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98-685: Currently, the bureau is a group of 24 top officials who oversee the party and central government. The politburo is headed by a general secretary . Unlike politburos of other communist parties , power within the CCP Politburo is further centralized in the Politburo Standing Committee , a group of 7 individuals from among the larger Politburo. The Politburo is elected by the Central Committee. In practice, however, scholars of Chinese elite politics believe that

196-478: A coal-producing province in central China, the stationed inspection team picked up on a corruption labyrinth that seeped into almost all aspects of governance in the province, particularly the collusion between local politicians and business elites, most of whom ran coal companies. The inspection initially resulted in the dismissal of Deputy Party Secretary Jin Daoming , Vice Governor Du Shanxue , and Ling Zhengce ,

294-409: A generational leadership transition at the subsequent party congress. The powers and roles of the general secretary are vaguely defined, with no term limits or written rules for selecting a successor. However, as China is a one-party state , the general secretary holds ultimate power and authority over state and government, and is usually considered the " paramount leader " of China. According to

392-650: A latter-day " Gang of Four ", whose real crime was not corruption but conspiring to usurp power. Chinese writer Murong Xuecun , a continual critic of the CCP, wrote in an opinion article "In my view, Xi's anti-corruption campaign looks more like a Stalinist political purge... he relies on the regulations of the party and not on the laws of the state, the people carrying it out operate like the KGB , and most cases cannot be reported on with any transparency." Factional struggle has been proposed as another explanation. The Economist cited

490-415: A marked increase in patronage appointments that spanned the military, the provinces, and the party apparatus. Patron-client relationships, rather than merit, became the primary factor in securing promotions, giving rise to the formation of internal factions based on personal loyalty. Prominent examples of factions identified by observers include Jiang's Shanghai clique , Zhou Yongkang's spheres of influence in

588-412: A matter of time before the investigation was made public. On January 30, 2014, Caixin , a Chinese website known for its investigative journalism, released a video and an accompanying article entitled "The Three 'White Gloves' of Zhou Bin", detailing allegations about the wrongdoing of Zhou Yongkang's son, without mentioning the senior Zhou directly as a means to skirt censorship rules. In November 2013,

686-413: A month. The Politburo holds regular study sessions which serve as an opportunity for CCP leadership to promote new policies. The CCP almost always releases a readout to summarize the outcomes of Politburo meetings and, since 2002, these sessions have been widely publicized. Frequently, they address foreign affairs . The General Secretary of the Central Committee is responsible for convening the meetings of

784-478: A political party that was faced with pervasive corruption and in danger of collapse. Xi and the new generational leaders aimed to eliminate corruption at the higher levels of the CCP because of their belief that only the party was capable of governing China, and that a collapse of the party would be disastrous for the Chinese people. Wang further adds, "Xi Jinping obviously believes that his anti-corruption campaign

882-587: A process called "democratic recommendation" ( 民主推荐 ) where the CCP conducted a straw poll of 200 candidates to the Politburo, which were factored into the final list of candidates presented at the National Congress of the CCP. However, this was abolished in the 19th National Congress under Xi, which denounced the "vote buying" and the "voting based on personal connections and favors" of this method, particularly in connection to politicians who fell after

980-450: A provincial office; several of Wang's subordinates were investigated for corruption. In Jiangsu, home province of former party leader Jiang Zemin and disgraced security chief Zhou Yongkang, several 'native sons' with seemingly promising political futures underwent investigation. Nanjing mayor Ji Jianye was the "first tiger" to fall in the province. His dismissal was trumpeted by the city's then party chief Yang Weize as having "removed

1078-565: A ringleader for the so-called Xishan Society , a secret society -like network of high officials from Shanxi province. Su Rong , the fourth 'big tiger' who was then also serving as CPPCC Vice-chairman, was already 'netted' earlier in the year, but was officially expelled from the party in February 2015. Su was better known for his lengthy career as party chief in three Chinese provinces, but his term in Jiangxi (2007 – 2013), where corruption

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1176-771: A second round of inspection teams were dispatched. These teams were sent to the provinces of Shanxi , Jilin, Yunnan, Anhui, Hunan and Guangdong, as well as the Xinhua News Agency, the Ministry of Commerce, and the state-owned company overseeing the construction of the Three Gorges Dam . In Guangdong, the inspections resulted in the abrupt downfall of the populist party chief of the provincial capital, Guangzhou, Wan Qingliang . In Yunnan, former provincial party chief Bai Enpei and Vice Governor Shen Peiping were implicated in corruption and detained. In Shanxi,

