Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors (or the "Higgs review") was a report chaired by Derek Higgs on corporate governance commissioned by the UK government, published on 20 January 2003. It reviewed the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors and of the audit committee, aiming at improving and strengthening the existing Combined Code .
201-804: The UK Corporate Governance code , formerly known as the Combined Code (from here on referred to as "the Code") is a part of UK company law with a set of principles of good corporate governance aimed at companies listed on the London Stock Exchange . It is overseen by the Financial Reporting Council and its importance derives from the Financial Conduct Authority 's Listing Rules . The Listing Rules themselves are given statutory authority under
402-429: A legal personality separate from those who invest their capital and labour to run the business. The general rules of contract, tort and unjust enrichment operate in the first place against the company as a distinct entity. This differs fundamentally from other forms of business association . A sole trader acquires rights and duties as normal under the general law of obligations. If people carry on business together with
603-536: A leveraged buyout , unless the company is delisted and or taken private. Finally, in order to protect investors from being placed at an unfair disadvantage, people inside a company are under a strict duty to not trade on any information that could affect a company's share price for their own benefit. Companies limited by shares also acquire finance through 'equity' (a synonym for the share capital). Shares differ from debt in that shareholders rank last in insolvency . The main justification for shareholders' residual claim
804-489: A " stake " in the company's success. The Companies Act 2006 , in conjunction with other statutes and case law, lays down an irreducible minimum core of mandatory rights for shareholders, employees, creditors and others by which all companies must abide. UK rules usually focus on protecting shareholders or the investing public, but above the minimum, company constitutions are essentially free to allocate rights and duties to different groups in any form desired. The constitution of
1005-426: A "colourable" taint, and the shares could be treated as being not properly paid for. The shareholder would have to pay again. This laissez faire approach was changed for public companies. Shares cannot be issued in return for services that will only be provided at a later date. Shares can be issued in return for assets, but a public company must pay for an independent valuation. There are also absolute limits to what
1206-564: A "right of property". Otherwise, the articles may be enforced by any member privy to the contract. Companies are excluded from the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 , so people who are conferred benefits under a constitution, but are not themselves members, are not necessarily able to sue for compliance. Partly for certainty and to achieve objectives the Act would prohibit, shareholders in small closely held companies frequently supplement
1407-525: A Code, was the original concern of the Cadbury Report , that companies faced with minimum standards in law would comply merely with the letter and not the spirit of the rules. The Financial Services Authority has recently proposed to abandon a requirement to state compliance with the principles (under LR 9.8.6(5)), rather than the rules in detail themselves. UK company law The United Kingdom company law regulates corporations formed under
1608-536: A Parliamentary Committee on Joint Stock Companies, which led to the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 . For the first time it was possible for ordinary people through a simple registration procedure to incorporate. The advantage of establishing a company as a separate legal person was mainly administrative, as a unified entity under which the rights and duties of all investors and managers could be channeled. The most important development came through
1809-428: A bank, companies will often be required by contract to give their creditors a security interest over the company's assets, so that in the event of insolvency, the creditor may take the secured asset. The Insolvency Act 1986 limits powerful creditors ability to sweep up all company assets as security, particularly through a floating charge , in favour of vulnerable creditors, such as employees or consumers. If money
2010-565: A bankrupt entity, has been changed in Chandler v Cape plc so that a duty of care may be owed by a parent to workers of a subsidiary regardless of separated legal personality. However even though tort victims are protected, the restrictive position remains subject to criticism where a company group is involved, since it is not clear that companies and actual people ought to get the protection of limited liability in identical ways. An influential decision, although subsequently doubted strongly by
2211-460: A claim to recover the money from any recipients. They are liable as constructive trustees , which probably mirrors the general principles of any action in unjust enrichment . This means that liability is probably strict, subject to a change of position defence, and the rules of tracing will apply if assets wrongfully paid out of the company have been passed on. For example, in It's A Wrap (UK) Ltd v Gula
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#17327718461892412-443: A company can persist forever , even as the natural people who invest in it and carry out its business change or pass away. Most companies adopt limited liability for their members, seen in the suffix of " Ltd " or " plc ". This means that if a company does go insolvent, unpaid creditors cannot (generally) seek contributions from the company's shareholders and employees, even if shareholders and employees profited handsomely before
2613-660: A company could launch its business with 1000 shares (for public companies, called an "IPO" or initial public offering ) each with a nominal value of 1 penny, and an issue price of £1. Shareholders would buy the £1 shares, and if all are sold, £1000 would become the company's " legal capital ". Profits are whatever the company makes on top of that £1000, though as a company continues to trade, the market price of shares could well be going up to £2 or £10, or indeed fall to 50 pence or some other number. The Companies Act 2006 states in section 830 that dividends , or any other kind of distribution, can only be given out from surplus profits beyond
2814-493: A company does not have enough assets to pay its debts as they fall due, it will be insolvent - bankrupt. Unless an administrator (someone like an auditing firm partner, usually appointed by creditors on a company's insolvency) is able to rescue the business, shareholders will lose their money, employees will lose their jobs and a liquidator will be appointed to sell off any remaining assets to distribute as much as possible to unpaid creditors. Yet if business remains successful,
3015-486: A company group at half its market value. A general principle, however, recently expounded in Progress Property Co Ltd v Moorgarth Group Ltd is that if a transaction is negotiated in good faith and at arm's length, then it may not be unwound, and this is apparently so even if it means that creditors have been "ripped off". If distributions are made without meeting the law's criteria, then a company has
3216-488: A company if three criteria were fulfilled: that the company was a small "quasi-partnership" founded on mutual confidence of the corporators, that shareholders participate in the business, and there are restrictions in the constitution on free transfer of shares. Given these features, it may be just and equitable to wind up a company if the court sees an agreement just short of a contract, or some other "equitable consideration", that one party has not fulfilled. So where Mr Ebrahmi,
3417-413: A company is unable to pay its debts as they fall due, UK insolvency law requires an administrator to attempt a rescue of the company (if the company itself has the assets to pay for this). If rescue proves impossible, a company's life ends when its assets are liquidated, distributed to creditors and the company is struck off the register. If a company becomes insolvent with no assets it can be wound up by
3618-406: A company is usually referred to as the " articles of association ". Companies are presumed to adopt a set of " Model Articles ", unless the incorporators choose different rules. The Model Articles set out essential procedures for conducting a company's business, such as when to hold meetings, appointment of directors, or preparing accounts. These rules may always be changed, except where a provision
3819-633: A company may choose to be "limited by shares", meaning capital investors' liability is limited to the amount they subscribe for in share capital. A third choice is whether a company limited by shares will be public or private. Both kinds of companies must display (partly as a warning) the endings "plc" or "Ltd" following the company name. Most new businesses will opt for a private company limited by shares , while unlimited companies and companies limited by guarantee are typically chosen by either charities, risky ventures or mutual funds wanting to signal they will not leave debts unpaid. Charitable ventures also have
4020-454: A company member through agreement with others involved in a new or existing company. However, because of the bargaining position that people have through capital investment, shareholders typically are the only members, and usually have a monopoly on governance rights under a constitution. In this way, the UK is a "pro-shareholder" jurisdiction relative to its European and American counterparts. Since
4221-462: A company to buy a carpark next to one of the company's properties. The family company, amidst the feud, had in fact resolved to buy no further investment properties, but even so, because the director failed to fully disclose the opportunity that could reasonably be considered as falling within the company's line of business, the Court of Appeal held he was liable to make restitution for all profits made on
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#17327718461894422-524: A company will sign a memorandum of association stating what shares they will initially take, and pledge their compliance with the Companies Act 2006 . A standard company constitution, known as the Model Articles , is deemed to apply, or the corporators may register their own individualised articles of association . Directors must be appointed - one in a private company and at least two in
4623-413: A company with another party in which directors have an interest. Under section 177, when directors are on both sides of a proposed contract, for example where a person owns a business selling iron chairs to the company in which he is a director, it is a default requirement that they disclose the interest to the board, so that disinterested directors may approve the deal. The company's articles could heighten
4824-410: A company's accountability to a broader public and the conscientiousness of its behaviour must rely also, in great measure, on its governance. If a company goes insolvent, there are certain situations where the courts lift the veil of incorporation on a limited company, and make shareholders or directors contribute to paying off outstanding debts to creditors. However, in UK law the range of circumstances
