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86-585: Nikkei can refer to: Nikkei, Inc. ( Kabushikigaisha Nihonkeizaishimbunsha ) ( 株式会社日本経済新聞社 ) , abbreviated 日経 , Nikkei, a large media corporation in Japan The Nikkei ( Nihon Keizai Shimbun ) ( 日本経済新聞 ) , abbreviated 日経 , Nikkei, a major business newspaper published in Japan Nikkei 225 ( 日経225 ) , a Japanese stock market index, published by Nihon Keizai Shimbun Nikkei cuisine ,

172-524: A Japanese Peruvian fusion cuisine that was created by the Japanese immigrants that came to Peru Nikkei people ( 日系人 , Nikkei ) , often simply Nikkei, people in the Japanese diaspora Nikkey Shimbun ( ニッケイ新聞 ) , a Japanese-language newspaper published in São Paulo, Brazil Topics referred to by the same term [REDACTED] This disambiguation page lists articles associated with

258-481: A director without executive rights ... Shuichi Takayama, a current director, will replace him as president. – Olympus statement announcing departure of Kikugawa At a press conference in Tokyo on 27 October, president Takayama blamed Woodford for the decline in the company's share price, saying "If this secret information had not been leaked, there would have been no change in our corporate value." Takayama said

344-563: A letter filed with the UK Registrar of Companies , the auditors to Gyrus resigned "partly because of its client's accounting for the securities". KPMG qualified Gyrus' accounts because they could not ascertain that Axam was not a related party. The auditors also took issue with the accounting treatment of the preference shares. In its audit letter to Gyrus Group dated 26 April 2010, KPMG considered that there were "circumstances connected with our ceasing to hold office that should be brought to

430-618: A licensing agreement with LexisNexis . In Japan the price of the newspaper morning edition is 160 yen . The afternoon edition is 70 yen and subscription is 4,509 yen/month (morning and afternoon edition). Nikkei agreed on 23 July 2015 to buy the UK-based FT Group, which includes business daily Financial Times , for the equivalent of $ 1.32 billion from Pearson PLC . On 30 November 2015, Nikkei completed acquisition of Financial Times from Pearson plc. Nikkei also owns TV Tokyo and Nikkei CNBC , which provides coverage of

516-643: A major Japanese manufacturer of optical imaging laboratory and medical equipment listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange had, according to its accounts for the year ended 31 March 2011, consolidated net sales of ¥847.1 billion (US$ 10.6 billion) in the year, and total shareholders' equity of ¥262.5 billion (US$ 3.3 billion). The group employs close to 40,000 people around the world. Its assets of ¥1 trillion (US$ 13.3 billion) as at 31 March 2011 included ¥175.5 billion (US$ 2.2 billion) of goodwill , an intangible asset . Under

602-468: A number of actions taken by management which are questionable and which give cause for concern ... We were unable to confirm that there has been improper conduct, however, given the sums of money involved and some of the unusual decisions that have been made it cannot be ruled out at this stage ... In addition, there are a number of other potential offences to consider including false accounting, financial assistance and breaches of directors' duties by

688-535: A report dated 12 October, suspended its coverage after Woodford was removed from office. Nomura and JPMorgan announced on 20 October that their coverage of the company was halted. It was reported that Government of Singapore Investment Corp. , the Singapore sovereign wealth fund which was one of the principal shareholders, immediately disposed of its 2 percent stake on the first hint of scandal. The share price plunged several days running upon market fears that

774-512: A software maker acquired by Olympus through ITX in 2005, as "a front company" with known affiliations with the Yamaguchi Gumi , the largest of Japan's yakuza organisations. Altis, Humalabo and News Chef – acquisitions advised by Global Company – were also identified as front companies with links to organised crime. The headquarters of Olympus Corp. was visited by Japanese prosecutors on 21 December 2011 as part its investigation; NHK TV said

860-481: Is Hideaki Fujizuka, formerly with the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi. While the company argued the candidates were well-qualified, a shareholder advisory firm urged investors to vote down the proposed president citing his lack of experience as a corporate manager of a turnaround situation; it also expressed concern that the ex-bankers may put banks' interests ahead of shareholders'. ISS also recommended shareholders not to approve

