Military advisors or combat advisors are military personnel deployed to advise on military matters. The term is often used for soldiers sent to foreign countries to aid such countries' militaries with their military education and training , organization , and other various military tasks. The foreign powers or organizations may send such soldiers to support countries or insurgencies while minimizing the risks of potential casualties and avoiding the political ramifications of overtly mobilizing military forces to aid an ally.
60-704: The Karachi Agreement of 1949 was signed by the military representatives of India and Pakistan, supervised by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan , establishing a cease-fire line in Kashmir following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 . It established a cease-fire line which has been monitored by United Nations observers from the United Nations since then. The Security Council Resolution 39 of April 1948 established
120-619: A UN Commission ( United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan — UNCIP) to mediate between India and Pakistan to bring about a cessation of fighting in Kashmir and to make arrangements for a popular plebiscite. After negotiations with the two sides, the Commission passed a three-part resolution in August 1948 and subsequently added a 'supplement'. The three parts dealt with ceasefire, terms for truce, and procedures for negotiation regarding
180-506: A combat-arms background. United States Army Reserve , United States Air Force and United States Navy personnel serve as advisors in logistics and other support roles. The advisors on the ground in infantry or commando units of the ANA ( Afghan National Army ) or the Iraqi Army are soldiers or Marines with combat-arms experience. Special Forces and Navy SEALS also work with ANA/ASF or with
240-574: A demilitarisation plan. In the course of his discussion, on 22 December 1949, McNaughton proposed that both Pakistani and Indian forces should be reduced to a minimum level, followed by the disbandment of both the Azad forces and the State forces. India proposed two far-reaching amendments, in effect rejecting the McNaughton proposals. The McNaughton proposals represented an important departure from those of
300-426: A plebiscite. Korbel states that the Commission faced "enormous difficulties". India insisted on the disbandment of the 'Azad forces' as an "essential condition" before the plebiscite, which, according to Korbel, came as "jolt" to the Commission. This was indeed agreed in the previous round. However India appeared to have advanced the timetable. The so-called 'Azad forces' were made up of the demobilised soldiers of
360-452: A rough arc northwards and then northeastwards to the map coordinate NJ9842 , about 19 km north of the Shyok river . From the map point NJ9842, it was said to run due north to the international boundary with China, at a distance of about 60–65 km. Since there were no troops in that area of inaccessible glacial terrain, no effort was made to extend the ceasefire line between NJ9842 and
420-695: A total of 16,000 German citizens fighting in the war were killed. During the Interwar Period, German Military advisors under Alexander von Falkenhausen were involved in modernising the National Revolutionary Army . the German Empire sent advisors to the Ottoman Empire, notably generals such as Otto Liman Von Sanders and Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz T. E. Lawrence ("Lawrence of Arabia") became arguably
480-662: A week starting 18 July to demarcate the positions under their control. S. K. Sinha stated that the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru briefed the Indian delegation before the Karachi meeting, wherein he informed them that the UN Resolution conceded the legality of Kashmir's accession to India and, so, any "no man's land" would belong to India. The Pakistani delegation would need to produce proof to
540-635: A whole without the required sequentiality of the August resolution; that the UN representatives should have the authority to settle issues by arbitration. The Czech delegate submitted a minority report contending that the Commission's declaration of failure was premature, that the problem of Azad forces had been underrated, and that the Northern Areas did not receive adequate attention. The Security Council asked its Canadian delegate, General A. G. L. McNaughton , to informally consult India and Pakistan towards
600-549: Is apparent that the Security Council viewed the problem as primarily a political dispute rather than looking at its legal underpinnings, in particular whether Kashmir's accession to India was valid. It implicitly assumed that accession was valid but incomplete, contingent upon the ratification by the people of the state. Thus it asked for the Pakistani nationals to withdraw in the first instance but held that plebiscite
660-570: The American Revolutionary War of 1775–1783. The Soviet Union deployed military advisors in (for example) Spain , China and Angola, where "The 1976 treaty of friendship and cooperation provided for Soviet-Angolan military cooperation in strengthening the mutual defense capacity. Moscow immediately provided weaponry and supplies, and some 500 military advisors." In China, the "Soviet Union ..sent about 1500 military advisors ..during this period [1937-39]. Included were some of
