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93-761: After the end of the Soviet summer offensive of 1944 ( Operation Bagration ), the frontline of the Eastern Front had stabilised roughly in the middle of Poland, running from Riga on the Baltic coast over Warsaw via the Vistula to the Carpathian Mountains . Most of the pre-war German territory was still under control of the Third Reich at the end of 1944. On 12 january 1945, Soviet troops launched

186-570: A Soviet offensive breaks out the Army will either have to go over to a mobile defence or see its front smashed". Because the initial offensive in Belarus was thought to be a feint, the Feste Plätze spanned the entire length of the Eastern Front. Army Group Centre had Feste Plätze at Vitebsk , Orsha , Mogilev , Baranovichi , Minsk , Babruysk , Slutsk , and Vilnius . Operation Bagration

279-488: A counter-attack against the 3rd Guards Tank Army 's spearheads, which had reached and taken Lauban during the Lower Silesian offensive. The LVI Panzer Corps and XXXIX Panzer Corps were grouped under the command of General Nehring ; a two-pronged attack began on 1 March, with the 17th Panzer and Führer Grenadier Divisions attacking in the north, and 8th Panzer Division to the south. The 3rd Guards Tank Army

372-488: A more ambitious offensive to the north to relieve the besieged city of Breslau , moving Nehring's divisions northwards from Lauban by rail, but Konev acted decisively to regain the initiative in Silesia. Shifting the 4th Tank Army from the northern flank of his Front, he redeployed it near Grottkau in order to spearhead a major attack into Upper Silesia , neutralising the threat to the left flank of his forces and taking

465-673: A significant disruptive effect. The partisans were also used to mop up encircled German forces once the breakthrough and exploitation phases of the operation were completed. The Stavka had committed approximately 1,670,300 combat and support personnel, approximately 32,718 artillery pieces and mortars, 5,818 tanks and assault guns and 7,799 aircraft. Army Group Centre's strength was 486,000 combat personnel (849,000 total, including support personnel). The army group had 3,236 field guns and other artillery pieces (not including mortars) but only 495 operational tanks and assault guns and 920 available aircraft, of which 602 were operational. Army Group Centre

558-453: The 11th Guards Army , 5th Army and 31st Army then attacked the German positions, breaking through the first defensive belt on the same day. The German deployment of its only reserve division was met the next day with the insertion of the massed Soviet tank brigades, which achieved the operational breakthrough. By 25 June, Soviet forces began to advance into the German rear. Völckers' position

651-457: The 3rd Panzer Army under the command of Georg-Hans Reinhardt ; the lines ran through marshy terrain in the north, through a salient round the city of Vitebsk, to a sector north of the main Moscow –Minsk road, held by the 4th Army . It was opposed by the 1st Baltic Front of Hovhannes Bagramyan , and Ivan Chernyakhovsky 's 3rd Belorussian Front , which were given the task of breaking through

744-464: The Allied invasion of Italy where it initially inflicted heavy casualties on the landing forces but also lost more than half of its tanks in the process, coming under fire from naval guns supporting the landing. Despite the 16th Panzer Division performing adequately under his command, Rudolf Sieckenius was made a scapegoat for the German defeat at Salerno and removed from his position. It took part in

837-602: The Battle of Dubno 293 Soviet tanks were destroyed. By late November the 16th Panzer Division had run out of supplies and could only retreat after having been resupplied during a Soviet counter offensive. It fought in defensive positions during the winter of 1941–42 and took part in anti-partisan operations in the Stalino region. The division participated in the fighting of the Second Battle of Kharkov and, following this,

930-648: The Courland Pocket . On 22 June 1944, the Red Army attacked Army Group Centre in Byelorussia, with the objective of encircling and destroying its main component armies. By 28 June, the German 4th Army had been destroyed, along with most of the Third Panzer and Ninth Armies. The Red Army exploited the collapse of the German front line to encircle German formations in the vicinity of Minsk in

1023-706: The German occupation , mostly carried out by the Home Army , and severely destroyed through shelling by Wehrmacht units in 1944 and eventually burned down. In January 1945 the division was entrapped once more with the start of the Soviet Vistula–Oder Offensive but managed to reach German lines. After a short rest and resupply in February it fought in Silesia and Czechoslovakia. With the German surrender

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1116-597: The Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket early 1944 and found itself trapped in the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket but managed to break out with the main body of the 1st Panzer Army in April 1944. After limited resupplies the division took part in the German retreat to Poland and also participated in further anti-partisan operations in the area around Daleszyce . Daleszyce was a center of Polish resistance to

