65-414: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Operation Taylor Common was a search and destroy operation conducted by Task Force Yankee , a task force of the 1st Marine Division supported by
130-466: A cease-fire being brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violated the Logan Act , banning private citizens from intruding into official government negotiations with a foreign nation, and thus constituted treason. While the discussion following splits into military and political/civil strategies, that is a Western perspective. North Vietnamese forces took a more grand strategic view than did
195-779: A centre of gravity built around gradual and small-scale erosion of US capabilities, closing the enormous technological disadvantage with surprise attacks and strategies, while building and consolidating political control over the rural areas of South Vietnam. See the protracted warfare model . Despite differences in were both sides believe their centres of gravity were, the NVA and Viet Cong would retain strategic initiative throughout this period, choosing when and were to attack, and being capable of controlling their losses quite widely. They were estimated to have initiated 90% of all contacts and engagement firefights, in which 46% of all engagements were NVA/VC ambushes against US forces. A different study by
260-563: A conventional, combined-arms conquest against the Army of the Republic of Vietnam , and taking and holding land permanently. Military developments in this period should be considered in several broad phases that do not fit neatly into a single year: Some fundamental decisions about U.S. strategy, which would last for the next several years, took place in 1965. Essentially, there were three alternatives: Even with these three approaches, there
325-549: A figurehead. COL Bùi Tín led a reconnaissance mission of specialists reporting directly to the Politburo, who said, in a 1981 interview with Stanley Karnow, that he saw the only choice was escalation including the use of conventional troops, capitalizing on the unrest and inefficiency from the series of coups in the South. The Politburo ordered infrastructure improvements to start in 1964. In February and March 1964, confirming
390-465: A graduated scale of intensity, ranging from reconnaissance, threats, cross-border operations, and limited strikes on logistical targets supporting DRV operations against South Vietnam and Laos, to strikes (if necessary) on a growing number of DRV military and economic targets. In the absence of all-out strikes by the DRV or Communist China, the measures foreseen would not include attacks on population centers or
455-604: A guerilla in Asia during the Second World War, was forced out of office on 24 February. MG Jack Singlaub, to become the third commander of SOG, argued that special operators needed to form their own identity; while today's United States Special Operations Command has components from all the services, there is a regional Special Operations Component, alongside Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Components, in every geographic Unified Combatant Command . Today, officers from
520-534: A land war in Asia, and that the U.S. was too concerned with Chinese intervention to use airpower outside South Vietnam. Once the elections were over, North Vietnam developed a new plan to move from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Cambodia, in central Vietnam (i.e., ARVN II Corps Tactical Zone ), with a goal of driving through to the seacoast over Highway 19 , splitting South Vietnam in half. For this large operation,
585-494: A landing there and the 3/3 Marines was landed on Hill 728 and fought their way to Hill 508 seizing it by 15 January and establishing Firebase Maxwell there. The Marines then proceeded to search the western part of Base Area 112, establishing further firebases as they went and uncovering PAVN base camps and stores. On 15 January an Army UH-1H carrying Colonel Spark and his command group was hit by machine-gun fire near Firebase Maxwell and crashed, killing all on board. On 29 January
650-555: A matter of establishing a viable, sustainable political structure for South Vietnam, rather than radically improving the short-term security situation. It saw the Minh-Tho government as enjoying an initial period of popular support as it removed some of the most disliked aspects of the Diem government. During this time, the increase in VC attacks was largely coincidental; they were resulting from
715-560: A maximum effort of American power could salvage the situation. Two days later, the Minh Tho government was overthrown. Col. Don Si Nguyen brought in battalions of engineers to improve the Trail, principally in Laos, with up-to-date Soviet and Chinese construction equipment, with a goal, over several years, of building a supply route that could pass 10 to 20,000 soldiers per month. At this time,
