American intervention 1965
95-840: 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations Combat Skyspot was the ground-directed bombing (GDB) operation of the Vietnam War by the United States Air Force using Bomb Directing Centrals and by the United States Marine Corps using Course Directing Centrals (" MSQ-77 and TPQ-10 ground radars"). Combat Skyspot's command guidance of B-52s and tactical fighters and bombers—"chiefly flown by F-100's "—at night and poor weather
190-696: A U.S. Special Forces border outpost at Lộc Ninh , in Bình Long Province . This attack sparked a ten-day battle that drew in elements of the U.S. 1st Infantry Division and the ARVN 18th Division and left 800 PAVN troops dead at its conclusion. The most severe of what came to be known as "the Border Battles" erupted during October and November around Dak To , another border outpost in Kon Tum Province . The clashes there between
285-567: A U.S. bombing raid on COSVN after having been evacuated from Cambodia. After cementing their position during the Party crackdown, the militants sped up planning for a major conventional offensive to break the military deadlock. They concluded that the Saigon government and the U.S. presence were so unpopular with the population of the South that a broad-based attack would spark a spontaneous uprising of
380-449: A compromise: The CIA would drop its insistence on including the irregulars in the final tally of forces and add a prose addendum to the estimate that would explain the agency's position. George Allen, Carver's deputy, laid responsibility for the agency's capitulation at the feet of Richard Helms , the director of the CIA. He believed that "it was a political problem ... [Helms] didn't want
475-615: A conventional conflict might draw China in, as had happened in the Korean War . They also resisted the idea of negotiating with the allies. Moscow, on the other hand, advocated negotiations, but simultaneously armed Hanoi's forces to conduct a conventional war on the Soviet model. North Vietnamese foreign policy therefore consisted of maintaining a critical balance between war policy, internal and external policies, domestic adversaries, and foreign allies with "self-serving agendas." To "break
570-609: A countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces. Concurrently, a propaganda offensive to induce ARVN troops to desert and the South Vietnamese population to rise up against the government would be launched. If outright victory was not achieved, the battle might still lead to the creation of a coalition government and the withdrawal of the Americans. If the general offensive failed to achieve these purposes, follow-up operations would be conducted to wear down
665-406: A dawning realization that if current trends continued, Hanoi would eventually lack the resources necessary to affect the military situation in the South. As a result, there were more strident calls by the moderates for negotiations and a revision of strategy. They felt that a return to guerrilla tactics was more appropriate since the U.S. could not be defeated conventionally. They also complained that
760-668: A major North Vietnamese military buildup. In addition to captured documents (a copy of Resolution 13 , for example, was captured by early October), observations of enemy logistical operations were also quite clear: in October, the number of trucks observed heading south through Laos on the Hồ Chí Minh Trail jumped from the previous monthly average of 480 to 1,116. By November this total reached 3,823 and, in December, 6,315. On 20 December, Westmoreland cabled Washington that he expected
855-423: A preliminary phase, during which diversionary attacks would be launched in the border areas of South Vietnam to draw American attention and forces away from the cities. The general offensive and uprising would then commence with simultaneous actions on major allied bases and most urban areas, and with particular emphasis on the cities of Saigon and Huế. Concurrently, a substantial threat would have to be made against
950-419: A protracted war of attrition". In May, MACV attempted to obtain a compromise from the CIA by maintaining that VC militias did not constitute a fighting force but were essentially low-level fifth columnists used for information collection. With the groups deadlocked, George Carver, CIA Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, represented the CIA in the last stage of the negotiations. In September, Carver devised
1045-553: A rapid and precise automatic analog computer suitable for detailed simulation of guided missiles". The contract's Task Order III on June 12, 1947, required Reeves provide "a simulation laboratory, the Project Cyclone Laboratory, which was to be operated by the Reeves Analysis and Computer Group." Reeves built the lab's original Reeves Electronic Analog Computers in 1947, and a new computing lab of REACs
SECTION 10
#17327721549071140-611: A series of coups had characterized the preceding years. Protests, campaigning and the atmosphere of elections were interpreted by the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam and Lê Duẩn as signs that the population would embrace a 'general uprising' against the government of South Vietnam. The Politburo sought to exploit perceived instability and maintain political weakness in South Vietnam. During late 1967,