1209-554: The Lithuanian Security Police . The relatively static lines in Byelorussia had enabled the Germans to construct extensive field fortifications, with multiple trench lines to a depth of several kilometres and heavily mined defensive belts. Besides the pro-German and pro-Soviet forces, some third-party factions were also involved in the fighting during Operation Bagration, most notably several resistance groups of

1302-781: The Lublin – Brest and Lvov – Sandomierz areas to the central sectors, enabling the Soviets to undertake the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive and Lublin–Brest Offensive . This allowed the Red Army to reach the Vistula River and Warsaw , which in turn put Soviet forces within striking distance of Berlin , conforming to the concept of Soviet deep operations—striking into the enemy's strategic depths . Germany's Army Group Centre had previously proven difficult to counter, as

1395-623: The Lublin–Brest Offensive as well as engage in offensive operations in that area. The bulk of tactical resources, in particular anti-tank artillery , was allocated to the 1st Ukrainian Front , the spearhead of the Vistula, L'vov-Premyshl operation. Thirty-eight of the 54 anti-tank regiments allocated to the Byelorussian-Baltic-Ukrainian operations were given to the 1st Ukrainian Front. This demonstrates that

1488-540: The Minsk Offensive and destroy them, with Minsk liberated on 4 July. With the end of effective German resistance in Byelorussia, the Soviet offensive continued on to Lithuania , Poland and Romania over the course of July and August. The Red Army successfully used the strategies of Soviet deep battle and maskirovka (deception) to their full extent for the first time, albeit with continuing heavy losses. Operation Bagration diverted German mobile reserves from

1581-571: The SS and 168th Infantry Division found themselves trapped by the advance of the 4th Tank Army and 59th Army which linked up near Neustadt . By the 22nd, Soviet forces of the 59th and 21st Armies succeeded in reducing the Oppeln 'cauldron' ( German : Kessel ), claiming to have killed 15,000 and captured a further 15,000 of the German troops trapped there. Konev launched further attacks on 24 March, and by 31 March, when Ratibor and Katscher were taken,

1674-523: The VI Corps , pushing it so far to the south that it came under the command of the 4th Army. The LIII Corps had received permission to retreat on 24 June with three divisions, while leaving one division behind in the fester Platz Vitebsk . However, by the time the order arrived, the city was already encircled. General Friedrich Gollwitzer , the commander of the Vitebsk "strongpoint", decided to disobey

1767-560: The Warsaw Uprising against the German occupation forces. The battle has been described as the triumph of the Soviet theory of the " operational art " because of the complete coordination of all the strategic front movements and signals traffic to fool the enemy about the target of the offensive. The military tactical operations of the Red Army successfully avoided the mobile reserves of the Wehrmacht and continually "wrong-footed"

1860-411: The "deep battle", envisaged breaking through the tactical zones and forward German defences. Once these tactical offensives had been successful, fresh operational reserves were to exploit the breakthrough and the operational depths of the enemy front using powerful mechanized and armoured formations to encircle enemy concentrations on an Army Group scale. Army Group Centre's northern flank was defended by

1953-486: The 1st Mechanised Corps swept hastily across the edge of the Pripyet Marshes , subduing the German 9th Army troops defending fester platz Slutsk, cutting through the fortress, effectively hindering the bulk of the 9th Army's ability to flee through the south and ultimately sealing the fate of the battle-hardened unit on the lands of Belorussia. It was the ability of KMG Pliev to seize Slutsk and swing south against

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2046-561: The 4th Army's XXVII Corps holding Orsha and the main Moscow-Minsk highway. Despite a tenacious German defense, Orsha was liberated by 26 June, and the 3rd Belorussian Front's mechanized forces were able to penetrate far into the German rear, reaching the Berezina River by 28 June. The central sector of Soviet operations was against the long front of 4th Army, under the command of Kurt von Tippelskirch . Soviet plans envisaged

2139-504: The 9th Army that truly showed the effectiveness of the combination of the anachronistic horse-mounted Soviet cavalrymen and the fleet of mechanised beasts of the Soviet armoured formations in the form of the Cavalry-Mechanised Group in striking deep into the operational depth of the opponent as envisaged by Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky 's Deep Battle doctrine. With the flanks secured by the Cavalry-Mechanised Group and

