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76-434: U.S. body count : 10,889 killed 688 individual and 60 crew-served weapons recovered American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Speedy Express was a controversial military operation conducted by

152-416: A 1st Brigade unit engaged a PAVN/VC force 9 miles (14 km) west of Cái Bè. The action continued until 23:10 and the bodies of 101 PAVN/VC dead and 21 individual weapons were found. On 23 May at 11:15 a 2nd Brigade unit supported by helicopter gunships engaged a PAVN/VC force 10 miles (16 km) northwest of Bến Tre. The fighting continued until 17:10, 22 PAVN/VC and six U.S. were killed. On 24 May at 15:00

228-399: A 1st Brigade unit operating 5 miles (8.0 km) north of Cái Bè engaged approximately 35 PAVN/VC killing 23. At 20:25 another PAVN/VC force was engaged in the same area resulting in 14 killed. An O-1 was shot down 7 miles (11 km) northwest of Bến Tre and both crewmembers killed. On 21 March at 19:25 a unit of the 2nd Brigade operating 5 miles (8.0 km) northeast of Bến Tre engaged

304-415: A 2nd Brigade unit searched the area finding 16 PAVN/VC dead and eight individual and two crew-served weapons. Further contacts later that day killed a further 21 PAVN/VC and captured six individual weapons, U.S. losses were one killed. On 12 May an OH-6 was shot down 4 miles (6.4 km) northeast of Bến Tre and both crewmen killed. On 17 May at 19:45 a 2nd Brigade unit supported by helicopter gunships engaged

380-497: A 2nd Brigade unit supported by helicopter gunships engaged a PAVN/VC company 6 miles (9.7 km) northwest of Bến Tre. The PAVN/VC withdrew by 18:20 leaving 92 dead. The operation concluded on 31 May. The U.S. Army claimed 10,899 PAVN/VC dead and 2,579 suspects detained, while 242 U.S. soldiers were killed and 2,385 wounded (a kill ratio of 45:1) and 688 individual and 60 crew-served weapons recovered (a ratio of enemy killed to weapons seized of 14.6:1). According to Le Quan Cong ,

456-500: A 75mm recoilless rifle, four AK-47s , two RPG-7s and assorted munitions. On 27 February at 19:30 a unit of the 1st Brigade supported by the air cavalry squadron of the 164th CAG engaged a PAVN/VC force 6 miles (9.7 km) northwest of Cái Bè. The PAVN/VC returned fire and the action continued until 21:30 when the PAVN/VC withdrew leaving 36 killed for no U.S. casualties. On 4 March at approximately 20:45 1st Brigade infantry ambushed

532-430: A PAVN/VC force 5 miles (8.0 km) south of Bến Tre killing 14 and destroying six sampans. On 19 May at 18:00 a 2nd Brigade unit engaged a PAVN/VC force 3 miles (4.8 km) east of Bến Tre killing 17. On 21 May at 19:30 a 2nd Brigade unit supported by helicopter gunships engaged a PAVN/VC force 2 miles (3.2 km) northeast of Bến Tre. Twelve secondary explosions were observed and 21 PAVN/VC killed. On 22 May at 09:30

608-528: A PAVN/VC force killing 40 for the loss of one U.S. killed. On 22 March at 20:00 a unit from the 2nd Brigade supported by helicopter gunships engaged a PAVN/VC force 8 miles (13 km) southwest of Bến Tre killing 39. On 23 March during the early morning while operating 14 miles (23 km) southeast of Cao Lanh a 1st Brigade unit supported by helicopter gunships engaged two VC platoons. The VC withdrew after an hour leaving 34 dead and one captured and four individual weapons, U.S. losses were two killed. At 15:00 in