1235-411: A small target such as by Commando Nail forward air controller , e.g., to "hit a couple bull dozers … The Fac would say [you got him pause nope he's back on the dozer, move your coordinates to the adjusted location]… It took 4 F-4 strikes to knock it out." "On 22 December 1968, RF-4Cs from the 12 and 16 TRS began flying bomb damage assessment missions to evaluate" Skyspot accuracy. Commando Club
1330-480: A target for plotting its coordinates. As with " loran -controlled photography" for target geolocation, Skyspot was also used for surveying during 'recce escort' missions, e.g., for Commando Club calibration with an RF-4C reconnaissance jet taking high speed target photos during a "Run for the Roses" ("almost guaranteed to produce copious SAM firings"). Interdiction occasionally used Skyspot to walk subsequent bombs onto
1425-529: A very public debate over military strategy took place in print and via radio between Thanh and his rival for military power, Giáp. Giáp had advocated a defensive, primarily guerrilla strategy against the U.S. and South Vietnam. Thanh's position was that Giáp and his adherents were centered on their experiences during the First Indochina War and that they were too "conservative and captive to old methods and past experience... mechanically repeating
1520-582: A wholly owned subsidiary of … Claude Neon , Inc." on April 15, 1955, when the former merged into Dynamics Corporation of America ; and on January 20, 1956, the other Reeves division of Neon—Reeves-Ely Laboratories, Inc.--also merged into Dynamics. In 1958, RICO moved production to its Roosevelt Field plant on East Gate Blvd in Garden City, New York . In the early 1960s, the Reeves AN/MSQ-35 Bomb Scoring Central
1615-448: A winter-spring offensive during 1968 had begun in early 1967 and continued until early the following year. According to American sources, there has been an extreme reluctance among Vietnamese historians to discuss the decision-making process that led to the general offensive and uprising , even decades after the event. In official Vietnamese literature, the decision to launch the Tet offensive
1710-610: Is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, Tết Nguyên Đán , with the offense chosen during a holiday period as most ARVN personnel were on leave. The purpose of the wide-scale offensive by the Hanoi Politburo was to trigger political instability in a belief that mass armed assault on urban centers would trigger defections and rebellions . The offensive was launched prematurely in
1805-407: The 1967 South Vietnamese presidential election , looked increasingly stable. Rivalries between South Vietnam's generals were becoming less chaotic, and Thiệu and Kỳ formed a joint ticket for the election. Despite efforts by North Vietnam to disrupt elections, higher than usual turnouts saw a political turning point towards a more democratic structure and ushered in a period of political stability after
1900-639: The Battle of Route 602 . "On 21 February the [Laos] Ambassador authorized the Local Area Defense Commander (alternately the senior CIA officer or the FAC) to use the TSQ radar to direct any and all strikes within 12 kilometers of the summit" and "between the 20th and 29th, 342 sorties hit within 30 kilometers of Phou Phathi." Commando Club operations during the Battle of Route 602 were part of
1995-521: The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The intense shelling (100–150 rounds per day) prompted Westmoreland to launch Operation Neutralize , an intense aerial bombardment campaign of 4,000 sorties into and just north of the DMZ. On 27 October, an ARVN battalion at Sông Bé , the capital of Phước Long Province , came under attack by an entire PAVN regiment. Two days later, another PAVN regiment attacked
SECTION 20
#17327721549072090-512: The People's Republic of China and called for the reunification of the nation by military means and that no negotiations should be undertaken with the Americans. This group was led by Communist Party First Secretary Lê Duẩn and Lê Đức Thọ (no relation). From the early to mid-1960s, the militants had dictated the direction of the war in South Vietnam. General Nguyễn Chí Thanh , the head of Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), headquarters for
2185-537: The United States . The corporation was the Project Cyclone laboratory operator for simulation of guided missiles, and RICO developed several Strategic Air Command combination (radar/computer/communications) systems ("Q" systems). Reeves was originally "Hudson American…just a little bit before the end of D-Day " and in 1946 Reeves Sound Laboratory , a division of Reeves-Ely Laboratories (R.E.L.),
2280-794: The 1043rd Radar Evaluation Squadron performing AN/TSQ-81 operations as Lockheed civilians (volunteers discharged from the USAF for cover). Due to limited reliability of the AN/TSQ-81 radios, an intermediary aircraft ( EC-121 or "usually a C-135 …decoy ship") provided a " radio relay [and] surveillance/control channel" (callsign: WAGER) between the radar and the bomber. The LS-85 radar with callsign "Wager Control" at 396.2 MHz and day/night shift crews of 5 men each became operational on November 1, 1967; and trial missions by Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs were led by Col. John C. Giraudo ( 355th Fighter Wing commander). F-105 Commando Club missions included