2232-616: The Berezina River on 28 June. The centre of the 4th Army was holding the tip of the Byelorussian bulge, with the bulk of its forces on a shallow bridgehead east of the Dnieper River . The Mogilev Offensive opened with an intense artillery barrage against the German defensive lines on the morning of 22 June. The goal of the 2nd Belorussian Front (Colonel-General Gyorgy Zakharov ) was to pin the 4th Army near Mogilev while

2325-649: The Dnieper crossings on the evening of 27 June and fought its way into the city during the night, while mobile units enveloped the garrison from the northwest. During the day both the German XII Corps and XXXIX Panzer Corps began falling back towards the Berezina crossings. Travel was nearly impossible by day, due to the omnipresence of the Soviet air force, while Soviet tank columns and roadblocks provided constant obstacles. The main body of 4th Army arrived at

2418-480: The Dnieper; this was countermanded by the Army Group commander, Busch, who instructed Tippelskirch to order the units to return to their positions. This was however impossible as a cohesive frontline no longer existed. With the front collapsing, Busch met with Hitler on 26 June and received the authorisation to pull the army back to the Berezina River, 100 kilometres (60 miles) west of Mogilev. The 49th Army forced

2511-500: The German attack on the city the division suffered heavy losses and, reduced to a strength of 4,000 men by mid-November, was scheduled for replacement. During its withdrawal from the front line the division was caught up in the Soviet counter offensive, Operation Uranus , which started on 19 November. Most of the division was trapped in what became the Stalingrad pocket while a smaller number of units were pushed west. The main body of

2604-470: The German forces. Despite the massive forces involved, Soviet front commanders left their adversaries completely confused about the main axis of attack until it was too late. The Russian maskirovka is roughly equivalent to the English camouflage , but it has broader application in military use. During World War II the term was used by Soviet commanders to describe measures to create deception with

2697-409: The German lines west of Oppeln and drove directly southward, heading for Neustadt . A subsidiary attack by the 4th Guards Tank Corps fanned out to take Neisse . South-east of Oppeln, the 59th and 60th Armies also broke through, the former swinging westwards to link up with the 4th Tank Army. The First Panzer Army's XI Corps , holding the lines near Oppeln, was now threatened with encirclement. In

2790-458: The German retreat and defensive operations in Italy until November 1943 when it was sent back to the Eastern Front. The 16th Panzer Division was used in a number of locations in the southern sector after this in an attempt to stabilize the German front lines, frequently being moved between points of crisis. It took part in the only partially successful effort to relieve the trapped German forces in

2883-513: The German summer offensive, Case Blue . During these operations the division played a role in the encirclement of 50 Soviet divisions and the capture of 665,000 Soviet soldiers at the Battle of Kiev. The division also destroyed a thousand Soviet tanks. The Division was part of the offensive towards Stalingrad and reached the Volga river north of the city on 23 August 1942. Supporting the flank of

Upper Silesian offensive - Misplaced Pages Continue

2976-592: The Germans to move their powerful armoured forces, fresh from their victory in the First Jassy–Kishinev Offensive in April–June 1944, to the central front to support Army Group Centre. This was the primary purpose of Bagration. In order to maximize the chances of success, the maskirovka was a double bluff. The Soviets left four tank armies in the L'vov-Peremyshl area and allowed the Germans to know it. The attack into Romania in April–June further convinced

3069-701: The Ilyushin-2 Shturmovik "Flying Tank" ground-attack aircraft strafed and bombed the German columns as the Red Air Force firmly controlled the skies of the Belorussian balcony. Following the colossal bombardment which was supposed to shatter the forward defences of the 9th Army, troops of the Soviet 3rd Army launched their assault from Rogachev, but were met with obstinate resistance from the Germans in that sector and sustained heavy casualties, while not many advancements were attained. Meanwhile,

3162-410: The L'vov operation. This totaled twelve tank and five mechanized corps. In contrast, Operation Bagration ' s Baltic and Byelorussian Fronts were allocated just eight tank and two mechanized corps. The 1st Byelorussian Front (an important part of the L'vov-Premyshl operation) is not mentioned on the Soviet battle order for the offensive. It contained a further six armies and was to protect the flank of

3255-537: The Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive allowed the Red Army to reach the outskirts of Warsaw after gaining control of Poland east of the Vistula river. The campaign enabled the next operation, the Vistula–Oder Offensive , to come within sight of the German capital. The Soviets were initially surprised at the success of the Byelorussian operation which had nearly reached Warsaw. The Soviet advance encouraged