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#1732780327906780-406: A not too long a period of time...There is no contradiction in the concept of a protracted war and the concept of taking opportunities to gain victories in a short time." Protracted war theory, however, does not urge rapid conclusion. Palmer suggests that there might be at least two reasons beyond a simple speedup: They may also have believed the long-trumpeted U.S. maxim of never getting involved in
845-608: A period of gradual escalation and direct intervention referred to as the " Americanization " of joint warfare in South Vietnam during the Vietnam War . At the start of the decade, United States aid to South Vietnam consisted largely of supplies with approximately 900 military observers and trainers. After the assassination of both Ngo Dinh Diem and John F. Kennedy close to the end of 1963 and Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 and amid continuing political instability in
910-573: A political dau tranh argument: the U.S. was faced with two unacceptable alternatives: invading the North or continue a stalemate. Invasion of "a member country of the Socialist camp" would enlarge the war, which Giap said would cause the "U. S. imperialists...incalculable serious consequences." As for reinforcements, "Even if they increase their troops by another 50,000, 100,000 or more, they cannot extricate themselves from their comprehensive stalemate in
975-605: A report on 2 January 1964, for the first operational phase to begin on 1 February. INR determined that the North Vietnamese had, in December, adopted a more aggressive stance toward the South, which was in keeping with Chinese policy. This tended to be confirmed with more military action and less desire to negotiate in February and March 1964 Duiker saw the political dynamics putting Lê Duẩn in charge and Ho becoming
1040-548: The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines on Go Noi Island observed a 300 strong PAVN force crossing the Song Ky Lam and artillery fire was directed against them, the PAVN tried to escape to the west but were engaged by Company D, 5th Marines. The fighting continued all night before the PAVN broke contact and the next morning the bodies of 72 PAVN were found. On 10 February Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 3rd Battalion, 26th Marines joined
1105-455: The 3rd Marine Regiment which had recently redeployed from Quảng Trị Province . On 11 December following a preparatory air and artillery strike the engineers of Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion supported by Company K, 5th Marines landed on Hill 575 8 km southwest of An Hoa Combat Base and established Firebase Lance ( 15°43′34″N 108°00′11″E / 15.726°N 108.003°E / 15.726; 108.003 ). On 13 December
1170-556: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), southwest of Hội An from 6 December 1968 to 8 March 1969. Base Area 112 was a Viet Cong (VC) and People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) base area located in the mountains of Quảng Nam Province southwest of Da Nang near the area known to the Marines as the "Arizona Territory" The base was believed to support the PAVN 21st Regiment, 3rd Battalion, 68B Rocket Regiment, 2nd Battalion, 141st Regiment and command and support units. The operational plan
1235-635: The Tet Mau Than or Tong Kong Kich/Tong Kong Ngia (TCK/TCN, General Offensive-General Uprising ) One of the great remaining questions is if this was a larger plan into which the Battle of Khe Sanh and Tet Offensive were to fit. If there was a larger plan, to what extent were North Vietnamese actions in the period of this article a part of it? Douglas Pike believed the TCK/TCN was to have three main parts: Pike used Dien Bien Phu as an analogy for
1300-533: The armed struggle ( dau trinh ) theory espoused by Võ Nguyên Giáp but opposed by the politically oriented Trường Chinh . Pike said he could almost hear Trường Chinh saying, "You see, it's what I mean. You're not going to win militarily on the ground in the South. You've just proven what we've said; the way to win is in Washington." Alternatively, Giáp, in September 1967, had written what might well have been
1365-521: The center of gravity of the opposition. Lyndon Johnson and Robert McNamara , in selecting a strategy in 1965, had assumed the enemy forces were assumed that much as the defeat of the Axis military had won the Second World War, the Communist military was the center of gravity of the opposition, rather than the political opposition or the security of the populace. In contrast, the North Vietnamese took
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#17327803279061430-400: The 1st Cav, so BG Man revised a plan to bring to try to fight the helicopter-mobile forces on terms favorable to the North Vietnamese. They fully expected to incur heavy casualties, but it would be worth it if they could learn to counter the new U.S. techniques, inflict significant casualties on the U.S. Army, and, if very lucky, still cut II CTZ in half. That planned movement was very similar to