2375-610: The 14th Plenary session of the Party Central Committee in January 1968. The resultant Resolution 14 was a major blow to domestic opposition and "foreign obstruction". Concessions had been made to the center group, however, by agreeing that negotiations were possible, but the document essentially centered on the creation of "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a decisive victory in the shortest time possible." Contrary to Western belief, Giáp did not plan or command
2470-582: The American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. The American public, "more confused than convinced, more doubtful than despairing ... adopted a 'wait and see' attitude." During a discussion with an interviewer from Time magazine, Westmoreland dared the communists to launch an attack: "I hope they try something because we are looking for a fight." Planning in Hanoi for
2565-554: The Americans would win the war. There was a discrepancy, however, between the order of battle estimates of the MACV and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concerning the strength of VC guerrilla forces within South Vietnam. In September, members of the MACV intelligence services and the CIA met to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate that would be used by the administration to gauge U.S. success in
2660-816: The B-52D sorties flown" from July-December 1966, in January 1967, and in March 1967. Similar to the lead bomber for 3-ship B-52 missions, a North American F-100 Super Sabres could use Skyspot to act as a pathfinder for Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs . On July 3, 1966, "24-hour all-weather bombing [was] authorized against targets in Laos [using] MSQ-77 ground director bombing system (SKY SPOT)" and on July 5, " Quick Run " began with Skyspot airstrikes where " MACV could request priority targeting resulting in B-52D missions diverted from their primary targets prior to take off or after takeoff". In addition to Arc Light B-52 airstrikes, Skyspot
2755-508: The Communist Party militants. For the moderates and centrists, it offered the prospect of negotiations and a possible end to the American bombing of the North. Only in the eyes of the militants, therefore, did the offensive become a "go for broke" effort. Others in the Politburo were willing to settle for a much less ambitious "victory". The PAVN official history states that the objectives of
2850-680: The January–February 1968 offensive, but it can also include the so-called " Mini-Tet " offensive that took place in May and the Phase III offensive in August, or the 21 weeks of unusually intense combat that followed the initial attacks in January. Leading up to the Tet Offensive were years of marked political instability and a series of coups after the 1963 South Vietnamese coup . In 1966,
2945-703: The Kim Lo Army Barracks northwest of Hanoi on February 7, 1968, a Route Pack V target on February 11, and the "Phuc Yen (JCS 6) airfield" & "the Ban Nakay truck park in Northern Laos" on February 19. Arc Light B-52s and other aircraft also flew missions of Commando Club, which were 20% (less than 1 per day) of all bombing missions on North Vietnam targets during November 1 – March 10. Commando Club airstrikes against Laos targets included operations to interdict enemy advances on LS-85 such as
Combat Skyspot - Misplaced Pages Continue
3040-1285: The LS-85 battle were identified in 2005 & 2012. The Combat Skyspot Memorial on Andersen Air Force Base , Guam, identifies personnel killed in Southeast Asia (its AN/MSQ-77 antenna was destroyed by a typhoon c. 2007 ). Tet Offensive In Phase One: [REDACTED] South Vietnam: 4,954 killed 15,917 wounded 926 missing [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Others: 4,124 killed 19,295 wounded 604 missing Total casualties in Phase One : 45,820 casualties: In Phase One: RVN/U.S. claimed: One PAVN source (Saigon only): Phase One, Phase Two and Phase Three : Trần Văn Trà reports (Phase One and Two): 75,000+ killed and wounded PAVN source (total for 3 phases): 111,179 casualties: American intervention 1965 1966 1967 Tet Offensive and aftermath Vietnamization 1969–1971 1972 Post- Paris Peace Accords (1973–1974) Spring 1975 Air operations Naval operations Lists of allied operations The Tet Offensive
3135-476: The North Vietnamese had done was carry out the first stage of their plan: to fix the attention of the U.S. command on the borders and draw the bulk of U.S. forces away from the heavily populated coastal lowlands and cities. Westmoreland was more concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine garrison. MACV
3230-518: The November 15, 1967, 357th Tactical Fighter Squadron bombing of Yên Bái Air Base in Route Package 5 ("no BDA possible") and the defeated November 18 raid of 16 F-105s of the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing —preceded by 4 F-105 Wild Weasels —on Phúc Yên Air Base (JCS Target 6). The latter mission's loss of 2 Wild Weasels to MiGs and then some of the bombers to SAM sites that tracked