3348-649: The Polish Home Army . The latter mostly fought both the German as well as the Soviet-led troops. Some Home Army partisan factions regarded the Soviet Union as the greater threat, however, and negotiated ceasefires or even ad-hoc alliances with the German occupation forces. Such deals were condemned by the Home Army's leadership, and several partisan officers who cooperated with the Germans against

3441-612: The Soviet defeat in Operation Mars had shown. However, by June 1944, despite shortening its front line, it was exposed following the defeats of Army Group South in the Battle of Kursk , the Battle of Kiev , the Dnieper–Carpathian offensive and the Crimean offensive in the late summer, autumn, and winter of 1943–44. In the north, Army Group North was also pushed back, leaving Army Group Center's lines protruding towards

3534-491: The Soviet plans for the L'vov operation were a major consideration and whoever planned the offensive was determined to hold the recently captured territory. The target for this operation was the Vistula bridgehead and the enormous anti-tank artillery forces helped repulse big counter-attacks by German armoured formations in August–October 1944. One American author suggests that these Soviet innovations were enabled, in part, by

3627-525: The Soviet strategic fronts. Instead they suggested four options: an offensive into Romania and through the Carpathian Mountains , an offensive into the western Ukrainian SSR aimed at the Baltic coast , an attack into the Baltic, and an offensive in the Byelorussian SSR . The first two options were rejected as being too ambitious and open to flank attack. The third option was rejected on the grounds

3720-558: The Soviet-controlled Polish People's Army , murdered, imprisoned or deported. Two special representatives to Stavka were appointed to coordinate the operations of the Fronts involved: Aleksandr Vasilevsky and Georgy Zhukov . The 1st Belorussian Front was particularly large and included further units which were only committed during the follow-on Lublin-Brest Offensive . 2nd Army was not involved in

3813-550: The Soviets that the Axis forces in Romania needed removing and kept the Germans concerned about their defences there and in southern Poland, while drawing German forces to the L'vov sector. Once the offensive against Army Group Centre, which lacked mobile reserves and support, had been initiated, it would create a crisis in the central sector that would force the German armoured forces north to Byelorussia from Poland and Romania, despite

Upper Silesian offensive - Misplaced Pages Continue

3906-699: The Soviets were subsequently court-martialed. However, many times Polish Home Army fought Soviet troops in self-defence. Most often, Polish Home Army supported approaching Soviet forces and attacked German troops according to a plan of Operation Tempest . The plan was to cooperate with the advancing Red Army on a tactical level, while Polish civil authorities came out from underground and took power in Allied-controlled Polish territory. The plan failed, as Soviet troops would attack Polish Home Army groups after cooperation against German troops. Many Polish Home Army soldiers were killed in action, enlisted to

3999-428: The area around Ratibor . Divisional assignments to Corps as of 31 Dec. 1944. Units tended to move between Corps depending on situation. Also present: 8th , 16th , 17th , 19th and 20th Panzer Divisions. These tended to pass between Corps. Also Führer Begleit Division , 18th SS Div. , 20th SS GD , and Panzer Division Hermann Göring . Konev launched his main attack on 15 March. The 4th Tank Army broke through

4092-585: The bulk of it, the XXXIX Panzer Corps and XII Corps , being encircled while pinned down by attacks from the 2nd Belorussian Front in the parallel Mogilev Offensive Operation . By far the most important Soviet objective, however, was the main Moscow–Minsk road and the town of Orsha, which the southern wing of Chernyakhovsky's 3rd Belorussian Front was ordered to take. A breakthrough in this area, against General Paul Völckers ' XXVII Corps, would form

4185-574: The city up until the 1990s. Winfried Nachtwei , a former member of the German Parliament for the Green party from Münster, carried out some research into the division and its part and responsibility in the Battle of Stalingrad that saw more than 700,000 casualties, the majority Soviet soldiers and civilians. His research also established that, of the unknown number of soldiers of the division that surrendered at Stalingrad only 128 returned after

4278-525: The crossing on 30 June. It largely completed the crossing by 2 July, under heavy Soviet bombardment, but was retreating into a trap. The Mogilev Offensive fulfilled all its immediate objectives; not only was the city itself taken, but the 4th Army was successfully prevented from disengaging in time to escape encirclement in the Minsk Offensive , which commenced immediately afterwards. To capture Bobruysk , General Konstantin Rokossovsky proposed during

