Misplaced Pages

#460539

60-474: An insurgency can be fought via counter-insurgency warfare, as well as other political, economic and social actions of various kinds. Due to the blending of insurgents with the civilian population, insurgencies tend to involve considerable violence against civilians (by the state and the insurgents). State attempts to quell insurgencies frequently lead to the infliction of indiscriminate violence, whereas rebel control of territory frequently involves violence against

120-606: A 2004 article, Robert R. Tomes spoke of four elements that "typically encompass an insurgency": Tomes' is an example of a definition that does not cover all insurgencies. For example, the French Revolution had no cell system, and in the American Revolution , little to no attempt was made to terrorize civilians. In consecutive coups in 1977 and 1999 in Pakistan, the initial actions focused internally on

180-574: A BA in physics from Cornell University in 1979, and then another BA in philosophy and mathematics from the University of Oxford in 1981. She then received a MA in physics at the University of California, Berkeley , followed by an MA in Latin American Studies in 1988, also from UC Berkeley. She completed her education in 1995, receiving a PhD in political science from Stanford University . Upon completing her PhD, Wood became

240-412: A British Secret Intelligence Service definition as "a generalized intention to ( emphasis added ) " overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means." While insurgents do not necessarily use terror, it is hard to imagine any insurgency meeting its goals without undermining aspects of the legitimacy or power of the government or faction it opposes. Rosenau mentions

300-458: A basic part of his first part of the three phases of revolutionary warfare. Several insurgency models recognize that completed acts of terrorism widen the security gap ; the Marxist guerrilla theoretician Carlos Marighella specifically recommended acts of terror, as a means of accomplishing something that fits the concept of opening the security gap. Mao considered terrorism to be part of forming

360-539: A clear advantage over rebels in coercive capacity." In this kind of conflicts, rebel groups can reintegrate into the civilian population after an attack if the civilians are willing to silently accept them. Some of the most recent examples include the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. As the European countries intervenes in the conflicts, creating asymmetry between the government forces and rebels, asymmetric conflict

420-523: A common structure for 9 contemporary insurgent wars, supported on statistical data of more than 50,000 insurgent attacks. The model explains the recurrent statistical pattern found in the distribution of deaths in insurgent and terrorist events. Kilcullen describes a framework for counterinsurgency. He gives a visual overview of the actors in his model of conflicts, which he represents as a box containing an "ecosystem" defined by geographic, ethnic, economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics. Inside

480-440: A guerrilla movement. While not every insurgency involves terror, most involve an equally hard to define tactic, subversion. "When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered. Subversion is literally administration with a minus sign in front." The exceptional cases of insurgency without subversion are those where there is no accepted government that is providing administrative services. While

540-472: A more recent definition that suggests subversion includes measures short of violence, which still serve the purposes of insurgents. Rarely, subversion alone can change a government; this arguably happened in the liberalization of Eastern Europe. To the Communist government of Poland , Solidarity appeared subversive but not violent. In arguing against the term Global War on Terror , Francis Fukuyama said

600-431: A political or ideological (whether secular or religious) purpose. Terrorism is a criminal act, but it is more than mere criminality. To overcome the problem of terrorism it is necessary to understand its political nature as well as its basic criminality and psychology. The United Nations needs to address both sides of this equation. Yet another conflict of definitions involves insurgency versus terrorism. The winning essay of

660-769: A professor in the department of politics at New York University . She remained a professor in that department until 2004, when she moved to Yale University. During this time she also began a professorship at the Santa Fe Institute in 2002 which she held until 2010. From 2010 to 2017, she was a member of the external faculty at the Santa Fe Institute. In 2000, Wood published her first book, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador . In this book, Wood uses micro-level ethnographic data obtained from fieldwork in

SECTION 10

#1732772582461

720-403: A rationalist explanation behind them, which explains why leaders prefer to gamble in wars and avoid peaceful bargains. Fearon states that intermediate bargains can be a problem because countries cannot easily trade territories with the spread of nationalism. Furthermore, wars can take the form of civil wars . In her article Why Bad Governance Leads to Civil Wars, Barbara F. Walter has presented