684-672: A PAVN/VC squad 9 miles (14 km) west-northwest of Cái Bè and helicopter gunships attacked an enemy force resulting in 15 PAVN/VC killed and one captured for no U.S. losses. On 5/6 March in operations 3 miles (4.8 km) northeast of Cái Bè 1st Brigade infantry and 164th CAG gunships engaged small groups of PAVN/VC killing 35 and destroying 12 sampans. On 11 March in scattered actions between midnight and 04:00 1st Brigade infantry and 164th CAG gunships killed 18 PAVN/VC 9 miles (14 km) northwest of Cai Lậy District . At 12:55 1st Brigade infantry engaged an estimated VC battalion 9 miles northwest of Cai Lậy. Other 1st Brigade troops were landed in

760-518: A VC platoon commander operating in the Delta during the operation, "most of the people killed were civilians, because civilians would run, we soldiers held our fighting position so they could not get us, they had wiped out whole villages" while failing to actually interdict the VC in the region. The VC claimed a strategic victory, claiming that their fighters and bases were left mostly intact and their presence in

836-496: A direct measure of operational success, this often caused U.S. battle reports to list civilians killed as enemy KIA. Author Alex J. Bellamy wrote that the inclusion of civilians killed led to discrepancies between weapons seized and official body counts, noting that the official "enemy KIA" body count during Operation Speedy Express , was over 10,000 enemy KIA with only 748 weapons recovered. A U.S. Army Inspector General estimated that there were 5,000 to 7,000 civilian casualties from

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912-489: A further 18 PAVN/VC. At 19:30 a reconnaissance platoon from the 2nd Brigade ambushed a PAVN/VC platoon 6 miles (9.7 km) northwest of Bến Tre killing 19. From 19:40 to 21:40 helicopter gunships from the 164th CAG engaged scattered groups of PAVN/VC 9 miles (14 km) northwest of Cái Bè killing 16. At 21:00 a reconnaissance platoon from the 1st Brigade engaged a PAVN/VC platoon 3 miles (4.8 km) northwest of Cái Bè killing 15 and destroying two sampans. On 16 March at 20:00

988-410: A phrase in 1965 to describe missions aimed at flushing the VC out of hiding, while the body count was the measuring stick for the success of any operation. Since the early stages of the war did not seek to hold territory, assessments of whether an operation was considered a victory or not was entirely based on having a higher enemy killed ratio for U.S. commanders. Competitions were held between units for

1064-573: A positive incentive for deliberate fabrication. During the Battle of Dak To and the Battle of the Slopes , one company commander alleges after losing 78 men while finding 10 enemy bodies, the "enemy body count" figures were deliberately re-written as 475 by General Westmoreland and released as official operational reports. Shelby Stanton stated that accurate assessments of PAVN and VC losses were largely impossible due to lack of corresponding statistics,

1140-445: A probing attack, the unit returned fire supported by helicopter gunships and 12 PAVN/VC dead were found in the area. On 30 March from 20:00 to midnight helicopter gunships from the 164th CAG engaged PAVN/VC forces 7 miles (11 km) northeast of Cai Lậy killing 39 and destroying 18 sampans. On 31 March at 12:40 a 1st Brigade unit engaged a PAVN/VC force 6 miles (9.7 km) northwest of Cái Bè. The engagement continued until 16:15 when

1216-586: A quick reaction force to react to VC attacks. The vast majority of the CIDG camps were initially manned by inhabitants of ethnic minority regions in the country (especially Montagnard ), who disliked both the North and South Vietnamese and therefore quickly took to the American advisers. The program was widely successful, as once one village was pacified, it served as a training camp for other local villages. By 1963,

1292-505: A straight military system, and found a haven where their actions were not scrutinized too carefully, and where they came under only sporadic or intermittent observation from the regular chain of command." Many CIDG camps were assaulted or attacked. An example of this is the assault on Camp Loc Ninh , A-311, situated in the III Corps area, which took place from 29 October to 4 November 1967. The camp strike force, together with elements of