3325-531: The PAVN/VC "to undertake an intensified countrywide effort, perhaps a maximum effort, over a relatively short period of time." Despite all the warning signs, however, the allies were still surprised by the scale and scope of the offensive. According to ARVN Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung the answer lay with the allied intelligence methodology itself, which tended to estimate the enemy's probable course of action based upon their capabilities, not their intentions. Since, in
3420-457: The South, was another prominent militant. The followers of the Chinese line centered their strategy against the U.S. and its allies on large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong . By 1966–1967, however, after suffering massive casualties, stalemate on the battlefield, and destruction of the northern economy by U.S. aerial bombing , there was
3515-547: The Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls. Subsequently, the Johnson Administration sought negotiations to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election , Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon encouraged South Vietnamese President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace. The term "Tet offensive" usually refers to
3610-483: The Tet offensive were to: annihilate and cause the total disintegration of the bulk of the puppet army, overthrow the "puppet" (South Vietnamese) regime at all administrative levels, and place all government power in the hands of the people. Annihilate a significant portion of the American military's troop strength and destroy a significant portion of his war equipment in order to prevent the American forces from being able to carry out their political and military missions; on
3705-491: The Thiệu government in the southern press. Launching such an offensive would also finally put an end to what had been described as "dovish calls for talks, criticism of military strategy, Chinese diatribes of Soviet perfidy, and Soviet pressure to negotiate—all of which needed to be silenced." In October, the Politburo decided on the Tet holiday as the launch date and met again in December to reaffirm its decision and formalize it at
3800-457: The U.S. Khe Sanh Combat Base . The Khe Sanh actions would draw PAVN forces away from the offensive into the cities, but Giáp considered them necessary to protect his supply lines and divert American attention. Attacks on other U.S. forces were of secondary, or even tertiary importance, since Giáp considered his main objective to be weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military and government through popular revolt. The offensive, therefore,
3895-617: The U.S. command in Saigon was perplexed by a series of actions initiated by the PAVN/VC in the border regions. On 24 April a U.S. Marine Corps patrol prematurely triggered a PAVN offensive aimed at taking Khe Sanh Combat Base, the western anchor of the Marines' defensive positions in Quảng Trị Province . For 49 days during early September and lasting into October, the PAVN began shelling the U.S. Marine outpost of Con Thien , just south of
Combat Skyspot - Misplaced Pages Continue
3990-593: The U.S. perspective was summed up by an MACV intelligence analyst: "If we'd gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn't have been believed. It wouldn't have been credible to us." The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." Lieutenant Colonel Dave R. Palmer: Current Readings in Military History . From early to late 1967,
4085-511: The USAF jamming resulted in temporary suspension of Commando Club until electronic countermeasures were improved. Through November 16, LS-85 had effected a direct hit (zero miss distance) as well as a 5 mi (8.0 km) miss: the Commando Club CEP for "14 runs was 867 feet" while other Skyspot sites for 1967 missions averaged 300–350 ft (91–107 m) error at ranges ≤100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi). LS-85 accuracy
4180-777: The USAF vacuum-tube trajectory computer/radar system began in early 1965 and in October 1965, F-100s tested the AN/MSQ-77 at Matagorda Island General Bombing and Gunnery Range on the Texas Gulf Coast (the Matagorda training unit was later moved to Bergstrom Air Force Base ). In 1967 a helicopter-transportable variant of the AN/MSQ-77 in rigid shelters ( AN/TSQ-81 ) was developed for Commando Club bombing of northern North Vietnam targets ( Red River Delta ), and in 1969 training for an additional transportable variant with tower-mounted antenna and digital computer ( AN/TSQ-96 )
4275-457: The VC with new AK-47 assault rifles and B-40 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, which granted them superior firepower over the ARVN. To pave the way and to confuse the allies as to its intentions, Hanoi launched a diplomatic offensive. Foreign Minister Trinh announced on 30 December that Hanoi would rather than could open negotiations if the U.S. unconditionally ended Operation Rolling Thunder ,
4370-581: The VC. General Bruce Palmer Jr. , one of Westmoreland's three Field Force commanders, claimed that "the Viet Cong has been defeated" and that "He can't get food and he can't recruit. He has been forced to change his strategy from trying to control the people on the coast to try to survive in the mountains." Westmoreland was even more emphatic in his assertions. At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, he reported that, as of