5025-456: A company's case, the bank is likely to be only one among a large number of creditors, such as employees , consumers , taxpayers , or small businesses who rely on the company's trade. Only the bank will have priority for its loan, and so the risk falls wholly on other stakeholders. Financial assistance for share purchase, especially indemnifying a takeover bidder's loan, was therefore seen as encouraging risky ventures that were prone to failure, to
5226-439: A company's fortunes declined or would bear primary responsibility for the losses under ordinary civil law principles. The liability of a company itself is unlimited (companies have to pay all they owe with the assets they have), but the liability of those who invest their capital in a company is (generally) limited to their shares, and those who invest their labour can only lose their jobs. However, limited liability acts merely as
5427-661: A company, and the rights which attach are a question of construction. For instance, in Scottish Insurance Corp Ltd v Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd the House of Lords held that when the Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946 was passed, preferential shareholders were entitled to no extra, special share of assets upon winding up: construction of the terms of the shares entitled them to extra dividends, but without special words to
5628-568: A constitution by the required majority so long as it is " bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole." This constraint is not heavy, as it can mean that a constitutional amendment, while applying in a formally equal way to all shareholders, has a negative and disparate impact on only one shareholder. This was so in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd , where the articles were changed to remove all shareholders' pre-emption rights, but only one shareholder (the claimant, Mr Greenhalgh, who lost)
5829-577: A corporator relies, which would be inequitable to go back on, would suffice, unlike the facts of the leading case, O'Neill v Phillips . Here Mr O'Neill had been a prodigy in Mr Phillips' asbestos stripping business, and took on a greater and greater role until economic difficulties struck. Mr O'Neill was then demoted, but claimed that he should be given 50 per cent of the company's shares because negotiations had started for this to happen and Mr Phillips had said one day it might. Lord Hoffmann held that
6030-481: A creditor, for a fee (not that common), or more commonly by the tax creditor (HMRC). Company law in its modern shape dates from the mid-19th century, however an array of business associations developed long before. In medieval times traders would do business through common law constructs, such as partnerships . Whenever people acted together with a view to profit , the law deemed that a partnership arose. Early guilds and livery companies were also often involved in
6231-402: A decision. In public companies, a special resolution must also be passed, and a court order is necessary. The court can make a number of orders, for example that creditors should be protected with security interest . There is a general principle that shareholders must be treated equally in making capital reductions, however this does not mean that unequally situated shareholders must be treated
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6432-402: A default position. It can be "contracted around", provided creditors have the opportunity and the bargaining power to do so. A bank, for instance, may not lend to a small company unless the company's director gives his own house as security for the loan (e.g., by mortgage ). Just as it is possible for two contracting parties to stipulate in an agreement that one's liability will be limited in
6633-410: A form and of a quality appropriate to enable it to discharge its duties. The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors. All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals, subject to continued satisfactory performance. The board should present a balanced and understandable assessment of
6834-452: A formal and transparent procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of individual directors. No director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration. There should be a dialogue with shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives. The board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders takes place. The board should use
7035-404: A formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of new directors to the board. All directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge their responsibilities All directors should receive induction on joining the board and should regularly update and refresh their skills and knowledge. The board should be supplied in a timely manner with information in
7236-546: A limited company is deemed to be a legal person separate from its shareholders and employees, as a matter of fact, a company can only act through its employees, from the board of directors down. So there must be rules to attribute rights and duties to a company from its actors. This usually matters because an aggrieved third party will want to sue whoever has money to pay for breach of an obligation, and companies rather than their employees often have more money. Up until reforms in 2006 this area used to be complicated significantly by
7437-405: A limited company. " Unlimited " will mean the incorporators will be liable for all losses and debts under the general principles of private law. The option of a limited company leads to a second choice. A company can be " limited by guarantee ", meaning that if the company owes more debts than it can pay, the guarantors' liability will be limited to the extent of the money they elect to guarantee. Or
7638-401: A minority shareholder, had been removed from the board, and the other two directors paid all company profits out as director salaries, rather than dividends to exclude him, the House of Lords regarded it as equitable to liquidate the company and distribute his share of the sale proceeds to Mr Ebrahimi. The drastic remedy of liquidation was mitigated significantly as the unfair prejudice action
7839-577: A new version of the UK Corporate Governance Code, hence separating the issues from one another. Every company should be headed by an effective board which is collectively responsible for the long-term success of the company. There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. The chairman
8040-426: A principles-based approach in the sense that it provides general guidelines of best practice. This contrasts with a rules-based approach which rigidly defines exact provisions that must be adhered to. In 2017, it was announced that the Financial Reporting Council would amend the Code to require companies to "comply or explain" with a requirement to have elected employee representatives on company boards. In July 2018,
8241-507: A public company - and a public company must have a secretary, but there needs to be no more than a single member. The company will be refused registration if it is set up for an unlawful purpose, and a name must be chosen that is not inappropriate or already in use. This information is filled out in a form available on the Companies House website. In 2018, a £12 fee was paid for online registration when Model Articles are adopted, or
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8442-533: A railway line construction contract in their own names, rather than that of their company, to exclude a fourth director from the business. Even though the directors used their votes as shareholders to "ratify" their actions, the Privy Council advised that the conflict of interest precluded their ability to forgive themselves. Similarly, in Bhullar v Bhullar , a director on one side of a feuding family set up
8643-451: A reasonable person, creating an estoppel . If the actions of a company employee have authority deriving from a company constitution in none of these ways, a third party will only have recourse for breach of an obligation (a warrant of authority) against the individual agent, and not to the company as the principal. The Companies Act 2006 section 40 makes clear that directors are always deemed to be free of limitations on their authority under
8844-461: A remuneration committee of directors. Under section 439, shareholders may cast a vote on remuneration but this " say on pay ", as yet, is not binding. Finally, under section 172 directors must "promote the success of the company". This somewhat nebulous provision created significant debate during its passage through Parliament, since it goes on to prescribe that decisions should be taken in the interests of members, with regard to long term consequences,
9045-444: A series of procedures with the registrar at Companies House . Before registration, anybody promoting the company to attract investment falls under strict fiduciary duties to disclose all material facts about the venture and its finances. Moreover, anybody purporting to contract in a company's name before its registration will generally be personally liable on those obligations. In the registration process, those who invest money in
9246-413: A share can be bought for in cash, based on a share's "nominal value" or "par value". This refers to a figure chosen by a company when it begins to sell shares, and it can be anything from 1 penny up to the market price. UK law always required that some nominal value be set, because it was thought that a lower limit of some kind should be in place for how much shares could be sold, even though this very figure
9447-440: A shareholder sued the board for not following a resolution, carried with an ordinary majority of votes, to sell off the company's assets. The Court of Appeal refused the claim, since the articles stipulated that a three quarter majority was needed to issue specific instructions to the board. Shareholders always have the option of gaining the votes to change the constitution or threaten directors with removal, but they may not sidestep
9648-554: A shareholder who disagreed with an action outside the company's objects must sue directors for any loss. Contracts remain valid and third parties will be unaffected by this alone. Contracts between companies and third parties, however, may turn out to be unenforceable on ordinary principles of agency law if the director or employee obviously exceeded their authority. As a general rule, third parties need not be concerned with constitutional details conferring power among directors or employees, which may only be found by laboriously searching
9849-422: A small percentage of capital in the company, and these investments entail heavy risks for workers, given the lack of diversification . Directors appointed to the board form the central authority in UK companies. In carrying out their functions, directors (whether formally appointed, de facto , or " shadow directors " ) owe a series of duties to the company. There are presently seven key duties codified under