4371-608: The defences to the north and south of Vitebsk and cutting off the salient. In the north, the 1st Baltic Front pushed the German IX Corps over the Dvina, while encircling the LIII Corps in the city of Vitebsk by 24 June, opening a gash in the frontline of 40 kilometres (25 miles) wide. The Soviet command inserted its mobile forces to begin exploitation in operational depth. To the south, the 3rd Belorussian Front attacked

4464-439: The developing Vitebsk–Orsha and Bobruysk Offensives encircled it. East of Mogilev, General Robert Martinek 's XXXIX Panzer Corps attempted to hold its lines in the face of an assault by the 49th Army during which the latter suffered heavy casualties. The 4th Army commander, Tippelskirch, requested that the army be allowed to withdraw on 25 June. When the permission was not forthcoming, he authorised his units to withdraw to

4557-471: The division attempted to reach American lines, with some parts succeeding in doing so but mostly being handed back to the Soviet forces. The commander of the division: Structure of the division: After the war a memorial was erected in Münster , the original garrison headquarters of the division, for the soldiers of the 16th Panzer Division. A small number of Stalingrad survivors held annual reunions in

4650-573: The division was destroyed at Stalingrad during the battle and when the Axis forces surrendered on 2 February 1943, with the commander of the division, Günther von Angern , committing suicide to avoid Soviet captivity. Reformed in Brittany in March 1943 from new recruits and units who had not been trapped at Stalingrad the division was sent to Italy in June 1943. It was part of the German defences during

4743-438: The east and at risk of losing contact with neighbouring army groups. The German High Command expected the next Soviet offensive to fall against Army Group North Ukraine (Field Marshal Walter Model ), and it lacked the necessary intelligence capabilities to discover the Soviets' true intentions. The Wehrmacht had redeployed one-third of Army Group Centre's artillery, half of its tank destroyers , and 88 per cent of tanks to

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4836-406: The enemy situation: When it is still to be considered that the attack against Army Group Centre will be a secondary operation in the framework of the global Soviet offensive operations, it must be taken into account that the enemy will also be capable in front of Army Group Centre to build concentrations of which the force of penetration cannot be underestimated in view of the ratio of forces between

4929-420: The enemy was too well prepared. The only safe option was an offensive into Byelorussia which would enable subsequent offensives from Ukraine into Poland and Romania. The Soviet and German High Commands recognised western Ukraine as a staging area for an offensive into Poland. The Soviets, aware that the enemy would anticipate this, sought to deceive the Germans by creating a crisis in Byelorussia that would force

5022-426: The escape routes of the 9th Army severed, the Soviet 65th Army swung north and soon entered the fortress city of Bobruysk. Heavy hand-to-hand fighting and ferocious urban warfare ensued, but the 65th Army was able to ultimately overcome the German 9th Army, capturing the stronghold by the 29th of June. The 9th Army was destroyed on 28 June after heavy fighting against the 65th Army, while they were unable to escape due to

5115-480: The fact that they had been cut off by the prior Soviet manoeuvres. Due to the failures of the commander of Army Group Centre, Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch was forced to commit the 20th Panzer Division as a relief force to the 9th Army. Busch was sacked on the 28th by Adolf Hitler and replaced with the experienced master of defensive warfare, Walther Model . The success of the Bobruysk Offensive

5208-423: The first or second phases of the German defense, being positioned south of the main axis of Soviet operations. The Wehrmacht's forces were based on logistic lines of communications and centres, which on Hitler's orders were declared Feste Plätze (fortified towns to be held at all costs) by OKH. General Jordan of 9th Army was very worried at how vulnerable this immobility made the army, correctly predicting that "if

5301-513: The former Gulag prisoner along those of Zhukov and Ivan Konev . The second phase of the operation involved the entire operation's most significant single objective: the retaking of Minsk, capital of the Byelorussian SSR. It would also complete the large-scale encirclement and destruction, set up by the first phase, of much of Army Group Centre. 16th Panzer Division The 16th Panzer Division ( German : 16. Panzer-Division )

5394-525: The goal of inflicting surprise on the Wehrmacht forces. The OKH expected the Soviets to launch a major offensive in the summer of 1944. The Stavka (Soviet High Command) considered a number of options. The timetable of operations between June and August had been decided on by 28 April 1944. The Stavka rejected an offensive in either the L'vov sector or the Yassy-Kishinev sectors owing to the presence of powerful enemy mobile forces equal in strength to