4465-486: The administration to launch a so-called "success offensive", a concerted effort to alter the widespread public perception that the war had reached a stalemate and to convince the American people that the administration's policies were succeeding. Under the leadership of National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow , the news media then was inundated by a wave of effusive optimism. Every statistical indicator of progress, from "kill ratios" and "body counts" to village pacification,
4560-491: The agency ... contravening the policy interest of the administration." During the second half of 1967 the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. According to public opinion polls, the percentage of Americans who believed that the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967. This trend
4655-467: The aircraft crew by radio (lead aircraft for multi-ship formations) to adjust the flight path toward an eventual release point for the actual bomb(s). Site personnel verbally directed release of the ordnance from the aircraft by voice countdown. This was a manual process requiring training, practice and adherence to procedure. Both the site and aircrew were authorized to "withhold" release at any point if doubt arose. All communications were tape recorded by
4750-567: The aircrew for post strike debriefing. Similar to World War II GDB and Korean War GDB , Combat Skyspot was planned during 1965 development of the Reeves AN/MSQ-77 Bomb Directing Central with a new integrating ballistic computer using vacuum tubes to continually compute the bomb release point during the bomb run (the USMC AN/TPQ-10 directed aircraft to a predetermined release point). Planning for
4845-450: The aircrew to the radar site such as the airspeed/heading for the central to estimate wind speed on the bomb(s). With the bomber near a designated "Initial Point" the GDB site would begin a radar track (Bomb Directing Centrals would calculate a computer track and solve the " bomb problem " for the aircraft position.) For B-52 missions the site personnel verbally transmitted guidance commands to
SECTION 50
#17327721549074940-402: The allied estimation, the communists hardly had the capability to launch such an ambitious enterprise: "There was little possibility that the enemy could initiate a general offensive, regardless of his intentions." The answer could also be partially explained by the lack of coordination and cooperation between competing intelligence branches, both South Vietnamese and American. The situation from
5035-484: The allied intelligence collection apparatus in Saigon. During the late summer and fall of 1967 both South Vietnamese and U.S. intelligence agencies collected clues that indicated a significant shift in communist strategic planning. By mid-December, mounting evidence convinced many in Washington and Saigon that something big was underway. During the last three months of the year intelligence agencies had observed signs of
5130-497: The approximately 400 Commando Club missions out of the "1,472 BARREL ROLL Strike missions " flown "around" LS-85 from November 1 – March 10. Despite the bombing campaign, the enemy reached LS-85 and it was captured during the Battle of Lima Site 85 on March 10/11, 1968. The AN/TSQ-96 at Ubon RTAFB directed the "last Arc Light strike of the Indochinese conflicts…on August 15, 1973", and the last Vietnam War Skyspot mission
5225-478: The attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Huế , intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, the PAVN/VC executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Huế . Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh , fighting continued for two more months. The offensive
5320-497: The basis, crush the American will to commit aggression and force the United States to accept defeat in South Vietnam and end all hostile actions against North Vietnam. In addition, using this as the basis, they would achieve the immediate goals of the revolution, which were independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality in South Vietnam, and then move toward achieving peace and national unification. The operation would involve
5415-676: The bombing campaign against North Vietnam. This announcement provoked a flurry of diplomatic activity (which amounted to nothing) during the last weeks of the year. South Vietnamese and U.S. military intelligence estimated that PAVN/VC forces in South Vietnam during January 1968 totaled 323,000 men, including 130,000 PAVN regulars, 160,000 VC and members of the infrastructure, and 33,000 service and support troops. They were organized into nine divisions composed of 35 infantry and 20 artillery or anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which were, in turn, composed of 230 infantry and six sapper battalions. Signs of impending communist action were noticed among
5510-419: The conflict. Provided with an enemy intelligence windfall accrued during Operations Cedar Falls and Junction City , the CIA members of the group believed that the number of VC guerrillas, irregulars, and cadre within the South could be as high as 430,000. The MACV Combined Intelligence Center, on the other hand, maintained that the number could be no more than 300,000. Westmoreland was deeply concerned about