10050-416: A variety of different accounting methods can be used which can lead to different assessments of when a profit exists. The prohibition on falling below the legal capital applies to "distributions" in any form, and so "disguised" distributions are also caught. This has been held to include, for example, an unwarranted salary payment to a director's wife when she had not worked, and a transfer of a property within
10251-601: A view to profit, they are deemed to have formed a partnership under the Partnership Act 1890 section 1. Like a sole trader, partners will be liable on any contract or tort obligation jointly and severally in shares equal to their monetary contribution, or according to their culpability. Law , accountancy and actuarial firms are commonly organised as partnerships. Since the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 , partners can limit
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#173277184618910452-470: A way that is unfair. "Unfairness" is now given a minimum meaning identical to that in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd . A court must at least have an "equitable consideration" to grant a remedy. Generally this will refer to an agreement between two or more corporators in a small business that is just short of being an enforceable contract, for the lack of legal consideration . A clear assurance, on which
10653-518: A £40 for postal registration using the "IN01" form. The registrar then issues a certificate of incorporation and a new legal personality enters the stage. English law recognised long ago that a corporation would have "legal personality". Legal personality simply means the entity is the subject of legal rights and duties. It can sue and be sued. Historically, municipal councils (such as the Corporation of London ) or charitable establishments would be
10854-405: Is a compulsory term deriving from the Companies Act 2006 , or similar mandatory law . In this sense a company constitution is functionally similar to any business contract, albeit one that is usually variable among the contracting parties with less than consensus. In Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd , Lord Hoffmann held that courts construe the meaning of a company's articles in
11055-588: Is a dividend "disguised" as something else, directors will be liable for repayment. Companies may, however, reduce their capital to a lower figure if directors of private companies warrant solvency, or courts approve a public company's reduction. Because a company buying back shares from shareholders in itself, or taking back redeemable shares, has the same effect as a reduction of capital, similar transparency and procedural requirements need to be fulfilled. Public companies are also precluded from giving financial assistance for purchase of their shares, for example through
11256-435: Is between an aversion to "one size fits all" solutions, which may not be right for everyone, and practices which are in general agreement to be tried, tested and successful. If companies find that non-compliance works for them, and shareholders agree, they will not be punished by an exodus of investors. So the chief method for accountability is meant to be through the market , rather than through law . An additional reason for
11457-462: Is done out of distributable profits. Crucially, the directors must also state that the company will be able to pay all its debts and continue for the next year, and shareholders must approve this by special resolution. Under the Listing Rules for public companies, shareholders must generally be given the same buy back offer, and get shares bought back pro rata. How many shares are retained by
11658-443: Is found in section 174. Directors must display the care, skill and competence that is reasonable for somebody carrying out the functions of the office, and if a director has any special qualifications an even higher standard will be expected. However, under section 1157 courts may, if directors are negligent but found to be honest and ought to be excused, relieve directors from paying compensation. The "objective plus subjective" standard
11859-551: Is found in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 . This creates a criminal offence for manslaughter , meaning a penal fine of up to 10 per cent of turnover against companies whose managers conduct business in a grossly negligent fashion, resulting in deaths. Without lifting the veil there remains, however, no personal liability for directors or employees acting in the course of employment, for corporate manslaughter or otherwise. The quality of
12060-540: Is just unlikely, and strongly discouraged by the regulatory framework. Shares are also presumed to be transferable to other people, although like other rights, the right to trade is subject to the company's constitution. Higgs review There was widespread unrest after the scandals in the US, involving Enron , WorldCom , and Tyco . The US opted for legislation under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act . Higgs strongly backed
12261-575: Is limited. This is usually said to derive from the "principle" in Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd . In this leading case, a Whitechapel cobbler incorporated his business under the Companies Act 1862 . At that time, seven people were required to register a company, possibly because the legislature had viewed the appropriate business vehicle for fewer people to be a partnership . Mr Salomon met this requirement by getting six family members to subscribe for one share each. Then, in return for money he lent
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#173277184618912462-574: Is manifested firstly in section 175 which specifies that directors may not use business opportunities that the company could without approval. Shareholders may pass a resolution ratifying a breach of duty, but under section 239 they must be uninterested in the transaction. This absolute, strict duty has been consistently reaffirmed since the economic crisis following the South Sea Bubble in 1719. For example, in Cook v Deeks , three directors took
12663-521: Is no equitable bar to rescission . The third party would have a claim against the (probably less solvent) employee instead. First, an agent may have express actual authority, in which case there is no problem. Her actions will be attributed to the company. Second, an agent may have implied actual authority (also sometimes called "usual" authority), which falls within the usual scope of the employee's office. Third, an agent may have " apparent authority " (also called "ostensible" authority) as it would appear to
12864-504: Is not amended, the rules remain in place for public companies. The second measures, which originally came from the common law but also went into the Second Company Law Directive , were to regulate what was paid for shares. Initial subscribers to a memorandum for public companies must buy their shares with cash, though afterwards it is possible to give a company services or assets in return for shares. The problem
13065-403: Is not subject to imbecilities, or death of the natural, body , and divers other cases. Without a body to be kicked or a soul to be damned, a corporation does not itself suffer penalties administered by courts, but those who stand to lose their investments will. A company will, as a separate person, be the first liable entity for any obligations its directors and employees create on its behalf. If
13266-423: Is only a duty for a director to do what she or "he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company". Proof of subjective bad faith toward any group being difficult, directors have the discretion to balance all competing interests, even if to the short term detriment of shareholders in a particular instance. There is also a duty under section 173 to exercise independent judgment and
13467-472: Is plain that minority shareholders can also bring claims for more serious breaches of obligation, such as breach of directors' duties . Unfair prejudice petitions remain most prevalent in small companies, and are the most numerous form of dispute to enter company courts. But if to hold directors accountable dispersed shareholders do not engage through voting, or through litigation, companies may be ripe for takeover. While corporate governance primarily concerns
13668-499: Is raised by offering shares, the shareholders' relations are determined as a group by the provisions under the constitution. The law requires disclosure of all material facts in promotions, and prospectuses. Company constitutions typically require that existing shareholders have a pre-emption right , to buy newly issued shares before outside shareholders and thus avoid their stake and control becoming diluted . Actual rights, however, are determined by ordinary principles of construction of
13869-474: Is requisite for specific transactions with directors, or connected persons, when the sum of money either exceeds 10% of the company and is over £5000, or is over £100,000 in a company of any size. Further detailed provisions govern loaning money. On the question of director remuneration where the conflict of interest appears most serious, however, regulation is again relatively light. Directors pay themselves by default, but in large listed companies have pay set by
14070-488: Is responsible for leadership of the board and ensuring its effectiveness on all aspects of its role. As part of their role as members of a unitary board, non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop proposals on strategy. The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence and knowledge of the company to enable them to discharge their respective duties and responsibilities effectively. There should be
14271-589: Is that, unlike many creditors (though not large banks) they are capable of diversifying their portfolio . Taxation of profits on shares can also be treated differently with a different tax rate (under the Income Tax Act 2007 ) to capital gains tax on debt (which falls under the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 ). This makes the distinction between shares and debt important. In principle, all forms of debt and equity arise from contractual arrangements with
14472-476: Is the securities market, typified by the London Stock Exchange . Through the Takeover Code the UK strongly protects the right of shareholders to be treated equally and freely trade their shares. Corporate finance concerns the two money raising options for limited companies. Equity finance involves the traditional method of issuing shares to build up a company's capital . Shares can contain any rights
14673-402: Is to claim a "personal right" under the constitution or the general law is breached. If a shareholder brings a personal action to vindicate a personal right (such as the right to not be misled by company circulars ) the principle against double recovery dictates that one cannot sue for damages if the loss an individual shareholder suffers is merely the same as will be reflected in the reduction of
14874-471: Is to follow the company's constitution, but also only exercise powers for implied "proper purposes". Prior proper purpose cases often involved directors plundering the company's assets for personal enrichment, or attempting to install mechanisms to frustrate attempted takeovers by outside bidders, such as a poison pill . Such practices are improper, because they go beyond the reason for which directors were delegated their power. The all-important duty of care