1274-580: A study by an Australian scholar which concluded that no Princelings , or descendants of the early Communist revolutionaries otherwise known as the "red second generation", have been targets of the anti-corruption campaign. Xi himself is considered a princeling; some also consider CCDI chief Wang Qishan a princeling through his father-in-law. However, the cohesiveness of the princelings as a political faction with similar policy preferences has not been well established. Indeed, just prior to Xi's ascension to power, Bo Xilai, arguably China's most high-profile princeling,

1372-476: A tumour" from the provincial capital. In January 2015, Yang himself was also detained for investigation. Former provincial party secretary-general Zhao Shaolin and Executive Vice Governor Li Yunfeng were also rounded up for investigation. Zhejiang, 'home turf' of Party general secretary Xi Jinping and the site of much smaller-scale anti-corruption experimentation during Xi's term as party chief there, had been largely spared of high-profile political changes in

1470-593: Is Xi Jinping , who took office on 15 November 2012 and was re-elected twice on 25 October 2017 and 23 October 2022. The last person to rule the country for more than two terms was Mao Zedong , who served as Chairman of the CCP Central Committee from 1943 until his death in 1976. The post was established by the 12th Central Committee in 1982, replacing the post of Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. Since its revival in 1982,

1568-410: Is a threat to the party's survival. Xi made special mention of corruption in his inaugural speech as General Secretary on November 15, 2012. In his first days in office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", that is, high-ranking officials and petty civil servants alike. He also warned his colleagues on the Politburo that corruption would "doom the party and state." In other cases, some violate

1666-594: Is also the head of the Secretariat , and sets the agenda of Central Committee, Politburo and PSC meetings. Since the 1990s, the holder of the post has been, except for transitional periods, the president of China , making the holder the head of state, and the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), the supreme commander of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). As the leader of

1764-527: Is an internal agency of the party and therefore does not have judicial authority. In general, the CCDI investigates officials and, when necessary, forwards evidence gathered to judicial organs, such as the Supreme People's Procuratorate (in charge of investigation and prosecution), who proceeds to charge the accused with criminal wrongdoing and move the case to trial. While the CCDI formally reports into

1862-432: Is part of a much wider drive to clean up malfeasance within party ranks and shore up party unity. It has become an emblematic feature of Xi Jinping's political brand. We should continue to catch "tigers" as well as "flies" when dealing with cases of leading officials in violation of Party discipline and state laws as well as misconduct and corruption problems that directly affect the people's interests. All are equal before

1960-718: The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the sole ruling party of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since 1989, the CCP general secretary has been the paramount leader of the PRC. According to the CCP constitution , the general secretary is elected during a plenary session of the Central Committee . The general secretary serves as an ex officio member of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), China's de facto top decision-making body. The general secretary

2058-507: The Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a legislative advisory body. Ling hailed from the prominent Linghu political family from Pinglu County , Shanxi. Several of his relatives were reported as having been investigated beginning in the third quarter of 2014, in what seemed to be another 'encirclement campaign' similar to what was happening with Zhou Yongkang. It was later alleged that Ling served as somewhat of

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2156-614: The Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party , the general secretary serves as an ex officio member of the Politburo Standing Committee. According to regulations of the CCP, the general secretary is responsible for convening the meetings of the Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. The general secretary additionally presides over the work of the Secretariat. The general secretary also sets

2254-664: The Cultural Revolution . The agency directly charged with overseeing the campaign is the CCDI, which, at the time of the campaign, was headed by Secretary Wang Qishan , a politician known for his work in the financial sector and one of the seven members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Wang was in charge of the day-to-day execution of the campaign. The CCDI's official mandate is to enforce party discipline, combat malfeasance, and punish party members for committing offenses. The CCDI

2352-603: The Reform magazine in China, told Voice of America that by signalling that no one is off limits and by targeting retired officials, the campaign aimed to reduce the undue influence of party "elders" who were no longer in office but nevertheless wanted to interfere in political affairs. Writing for Radio Free Asia , Liu Qing, among others, suggest that the campaign's main aim was to extinguish vestiges of influence of former Party general secretary Jiang Zemin. Jiang's time in power saw

2450-407: The anti-corruption campaign under Xi . The process was officially replaced with a method of "face-to-face interviews, investigation and study". In 2001, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party published the 2001-2005 National Plan for Cadre Training elevating the importance of cadre training for Chinese economic reform . The salaries of staff in party schools were brought in line with