5487-525: The group of forces in Parichi would be commanded by Konstantin Rokossovsky himself. A rivalry formed between the two most competent commanders of the Soviet Red Army as the two raced against each other towards Bobruysk. On 24 June 1944, 7000 guns, mortars and BM-13 Katyusha rocket launchers of the 1st Belorussian Front unleashed their fury of projectiles upon the troops of the German 9th Army, while

5580-429: The main operation would be against Army Group North Ukraine. On 14 June, the Chief of Staff of Army Group Centre told General Kurt Zeitzler , the Chief of the Army General Staff, that "...the Russian concentration here [in front of 9th Army] and at the Autobahn clearly indicates that the enemy attack will be aimed at the wings of the Army Group". On 10 June the OKH adopted the opinion of Army Group Centre in its estimate of

5673-507: The northern pincer of the encirclement. The Minsk highway was protected by extensive defensive works manned by the 78th Assault Division , a specially reinforced unit with extra artillery and assault gun support. Orsha itself had been designated a Fester Platz (stronghold) under the 78th Division's commander. The Soviet assault on this sector opened on 22 June with a massive artillery barrage that destroyed defensive positions, flattened bunkers, and detonated ammunition stores. Infantry from

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5766-419: The northern wing of Konev's forces make further gains, closing up to the Neisse River. This had, however, left a long exposed flank to the south and east in the Sudeten Mountains , still held by Schulz's troops, which formed a potential threat to the proposed Soviet advance on Berlin. The commander of Army Group Centre , Field-Marshal Ferdinand Schörner , began to build up Schulz's forces during February for

5859-481: The operation would be a success. According to Rokossovsky's plan, the 1st Belorussian Front would be divided into two sectors - the Soviet 3rd Army under the command of General Alexander Gorbatov striking from Rogachev and the sector comprising the Soviet 10th, 28th and 65th Armies as well as the Cavalry-Mechanised Group(KMG) under the command of Lieutenant General Issa Pliyev mounting its assault from Parichi. The Rogachev sector would be supervised by Zhukov, while

5952-405: The order and have all units of his corps break out at the same time. Abandoning its heavy equipment, the corps began a breakout attempt in the morning of 26 June but quickly ran into Soviet roadblocks outside the city. Vitebsk was taken by 29 June, with the entire LIII Corps of 28,000 men eliminated from the German order of battle. The 3rd Belorussian Front simultaneously opened operations against

6045-459: The places where the main Soviet attacks would take place, with the exception of 6th Guards Army near Vitebsk. The Soviet strategic reserves were not detected. The start of Operation Bagration involved many Soviet partisan formations in the Byelorussian SSR, which were instructed to resume their attacks on railways and communications . From 19 June large numbers of explosive charges were placed on rail tracks and though many were cleared, they had

6138-406: The planning of Operation Bagration a multi-pronged approach by seizing both Bobruysk and Slutsk and ultimately destroying the German 9th Army under Generalfeldmarschall Hans Jordan by attacking both fortress cities with equal priority and strength, with which the Soviet General Staff and Joseph Stalin himself had initially disagreed. However, Rokossovsky stubbornly insisted and promised Stalin that

6231-539: The presence of powerful Soviet concentrations threatening German-occupied Poland. The intent of the Soviets to strike their main blow towards the Vistula can be seen in the Red Army's (albeit fragmented) order of battle. The Soviet general staff studies of both the Byelorussian and L'vov-Sandomierz operations reveal that the L'vov- Przemyśl operation received the overwhelming number of tank and mechanized corps. Six guards tank corps and six tank corps along with three guards mechanized and two mechanized corps were committed to

6324-422: The provision of over 220,000 Dodge and Studebaker trucks by the United States to motorize the Soviet infantry. Most of the aviation units, fighter aircraft and assault aviation ( strike aircraft ) were given to the L'vov operation and the protection of the 1st Ukrainian Front. Of the 78 fighter and assault aviation divisions committed to Bagration, 32 were allocated to the L'vov operation and contained more than

6417-419: The sector under Konstantin Rokossovsky met much less retaliation, as the lines around Parichi were not heavily guarded by the German troops. In a magnificent demonstration of the Soviet Red Army's mastery over the deployment of mobile troops in accordance with the Deep Battle doctrine, the Cavalry-Mechanised Group(KMG) under the command of Lieutenant General Issa Pliev consisting of the 4th Guards Cavalry Corps and