15075-602: Is to make directors more accountable, at least, to investors of capital. While it has not been the norm, employee participation rights in corporate governance have existed in many specific sectors, particularly universities , and many workplaces organised as partnerships . Since the turn of the 20th century Acts such as the Port of London Act 1908 , Iron and Steel Act 1967 , or the Post Office Act 1977 , all workers in those specific companies had votes to elect directors on
15276-435: Is useless and best abolished. The third, and practically most important strategy for creditor protection, was to require that dividends and other returns to shareholders could only be made, generally speaking, if a company had profits. The concept of " profit " is defined by law as having assets above the amount that shareholders, who initially bought shares from the company, contributed in return for their shares. For example,
15477-668: The Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment , chaired in 1945 by Lord Cohen , led to the Companies Act 1947 , as members and voters in the general meeting of public companies, shareholders have the mandatory right to remove directors by a simple majority, while in Germany, and in most American companies (predominantly incorporated in Delaware ) directors can only be removed for a "good reason". Shareholders will habitually have
15678-484: The Companies Act 2006 section 168 defines "members" as those with the ability to vote out the board. Under section 112 a "member" is anybody who initially subscribes their name to the company memorandum, or is later entered on the members' register, and is not required to have contributed money as opposed to, for instance, work. A company could write its constitution to make "employees" members with voting rights under any terms it chose. In addition to national rules, under
15879-495: The Companies Act 2006 sections 171 to 177, which reflect the common law and equitable principles. These may not be limited, waived or contracted out of, but companies may buy insurance to cover directors for costs in the event of breach. The remedies for breaches of duty were not codified, but follow common law and equity, and include compensation for losses, restitution of illegitimate gains and specific performance or injunctions . The first director's duty under section 171
16080-409: The Companies Act 2006 sections 261–264. Section 260 stipulates that such actions are concerned with suing directors for breach of a duty owed to the company. Under section 261 a shareholder must, first, show the court there is a good prima facie case to be made. This preliminary legal question is followed by the substantive questions in section 263. The court must refuse permission for the claim if
16281-654: The Companies Act 2006 . Also governed by the Insolvency Act 1986 , the UK Corporate Governance Code , European Union Directives and court cases, the company is the primary legal vehicle to organise and run business. Tracing their modern history to the late Industrial Revolution , public companies now employ more people and generate more of wealth in the United Kingdom economy than any other form of organisation. The United Kingdom
16482-499: The Environment Agency , companies may still have a collective incentive to ignore the rules in the knowledge that the costs and likelihood of enforcement is weaker than potential profits. Criminal sanctions remain problematic, for instance if a company director had no intention to harm anyone, no mens rea , and managers in the corporate hierarchy had systems to prevent employees committing offences. One step toward reform
16683-659: The European Company Statute , businesses that reincorporate as a Societas Europaea may opt to follow the Directive for employee involvement. An SE may have a two-tiered board, as in German companies , where shareholders and employees elect a supervisory board that in turn appoints a management board responsible for day-to-day running of the company. Or an SE can have a one tiered board, as every UK company, and employees and shareholders may elect board members in
16884-612: The European Court of Justice held that a Danish minimum capital rule for private companies was a disproportionate infringement of the right of establishment for businesses in the EU. A UK private limited company was refused registration by the Danish authorities, but it was held that the refusal was unlawful because the minimum capital rules did not proportionately achieve the aim of protecting creditors. Less restrictive means could achieve
17085-475: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and require that public listed companies disclose how they have complied with the code, and explain where they have not applied the code – in what the code refers to as 'comply or explain'. Private companies are also encouraged to conform; however there is no requirement for disclosure of compliance in private company accounts. The Code adopts
17286-595: The First World War was being fought). There are also case based exceptions to the Salomon principle, though their restrictive scope is not wholly stable. The present rule under English law is that only where a company was set up to commission fraud, or to avoid a pre-existing obligation can its separate identity be ignored. This follows from a Court of Appeal case, Adams v Cape Industries plc . A group of employees suffered asbestos diseases after working for
17487-722: The Industrial Revolution had gathered pace, pressing for legal change to facilitate business activity. Restrictions were gradually lifted on ordinary people incorporating, though businesses such as those chronicled by Charles Dickens in Martin Chuzzlewit under primitive companies legislation were often scams. Without cohesive regulation, undercapitalised ventures like the proverbial "Anglo-Bengalee Disinterested Loan and Life Assurance Company" promised no hope of success, except for richly remunerated promoters. Then in 1843, William Gladstone took chairmanship of
17688-556: The Insolvency Act 1986 and the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 against directors who negligently ran companies at a loss. Through the 1990s the focus in corporate governance turned toward internal control mechanisms, such as auditing, separation of the chief executive position from the chair, and remuneration committees as an attempt to place some check on excessive executive pay . These rules applicable to listed companies, now found in
17889-508: The Limited Liability Act 1855 , which allowed investors to limit their liability in the event of business failure to the amount they invested in the company. These two features - a simple registration procedure and limited liability - were subsequently codified in the world's first modern company law, the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856 . A series of Companies Acts up to the present Companies Act 2006 have essentially retained
18090-446: The London Stock Exchange or a similar securities market. Businesses may also elect to incorporate under the European Company Statute as a Societas Europaea . An "SE" will be treated in every European Union member state as if it were a public company formed in accordance with the law of that state, and may opt in or out of employee involvement . Once the decision has been made about the type of company, formation occurs through
18291-471: The UK Corporate Governance Code , have been complemented by principles based regulation of institutional investors ' activity in company affairs. At the same time, the UK's integration in the European Union meant a steadily growing body of EU Company Law Directives and case law to harmonise company law within the internal market. Companies occupy a special place in private law, because they have
18492-519: The UK Corporate Governance Code . This makes recommendations about the structure, accountability and remuneration of the board of directors in listed companies, and was developed after the Polly Peck , BCCI and Robert Maxwell scandals led to the Cadbury Report of 1992. However, put broadly corporate governance in UK law focuses on the relative rights and duties of directors, shareholders , employees , creditors and others who are seen as having
18693-572: The board of directors should have an equal number of representatives elected by employees as there were for shareholders. But reform stalled, and was abandoned after the 1979 election . Despite successful businesses like the John Lewis Partnership and Waitrose that are wholly managed and owned by the workforce, voluntary granting of participation is rare. Many businesses run employee share schemes , particularly for highly paid employees; however, such shares seldom compose more than
18894-489: The regulation of competition between traders. As England sought to build a mercantile Empire , the government created corporations under a Royal Charter or an Act of Parliament with the grant of a monopoly over a specified territory. The best-known example, established in 1600, was the British East India Company . Queen Elizabeth I granted it the exclusive right to trade with all countries to
19095-707: The AGM to communicate with investors and to encourage their participation. This goes into more detail about the problem of director pay. This sets out a checklist of which duties must be complied with (or explained) under Listing Rule 9.8.6. It makes clear what obligations there are, and that everything should be posted on the company's website. In its 2007 response to a Financial Reporting Council consultation paper in July 2007 Pensions & Investment Research Consultants Ltd (a commercial proxy advisory service) reported that only 33% of listed companies were fully compliant with all of
19296-574: The American wholly owned subsidiary of Cape Industries plc . They were suing in New York to make Cape Industries plc pay for the debts of the subsidiary. Under conflict of laws principles, this could only be done if Cape Industries plc was treated as "present" in America through its US subsidiary (i.e. ignoring the separate legal personality of the two companies). Rejecting the claim, and following
19497-620: The Codes provisions. Spread over all the rules, this is not necessarily a poor response, and indications are that compliance has been climbing. PIRC maintains that poor compliance correlates to poor business performance, and at any rate a key provision such as separating the CEO from the Chair had an 88.4% compliance rate. The question thrown up by the Code's approach is the tension between wanting to maintain "flexibility" and achieve consistency. The tension
19698-500: The Companies Acts have sought to regulate the company's use of its capital in at least four ways. "Capital" refers to the economic value of a company's assets, such as money, buildings, or equipment. First, and most controversially, the Companies Act 2006 section 761, following the EU's Second Company Law Directive , requires that when a public company begins to trade, it has a minimum of £50,000 promised to be paid up by
19899-456: The Exchequer. The fourth main area of regulation, which is usually thought of as preserving a company's capital, is prohibition of companies providing other people with financial assistance for purchasing the company's own shares. The main problem which the regulation was intended to prevent was leveraged buyouts where, for example, an investor gets a loan from a bank, secures the loan on
