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35-521: Since the launch of the ITSEC in 1990, a number of other European countries have agreed to recognize the validity of ITSEC evaluations. The ITSEC has been largely replaced by Common Criteria , which provides similarly defined evaluation levels and implements the target of evaluation concept and the Security Target document. The product or system being evaluated, called the target of evaluation ,

70-631: A Security Target document, whose contents had to be evaluated and approved before the target itself was evaluated. Each ITSEC evaluation was based exclusively on verifying the security features identified in the Security Target. The formal Z notation was used to prove security properties about the Mondex smart card electronic cash system, allowing it to achieve ITSEC level E6, the highest granted security-level classification. Common Criteria The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (referred to as Common Criteria or CC )

105-796: A letter of intent to the NIAP prior to entering the NVLAP process. Additional laboratory-related information can be found in CCEVS publications: In Canada the Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) Canadian Common Criteria Scheme (CCCS) oversees Common Criteria Evaluation Facilities (CCEF). Accreditation is performed by Standards Council of Canada (SCC) under its Program for the Accreditation of Laboratories – Canada (PALCAN) according to CAN-P-1591,

140-471: A Common Criteria certification allows a vendor to restrict the analysis to certain security features and to make certain assumptions about the operating environment and the strength of threats faced by the product in that environment. Additionally, the CC recognizes a need to limit the scope of evaluation in order to provide cost-effective and useful security certifications, such that evaluated products are examined to

175-505: A level of detail specified by the assurance level or PP. Evaluations activities are therefore only performed to a certain depth, use of time, and resources and offer reasonable assurance for the intended environment. In the Microsoft case, the assumptions include A.PEER: "Any other systems with which the TOE communicates are assumed to be under the same management control and operate under

210-549: A list of certified products, including operating systems, access control systems, databases, and key management systems. Common Criteria evaluations are performed on computer security products and systems. The evaluation process also tries to establish the level of confidence that may be placed in the product's security features through quality assurance processes: So far, most PPs and most evaluated STs/certified products have been for IT components (e.g., firewalls, operating systems , smart cards). Common Criteria certification

245-546: A negative impact on mutual recognition . In Sept of 2012, the Common Criteria published a Vision Statement implementing to a large extent Chris Salter's thoughts from the previous year. Key elements of the Vision included: Common Criteria Testing Laboratory The Common Criteria model provides for the separation of the roles of evaluator and certifier. Product certificates are awarded by national schemes on

280-409: A source of debate to those used to the more prescriptive approach of other earlier standards such as TCSEC and FIPS 140 -2. Common Criteria certification cannot guarantee security, but it can ensure that claims about the security attributes of the evaluated product were independently verified. In other words, products evaluated against a Common Criteria standard exhibit a clear chain of evidence that

315-463: A transition period has not been fully determined. On July 2, 2014, a new CCRA was ratified per the goals outlined within the 2012 vision statement. Major changes to the Arrangement include: Common Criteria is very generic; it does not directly provide a list of product security requirements or features for specific (classes of) products: this follows the approach taken by ITSEC , but has been

350-428: Is an international standard ( ISO / IEC 15408) for computer security certification. It is currently in version 3.1 revision 5. Common Criteria is a framework in which computer system users can specify their security functional and assurance requirements (SFRs and SARs, respectively) in a Security Target (ST), and may be taken from Protection Profiles (PPs). Vendors can then implement or make claims about

385-500: Is an international agreement that recognizes evaluations against the Common Criteria standard performed in all participating countries. It is mutually understood that, in respect of IT products and protection profiles, the Participants plan to recognise the Common Criteria certificates which have been authorised by any other certificate authorising Participant in accordance with the terms of this Arrangement and in accordance with

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420-579: Is sometimes specified for IT procurement. Other standards containing, e.g., interoperation, system management, user training, supplement CC and other product standards. Examples include the ISO/IEC 27002 and the German IT baseline protection . Details of cryptographic implementation within the TOE are outside the scope of the CC. Instead, national standards, like FIPS 140-2 , give the specifications for cryptographic modules, and various standards specify