780-425: A state must be able to close three "gaps", of which the first is most important: Note the similarity between Eizenstat's gaps and Kilcullen's three pillars. In the table below, do not assume that a problematic state is unable to assist less developed states while closing its own gaps. McCormick's model is designed as a tool for counterinsurgency (COIN), but develops a symmetrical view of the required actions for both

840-500: A theory that explains the role of strong institutions in preventing insurgencies that can result in civil wars. Walter believes that institutions can contribute to four goals. Institutions are responsible for checking the government, creating multiple peaceful routes to help the government solve problems, making the government committed to political terms that entails preserving peace, and creating an atmosphere where rebels do not need to form militias. Furthermore, Walter adds that if there

900-401: A war not specifically on the tactic of terror but in co-ordination among multiple national or regional insurgencies. It may be politically infeasible to refer to a conflict as an "insurgency" rather than by some more charged term, but military analysts, when concepts associated with insurgency fit, should not ignore those ideas in their planning. Additionally, the recommendations can be applied to

960-433: A worldwide view of terror: Social scientists, soldiers, and sources of change have been modeling insurgency for nearly a century if one starts with Mao. Counterinsurgency models, not mutually exclusive from one another, come from Kilcullen, McCormick, Barnett and Eizenstat. Kilcullen describes the "pillars" of a stable society, while Eizenstat addresses the "gaps" that form cracks in societal stability. McCormick's model shows

1020-410: Is a conflict between the government and the insurgents in the form of a civil war, that can bring about a new government that is accountable to a wider range of people, who have to commit to a compromise in political bargains. According to Walter, the presence of strong influential institutions can be beneficial to prevent the repetition of civil wars, but autocratic governments are less likely to accept

1080-655: Is an American political scientist , currently the Franklin Muzzy Crosby Professor of the Human Environment, professor of political science, and professor of international and area studies at Yale University . She studies sexual violence during war, the emergence of political insurgencies and individuals' participation in them, and democratization , with a focus on Latin American politics and African politics . Wood received

1140-456: Is one of the axioms of military doctrine that change with the use of swarming:. In Edwards' swarming model, as in Kilcullen's mode, unity of command becomes " unity of effort at best, and collaboration or deconfliction at least." As in swarming, in Kilcullen's view unity of effort "depends less on a shared command and control hierarchy, and more on a shared diagnosis of the problem (i.e.,

1200-961: Is the most common form of subnational conflicts and the most civil conflicts where the western countries are likely to be involved. Such interventions and their impacts can be seen in the NATO operation in Libya in 2011 and the French-led intervention in Mali in 2013 . Berman and Matanock suggested an information-centric framework to describe asymmetric conflicts on a local level. Three parties are involved in framework: government forces, rebels and civilians. Government forces and rebels attack each other and may inadvertently harm civilians whereas civilians can anonymously share local information with government forces, which would allow government forces to effectively use their asymmetric advantage to target rebels. Taking

1260-447: Is well to understand that counterterrorism, as used by Cordesman, does not mean using terrorism against the terrorism, but an entire spectrum of activities, nonviolent and violent, to disrupt an opposing terrorist organization. The French general, Joseph Gallieni, observed, while a colonial administrator in 1898, A country is not conquered and pacified when a military operation has decimated its inhabitants and made all heads bow in terror;

SECTION 20

#1732772582461

1320-532: The Confederate States of America was not recognized as a sovereign state, but it was recognized as a belligerent power, and thus Confederate warships were given the same rights as United States warships in foreign ports. Sometimes there may be two or more simultaneous insurgencies (multipolar) occurring in a country. The Iraq insurgency is one example of a recognized government versus multiple groups of insurgents. Other historic insurgencies, such as

1380-602: The Russian Civil War , have been multipolar rather than a straightforward model made up of two sides. During the Angolan Civil War there were two main sides: MPLA and UNITA . At the same time, there was another separatist movement for the independence of the Cabinda region headed up by FLEC . Multipolarity extends the definition of insurgency to situations where there is no recognized authority, as in

1440-672: The Somali Civil War , especially the period from 1998 to 2006 , where it broke into quasi-autonomous smaller states, fighting among one another in changing alliances. James Fearon and David Laitin define insurgency as "a technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla warfare from rural base areas." Austin Long defines insurgency as "the use of political and military means by irregular forces to change an existing political order. These forces typically mingle with civilians in order to hide from