2548-480: The "coal bosses" that stack their wallets in exchange for favourable treatment in approving development projects. Even officials who were previously seen as incorruptible eventually caved in to the systemic culture of graft. At one point in 2015, the anti-corruption campaign was so intense that 300 government jobs were vacant. In Guangdong, the campaign severely upset the political ecosystem that had long been dominated by native Cantonese politicians. Wan Qingliang,

2646-438: The "great Shanxi political earthquake". The province's Party Secretary Yuan Chunqing was then abruptly transferred out of office, as the central authorities 'parachuted' then Jilin party chief Wang Rulin to take his place. During the transfer-of-power announcement in the provincial capital Taiyuan , Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan sat centre stage as party organization officials and provincial politicians ran

2744-563: The "political earthquake", only three members of the original group remained, and only two members were born and raised in Shanxi province. The remainder have been removed from office, transferred out of the province, or otherwise replaced, indicating that the central authorities from Beijing had essentially 'taken over' political control of the province from Shanxi locals. Moreover, many municipal and local district leaders were also sacked and investigated for corruption in quick succession, such as in

2842-478: The "political purge" and "factional warfare" hypotheses, contending that Xi's main patrons were Jiang and Jiang's ally Zeng Qinghong, yet major targets of the campaign such as Xu Caihou, Zhou Yongkang and Liu Zhijun were in Jiang's camp, while others affiliated to the purged officials remain in office. His anti-corruption drive has widespread consensus in the party. The BBC's Jonathan Fenby, among others, believe that

2940-450: The 1980s. Xi Jinping had declared in his speeches that internal factionalism is as harmful to the party's ability to govern as corruption. As of November 2015, all 31 provincial-level divisions, including municipalities like Beijing and Shanghai, which were once considered to be relatively free of corruption, have seen at least one provincial-level official investigated for corruption. Of the most heavily targeted provinces, Shanxi has been

3038-410: The CCDI became much less likely to face interference from local barons and vested interests in performing its duties. It has also strengthened internal regulations on the manner in which investigations are to be conducted, to ensure that CCDI officials themselves do not abuse their power and break the very same rules they are tasked with enforcing. The anti-corruption campaign has been well received by

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3136-440: The CCDI has been seen as a body that is largely inept at fighting corruption, but during the term of Hu Jintao the organization began a series of reforms strengthening its independence. Upon Xi's assuming the party leadership, further reforms were enacted to make the CCDI a bona fide control and auditing organization governed by a sophisticated set of rules and regulations to ensure professionalism and procedural fairness. Under Xi,

3234-500: The CCDI has seen a massive expansion of its powers since Xi's ascension, and that it was increasingly involved in the governance of the state. Lam also contended that the CCDI seemed to be deriving most of its power from Xi Jinping personally. Conversely, state media and some observers have pointed out that the CCDI has undergone significant structural reform in recent years aimed at making anti-corruption efforts more depoliticized, rules-based, and process-oriented. For much of its history

3332-525: The CCDI was also led by Wang Qishan. The inspection teams are typically 'stationed' for a few months at the organization they were tasked with overseeing, and are in charge of thorough audits into the conduct of officials and organizational practices. The inspection teams send the results of the audits to the CCDI to enact formal investigative procedures such as Shuanggui (the practice of detaining individual party members for investigation). The proposed constitutional changes published on February 25 envision

3430-547: The CCP had created vulnerabilities exploited by outside intelligence agencies, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency . Purges under the guise of anti-corruption were at least partially motivated by counterintelligence concerns. Further reporting by Axios also revealed that years of corruption from the Hu-Wen era had left the CCP vulnerable to infiltration after Chinese officials discovered that

3528-441: The CCP. The first batch of central inspection teams were dispatched in the third quarter of 2013 to various Chinese provinces, including Jiangxi, Inner Mongolia, Chongqing, and Hubei. A handful of provincial-level officials were investigated for corruption and removed from office as a result of the first round of inspection work. Of these regions, the inspection team in charge of Jiangxi uncovered far-reaching official corruption in

3626-422: The Central Military Commission from 2004 to 2013, was being expelled from the party for taking bribes in exchange for promotions, and facing criminal prosecution. The CMC Vice-chairman position is the highest position held by a military officer in China, as the chairmanship (commander-in-chief) is customarily occupied by a civilian. Xu was the highest-ranked PLA military officer ever to be implicated in corruption and