5605-429: The early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I and II Corps Tactical Zones of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning hours of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; eventually more than 80,000 PAVN/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, five of
5700-407: The economic viability of North Vietnam should come before support of a massive and conventional southern war and they generally followed the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence by reunifying Vietnam through political means. Heading this faction were party theorist Trường Chinh and Minister of Defense Võ Nguyên Giáp . The militant faction, on the other hand, tended to follow the foreign policy line of
5795-425: The end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view." By the end of the year the administration's approval rating had indeed crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of
SECTION 60
#17327721549075890-517: The enemy and lead to a negotiated settlement; Phase II was scheduled to begin on 5 May and Phase III on 17 August. Preparations for the offensive were already underway. The logistical build-up began in mid-year, and by January 1968, 81,000 tons of supplies and 200,000 troops, including seven complete infantry regiments and 20 independent battalions made the trip south on the Ho Chi Minh Trail . This logistical effort also involved re-arming
5985-559: The following month. Thanh was then ordered to the capital to explain his concept in person to the Military Central Commission. At a meeting in July, Thanh briefed the plan to the Politburo. On the evening of 6 July, after receiving permission to begin preparations for the offensive, Thanh attended a party and died of a heart attack after drinking too much. An alternative account is that Thanh died of injuries sustained in
6080-571: The four regiments of the PAVN 1st Division , the U.S. 4th Infantry Division , the 173rd Airborne Brigade and ARVN infantry and Airborne elements, lasted for 22 days. By the time the fighting was over, between 1,200 and 1,600 PAVN and 262 U.S. troops had been killed. MACV intelligence was confused by the possible motives of the North Vietnamese in prompting such large-scale actions in remote regions where U.S. artillery and aerial firepower could be applied indiscriminately, which meant that tactically and strategically, these operations made no sense. What
6175-534: The leadership in South Vietnam, represented by the Head of State Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and Prime Minister Nguyễn Cao Kỳ were persuaded to commit to democratic reforms in an effort to stabilize the political situation at a conference in Honolulu . Prior to 1967, the South Vietnamese constituent assembly was in the process of drafting a new constitution and eventual elections. The political situation in South Vietnam, after
6270-435: The most important reason for loss reduction" (fewer shoot downs), Casualties associated with Combat Skyspot included a Detachment 15 NCO killed in an enemy rocket attack, 6 of a site survey team killed in a 1966 ambush, and the 13 KIA of the Battle of Lima Site 85 . In 1989, remains of an F-4C Weapon System Officer shot down during a November 10, 1967, AN/MSQ-77 bomb run were recovered in Southeast Asia, and US remains from
6365-501: The offensive himself. Thanh's original plan was elaborated on by a party committee headed by Thanh's deputy, Phạm Hùng , and then modified by Giáp. The Defense Minister may have been convinced to toe the line by the arrest and imprisonment of most of the members of his staff during the Revisionist Anti-Communist Party Affair. Although Giáp went to work "reluctantly, under duress", he may have found
6460-517: The past." The arguments over domestic and military strategy also carried a foreign policy element, as North Vietnam, like South Vietnam, was largely dependent on outside military and economic aid. The vast majority of North Vietnam's military equipment was provided by either the Soviet Union or China. Beijing advocated that North Vietnam conduct a protracted war on the Maoist model, fearing that
6555-560: The policy of rejecting negotiations was in error. The Americans could only be worn down in a war of wills during a period of "fighting while talking". During 1967 things had become so bad on the battlefield that Lê Duẩn ordered Thanh to incorporate aspects of protracted guerrilla warfare into his strategy. During the same period, a counter-attack was launched by a new, third grouping (the centrists) led by President Hồ Chí Minh , Lê Đức Thọ, and Foreign Minister Nguyễn Duy Trinh , who called for negotiations. From October 1966 through April 1967,
6650-599: The population, which, if the offensive was successful, would enable the North Vietnamese to sweep to a quick, decisive victory. Their basis for this conclusion included: a belief that the South Vietnamese military was no longer combat-effective; the results of the 1967 presidential election (in which the Thiệu/Kỳ ticket had only received 24 percent of the popular vote); the Buddhist crises of 1963 and 1966 ; well-publicized anti-war demonstrations in Saigon; and continuous criticism of