1500-525: The US South ran high risks of bodily harm in challenging the long-standing practices of racial exclusion in Mississippi ." There are many selective incentives that encourage insurgency and violent movements against autocratic political regimes. For example, the supply of safety as a material good can be provided by the insurgents, which abolishes the exploitation of the government and thus forms one of

1560-504: The 24th Annual United States Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Contest, by Michael F. Morris, said [A pure terrorist group] "may pursue political, even revolutionary, goals, but their violence replaces rather than complements a political program." Morris made the point that the use, or non-use, of terrorism does not define insurgency, "but that organizational traits have traditionally provided another means to tell

1620-503: The Insurgent and COIN forces to achieve success. In this way the counterinsurgency model can demonstrate how both the insurgent and COIN forces succeed or fail. The model's strategies and principle apply to both forces, therefore the degree the forces follow the model should have a direct correlation to the success or failure of either the Insurgent or COIN force. The model depicts four key elements or players: All of these interact, and

1680-724: The Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism. Reporting to the Secretary-General in 2002, the Working Group stated the following: Without attempting a comprehensive definition of terrorism, it would be useful to delineate some broad characteristics of the phenomenon. Terrorism is, in most cases, essentially a political act. It is meant to inflict dramatic and deadly injury on civilians and to create an atmosphere of fear, generally for

1740-490: The US and its allies need to focus on specific radical groups rather than clash with global Islam. Fukuyama argued that political means, rather than direct military measures, are the most effective ways to defeat that insurgency. David Kilcullen wrote "We must distinguish Al Qa'eda and the broader militant movements it symbolises – entities that use terrorism – from the tactic of terrorism itself." There may be utility in examining

1800-622: The United States was not fighting terrorism generically, as in Chechnya or Palestine . Rather, he said the slogan "war on terror" is directed at "radical Islamism, a movement that makes use of culture for political objectives." He suggested it might be deeper than the ideological conflict of the Cold War, but it should not be confused with Samuel Huntington 's "clash of civilizations." Addressing Huntington's thesis, Fukuyama stressed that

1860-443: The [insurgents' intended] overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime." Steven Metz observes that past models of insurgency do not perfectly fit modern insurgency, in that current instances are far more likely to have a multinational or transnational character than those of the past. Several insurgencies may belong to more complex conflicts, involving "third forces (armed groups which affect

Insurgency - Misplaced Pages Continue

1920-651: The book, Jon Shefner noted that the field sites that Wood spent time in to research the book were particularly challenging and dangerous, and that she documented her findings with noteworthy methodological precision. Wood has been a co-editor of two other books: the 2010 volume Political Representation , and the 2012 volume Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes . In addition to publications in journals like Politics and Society , The Journal of Peace Research , and Comparative Political Studies on topics like democratization in El Salvador, sexual assault in

1980-702: The box are, among others, governments, counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general population, which is made up of three groups: Often, but not always, states or groups that aid one side or the other are outside the box. Outside-the-box intervention has dynamics of its own. The counterinsurgency strategy can be described as efforts to end the insurgency by a campaign developed in balance along three "pillars": security, political, and economical. "Obviously enough, you cannot command what you do not control. Therefore, unity of command (between agencies or among government and non-government actors) means little in this environment." Unity of command

2040-492: The civilian population. Insurgency sets itself apart from terrorism by aiming for political control rather than resorting to indiscriminate violence, however, it may incorporate terrorist tactics. Where a revolt takes the form of armed rebellion, it may not be viewed as an insurgency if a state of belligerency exists between one or more sovereign states and rebel forces. For example, during the American Civil War ,

2100-494: The different elements have to assess their best options in a set of actions: In Thomas Barnett's paradigm, the world is divided into a "connected core" of nations enjoying a high level of communications among their organizations and individuals, and those nations that are disconnected internally and externally. In a reasonably peaceful situation, he describes a "system administrator" force, often multinational, which does what some call "nation-building", but, most importantly, connects

2160-419: The discussion of failed states below.) Metz suggests that contemporary insurgencies have far more complex and shifting participation than traditional wars, where discrete belligerents seek a clear strategic victory. Many insurgencies include terrorism. While there is no accepted definition of terrorism in international law, United Nations -sponsored working definitions include one drafted by Alex P. Schmid for