946-636: Is an employee-owned company ; Japanese law does not allow newspaper companies to be publicly traded . In addition to the Japan-based The Nikkei newspaper (the world's largest business daily in terms of circulation), Nikkei, Inc. owns and publishes two international publications: the Nikkei Asia weekly newsmagazine and the London-headquartered Financial Times daily newspaper. Furthermore, it

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1032-467: Is the owner of the TX Network , of which TV Tokyo is the flagship station. Nikkei, Inc.'s current holdings include companies in books, magazines to digital media, database services, broadcasting, and other activities such as economic/cultural events. Nikkei Inc. through its main publication The Nikkei is said to have formed an "institutionalized" relationship with the national government through

1118-407: Is the weakest among its peer group. Olympus is the only Nikkei 225 constituent whose intangible assets – principally goodwill of around ¥168 billion – exceeds net assets (¥151 billion). Having spent some US$ 4 billion during this period under the stewardship of Kikukawa, the company's aggressive strategy of external growth was not without criticism. According to an Olympus employee,

1204-651: The Ernst & Young organisation (auditors to Olympus) in Japan, Europe and the United States, as well as their global chairman and CEO. PwC's report highlighted that as part of the deals, a "success fee" – an intermediary's fee for closing an acquisition deal – of $ 687 million for the Gyrus acquisition was paid to two small firms, US-based Axes America LLC and Cayman Islands-based Axam Investments Ltd. PwC also examined

1290-580: The Nikkei was "depending too much on leaks — apparently provided by corporate insiders" and that the paper was "often seen as reluctant to bluntly criticize Japanese firms." The New York Times reporter Hiroko Tabuchi said the Nikkei ' s purchase of the FT was "worrying", further stating that: " [The] Nikkei is basically a PR machine for Japanese biz; it initially ignored the 2011 Olympus accounting scandal (which FT broke). Nikkei has also hardly covered

1376-509: The Nikkei industrial daily newspaper in 1986: "When the main business is struggling, we need to earn through zaitech " (meaning financial engineering ). Olympus invested in financial derivatives and other risky investments to boost profits. However, Shimoyama said he "does not remember" any attempt to conceal losses ( tobashi ) during his tenure as president: "As president it wasn't the case where all financial reports would come to me, so I have no memory. During that time Masatoshi Kishimoto

1462-497: The Princeton Economics International Ponzi scheme . According to Bloomberg , the annual report of Olympus Corporation for the year ended 31 March 2010 showed a ¥15.5 billion ($ 201 million) prior period adjustment for "loss related to the purchase of preference shares from [an unnamed] third party"; goodwill on its balance sheet also increased by ¥13.5 billion yen to account for

1548-457: The Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) on 15 November had fallen by some 75 percent since the scandal erupted. The price continued to be volatile: trading was halted as its price hit the upper limit for price falls. On 14 and 15 November, after the threat of delisting ebbed, trading in its shares was once again halted when buy orders heavily outnumbered sell orders; the price rose by the upper limit of ¥100. Trading only took place after hours as there

1634-754: The Yakuza . The Financial Times reported that relevant authorities in several jurisdictions were investigating the case. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), to which Woodford had also given files about the suspicious transactions, opened its case in mid-October; other federal law enforcement agencies, including federal prosecutors in Manhattan, had also taken an interest. The SEC was said to be examining Axes America. Experts speculated that US investigators were assessing whether there were kickbacks to Olympus officials or whether money laundering or other illicit acts were involved. The British Serious Fraud Office and

1720-523: The 12-week public scandal had taken an enormous emotional toll on him and his family, and announced that he would abandon his proxy fight to take control of the Olympus board. Instead, his lawyers had initiated legal proceedings in London seeking unspecified damages for dismissal from his four-year contract. Olympus convened an extraordinary shareholders' meeting for 20 April 2012 to vote on its proposal for

1806-422: The 2008 recession." However, it later admitted that "the business prospect diverged from the assumption we had at the time of the investment." As we have troubled our customers, business partners and shareholders over a series of press reports and a slump in share prices, chairman and president Tsuyoshi Kikukawa today returned his titles, as well as his right to representation ... Mr Kikukawa will become