1495-527: The 3rd Marines command group being withdrawn on the 16th and redeployed to Đông Hà Combat Base , followed the next day by 1/3 Marines. After midnight on 23 February, PAVN mortars hit An Hoa Combat Base triggering explosions in the ammunition dumps, followed by a sapper attack which was repulsed with gunship and artillery fire. At the same time, firebases Maxwell and Tomahawk ( 15°44′N 107°49′E / 15.74°N 107.81°E / 15.74; 107.81 ) were hit by mortar and sapper attacks. Due to
1560-703: The Arizona Territory to act as a blocking force for the ARVN Rangers. The 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines and 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines which had just completed Operation Meade River had already moved southwest from the Liberty Bridge ( 15°50′28″N 108°07′16″E / 15.841°N 108.121°E / 15.841; 108.121 ) into the An Hoa area. On 9 December control of the operation passed to Colonel Michael M. Spark, commander of
1625-456: The December decision, there was more emphasis on military action and less attention to negotiation. As opposed to many analysts who believed the North was simply unaware of McNamara's "signaling"; INR thought that the North was concerned of undefined U.S. action on the North and sought Chinese support. If INR's analysis is correct, the very signals mentioned in the March 1965 McNaughton memo, which
1690-518: The Maoist doctrine of Protracted War, which itself assumed it would attrit the counterinsurgents . An alternative view, considering overall security as the center of gravity, was shared by the Marine leadership and some other U.S. government centers of opinion, including Central Intelligence Agency , Agency for International Development , and United States Army Special Forces . Roughly until mid-1965,
1755-479: The Marines tried to recover the bodies again, but were forced back by PAVN fire. The bodies were later recovered by a reconnaissance team. Firebase Tomahawk was evacuated and closed on 5 March, while Maxwell was closed on 7 March. The operation ended on 8 March 1969. Marine losses were 183 killed and 1,487 wounded, ARVN losses were 100 killed and 378 wounded. The Marines reported 1,398 PAVN were killed and took 29 prisoner. One Marine, Lance Corporal William R. Prom ,
1820-508: The PAVN created its first division headquarters, under then-brigadier general Chu Huy Man . This goal at first seemed straightforward, but was reevaluated when major U.S. ground units entered the area, first the United States Marine Corps at Da Nang , and then the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) , the "First Cav". In particular, the PAVN were not sure of the best tactics to use against the air assault capability of
1885-571: The PAVN to retreat onto very reasonable paths to break away from the Americans – but different Americans had silently set ambushes, earlier, across those escape routes. By late 1966, however, North Vietnam began a buildup in the northwest area of the theater, in Laos, the southernmost part of the DRV, the DMZ, and in the northern part of the RVN. It is known that the North Vietnamese planned something called
1950-511: The PAVN/Viet Cong occurred and Phase 2 of the operation ended on 31 December 1968 On 1 January 1969 3/5 Marines was landed at Combat Operations Base Javelin ( 15°42′07″N 107°52′16″E / 15.702°N 107.871°E / 15.702; 107.871 ) and proceeded to bombard Hill 508 ( 15°44′20″N 107°53′06″E / 15.739°N 107.885°E / 15.739; 107.885 ) however heavy PAVN fire prevented
2015-558: The Republic of [South] Vietnam by destroying the VC—his forces, organization, terrorists, agents, and propagandists—while at the same time reestablishing the government apparatus, strengthening GVN military forces, rebuilding the administrative machinery, and re-instituting the services of the Government. During this process security must be provided to all of the people on a progressive basis. Westmoreland complained that, "we are not engaging
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2080-524: The SVN-US strategy still focused around pacification in South Vietnam , but it was increasingly irrelevant in the face of larger and larger VC conventional attacks. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam began to refer to the "two wars", one against conventional forces, and the other of pacification . The former was the priority for U.S. forces, as of 1965, assuming the South Vietnamese had to take
2145-551: The South, the Lyndon Johnson Administration made a policy commitment to safeguard the South Vietnamese regime directly. The American military forces and other anti-communist SEATO countries increased their support, sending large scale combat forces into South Vietnam; at its height in 1969, slightly more than 400,000 American troops were deployed. The People's Army of Vietnam and the allied Viet Cong fought back, keeping to countryside strongholds while
