61-537: The Cossack uprisings (also kozak rebellions , revolts ) were a series of military conflicts between the Cossacks and the states claiming dominion over the territories they lived in, namely the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and Russian Empire during the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The conflict resulted from both states' attempts to exert control over the independent-minded Cossacks. While
122-437: A 1965 book that conceptualizes the inherent problem with an activity that has concentrated costs and diffuse benefits. In this case, the benefits of rebellion are seen as a public good , meaning one that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Indeed, the political benefits are generally shared by all in society if a rebellion is successful, not just the individuals that have partaken in the rebellion itself. Olson thus challenges
183-444: A government, authority figure, law, or policy. If a government does not recognize rebels as belligerents then they are insurgents and the revolt is an insurgency . In a larger conflict the rebels may be recognized as belligerents without their government being recognized by the established government, in which case the conflict becomes a civil war . Civil resistance movements have often aimed at, and brought about,
244-514: A grassroots movement by nature because they do more than change the modalities of power, they aim to transform the fundamental social structure of society. As a corollary, this means that some "revolutions" may cosmetically change the organization of the monopoly over power without engineering any true change in the social fabric of society. Her analysis is limited to studying the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions. Skocpol identifies three stages of
305-593: A laborer, for example, will be to move to a tenant position, then smallholder , then landlord; where there is less variance and more income. Voluntarism is thus non-existent in such communities. Popkin singles out four variables that impact individual participation: Without any moral commitment to the community, this situation will engineer free riders. Popkin argues that selective incentives are necessary to overcome this problem. Political Scientist Christopher Blattman and World Bank economist Laura Ralston identify rebellious activity as an "occupational choice". They draw
366-425: A noun does not necessarily imply that a belligerent country is an aggressor . In times of war , belligerent countries can be contrasted with neutral countries and non-belligerents . However, the application of the laws of war to neutral countries and the responsibilities of belligerents are not affected by any distinction between neutral countries , neutral powers or non-belligerents . "Belligerency"
427-446: A parallel between criminal activity and rebellion, arguing that the risks and potential payoffs an individual must calculate when making the decision to join such a movement remains similar between the two activities. In both cases, only a selected few reap important benefits, while most of the members of the group do not receive similar payoffs. The choice to rebel is inherently linked with its opportunity cost , namely what an individual
488-431: A peasant, according to Popkin, will disregard the ideological dimension of a social movement and focus instead on whether or not it will bring any practical benefit to him. According to Popkin, peasant society is based on a precarious structure of economic instability. Social norms, he writes, are "malleable, renegotiated, and shifting in accord with considerations of power and strategic interaction among individuals" Indeed,
549-473: A portion of a state. A rebellion is often caused by political, religious, or social grievances that originate from a perceived inequality or marginalization. The word "rebellion" comes from Latin "re" + "bellum," and, in Lockian philosophy, refers to the responsibility of the people to overthrow unjust government . An insurrection is an armed rebellion. A revolt is a rebellion with an aim to replace
610-412: A position with higher income and less variance". Popkin stresses this "investor logic" that one may not expect in agrarian societies, usually seen as pre-capitalist communities where traditional social and power structures prevent the accumulation of capital. Yet, the selfish determinants of collective action are, according to Popkin, a direct product of the inherent instability of peasant life. The goal of
671-496: A rational, profit maximizing logic. The authors conclude that the best way to fight rebellion is to increase its opportunity cost, both by more enforcement but also by minimizing the potential material gains of a rebellion. The decision to join a rebellion can be based on the prestige and social status associated with membership in the rebellious group. More than material incentives for the individual, rebellions offer their members club goods , public goods that are reserved only for
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#1732784052118732-471: A system's value structure and its problems in order to conceptualize the revolutionary situation in any meaningful way". Skocpol introduces the concept of the social revolution, to be contrasted with a political revolution. While the latter aims to change the polity, the former is "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below". Social revolutions are