1368-480: A unit from the 1st Brigade engaged a VC force 12 miles (19 km) southeast of Cao Lanh. the action continued until 16:00 and resulted in 11 VC killed and eight individual weapons captured. At 20:45 helicopter gunships attacked a PAVN/VC platoon 5 miles (8.0 km) northeast of Bến Tre killing 31. On 26 March at 20:45 a 2nd Brigade unit ambushed a PAVN/VC force 6 miles (9.7 km) east of Bến Tre killing ten. On 27 March between 18:00 and 23:30 helicopter gunships from

1444-509: Is a blot on the honor of the Army', and that they were grossly exaggerated by many units primarily because of the incredible interest shown by people like McNamara and Westmoreland. Secretary of Defense Charles Hagel states that U.S. commanders on the ground inflated body counts since this was how their success was judged. "You used that body count, commanding officers did, as the metric and measurement of how successful you were", hence providing

1520-452: Is about as gross an exaggeration as I could imagine, but to talk about ratios of forty-five to one simply defies my imagination." More recently, former Senator (and eventual Secretary of Defense ) Charles Hagel of Nebraska, a veteran of the 9th Infantry, alleged that some U.S. commanders on the ground inflated the body count during the operation since this was how their success was judged."You used that body count, commanding officers did, as

1596-525: The 1st Infantry Division (1ID), which reinforced it on the second day, successfully defended the camp with no other help, except for air strikes . It is estimated that 1,000 enemies were killed, of which 184 were credited to the civilian irregulars and their American allies. Six CIDG troops died and 39 were wounded; four members of the Green Berets died. Three major changes took place in the CIDG effort between June 1967 and June 1968: In response to

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1672-581: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) or other government agencies to increase Vietnamese participation. By late 1970, the remaining CIDG camps were converted to Vietnamese Rangers (ARVN Rangers) camps. The indigenous ethnic-minority people that formed the CIDG reaped significant benefits by the government of South Vietnam for their allegiance and it was the first time that minority groups were given full status as citizens of South Vietnam. The CIDG program

1748-478: The Middle Ages and bury themselves... with concrete." After visiting some of their more exposed Highland camps, he expressed "horror" that an organization that prided itself on being a "highly mobile, disdainful of fixed installations, innovative, [and] not requiring organized logistical support" should find itself "in fortified installations with mortars in concrete emplacements with fixed range cards printed on

1824-749: The United States Army 's 9th Infantry Division during the Vietnam War in the Mekong Delta provinces of Kiến Hòa and Vĩnh Bình . The operation, led by Major-General Julian Ewell , was part of counterinsurgency operations by the United States Armed Forces which targeted the Viet Cong (VC). U.S. forces aimed to interdict VC lines of communication and prevent Viet Cong personnel from establishing outposts in

1900-543: The 12th CAG on a night reconnaissance mission detected an unknown number of enemy soldiers in Sampans in an area 30 miles (48 km) northwest of Cao Linh and 1 mile (1.6 km) south of the Cambodian border. The area was illuminated and the gunships attacked the sampans. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons and the action continued into the night with USAF AC-47 Spooky gunships also engaging

1976-399: The 164th CAG attacked a PAVN/VC platoon 8 miles (13 km) northeast of Cai Lậy in three separate contacts killing 19 and destroying three sampans. On 28 March at 21:30 helicopter gunships from the 164th CAG engaged scattered PAVN/VC groups 9 miles (14 km) north of Cái Bè killing 26. At 22:30 a division unit in a night defensive position 5 miles (8.0 km) northeast of Cai Lậy received

2052-516: The 164th CAG supporting ARVN troops engaged a PAVN/VC force 6 miles (9.7 km) west of Kiên Hưng killing 36. A UH-1 and an OH-6 were shot down 14 miles (23 km) north of Kiên Long in Chương Thiện Province . On 15 March at 00:40 a unit from the 2nd Brigade operating 7 miles (11 km) northwest of Bến Tre engaged a PAVN/VC squad killing six. A further 20 were killed in later scattered contacts. Later that day helicopter gunships killed