2210-463: The South. The U.S. would avoid further Geneva talks until it was established that they would not improve the Communist position. It was estimated that while there would be a strong diplomatic and propaganda response, the DRV and its allies would "refrain from dramatic new attacks, and refrain from raising the level of insurrection for the moment." The U.S/RVN and North Vietnam had strategic goals, with very different, and often inaccurate, definitions of
2275-546: The U.S. and South Vietnam with a protracted warfare model , in their concept of dau tranh , or "struggle", where the goal coupling military and political initiatives alongside each-other; there are both military and organisational measures that support the political goal. Following the Tet Offensive and with US Withdrawal, once the United States was no longer likely to intervene, the North Vietnamese changed to
2340-479: The U.S. had little intelligence collection capability to detect the start of this project. Specifically, MACV-SOG , under Russell, was prohibited from any operations in Laos, although SOG was eventually authorized to make cross-border operations. Before the operations scheduled by the Krulak committee could be attempted, there had to be an organization to carry them out. An obscure group called MACV-SOG appeared on
2405-617: The VC having reached a level of offensive capability rather than capitalizing on the overthrow of Diem. During this period, INR observed, in a 23 December paper, the U.S. needed to reexamine its strategy focused on the Strategic Hamlet Program, since it was getting much more accurate – if pessimistic – from the new government than it had from Diem. Secretary McNamara, however, testified to the House Armed Service Committee, on 27 December, that only
2470-470: The VC with sufficient frequency or effectiveness to win the war in Vietnam." He said that American troops had shown themselves to be superb soldiers, adept at carrying out attacks against base areas and mounting sustained operations in populated areas. Yet, the operational initiative— decisions to engage and disengage—continued to be with the enemy. In December 1963, the Politburo apparently decided that it
2535-399: The anti-communist allied forces tended to control the cities. The most notable conflict of this era was the 1968 Tet Offensive , a widespread campaign by the communist forces to attack across all of South Vietnam; while the offensive was largely repelled, it was a strategic success in seeding doubt as to the long-term viability of the South Vietnamese state. This phase of the war lasted until
2600-488: The department of defence breaks down the types of engagements from a periodic study here. William Westmoreland , and to a lesser extent Maxwell Taylor , rejected, if they seriously considered, the protracted war doctrine stated by Mao and restated by the DRV leadership, mirror-imaging that they would be reasonable by American standards, and see that they could not prevail against steady escalation. They proposed to defeat an enemy, through attrition of his forces, who guided by
2665-432: The election of Richard Nixon and the change of U.S. policy to Vietnamization , or ending the direct involvement and phased withdrawal of U.S. combat troops and giving the main combat role back to the South Vietnamese military. One of the main problems that the joint forces faced was continuing weakness in the South Vietnamese government, along with a perceived lack of stature among the generals who rose up to lead it after
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2730-725: The engineers supported by Company E, 2/5 Marines established Firebase Pike ( 15°46′01″N 107°58′26″E / 15.767°N 107.974°E / 15.767; 107.974 ) northwest of Firebase Lance. On 15 December several M-121 Combat Trap bombs were dropped on Hill 558 in an experiment to blast helicopter landing zones in dense jungle. The Combat Trap was only a partial success and Company B, 3rd Engineer Battalion supported by 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines were landed by helicopters to establish Firebase Spear ( 15°46′01″N 107°58′26″E / 15.767°N 107.974°E / 15.767; 107.974 ) 8 km west of Firebase Lance. On 18 December 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines
2795-688: The incident, and at least some North Vietnamese naval patrols were deployed against these. Possible consequences of such actions, although not explicitly addressing the OPPLAN34A operations, were assessed by the United States Intelligence Community in late May, on the assumption The actions to be taken, primarily air and naval, with the GVN (US-assisted) operations against the DRV and Communist-held Laos, and might subsequently include overt US military actions. They would be on