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#1732772903265720-579: The British Indian Army belonging to the Poonch and Mirpur districts. They rose in revolt against the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir prior to the tribal invasion. Following the invasion, Pakistan organised the soldiers into 32 battalions of a serious military force and used them to fight the Indian forces. During the truce discussions, Pakistan insisted on a balance between the Azad forces and
780-529: The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir . India generally referred to this boundary as the "international border", whereas Pakistan referred to it as the "border" or the "working border". U.N. document number S/1430/Add.2 (which is the second addendum to the 1949 Karachi Agreement) shows the Cease Fire Line (CFL) marked on the Map of the State of Jammu and Kashmir . Title of this addendum reads: Map of
840-462: The subcontinent and help the governments of India and Pakistan restore peace and order to the region and prepare for a plebiscite to decide the fate of Kashmir . Secondly, the Resolution recommended a three-step process for the resolution of the dispute. In the first step, Pakistan was asked to withdraw all its nationals that entered Kashmir for the sake of fighting. In the second step, India
900-455: The "Northern Areas" (present day Gilgit-Baltistan ). India demanded that, upon Pakistani withdrawal, these areas should be restored to the government of Jammu and Kashmir and India should be allowed to defend its borders. The Commission conceded the legal basis of the Indian demand but feared that it would cause renewed fighting between the Indian forces and the local forces. It proposed that the areas should be governed by "local authorities" under
960-664: The 20th century to more recent conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. In the early 1960s elements of the U.S. Army Special Forces and Echo 31 went to South Vietnam as military advisors to train and assist the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) for impending actions against the North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN). United States Marines also filled a significant role as advisors to Vietnamese forces. Combat advisors served during
1020-407: The Azad and State forces. Pakistan also wished to see the detailed plans of the Indian withdrawal and insisted that it should be "synchronized" with the Pakistani withdrawal. After multiple rounds of proposals for demilitarisation, which were rejected by both India and Pakistan, the Commission proposed arbitration. Pakistan accepted the proposal for arbitration, but India rejected it, saying that it
1080-597: The China border. This area, of the Siachen Glacier , eventually became a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Another anomaly arose at the southern end of the ceasefire line in Jammu . From the terminus of the ceasefire line to the international boundary between Indian and Pakistani Punjab , there was a gap of over 200 km, which was covered by a recognised "provincial boundary" between Pakistani Punjab and
1140-484: The Commission believed it was "tantamount to rejection". The Commission surmised that Pakistan's main preoccupation was the guarantee of a free and impartial plebiscite after the fighting stopped. It then developed a supplement to its August resolution outlining proposals for the administration of the plebiscite. It defined the functions of the Plebiscite Administrator who would, among others, decide
1200-582: The Commission declared its failure in December 1949. Prior to 1947, Jammu and Kashmir (Kashmir) was a princely state under British Paramountcy , ruled by a Hindu maharaja . With the impending independence and partition of British Raj into the dominions of Pakistan and India , the British announced that the British Paramountcy would lapse and the rulers of princely states were given
1260-798: The Commission recognized that the Sheikh Abdullah government in Jammu and Kashmir and the Azad Kashmir government in Muzaffarabad were engaged in an irreconcilable struggle. On 13 August 1948, after discussions with both the governments, the Commission unanimously adopted a three-part resolution, amending and amplifying the UN Resolution 47. The structure of the resolution was of significance to India. The three-part structure implicitly recognized Pakistan's "aggression" by making
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#17327729032651320-534: The Indian delegation were Maj. Gen. K. S. Thimayya , Brig. Sam Manekshaw , Maj. S. K. Sinha (who acted as the aide-de-camp for Gen. Srinagesh), and the secretaries of the Defence Ministry and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. The Pakistani delegation included Maj. Gen. Nazir Ahmed and Brig. Sher Khan and civil servants M. Ayub and A. A. Khan. The military representatives of the two sides negotiated for
1380-665: The Iraqi Army, but the bulk of combat advisors are infantry and combat-arms soldiers and Marines. The Combat Advisor Mission Defined. The combat advisor mission requires US officers and NCOs to teach, coach and mentor host nation (HN) security force counterparts. This enables the rapid development of our counterparts' leadership capabilities; helps develop command and control (C2) and operational capabilities at every echelon; allows direct access to Coalition Forces (CF) enablers to enhance HN security force counterinsurgency (COIN) operations; and incorporates CF lethal and nonlethal effects on