2128-401: The 164th Combat Aviation Group (164th CAG) operating over Bạc Liêu Province attacked scattered groups of PAVN/VC killing nine, destroying 70 structures and 14 sampans and capturing seven individual weapons. On 24 February at 10:00 a unit of the 1st Brigade on a sweep 5 miles (8.0 km) east-southeast of Cai Cai Camp discovered eight PAVN/VC bodies that had been killed the previous day and

2204-534: The 1970 "Study on Military Professionalism" (seemingly the study that Schwarzkopf refers to) had particularly violent reactions to instructions on the body count. "They told of being given quotas and being told to go out and recount until they had sufficient numbers. 'Nobody out there believes the body count,' was the reportedly common response." In Lewis Sorley 's book A Better War , published in 1999 after studies of voluminous previously-secret papers of General Creighton Abrams , he writes: Body count may have been

2280-879: The 1st Brigade, 9th U.S. Infantry Division operated in Định Tường Province , using night ambush tactics; the 2nd Brigade continued its mission with the Mobile Riverine Force . Although engagements in the operation were typically small, the 9th Infantry Division fought several sizeable engagements. The objective was summarized by a U.S. Army publication to take the "war to the enemy in the Delta and sever his supply lines from Cambodia". The U.S. military used 8,000 infantrymen, 50 artillery pieces, 50 helicopters and extensive aerial bombardment. The United States Air Force (USAF) used fighter bombers to carry out 3,381 tactical air strikes. The military also employed " people-sniffer " devices that detected traces of carbon and ammonia. The operation commenced on 1 December 1968 but

2356-641: The 5th SFG (A) staff developed jointly a program designed to continue operational missions in CIDG camps; process CIDG members administratively and medically; prepare MACV advisers for camp missions; transfer logistical support; reorganize CIDG units into Ranger battalions; and assimilate CIDG leaders into the ARVN ranks. The conversion process proceeded successfully, partly because the ARVN Special Forces camp commanders stayed in place and automatically became Ranger battalion commanders. Their familiarity with

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2432-582: The 9th Division achieve an unlikely enemy-to-GI kill ratio of 134:1 in April 1969. It has also been asserted that the operation targeted "people running, people in black pajamas, civilians past night-time". Furthermore, commanders and infantry units were forced into the field, and they were told they were not to leave until an acceptable number of "kills" were made. Robert G. Gard Jr. , who served as artillery commander under Ewell and commenting on his superior officer stated "the idea that we killed only enemy combatants

2508-563: The Army's obsession with meaningless statistics and was especially damning on the subject of body counts in Vietnam. A young captain had told the investigators a sickening story: he'd been under so much pressure from headquarters to boost his numbers that he'd nearly gotten into a fistfight with a South Vietnamese officer over whose unit would take credit for various enemy body parts. Many officers admitted they had simply inflated their reports to placate headquarters. The junior officers queried in

2584-538: The CIDG program was to counter the growing influence of Viet Cong (VC) in the Central Highlands by training and arming the villagers for village defense. The program rapidly expanded after the US military transferred its control from CIA to MACV after two years since its inception and changed its focus from village defense to more conventional operations. From June 1967 onwards the CIDG members were made part of

2660-467: The CIDG units stopped focusing on village defense and instead took part in more conventional operations, most notably Border surveillance. In 1966, Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson was confused and unhappy with the activities of the Green Berets in South Vietnam. They were "supposed to be training guerrilla warfare," he observed, "and what they did was build fortifications out of

2736-554: The MACV staff then decided to convert the remaining camps to ARVN Rangers camps, with a target date of 31 December 1970. Progressive, concurrent conversion cycles were initiated, with the major criteria being the state of security around each camp and seasonal weather. Camps in relatively secure areas that could be supplied easily during the rainy season were converted first. Camps in less secure areas were scheduled for later conversion so that more time and resources could be applied to increase

2812-593: The Mekong Delta during the operation the division had indulged in the "wanton killing" of civilians through the "indiscriminate use of mass firepower. Ewell refuted the report, describing it to COMUSMACV General Creighton Abrams as "the biggest collection of malicious innuendo I have ever seen." In June 1972, Newsweek ' s Saigon Bureau Chief, Kevin Buckley working with Alexander Shimkin , wrote an article titled "Pacification's Deadly Price" that questioned