20100-500: The Financial Reporting Council released the new 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code, which is designed to build on the relationships between companies, shareholders and stakeholders and make them key to long-term sustainable growth of the UK economy. The Code is essentially a consolidation and refinement of a number of different reports and codes concerning opinions on good corporate governance. The first step on
20301-454: The House of Lords, was passed by Lord Denning MR in DHN Ltd v Tower Hamlets BC . Here Lord Denning MR held that a group of companies, two subsidiaries wholly owned by a parent, constituted a single economic unit. Because the companies' shareholders and controlling minds were identical, their rights were to be treated as the same. This allowed the parent company to claim compensation from
20502-515: The London directors ignored a warning report about the currency exchange business in Singapore, where a rogue trader caused losses so massive that it brought the whole bank into insolvency. The central equitable principle applicable to directors is to avoid any possibility of a conflict of interest , without disclosure to the board or seeking approval from shareholders. This core duty of loyalty
20703-651: The Spanish South American colonies, but met with less success. The South Sea Company's monopoly rights were supposedly backed by the Treaty of Utrecht , signed in 1713 as a settlement following the War of Spanish Succession , which gave the United Kingdom an assiento to trade, and to sell slaves in the region for thirty years. In fact the Spanish remained hostile and let only one ship a year enter. Unaware of
20904-429: The alleged breach has already been validly authorised or ratified by disinterested shareholders, or if it appears that allowing litigation would undermine the company's success by the criteria laid out in section 172. If none of these "negative" criteria are fulfilled, the court then weighs up seven "positive" criteria. Again it asks whether, under the guidelines in section 172, allowing the action to continue would promote
21105-483: The amount they are liable for to their monetary investment in the business, if the partnership owes more money than the enterprise has. Outside these professions, however, the most common method for businesses to limit their liability is by forming a company. A variety of companies may be incorporated under the Companies Act 2006 . The people interested in starting the enterprise - the prospective directors, employees and shareholders - may choose, firstly, an unlimited or
21306-456: The annual Director's Report companies must explain how they have complied with their duties to stakeholders. Also, the idea of whether a company's success will be promoted is central when a court determines whether a derivative claim should proceed in the course of corporate litigation. Litigation among those within a company has historically been very restricted in UK law. The attitude of courts favoured non-interference. As Lord Eldon said in
21507-412: The articles. Even if companies' articles are silent on an issue, the courts will construe the gaps to be filled with provisions consistent with the rest of the instrument in its context, as in the old case of Attorney General v Davy where Lord Hardwicke LC held that a simple majority was enough for the election of a chaplain. Typically, a company's articles will vest a general power of management in
21708-422: The bank's Canary Wharf skyscraper. Problems arise where serious torts, and particularly fatal injuries occur as a result of actions by company employees. All torts committed by employees in the course of employment will attribute liability to their company even if acting wholly outside authority, so long as there is some temporal and close connection to work. It is also clear that acts by directors become acts of
21909-424: The board of directors, with full power of directors to delegate tasks to other employees, subject to an instruction right reserved for the general meeting acting with a three quarter majority. This basic pattern can theoretically be varied in any number of ways, and so long as it does not contravene the Act, courts will enforce that balance of power. In Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame ,
22110-477: The board, meaning the UK had some of the first " codetermination " laws in the world. However, as many of those Acts were updated, the Companies Act 2006 today still has no general requirement for workers to vote in the general meeting to elect directors, meaning corporate governance remains monopolised by shareholding institutions or asset managers . By contrast in 16 out of 28 EU member states employees have participation rights in private companies, including
22311-405: The board. In turn, directors owe a set of duties to their companies. Directors must carry out their responsibilities with competence, in good faith and undivided loyalty to the enterprise. If the mechanisms of voting do not prove enough, particularly for minority shareholders, directors' duties and other member rights may be vindicated in court. Of central importance in public and listed companies
22512-628: The bubble had "burst", and the share price sank from £1000 to under £100. As bankruptcies and recriminations ricocheted through government and high society, the mood against corporations, and errant directors, was bitter. Even in 1776, Adam Smith wrote in the Wealth of Nations that mass corporate activity could not match private entrepreneurship, because people in charge of "other people's money" would not exercise as much care as they would with their own. The Bubble Act 1720 's prohibition on establishing companies remained in force until 1825. By this point
22713-459: The company and purchaser wish to contract for, but generally grant the right to participate in dividends after a company earns profits and the right to vote in company affairs. A purchaser of shares is helped to make an informed decision directly by prospectus requirements of full disclosure , and indirectly through restrictions on financial assistance by companies for purchase of their own shares. Debt finance means getting loans, usually for
22914-476: The company as treasury shares or cancelled must be reported to Companies House. From the company's perspective the legal capital is being reduced, hence the same regulation applies. From the shareholder's perspective, the company buying back some of its shares is much the same as simply paying a dividend, except for one main difference. Taxation of dividends and share buy backs tends to be different, meaning that often buy backs are popular just because they " dodge "
23115-441: The company constitution. A host of rules exist to ensure that the company's capital (i.e. the amount that shareholders paid in when they bought their shares) is maintained for the benefit of creditors. Money is typically distributed to shareholders through dividends as the reward for investment. These should only come out of profits , or surpluses beyond the capital account. If companies pay out money to shareholders which in effect
23316-417: The company from a plc to an Ltd). The result has been a growing number of leveraged buyouts , and an increase in the private equity industry of the UK. Corporate governance is concerned primarily with the balance of power between the two basic organs of a UK company: the board of directors and the general meeting . The term "governance" is often used in the more narrow sense of referring to principles in
23517-438: The company it is about to buy, and uses the money to buy the shares. It was seen as a capital problem in the sense that if the venture proved unsustainable, all the company's assets would be seized under the mortgage terms, even though technically it did not reduce a company's capital. A leveraged buy out, in effect, is the same as a bank giving someone a loan to buy a house with a 100 per cent mortgage on that house. However, in
23718-528: The company law as it exists today, and that is another reason why amendment is required…" Sir Stafford Cripps , President of the Board of Trade introducing the Companies Act 1947 . In the Companies Act 2006 there is no duty to maximise profits for shareholders, and shareholders have few rights, because the word "shareholder" (those who usually invest capital in a company) is rarely used. Instead, "members" have rights in UK company law. Anybody can become
23919-426: The company not be treated as a separate entity. Under the Insolvency Act 1986 , section 214 stipulates that company directors must contribute to payment of company debts in winding up if they kept the business running up more debt when they ought to have known there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvency. A number of other cases demonstrate that in construing the meaning of a statute unrelated to company law,
24120-408: The company will remain solvent and will be able to pay its debts. If this turns out to be a negligent statement, the director can be sued. But this means it is hard to claw back any profits from shareholders if a company does indeed go insolvent, if the director's statement appeared good at the time. If not all the directors are prepared to make a solvency statement, the company may apply to court for
24321-406: The company's auditor. Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors’ remuneration should be structured so as to link rewards to corporate and individual performance. There should be
24522-438: The company's objects include anything directors feel is reasonably incidental to the business. Now the 2006 Act states that companies are deemed to have unlimited objects, unless they opt for restrictions. The 2006 reforms have also clarified the legal position that if a company does have limited objects, an ultra vires act will cause the directors to have breached a duty to follow the constitution under section 171. Therefore,
24723-498: The company's position and prospects. The board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk management and internal control systems. The board should establish formal and transparent arrangements for considering how they should apply the corporate reporting and risk management and internal control principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with
24924-442: The company's real business. The board of directors invariably holds the right to sue in the company's name as a general power of management. So if wrongs were alleged to have been done to the company, the principle from the case of Foss v Harbottle , was that the company itself was the proper claimant, and it followed that as a general rule that only the board could bring claims in court. A majority of shareholders would also have
25125-456: The company's success. It also asks whether the claimant is acting in good faith, whether the claimant could start an action in her own name, whether authorisation or ratification has happened or is likely to, and pays particular regard to the views of the independent and disinterested shareholders. This represented a shift from, and a replacement of, the complex pre-2006 position, by giving courts more discretion to allow meritorious claims. Still,