1440-644: The Pakistani-held Kashmir. The Pakistani government circles felt that the Security Council deliberations had been favourable to Pakistan but the final proposals were modified by the United States and Britain to "mollify" India. Britain came in for particular criticism. Both the sides however welcomed the UN Commission and agreed to work with it. The five member United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) consisted of
1500-528: The Secretary-General. United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 , adopted on 21 April 1948, concerns the resolution of the Kashmir conflict . After hearing arguments from both India and Pakistan, the Council increased the size of the UN Commission created by the former Resolution 39 to five members, instructed the Commission to go to
1560-494: The State forces, and demanded that Pakistan be allowed to train the Azad forces to take the positions that the Pakistani forces would vacate. This led the Indians to conclude that Pakistan was planning to resume hostilities as soon as the Indian withdrawal began. Thus they demanded that the disbandment of Azad forces should occur during the truce stage itself. Pakistan rejected the demand for disbandment and insisted on parity between
1620-631: The State of Jammu and Kashmir showing the Cease Fire Line as Agreed Upon in the Karachi Agreement, Ratified by the Governments of India and Pakistan on 29 and 30 July Respectively. (See Annex 26 to the third Interim Report of the United Nation Commission for India and Pakistan) The Karachi Agreement between India and Pakistan established a cease-fire line to be supervised by the military observers. These observers, under
1680-586: The U.S. war on terror . They were designated as Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) in Afghanistan and as Military Transition Teams (MTTs) in Iraq . These soldiers and Marines live with their Afghan and Iraqi counterparts (often in very austere and stoic conditions) in remote combat outposts often a great distance away from any U.S. or coalition support. ETTs and MTTs are composed primarily of United States Army , National Guard , and Marine Corps personnel with
1740-487: The UN Commission of factual positions of their control for all the territory they claim. Sinha stated that, based on this principle, the agreement demarcated several hundred square miles of territory on the Indian side even though there were no Indian troops in that territory. The 830 kilometre long ceasefire line established in the agreement started from a southernmost point just west of the Chenab river in Jammu . It ran in
1800-482: The UN Commission. Through its mediation, the Commission amplified and amended the Security Council Resolution, adopting two resolutions of its own, which were accepted by both India and Pakistan. Subsequently, a cease-fire was achieved by the Commission at the beginning of 1949. However, a truce was not achieved due to disagreements over the process of demilitarisation. After considerable efforts,
1860-476: The UN Secretary-General but would function as the officials of the state. The third part dealt with creating an interim administration for the state which would represent all major political groups in the state. During the subsequent discussion, the draft was modified considerably, with several concessions made to Pakistan at the instigation of the British delegation. India expressed discomfort at
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1920-763: The UNCIP resolutions in that they treated India and Pakistan on an equal footing. India was averse to such an equation. Despite India's apparent objection, the Security Council adopted the McNaughton proposals in Resolution 80 and appointed a mediator. The mediation also ended in failure. In 1972, following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 , India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement , agreeing to resolve all their differences through bilateral negotiations. The United States, United Kingdom and most Western governments have since supported this approach. In 2001,
1980-538: The archetypal British military advisor due to his guerrilla role (1916–1918) in the Arab Revolt . Developing capabilities and increasing capacity through advising is an operation the U.S. Army has conducted for more than one hundred years. The Army has performed advisory missions to increase the capability and capacity of foreign militaries from the Philippine Insurrection at the beginning of
2040-469: The attention of the UN matters endangering international peace. It claimed that Pakistani nationals and tribesmen had attacked Jammu and Kashmir, which was Indian territory. It requested the Security Council to prevent Pakistan from continuing its actions. India also stated that, despite holding the state's legal accession, it was prepared to conduct a plebiscite to confirm the people's wishes and abide by its results. In response, Pakistan denied involvement in
2100-472: The battlefield. Security Forces Assistance (SFA) defines a more in-depth method of embedded mentorship. MTTs have fallen into disuse with shifts in focus and doctrine. Specifically, previous MTTs were drawn from soldiers from separate units, often on an ad hoc basis. SFATs, on the other hand, provide all personnel from organic, modular Brigade Combat Teams rather than supplying personnel piece-meal from various Army units. By design, these teams are manned by
