38-463: Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130, commonly called High Trees , is a leading opinion in the High Court relating to contract law . It reaffirmed and extended the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the contract law of England and Wales . However, the most significant part of the judgment is obiter dictum as it relates to hypothetical facts; that is,
76-873: A "landmark ruling". Decisions in leading cases in New Zealand were made by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand before the establishment of the Supreme Court of New Zealand , although historically some have been made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London . Decisions in leading cases in the United Kingdom have usually been made by the House of Lords , or more recently
114-521: A cause of action rather than merely providing a defence to an action). Leading case Landmark court decisions, in present-day common law legal systems, establish precedents that determine a significant new legal principle or concept, or otherwise substantially affect the interpretation of existing law . " Leading case " is commonly used in the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth jurisdictions instead of " landmark case ", as used in
152-449: A course of negotiation which has the effect of leading one of the parties to suppose that the strict rights arising under the contract will not be enforced, or will be kept in suspense, or held in abeyance, the person who otherwise might have enforced those rights will not be allowed to enforce them where it would be inequitable having regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties. My Lords, I repeat that I attribute to
190-404: A later stage. Being obiter dicta and in a court of first instance this was doubly not a binding precedent, yet it essentially created the doctrine of promissory estoppel . If I were to consider this matter without regard to recent developments in the law, there is no doubt that had the plaintiffs claimed it, they would have been entitled to recover ground rent at the rate of £2,500 a year from
228-406: A series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that
266-437: A sufficient basis for saying that a party would not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. In my opinion, the time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognized. The logical consequence, no doubt is that a promise to accept a smaller sum in discharge of a larger sum, if acted upon, is binding notwithstanding the absence of consideration: and if the fusion of law and equity leads to this result, so much
304-495: A year as a temporary expedient while the block of flats was not fully, or substantially fully let, owing to the conditions prevailing. That means that the reduction in the rent applied throughout the years down to the end of 1944, but early in 1945 it is plain that the flats were fully let, and, indeed the rents received from them (many of them not being affected by the Rent Restrictions Acts), were increased beyond
342-410: Is unenforceable for want of consideration. Denning commented that such an agreement should now be enforceable under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, and indeed the plaintiff did not seek the full debt on the basis of what was fair and, perhaps, thought was the law. However, the courts were at first reluctant to overrule or distinguish cases like Pinnel's case and Foakes v Beer having formed part of
380-475: The High Court of Australia , although historically some have been made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London . There is no universally agreed-to list of "leading decisions" in Canada. One indication, however, as to whether a case is widely regarded as being "leading" is its inclusion of the ruling in one or more of the series of compilations prepared over the years by various authors. One of
418-592: The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ; in Scotland by the Court of Session or High Court of Justiciary ; in England and Wales by the Court of Appeal or the High Court of Justice of England and Wales . Landmark cases in the United States come most frequently (but not exclusively) from the Supreme Court of the United States . United States Courts of Appeals may also make such decisions, particularly if
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#1732765575279456-580: The 1940s, most landmark decisions were made by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London . The Supreme Court of India , which is the highest judicial body in India, has decided many leading cases of Constitutional jurisprudence, establishing Constitution Benches for hearing the same. Given below are a list of some leading cases: The criminal case against the operator of the Italian fake review business PromoSalento in 2018 has been described as
494-537: The Appellant no intention here to take advantage of, to lay a trap for, or to lull into false security those with whom he was dealing; but it appears to me that both parties by entering upon the negotiation which they entered upon, made it an inequitable thing that the exact period of six months dating from the month of October should afterwards be measured out as against the Respondents as the period during which