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1892-733: The FBI were said to be working with the Japanese Financial Services Agency. Olympus disclosed that they were being investigated by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, while unnamed sources said that a unit of the Tokyo police dealing with organised crime may also be involved in the investigation. The Japanese Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) and the Tokyo Stock Exchange are also reported to have taken an interest in

1978-405: The Gyrus acquisition, which should have been within his scope but was instead handled from Tokyo. (Woodford had set out to resign over the matter but stayed with Olympus after being reassured on the acquisition and being promoted to oversee Olympus' European businesses and appointed to the main Olympus board ). However, on 30 July 2011, the matter surfaced again, when Woodford's attention as President

2064-505: The Japanese market during trading hours and rebroadcasts CNBC during off-hours and weekends. Major companies: Olympus scandal The Olympus scandal was a case of accounting fraud exposed in Japan in 2011 at optical equipment manufacturer Olympus . On 14 October, British-born Michael Christopher Woodford was suddenly ousted as chief executive. He had been company president for six months, and two weeks prior had been promoted to chief executive officer, when he exposed "one of

2150-524: The Olympus inquiry had questioned the auditors' signing off on the accounting treatment of preferred shares, and whether the handover from KPMG to Ernst & Young in 2009 was thorough, EY's own review in turn questioned "the thoroughness and accuracy" of the Olympus inquiry's findings. The EY concluded there were "no problems with the handover in terms of the guidelines," but were looking into what more could have been done. It further said that its powers of investigation were limited by their inability to question

2236-547: The Takata airbag defect; almost no investigative work on that issue whatsoever. Nikkei is Japan Inc." Nikkei Inc. specializes in publishing financial, business and industry news. Its main news publications include: Nikkei sells these newspapers around the world, in their original languages and in translation. It also makes many of its Japanese articles available in English through wire services, an English-language website, and

2322-559: The US$ 2.2 billion deal in 2008 to acquire British medical equipment maker Gyrus Group, and said on Bloomberg Television : "The board has to go, they're all toxic, they are all contaminated." On 30 November, Woodford announced that he would resign from the Olympus board, saying that his decision was unrelated to the official investigations in Japan, the UK, and the USA. He added that his resignation

2408-449: The accounts on grounds that it could undermine any legal recourse they may want to pursue in future. Foreign shareholders oppose the nominations, citing "undue influence" of the creditor banks. Masaki Shizuka of the TSE expressed the concern that "investor confidence in information provided by the company may decline." Tsutomu Okubo, who is to chair a new working team to discuss reforms to

2494-500: The acquisition of Gyrus, as well as funds used in the purchase of three new domestic businesses ... were used, among other things, to dispose of unrealised losses on securities, the reporting of which had been put off. – Olympus statement about advisory fees, November 2011 At the news conference, Takayama bowed as he apologised for the "highly inappropriate disposal" of the losses. The Financial Times said Takayama had not addressed "the size and origin of Olympus' past losses;

2580-439: The acquisitions of Altis, News Chef, and Humalabo, saying that they "were determined to have great potential in the medical and health care industries." Press reported that although the three companies had "minuscule capital funds", their combined business value was estimated at between ¥96.9–124.6 billion (US$ 1.3–1.6 billion). Olympus denied that the acquisitions were unrelated to the core business. The description given of

2666-422: The acquisitions process and funds movements were under the tight control of a small circle of executives in the "Financial Affairs Group". Japanese business daily is quoted as saying more than a hundred businesses were acquired during Kikukawa's tenure, and that the majority were unlisted and loss-making. The investments were in diverse sectors such as pet care and DVD production, and often had little connection with

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2752-447: The amounts paid for Gyrus "will pay off considering what value we will gain from the Gyrus acquisition in the future." He further justified the purchase of the three small Japanese companies as part of a strategy "to find new growth areas to reduce our over-reliance on the endoscope business." However, Mori, who was the main speaker, and Takayama were criticised by impatient journalists for their responses that meandered without addressing

2838-473: The article as "tabloid, sensationalist journalism". Upon learning about a second article referring to payments by Olympus to "anti-social forces", a euphemism for yakuza (Japanese criminal organisations ), The Japan Times notes that from the start, Facta remained the lone Japanese journal to scoop the Olympus accounting irregularities until the scandal broke in Western media sources after Woodford exposed