6510-418: The simultaneous Vistula–Oder and Western Carpathian offensives . The front lines in Silesia had been established at the end of the Vistula–Oder offensive in January, during which Konev's troops had forced the German Seventeenth Army of General Friedrich Schulz out of the industrial heartland of Upper Silesia around Kattowitz . The Lower Silesian offensive operation , taking place in February, had seen

6603-429: The south, the 38th Army attacked German troops of the LIX Corps defending with their backs to the highlands of Moravia . By means of a limited tactical withdrawal on 10 March, Heinrici was able to minimise the damage inflicted by the preparatory bombardment, and the front in this sector remained firm. The LVI Panzer Corps positioned near Oppeln also started to pull back, but the 20th Grenadier (Estonian) Division of

6696-411: The south-east at Striegau , which was commenced on 9 March. Though there were not enough forces available for a double envelopment, the Germans were able to penetrate the Soviet lines and cut off elements of the 5th Guards Army on the night of 11–12 March; there was an outbreak of panic amongst the trapped troops, who were massacred by Schörner's men as they tried to escape. Schörner began to organise

6789-519: The south. The entire operational reserve on the Eastern front (18 Panzer and mechanised divisions, stripped from Army Groups North and Centre) was deployed to Model's sector, leaving Army Group Centre with a total of only 580 tanks, tank destroyers, and assault guns. German lines were thinly held; for example, the 9th Army sector had 143 soldiers per km of the front. A key factor in the subsequent collapse of Army Group Center during Operation Bagration

6882-424: The spring of 1944, aimed at the city of Kovel , Army Group Center was significantly weakened by being forced to transfer nine divisions and numerous independent armored formations from its main front to its far right flank, located deep in the rear at the junction with Army Group South. These forces would then be attached to Army Group North Ukraine, the successor to Army Group South. This meant that Army Group Center

6975-405: The trapped force had been destroyed (the fighting in Silesia has been characterised as "merciless", with German forces not taking prisoners). Despite the limited nature of the victory, the recapture of Lauban was presented as a great success by German propaganda , with Joseph Goebbels visiting the town on 9 March to give a speech on the battle. Schörner made preparations for a further attack to

7068-410: The two sides. On 19 June, Army Group Centre noted in its estimate of the enemy situation that the concentration of enemy air forces had become greater (4,500 out of 11,000) and that this left new doubts regarding OKH's estimate. OKH saw no grounds for this supposition. Shortly before the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the army commands had detected some enemy forces near the front and had identified

7161-561: The war. The original copies of the war diaries of the division from mid-1943 onward were destroyed during a fire in Potsdam in April 1945 while earlier editions had been moved to Liegnitz, now Legnica in Poland. These fell into American hands in 1945, having been evacuated to Thuringia , were taken to the US for research and gradually returned to West Germany from 1962 onward. History of

7254-434: The west. It was during this operation that Nazi Germany was forced to fight simultaneously on two major fronts for the first time since the war began. The Soviet Union destroyed 28 of 34 divisions of Army Group Centre and completely shattered the German front line. The overall engagement is the largest defeat in German military history, with around 450,000 German casualties, while 300,000 other German soldiers were cut off in

7347-901: Was a formation of the German Army in World War II . It was formed in November 1940 from the 16th Infantry Division . It took part in Operation Barbarossa , the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, operating in the southern sector of the Eastern Front . After the Soviet offensive in November 1942 the division was trapped in Stalingrad , where it surrendered in February 1943. A new 16th Panzer Division

7440-787: Was able to declare the offensive phase of operations over. The Upper Silesian Offensive succeeded in stabilising Konev's left flank in preparation for the advance on Berlin, and removed the threat of any German counter-attacks from Army Group Centre . The lines in Silesia remained largely unchanged until the end of the war, when Schoerner's force surrendered. Operation Bagration Zaloga: 300,000–375,000 overall Frieser: 399,102 Glantz and House: ~450,000 combat casualties Isayev: ~500,000 combat casualties Soviet sources: 539,480 total casualties Glantz and House: 770,888 (including ~550,000 combat casualties) Operation Bagration ( Russian : Операция Багратион , romanized :  Operatsiya Bagration )

7533-475: Was committed to the Byelorussian operation. This concentration of aviation was to protect the Vistula bridgeheads against air attack and to assault German counteroffensives from the air. Towards the beginning of June 1944, the German High Command, Army Group Center and the army commands had identified a large part of the concentration against Army Group Centre, although they still considered that