455-407: Is subjected to a detailed examination of its security features culminating in comprehensive and informed functional and penetration testing. The degree of examination depends upon the level of confidence desired in the target. To provide different levels of confidence, the ITSEC defines evaluation levels , denoted E0 through E6. Higher evaluation levels involve more extensive examination and testing of

490-434: Is typically demonstrated to a National approval authority: Characteristics of these organizations were examined and presented at ICCC 10. As well as the Common Criteria standard, there is also a sub-treaty level Common Criteria MRA (Mutual Recognition Arrangement), whereby each party thereto recognizes evaluations against the Common Criteria standard done by other parties. Originally signed in 1998 by Canada, France, Germany,

525-728: The Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme (CCEVS). In the column executives from the security industry, researchers, and representatives from the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) were interviewed. Objections outlined in the article include: In a 2006 research paper, computer specialist David A. Wheeler suggested that the Common Criteria process discriminates against free and open-source software (FOSS)-centric organizations and development models. Common Criteria assurance requirements tend to be inspired by

560-477: The Common Criteria. These laboratories must meet the following requirements: CCTLs enter into contractual agreements with sponsors to conduct security evaluations of IT products and Protection Profiles which use the CCEVS, other NIAP approved test methods derived from the Common Criteria, Common Methodology and other technology based sources. CCTLs must observe the highest standards of impartiality, integrity and commercial confidentiality. CCTLs must operate within

595-754: The SOGIS-MRA typically recognize higher EALs as well. Evaluations at EAL5 and above tend to involve the security requirements of the host nation's government. In September 2012, a majority of members of the CCRA produced a vision statement whereby mutual recognition of CC evaluated products will be lowered to EAL 2 (Including augmentation with flaw remediation). Further, this vision indicates a move away from assurance levels altogether and evaluations will be confined to conformance with Protection Profiles that have no stated assurance level. This will be achieved through technical working groups developing worldwide PPs, and as yet

630-630: The United Kingdom and the United States, Australia and New Zealand joined 1999, followed by Finland, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain in 2000. The Arrangement has since been renamed Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement ( CCRA ) and membership continues to expand. Within the CCRA only evaluations up to EAL 2 are mutually recognized (Including augmentation with flaw remediation). The European countries within

665-725: The Validation Body. NIAP approved CCTLs must agree to the following: A testing laboratory becomes a CCTL when the laboratory is approved by the NIAP Validation Body and is listed on the Approved Laboratories List . To avoid unnecessary expense and delay in becoming a NIAP-approved testing laboratory, it is strongly recommended that prospective CCTLs ensure that they are able to satisfy the scheme-specific requirements prior to seeking accreditation from NVLAP. This can be accomplished by sending

700-555: The absence of a permanently staffed organizational body that monitors compliance, and the idea that the trust in the Common Criteria IT-security certifications will be maintained across geopolitical boundaries. In 2017, the ROCA vulnerability was found in a list of Common Criteria certified smart card products. The vulnerability highlighted several shortcomings of Common Criteria certification scheme: Throughout

735-799: The applicable laws and regulations of each Participant. There are some limitations to this agreement and, in the past, only evaluations up to EAL4+ were recognized. With on-going transition away from EAL levels and the introduction of NDPP evaluations that “map” to up to EAL4 assurance components continue to be recognized. In the United States the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredits CCTLs to meet National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP) Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme requirements and conduct IT security evaluations for conformance to

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770-598: The basis of evaluations carried by independent testing laboratories . A Common Criteria testing laboratory is a third-party commercial security testing facility that is accredited to conduct security evaluations for conformance to the Common Criteria international standard. Such facility must be accredited according to ISO/IEC 17025 with its national certification body. List of laboratory designations by country: Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) or Common Criteria Mutual Recognition Arrangement (MRA)

805-482: The certification body of the country in which the product was evaluated. The certified Microsoft Windows versions remain at EAL4+ without including the application of any Microsoft security vulnerability patches in their evaluated configuration. This shows both the limitation and strength of an evaluated configuration. In August 2007, Government Computing News (GCN) columnist William Jackson critically examined Common Criteria methodology and its US implementation by