2160-808: The command of the Military Advisor , formed the nucleus of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). On 30 March 1951, following the termination of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), the Security Council, by Resolution 91 (1951) decided that UNMOGIP should continue to supervise the cease-fire line in Kashmir. UNMOGIP's functions were to observe and report, investigate complaints of cease-fire violations and submit its findings to each party and to
2220-423: The complaint of Pakistani aggression and Kashmir's legal accession to India. Secondly, it objected to the absence of allowance for it to retain troops in the state for its defence. It also felt the requirement of a coalition government would put Sheikh Abdullah , then Prime Minister of Kashmir, in an impossible position. It said that the powers conferred on the Plebiscite Administrator were far too wide and undermined
2280-447: The conflict and made counter-accusations claiming that India had acquired the state's accession by "fraud and violence" and that it was conducting a "genocide" against Muslims. On 20 January 1948, the Security Council passed Resolution 39 establishing a three-member Commission to investigate the complaints. However such a Commission did not come into fruition until May 1948. Meanwhile, the Security Council continued its deliberations and
2340-543: The dispute. In 2020, the UN secretary-general António Guterres called for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions on Kashmir, including the holding of a plebiscite among Kashmir's residents on whether they wanted join India or Pakistan. Military Advisor The French Marquis de Lafayette and the Prussian Baron von Steuben offered key assistance to the Continental Army during
2400-477: The dispute. It did not condemn Pakistan as the aggressor, as India had requested. Neither did it touch upon the legalities of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir. Korbel states that the Security Council could have requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the legal issues. Had that been done, the Security Council would have been in a stronger position to declare one of
2460-498: The final disposal of the Indian and Azad Kashmir forces. India objected that it was being asked to make further concessions even though Pakistan had not accepted the truce agreement. It sought and obtained several assurances, including an agreement that it would not be bound by plebiscite if Pakistan did not implement the first two parts of the August resolution; and assurance that the Azad Kashmir forces would be disbanded before
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2520-608: The modifications. The final resolution adopted had two parts. The first part increased the Commission's strength to five members and asked it to proceed to the Indian subcontinent at once to mediate between India and Pakistan. The second part dealt with the Security council's recommendations for restoring peace and conducting a plebiscite. This involved three steps. The resolution was approved by nine votes against none. The Soviet Union and Ukrainian SSR abstained. The resolution
2580-571: The next day. Considerable evidence cited by scholars since then has pointed to Pakistan's complicity in instigating and supporting the invasion. A limited war ensued between the Indian troops and the Pakistani raiders within the confines of the princely state. On 1 January 1948, India took the matter to the United Nations Security Council under Article 35 of the UN Charter, which allows the member nations to bring to
2640-424: The option of joining one of the two new countries (termed " accession ") or staying independent. The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir chose to stay independent, however, most of the population was Muslim. Following an uprising in the western districts of the state and an armed invasion by Pashtun tribes from Pakistan, the Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947. India immediately air lifted troops into Kashmir
2700-467: The parties to be in the wrong, and the handling of the dispute would have been easier. In the event, the approach of the Security Council was "timid" in Korbel's view. Its evaluation of the Kashmir dispute was not realistic as was discovered soon with prolonged debates, endless wrangling, and adjournment of the deliberations. With the passing of time, the tensions and political cleavages in Kashmir grew and
2760-500: The plebiscite solution became increasingly difficult. The American ambassador to the UN Warren R. Austin also shared the view. He thought the resolution, as well as others that followed, were unrealistic and ineffective. They depended on the goodwill of India and Pakistan cooperating with the Security Council and failed to give it the authority to impose sanctions. The US embassies in India and Pakistan were equally frustrated. It
2820-466: The plebiscite. Despite reservations, questions and dissents, the two governments finally accepted the proposals, leading to a ceasefire in Kashmir on 1 January 1949. The Commission incorporated the supplement into a new resolution approved on 5 January 1949. The Commission returned to the subcontinent in February 1949 to implement the terms of the ceasefire, set up a truce agreement and prepare for
2880-661: The plebiscite. Both the countries accepted the resolution and a ceasefire was achieved on 31 December 1948. The Karachi Agreement formally called the Agreement Between Military Representatives of India and Pakistan Regarding the Establishment of a Cease-Fire Line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was signed on 27 July 1949, supervised by the Truce Subcommittee of the UNCIP. The signatories were: The other members of