793-408: A voice of anger that manifests itself against the established order. More precisely, individuals become angry when they feel what Gurr labels as relative deprivation , meaning the feeling of getting less than one is entitled to. He labels it formally as the "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities". Gurr differentiates between three types of relative deprivation: Anger
854-434: Is a normal and endogenous reaction to competition for power between different groups within society. "Collective violence", Tilly writes, "is the product of just normal processes of competition among groups in order to obtain the power and implicitly to fulfill their desires". He proposes two models to analyze political violence: Revolutions are included in this theory, although they remain for Tilly particularly extreme since
915-648: Is a term used in international law to indicate the status of two or more entities, generally sovereign states, being engaged in a war . Wars are often fought with one or both parties to a conflict invoking the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter (as the United Kingdom did in 1982 before the start of the Falklands War ) or under the auspices of a United Nations Security Council resolution (such as
976-415: Is at the intersection between the need for society to adapt to changes but at the same time firmly grounded in selective fundamental values. The legitimacy of political order, he posits, relies exclusively on its compliance with these societal values and in its capacity to integrate and adapt to any change. Rigidity is, in other words, inadmissible. Johnson writes "to make a revolution is to accept violence for
1037-416: Is heavily influenced by hyperlocal socio-economic factors, from the mundane traditional family rivalries to repressed grudges. Rebellion, or any sort of political violence, are not binary conflicts but must be understood as interactions between public and private identities and actions. The "convergence of local motives and supralocal imperatives" make studying and theorizing rebellion a very complex affair, at
1098-472: Is not always political in the sense that they cannot be reduced to a certain discourse, decisions, or ideologies from the "center" of collective action. Instead, the focus must be on "local cleavages and intracommunity dynamics". Furthermore, rebellion is not "a mere mechanism that opens up the floodgates to random and anarchical private violence". Rather, it is the result of a careful and precarious alliance between local motivations and collective vectors to help
1159-422: Is not taken into account seriously by the grievance model: individuals are fundamentally risk-averse. However, they allow that conflicts create grievances, which in turn can become risk factors. Contrary to established beliefs, they also find that a multiplicity of ethnic communities make society safer, since individuals will be automatically more cautious, at the opposite of the grievance model predictions. Finally,
1220-457: Is ready to give up in order to rebel. Thus, the available options beside rebellious or criminal activity matter just as much as the rebellion itself when the individual makes the decision. Blattman and Ralston, however, recognize that "a poor person's best strategy" might be both rebellion illicit and legitimate activities at the same time. Individuals, they argue, can often have a varied "portofolio" of activities, suggesting that they all operate on
1281-467: Is that violence is not an anarchic tactic or a manipulation by an ideology, but a conversation between the two. Rebellions are "concatenations of multiple and often disparate local cleavages, more or less loosely arranged around the master cleavage". Any pre-conceived explanation or theory of a conflict must not be placated on a situation, lest one will construct a reality that adapts itself to his pre-conceived idea. Kalyvas thus argues that political conflict
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#17327840521181342-510: Is thus comparative. One of his key insights is that "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity". This means that different individuals within society will have different propensities to rebel based on the particular internalization of their situation. As such, Gurr differentiates between three types of political violence: In From Mobilization to Revolution , Charles Tilly argues that political violence
1403-632: The United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 , which gave legal authority for the Gulf War ). A state of belligerency may also exist between one or more sovereign states on one side and rebel forces, if such rebel forces are recognised as belligerents. If there is a rebellion against a constituted authority (for example, an authority recognised as such by the United Nations), and those taking part in
1464-874: The Cossacks into serfs . Afterward the Khmelnytsky Uprising, the Treaty of Pereyaslav brought most of the Cossack Hetmanate under Russian control. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were not the only notable group of Cossacks; others included the Don Cossack Host , Dlobodsk Cossacks, Terek Cossacks and Yaik Cossacks . As the Tsardom of Muscovy took over the disputed Cossacks lands from the Poland–Lithuania, eventually all Cossacks came under
1525-506: The Cossacks, which caused tension with their traditional independent lifestyle. As the empire attempted to limit Cossacks autonomy in the 17th and 18th centuries, this resulted in rebellions led by Stenka Razin , Kondraty Bulavin and Yemelyan Pugachev . In extreme cases, whole Hosts could be dissolved, as was the fate of the Zaporozhian Sich in 1775. In this last phase of their history, the Cossacks lost most of their autonomy to