6745-424: The position of the militants as Hanoi's strategy: the rejection of negotiations, the abandonment of protracted warfare, and the focus on the offensive in the towns and cities of South Vietnam. More arrests followed in November and December. The operational plan for the general offensive and uprising had its origin as the "COSVN proposal" at Thanh's southern headquarters in April 1967 and had then been relayed to Hanoi
6840-401: The possible perceptions of the American public to such an increased estimate since communist troop strength was routinely provided to reporters during press briefings. According to MACV's chief of intelligence, General Joseph A. McChristian , the new figures "would create a political bombshell", since they were positive proof that the North Vietnamese "had the capability and the will to continue
6935-550: The question whether the U.S. strategy of attrition was working in South Vietnam weighed heavily on the minds of the American public and the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson . General William C. Westmoreland , the commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), believed that if a "crossover point" could be reached by which the number of communist troops killed or captured during military operations exceeded those recruited or replaced,
7030-474: The six autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns and the southern capital. The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side up to that point in the war. Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies, causing them to lose control of several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled
7125-435: The station provided bomb run corrections and designated when to release bombs. Planning of Vietnam GDB missions included providing coordinates with 10 m (11 yd) accuracy to the radar sites, handoff of the bomber from air controllers (e.g., a DASC ) to the site, tracking the aircraft by radiating the bomber (e.g., activating the 400 Watt Motorola SST-181 X Band Beacon Transponder ), and radioing of technical data from
7220-410: The task easier due to the fact that he was faced with a fait accompli . Since the Politburo had already approved the offensive, all he had to do was make it work. He combined guerrilla operations into what was basically a conventional military offensive and shifted the burden of sparking the popular uprising to the VC. If it worked, all would be well and good. If it failed, it would be a failure only for
7315-399: The war to admit that the current war strategy required reevaluation. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of
7410-521: The will of their domestic opponents and reaffirm their autonomy vis-à-vis their foreign allies", hundreds of pro-Soviet, party moderates, military officers, and intelligentsia were arrested on 27 July 1967, during what came to be called the Revisionist Anti-Party Affair . All of the arrests were based on the individual's stance on the Politburo's choice of tactics and strategy for the proposed general offensive. This move cemented
7505-553: Was a Combat Skyspot operation for ground-directed bombing of Red River Delta targets ( Hanoi , Haiphong , etc.) out of range of the initial Combat Skyspot sites using a specialized radar emplaced by Heavy Green at one of the Laos Sites of the Vietnam War . The operation also bombed clandestine targets in the neutral Kingdom of Laos (e.g., for self-defense during the Battle of Route 602 ) using Detachment 1 personnel of
7600-689: Was a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War . The Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) launched a surprise attack on 30 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies . It was a campaign of surprise attacks against military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. The name
7695-429: Was a military defeat for North Vietnam, as neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the world broadly. General Westmoreland reported that defeating the PAVN/VC would require 200,000 more American soldiers and activation of the reserves, prompting even loyal supporters of
7790-485: Was aimed at influencing the South Vietnamese public, not that of the U.S. There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended to influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S. According to General Trần Văn Trà , the new military head of COSVN, the offensive was to have three distinct phases: Phase I, scheduled to begin on 30 January, would be
7885-512: Was also from OL-25 (in December 1975 the TSQ-81 that had been at OL-23 was moved near Osan Air Base , Korea.) The AN/MSQ-77 averaged 300–350 ft (91–107 m) error for 1967 missions at ranges ≤100 nmi (190 km; 120 mi), and the AN/TPQ-10 had a CEP of 150 ft (46 m). For Route Package I sorties, the "major increase in high altitude MSQ-77 bombing was probably
7980-551: Was being conducted at the Reeves Instrument Corporation in New York. "In March 1966 the first MSQ-77 arrived at Bien Hoa" Air Base ("activated" April 1 to use the " reverse MSQ method ".) later Udorn RTAFB Combat Skyspot was first used "to support fighting ground troops" on July 2, 1966; and the initial 15,000 Skyspot sorties from March 1966-March 1967 included the respective 35%, 46%, and 54% "of
