned without restriction; its Primera Línea militias recruited 35,000 volunteers in a short period. In early October 1936 supreme power in the rebel zone was assumed by Francisco Franco, who set up an executive administration named
30294-453: The war there. Yet he later became one of the most outspoken critics of nationalist killings, arguing it alienated the workers from their cause – on Christmas Eve 1936 he told the Falange not to persecute workers who had "voted for the left out of hunger or despair. We all know that in many towns there were – and are – right-wingers who are worse than the reds." These statements, however, made Hedilla and other left-wing Falangists highly suspect in
30481-450: The war. However, most of the property of all other parties and trade unions were assigned to the party. In 1938, all trade unions were unified under Falangist command. Junta T%C3%A9cnica del Estado The Junta Técnica del Estado ( Spanish for: Technical State Junta ) was one of several political-administrative bodies created by General Franco in October 1936 after his appointment as head of government of rebel Spain during
30668-425: The weight of management was carried by the vice-president Enrique Suñer . Eugenio Montes , Vegas Latapié , Mariano Puigdollers and Alfonso García Valdecasas were members. There was a predominance of former collaborators of Acción Española , and their relations with the Falangists were not good. Strong censorship was implemented, pornography was persecuted and public book burnings were carried out. But
30855-493: Was appointed to Junta Política. The “legitimists” – Sancho Dávila y Fernández de Celis , Agustín Aznar , Moreno – were in prison following the Salamanca events of April 16–17; Hedilla himself, misled by Franco that he would be appointed the leader, was shocked to find himself just one of 10 Junta members and on April 23 he refused to take his seat. He was almost immediately arrested, trialed, sentenced to death on inflated charges of treason, commuted and placed in prison. To Rodezno
31042-531: Was delighted to hear the news, but the merger-minded Carlists still hoped for a deal agreed with Falange, not imposed by the military. In early April their Junta adopted a plan which envisioned common party led by a directorio, to be composed of 3 Carlists, 3 Falangists and 6 nominees of Franco, himself the directorio president; they still hoped the organization would lead to buildup of a Catholic, regionalist, social and ultimately Traditionalist monarchy. Another round of talks with Falangists took place on April 11 and it
31229-568: Was ensuring political unity within the Nationalist camp. The most dynamic political groupings in the rebel zone, so far fully loyal but autonomous and demonstrating own ambitions, were marginalized. Falange was domesticated and though the independent national-syndicalist current within FET remained strong, the party was now firmly controlled by caudillo and his men. Carlism retained its independent political identity beyond FET yet it suffered from fragmentation bordering breakup and Comunión Tradicionalista started to languish in semi-clandestine life. Neither
31416-471: Was formatted along national-syndicalist lines. It remains obscure why Falange from the onset enjoyed advantage over the Carlists, and specifically whether it was the setup designed by Franco and Serrano (who appreciated greater Falangist mobilization potential and intended to present a counter-offer to radicalized masses), or whether it was the result of internal dynamics within the party (resulting from Carlist numerical inferiority, consistently skeptical stand of
31603-455: Was formatted along syndicalist lines and in the Francoist Spain it turned into merely one of many groupings competing for power; other of these so-called political families included the Alfonsists, the Carlists, the military, the technocrats, the Church and the bureaucracy. The unification is generally viewed as Franco's success which secured a number of objectives; some scholars consider it even
31790-475: Was heavily influenced by Catholicism but the party desired a separation between church and state; the Falange had no intention of forcing Catholicism upon millions of Spanish non-believers. The Falangist were in some ways anti-conservative, as while most of the Spanish conservative right refused any reform and defended private property at all levels, the Falange favoured some nationalisations (such as banking and public services), as well as economic and social reform;
31977-499: Was heterodox from the economic point of view, Franco's decision was politically opportune, as it contributed to keep prices stable during the whole period. Amado's technical competence helped the economic situation to improve in the second half of 1937. It was presided over by the then president of the Audiencia Provincial of Las Palmas , José Cortés , and had an exclusively technical composition. Its headquarters
32164-404: Was in Burgos . Its main task was to review the legislation then in force in order to eliminate that which was deemed incompatible with the "New State". It was also to facilitate a transition from the absolute empire of the military jurisdiction to an ordinary one. Its presidency was entrusted to Joaquín Bau , a traditionalist monarchist who had also been a collaborator of Calvo Sotelo when
32351-405: Was in charge of such matters as censorship of spectacles and control of market abuses. The Junta did participate in the purge of public employees. On December 5, 1936, it decreed the separation from service of public servants of all kinds who were considered contrary to the " Movimiento Nacional ". No appeal could be lodged before the courts of justice against the resolution which put an end to
32538-424: Was in sight, yet representatives of both groupings agreed they would resist interference of any third party; scholars suggest this stipulation was aimed against other right-wing parties rather than against Franco. In late February one more round of talks was held by Hedillistas and a different representation of Carlists, headed by Rodezno. The Falangist softened their position; Carlism would still be incorporated but