1586-698: The Polish-Lithuanian states in the war periods, they proved to be more problematic in the peacetime, due to their raids on the Commonwealth neighbours (primarily, the Ottoman Empire and its allies). Further, the Polish nobility tried to assert control over the Cossack territories, turn them into feudal latifundia , limit the growth of the militant Cossacks, and even reverse it, by turning
1647-592: The Russian rule, but the Tsarist and later Imperial government had only a limited control over the Cossacks. The Cossacks provided refuge for runaway serfs and bandits, and often mounted unauthorized raids and pirate expeditions against the Ottoman Empire . While the Cossack hosts in the Russian Empire served as buffer zones on its borders, the expansionist ambitions of the empire relied on ensuring control over
1708-463: The Russian state. Cossack uprisings, like the Cossack people themselves, have been portrayed variously in the Polish, Russian and Ukrainian historiographers . Rebellion Rebellion is a violent uprising against one's government. A rebel is a person who engages in a rebellion. A rebel group is a consciously coordinated group that seeks to gain political control over an entire state or
1769-492: The Ukrainian Cossacks formed the Zaporozhian Sich centered on the fortified Dnipro islands. Initially a vassal of Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth , the increasing social and religious pressure from the Commonwealth sparked a series of uprisings, and the proclamation of an independent Cossack Hetmanate , culminating in a rebellion under Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the mid-17th century. While the Cossacks were useful to
1830-449: The assumption that simple interests in common are all that is necessary for collective action . In fact, he argues the " free rider " possibility, a term that means to reap the benefits without paying the price, will deter rational individuals from collective action. That is, unless there is a clear benefit, a rebellion will not happen en masse. Thus, Olson shows that "selective incentives", only made accessible to individuals participating in
1891-409: The assumptions of an older moral economy, which taught the immorality of any unfair method of forcing up the price of provisions by profiteering upon the necessities of the people". In 1991, twenty years after his original publication, Thompson said that his, "object of analysis was the mentalité , or, as [he] would prefer, the political culture, the expectations, traditions, and indeed, superstitions of
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1952-546: The authors also note that the grievances expressed by members of the diaspora of a community in turmoil has an important on the continuation of violence. Both greed and grievance thus need to be included in the reflection. Spearheaded by political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott in his book The Moral Economy of the Peasant , the moral economy school considers moral variables such as social norms, moral values, interpretation of justice, and conception of duty to
2013-447: The bourgeoisie. In Marx's theory, revolutions are the "locomotives of history" because revolution ultimately leads to the overthrow of a parasitic ruling class and its antiquated mode of production. Later, rebellion attempts to replace it with a new system of political economy, one that is better suited to the new ruling class, thus enabling societal progress. The cycle of revolution, thus, replaces one mode of production with another through
2074-507: The business of surviving and producing enough to subsist. Therefore, any extractive regime needs to respect this careful equilibrium. He labels this phenomenon the "subsistence ethic". A landowner operating in such communities is seen to have the moral duty to prioritize the peasant's subsistence over his constant benefit. According to Scott, the powerful colonial state accompanied by market capitalism did not respect this fundamental hidden law in peasant societies. Rebellious movements occurred as
2135-415: The cause. Club goods serve not so much to coax individuals into joining but to prevent defection. World Bank economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler compare two dimensions of incentives: Vollier and Hoeffler find that the model based on grievance variables systematically fails to predict past conflicts, while the model based on greed performs well. The authors posit that the high cost of risk to society
2196-409: The challenger(s) aim for nothing less than full control over power. The "revolutionary moment occurs when the population needs to choose to obey either the government or an alternative body who is engaged with the government in a zero-sum game. This is what Tilly calls "multiple sovereignty". The success of a revolutionary movement hinges on "the formation of coalitions between members of the polity and
2257-621: The collective effort, can solve the free rider problem. Samuel L. Popkin builds on Olson's argument in The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. His theory is based on the figure of a hyper rational peasant that bases his decision to join (or not) a rebellion uniquely on a cost-benefit analysis. This formalist view of the collective action problem stresses the importance of individual economic rationality and self-interest:
2318-427: The collective imaginary. For example, the development of the bourgeoisie class went from an oppressed merchant class to urban independence, eventually gaining enough power to represent the state as a whole. Social movements, thus, are determined by an exogenous set of circumstances. The proletariat must also, according to Marx, go through the same process of self-determination which can only be achieved by friction against
2379-422: The community as the prime influencers of the decision to rebel. This perspective still adheres to Olson's framework, but it considers different variables to enter the cost/benefit analysis: the individual is still believed to be rational, albeit not on material but moral grounds. British historian E.P. Thompson is often cited as being the first to use the term "moral economy", he said in his 1991 publication that
2440-442: The constant class friction. In his book Why Men Rebel , Ted Gurr looks at the roots of political violence itself applied to a rebellion framework. He defines political violence as: "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime , its actors [...] or its policies. The concept represents a set of events, a common property of which is the actual or threatened use of violence". Gurr sees in violence
2501-473: The constant insecurity and inherent risk to the peasant condition, due to the peculiar nature of the patron-client relationship that binds the peasant to his landowner, forces the peasant to look inwards when he has a choice to make. Popkin argues that peasants rely on their "private, family investment for their long run security and that they will be interested in short term gain vis-à-vis the village. They will attempt to improve their long-run security by moving to
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2562-483: The contenders advancing exclusive alternative claims to control over Government.". For Chalmers Johnson, rebellions are not so much the product of political violence or collective action but in "the analysis of viable, functioning societies". In a quasi-biological manner, Johnson sees revolutions as symptoms of pathologies within the societal fabric. A healthy society, meaning a "value-coordinated social system" does not experience political violence. Johnson's equilibrium
2623-423: The contrary, such riots involved a coordinated peasant action, from the pillaging of food convoys to the seizure of grain shops. A scholar such as Popkin has argued that peasants were trying to gain material benefits, such as more food. Thompson sees a legitimization factor, meaning "a belief that [the peasants] were defending traditional rights and customs". Thompson goes on to write: "[the riots were] legitimized by
2684-627: The decision to enroll in such high stakes organization can be rationalized. Berman and Laitin show that religious organizations supplant the state when it fails to provide an acceptable quality of public goods such a public safety, basic infrastructure, access to utilities, or schooling. Suicide operations "can be explained as a costly signal of "commitment" to the community". They further note "Groups less adept at extracting signals of commitment (sacrifices) may not be able to consistently enforce incentive compatibility." Thus, rebellious groups can organize themselves to ask of members proof of commitment to
2745-529: The early uprisings were against the Commonwealth, as the Russian Empire gained increasing and then total control over the Ruthenian ( Ukrainian ) lands where the Cossacks lived, the target of Cossacks uprisings changed as well. The origins of the first Cossacks are disputed. Traditional historiography dates the emergence of Cossacks to the 14th to 15th centuries. Towards the end of the 15th century,
2806-680: The element in some of these movements of acting to defend the rule of law and constitutionalism. The following theories broadly build on the Marxist interpretation of rebellion. Rebellion is studied, in Theda Skocpol 's words, by analyzing "objective relationships and conflicts among variously situated groups and nations, rather than the interests, outlooks, or ideologies of particular actors in revolutions". Karl Marx 's analysis of revolutions sees such expression of political violence not as anomic, episodic outbursts of discontents but rather
2867-407: The fall of a government or head of state, and in these cases could be considered a form of rebellion . In many of these cases, the opposition movement saw itself not only as nonviolent, but also as upholding their country's constitutional system against a government that was unlawful, for example, if it had refused to acknowledge its defeat in an election. Thus the term rebel does not always capture
2928-456: The former rely on local conflicts to recruit and motivate supporters and obtain local control, resources, and information- even when their ideological agenda is opposed to localism". Individuals will thus aim to use the rebellion in order to gain some sort of local advantage, while the collective actors will aim to gain power. Violence is a mean as opposed to a goal, according to Kalyvas. The greater takeaway from this central/local analytical lens
2989-442: The individual cause. Rebel governance is the development of institutions, rules and norms by rebel groups with an intent to regulate civilians' social, economic and political life, usually in areas under the territorial control of the rebel groups. Rebel governance may include systems of taxation, regulations on social conduct, judicial systems, and public goods provision. One third of rebel leaders who sign peace agreements with