2888-450: The PAVN/VC or claimed as "VC" casualties by U.S. forces in subsequent "Personnel Damage Assessments". Other reported incidents include ambushing or attacking unarmed groups of men such as fishermen or farmers, which were reported as "Viet Cong", as well as any civilians wearing black pajamas and civilians running away from helicopters, including women and children who were again reported as "enemy combatants" KIA. One notable example of this

2964-432: The PAVN/VC withdrew leaving 30 dead and ten individual weapons. From 21:00 to 23:00 infantry from the 2nd Brigade engaged a PAVN/VC company 3 miles (4.8 km) east of Bến Tre killing 23 and capturing one. On 4 May at 09:50 a unit of the 1st Brigade engaged a PAVN/VC squad 8 miles (13 km) west of Cái Bè killing seven. On 11 May at 12:15 air cavalry units attacked an area 6 miles (9.7 km) northwest of Bến Tre and

3040-406: The U.S. Army inspector general estimated that there may have been between 5,000 and 7,000 Vietnamese civilian casualties during the operation. Fewer than 750 weapons were captured by American forces. A VC report estimated that the U.S. military killed at least 3,000 Vietnamese civilians and destroyed "thousands of houses, hundreds of hectares of fields and orchards" during the operation. In late 1968

3116-494: The U.S. was winning the war. The army's theory was that eventually, the Viet Cong (VC) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) would lose after the attrition warfare . According to historian Christian Appy , " search and destroy was the principal tactic; and the enemy body count was the primary measure of progress" in General William Westmoreland ’s war of attrition. "Search and destroy" was coined as

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3192-564: The US military felt that the program was a great success, but only that the CIDG units and Green Berets units were not being employed properly, and ordered Operation Switchback, which transferred control of the CIDG program from the CIA over to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). The CIDG Program was rapidly expanded, as the entire 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (5th SFG (A)), United States Army Special Forces (USASF), moved into Vietnam, and

3268-495: The area and helicopter gunships and airstrikes were conducted throughout the day and night. The VC withdrew before dawn leaving 57 dead and eight individual weapons, U.S. losses were one killed. A UH-1 was shot down during the action and crash-landed. On 13 March at 03:40 a 1st Brigade unit engaged two VC platoons 12 miles (19 km) west-northwest of Cái Bè. The VC withdrew after two hours leaving 17 dead while U.S. losses were two dead. On 14 March at 16:00 helicopter gunships from

3344-535: The area and made contact with an enemy force and the action continued until 15:50 when the enemy withdrew leaving 38 dead and five sampans destroyed. There were no U.S. or CIDG casualties. On 14 February in scattered contacts 7 miles (11 km) north-northwest of Thuy Dong helicopter gunships from the 12th CAG killed 28 PAVN/VC for no U.S. losses. On 17 February at 15:15 reconnaissance aircraft sighted numerous sampans with an unknown number of enemy soldiers onboard 9 miles (14 km) southeast of Cao Lanh. At about 18:00

3420-632: The book The Vietnam War state over a million casualties were reported as well. Civilian Irregular Defense Group program The Civilian Irregular Defense Group ( CIDG , pronounced / ˈ s ɪ d ʒ iː / , SID -jee ; Vietnamese : Lực lượng Dân sự chiến đấu ) was a military program developed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during the Vietnam War , which was intended to develop South Vietnamese irregular military units (militia) from indigenous ethnic-minority populations. The main purpose of setting up

3496-466: The combat readiness of these camps. The final number of CIDG camps converted to Rangers was 37. During the stand-down period, every effort was made to raise the combat readiness of the 37 remaining CIDG camps to the highest efficiency. Concurrently, a concerted effort was made to assimilate the Montagnard and other minority ethnic groups from remote areas into the ARVN. The ARVN Special Forces and