2924-701: The attention of the company's members or creditors." Ernst & Young, the firm that succeeded KPMG, also expressed reservations about the 2010 Gyrus accounts for uncertainty, due to the lack of information about Axam. Bloomberg noted that both Gyrus annual reports were filed late: instead of filing within the nine-month statutory limit, the accounts were filed more than a year from the company's year end. In late November 2011 Michael Andrew, KPMG International global chairman, said his firm had complied with its legal obligations to pass on information related to Olympus's 2008 acquisition of Gyrus, and were removed as auditors for so doing. Andrew said: "It's pretty evident to me there

3010-556: The auditor up until 2009, after which the Ernst & Young ShinNihon (EY) took over. At no point were any major issues signalled by the company's auditors; The Financial Times (FT) reported that KPMG had raised some questions when the firm audited Olympus, but audit reports were always unqualified, and EY signed off on "clean" audit reports in 2010 and 2011. According to an email sent by former chairman Tsuyoshi Kikukawa that Michael Woodford made public, Olympus had replaced KPMG with EY after

3096-500: The biggest and longest-running loss-hiding arrangements in Japanese corporate history", according to The Wall Street Journal . Tsuyoshi Kikukawa , the board chairman, who had appointed Woodford to these positions, again assumed the title of CEO and president. The incident raised concern about the endurance of tobashi schemes , and the strength of corporate governance in Japan. Apparently irregular payments for acquisitions had resulted in very significant asset impairment charges in

3182-660: The board members would resign once "the path to Olympus' revival became clear." However, Woodford said: "If they have an iota of care for the company then they should ... resign in the near future." According to Olympus, eight executives including Takayama were to take pay cuts of between 30 and 50 per cent starting December, to take responsibility for the accounting scandal; Takayama's salary would be halved. In mid-January 2012, Olympus published its panel's report. It decided that five individuals were responsible: auditors Minoru Ota and Katsuo Komatsu, outside auditors Makoto Shimada and Yasuo Nakamura, and standing auditor Tadao Imai. Ota

3268-544: The board. PriceWaterhouseCoopers report on the 2008 Olympus acquisitions Woodford said that he asked Hisashi Mori and some confidants about the Facta report, and stated also that at a lunch meeting in August with Kikukawa and Hisashi Mori, Olympus' compliance officer, Kikukawa revealed he ordered staff not to tell Woodford about the allegations because Woodford was "too busy" dealing with other matters. Kikukawa dismissed

3354-627: The case. The New York Times published details of an official investigators' memorandum prepared for the SESC, the Tokyo prosecutor's office and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department which stated the true magnitude of losses was ¥481 billion ($ 6.25 billion). It said that of the "questionable acquisition payments, investments and advisory fees" made between 2000 and 2009, only ¥105 billion has been accounted for in some way. Investigators named Tsubasa Net,

3440-462: The circulated agenda and asked the board to consider removing Woodford from his post of chief executive. Woodford was not allowed to speak or vote; the motion was carried unanimously, although he retained his seat on the board of directors. Kikukawa circulated a staff email the same day, stating that the departure was due to differences in management style, and that Woodford had "ignored established decision-making processes and created many wedges among

3526-535: The companies on 19 October, and how they fit into the group's strategy, were contradicted by the later statement: initially, Altis was described as being engaged in "environmental solutions business proposing resources recycling and CO 2 reduction focused on petrochemical plants." In a 27 October disclosure, the unit was "mainly engaged in recycling business for medical waste ." Humalabo was initially said to undertake "research and development/sale of skin improving substances using [a fungus known as] basidomycota", but in

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3612-417: The company act to strengthen corporate governance, questioned whether the corporate auditor system was functioning properly, and whether the company's accountants were acting as a proper check on management. Toshio Oguchi, representative director of Governance for Owners in Tokyo, argued that the affair pointed to a dysfunctional board: "Even if they didn't know about the tobashi, the fact that the board approved