2220-461: The distributed knowledge of swarms), platforms for collaboration, information sharing and deconfliction. Each player must understand the others' strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and objectives, and inter-agency teams must be structured for versatility (the ability to perform a wide variety of tasks) and agility (the ability to transition rapidly and smoothly between tasks)." Insurgencies, according to Stuart Eizenstat grow out of "gaps". To be viable,

2280-826: The editorial boards of the American Political Science Review from 2007-2013, as well as of World Politics , Politics and Society , and the Contentious Politics Series of the Cambridge University Press . She has also served on the American Political Science Association 's Committee on Human Subjects Research. In 2010, Wood was named a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences , and in 2018 she

2340-458: The emergence of strong institutions because of their resulting constraint of governmental corruption and privileges. In her book, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in Salvador , Elisabeth Jean Wood explains that participants in high-risk activism are very aware of the costs and benefits of engaging in civil wars. Wood suggests that "participants in the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign in

2400-462: The ferments of revolt will germinate in the mass and the rancours accumulated by the brutal action of force will make them grow again Both Kilcullen and Eizenstat define a more abstract goal than does Cordesman. Kilcullen's security pillar is roughly equivalent to Eizenstat's security gap: This pillar most engages military commanders' attention, but of course military means are applied across

2460-440: The forces defending the political order." According to Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas Pepinsky and Stathis Kalyvas, a central objective in insurgencies is to achieve control over civilians. To exercise control armed groups apply a variety of practices, including different types of violence, dispute resolution, taxation, regulation of movement, access to aid and services, and social strictures. According to James D. Fearon , wars have

Insurgency - Misplaced Pages Continue

2520-477: The government rather than on seeking broad support. While Tomes' definition fits well with Mao's Phase I, it does not deal well with larger civil wars. Mao does assume terrorism is usually part of the early phases, but it is not always present in revolutionary insurgency. Tomes offers an indirect definition of insurgency, drawn from Trinquier 's definition of counterinsurgency: "an interlocking system of actions—political, economic, psychological, military—that aims at

2580-767: The groupings in Samuel P. Huntington 's idea of the clash of civilizations , but, rather assuming the civilizations must clash, these civilizations simply can be recognized as actors in a multinational world. In the case of Iraq, Cordesman observes that the burden is on the Islamic civilization, not unilaterally the West, if for no other reason that the civilization to which the problematic nation belongs will have cultural and linguistic context that Western civilization cannot hope to equal. The heart of strengthening weak nations must come from within, and that heart will fail if they deny that

2640-539: The interplay among the actors: insurgents, government, population and external organizations. Barnett discusses the relationship of the country with the outside world, and Cordesman focuses on the specifics of providing security. Recent studies have tried to model the conceptual architecture of insurgent warfare using computational and mathematical modelling. A recent study by Juan Camilo Bohorquez, Sean Gourley, Alexander R. Dixon, Michael Spagat, and Neil F. Johnson entitled "Common Ecology Quantifies Human Insurgency", suggests

2700-437: The main incentives. The revolutionary power can help manifest a social-political network that in return provides access to political opportunities to diverse candidates, who share a collective identity and cultural homogeneity. Also, civil wars and insurgencies can provide employment and access to services and resources that were once taken over by the autocratic regimes. Insurgencies differ in their use of tactics and methods. In

2760-495: The majority of modern populations. Counter-insurgency Too Many Requests If you report this error to the Wikimedia System Administrators, please include the details below. Request from 172.68.168.133 via cp1102 cp1102, Varnish XID 545839070 Upstream caches: cp1102 int Error: 429, Too Many Requests at Thu, 28 Nov 2024 05:43:02 GMT Elisabeth Jean Wood Elisabeth Jean Wood

2820-562: The military, and sexual violence by armed forces, she has authored a number of public policy pieces in the popular media. These include pieces in The Washington Post , The New York Times , and Al Jazeera . Wood is a member of the 2020-2024 editorial leadership of the American Political Science Review , which is the most selective political science journal. She was previously a member of