3724-595: The PSC and decides their agenda. The 20th Politburo was elected at the first plenary session of the 20th Central Committee in October 2022. General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party The general secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party ( Chinese : 中国共产党中央委员会总书记 ; pinyin : Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng Zhōngyāng Wěiyuánhuì Zǒngshūjì ) is the leader of

3822-466: The Party Congress, nominally the highest representative body of the party which gathers once every five years, and is intended to be an 'independent' agency from a constitutional standpoint, in practice ultimate oversight of the agency falls under the purview of Xi Jinping by virtue of holding the office of General Secretary (i.e., de facto leader ). Xi, who also directs anti-graft efforts of

3920-603: The Party organization is still kept in the dark. Some have many passports and even fake ID cards . Should not these things be reported? According to the rules, they should report them. Why do some keep such things unreported? One reason is that they do not know the rules, and the other is that they have ulterior motives. Recent years of investigations into serious violations of Party discipline and state laws by high-ranking officials, Zhou Yongkang , Bo Xilai , Xu Caihou , Ling Jihua and Su Rong in particular, show that violations of

4018-410: The Party's political discipline and political rules have become a prominent problem and must be treated with the utmost importance. In the case of such people, the greater power and higher position they hold, the less they take the Party's political discipline and rules seriously. Some of their conduct is outrageous. Driven by their overinflated political ambitions and eagerness to acquire personal gain or

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4116-498: The Politburo and Secretariat have. In addition, some Politburo members hold powerful regional positions. How the Politburo works internally is unclear, but it appears that the full Politburo meets once a month and the standing committee meets weekly. This is believed to be much less frequent than meetings of the former Soviet Politburo . The agenda for the meetings is controlled by the CCP general secretary and decisions are made by consensus rather than by majority vote. The Politburo

4214-434: The Politburo is a self-perpetuating body, with new members of both the Politburo and its Standing Committee chosen through a series of deliberations by current Politburo members and retired Politburo Standing Committee members. The current and former Politburo members conduct a series of informal straw polls to determine the group's level of support for each new candidate's membership in the Politburo. The process for selecting

4312-460: The U.S. intelligence agencies were allegedly paying "promotion fees" for certain government officials; simultaneous to the anti-corruption drive beginning 2013, dozens of U.S. intelligence assets within China were reportedly executed and arrested. Outside observers have noted that crackdowns on graft inside of the PLA are motivated at least in part by a desire to increase military readiness after viewing

4410-458: The benefit of their inner circle, some resort to political conspiracies against the Party and plot to undermine and divide it. — Xi Jinping, "Observe Discipline and Rules", Qiushi , January 13, 2015, The first salvos of the campaign was the abrupt sacking of Sichuan Deputy Party Secretary Li Chuncheng , which took place in December 2012, shortly after Xi took office as leader of

4508-482: The brother of the once powerful chief presidential aide Ling Jihua . The political drama in Shanxi played out over the third quarter of 2014, as the province experienced a wholesale cleansing of its political establishment with ferocity unseen in the post-Mao era China. Between August 23 and 29, 2014, four sitting members of the province's top governing council, the provincial Party Standing Committee , were sacked in quick succession, giving rise to what became known as

4606-565: The campaign has helped Xi conduct some much-needed "clean-up" of entrenched vested interests before pushing ahead with much larger structural reforms. Academic Keyu Jin writes that though there may be political motivations behind the campaign, its scope, depth, and sustained effort "proves the seriousness of the intention to sever corrosive links fostered in an era of rapid but disorderly growth." A December 2020 article in Foreign Policy suggested that decades of corruption inside of

4704-606: The campaign is part of a wider agenda of systemic reform aimed at restoring legitimacy of the CCP's mandate to rule, which – in the decades immediately prior – was heavily challenged by widespread corruption, a widening gap between rich and poor, social injustice, and excessive focus on material wealth. In this view, the campaign is consistent to the other initiatives focused on social justice undertaken by Xi, including pushing ahead legal reform, abolishing re-education through labour , and castigating local officials from meddling in judicial proceedings. Moreover, many officials implicated in

4802-420: The campaign is to strengthen the role of institutions and stamp out factionalism and networks of personal loyalty, thereby creating a more united and meritocratic organization and achieving greater efficiency for governance. Several Chinese-language media sources rejected the notion that the corruption campaign should be likened to a political purge, calling this view naive and overly cynical. Duowei wrote that