32725-586: Was little agreement about the strategy to be adopted. Within Carlism Rodezno and the Navarrese maneuvered Fal and Don Javier into grudging permission to open negotiations; within Falange Hedilla tended to seek alliance with Carlism against the military dictate, while “the legitimists” preferred to align closer with the military in order to gain hegemony over other political groupings. Eventually
32912-557: Was not enough until in 1935, it was subsidized monthly with 50,000 lire by the Italian Fascist regime. The subsidy was reduced by half and withdrawn after the poor electoral results of 1936. The party was republican , modernist , championed the lower classes and opposed both oligarchy and communism , but it never garnered the kind of popular following demonstrated by fascist movements elsewhere in Europe. For these reasons,
33099-535: Was not rigorously enforced on rightist organizations, but each of their fates differed significantly. The largest grouping, CEDA, which held 88 seats in the Cortes , had been gradually disintegrating since the February elections ; its structures had partially collapsed, having been abandoned by militants disappointed with the movement's legalist strategy. In addition, its leader José María Gil-Robles y Quiñones declared
33286-705: Was nothing to be anxious about. Not entirely convinced, they met few days later to edit a preamble, to be proposed to Franco; the intention was to counter revolutionary Falangism. On April 12 Hedilla told his men that accord with the Carlists was almost ready and called the Falangist Consejo Nacional for April 26. However, on April 16 his opponents in the executive visited Hedilla in his Salamanca office and declared him deposed; both Hedillistas and “legitimists” remained in touch with Franco and both were led to believe they had his support. The following day Hedilla stroke back and tried to arrest his opponents;
33473-432: Was reinstated at the same post in FET. Unlike in case of Carlism no effort was made to maintain original, independent structures; a so-called Falange Española Auténtica, active in the late 1937-1939, were loose tiny groups of third-rate dissidents. Within FET the second half of 1937 was the period of fierce competition for posts and assets between the Falangists and the Carlists. Some 500 conflicts were officially recorded in
33660-482: Was reluctant to take up the post, and realized from the outset the difficulties of his performance, acknowledging in his diary that he was "truly disheartened by the impossibility of arranging this tangle". Furthermore, he believed that Franco himself was not in a fit state of mind to deal with political matters; that Nicolás Franco , secretary general of the head of State, was "a brilliant and extraordinary man, but unbalanced" and that he acted without any coordination with
33847-648: Was retained. In January 1937 Franco confirmed that the country would be able to elect any regime, though he also made references to “corporative state”; in private he confessed to an Italian envoy that he would found a political association, be its leader and endeavor to unite the parties. Some of these speaking to him noted he started to emphasize that current provisional status had to be replaced with some permanent solution. In February he also ventured to offer some thoughts on “ideologia nacional”; having ignored all other groupings he suggested it should possibly be founded on Falangism and Traditionalism , though he also rejected
34034-604: Was running in 13 districts) obtained a total of 24,017 votes; Manuel López Sendón received 18,704 votes and Raimundo Fernández-Cuesta got 10,438 votes. Having likely never exceeded ten thousand members in the early 1930s, the Falange lost supporters in the run-up to the Spanish Civil War, leaving a core of young, dedicated activists, many in the organization's student organization, the Sindicato Español Universitario . The Falangist program
34221-436: Was still largely intact and it proved crucial in the reorganisation of the Falange into a true underground movement. The Women's Section raised money for Falangist prisoners and their families and distributed clandestine propaganda, as well as carrying messages from imprisoned leaders to outside militants. Following the 1936 elections, more violence erupted between the Falange and its enemies. While Rivera initially thought that
34408-443: Was supposed to aid Jefe in all matters; half of its members were to be appointed by Jefe del Estado and half by Consejo Nacional. The decree did not specify how members of Consejo were to be nominated. All bodies were supposed to work towards final structure of “totalitarian state”. The third point declared all party militias merged into Milicia Nacional. The preamble stated that the program of the new party would be based on 26 points of
34595-435: Was the Falangists' 27 puntos —reduced after the unification to 26. While the Carlists came off worse in this forced union, Franco had correctly deduced that they would be more obedient and less politically minded, making it less of a concern. Despite this, the party was in fact a wide-ranging nationalist coalition, closely controlled by Franco. Parts of the original Falange (including Hedilla) and many Carlists did not join
34782-480: Was the most senior major general among the military rebels. The Junta assumed for a period of time and in a collegiate manner "all the powers of the State" in the territory controlled by the coup plotters, and self-styled as the national zone . However, movements soon arose in favor of centralizing the command. As a result, on September 30, 1936, Decree 138 was published in the Official Bulletin of
34969-412: Was therefore content to create a more technical than political body —the Junta Técnica del Estado — and to rely on his brother Nicolas , whom he appointed general secretary to the head of state. On October 2, the law creating this and other agencies was published in the renamed Boletín Oficial del Estado . The preamble of the law reveals its nature: The structuring of the new Spanish State, within
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