3698-486: The company they say they love. Miyata also circulated a petition targeted at employees calling on the reinstatement of Woodford. As Olympus has a 70-percent market share in endoscopy, the scandal caused anxiety and concern among the medical profession, which sees Olympus endoscopes as irreplaceable. While foreign shareholders supported Woodford's proxy fight to replace the Olympus board, he failed to gain support from Japanese institutions; Sumitomo Mitsui bank, identified as

3784-407: The company under the new management". At the press conference, he declared Olympus to be clean, continued to accuse Woodford of attempting to seize power, and maintained Woodford was "autocratic", and that his alleged offences "included intimidation of my own staff." By contrast, Woodford alleged that his forced departure was linked to several prior acquisitions and payments he questioned, particularly

3870-565: The company's accounts, and this was exposed in an article in the Japanese financial magazine FACTA and had come to Woodford's attention. Japanese press speculated on a connection to Yakuza (Japanese organised crime syndicates). Olympus defended itself against allegations of impropriety. Despite Olympus' denials, the matter quickly snowballed into a corporate corruption scandal over concealment (called tobashi ) of more than 117.7 billion yen ($ 1.5 billion) of investment losses and other dubious fees and other payments dating back to

3956-570: The company's leadership. Woodford himself was soon to realise that his appointment to CEO was in name only." If the intention of the promotion was to deter Woodford's questions, it did not have the intended effect. Following his appointment, Woodford persisted in pressing the issue of the questionable transactions, and, based on his belief that an internal probe would not get all the necessary answers, he also engaged accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to give substance to his suspicions. Woodford copied his final two letters to senior members of

4042-521: The company's main creditor, warned Woodford that he would fail. Woodford was disappointed by their silence, but acknowledged that even had he won a shareholder vote to become chief executive, the antipathy towards him of major shareholders and creditors, and the discomfort within the company about his decision to publicly disclose the accounting irregularities, would have made running the company difficult. On 6 January 2012, on failing to secure support from Japanese institutional shareholders, Woodford said that

4128-562: The company, failing which he will sue them through another rights group, Lawyers for Shareholders' Rights. Two American law firms announced that they were initiating "investigations" of Olympus Corporation and some of its directors and were seeking investors who purchased Olympus ADRs between 7 November 2006 and 7 November 2011 on the grounds that the company's share price had been inflated through false accounting and that directors had hidden substantial losses by "false statements and material omissions". The quotation price of Olympus shares on

4214-475: The core Olympus business. The most significant acquisition was the British medical equipment maker Gyrus Group, acquired in 2008 at a cost of $ 2 billion – the equivalent of almost 5 times turnover and 27 times EBITDA . In the same year, Olympus also paid out ¥73.5 billion ($ 965 million) when it acquired three "small venture firms" – Altis, Humalabo, and NewsChef. By contrast, in 2009 Olympus sold

4300-537: The former expressed disagreement with the accounting treatment of the Gyrus acquisition. The FT queried why, this being the case, KPMG had signed off on the 2009 accounts. Tsutomu Okubo raised a question in the upper house of the Diet as to why the auditors apparently failed to stop the cover-up; the Japanese Institute of Certified Accountants said that it would look into the auditors' role. According to

4386-467: The home of Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, former Olympus president, was also targeted by authorities looking into wrongdoing. The Tokyo District Court handed several rulings on this case. For details, see sections #Criminal lawsuit and #Civil lawsuit . The accounts of Olympus were audited in the 1990s by the Japanese affiliate of then "Big Five" accounting firm Arthur Andersen until the latter collapsed in 2002, when KPMG Azsa became its auditor. KPMG remained

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4472-438: The identity of the executives who approved the initial cover-up; the exact means by which it was executed; and the reason it took so long to dispose of the bad assets." Ahead of the much-awaited board meeting on 25 November, to be attended by Woodford, two directors – Kikukawa and Mori – announced their resignation; Yamada, who enjoyed observer status on the board, also resigned. Separately, current president Shuichi Takayama said

4558-508: The illegal acts by artfully manipulating experts' opinions." Following his dismissal, Woodford quickly travelled back to London, where he passed on a file of information to the British Serious Fraud Office , and requested police protection. He hinted that the payments may have been linked to "forces behind" the Olympus board; Japanese newspaper Sankei went further, to suggest that the payments could be linked to