4900-399: The campaign may also be motivated by economic rather than political goals. For example, by tackling graft in state-owned enterprises, seen as bastions of entitlement, entrenched vested interests, and glaring inefficiencies, the government is better able to pursue economic reform programs aimed at liberalizing markets, breaking up monopolies, and reducing state control. Hu Xingdou also suggested

4998-403: The campaign was not only wholly misleading but also unproductive. Li believes that not only has Xi's campaign had the effect of truly curbing corrupt practices at all levels of government, it has also restored public confidence in the CCP's mandate to rule, and has also returned massive ill-gotten gains back into state coffers which could be re-directed towards economic development. Li also refuted

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5096-405: The campaign was notable in implicating both incumbent and former national-level leaders, including former Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) member Zhou Yongkang and former Central Military Commission (CMC) vice-chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong . Such investigations broke the unspoken rule regarding 'PSC criminal immunity ' ( Chinese : 刑不上常委 ) that has been the norm since the end of

5194-520: The campaign were long retired or no longer serving in influential roles, and therefore posed no direct political threats to the incumbent administration. Chinese sociologist Hu Xingdou told Deutsche Welle that the campaign was only the first stage of a long-term strategy aimed at genuinely tackling corruption and speculated that the second stage will include the establishment of independent anti-corruption organs. Brookings Institution China scholar Cheng Li asserted that attributing ulterior motives to

5292-457: The cities of Datong , Lüliang , Yuncheng , Yangquan , and the provincial capital Taiyuan. According to official data, in 2013 alone, 26 officials of prefecture-department rank ( 厅局级 ) and 336 officials of county-division rank ( 县处级 ) were disciplined in Shanxi province. In 2014, 17 county-level party chiefs were investigated in Shanxi. The inspection teams in the province uncovered widespread collusion between those who hold political power and

5390-505: The coal industry. As part of the anti-corruption campaign, in December 2014, central government officials met with local officials in Macau and reached an agreement allowing the central economic crimes bureau to have real-time access to all transactions in Macau involving UnionPay cards. UnionPay transactions had previously been a primary tool for gray-market money transfers from Macau to

5488-431: The conclusion of the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 2012. The campaign, carried out under the aegis of Xi Jinping , General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party , was the largest organized anti-corruption effort in the history of CCP rule in China. Upon taking office, Xi vowed to crack down on "tigers and flies", that is, high-level officials and local civil servants alike. Most of

5586-514: The creation of a new anti-graft state agency that merges the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and various anti-corruption government departments. The thus formed National Supervisory Commission will be the highest supervisory body in the country, and will be a cabinet-level organization outranking courts and the office of the prosecutor. Anti-corruption efforts have been on the agenda of successive Chinese leaders, though

5684-505: The effectiveness of these campaigns have varied. Since economic reforms began in 1978, political corruption in China has grown significantly. The types of offenses vary, though usually they involve trading bribes for political favours, such as local businesses trying to secure large government contracts or subordinates seeking promotions for higher office. At the 18th Party Congress, both outgoing General Secretary Hu Jintao and incoming party leader Xi Jinping repeatedly emphasized corruption

5782-474: The effects of corruption on the Russian armed forces during the invasion of Ukraine . Investigations by the party's disciplinary bodies are not part of the state judicial system. When an official is detained for an investigation, known as Shuanggui , they are essentially placed under house arrest and are isolated from the outside world. The subject often must endure days of grueling interrogation. Data from

5880-528: The first Politburo member investigated for corruption since the sacking of former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai . Unlike the steady build-up of speculation surrounding the Zhou case, the announcement of Xu's expulsion from the party came without any apparent warning. Reports later surfaced that the 71-year-old general, who was going through medical treatment for bladder cancer at 301 Military Hospital in Beijing,

5978-415: The first half of 2014 showed that the conviction rate of those who were investigated in that time period to be around 99%. The CCDI and its local counterparts usually gather evidence covertly well in advance of detaining the subject. Generally, when an official is announced to be under investigation, the CCDI has already collected an overwhelming amount of hard evidence. China scholar Willy Lam also wrote that

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6076-540: The law and Party discipline; whoever is involved in a corruption case must be thoroughly and impartially investigated. — Xi Jinping, "Power Must Be "Caged" by the System", Qiushi January 22, 2013, Executed largely under the direction of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and its Secretary from 2012 to 2017 Wang Qishan along with corresponding military and judicial organs,