2880-478: The model, not just in the security domain, while civilian activity is critically important in the security pillar also ... all three pillars must develop in parallel and stay in balance, while being firmly based in an effective information campaign. Anthony Cordesman, while speaking of the specific situation in Iraq, makes some points that can be generalized to other nations in turmoil. Cordesman recognizes some value in

2940-405: The nation to the core and empowers the natives to communicate—that communication can be likened to swarm coordination. If the state is occupied, or in civil war, another paradigm comes into play: the leviathan, a first-world military force that takes down the opposition regular forces. Leviathan is not constituted to fight local insurgencies, but major forces. Leviathan may use extensive swarming at

3000-402: The outcome, such as militias) and fourth forces (unarmed groups which affect the outcome, such as international media), who may be distinct from the core insurgents and the recognized government. While overt state sponsorship becomes less common, sponsorship by transnational groups is more common. "The nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure..." (See

3060-488: The real issue is the future of their civilization, if they tolerate religious, cultural or separatist violence and terrorism when it strikes at unpopular targets, or if they continue to try to export the blame for their own failures to other nations, religions, and cultures. Asymmetric conflicts (or irregular conflicts ), as the emerging type of insurgencies in recent history, is described by Berman and Matanock in their review as conflicts where "the government forces have

SECTION 50

#1732772582461

3120-682: The role of civilians in this framework into consideration, the government and rebels will divert resources to provide services to civilians so as to influence their decision about sharing information with the government. The framework is based on several assumptions: This framework leads to five major implications for counterinsurgency strategies: These implications are tested by empirical evidences from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and several other subnational conflicts. Further research on governance , rule of law , attitudes, dynamics and agency between allies are needed to better understand asymmetric conflicts and to have better informed decisions made at

3180-494: The security gap begins with training, sometimes in specialized areas such as intelligence. More direct, but still noncombat support, includes intelligence, planning, logistics and communications. Anthony Cordesman notes that security requirements differ by region and state in region. Writing on the Middle East, he identified different security needs for specific areas, as well as the US interest in security in those areas. It

3240-413: The strategic campaign, even if it is politically unfeasible to use precise terminology. Insurgent groups often struggle to maintain coherency and authority due to their decentralized nature, and thus rely heavily upon ethnic, religious, or ideological bounds to avoid splintering. While it may be reasonable to consider transnational insurgency, Anthony Cordesman points out some of the myths in trying to have

3300-399: The tactical level, but its dispatch is a strategic decision that may be made unilaterally, or by an established group of the core such as NATO or ASEAN . Other than brief "Leviathan" takedowns, security building appears to need to be regional, with logistical and other technical support from more developed countries and alliances (e.g., ASEAN, NATO). Noncombat military assistance in closing

3360-742: The tactical, strategic and public policy levels. Before one counters an insurgency, one must understand what one is countering. Typically the most successful counter-insurgencies have been the British in the Malay Emergency and the Filipino government's countering of the Huk Rebellion . In the Philippine–American War , U.S. forces successfully quelled the Filipino insurgents by 1902, albeit with tactics considered unacceptable by

3420-477: The term "subversion" is less commonly used by current U.S. spokesmen, that may be due to the hyperbolic way it was used in the past, in a specifically anticommunist context. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk did in April 1962, when he declared that urgent action was required before the "enemy's subversive politico-military teams find fertile spawning grounds for their fish eggs." In a Western context, Rosenau cites

3480-457: The two apart. Insurgencies normally field fighting forces orders of magnitude larger than those of terrorist organizations." Insurgencies have a political purpose, and may provide social services and have an overt, even legal, political wing. Their covert wing carries out attacks on military forces with tactics such as raids and ambushes , as well as acts of terror such as attacks that cause deliberate civilian casualties. Mao considered terrorism

3540-405: The two cases of El Salvador and South Africa to argue that the process of democratization can be prompted by alliances of workers and impoverished people who confront established elites . In Forcing Democracy from Below , Wood studies the conditions in which this sort of democratization process can be successful. Wood's second book, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in El Salvador ,

3600-432: Was published in 2003. Wood studies the cooperation of rural people and agricultural cooperatives with a political insurgency in El Salvador, arguing that many individuals overcame the collective action problem to participate in a dangerous insurgency because of a combination of beliefs that the insurgency would have positive effects, a desire to express defiance, and the pleasure of expressing individual agency. In reviewing

#460539