532-488: The Court of Appeal. It ruled that with the initiation of the negotiations there was an implied promise by the landlord not to enforce their strict legal rights with respect to the time limit on the repairs, and the tenant acted on this promise to their detriment. Lord Cairns LC gave the lead judgment, with which Lords O'Hagan, Selborne, Blackburn and Gordon concurred. My Lords, it is upon those grounds that I am of opinion that
570-531: The Supreme Court chooses not to review the case, or adopts the holding of the court below. Although many cases from state supreme courts are significant in developing the law of that state, only a few are so revolutionary that they announce standards that many other state courts then choose to follow. Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co [1877] is a House of Lords case considered unremarkable for many years until it
608-535: The United States. In Commonwealth countries, a reported decision is said to be a leading decision when it has come to be generally regarded as settling the law of the question involved. In 1914, Canadian jurist Augustus Henry Frazer Lefroy said "a 'leading case' [is] one that settles the law upon some important point". A leading decision may settle the law in more than one way. It may do so by: Decisions in leading cases in Australia have usually been made by
646-423: The beginning of the term, since the lease under which it was payable was a lease under seal which, according to the old common law, could not be varied by an agreement by parol (whether in writing or not), but only by deed. Equity, however stepped in, and said that if there has been a variation of a deed by a simple contract (which in the case of a lease required to be in writing would have to be evidenced by writing),
684-709: The better. That aspect was not considered in Foakes v. Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605. At this time of day however, when law and equity have been joined together for over seventy years, principles must be reconsidered in the light of their combined effect. It is to be noticed that in the Sixth Interim Report of the Law Revision Committee , pars. 35, 40, it is recommended that such a promise as that to which I have referred should be enforceable in law even though no consideration for it has been given by
722-516: The breach of such a promise, but they have refused to allow the party making it to act inconsistently with it. It is in that sense, and that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The decisions are a natural result of the fusion of law and equity: for the cases of Hughes v. Metropolitan Ry. Co. (1877) 2 App. Cas. 439, 448, Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London & North Western Ry. Co. (1888) 40 Ch. D. 268, 286 and Salisbury (Marquess) v. Gilmore [1942] 2 K. B. 38, 51, afford
760-464: The building within six months of notice. Notice was given on 22 October 1874 from which the tenants had until 22 April to finish the repairs. On 28 November, the tenant railway company sent a letter proposing that Hughes purchase the tenant's leasehold interest. Negotiations began but later broke down, at which point the landlord demanded the repair of the building from 6 months since the original notice. The tenant claimed he should have had 6 months from
798-455: The common law for so long. Lady Justice Arden in Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd (2007) accepted in principle that High Trees could be used to extinguish a creditor's right to full payment of a debt in such circumstances. In Amalgamated Investment Co v Texas Bank it was decided that proprietary estoppel can act as a sword and not merely as a shield (that is, it can be used as
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#1732765575279836-460: The courts may give effect to it as is shown in Berry v. Berry [1929] 2 K. B. 316. That equitable doctrine, however, could hardly apply in the present case because the variation here might be said to have been made without consideration. With regard to estoppel, the representation made in relation to reducing the rent was not a representation of an existing fact. It was a representation, in effect, as to
874-580: The decision of the Court below is correct. It was not argued at your Lordships' Bar, and it could not be argued, that there was any right of a Court of Equity , or any practice of a Court of Equity, to give relief in cases of this kind, by way of mercy, or by way merely of saving property from forfeiture, but it is the first principle upon which all Courts of Equity proceed, that if parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results—certain penalties or legal forfeiture—afterwards by their own act or with their own consent enter upon
912-532: The earlier examples is Augustus Henry Frazer Lefroy's Leading Cases in Canadian Constitutional Law , published in 1914. More recently, Peter H. Russell and a changing list of collaborators have published a series of books, including: Decisions in leading cases in Canada have usually been made by the Supreme Court of Canada . Prior to the abolition of appeals of Supreme Court decisions in
950-427: The estoppel would cease when the conditions to which the representation applied came to an end, or it also might be said that it would only come to an end on notice. In either case it is only a way of ascertaining what is the scope of the representation. I prefer to apply the principle that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply. Here it