6174-548: The military and security sectors have been limited to 3 posts. In contrast, most members in the 1980s had a military command background. In 2017, for the 19th Central Committee Politburo, aside from the heads of the four main institutional hierarchies—the CCP, the National People's Congress , the State Council and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference , there were six members each holding posts in

6272-451: The military through his holding the office of Chairman of the Central Military Commission (i.e., commander-in-chief ). The majority of reporting on the campaign by media sources have highlighted Xi Jinping's direct involvement in managing the campaign, which has become a central hallmark of his term in office. However, formal disciplinary measures meted out to high-ranking officials such as former Politburo members must undergo ratification by

6370-466: The most notable 'disaster zone', with a total of nine officials of provincial rank investigated or dismissed for corruption, five of which were sitting members of the provincial party standing committee , the province's highest de facto governing body. At the time of the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, there were 13 seats on the provincial standing committee. By March 2015, less than a year after

6468-402: The motions and exchanged obligatory political declarations to stabilize the province and maintain unwavering loyalty to the party centre. As the public awaited word on the fate of Zhou Yongkang amid intense rumours circulating inside the country and in international media, on June 30, an announcement came from Beijing that General Xu Caihou , former member of the Politburo and vice chairman of

6566-523: The new Politburo begins with a closed door meeting by the incumbent Politburo Standing Committee in Beidaihe in the summer before the National Congress of the CCP convenes. The power of the Politburo resides largely in the fact that its members generally simultaneously hold positions within the People's Republic of China state positions and with the control over personnel appointments that

6664-446: The officials investigated were removed from office and faced accusations of bribery and abuse of power, although the range of alleged abuses varied widely. The campaign 'netted' over 120 high-ranking officials , including about a dozen high-ranking military officers, several senior executives of state-owned companies, and five national leaders. As of 2023, approximately 2.3 million government officials have been prosecuted. The campaign

6762-474: The party, the national government, the regional governments, and three in the military. The average age of the 2017 Politburo's members was 62, which was similar to those in recent decades. Before that, the Party under Deng Xiaoping deliberately encouraged turnover by imposing term limits and retirement ages. In October 2017, at the First Plenary Session of the 19th CCP Central Committee , it

6860-623: The past as Party Chiefs of provincial capitals, making the position especially 'susceptible' for investigation. For example, Taiyuan ( Chen Chuanping , Shen Weichen ), Nanning ( Yu Yuanhui ), Jinan ( Wang Min ), Guangzhou ( Wan Qingliang ), Nanjing ( Yang Weize ), Xining ( Mao Xiaobing ), Urumqi ( Li Zhi ), Lanzhou ( Lu Wucheng ), Kunming ( Qiu He , Zhang Tianxin , Gao Jinsong ), and Chengdu ( Li Chuncheng ). From January 2020 to October 2020, 534 cadres in Inner Mongolia were investigated for corruption related to dealings in

6958-457: The popular and relatively youthful party chief of Guangzhou known for his frugality and accessibility, was sacked in the third quarter of 2014, and was also replaced by an outsider, former Tianjin vice mayor Ren Xuefeng . The province's top political advisor, Zhu Mingguo , also became one of the few incumbent officials of full provincial rank to be investigated for corruption. Lieutenant Governor Liu Zhigeng , another native Cantonese official who

7056-440: The position of first Secretary of the Secretariat in the same process used to determine the membership and roles of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee. Under this informal process, the first secretary would be chosen during deliberations by incumbent Politburo members and retired Politburo Standing Committee members in the lead up to a Party Congress . The first secretary would later succeed the retiring general secretary as part of

7154-514: The post of chairman of the Central Military Commission , making the holder the supreme commander of the People's Liberation Army . The CCP general secretary is nominally elected by a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party from among the members of the Politburo Standing Committee . In practice, the de facto method of selecting the general secretary has varied over time. The two most recent general secretaries, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping , were first elevated to

7252-495: The post of general secretary has been the highest office in the CCP, though it did not become the most powerful post until Deng Xiaoping 's retirement in 1990. Since the mid-1990s, starting with Jiang Zemin , the general secretary has traditionally also held the post of president of China . While the presidency is a ceremonial post, it is customary for the general secretary to assume the presidency to confirm his status as head of state . It has additionally been held together with