7626-475: Was effectively deprived of well over 100,000 personnel and 552 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled guns at the start of Operation Bagration. Operation Bagration, in combination with the neighbouring Lvov–Sandomierz offensive , launched a few weeks later in Ukraine , allowed the Soviet Union to recapture Byelorussia and Ukraine within its 1941 borders, advance into German East Prussia , but more importantly,

7719-570: Was formed in 1943 and sent to Italy where it was part of the unsuccessful German defense against the Allied invasion of Italy . Sent back to the Eastern Front in November 1943 the division once more saw action in the southern sector, taking part in the relief operation of the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket and being part of the Kamenets-Podolsky pocket . It eventually surrendered to Soviet and American forces in Czechoslovakia in May 1945. The division

7812-628: Was formed in Autumn 1940 from the 16th Infantry Division which had previously taken part in the German invasion of France in 1940. The division, based in the Wehrkreis VI in the Westphalia region of Germany, received the 2nd Tank Regiment from the 1st Panzer Division and moved its home base from Münster to Wuppertal and came under the command of Hans-Valentin Hube . The new tank division

7905-400: Was further threatened by the near-collapse of the 3rd Panzer Army's VI Corps, immediately to the north. By midnight on 25 June, the 11th Guards Army had shattered the remains of VI Corps, and 26 June saw the German forces in retreat. Soviet tank forces of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were able to push up the road towards Minsk at speed, with a subsidiary force breaking off to encircle Orsha, which

7998-438: Was initially taken by surprise, though by 3 March German forces found themselves threatened by Soviet counterattacks from Naumberg . As a result, Nehring decided on a more limited plan of encirclement. Rybalko's troops evacuated Lauban to avoid being cut off, and the town was retaken by the 6th Volksgrenadier Division . By 4 March, the encirclement was closed, though large numbers of Soviet troops were able to escape; within 4 days

8091-518: Was launched on a staggered schedule, with partisan attacks behind German lines beginning on 19–20 June. On the night of 21–22 June, the Red Army launched probing attacks on German frontline positions, combined with bombing raids on Wehrmacht's lines of communication. The main offensive began in the early morning of 22 June, with an artillery bombardment of unprecedented scale against the defensive works. The initial assault achieved breakthroughs almost everywhere. The first phase of Soviet deep operations,

8184-434: Was liberated on the evening of 26 June. The main exploitation force, Pavel Rotmistrov 's 5th Guards Tank Army , was then committed through the gap in the German lines. VI Corps finally crumbled completely; its commander, General Georg Pfeiffer , was killed on 28 June after losing contact with his divisions. Achieving complete success, the operation effectively ceased with the arrival of 5th Guards Tank Army's forward units at

8277-546: Was one that was so stupendous and respectable that Joseph Stalin began addressing Rokossovsky as Konstantin Konstantinovich as a sign of respect, a privilege that was only bestowed upon one other military officer, Boris Shaposhnikov . The vital victory at the crucial railway junction of Bobruysk had also earned Konstantin Rokossovsky the title of the Marshal of the Soviet Red Army, bringing the position and reputation of

8370-456: Was sent to Romania and Bulgaria in early 1941 but kept in reserve and did not take part in the German invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece . It briefly returned to Germany before being sent to Poland for the preparation of the invasion of the Soviet Union . The division fought in the southern sector of the Eastern Front, taking part in the Battle of Kiev and in the German drive to the Sea of Azov. At

8463-502: Was seriously short of mobile reserves: the demotorized 14th Infantry Division was the only substantial reserve formation, though the 20th Panzer Division , with 56 tanks, was positioned in the south near Bobruisk and the Panzergrenadier Division Feldherrnhalle , still in the process of forming, was also held in reserve. Furthermore, the Germans were supported by collaborationist troops such as

8556-487: Was the codename for the 1944 Soviet Byelorussian strategic offensive operation ( Russian : Белорусская наступательная операция «Багратион» , romanized :  Belorusskaya nastupatelnaya operatsiya "Bagration" ), a military campaign fought between 22 June and 19 August 1944 in Soviet Byelorussia in the Eastern Front of World War II , just over two weeks after the start of Operation Overlord in

8649-633: Was the Soviet Dnieper–Carpathian offensive in Ukraine. The success of this Soviet offensive had convinced the Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command, OKH) that the southern sector of the Eastern Front would be the staging area for the main Soviet summer offensive of 1944. As a result, German forces stationed in the south, panzer divisions in particular, received priority in reinforcements. Furthermore, during this Soviet offensive in

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