2860-505: The lead in pacification. Arguably, however, there were three wars: There were, however, changes in the overall situation from early 1964 to the winter of 1965–1966, from 1966 to late 1967, and from late 1968 until the U.S. policy changes with the Nixon Administration. Nixon's papers show that in 1968, as a presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his liaison to the South Vietnam government, to persuade them to refuse
2925-701: The next two days, the ARVN would succeed with Operation Thang Lang-Hai Yen 79 on the Dinh Tuong–Kien Phuong Sector border, killing 99 VC, followed the next day by an attack on a training camp in Quảng Ngãi, killing 50. These successes, however, must be balanced by the Buddhist crisis and the increased instability of Diem. After Diem's fall in November 1963 , INR saw the priority during this period as more
2990-407: The operation and was landed in the Arizona Territory where they engaged numerous small PAVN units. At the end of February Company L, 3/26 Marines killed 75 PAVN and destroyed two anti-aircraft machine-gun positions. By mid-February Base Area 112 had been largely neutralized and the participating units were needed in the DMZ area, so the operation was progressively scaled back, with the 3/3 Marines and
3055-557: The organization charts. Its overt name was "MACV Studies and Operations Group". In reality, it was the Special Operations Group, with CIA agent programs for the North gradually moving under MACV control – although SOG almost always had a CIA officer in its third-ranking position, the second-in-command being an Air Force officer. The U.S. had a shortage of covert operators with Asian experience in general. Ironically, Assistant Secretary of State Roger Hilsman , who had been
3120-438: The original government of Diem was deposed. Coups in 1963 , January 1964 , September 1964 , December 1964 , and 1965 all shook faith in the government and reduced the trust of civilians. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the [North Vietnamese] Party concluded, the "United States was forced to introduce its own troops because it was losing the war. It had lost the political game in Vietnam." Robert McNamara suggests that
3185-483: The overthrow of Dương Văn Minh by Nguyễn Khánh , in January 1964, reflected differing U.S. and Vietnamese priorities. And since we still did not recognize the North Vietnamese and Vietcong and North Vietnamese as nationalist in nature, we never realized that encouraging public identification between Khanh and the U.S. may have only reinforced in the minds of many Vietnamese that his government drew its support not from
3250-520: The people, but from the United States. The situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate with corruption rife throughout the Diem government and the ARVN unable to effectively combat the Viet Cong. In 1961, the newly elected Kennedy Administration promised more aid and additional money, weapons, and supplies were sent with little effect. Some policy-makers in Washington began to believe that Diem
3315-514: The south but died, possibly of natural causes, in 1967; Thanh may very well have been among those couple of dozen. Thanh was replaced by Trần Văn Trà . Trà's analysis (see above) was that while the concept of the General Offensive-General Uprising was drawn up by the Politburo in 1965, the orders to implement it did not reach the operational headquarters until late October 1967. Pike described it as consistent with
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#17327803279063380-594: The special operations community have risen to four-star rank, including Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , but special operators were regarded as outcasts, unlikely to rise high in rank, during the Vietnam War. To understand factors that contributed to the heightened readiness in the Gulf, it must be understood that MACV-SOG OPPLAN 34A naval operations had been striking the coast in the days immediately before
3445-429: The successful PAVN maneuver in 1975. The resulting campaign is called the Battle of Ia Drang , with a followup at the Battle of Bong Son , but Ia Drang actually had three major phases: In the larger Battle of Bong Son approximately a month later, which extended into 1966, 1st Cav drew their own lessons from what they believed the PAVN developed as countertactics to air assault , and used obvious helicopters to cause
3510-441: The third phase, although Dien Bien Phu was an isolated, not urban, target. Losing elite troops during the Tet Offensive never let them develop the "second wave" or "third phase" "We don't ever know what the second wave was; we have never been able to find out because probably only a couple of dozen people knew it." The description of the three fighting methods is consistent with the work of Nguyễn Chí Thanh , who commanded forces in