3572-498: The concrete, and literally... locked in by their own actions." In his estimation the CIDG program drained manpower from Saigon and was too expensive; the indigenous soldiers spent too much time protecting their own dependents who lived nearby. Furthermore, he felt that Green Berets members "viewed themselves as something separate and distinct from the rest of the military effort," describing them as " fugitives from responsibility" who "tended to be nonconformist, couldn't quite get along in

3648-529: The conflict claimed that the murder of unarmed civilians who ran and claiming they were enemy combatants was military standard operating procedure for the 11th Infantry Brigade , Americal Division prior to the unit becoming infamous for the My Lai massacre. In the summer of 1970, Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. wrote, "the Army War College issued a scathing report" that, among other things: criticized

3724-417: The culture and the killing of civilians on whim or suspicion. During the operation he was told about numerous incidents including when a man riding a bicycle past a patrol near his town was shot and subsequently declared a VC, and the shooting of a woman carrying medical supplies, who was then declared an enemy combatant serving as a medic post-mortem. British photojournalist Tony Swindell who had documented

3800-569: The enemy. The bodies of 24 PAVN/VC were observed lying in the strike area and five sampans were destroyed. There were no U.S. casualties. On 11 February at 14:30 helicopter gunships from the air cavalry squadron of the 164th Combat Aviation Group on a Delta Blackhawk mission observed an unknown size enemy force in sampans 35 miles (56 km) northwest of Cao Lanh. The gunships attacked the sampans with machine guns and rockets and they returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. Civilian Irregular Defense Group program (CIDG) troops were landed in

3876-416: The fact that allied ground units were often unable to confirm artillery and aerial kills, and gamesmanship practiced by units under pressure to "produce results". American losses were subject to statistical manipulation as well. For instance, dying soldiers put aboard medical evacuation helicopters were often counted as only wounded in unit after-action tables. The official U.S. Department of Defense figure

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3952-405: The highest count in the land." Hackworth added that "the 9th Division had the lowest weapons-captured-to-enemy-killed ratio in Vietnam." According to Hackworth, Ewell's policies would later earn him the nickname the "Butcher of the Delta" from members of the 9th Division. Nick Turse in his book Kill Anything That Moves asserts that "free fire zones", where any human present could be killed, helped

4028-665: The highest number of VC/PAVN killed in action, or KIAs. Army and marine officers knew that promotions were largely based on confirmed kills. The pressure to produce confirmed kills resulted in massive fraud. Appy claims that U.S. commanders exaggerated body counts by 100 percent. One study revealed that 61% of U.S. commanders considered that body counts were grossly exaggerated. Historian Guenter Lewy estimated that 1/3 of those killed and counted as "enemy KIA" killed by U.S./ ARVN forces were civilians. He estimates around 220,000 civilians were counted as "enemy KIA" in battlefield operations reports during battles against VC/NVA. Lewy estimated

4104-722: The increasing enemy firepower, also in recognition to the CIDG, the US MACV approved a weapons modernization program in April 1968, under which CIDG troops were equipped with M16 rifles , M60 machine guns , and M79 grenade launchers . Up to that point, CIDG troops had used mainly M1 Carbines and M14 rifles . The weapons transfer program was completed in January 1969. By 1 June 1970, the number of CIDG camps in South Vietnam had been reduced to thirty-eight, either by conversion to South Vietnamese Regional Forces (SVRF) status or by closure. The South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS) and

4180-769: The later phase, and across all three wars, including the First Indochina War and the Third Indochina War , there was a total of 1,146,250 PAVN/VC confirmed military deaths. Per war: 191,605 deaths in the First Indochina War, 849,018 deaths in the Second Indochina War (Vietnam War), and 105,627 deaths in the Third Indochina War. In addition, more than 300,000–330,000 PAVN/VC soldiers remain officially missing in action (their bodies were not found), with some estimates putting