8075-455: Was billed as a "high-level policy review". Upon their arrival, the two men bolstered the administration's claims of success. From Saigon, pacification chief Robert Komer asserted that the CORDS pacification program in the countryside was succeeding, and that sixty-eight percent of the South Vietnamese population was under the control of Saigon while only seventeen percent was under the control of
8170-935: Was contracted under Task Order III in 1949. "The guided missile simulator of Task Order II was completed in early 1949 [with a] satisfactory demonstration in February 1949 of the guided missile simulator solving a three-dimensional guided missile problem". Early in the Cold War , Reeves developed and tested the AN/USQ-24 ;[ sic ] [AN/MSQ-2A] Bomb Scoring Central, a variant of the MSQ-2 Close Support Control Set developed by Rome Air Development Center . Bomb Scoring Centrals by RICO were used for Radar Bomb Scoring (RBS), as well as Korean War ground-directed bombing (GDB) controlled by TADPOLE sites. "Reeves Instrument Corporation [was]
8265-431: Was convinced that the PAVN planned to stage an attack and overrun the base as a prelude to an all-out effort to seize the two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam. To deter any such possibility, he deployed 250,000 men, including half of MACV's U.S. maneuver battalions, to I Corps. Reeves Instrument Corporation Reeves Instrument Corporation (RICO) was a Cold War manufacturer of computer and radar systems for
8360-488: Was fed to the press and to the Congress . "We are beginning to win this struggle", asserted Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey on NBC 's Today show in mid-November. "We are on the offensive. The territory is being gained. We are making steady progress." At the end of November, the campaign reached its climax when Johnson summoned Westmoreland and the new U.S. Ambassador, Ellsworth Bunker , to Washington, D.C., for what
8455-490: Was fueled not by a belief that the struggle was not worthwhile, but by mounting casualty figures, rising taxes, and the feeling that there was no end to the war in sight. A poll taken in November indicated that 55 percent wanted a tougher war policy, exemplified by the public belief that "it was an error for us to have gotten involved in Vietnam in the first place. But now that we're there, let's win – or get out." This prompted
8550-613: Was improved during the suspension period, another UHF radio was added at the summit, and the radio relay's secondary task of surveilling for MiGs was eliminated. Commando Club was resumed by November 21 when F-105s attacked the Yên Bái airfield (also on December 1 & 23, January 5, & February 11.) LS-85 directing bombings of Laos' Ban Phougnong truck park on December 22, a target "25 miles west of [LS-85's TACAN] Channel 97" on December 28, and "a target 20 miles east of San Neua" December 31; and "Commando Club under Wager Control" bombed
8645-441: Was produced for Strategic Air Command RBS and in 1965, the Reeves AN/MSQ-77 Bomb Directing Central was built for Vietnam War GDB. Reeves also produced a 1967 transportable variant of the vacuum tube AN/MSQ-77, and one of the AN/TSQ-81 variants was destroyed after the Battle of Lima Site 85 in Laos. By the end of the war the vacuum-tube Reeves AN/TSQ-96 Bomb Directing Central with a solid state Univac 1219 B ballistic computer
8740-565: Was researching "advance gunfire control systems and computers; radar and tracking systems; guided missile controls; aircraft control instruments… (Research initiated 1942.)" RICO was awarded the Department of the Navy contract No. N60ori-128 on June 10, 1946, for "development of a guided missile simulator and the operation of a simulation laboratory [for] research and development on guided missile simulation" and "development and construction of
8835-590: Was used against Cambodia targets of Operation Menu from Bien Hoa Air Base and by Operation Niagara . The Combat Skyspot "Operations Order (OPORD) 439–67" was published March 10, 1967; and notable battles using Skyspot include: Skyspot also supported Lockheed AC-130 gunships, BLU-82 /B drops from MC-130 Commando Vault aircraft to clear landing zones, at least 1 helicopter evacuation of wounded on August 13, 1966, and "since many maps of South Vietnam contained distance errors of up to 300 meters", target surveying by tracking an observation aircraft flying circles around
8930-466: Was used for aerial bombing of strategic, close air support, interdiction, and other targets. Using a combination radar/computer/communications system ("Q" system) at operating location in Southeast Asia , a typical bombing mission (e.g., during Operation Arc Light with a "cell" of 3 Boeing B-52 Stratofortresses ) had an air command post turn over control of the mission to the radar station, and
9025-562: Was usually presented as the result of a perceived U.S. failure to win the war quickly, the failure of the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and the anti-war sentiment that pervaded the population of the U.S. The decision to launch the general offensive, however, was much more complicated. The decision signaled the end of a bitter, decade-long debate within the North Vietnamese Government between first two, and then three factions. The moderates believed that
#906093