3575-541: The use of nuclear weapons. Further assumptions is that the U.S. would inform the DRV, China, and the Soviet Union that these attacks were of limited purpose, but show serious intent by additional measures including sending a new 5,000 troops and air elements to Thailand; deploying strong air, naval, and ground strike forces to the Western Pacific and South China Sea; and providing substantial reinforcement to
3640-506: The withdrawal of participating units from the operation, it was decided to withdraw the Marines from the western firebases. On 3 March a patrol from Company M, 3/5 Marines was ambushed near Firebase Maxwell. Three Marines were killed and two of the bodies were left behind as the company withdrew. The next day the Marines recovered one of the bodies and the following day attempted to recover the other, but were ambushed again, and two Marines killed whose bodies also could not be recovered. On 6 March
3705-627: Was a grinding war of attrition, with no decision, as death and destruction ground along. For example, on 23 March 1964, ARVN forces in Operation Phuong Hoang 13-14/10, Dien Phong Sector, raids a VC battalion in a fortified village, killing 126. On 13 April, however, the VC overran Kien Long (near U Minh Forest ), killing 300 ARVN and 200 civilians. On 25 April, GEN Westmoreland was named to replace GEN Harkins; an ARVN ambush near Plei Ta Nag killed 84 VC. Ambassador Lodge resigned on 23 June, with General Taylor named to replace him. In
3770-544: Was awarded the Medal of Honor for gallantry during Taylor Common. [REDACTED] This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Marine Corps . Joint warfare in South Vietnam, 1963%E2%80%931969 Anti-Communist forces: Communist forces: United States : 409,111 (1969) During the Cold War in the 1960s, the United States and South Vietnam began
3835-457: Was finalized around 20 December, under joint MACV-CIA leadership; the subsequent MACV-SOG organization had not yet been created. There were five broad categories, to be planned in three periods of 4 months each, over a year: Lyndon Johnson agreed with the idea, but was cautious. He created an interdepartmental review committee, under Major General Victor Krulak , on 21 December, to select the least risky operations on 21 December, which delivered
3900-620: Was for Task Force Yankee , an ad hoc unit based around the 5th Marine Regiment , to secure the An Hoa Basin together with the ARVN 1st Ranger Group , the Task Force would then construct a series of fire support bases to support operations west into the Base Area and finally destroy the Base Area. The operation commenced on 7 December with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines being landed by helicopters from HMM-165 and HMM-364 into
3965-542: Was incapable of defeating the communists, and some even feared that he might make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. Discussions then began in Washington regarding the need to force a regime change in Saigon . This was accomplished on 2 November 1963, when the CIA allegedly aided a group of ARVN officers to overthrow Diem. To help deal with the post-coup chaos, Kennedy increased the number of US advisors in South Vietnam to 16,000. OPPLAN 34A
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#17327803279064030-434: Was landed on Hill 375 4 km southwest of Firebase Spear and established Combat Operations Base Mace ( 15°40′37″N 107°57′29″E / 15.677°N 107.958°E / 15.677; 107.958 ). Having established their operating bases the Marines began patrolling west into the eastern part of Base Area 112, while they found numerous abandoned bunkers, barracks and support facilities no major encounters with
4095-415: Was possible to strike for victory in 1965. Theoretician Trường Chinh stated the conflict as less the classic, protracted war of Maoist doctrine, and the destabilization of doctrine under Khrushchev, than a decision that it was possible to accelerate. "on the one hand we must thoroughly understand the guideline for a protracted struggle, but on the other hand we must seize the opportunities to win victories in
4160-484: Was still significant doubt, in the U.S. government, that the war could be ended with a military solution that would place South Vietnam in a strongly anticommunist position. In July, two senior U.S. Department of State officials formally recommended withdrawal to President Lyndon B. Johnson ; Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara , at the same time, saw the situation as bad but potentially retrievable with major escalation. Westmoreland's "ultimate aim", was: To pacify
4225-425: Was very much concerned with Chinese involvement, may have brought it closer. There were numerous ARVN and VC raids, of battalion size, for which only RVN losses or body count is available. They took place roughly monthly. In the great casualty lists of a war, 100–300 casualties may not seem an immense number, but these have to be considered as happening at least once a month, with a population of perhaps 10 million. It
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