4256-609: The metric and measurement of how successful you were...." Vietnam War body count controversy Since the goal of the United States in the Vietnam War was not to conquer North Vietnam but rather to ensure the survival of the South Vietnamese government, measuring progress was difficult. All the contested territory was theoretically "held" already. Instead, the U.S. Army used body counts to show that

4332-418: The most corrupt – and corrupting – measure of progress in the whole mess. Certainly the consensus of senior Army leaders, the generals who commanded in Vietnam, strongly indicates that it was. A survey found that sixty-one percent of officers believed that the body count was often inflated. Typical comments by the respondents were that it was 'a fake – totally worthless', that 'the immensity of the false reporting

4408-519: The number as high as 500,000. Sorley in A Better War cites Douglas Pike with a figure of 900,000 PAVN/VC dead and missing by 1973, and states that during a 1974 visit by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to North Vietnam, PAVN General Võ Nguyên Giáp advised Zumwalt that the North had 330,000 missing. Jim Webb claims that the Vietnamese lost over 1.1 million soldiers. Geoffrey Ward and Ken Burns in

4484-399: The number of weapons which might have been captured would not have justified the number of casualties that probably would have been sustained to locate them." On top of that, Stevens said, many members of guerrilla units in the region were unequipped with individual firearms. The US Army Inspector General estimated that there were 5,000 to 7,000 civilian casualties from the operation. Ewell,

4560-499: The operation. The My Lai massacre and Sơn Thắng massacre both initially reported women and children killed as "enemy combatants". Former marine officer and later war-time correspondent Philip Caputo in the book A Rumor of War noted: General Westmoreland's strategy of attrition also had an important effect on our behavior. Our mission was not to win terrain or seize positions, but simply to kill: to kill communists and as many of them as possible. Stack 'em like cordwood. Victory

4636-547: The possible 17,057 troop spaces scheduled for conversion 14,534 CIDG troops actually became members of the Ranger command. A significant benefit that accrued to the minority ethnic groups involved was the better treatment by the government of South Vietnam. For their allegiance, as expressed by their willingness to join the ARVN units, the government provided legal birth and marriage certificates as well as medical benefits and disability pay for injuries received in military action. This

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4712-428: The region via the operation. The U.S. claimed the operation was successful in achieving its objectives, although the VC denied this and claimed the operation failed to stop their activities in the region. The number of Vietnamese casualties that resulted from the operation is controversial. The U.S. Army's official body count estimate of VC fighters killed was 10,889, however this has been described as an exaggeration and

4788-455: The region was not removed by the operation. In December 1969 in the aftermath of the revelation of the My Lai massacre , stories began to appear in the press that atrocities by Americans and their allies were far more commonplace in South Vietnam than the U.S. government was willing to admit. Robert Kaylor of United Press International alleged that according to American pacification advisers in

4864-442: The same general area a 1st Brigade unit engaged two PAVN/VC companies, the action continued until 22:30 with helicopter gunships and tactical fighter providing support. The PAVN/VC lost 77 killed, 11 individual and nine crew-served weapons and three radios, U.S. losses were two killed. At 16:40 a unit of the 2nd Brigade freed ten South Vietnamese being held captive 11 miles (18 km) south-southwest of Bến Tre. On 24 March at midday

4940-476: The sampans were attacked by helicopter gunships and the enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons. The action continued until 19:30 when the enemy withdrew leaving 16 dead and 21 sampans destroyed. At 23:20 a unit of the 1st Brigade ambushed an enemy unit on four sampans 2 miles (3.2 km) east of Cái Bè . Helicopter gunships provided support and all four sampans were destroyed and ten PAVN/VC killed for no U.S. losses. On 19 February helicopters from

5016-408: The spectacular ratio of U.S. dead to purported VC, as well the small number of weapons recovered, and suggested that perhaps more than 5,000 of the dead were innocent civilians (quoting an unnamed U.S. official). Buckley's statements were based on extensive interviews conducted by him and Shimkin, who was fluent in Vietnamese. Although Buckley acknowledged that VC infrastructure and control in the region