7350-608: The province, bringing down about a dozen officials, including Lieutenant Governor Yao Mugen . The inspection work in Hubei province also resulted in about a dozen cases, including that of Lieutenant Governor Guo Youming . In Inner Mongolia, head of the party's regional United Front department Wang Suyi was detained. Meanwhile, in the latter half of 2013, a separate operation began to investigate officials with connections to Zhou Yongkang , former Politburo Standing Committee member and national security chief. Three sectors in which Zhou

7448-516: The regulation regarding officials reporting major personal matters...Some [Cadres] do not report the fact that their children or spouses have stayed abroad for a long time. According to regulations, officials should report to the Party organization if their family members settle down abroad. They think it unnecessary to report since their family members have not officially settled down abroad. Some do not report major changes in their family situation. Even after they have been divorced or remarried for years,

7546-424: The rest of China. Reaction to the campaign has been mixed. It is believed to enjoy popular support among most ordinary Chinese, but has raised some concerns in the country's legal community. Much of the press coverage surrounding the campaign has included speculation over its aims and the political and economic effects of the campaign. According to historian and sinologist Wang Gungwu , Xi Jinping inherited

7644-539: The salaries paid in regular Chinese universities. Teaching, research, and information technology was modernized to enable distance education throughout the party school system. Modern cadre training focuses on quality and ability . Students are trained in ideological orthodoxy, submitting to Leninism and party discipline. The young cadre is trained in applying their knowledge creatively and independently, so as to deal flexibly with complex issues and accept continuous learning. The initiative for cadre training after 2002

7742-493: The sitting Politburo. The power of anticorruption is centralized to the CCP Politburo Standing Committee by undermining the original functions of the local Discipline Inspection Commissions. Coordination of anti-corruption efforts in the provinces and state-owned enterprises have been carried out by "central inspection teams" ( 中央巡视组 ), which reports to the Central Leading Group for Inspection Work , which like

7840-480: The state oil and public security sectors, and the so-called Xishan Society of Shanxi officials – apart from these well-known cases, political factionalism seemed to be the order of the day down to the lowest levels of party bureaucracy. This meant that factional patrons often exerted massive influence through informal channels rather than through the offices they hold. Indeed, the refusal of Jiang Zemin to relinquish his influence years after he had formally left office

7938-603: The topics of Central Committee, Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee meetings. Since October 2017, the first plenary session of the 19th CCP Central Committee , all Politburo members make an annual written presentation to the CCP General Secretary. The position is reportedly paid a basic annual salary of ¥136,620 or around US$ 19,200 per year. Anti-corruption campaign under Xi Jinping A far-reaching anti-corruption campaign began in China following

8036-461: The wake of the anti-corruption campaign. Whether this is because Xi instilled a puritan political culture in the province during his tenure there or because officials with patronage links to him were given favourable treatment was unclear. As of 2016, former provincial Party Standing Committee member Si Xinliang was the sole high official from the province to be investigated for disciplinary offenses. Notably, many of those investigated had served in

8134-399: The world's largest economy by GDP purchasing power parity (PPP) , the second largest economy by GDP nominal , the largest military in the world by personnel, a recognized nuclear weapons state , UN Security Council permanent member , and a potential superpower , the general secretary is considered to be one of the world's most powerful political figures. The incumbent general secretary

8232-738: Was buttressed by the Central Party School, and the regional party schools, including the Party Schools in Shanghai and Shenzhen . The Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee are the top decision-making institutions for the CCP Central Committee. According to the Party Constitution, the party's Central Committee elects the Politburo during a plenary session. Members of the Politburo are deputy-national-level leaders or more. The Politburo typically meets once

8330-467: Was decided that all Politburo members shall make an annual written presentation to the Central Committee and the General Secretary. In March 2018, all Standing Committee members and members of the Politburo made their first written presentation to the Central Committee and General Secretary Xi Jinping . Since the 17th National Congress , the official way of electing the Politburo was through

8428-400: Was eclipsed by the Secretariat of the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1980s under Hu Yaobang , but has re-emerged as a dominant force after Hu's ousting in 1987. Since the 1990s, Politburo members concurrently held posts in the party apparatus, in state posts, and as regional party chiefs. Some are party secretaries of important provinces or municipalities. In addition, members serving in

8526-820: Was known to carry immense influence were targeted for investigation, including the national oil sector (where Zhou was once a chief executive), Sichuan province (where Zhou was party chief), and security organs (once under the jurisdiction of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission , which Zhou headed). Senior officials, such as former China Petroleum chief executive Jiang Jiemin , senior Sichuan officials Li Chongxi and Guo Yongxiang , and former deputy minister of public security Li Dongsheng were all dismissed in 2013. Many of Zhou's former secretaries who later received promotions, including Ji Wenlin , Tan Li , Shen Dingcheng , and Li Hualin , were also rounded up for investigation. The fall of Jiang Jiemin – who