4644-607: The issues. Olympus delegated the task of selecting members of its third-party panel to investigate the allegations to two men who were appointed to the board in June: Yasuo Hayashida, a physician and visiting professor at Juntendo University , and Hiroshi Kuruma, a former executive at Nikkei Business . On 1 November, Olympus announced the composition of its third-party panel, headed by lawyer and former Supreme Court justice, Tatsuo Kainaka. The panel would include four lawyers and one certified public accountant. In

4730-541: The largest of its kind in Japanese history. This scandal also raised considerable turmoil and concern over Japan's prevailing corporate governance and transparency and the Japanese financial markets . Woodford received a reported £10 million ($ 16 m) in damages from Olympus for defamation and wrongful dismissal in 2012; around the same time, Olympus also announced it would shed 2,700 jobs (7% of its workforce) and around 40 per cent of its 30 manufacturing plants by 2015 to reduce its cost base . Olympus Corporation,

4816-514: The late 1980s and suspicion of covert payments to criminal organisations. On 26 October, Kikukawa was replaced by Shuichi Takayama as chairman, president, and CEO. On 8 November 2011, the company admitted that the company's accounting practice was "inappropriate" and that money had been used to cover losses on investments dating to the 1990s. The company blamed the inappropriate accounting on former president Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, auditor Hideo Yamada and executive vice-president Hisashi Mori. By 2012

4902-431: The later statement was said to be "mainly engaged in development of [health] supplements with ingredients extracted from shiitake mushroom mycelium." While the basic description of News Chef as a maker of cookware for microwave ovens was not changed, Olympus added that "disease prevention and prognosis through foods" was one of its objects. We wish to make a profound apology for all of the distress and trouble caused due to

4988-442: The leadership of Tsuyoshi Kikukawa, who became president in 2001, the company's revenues increased from ¥467 billion to ¥847 billion while the profits were a relatively constant ¥35 billion. During the 1980s, many Japanese corporations relied on investments to bolster dwindling profits, particularly in its exports, which had been eroded by a strong yen. Toshiro Shimoyama, Olympus president from 1984 to 1993, admitted to

5074-452: The management team led by Woodford, all the board directors attending today, except for Woodford himself who could not participate in the voting due to special interest, unanimously resolved the dismissal from his office of the representative director. Olympus press release: Olympus Corporation Resolved Dismissal of President Michael C. Woodford Kikukawa convened an emergency board meeting on 14 October, and then, arriving late, cancelled

5160-454: The managers and within the organization ... vastly different to what we had expected of him, which was to accelerate decision-making and speed up the management." After Woodford's removal, Kikukawa was re-appointed president and CEO of Olympus. One week later, he accused Woodford of having created "a gang" of direct reports that circumvented Mori, his supposed immediate subordinate. Kikukawa resigned on 26 October "to restore confidence in

5246-438: The matter. Woodford began to write a series of six letters to Mori and/or Kikukawa regarding his concerns as to governance issues "relating to the company's M&A (acquisitions) activities". Woodford copied later letters to the company's auditors, and threatened to resign if he did not receive satisfactory responses about the 2008 Gyrus acquisition costs, and the goodwill impairment of around $ 600 million made that year for

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5332-454: The media were handled with the appropriate evaluation and procedures ... These transactions were in no way improper and we are setting up an external panel of experts to examine and report on this acquisitions activity. Olympus said on 19 October that the value of the stakes in the three companies had been impaired by ¥55.7 billion – more than three-quarters of the acquisition cost, blaming it on "worsened external environment following

5418-429: The new board and to approve the restated accounts. The board slate consisted of 11 candidates, the majority of whom were "completely independent" of Olympus. The company controversially sought to promote its executive officer, Hiroyuki Sasa, to president; its candidate for chairman was Yasuyuki Kimoto, a former senior executive of Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. – the largest creditor of Olympus. Another proposed director

5504-537: The next tier down of management," thus signalling Woodford was "little more than his puppet". The New York Times similarly suggested that the promotion may have been intended to instill Woodford with a greater sense of loyalty to the board, and Woodford suggested it was done to reduce his motivation to resign. Nikkei Business noted that the announcement was made only in its English web page, and after talking to Olympus, it commented: "Woodford's title had changed from COO to CEO, but it did not signify any real change in