988-412: The figure at which it was originally contemplated that they would be let. At all events the rent from them must have been very considerable. I find that the conditions prevailing at the time when the reduction in rent was made, had completely passed away by the early months of 1945. I am satisfied that the promise was understood by all parties only to apply under the conditions prevailing at the time when it
1026-429: The full rent was payable from the time that the flats became fully occupied in mid-1945. However, he continued in an obiter statement that if Central London had tried to claim for the full rent from 1940 onwards, they would not have been able to. This was reasoned on the basis that if a party leads another party to believe that he will not enforce his strict legal rights, then the courts will prevent him from doing so at
1064-545: The future, namely, that payment of the rent would not be enforced at the full rate but only at the reduced rate. Such a representation would not give rise to an estoppel, because, as was said in Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185, a representation as to the future must be embodied as a contract or be nothing. But what is the position in view of developments in the law in recent years? The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185. There has been
1102-515: The landlord did not seek repayment of the full wartime rent. Denning J held estoppel to be applicable if a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. High Trees House Ltd leased a block of flats in Battersea, London from Central London Property Trust Ltd. The agreement
1140-512: The promise must be honoured. The cases to which I particularly desire to refer are: Fenner v. Blake [1900] 1 Q. B. 426, In re Wickham (1917) 34 T. L. R. 158, Re William Porter & Co., Ld. [1937] 2 All E. R. 361 and Buttery v. Pickard [1946] W. N. 25. As I have said they are not cases of estoppel in the strict sense. They are really promises - promises intended to be binding, intended to be acted on, and in fact acted on. Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 H. L. C. 185 can be distinguished, because there
1178-425: The promisee. It seems to me that, to the extent I have mentioned, that result has now been achieved by the decisions of the courts. I am satisfied that a promise such as that to which I have referred is binding and the only question remaining for my consideration is the scope of the promise in the present case. I am satisfied on all the evidence that the promise here was that the ground rent should be reduced to £1,250
Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd - Misplaced Pages Continue
1216-423: The promisor made it clear that she did not intend to be legally bound, whereas in the cases to which I refer the proper inference was that the promisor did intend to be bound. In each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for
1254-468: The time the negotiations broke down, based on promissory estoppel. The Court of Common Pleas held in favour of the landlord, Mr Hughes. Metropolitan appealed. Lord Coleridge CJ delivered the leading judgment, with which Brett J and Lindley J concurred. The Court of Appeal (1875–76) LR 1 CPD 120 reversed the decision of Court of Common Pleas. James LJ, Mellish LJ , Baggallay JA, Mellor J, and Cleasby B gave judgments. The House of Lords affirmed
1292-518: Was binding as covering the period down to the early part of 1945, and as from that time full rent is payable. I therefore give judgment for the plaintiff company for the amount claimed. Advances have been made in promissory estoppel since its inception in High Trees to create a new inroad into the rule in Pinnel's case that an agreement to accept part payment of a debt in full satisfaction of it
1330-532: Was made in 1937 and specified an annual ground rent of £2,500. The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 led to a downturn in the rental market. High Trees struggled to find tenants for the property and approached Central London Property Trust in January 1940 to request that the rent be lowered. A reduction to £1,250 per year was agreed in writing, though the duration was not specified and no consideration
1368-427: Was made, namely, when the flats were only partially let, and that it did not extend any further than that. When the flats became fully let, early in 1945, the reduction ceased to apply. In those circumstances, under the law as I hold it, it seems to me that rent is payable at the full rate for the quarters ending 29 September and 25 December 1945. If the case had been one of estoppel, it might be said that in any event
1406-450: Was provided. By 1945, the building was returning to full occupancy. On 21 September 1945, Central London Property wrote to High Trees to request a return to the full rent of £2,500 and claiming arrears of £7,916 for the period since 1940. They then brought a test action to recover part of the debt for the two quarters which had elapsed since June 1945. Based on previous judgments as Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co , Denning J held that
1444-473: Was resurrected in 1947 by Lord Denning in the case of Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd in his development of the doctrine of promissory estoppel . The case was the first known instance of the concept of promissory estoppel. Thomas Hughes owned property leased to the Railway Company at 216 Euston Road . Under the lease, Hughes was entitled to compel the tenant to repair
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