5092-467: The time, Colonel Phillip H. Stevens, observed that MACV investigators had attributed the low number of weapons captured to the nature of the terrain and the tactics Ewell had used. In the delta it was easy for the enemy to dispose of weapons by dropping them in canals, streams and paddies. A high percentage of casualties had also been inflicted at night or by aviation units, making the retrieval of weapons almost impossible. "In some heavily booby trapped areas,

5168-498: The troops, the camp area, and the tactical area of operations was invaluable. The MACV advisers did not arrive for duty until some 17 camps had been converted. The fact that many of the advisers were former Green Berets men familiar with the camps minimized problems. As a result of the close co-ordination between U.S. and ARVN Special Forces, the Ranger Command was strengthened by the addition of 37 light infantry battalions. Of

5244-399: The use of free-fire zones was an important factor in this. For official U.S. military operations reports on free-fire zones, there are no distinctions between enemy KIA and civilian KIA since it was assumed by U.S. forces that all individuals killed in an area declared a free-fire zone, regardless of whether they were combatants or civilians, were considered enemy KIA. Since body counts was

5320-490: Was 950,765 communist forces killed in Vietnam from 1965 to 1974. Defense Department officials believed that these body count figures need to be deflated by 30%. The Ministry of Defense for Vietnam reported 849,018 military dead during the war for the period between 1955 and 1975 (of which a third were non-combat deaths). The Vietnamese government does not officially view the First Indochina War as separate from

5396-686: Was a high body-count, defeat a low kill-ratio, war a matter of arithmetic. The pressure on unit commanders to produce enemy corpses was intense, and they in turn communicated it to their troops. This led to such practices as counting civilians as Viet Cong. "If it’s dead and Vietnamese, it's VC," was our rule of thumb in the bush. It is not surprising, therefore, that some men acquired a contempt for human life and predilection for taking it. Christian Appy in Working Class War documents and describes some atrocities committed by U.S. forces. Civilian deaths from U.S. airstrikes were sometimes blamed on

5472-483: Was allegedly known to be obsessed with body counts and favorable kill ratios and said "the hearts and minds approach can be overdone....in the delta the only way to overcome VC control and terror is with brute force applied against the VC". David Hackworth was a battalion commander during Speedy Express; according to him, "a lot of innocent Vietnamese civilians got slaughtered because of the Ewell-Hunt drive to have

5548-569: Was extensive, he wrote that local hospitals had treated more wounds caused by U.S. firepower than by the VC. Bến Tre provincial hospital in Kien Hoa, treated 1,882 civilians with war related injuries during the operation. 76% (1,431) of them were injured by American fire power while 451 were wounded by VC fire. In response to the issues raised by the Newsweek story, the Chief of MACV Information at

5624-682: Was formed for two reasons: The CIDG program was devised by the CIA in early 1961 to counter expanding VC influence in the Central Highlands. Beginning in the village of Buon Enao, small A Teams from the Green Berets moved into villages and set up Area Development Centers. Focusing on local defense and civic action, the Green Berets teams did the majority of the training. Villagers were trained and armed for village defense for two weeks, while localized strike forces ( MIKE Force ) would receive better training and weapons and served as

5700-468: Was only formally announced on 2 March 1969. On 2 February between 19:50 and 20:15, infantry from the 1st Brigade supported by helicopter gunships from the 12th Combat Aviation Group (12th CAG) engaged an unknown size enemy force in two contacts 11 miles (18 km) northeast of Cao Lanh. During the 25 minute battle, 16 enemy soldiers were killed (11 killed by air). There were no U.S. casualties. On 8 February at approximately 21:15 helicopter gunships from

5776-426: Was the purported killing of hundreds of unarmed civilians by Tiger Force following grievous losses from a PAVN ambush, in which the unit proceeded to kill countless women, children and crippled individuals during Operation Wheeler/Wallowa . Journalist Jonathan Schell , who reported on Operation Cedar Falls , reported a general inability of U.S. forces to discern VC from unarmed civilians, based on tacit ignorance of

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