8624-413: Was likely placed under some form of house arrest long prior to the announcement. The official confirmation that Zhou was under investigation made him the first Politburo Standing Committee member to fall from grace since the end of the Cultural Revolution , and broke the unspoken rule of "PSC criminal immunity" that has been the norm for over three decades. Moreover, it was unusual that the case against Zhou

8722-681: Was once the party chief of Dongguan , and Zhuhai party chief Li Jia , who had spent his entire political career in Guangdong, were also sacked. The breaking down of local patronage networks had already begun before the 18th Party Congress, and continued with greater intensity following the Congress under newly anointed party chief Hu Chunhua . The party leadership team in Shenzhen, China's most successful Special Economic Zone, also underwent significant changes, with party chief Wang Rong moving to

8820-425: Was ousted from office as party chief of Chongqing and member of the Politburo. At the same time, between 2013 and 2015, almost all the high-level officials investigated or removed from office were from 'commoner' backgrounds, most of them farmers. Other observers acknowledge the campaign may be intended to achieve political ends but depict its ultimate aims as something far less sinister. Li Weidong, former editor of

8918-706: Was pursued despite his having retired from office in 2012. Prior to Xi's ascension to power, corruption cases were typically targeted towards incumbent Politburo members, such as Chen Xitong , Chen Liangyu , and Bo Xilai. Zhou would be formally expelled from the party in December 2014, after the Politburo reviewed findings of his case. The internal investigation concluded that Zhou abused his power, maintained extramarital affairs with multiple women, took massive bribes, exchanged money and favours for sex, and "leaked state and party secrets." The fourth quarter of 2014 saw another flurry of officials detained for investigation. Criminal proceedings had also begun. On July 31, Wang Suyi

9016-410: Was said to be complicit in his corrupt activities. On December 22, 2014, Ling Jihua, former senior aide to former Party general secretary Hu Jintao and a political star whose ambitions were quashed by the untimely death of his Ferrari-driving son, also fell under the anti-graft dragnet. Ling was serving as the head of the party's United Front Work Department at the time, and also was vice chairman of

9114-405: Was said to have caused much unease with the party rank-and-file. It also had unduly constrained the ability of his successor Hu Jintao to enact systemic reforms or to carry out a cohesive agenda. By reversing this part of Jiang's legacy, some observers believe, Xi would be better equipped to discipline and unite the party under a common agenda. Proponents of this view believe that the ultimate aim of

9212-429: Was said to have flourished under his watch, was cited as the major reason for his downfall. Several provinces have faced the brunt of the anti-corruption campaign: Guangdong, Shanxi, Sichuan, and Jiangsu. In addition to tackling corruption, the campaign has also had the effect of reducing regional factionalism and dissecting entrenched patron-client networks that have flourished since the beginning of economic reforms in

9310-459: Was seen as a close confidant of Zhou Yongkang and who also held membership on the elite Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party – in September 2013 was seen as an unmistakable sign that the net was closing in on Zhou himself. On December 15, 2013, The New York Times , in a front-page article, confirmed that Zhou Yongkang was the ultimate target of the campaign, and that it would be only

9408-418: Was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for bribery. On August 5, Tong Mingqian was convicted of dereliction of duty in a vote-buying scandal and sentenced to five years in prison. In September 2014, the trial of former economic official Liu Tienan became the first high-profile televised trial of the campaign. On camera, a teary-eyed Liu recanted his crimes and lamented having ruined the future of his son, who

9506-474: Was taken from his sick bed in March 2014 to be investigated. A month after Xu's fall, on July 30, 2014, state media finally broke months of silence on Zhou Yongkang with a press release naming him the subject of an investigation into "severe disciplinary violations". The terse news bulletin, carried throughout Chinese media, signalled that Zhou was "no longer a comrade" but did not discuss criminal wrongdoing. Zhou

9604-475: Was vital to enable him to save the Party." In 2014, the British news magazine The Economist wrote in its "Banyan" column, "it is hard not to see corruption allegations as the latter-day weapon of choice in the winner-takes-all power struggles that the party has always suffered". Meanwhile, He Pin, editor at overseas Chinese news portal Boxun , likened Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Ling Jihua, and Xu Caihou, to

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