2940-541: The red Army's best officers [...] Georgii Zhukov [...] Vasilii I. Chuikov [...] P.F. Batitsky [...] Andrey A. Vlasov [...]. Like Spain, China served as a training ground for Soviet officers." During the Spanish Civil War , Germany deployed a large number of 'volunteers', also known as the Condor Legion , to serve as mercenaries and pilots to assist the nationalist forces . Approximately 300 out of
3000-608: The representatives from Czechoslovakia ( Josef Korbel ), Argentina ( Ricardo Siri ), Belgium (Egbert Graeffe), Colombia (Alfredo Lozano) and the United States ( Jerome Klahr Huddle ). It secretariat was headed by Erik Colban , the Norwegian ambassador to the UK, with the British Quaker Richard Symonds acting as Colban's secretary. Sources state that the political atmosphere in both India and Pakistan
3060-484: The state's sovereignty. It felt that provision for the return of all refugees was unrealistic. Finally, India wanted Pakistan to be excluded from the conduct of the plebiscite. Pakistan objected to the retention of the Indian forces in Kashmir, even at the minimum level allowed by the resolution. It wanted an equal representation in the government of the state for the Muslim Conference , the dominant party of
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#17327729032653120-412: The supervision of the Commission and Indian forces would be sent only if the UN observers notified it of their necessity. This compromise was rejected by both India and Pakistan. The Commission declared its failure and submitted its final report to the Security Council on 9 December 1949. It recommended that the Commission be replaced by a single mediator; that the problem of demilitarisation be viewed as
3180-440: The then Secretary-General of the United Nations , Kofi Annan during his visit to India and Pakistan, clarified that Kashmir resolutions are only advisory recommendations and they should not be compared to those on East Timor and Iraq . In 2003, the then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf announced that Pakistan was willing to "leave aside" the demand for UN resolutions and explore alternative bilateral options for resolving
3240-447: The truce agreement precede the consultation for the future of the state. Moreover, plebiscite was not mentioned, which allowed for other possible avenues for determining the will of the people, such as electing a constituent assembly. India feared that a plebiscite would incite religious passions and unleash "disruptive forces". While India accepted the Commission's resolution, Pakistan attached so many reservations and qualifications that
3300-468: The war too continued. On 18 March, the Republic of China tabled a new draft resolution in three parts. The first part dealt with the restoration of peace, asking Pakistan to withdraw its nationals. The second part dealt with the conduct of plebiscite for the people of Kashmir to choose between India and Pakistan. India was asked to create a "Plebiscite Administration" whose directors would be nominated by
3360-449: Was asked to progressively reduce its forces to the minimum level required for law and order. In the third step, India was asked to appoint a plebiscite administrator nominated by the United Nations who would conduct a free and impartial plebiscite. The resolution was adopted paragraph by paragraph; no vote on the resolution as a whole was taken. Both India and Pakistan raised objections to the Resolution. However, they welcomed mediation by
3420-548: Was hostile to the Commission upon its arrival in the subcontinent in July 1948. Upon arriving in Karachi , the Commission was informed by Pakistan that three brigades of its regular troops had been fighting in Kashmir since May, which was described as a "bombshell" by Josef Korbel. In New Delhi , India asserted that it attached the highest importance to a declaration of Pakistan's guilt. The fighting in Kashmir went on unabated and
3480-469: Was not a matter for arbitration but for "affirmative and immediate decision". India's position was that no distinction could be made between the Pakistan Army and the Azad forces. The Commission conceded that the Azad forces now had a strength that changed the military situation and made the Indian withdrawal as envisaged in the original resolution difficult. Another difficulty arose with regard to
3540-614: Was passed under the Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter (which is devoted to "peaceful settlement of disputes"). It did not consist of directives to the parties, but rather "recommendations". Former UN diplomat Josef Korbel states that this bound the parties only "morally" but not "juridicially". The final resolution of the conflict rested with the governments of India and Pakistan and depended on their goodwill. The Security Council refrained from taking sides in
3600-413: Was the ultimate solution. Legal specialist Sumathi Subbiah contends that the way of dealing with the situation as a political dispute rather than legal obligations proved too weak to compel India and Pakistan to reach a final resolution. Both India and Pakistan raised objections to the Resolution 47. India objected first of all that the resolution placed India and Pakistan on an equal footing, ignoring
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