25326-464: The company, any expenditure on political donations, share buybacks, or a (for the time being) non-binding say on pay of directors, are reserved exclusively for the shareholder body. While shareholders have a privileged position in UK corporate governance, most are themselves, institutions - mainly asset managers - holding "other people's money" from pension funds, life insurance policies and mutual funds. Shareholding institutions, who are entered on
25527-473: The company, as they are "the very ego and centre of the personality of the corporation." But despite strict liability in tort, civil remedies are in some instances insufficient to provide a deterrent to a company pursuing business practices that could seriously injure the life, health and environment of other people. Even with additional regulation by government bodies, such as the Health and Safety Executive or
25728-428: The company, he made the company issue a debenture , which would secure his debt in priority to other creditors in the event of insolvency. The company did go insolvent, and the company liquidator, acting on behalf of unpaid creditors attempted to sue Mr Salomon personally. Although the Court of Appeal held that Mr Salomon had defeated Parliament's purpose in registering dummy shareholders, and would have made him indemnify
25929-399: The company, the House of Lords held that so long as the simple formal requirements of registration were followed, the shareholders' assets must be treated as separate from the separate legal person that is a company. There could not, in general, be any lifting of the veil. This principle is open to a series of qualifications. Most significantly, statute may require directly or indirectly that
26130-454: The complexity and narrowness in the exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle . This was witnessed by the fact that successful cases on directors' duties before the Companies Act 2006 seldom involved minority shareholders, rather than a new board, or a liquidator in the shoes of an insolvent company, suing former directors. The new requirements to bring a " derivative claim " are now codified in
26331-447: The constitution by entering a shareholders' agreement . By contract shareholders can regulate any of their rights outside the company, yet their rights within the company remain a separate matter. "...the relationship between management and ownership in limited liability companies has tended progressively to be more and more shadowy. Even before the war, apprehension was expressed on this point, and remedies were then suggested, and, with
26532-401: The constitution, unless a third party acting in callous bad faith takes advantage of a company whose director acts outside the scope of authority. For employees down the chain of delegation, it becomes less and less likely that a reasonable contracting party would think big transactions will have had authority. For instance, it would be unlikely that a bank cashier would have the authority to sell
26733-456: The contrary, shareholders were presumed equal otherwise. For anyone to become a member of a company under the Companies Act 2006 section 33, the contract for shares must simply manifest the intention to do so. However, beyond this, the dividing line between shares and debt is more a matter of standard practice than law. It is legally possible to become a member of the company without being a shareholder, simply by being accepted and registered on
26934-458: The corporate veil. The other justices disagreed with this analysis and as Alan Dignam and Peter Oh have argued this has made it extremely difficult for subsequent judges to interpret lifting/piercing precedent. However it is still very rare for English courts to lift the veil. The liability of the company is generally attributed to the company alone. Because limited liability generally prevents shareholders, directors or employees from being sued,
27135-460: The council for compulsory purchase of its business, which it could not have done without showing an address on the premises that its subsidiary possessed. Similar approaches to treating corporate "groups" or a " concern " as single economic entities exist in many continental European jurisdictions. This is done for tax and accounting purposes in English law, however for general civil liability broadly
27336-517: The dealing of the agent; for the safety of mankind requires that no agent shall be able to put his principal to the danger of such an inquiry as that. James LJ, Parker v McKenna (1874-75) LR 10 Ch App 96, 124-125 The purpose of the no conflict rule is to ensure directors carry out their tasks like it was their own interest at stake. Beyond corporate opportunities, the law requires directors accept no benefits from third parties under section 176, and also has specific regulation of transactions by
27537-474: The default right to start litigation, but the interest a minority shareholder had was seen as relative to the wishes of the majority. Aggrieved minorities could not, in general, sue. Only if the alleged wrongdoers were themselves in control, as directors or majority shareholder, would the courts allow an exception for a minority shareholder to derive the right from the company to launch a claim. In practice very few derivative claims were successfully brought, given
27738-465: The desired proportion. An "SE" can have no fewer employee participation rights than what existed before, but for a UK company, there is likely to have been no participation in any case. In the 1977 Report of the committee of inquiry on industrial democracy the Government proposed, in line with the new German Codetermination Act 1976 , and mirroring an EU Draft Fifth Company Law Directive , that
27939-422: The detriment of creditors other than the bank. It was prohibited from 1929. The prohibition remains in regard to public companies, however the Companies Act 1981 relaxed the restrictions and the Companies Act 2006 section 678, following various sources of academic criticism, repealed the prohibition for private companies altogether. It became possible to " take private " a public company (on its purchase, change
28140-477: The directors of a bankrupt company argued that they had been unaware that dividend payments they paid themselves were unlawful (as there had not in fact been profits) because their tax advisers had said it was okay. The Court of Appeal held that ignorance of the law was not a defence. A contravention existed so long as one ought to have known of the facts that show a dividend would contravene the law. Directors can similarly be liable for breach of duty, and so to restore
28341-462: The duty of care in section 174 applies to the decision-making process of a director having regard to the factors listed in section 172, so it remains theoretically possible to challenge a decision if made without any rational basis. Only registered shareholders, not other stakeholders without being members of the general meeting, have standing to claim any breach of the provision. But section 172's criteria are useful as an aspirational standard because in
28542-546: The east of the Cape of Good Hope . Corporations at this time would essentially act on the government's behalf, bringing in revenue from its exploits abroad. Subsequently, the company became increasingly integrated with British military and colonial policy, just as most UK corporations were essentially dependent on the British navy's ability to control trade routes on the high seas . "The directors of such companies, however, being
28743-464: The election of members of the boards of directors, and binding votes on decisions about individual employment rights, like dismissals, working time and social facilities or accommodation. At board level, UK company law , in principle, allows any measure of employee participation, alongside shareholders, but voluntary measures have been rare outside employee share schemes that usually carry very little voice and increase employees' financial risk. Crucially,
28944-405: The event of contractual breach , the default position for companies can be switched back so that shareholders or directors do agree to pay off all debts. If a company's investors do not do this, so their limited liability is not "contracted around", their assets will (generally) be protected from claims of creditors. The assets are beyond reach behind the metaphorical "veil of incorporation". While
29145-636: The existing non-prescriptive approach to corporate governance: "comply or explain". Yet he advocated more provisions with more stringent criteria for the board composition and evaluation of independent directors. He wanted to remove some of the discretion that the Code allowed. Higgs viewed the earlier scandals, which led to the Cadbury Report could have been avoided had a Code been in place. The Robert Maxwell debacle could have been avoided in his view because many firms already refused to deal with him, and disclosure of his company's governance practices would have led to more pressure for change. In December 2009,
29346-403: The first cases showed the courts remaining conservative. In other respects the law remains the same. According to Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) , minority shareholders will be indemnified for the costs of a derivative claim by the company, even if it ultimately fails. While derivative claims mean suing in the company's name, a minority shareholder can sue in her own name in four ways. The first
29547-452: The general principle that in this Court no agent in the course of his agency, in the matter of his agency, can be allowed to make any profit without the knowledge and consent of his principal; that that rule is an inflexible rule, and must be applied inexorably by this Court, which is not entitled, in my judgment, to receive evidence, or suggestion, or argument as to whether the principal did or did not suffer any injury in fact by reason of
29748-429: The general relative rights and duties of shareholders, employees and directors in terms of administration and accountability, corporate finance concerns how the monetary or capital stake of shareholders and creditors are mediated, given the risk that the business may fail and become insolvent . Companies can fund their operations either through debt (i.e. loans) or equity (i.e. shares). In return for loans, typically from
29949-542: The government's Bullock Report proposed reform to allow employees to participate in selecting the board of directors , as was happening across Europe, exemplified by the German Codetermination Act 1976 . However the UK never implemented the reforms, and from 1979 the debate shifted. Although making directors more accountable to employees was delayed, the Cork Report led to stiffer sanctions in
30150-555: The great growth in the size of companies, the old relationship, which really grew out of the idea of partnership, where individual owners were closely concerned themselves with the management, has largely disappeared in modern company structure. The growth of groups or chains of companies, which make the true economic entity rather than the company itself, where we get a whole complex of companies operating together—that factor has still further divorced management from ownership. This now well-developed tendency is, in fact, practically ignored by