840-558: The common use of general-purpose operating systems, the claimed security functions of the Windows products are evaluated. Thus they should only be considered secure in the assumed, specified circumstances, also known as the evaluated configuration . Whether you run Microsoft Windows in the precise evaluated configuration or not, you should apply Microsoft's security patches for the vulnerabilities in Windows as they continue to appear. If any of these security vulnerabilities are exploitable in

875-527: The cryptographic algorithms in use. More recently, PP authors are including cryptographic requirements for CC evaluations that would typically be covered by FIPS 140-2 evaluations, broadening the bounds of the CC through scheme-specific interpretations. Some national evaluation schemes are phasing out EAL-based evaluations and only accept products for evaluation that claim strict conformance with an approved PP. The United States currently only allows PP-based evaluations. CC originated out of three standards: CC

910-432: The guidelines established by the CCEVS. To become a CCTL, a testing laboratory must go through a series of steps that involve both the NIAP Validation Body and NVLAP. NVLAP accreditation is the primary requirement for achieving CCTL status. Some scheme requirements that cannot be satisfied by NVLAP accreditation are addressed by the NIAP Validation Body. At present, there are only three scheme-specific requirements imposed by

945-613: The lifetime of CC, it has not been universally adopted even by the creator nations, with, in particular, cryptographic approvals being handled separately, such as by the Canadian / US implementation of FIPS-140 , and the CESG Assisted Products Scheme (CAPS) in the UK. The UK has also produced a number of alternative schemes when the timescales, costs and overheads of mutual recognition have been found to be impeding

980-426: The operation of the market: In early 2011, NSA/CSS published a paper by Chris Salter, which proposed a Protection Profile oriented approach towards evaluation. In this approach, communities of interest form around technology types which in turn develop protection profiles that define the evaluation methodology for the technology type. The objective is a more robust evaluation. There is some concern that this may have

1015-401: The process of specification, implementation, and evaluation has been conducted in a rigorous and standard manner. Various Microsoft Windows versions, including Windows Server 2003 and Windows XP , have been certified, but security patches to address security vulnerabilities are still getting published by Microsoft for these Windows systems. This is possible because the process of obtaining

1050-421: The product's evaluated configuration, the product's Common Criteria certification should be voluntarily withdrawn by the vendor. Alternatively, the vendor should re-evaluate the product to include the application of patches to fix the security vulnerabilities within the evaluated configuration. Failure by the vendor to take either of these steps would result in involuntary withdrawal of the product's certification by

1085-615: The same security policy constraints. The TOE is applicable to networked or distributed environments only if the entire network operates under the same constraints and resides within a single management domain. There are no security requirements that address the need to trust external systems or the communications links to such systems." This assumption is contained in the Controlled Access Protection Profile (CAPP) to which their products adhere. Based on this and other assumptions, which may not be realistic for

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1120-453: The security attributes of their products, and testing laboratories can evaluate the products to determine if they actually meet the claims. In other words, Common Criteria provides assurance that the process of specification, implementation and evaluation of a computer security product has been conducted in a rigorous and standard and repeatable manner at a level that is commensurate with the target environment for use. Common Criteria maintains

1155-519: The target. Unlike earlier criteria, notably the TCSEC developed by the US defense establishment , the ITSEC did not require evaluated targets to contain specific technical features in order to achieve a particular assurance level. For example, an ITSEC target might provide authentication or integrity features without providing confidentiality or availability. A given target's security features were documented in

1190-399: The traditional waterfall software development methodology. In contrast, much FOSS software is produced using modern agile paradigms. Although some have argued that both paradigms do not align well, others have attempted to reconcile both paradigms. Political scientist Jan Kallberg raised concerns over the lack of control over the actual production of the products once they are certified,

1225-528: Was produced by unifying these pre-existing standards, predominantly so that companies selling computer products for the government market (mainly for Defence or Intelligence use) would only need to have them evaluated against one set of standards. The CC was developed by the governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the U.S. All testing laboratories must comply with ISO/IEC 17025 , and certification bodies will normally be approved against ISO/IEC 17065. The compliance with ISO/IEC 17025

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