5590-485: The other acquisitions. On 1 April 2011, Woodford was promoted to the post of president and chief operating officer, replacing Kikukawa and becoming the first ever non-Japanese chairman of Olympus. Six months after Woodford's appointment as COO and President, on 1 October, he was elevated to chief executive officer, with Olympus stating that since his appointment as president/COO, "the Board have been extremely pleased with

5676-499: The outgoing audit firm. Olympus had a market capitalisation of ¥673 billion on 13 October 2011, immediately before Woodford was sacked. By the end of the next day, the valuation had fallen to ¥422 billion ($ 5.5 billion). Analysts at Goldman Sachs , Deutsche Bank and Nomura Securities , concerned about corporate governance issues at the company as well as its balance sheet, all immediately downgraded their stock ratings. Goldman Sachs, who had only upgraded its rating in

5762-419: The profitable diagnostics unit it had built up over 40 years to Beckman Coulter for $ 1 billion – approximately two times turnover – to free up capital. British-born Michael Christopher Woodford was an Olympus veteran of 30 years, and previously executive managing director of Olympus Medical Systems Europa. As European Director in 2008, Woodford had noticed the "strange goings-on at the company" such as

5848-443: The progress made under Mr. Woodford's leadership in this role, which has exceeded the expectations at the time of his appointment." At the time of Woodford's appointment, he was regarded as an unlikely choice. Reuters reports there were rumours that he only got the job because he would be "easy to control"; some Japanese observers saw Woodford, who speaks no Japanese, as the chairman Kikukawa's new pet. An article in Facta underlined

5934-424: The purchase. In September 2011, Olympus announced that it had written off part of a ¥45 billion investment in emerging market bonds. BusinessWeek noted that the ratio of company debt relative to equity ranked Olympus among the top 2 percent most highly geared of Japan's largest companies, while The Financial Times commented that its capital base – an equity ratio in 2011 of below 14 percent –

6020-539: The recent series of media reports and fall in the stock prices triggered by our recent change in President ;... We shall provide updates in a timely manner through the Tokyo Stock Exchange's disclosure network and our website ... We sincerely hope to conclude this situation as quickly as possible to restore society's trust in us and to bring reassurance to our customers, business partners, shareholders and employees ... The past acquisitions mentioned in

6106-525: The scandal had developed into one of the biggest and longest-lived loss-concealing financial scandals in the history of corporate Japan; it had wiped 75–80% off the company's stock market valuation , led to the resignation of much of the board and investigations across Japan, the UK and US. Among the people criminally charged in this scandal , only two securities brokers went to prison for 3–4 years. A shareholder derivative suit in 2019 fined three Olympus board members for 59.4 billion yen (USD 594 million),

6192-420: The sceptics' views, saying "The fact that the company picked a bottom-ranking foreign executive director with virtually no significant responsibilities from amongst a total pool of 25 potential candidates, including the vice-president who was responsible for medical instruments ... set tongues a-wagging." Woodford himself was soon to realise that his appointment to CEO was in name only. Woodford's promotion

6278-638: The shares would be delisted as the company could not meet its reporting mandatory deadline for its quarterly results; in the week to 18 November Nippon Life announced that its stake had been reduced by one-third, from 8.18 per cent to 5.11 per cent, because of the uncertainty; Mitsubishi reduced its stake from 10 per cent to 7.6 per cent. Some major foreign institutional investors have pushed to bring back ousted chief executive Michael Woodford: UK fund manager Baillie Gifford , Harris Associates, and Southeastern Asset Management, owning respectively 4 percent, 5 percent and 5 percent stake, all believed he

6364-437: The so-called " press clubs ", where large national newspapers such as The Nikkei are given "privileged access to officials, whose perspectives they end up sharing." This symbiotic relationship between the government and national newspapers and broadcasters leads publications to "avoiding any actual confrontation with the administration". According to reporters such as Shusuke Murai and Reiji Yoshida from The Japan Times ,