30351-415: The internal company rules, so long as the mandatory minimum rights of investors under its legislation are complied with. Company law, or corporate law , can be broken down into two main fields, corporate governance and corporate finance . Corporate governance in the UK mediates the rights and duties among shareholders, employees, creditors and directors. Since the board of directors habitually possesses
30552-476: The last forty years. Institutional investors, who deal with other people's money, are bound by fiduciary obligations, deriving from the law of trusts and obligations to exercise care deriving from the common law . The Stewardship Code 2010, drafted by the Financial Reporting Council (the corporate governance watchdog), reinforces the duty on institutions to actively engage in governance affairs by disclosing their voting policy, voting record and voting. The aim
30753-533: The legal capital. It is generally the decision of the board of directors, affirmed by a shareholder resolution, whether to declare a dividend or perhaps simply retain the earnings and invest them back into the business to grow and expand. The calculation of companies' assets and liabilities, losses and profits, will follow the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles in the UK, but this is not an objective, scientific process:
30954-577: The management of the affairs of such a company. It is upon this account, that joint-stock companies for foreign trade have seldom been able to maintain the competition against private adventurers." A Smith , An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) Book V, ch 1, §107 A similar chartered company , the South Sea Company , was established in 1711 to trade in
31155-493: The managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master's honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in
31356-442: The members' register. It is also possible to be a shareholder without being a member immediately. It is standard practice that shareholders have one vote per share, but occasionally shareholders (particularly those with preferential dividend rights) do not have votes, and debt holders and others may have votes without having shares. It is even possible for creditors to contract to be subordinated behind shareholders in insolvency – it
31557-421: The money wrongfully paid away, if they failed to take reasonable care. Legal capital must be maintained (not distributed to shareholders, or distributed "in disguise") unless a company formally reduces its legal capital. Then it can make distributions, which might be desirable if a company wishes to shrink. A private company must have a 75 per cent vote of the shareholders, and the directors must then warrant that
31758-480: The motive of protecting the South Sea Company from competition) prohibited the establishment of any companies without a Royal Charter. The share price rose so rapidly that people began buying shares merely in order to sell them at a higher price. By inflating demand this in turn led to higher share prices. The "South Sea bubble" was the first speculative bubble the country had seen, but by the end of 1720,
31959-409: The need to act fairly between members, and a range of other " stakeholders ", such as employees, suppliers, the environment, the general community, and creditors. Many groups objected to this "enlightened shareholder value " model, which in form elevated the interests of members, who are invariably shareholders, above other stakeholders. However, the duty is particularly difficult to sue upon since it
32160-559: The old case of Carlen v Drury , "This Court is not required on every Occasion to take the Management of every Playhouse and Brewhouse in the Kingdom." If there were disagreements between the directors and shareholders about whether to pursue a claim, this was thought to be a question best left for the rules of internal management in a company's constitution, since litigation could legitimately be seen as costly or distracting from doing
32361-499: The option to become a community interest company . Public companies are the predominant business vehicle in the UK economy. While far less numerous than private companies, they employ the overwhelming mass of British workers and turn over the greatest share of wealth. Public companies can offer shares to the public, must have a minimum capital of £50,000, must allow free transferability of its shares, and typically (as most big public companies will be listed) will follow requirements of
32562-423: The power to manage the business under a company constitution, a central theme is what mechanisms exist to ensure directors' accountability. UK law is "shareholder friendly" in that shareholders , to the exclusion of employees , typically exercise sole voting rights in the general meeting. The general meeting holds a series of minimum rights to change the company constitution, issue resolutions and remove members of
32763-479: The price of a fixed annual interest repayment. Sophisticated lenders, such as banks typically contract for a security interest over the assets of a company, so that in the event of default on loan repayments they may seize the company's property directly to satisfy debts. Creditors are also, to some extent, protected by courts' power to set aside unfair transactions before a company goes under, or recoup money from negligent directors engaged in wrongful trading . If
32964-877: The primary examples of corporations. In 1612, Sir Edward Coke remarked in the Case of Sutton's Hospital , the Corporation itself is onely in abstracto , and resteth onely in intendment and consideration of the Law ; for a Corporation aggregate of many is invisible , immortal , & resteth only in intendment and consideration of the Law; and therefore it cannot have predecessor nor successor. They may not commit treason , nor be outlawed, nor excommunicate , for they have no souls , neither can they appear in person, but by Attorney . A Corporation aggregate of many cannot do fealty , for an invisible body cannot be in person, nor can swear, it
33165-479: The problems, investors in the UK, enticed by company promoters ' extravagant promises of profit, bought thousands of shares. By 1717, the South Sea Company was so wealthy (still having done no real business) that it assumed the public debt of the UK government. This accelerated the inflation of the share price further, as did the Royal Exchange and London Assurance Corporation Act 1719 , which (possibly with
33366-421: The purchase. The duty of directors to avoid any possibility of a conflict of interest also exists after a director ceases employment with a company, so it is not permissible to resign and then take up a corporate opportunity, present or maturing, even though no longer officially a "director". I do not think it is necessary, but it appears to me very important, that we should concur in laying down again and again
33567-736: The purpose of the legislation should be fulfilled regardless of the existence of a corporate form. For example, in Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co (Great Britain) Ltd , the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 said that trading with any person of "enemy character" would be an offence. So even though the Continental Tyre Co Ltd was a "legal person" incorporated in the UK (and therefore British) its directors and shareholders were German (and therefore enemies, while
33768-451: The reasoning in Jones v Lipman , the Court of Appeal emphasised that the US subsidiary had been set up for a lawful purpose of creating a group structure overseas, and had not aimed to circumvent liability in the event of asbestos litigation. The potentially unjust result for tort victims, who are unable to contract around limited liability and may be left only with a worthless claim against
33969-424: The register at Companies House . In general, if a third party acts in good faith , then any contract, even one going beyond the constitutional authority of the director or employee with whom they strike a deal, is valid. However, if it would appear to a reasonable person that a company employee would not have the authority to enter an agreement, then the contract is voidable at the company's instance so long as there
34170-490: The requirement on companies to specify an objects clause for their business, for instance "to make and sell, or lend on hire, railway-carriages". If companies acted outside their objects, for instance by giving a loan to build railways in Belgium, any such contracts were said to be ultra vires and consequently void. This is what happened in the early case of Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co Ltd v Riche . The policy
34371-414: The requirement, say, to shareholder approval. If such a self dealing transaction has already taken place, directors still have a duty to disclose their interest and failure to do so is a criminal offence, subject to a £5000 fine. While such regulation through disclosure hovers with a relatively light touch, self dealing rules become more onerous as transactions become more significant. Shareholder approval
34572-534: The returns on shares. Historically, institutions have often not voted or participated in general meetings on their beneficiaries' behalf, and often display an uncritical pattern of supporting management. Under the Pensions Act 2004 sections 241 to 243 require that pension fund trustees are elected or appointed to be accountable to the beneficiaries of the fund, while the Companies Act 2006 section 168 ensures that directors are accountable to shareholders. However,
34773-515: The right to change the company's constitution with a three quarter majority vote, unless they have chosen to entrench the constitution with a higher threshold. Shareholders with support of 5 per cent of the total vote can call meetings , and can circulate suggestions for resolutions with support of 5 per cent of the total vote, or any one hundred other shareholders holding over £100 in shares each. Categories of important decisions, such as large asset sales, approval of mergers, takeovers, winding up of
34974-561: The road to the initial iteration of the code was the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992. Produced by a committee chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury , the Report was a response to major corporate scandals associated with governance failures in the UK. The committee was formed in 1991 after Polly Peck , a major UK company, went insolvent after years of falsifying financial reports. Initially limited to preventing financial fraud, when BCCI and Robert Maxwell scandals took place, Cadbury's remit
35175-586: The role of institutional investors for the Treasury, whose principles were also found in the Combined Code. Shortly following the collapse of Northern Rock and the Financial Crisis , the Walker Review produced a report focused on the banking industry, but also with recommendations for all companies. In 2010, a new Stewardship Code was issued by the Financial Reporting Council , along with
35376-675: The rule still followed is that in Adams v Cape Industries plc . In 2013 in Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34 the UK Supreme Court returned to the issue of veil lifting/piercing. In an unusual sitting of seven Justices, indicating the importance of the case, they declined to lift the veil in family law preferring instead to utilise trust law. In reaching that decision Lords Sumption and Neuberger set out principles of evasion and concealment to assist in determining when to lift/pierce