3050-516: The intersection between the political and the private, the collective and the individual. Kalyvas argues that we often try to group political conflicts according to two structural paradigms: Kalyvas' key insight is that the central vs periphery dynamic is fundamental in political conflicts. Any individual actor, Kalyvas posits, enters into a calculated alliance with the collective. Rebellions thus cannot be analyzed in molar categories, nor should we assume that individuals are automatically in line with
3111-441: The members inside that group. Economist Eli Berman and Political Scientist David D. Laitin's study of radical religious groups show that the appeal of club goods can help explain individual membership. Berman and Laitin discuss suicide operations, meaning acts that have the highest cost for an individual. They find that in such a framework, the real danger to an organization is not volunteering but preventing defection. Furthermore,
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#17327840521183172-631: The now illegitimate political order will have to use coercion to maintain its position. A simplified example would be the French Revolution when the Parisian Bourgeoisie did not recognize the core values and outlook of the King as synchronized with its own orientations. More than the King itself, what really sparked the violence was the uncompromising intransigence of the ruling class. Johnson emphasizes "the necessity of investigating
3233-571: The owners of the conditions of production to the direct producers". The conflict that arises from producers being dispossessed of the means of production, and therefore subject to the possessors who may appropriate their products, is at the origin of the revolution. The inner imbalance within these modes of production is derived from the conflicting modes of organization, such as capitalism emerging within feudalism, or more contemporarily socialism arising within capitalism. The dynamics engineered by these class frictions help class consciousness root itself in
3294-435: The purpose of causing the system to change; more exactly, it is the purposive implementation of a strategy of violence in order to effect a change in social structure". The aim of a revolution is to re-align a political order on new societal values introduced by an externality that the system itself has not been able to process. Rebellions automatically must face a certain amount of coercion because by becoming "de-synchronized",
3355-470: The reaction to an emotional grief, a moral outrage. Blattman and Ralston recognize the importance of immaterial selective incentives, such as anger, outrage, and injustice ("grievance") in the roots of rebellions. These variables, they argue, are far from being irrational, as they are sometimes presented. They identify three main types of grievance arguments: Stathis N. Kalyvas, a political science professor at Yale University, argues that political violence
3416-407: The rest of the actors simply by virtue of ideological, religious, ethnic, or class cleavage. The agency is located both within the collective and in the individual, in the universal and the local. Kalyvas writes: "Alliance entails a transaction between supralocal and local actors, whereby the former supply the later with external muscle, thus allowing them to win decisive local advantage, in exchange
3477-496: The revolution in these cases (which she believes can be extrapolated and generalized), each accordingly accompanied by specific structural factors which in turn influence the social results of the political action: Here is a summary of the causes and consequences of social revolutions in these three countries, according to Skocpol: The following theories are all based on Mancur Olson 's work in The Logic of Collective Action ,
3538-479: The state experience exile, imprisonment, or unnatural death while two thirds go into regular politics or pursue further rebellion. Belligerent A belligerent is an individual, group, country, or other entity that acts in a hostile manner, such as engaging in combat . The term comes from the Latin bellum gerere ("to wage war"). Unlike the use of belligerent as an adjective meaning "aggressive", its use as
3599-550: The symptomatic expression of a particular set of objective but fundamentally contradicting class-based relations of power. The central tenet of Marxist philosophy, as expressed in Das Kapital , is the analysis of society's mode of production (societal organization of technology and labor) and the relationships between people and their material conditions. Marx writes about "the hidden structure of society" that must be elucidated through an examination of "the direct relationship of
3660-595: The term had been in use since the 18th century. In his 1971 Past & Present journal article, Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century , he discussed English bread riots, and other localized form of rebellion by English peasants throughout the 18th century. He said that these events have been routinely dismissed as "riotous", with the connotation of being disorganized, spontaneous, undirected, and undisciplined. He wrote that, on
3721-661: The working population most frequently involved in actions in the market". The opposition between a traditional, paternalist, and the communitarian set of values clashing with the inverse liberal, capitalist, and market-derived ethics is central to explain rebellion. In his 1976 book The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia , James C. Scott looks at the impact of exogenous economic and political shocks on peasant communities in Southeast Asia. Scott finds that peasants are mostly in
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