6450-498: The title Nikkei . If an internal link led you here, you may wish to change the link to point directly to the intended article. Retrieved from " https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Nikkei&oldid=1153570353 " Category : Disambiguation pages Hidden categories: Articles containing Japanese-language text Short description is different from Wikidata All article disambiguation pages All disambiguation pages Nikkei, Inc. Nikkei

6536-500: The transactions resulting in the $ 600 million write-down. Michael C. Woodford has largely diverted from the rest of the management team in regard to the management direction and method, and it is now causing problems for decision making by the management team. Hence, judging that realisation of the 2010 Corporate Strategic Plan with its slogan of "Advancing to the Next Stage of Globalisation" would be difficult to achieve by

6622-508: The week of 6 November, Olympus announced that Hisashi Mori had been dismissed and auditor Hideo Yamada had resigned. At a press conference, Takayama revealed he had known "absolutely nothing" about the scheme until Mori informed him earlier in the week. He said Kikugawa, Mori ,and Yamada were not responsible for the initial investments, but had covered up the losses "with the company's best interests at heart". It has become clear that advisory fees and funds used to buy back preferred shares in

6708-416: Was a glut of unsatisfied buy orders. The share price rose in four straight trading sessions, reaching 834 yen at one point on 16 November. Many long-time employees of Olympus Corp were shocked and angry, and felt betrayed by the executives who were responsible for bringing public humiliation onto the company. Former director Koji Miyata started a web site, called Olympus Grassroots, demanding clean-up at

6794-420: Was announced through a press statement without calling a news conference. The press release, which was full of praise for Woodford, mentioned his success in cutting costs and presented him as the "new global face of Olympus". According to Woodford, Kikukawa had reminded him privately upon appointing him president: "I am the one who has the authority to hire and fire, and to decide remuneration for board members and

6880-515: Was drawn by German colleagues to an article in Facta that alleged Olympus had made undisclosed payments for a series of acquisitions some of which were outside its "core" camera and endoscope business, most notably a sum of $ 687 million apparently paid to advisers as part of the Gyrus acquisition. The eventual cost of the Transaction to Olympus is extremely significant and is as a result of

6966-465: Was held responsible for ¥3.7 billion, having been the head of the accounting division at the time the losses were made in the 1990s, the others were held jointly responsible for around ¥4.7 billion for overlooking the illegal activities. The report cleared KPMG and Ernst & Young of any responsibility for the accounting fraud at the company and concluded that the scheme had been too well concealed. The report said: "The masterminds of this case were hiding

7052-484: Was necessary in the context, and that he was "committed to ensuring that Olympus has the best possible opportunity to succeed going forward, starting with a new and untainted board of directors." During a conference call with investors on 17 October (reported in a Morgan Stanley research note), Olympus Executive Vice-President Hisashi Mori said the company might sue Woodford for releasing internal information to news media. Olympus issued statements on 19 October defending

7138-510: Was subject of market rumours that it had suffered sizeable trading losses on derivatives which caused its shares to plunge by 11 per cent. The rumours were emphatically denied by Olympus, which subsequently announced record profits. The company further disclosed during its interim results in October 1999, that it had lost nearly ¥17 billion from interest rate and currency swaps. The company also reported that it had lost ¥2.9 billion in

7224-470: Was the best candidate to lead the clean-up. Other investors have demanded more disclosures from the company about the state of its affairs. Domestic investors, including Nippon Life Insurance (8.4 percent stake), demanded "prompt action". On 2 November, a shareholder from Nara Prefecture was reported to have asked the company's auditor to bring a case against former executives of Olympus to court to reimburse ¥140 billion ($ 1.79 billion) to

7310-405: Was the treasurer ... I wouldn't have heard financial details." Kishimoto, Olympus president from 1993 to 2001, in turn denied involvement in concealing losses, and instead suggested possible implication of Hideo Yamada, whom he said he supervised poorly. In 1991 Olympus had to take losses of ¥2.1 billion on the value of its investments after the investment bonanza ended. In June 1998, Olympus

7396-421: Was very, very significant fraud and that a number of parties had been complicit." However, the while the Japanese firm forced a ¥71 billion restatement of dubious valuation of certain acquired assets, the firm signed off on the financial statements in the same year that contained questionable figures other members of its global network in UK and elsewhere had apparently expressed grave reservations over. Although

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