35577-485: The rules of contract , equity and fiduciary duty that operate between asset managers and the real capital investors have not been codified. Government reports have suggested, and case law requires, that asset managers follow the instructions about voting rights from investors in pooled funds according to the proportion of their investment, and follow instructions entirely when investors have separate accounts. Some institutional investors have been found to work "behind
35778-478: The same effect as a reduction of capital. Originally it was prohibited by the common law, but now although the general rule remains in section 658 there are two exceptions. First, a company may issue shares on terms that they may be redeemed, though only if there is express authority in the constitution of a public company, and the re-purchase can only be made from distributable profits. Second, since 1980 shares can simply be bought back from shareholders if, again this
35979-490: The same fundamental features. Over the 20th century, companies in the UK became the dominant organisational form of economic activity, which raised concerns about how accountable those who controlled companies were to those who invested in them. The first reforms following the Great Depression, in the Companies Act 1948 , ensured that directors could be removed by shareholders with a simple majority vote . In 1977,
36180-538: The same goal, such as allowing creditors to contract for guarantees. This led a large number of businesses in countries with minimum capital rules, like France and Germany, to begin incorporating as a UK " Ltd ". France abolished its minimum capital requirement for the SARL in 2003, and Germany created a form of GmbH without minimum capital in 2008. However, while the Second Company Law Directive
36381-440: The same way as any other contract, or a piece of legislation, mindful of the context in which it was formulated. So in this case, the appropriate construction of a company's articles led to the implication that a director could be removed from office by shareholders (and did not have a job for life), even though a literal construction would have meant no person possessed the two classes of shares required to remove that director under
36582-402: The same. In particular, while no ordinary shareholder should lose shares disproportionately, it has been held legitimate to cancel preferential shares before others, particularly if those shares are entitled to preferential payment as a way of considering "the position of the company itself as an economic entity". Economically, companies buying their own shares back from shareholders would achieve
36783-532: The scenes" to achieve corporate governance objectives through informal but direct communication with management, although an increasing concern developed after the 2007–2008 financial crisis that asset managers and all financial intermediaries face structural conflicts of interest and should be banned from voting on other people's money entirely. Individual shareholders form an increasingly small part of total investments, while foreign investment and institutional investor ownership have grown their share steadily over
36984-674: The separation of powers found in the company constitution. Though older cases raise an element of uncertainty, the majority opinion is that other provisions of a company's constitution generate personal rights that may be enforced by company members individually. Of the most important is a member's right to vote at meetings. Votes need not necessarily attach to shares, as preferential shares (e.g., those with extra dividend rights) are frequently non-voting. However, ordinary shares invariably do have votes and in Pender v Lushington Lord Jessel MR stated votes were so sacrosanct as to be enforceable like
37185-414: The share registers of public companies on the London Stock Exchange , are mainly asset managers and they infrequently exercise their governance rights. In turn, asset managers take money from other institutional investors , particularly pension funds , mutual funds and insurance funds , own most shares. Thousands or perhaps millions of persons, particularly through pensions , are beneficiaries from
37386-469: The share value. For losses reflective of the company's, only a derivative claim may be brought. The second is to show that a company's articles were amended in an objectively unjustifiably and directly discriminatory fashion. This residual protection for minorities was developed by the Court of Appeal in Allen v Gold Reefs of West Africa Ltd , where Sir Nathaniel Lindley MR held that shareholders may amend
37587-472: The shareholders. After that, the capital can be spent. This is a largely irrelevant sum for almost any public company, and although the first Companies Acts required it, since 1862 there has been no similar provision for a private company. Nevertheless, a number of EU member states kept minimum capital rules for their private companies, until recently. In 1999, in Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen
37788-425: The vague aspiration that it "might" was not enough here: there was no concrete assurance or promise given, and so no unfairness in Mr Phillips' recanting. Unfair prejudice in this sense is an action not well suited to public companies, when the alleged obligations binding the company were potentially undisclosed to public investors in the constitution, since this would undermine the principle of transparency. However it
37989-587: Was chairman and managing director of ICI plc , chaired a third committee. The ensuing Hampel Report suggested that all the Cadbury and Greenbury principles be consolidated into a "Combined Code". It added that, It rejected the idea that had been touted that the UK should follow the German two-tier board structure, or reforms in the EU Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law. A further mini-report
38190-407: Was chosen by the company itself. Every share, therefore, is still required to have a nominal value and shares cannot be sold at a price lower. In practice this has meant companies always set nominal values so low below the issue price, that the actual market price at which a share ends up being traded is very unlikely to plummet so far. This has led to the criticism for at least 60 years that the rule
38391-412: Was emphasised by Cadbury that there was no such thing as "one size fits all". In 1994, the principles were appended to the Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange , and it was stipulated that companies need not comply with the principles, but had to explain to the stock market why not if they did not. Before long, a further committee chaired by chairman of Marks & Spencer Sir Richard Greenbury
38592-404: Was expanded to corporate governance generally. Hence the final report covered financial, auditing and corporate governance matters, and made the following three basic recommendations: These recommendations were initially highly controversial, although they did no more than reflect the contemporary "best practice", and urged that these practices be spread across listed companies. At the same time it
38793-458: Was first introduced in the wrongful trading provision from the Insolvency Act 1986 , and applied in Re D'Jan of London Ltd . The liquidator sought to recover compensation from Mr D'Jan, who failing to read an insurance policy form, did not disclose he was previously the director of an insolvent company. The policy was void when the company's warehouse burnt down. Hoffmann LJ held Mr D'Jan's failure
38994-439: Was interested in preventing share sales to outside parties. This slim set of protections for minority shareholders was, until 1985, complemented only by a third, and drastic right of a shareholder, now under the Insolvency Act 1986 section 122(1)(g), to show it is "just and equitable" for a company to be liquidated. In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd , Lord Wilberforce held that a court would use its discretion to wind up
39195-410: Was introduced by the Companies Act 1985 . Now under the Companies Act 2006 section 996, a court can grant any remedy, but will often simply require that a minority shareholder's interest is bought out by the majority at a fair value. The cause of action, stated in section 994, is very broad. A shareholder must simply allege they have been prejudiced (i.e. their interests as a member have been harmed) in
39396-667: Was negligent, but exercised discretion to relieve liability on the ground that he owned almost all of his small business and had only put his own money at risk. The courts emphasise that they will not judge business decisions unfavourably with the benefit of hindsight, however simple procedural failures of judgment will be vulnerable. Cases under the Company Director Disqualification Act 1986 , such as Re Barings plc (No 5) show that directors will also be liable for failing to adequately supervise employees or have effective risk management systems, as where
39597-572: Was produced the following year by the Turnbull Committee which recommended directors be responsible for internal financial and auditing controls. A number of other reports were issued through the next decade, particularly including the Higgs review , from Derek Higgs focusing on what non-executive directors should do, and responding to the problems thrown up by the collapse of Enron in the US. Paul Myners also completed two major reviews of
39798-745: Was set up as a 'study group' on executive compensation . It responded to public anger, and some vague statements by the Prime Minister John Major that regulation might be necessary, over spiralling executive pay , particularly in public utilities that had been privatised . In July 1995 the Greenbury Report was published. This recommended some further changes to the existing principles in the Cadbury Code: Greenbury recommended that progress be reviewed every three years and so in 1998 Sir Ronald Hampel , who
39999-563: Was the first country to draft modern corporation statutes, where through a simple registration procedure any investors could incorporate, limit liability to their commercial creditors in the event of business insolvency , and where management was delegated to a centralised board of directors . An influential model within Europe, the Commonwealth and as an international standard setter, UK law has always given people broad freedom to design
40200-481: Was thought to protect shareholders and creditors, whose investments or credit would not be used for an unanticipated purpose. However, it soon became clear that the ultra vires rule restricted the flexibility of businesses to expand to meet market opportunities. Void contracts might unexpectedly and arbitrarily hinder business, so companies began to draft ever longer objects clauses, often adding an extra provision stating all objects must be construed as fully separate, or
40401-459: Was whether the services or assets accepted were in fact as valuable to the company as the cash share price otherwise would be. At common law, In re Wragg Ltd said that any exchange that was "honestly and not colourably" agreed to, between the company and the purchaser of shares, would be presumed legitimate. Later on it was also held that if the assets given were probably understood by both parties to have been insufficient, then this would count as
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